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## **Whither the Serbian Military after Kosovan Independence?**

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## **Key Points**

\* Kosovo's secession has presented the Serb military with a new dilemma. The military leadership is now uncertain about the future path of military reform.

\* The nature of security sector reform in Serbia depends on its future foreign policy orientation which is likely to be either: a) integration into Euro-Atlantic structures; b) closer cooperation with Russia or c) some as yet undefined third option (probably some form of neutrality).

\* Military reform in Serbia is heavily influenced by day to day politics. In the period since the overthrow of Milošević reform has had to contend with three major obstacles: the dissolution of the State-Union caused by Montenegro's proclamation of independence; the obligation of transferring indicted war criminals to the Hague Tribunal; and lastly, but probably most importantly, the unresolved status of Kosovo.

\* If the nationalists win the May elections the path of Euro-Atlantic integration would be abandoned as well as a large part of the economic and military reforms that have been conducted in accordance with EU and NATO standards in all spheres of society. Closer connection to Russia would be promoted instead and future cooperation and reform are likely to be directed to meet demands of Serbia's new partner.

\* The democrats would most probably continue the process of Euro-Atlantic integration that would include accession to the EU and possibly at a later stage NATO.

# Whither the Serbian Military after Kosovan Independence?

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After the proclamation of independence by Kosovo in February 2008, the Serbian armed forces, as expected, remained in their barracks. The Serb political leadership made clear to the military leadership that there would be no military response to the independence declaration. Serbia decided to tackle this problem by diplomatic and legal means rather than by force. However Kosovo's secession has presented the Serb military with a new dilemma. The military leadership is now uncertain about the future path of military reform.

After the turbulence of the break-up of the Yugoslav federation and the resulting wars, the military leads the way in security sector reform in Serbia. Indeed, it is the only part of the security sector with a clear and publicly stated reform plan. However, the armed forces are still very much influenced by the vagaries of daily politics, which have delayed the reform process.

The armed forces have undergone major changes since 2000. There is in theory now democratic civilian control as prescribed by the Constitution,<sup>1</sup> and by new laws on defence and the armed forces.<sup>2</sup> The size of the military has been considerably reduced. Its structure has been reorganised in accordance with NATO standards.<sup>3</sup> However the professionalisation of the armed forces has yet to be completed; it is scheduled to be completed by 2010.<sup>4</sup> There is as yet neither a National Security Strategy concept, nor a Defence Strategy concept, which would be based on the former. The development of these concepts has to be determined by the Serb political and military leaderships. The nature of these concepts depends on Serbia's future foreign policy orientation which is likely to be either:

- a. Integration into Euro-Atlantic structures;
- b. Closer cooperation with Russia;
- c. Some as yet undefined third option (probably some form of neutrality).

Serbia's closer integration with NATO was very probable until the proclamation of independence by Kosovo. Serbia is a member of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, joining in December 2006. However Kosovan independence has resulted in the Serbian political elite turning away from NATO. It even led to the Serbian parliament's proclamation in December 2007 of neutral status toward "effective military alliances".<sup>5</sup> This statement was actually aimed at the NATO integration process.

Another possible option for the Serb armed forces is that of closer cooperation with Russia. Russia has become more assertive internationally in Vladimir Putin's second presidential term, and the Kremlin intends to revive Russian military power.<sup>6</sup> Russia might be interested in developing closer military ties with Serbia, particularly in light of the identity of views of Moscow and Belgrade over Kosovo, and the development of an important Russo-Serb energy relationship. Some of the

more radical Serb political forces favour a union consisting of Russia, Belarus and Serbia.<sup>7</sup>

The stance which is presently being favoured by the Serbian government is that of military neutrality, along the lines of the neutrality pursued by Sweden, Switzerland, Finland and Austria. There is also interest in the former Yugoslav tradition of non-alignment. There is however little discussion of whether Serbia can be validly compared with these countries.

The aim of this analysis is to indicate the current status of Serbian military reform, the main driving forces that influence this reform, and the major obstacles to it. Before analysing current trends, however, it is necessary to consider the Serbian military legacy.

### **The Heritage Of The Serbian Military**

Serbia's military heritage hinders the reform process. In the Western Balkans the military has always occupied a significant place in society. It is no exaggeration to say that the history of Serbia and the history of its military are one and the same. The break-up of Yugoslavia and the consequent wars confirm this notion.

The current Serbian military, as well as the state itself, was created as a result of the dissolution of the Serbia-Montenegro State-Union in 2006. But this was only the last piece in the puzzle. To go back only a few years, the Serbian military is the successor of the Yugoslav People's Army of the Communist era, the Yugoslav military of the post-communist era and the armed forces of the union of Serbia and Montenegro. As one can easily see, the military has shared in the turmoil endured by Yugoslavia and Serbia since 1990.

After once being the most powerful military in South-Eastern Europe,<sup>8</sup> and the pillar of society,<sup>9</sup> the military found itself in an unenviable position. The country which it supposedly tried to protect fell apart and some of its members committed war crimes on a scale not seen in Europe since the Second World War. The military was used by the Serbian regime for something that destroyed the very essence of its existence – it turned its weapons against its own people. This was a battle the regime could never win.

After this period of being a state within the state, the military started for the first time to share the fate of ordinary people. Many officers had to leave their homes in the newly formed successor states and came to live as refugees in Serbia. Many of them live like that even today. The regime of Slobodan Milošević never trusted the military completely. It had confidence in only a handful of senior generals. The ordinary soldiers were the same young people who demonstrated against the regime in autumn 2000 and who strongly opposed it.

It is therefore unsurprising that the military did not intervene against demonstrating citizens on the eve of the regime's collapse in October 2000, even though the political leadership ordered it to do so. After the deliberate destruction of the Serbian military by enlarging the police and secret services, Milošević could not count on the officers' support. The generals hoped that by not defending Milošević, who was clearly finished, they would be able to keep their positions under the new democratic government. This calculation proved to be right, at least for the Chief of the General Staff Nebojsa Pavković who found a new ally in the newly elected President Vojislav Koštunica.<sup>10</sup>

## The Results Of The Reforms

Military reform is an extremely demanding task. No one from the democratic coalition that succeeded Milošević was very keen to commit themselves to pursuing such a difficult mission. However after years of hard work and several changes in the Ministry of Defence and General Staff there has been significant progress, and the military is now much more reformed than other elements of the Serbian security sector.

The most important change since the downfall of Milošević is the introduction of democratic civilian control over the military. This system of control was first mentioned in the Constitutional Charter of the State-Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003.<sup>11</sup> Once implemented into the legal system of the State-Union, it was transferred to the Serbian Constitution after Montenegro proclaimed independence and Serbia regained its statehood.

Although the General Staff has finally been subordinated to the Ministry of Defence and this Ministry is now only headed by civilians, it is more accurate to say that democratic civilian control over the military exists only on paper. Parliament has been reluctant to exercise the control legally granted to it. In December 2007 the Serbian parliament adopted new laws on defence and on the military. The new Law on the Military increases the number of institutions that can exercise various forms of civilian control over the military. Apart from the Parliament, the Ombudsman and other state apparatuses according to their competency, citizens and the public all have the legal power to exercise some form of civilian control.<sup>12</sup> This amendment was introduced after strong public pressure. It was argued that as citizens are the ultimate holders of the sovereignty in every country, and maybe even more importantly, as the financiers of the security sector, then they should have the right to know how their money is being spent.<sup>13</sup> It can therefore be expected that democratic civilian control over the military will become a more important issue for civil society, even if parliament remains reluctant to exercise its legal powers in this area.

The gradual professionalisation of the armed forces is another important aspect of military reform. The Ministry of Defence in its Strategic Defence Review of 2006 stated that by 2010 the Serbian military would overall have 21,000 volunteers. In the meantime the total size of the armed forces will be steadily reduced. Alongside the downsizing of forces and discarding of obsolete equipment, military structures have been reorganised in accordance with NATO standards.

The General Staff has been reorganised. A Joint Operational Command has been formed, the combat establishment structure will be modular and the organisational structure of the army will be that of battalion-division-squadron. The new structure of the Serbian military will by 2015 comprise 15% officers, 25% NCOs, 45% contract soldiers and 15% civilians. The Strategic Defence Review predicts that the peacetime establishment of the Serbian armed forces will range from around 0.2% to 0.4% of the population. The peacetime and wartime armed forces establishment ratio will be up to 1:3. It is estimated that defence spending will constitute around 2.4% of national GDP.<sup>14</sup>

As a result of the lack of sufficient legislation, the military leadership has sometimes acted on its own initiative. In addition to introducing NATO organisational standards the military leadership was also responsible for Serbia's

accession to the PfP programme. The legislative framework for civilian democratic control developed after October 2000 did not foresee the possibility of accession to PfP and NATO. Whether these steps will be seen as positive or not is only likely to become clear after the parliamentary elections in May 2008 when the political orientation of the new government is announced.

Military reform in Serbia is heavily influenced by day to day politics. In the period since the overthrow of Milošević reform has had to contend with three major obstacles: the dissolution of the State-Union caused by Montenegro's proclamation of independence; the obligation of transferring indicted war criminals to the Hague Tribunal; and lastly, but probably most importantly, the unresolved status of Kosovo.

The State-Union of Serbia and Montenegro which was formed in February 2003 was an entity that was never likely to succeed. The EU virtually forced Montenegro to join the Union.<sup>15</sup> The Union was therefore unlikely to last. Poor relations between the political elites in the two states made military reform almost impossible. The Supreme Defence Council, a collective body that consisted of the presidents of Serbia, Montenegro and the State-Union, and which had supreme command over the military, rarely met. The parliament of the State-Union also barely functioned, and its Committee on Defence and Security did not meet at all. The main reason for this impasse was the lack of interest by the Montenegrin side, which was heavily involved in preparing for full independence. It was only after the State-Union was dissolved and responsibility for defence was transferred to Serbian structures from those of the State-Union that military reform was able to proceed.

Another legacy of the past that the Serbian military has had to face is the obligation of arresting and transferring the persons indicted for war crimes to the International Crime Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). This obligation became *conditio sine qua non* for Serbia's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Ten officers of the Serbian military were indicted and transferred to The Hague in the period 2000-7. In addition there are many Bosnian Serb officers that used to be members of the Yugoslav People's Army who are accused of war crimes.<sup>16</sup> Most of them were high ranking officers. Although among the remaining indicted persons there are no members of the Serbian military, some part of the military, especially its secret services, are constantly accused by the ICTY Chief Prosecutor of hiding or at least helping to hide Ratko Mladić, who was Chief of Staff of the Army of the Bosnian Serb Army during the 1992-5 war in Bosnia. The guarantees that the military leadership have given that Mladić is not protected by the Serbian military seem to be insufficient.<sup>17</sup> The truth about Mladić's whereabouts will be known only if he is ever arrested.

Of all the defeats the Serbian military suffered in the 1990s, the last defeat (i.e. the defeat by NATO over Kosovo in 1999) was the most painful. The Milošević regime pushed the armed forces into a conflict with the most powerful enemy conceivable - NATO. After three months of a heavy air campaign the Serbian leadership was forced to capitulate in June 1999. Although the regime at the time proclaimed a victory, it was obvious to everyone that the Serbian military was defeated. The military had to leave Kosovo and was replaced by a NATO force which still remains in the province.

After the democratic changes of October 2000 the post-Milošević leadership decided to use only diplomatic means to resolve the Kosovo problem. The use of force was completely excluded by the new leadership.<sup>18</sup> This removed a great burden from the military which could now commit itself to much-needed reforms. Military reform started after October 2000 almost *ab initio*.

However political tensions rose in Serbia in 2007 as the deadline over resolving Kosovo's status approached. The political leadership was sending the military different messages. The ruling democratic coalition was dividing over how to react to a Kosovan independence declaration. The process of Euro-Atlantic integration almost completely stopped after the declaration of independence. This has resulted in a setback for security sector reform, including that of the armed forces. Finally the government collapsed in March 2008 and fresh parliamentary elections will take place in May. The outcome of these elections is likely to determine the future direction of security sector reform in Serbia.

### **NATO versus Russia**

When President Boris Tadić signed the PfP Framework Document in December 2006 which was followed by Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić's submission to NATO of the Serbian PfP Presentation Document in September 2007, it looked as though Serbia was moving towards NATO membership. Six months later the situation is completely different and the future Euro-Atlantic integration of Serbia is in question. The reason for this state of affairs can be summed up in one word – Kosovo.

The proclamation of independence by the southern Serbian province resulted in major disagreements in the Serbian government over foreign policy. These disagreements, apart from breaking the ruling coalition, have heavily divided both the Serbian political elite and the nation as a whole. Two large blocs were created. One is led by the Democratic Party of President Boris Tadić which insists on further Euro-Atlantic integration irrespective of the outcome of the Kosovo crisis.<sup>19</sup> The second bloc is led by Tomislav Nikolić's Serbian Radical Party joined by Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica which argues that Serbia should never join NATO and not even the EU if members from these organisations recognize Kosovo as an independent state.<sup>20</sup> These two blocs are going to collide in the May 2008 elections and the winner will have an opportunity to pursue the foreign policy it advocated during the election campaign.

The population, which is already confused and concerned about an uncertain future, is constantly bombarded with messages from the opposing sides. The discourse in this debate mainly consists of passionate statements followed by war reminiscences rather than serious and expert discussion.

It would probably be more useful to the electorate if this debate were to discuss the system of values that Serbian society should adopt. The Serb people need to decide whether they want to finally become a part of the western civilisation and accept the principles of that civilisation or whether they want to remain a society isolated from the rest of Europe. The choice will then not be so difficult. If they opt for the first they will give their vote to the democrats, and if they choose the latter they will vote for the nationalists.

Membership of the EU and NATO would lead to the establishment of a values-system based on democracy and the rule of law. It would also promote stability both within Serbia and the neighbouring Balkans states. The most likely alternative is the pro-Russian orientation favoured by the nationalist bloc. This bloc argues that Serbia was recently at war with NATO. It claims that Russia has been Serbia's traditional friend, that Moscow backs the Serbian side over Kosovo, and that it would not be logical to ask for help from Russia and then join NATO.<sup>21</sup> They point

out that the countries from which Serbia needs protection are NATO members and that Serbia does not need protection from countries such as Russia, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria or China.<sup>22</sup> From this division of allies and enemies it is obvious that the nationalist bloc accept the hypocritical support of Russia, which has suddenly become a defender of national integrity whilst at the same time it supports the secessionist regions of Transdnestr in Moldova, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia.<sup>23</sup>

Although it is clear that Moscow and its allies in Serbia are strongly against Serbia's joining NATO, the question that still remains unanswered is whether Russia would be willing to support breaching relations with the EU. Russian interest in the Balkans is primarily motivated by its strategy to reassert itself on the international stage. Having an ally within the EU would probably be more helpful in achieving that goal. The Russian ambassador to Belgrade Aleksandr Alekseyev even emphasised that his country does not have a problem with Serbian integration into the EU and that Moscow actually supports this process.<sup>24</sup>

It is also rarely mentioned in public that Yugoslavia has already had a history of fruitful relations with NATO countries. This cooperation dates from 1951, when Yugoslavia after its break-away from the USSR signed the Military Assistance Pact with the USA and entered into a programme of military support (Mutual Defence Aid Programme) which was even more intense than today's PfP programme. This programme demanded from every signatory concrete and quick action in order to counteract any threat from the communist bloc. It was, to say the least, quite unusual for a communist country to sign such an agreement. The signing of this agreement was Yugoslavia's first step in developing a closer relationship with NATO which was continued two years later by the creation of the Balkan Pact together with NATO members Greece and Turkey.<sup>25</sup>

The most important question now is the extent to which the outcome of the May 2008 elections will influence the Serbian military reform process. It is necessary to bear in mind that the security sector in Serbia, of which the military is the largest component, has in many ways remained a client of the ruling elite even eight years after the collapse of the old regime. The almost six-month delay in forming the previous government, from January to May 2007, because of the disputes over which party would control which element of the security sector illustrates clearly the importance of this sector for the political class and their influence over it.

There are three very distinct scenarios for the further reform of the Serbian military after the May elections. Firstly, it can continue its NATO driven reform or secondly, move towards closer cooperation with Russia. The third possibility, which will be thoroughly considered in the next section, is to pursue a course of neutrality.

A victory for the democrats would probably mean that the military will continue to be reformed according to NATO standards. Much has already been achieved, and cooperation between the Serbian Ministry of Defence and NATO has been in many ways fruitful.<sup>26</sup> The Serbian side has started to understand how NATO mechanisms work. They were able to start adopting professional standards and to move away from the notion of a politicised armed force. The NATO side highly evaluated their Serbian colleagues, who had considerable military education and also significant experience.

The alternative election result, namely a victory for nationalist parties, would also highly influence the Serbian military. A new nationalist military leadership would take the reform process in a completely different direction.<sup>27</sup> The nationalist bloc "sees the Serbian Army as a patriotic, rather than professional force, based on



general military obligation, thus including conscripts, and think that its technical inferiority compared with the armies of the developed countries would be compensated by the number of troops".<sup>28</sup> What is more disconcerting is that the leader of the Serbian Radical Party Tomislav Nikolić in December 2007 in his presidential election campaign publicly called for Russian military bases to be established in Serbia, claiming that Serbia should become a Russian province rather than an EU colony.<sup>29</sup> This statement makes clear that the nationalist bloc is strongly opposed to Serbia's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, and that military reform will not go in this direction if the nationalist bloc comes to power.

Irrespective of which side triumphs in the parliamentary elections, it is evident that military reform will be started from the point where it found itself at the peak of Kosovo crisis at the beginning of 2008. The present situation whereby Serbia has proclaimed itself to be a militarily neutral country is hardly sustainable and probably will not last for long.

### **Military Neutrality**

On the eve of the proclamation of Kosovo's independence, the Serbian parliament passed in December 2007 a resolution "on the protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order of Republic of Serbia" in which Serbian military neutrality was proclaimed. It was said that Serbia will remain neutral to all present military alliances unless it was decided differently in a referendum.<sup>30</sup> At first glance the Resolution only proclaims the obvious. Serbia is presently not a member of any military alliance and in order to join one it is necessary that the decision be approved by national referendum. But the reason for this proclamation was found in NATO's role in the bombing of Serbia in 1999, and also in Annex 11 of the Ahtisaari Plan<sup>31</sup> which proclaims NATO to be the ultimate authority in an independent Kosovo.<sup>32</sup> The parliamentary resolution of December 2007 is actually aimed at opposing any possible accession by Serbia to NATO.

The resolution has been used mainly for domestic political purposes. It was supposed to show the unity of almost all relevant political factors in Serbia concerning the rejection of a possible independence proclamation by Kosovo Albanians. In their inability to prevent the inevitable Serbian politicians were competing in showing their patriotism. Unfortunately the resolution did not change much in real politics, as well as the everyday life of the Serbs living in Kosovo.

The Serbian policy makers have failed to give a clear explanation of the meaning of the concept of military neutrality. Various experts have enunciated a wide variety of views on the meaning of neutrality. Most of them gave examples of successful militarily neutral countries such as Sweden, Switzerland, Finland or Austria. Some even advocated the old Yugoslav tradition of non-alignment. In order to understand what military neutrality could mean for Serbia and its armed forces, it is necessary to understand the difference between military neutrality and non-alignment, and also to see if it is possible to compare Serbia with the existing neutral powers.

The memory of Yugoslav non-alignment during the Tito era which brought a certain amount of respect towards the country internationally is still very vivid in the minds of many people. Although the two terms "neutrality" and "non-alignment" are often used synonymously, they in fact have totally different meanings. Non-alignment was an ideology created in order to gather countries which did not belong to either of the two blocs – NATO or the Warsaw Pact. This movement was based on the so called five Ds – decolonisation, disarmament, development, détente and

dissemination.<sup>33</sup> The countries that accepted this ideology were gathered in an international movement which tried to stay non-aligned from the major power blocs.<sup>34</sup> The main task of neutral countries is abstention from war.<sup>35</sup> It can easily be seen that military neutrality is a much narrower concept than non-alignment. More importantly, military neutrality does not require the adoption of any kind of ideology.

Permanently neutral states have to do everything to avoid being drawn into any wars.<sup>36</sup> Bearing in mind the recent history of the Western Balkans and especially the situation that has emerged after the Kosovan independence proclamation, it would be very good if any future Serbian government could commit itself to the goal of permanent abstention from war. The chances for such a course of action are unlikely if the government is formed by the nationalistic bloc, as its largest party, the Serbian Radical Party, was in the government during the previous period of wars and its leader, Vojislav Šešelj, has been prosecuted for crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war by the ICTY.<sup>37</sup>

Another feature of permanent neutrality is the preclusion of the stationing of foreign military bases on neutral territory.<sup>38</sup> Tomislav Nikolić's call for deployment of Russian troops in Serbia therefore runs counter to the concept of military neutrality. Moreover, the issue of foreign military bases poses another problem in that both the nationalist and democratic political blocs claim that Kosovo is still a part of Serbia. Bearing in mind that Kosovo is presently occupied by foreign (NATO) troops, a future government will have difficulty in stating with conviction that Serbia is a neutral power, whilst simultaneously having on its territory 16,000 foreign troops and the biggest American military camp outside the US – Camp Bondsteel.

Every permanent neutral has also additional obligations. They have to prepare themselves for military defence of their neutrality.<sup>39</sup> It is debatable whether the Serbian military is capable of single-handedly defending the country from an external enemy. One possible way of answering this question is to compare the Serbian military with its counterparts from the European neutral powers. One of the principal characteristics of the Swedish, Swiss, Finnish and Austrian armed forces is that they compensate for the lack of allies by having the capability to mobilise the entire nation.<sup>40</sup> This has required a militia-type structure for the military, something that was characteristic for the Yugoslav People's Army but is no longer the case for Serbia. The permanently neutral countries also try to reduce their dependence on foreign military support by maintaining domestic defence industries.<sup>41</sup> Serbia's defence industry is moderately developed but it mainly produces small arms and light weapons. It is far from being the self-supporting defence industry that existed in former Yugoslavia. It is therefore evident that there are practical difficulties in this path and clear differences between Serbia and the permanent European neutrals. However the significance of these differences may be minimal if the government formed after the May 2008 elections shows explicitly that it is complying with the foremost principle of military neutrality – namely to remain neutral in any military conflict.<sup>42</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The changes in the armed forces that have taken place since October 2000 have significantly enhanced the position of the military in Serbian society. Of key importance is the fact that these changes have transformed the previous image of the military as a large, incapable armed force that lost all the wars it has fought

since 1990, committed major atrocities and which protected war criminals. The Serbian military has for the first time been put under democratic civilian control, its size considerably reduced, and a clear plan of further reform presented. This plan envisages the creation of a small, modern, well equipped military that can be easily deployed and that can stand side by side with any of its counterparts.

These outcomes could easily be proclaimed as wrong and unnecessary if a nationalist government comes to power. Such a government would completely alter Serbia's foreign and security policy orientation. The path of Euro-Atlantic integration would be abandoned as well as a large part of the economic and military reforms that have been conducted in accordance with EU and NATO standards in all spheres of society. Closer connection to Russia would be promoted instead and future cooperation and reform is likely to be directed to meet demands of Serbia's new partner.

It is evident that the proclamation of Kosovo's independence has had a disturbing effect on Serbian society, which has also affected the armed forces. The emergence of Kosovo as an independent state has re-opened wounds that have not properly healed, and has also opened a window of opportunity for the forces of the past to gain new allies in their effort to oppose Serbia's Euro-Atlantic integration. Whether this should have been anticipated by the EU and the USA and to what extent it would have changed their decision to recognise Kosovo as an independent state is a separate question. What is certain is that the recognition of Kosovo has created a crisis that could have serious consequences for Serbia and the Western Balkans.

The only predictable thing is that the present situation in which Serbia has proclaimed neutrality will not be enduring. The two opposing blocs that are aiming to form the future government both oppose neutrality. The democrats would most probably continue the process of Euro-Atlantic integration that would include accession to the EU and possibly at a later stage NATO. However, even if they do not opt for joining NATO, membership in the EU with its Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy as an integral feature is hardly compatible with neutrality.<sup>43</sup>

After eight years of having to deal with the task of reform following the collapse of the Milošević regime and the various military defeats following the break-up of Yugoslavia, the Serbian military is once again torn between the opposing interests of political elites. The fate of its reform will be decided after the May 2008 elections when the new government presents its views on the future direction of Serbia as a whole.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Serbia from 2006, Article 141.

<sup>2</sup> Law on the Serbian Military, Article 29, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 116/07 of 11.12.2007.

<sup>3</sup> Anastasijević, Dejan, *Vojska Srbije po NATO standardima*, Vreme weekly magazine, No. 863, Belgrade, July 2007.

<sup>4</sup> Strategic Defence Review, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, July 2006.

<sup>5</sup> See: Resolution of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia on protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order of Republic of Serbia, Official Gazette of Republic of Serbia No. 125/07 of December 26<sup>th</sup> 2007. <http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/kosovo-metohija/index.php?id=42050>

- <sup>6</sup> See Yasmann, Viktor, 'Russia: Reviving The Army, Revising Military Doctrine, RFE/RL Report 12 March 2007  
<http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/03/63173250-a8b3-40d0-a26d-219ed25d91b2.html>
- <sup>7</sup> See: *EU ili Rusija*, Radio Free Europe from April 8<sup>th</sup> 2008.
- <sup>8</sup> According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the period between 1990 and 1991 the Yugoslav People's Army consisted of 180,000 people; of that number 101,400 were conscripts. Its arsenal included 1,850 tanks, over 2,000 artillery weapons, 4 frigates, 15 missile craft, 14 torpedo and 30 patrol craft, 25 coastal batteries, 455 combat and training planes, 198 armed helicopters; *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, IISS, London, 1990, p.95-96.
- <sup>9</sup> The Yugoslav People's Army had a seat in the Yugoslav presidium according to the Constitution which gave it effectively equal status to other eight federal units.
- <sup>10</sup> General Pavković was retired after great pressure by Koštunica's coalition partners almost two years after the democratic changes. See:  
[http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news\\_body.cfm?newsid=2056](http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2056)
- <sup>11</sup> Constitutional Charter of the State-Union Serbia and Montenegro, Article 54, Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro, No.1/2003.
- <sup>12</sup> Law on the Serbian Military, Article 29, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 116/07 of 11.12.2007.
- <sup>13</sup> More on the newly adopted laws on defence and on the military at: Popović, Djordje, *Commentary of the Draft Law on Defence and the Draft Law on the Military*, Western Balkans Security Observer, No.7, October-December, Belgrade, 2007.
- <sup>14</sup> See the Strategic Defence Review from 2006 available at:  
<http://www.mod.gov.yu/000english/index-e.php>
- <sup>15</sup> The negotiations that led to the signing of the Belgrade Treaty which established the State-Union were taken by the representatives of Serbia and Montenegro in the presence of Javier Solana, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU.
- <sup>16</sup> For more details on the war-crimes indictments see: <http://www.un.org/icty> .
- <sup>17</sup> *Šutanovac: Relations with the ICTY one of the Priorities*, Daily Survey, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of May 30<sup>th</sup> 2007.  
[http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Bilteni/Engleski/b300507\\_e.html#N7](http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Bilteni/Engleski/b300507_e.html#N7)
- <sup>18</sup> *Tadić: We will not Push Army into Senseless Wars*, Daily Survey, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of January 1<sup>st</sup> 2008.  
[http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Bilteni/Engleski/b030108\\_e.html#N4](http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Bilteni/Engleski/b030108_e.html#N4)
- <sup>19</sup> *Tadić Says EU Integration is Only Way to Keep Kosovo*, Daily Survey, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of January 1<sup>st</sup> 2008.  
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- <sup>20</sup> *Serbia calls snap vote over EU, Kosovo dispute*, AFP of March 13<sup>th</sup> 2008 available at:  
[http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5ht\\_7vfkgabZISraA88ZmCJu0VaQw](http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5ht_7vfkgabZISraA88ZmCJu0VaQw)
- <sup>21</sup> See the Debate 'Serbia and NATO' at the web page of the Nova Srpska Politička Misao available at: [http://www.nspm.org.yu/in\\_srbija\\_i\\_NATO.htm](http://www.nspm.org.yu/in_srbija_i_NATO.htm)
- <sup>22</sup> Tubić, Dušan, „Da“ – Partnerstvu, „Ne“ u NATO, Nova srpska politička misao,  
[http://www.nspm.org.yu/Debate/2006\\_tubic\\_nato.htm](http://www.nspm.org.yu/Debate/2006_tubic_nato.htm)
- <sup>23</sup> See: Radu, Michael, *Kosovo: The Revenge of CNN and the Politics of Emotion*, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, 2008.
- <sup>24</sup> *Alekseyev says that Russia will not bargain with Kosovo*, Daily Survey, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of November 8<sup>th</sup> 2007.  
[http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Srpski/Bilteni/Srpski/b081107\\_s.html](http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Srpski/Bilteni/Srpski/b081107_s.html)
- <sup>25</sup> More about this period of Yugoslav history in: Dimitrijević, Bojan, *Skica savezništva pre pola veka*, Evroatlantska Revija, No.1, Belgrade, Winter 2005/2006 available at:  
<http://www.eai.org.yu/download/EvroatlantskaRevija1.pdf>
- <sup>26</sup> NATO and the Serbian Ministry of Defence jointly formed the Defence Reform Group (DRG) with the task of helping the defence reform process in Serbia. More about the DRG and its working tables available at:  
<http://www.mod.gov.yu/drg/index.htm>
- <sup>27</sup> The Radicals have already announced that if they form the government the new Chief of General Staff will be retired general Božidar Delić, presently deputy speaker of Serbian parliament. For Delić's profile see: Sikavica, Stipe, *Serbian Army's "New Beginning": "Glory"*

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> The first round of the Serb presidential election was held on 20 January 2008 and the second on 3 February 2008. More on Nikolić's views of Serbian future available at:

<http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7635> and also at:

<http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/01/18/Serbia.elections.ap/index.html>

<sup>30</sup> See: Resolution of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia on protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order of Republic of Serbia, Official Gazette of Republic of Serbia No. 125/07 of December 26<sup>th</sup> 2007.

<sup>31</sup> More about the Ahtisaari Plan available at:

<http://www.unosek.org/unosek/index.html>

<sup>32</sup> See: Resolution of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia on protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order of Republic of Serbia, Official Gazette of Republic of Serbia No. 125/07 from December 26<sup>th</sup> 2007.

<sup>33</sup> Köchler, Hans (ed.), *The Principles of Non-Alignment. The Non-aligned Countries in the Eighties - Results and Perspectives*, London: Third World Centre, 1982.

<sup>34</sup> The success of the non-aligned movement can be discussed especially with examples like Cuba which was very close to the former Soviet Union, or the Iraq – Iran war which broke out between the two member states.

<sup>35</sup> Vetschera, Heinz, *Neutrality and Defence: Legal Theory and Military Practice in the European Neutrals' Defence Policies*, Defence Analysis, Vol. 1, No 1, London, 1985.

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<sup>38</sup> Vetschera, Heinz, *Neutrality and Defence: Legal Theory and Military Practice in the European Neutrals' Defence Policies*, Defence Analysis, Vol. 1, No 1, London, 1985.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> A part of the European Security and Defence Policy are also the so called Berlin Plus arrangements which allow the EU to use NATO assets and capabilities if a crises arise. More about the Berlin Plus arrangements available at:

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf>



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