Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges

Emily J. Munro
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Preface

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in partnership with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, organised the third in a series of regional seminars on trends and challenges related to UN multidimensional and integrated peace operations in Geneva. The seminar focused particularly on the progress made towards implementing integrated missions to date and provided the opportunity for interaction between UN actors and humanitarian organisations, necessary because there is often contested ground between military, political and humanitarian actors in these operations. It also addressed issues relating to how the need for a more closely integrated approach to UN peace operations can be reconciled with the need to safeguard the independence and impartiality of humanitarian efforts.

The seminar brought together high-level participants from UN agencies, humanitarian and development organisations, academic research institutes, and non-governmental institutions based in both Geneva and Rome. The meeting was also able to draw on the insights of a number of former and current UN officials with managing experience in missions as diverse as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, Afghanistan, East Timor, Nepal, Haiti, and Liberia. In addition,
a number of participants from relevant institutions, including European
development, military, and police establishments, actively participated.²

Norwegian Minister of Defence, Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen

² Norwegian Minister of Defence Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen, Norwegian Ambassador to
Geneva Wegger C. Strømmen, and GCSP Director, Ambassador Dr. Fred Tanner, extend their
appreciation to all participants for their engaging presentations and discussions, and for pro-
viding feedback about this Paper. Thank you to the rapporteur and author of this synthetic
report, Emily J. Munro. Thierry Tardy, GCSP faculty member, offered constructive suggestions.
Anja T. Kaspersen and Magnus Aasbrenn both provided excellent feedback on the report draft
and managed an important initiative, of which this seminar was but one component.
Executive Summary

The progression of integrated missions has moved forward a great deal over the past years, but there remains a need for greater clarification in a number of critical areas. The Geneva meeting on integrated missions provided an opportunity to discuss how the integration agenda can and should be reconciled with the need to safeguard the independence and impartiality of humanitarian assistance.

Participants generally agreed that demand for integration reflects a genuine need but emphasised that it cannot come at any cost. They also stressed that there should be better links between strategic and operational dimensions, and between headquarters and field dimensions. Integration is not, and should not become, a bureaucratic exercise in aligning resources, but it should be an exercise in developing greater coherence on deliverables, something that will have to be done specifically for each mission. There are no fixed templates. The intensity of integration and timing will vary from mission to mission, as well as within a mission area, and will depend on exact circumstances, needs, and desired impact. It must be remembered that the ultimate aim for all actors involved is to establish the conditions for departure and for the return of a country to sustainable peace.

Humanitarian space remains an essential aspect of a mission and must be respected. Consultation and communication between the mission and humanitarian actors was seen as a key aspect to strengthen the overall impact, as well as identifying complementarities therein.
The UN Peacebuilding Commission and its Peacebuilding Support Office was discussed and there was guarded optimism about the role they could play in addressing the gaps in responses to post-conflict countries and encouraging integration.

Throughout the discussions, participants stressed the need to focus on the development of local absorption capacities and of adopting a long-term approach. Emphasis was placed on planning and the integration of many aspects at an early stage, ranging from encouraging local ownership to international and local staff training needs. A set of concrete recommendations derived from the discussions are presented at the end of this report.

Ambassador Dr. Fred Tanner (Director, GCSP)
H. E. Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen, Norwegian Minister of Defence, opened the meeting. She emphasised in her remarks the importance of unity of purpose, that is, of ensuring that the field and headquarters levels operate on the same page, and that respect for each other’s roles permeate throughout an operation. She went on to remind participants of the increased complexity of post-conflict environments and the need to react to these exigencies with coherent multilateral responses. The Minister set the tone and focus of the meeting by stating that the aim of further integration should be reconciled with respect for humanitarian imperatives. Progress in the field of integration requires greater awareness of the need for, and understanding of, long-term planning and objectives.

In her remarks, she reminded participants of the advent of the concept of integrated missions within the UN reform agenda, and of the increase in volume and complexity of UN peace operations over the last two decades. She made a number of key observations that resonated throughout the day’s discussions: a) the challenges of a post-conflict environment require mutually reinforcing contributions from a wide range of sectors and actors; b) no single situation is the same, nor is any situation ever static; c) integration can play a critical role in easing the interface between peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and restoring national capacities; d) there is not enough focus by the UN, donors, and other actors on the impact of the involvement, nor on critical areas that require attention and/or reconfiguration; and e) safeguarding humanitarian space for humanitarian actors, whilst ensuring a certain degree of coordination and collaboration, is vital.
She closed by drawing an example of international military health professionals providing medical services to local civilian populations. On the surface this function is a laudable act, but upon closer analysis, it is an activity that may run counter to efforts by local actors, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and the humanitarian agencies that support and develop long-term capacities in this area. She noted that, through extensive collaboration with all relevant actors, military health services can be put to use in missions through very distinct circumstances with the aim of supporting local capacities and producing sustainable results. The Minister thereby demonstrated that finding the areas of common interest and making practical linkages can be achieved and can produce credible results.

Following the Minister’s remarks, discussions centred on a number of topics that drew lessons learned from missions as well as from officials’ experiences within headquarters. Collectively, participants had a rich experience in all aspects of integrated missions. This report is a synthesis of the discussions held. The meeting was run under Chatham House Rule.

MINUSTAH’s Jordanian Battalion assists a school, Lycée de Damia, near Cité Soleil (their Area of Responsibility). The Jordanian Battalion 1 delivers milk, rice, flour and tea, all of which come from their own supplies of food, to 600 students. Port-Au-Prince, Haiti.

MINUSTAH Photo/Sophia Paris, 22 February 2006
Background: The Imperative of Integration?

The number and complexity of United Nations peacekeeping operations has increased exponentially in recent years. Thus, the UN’s introduction of the concept of integrated missions should be seen in this context as an important development in the evolution of international peacekeeping interventions. This idea recognises the complexity of the tasks at hand and the need to involve a host of actors across sectors that previously may have worked at cross purposes in the field. Rather than seeing a continuum from war to peacekeeping to peacebuilding, the figurative lines between these stages have become blurred, necessitating the involvement of a multitude of actors from different sectors. The integrated mission approach addresses both the substantive means by which these situations are addressed by the UN and the structural adaptations that need to be adopted to respond effectively. The challenge lies in leveraging the UN’s moral authority, resources, and experience in peace operations, while at the same time allowing for flexibility in the design of integrated strategies and encouraging the participation of diverse actors in this exercise.

There have been several practical applications of the integrated missions concept over past years; the earliest cases include Kosovo and Sierra Leone. Given such experiences, important clarifications of the concept of

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integrated missions have taken place. The concept has been refined since the first Note of Guidance on Relations Between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators, and Humanitarian Coordinators (October 2000). Most recently, a second Note from the Secretary-General, Guidance on Integrated Missions (January 2006), clarified the roles of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG), Resident Coordinator (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC).

An integrated mission was defined in the 2005 Report on Integrated Missions as:

…an independent instrument with which the UN seeks to help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace, or address a similarly complex situation that requires a system-wide UN response, through subsuming various actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework.⁴

In other words, an integrated mission requires the UN to develop an overarching strategic vision of each peace operation and to gather all the appropriate tools available across the UN system to achieve those goals. As the 2006 Note of Guidance states, an “integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities…” and the “UN system seeks to maximise its contribution to countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner.”

Despite refinement of the integrated mission concept, serious gaps remain in our understanding of what integration means, who will be integrated, and at what stage. Although the necessity of some type of integration has been recognised, given the multidimensional nature of peace operations, a comprehensive and common understanding of what defines an integrated mission does not exist.

The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) represents the apex of integration, in what has been probably one of the most distinct and serious challenges to date: peacebuilding in a country that is vast, has little infrastructure, and in which there remains areas of extreme instability and violence (especially in the vast

⁴ Ibid.
provinces of Eastern Congo). MONUC rose to a force level of 18,000 troops and 1,000 police, and it administered a humanitarian, human rights, and electoral assistance mission that cost some $US1.2 billion per year. The premise of the mission is that military and political strategies alone, however coordinated, are insufficient. The UN must build a viable, legitimate state, deliver humanitarian relief and development aid, and ensure that government authority and service delivery extends through the vast country.

In the case of large peacekeeping operations, such as in the DRC, Sudan, or Afghanistan, civilian and humanitarian actors will be under greater pressure to ‘integrate.’ Over the last years, UN actors and external actors, such as national agencies, regional organisations, and NGOs, all deepened their cooperation in UN missions as the link between security and development became recognised. This has led to important advances in terms of cooperative frameworks, such as the integrated mission concept, but also to inherent difficulties as the political and the humanitarian spheres are drawn together.

![Medical Unit of United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia](https://example.com/image)

United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) medical team doctors help local residents with emergency treatment. Young patients are frequent visitors to the medical team unit stationed in the Gali sector of Abkhazia region, Georgia.

UN Photo/Justyna Melnikiewicz, 28 January 2005
Effective and Efficient Implementation

Although the conference participants recognised the strides made between the publication of the 2005 Report on Integrated Missions and today, there was an awareness that much progress still needs to be made. As solutions for certain problems are found and implemented, new problems arise. Integration does not represent an end state, and the search for solutions to new challenges continues. For some, fundamental questions need to be revisited, such as what optimum level of effort should be applied to the search for strategic and operational coherence?

There was consensus that integration, to be effective, can only go so far. The stage of diminishing returns could be approaching or, in some situations, has already been reached.

Humanitarian Dilemmas

The need for the humanitarian community to preserve their ‘space’ to deliver aid, regardless of military or political considerations, remains a key challenge in the debate surrounding integrated missions. The discussion of humanitarian space and integrated missions formed one of the key aspects of the day’s proceedings. Attitudes towards these issues were less contested than participants expected and some understanding seemed to have been reached over the last couple of years, partially overcoming earlier tensions. In this context, there is still a risk of isolating these communities as other sectors integrate.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) A participant noted the balancing act to link these communities without contamination.
There remains a healthy degree of scepticism about what some see as a tendency towards deeper and structured integration but, overall, the necessity of working together has been accepted. Participants noted that creating humanitarian space is a prerequisite for a successful mission. They also acknowledged that the humanitarian imperatives were not incentives to avoid integration, but rather to guide the overall process of integration, by setting standards, checks and balances to ensure optimal impact.

Proscribing an unrealistic curtailment of the involvement of these actors in humanitarian tasks would not be helpful, but guidelines and clear communication protocols and consultation within the mission can be.

Structure and lines of command were key elements of the discussion on humanitarian relief in integrated missions. Following the October 2000 Note of Guidance, in February 2006 the second Note of Guidance further clarified the relationship between, and roles of, the SRSG, DSRSG, RC and HC. The discussion centred on the concern that, given the demands on the responsible DSRSG, who also wears the hats of RC/HC, this person is limited in the amount of time he/she can commit to any given issue. This constraint on time is because of the immense task of safeguarding humanitarian space, directing the differing roles of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the development agencies in situ, managing the transition from humanitarian relief to recovery and from recovery to development and capacity building, whilst cooperating with and coordinating more traditional UN peacekeeping activities. The concept of a ‘multi-hatted’ DSRSG is a good one, yet the implementation still left too much to the individual capacities of one person, without sufficient backup support from the UN system as a whole. A key solution practice from the field has been the development of an integrated RC/HC/Resident Representative (RR) office charged with supporting the DSRSG in his/her job, drawing from the competencies of all actors involved on the ground, and linking the different reform initiatives and efforts at pooling funding, resources, work plans and objectives together.

Participants expressed the need for strong supporting structures for all the ‘hats’ of the DSRSG, either in the form of a ‘cabinet’ structure or separate
back offices charged with managing the depth and diversity of the different agendas involved in support of the DSRSG strategic management of the overall process. Another weakness is the lack of strategic coordination and support structure (between the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), the UN Development Group (UNDG) overseeing the RC/RR function, and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)/Department of Political Affairs (DPA)) at headquarters level, adding to the complexities of the multi-hatted function of the DSRSG. They also emphasised that OCHA’s presence outside the integrated structure has proven to be a good model in that it is an impartial and independent coordinator of humanitarian assistance while still supporting and advising the work of the Humanitarian Coordinator inside the mission.

Inherent tensions exist between the need for a centralised authority with a plan for integration (at the very top levels of the mission, through the SRSG, and the two ‘multiple-hatted’ DSRSGs) and the need to balance the strong authoritative presence of the UN with the equally strong imperative for ‘local ownership’ of the peacebuilding process. This raises the question of whether structural integration helps or hinders the search for strategic coherence.

Some speakers were concerned that although there are today conceptual and substantial understandings and policies of integrated missions, the administrative structures and procedures have not evolved sufficiently to deal with integrated missions. The necessary evolution of administrative support and procedural flexibility is also hampered by member states that have passed resolutions requiring any assets used by UN agencies to be paid by these agencies. Similarly, on an operational level, it does not make sense that, in the case of the DRC for instance, the SRSG has very limited financial authority over mission projects, whereas the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) representative is authorised to sign for financial commitments up to $US 500,000 without further controls.

The roles of civilian and military actors must be seen as complementary and based on full respect of their distinct areas of competence. Therefore, the nexus between, and need for identifying, common objectives between the humanitarian community and the peacekeeping forces with regard to supporting the humanitarian delivery of assistance as an ‘enabling
capacity’ merits more discussion. By way of example, in the DRC, the Humanitarian Coordinator worked closely with the Force Commander to develop suitable and sufficient guidelines defining the parameters, roles, opportunities, and limits of such support.

In this context, military means, if managed well, can serve as a useful tool to create and protect humanitarian space rather than impinging upon it. For instance, the deployment of Mobile Operating Base in the DRC has, on the basis of a joint plan, been able to reduce Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) in the district of Katanga from 230,000 to 24,000 in a period of eight months.

Other examples of joint action between the military or political community within a mission, and the humanitarian community outside the mission, were also given. One such example included the regular joint reporting of human rights violations to the national government by the humanitarian community and the international military presence. This provides the government with a clear message rather than multiple, perhaps conflicting, reports.

In the context of the discussion on humanitarian space, the military’s involvement in quick impact projects (QIPs) was again debated. Although quick impact projects should not compromise the work of the humanitarian organisations, participants recognised that, in reality, this is not always the case, and better communication and consultation must take place before such military projects are undertaken. While there are certain clear areas where QIPs can be effective in filling a short-term gap where humanitarian organisations are unwilling to work, such as in the provision of medical assistance to service personnel, participants drew examples of harm done to humanitarian projects by the military, demonstrating that the tension surely remains. The idea of a joint funding pool for quick impact projects, managed by the DSRSG/HC/RC, as a tool to limit unwanted consequences and ensure better quality control was introduced as a potential solution.

‘Form Follows Function’

The planning mantra – ‘form follows function’ – emphasised in the 2005 Report, with regard to integrated missions, that planning remains as relevant as ever. The elements and priorities of an integrated mission
vary depending on specific circumstances. Therefore, the substantive needs must determine the form in which a mission is established while not based on ready-made organigrammes or templates. There is a tendency today to identify the units and people before defining the purpose (based on the mandate) and strategy for action. Although this sequence seems obvious, it continues to be a problem as the machineries involved continue to operate on the basis of ready-made templates. Integration is not foremost an exercise in defining a bureaucracy; it is fundamentally about deliverability and maximising capabilities and impact.

Equally, integration does not need to occur to the same degree across missions. As one participant noted, excellent cooperation can take place between UN agencies when a mission is not ‘integrated.’ In fact, it is only worthwhile to create an integrated mission if there is a critical mass of multiple tasks with a broad mandate. In case of the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), established by Resolution 1740 in January 2007, the concerned UN Departments disagreed over the question of integration. The DPA was to be in the lead, but DPKO provided the bulk of the operation. DPKO asked for the mission to be a standard integrated mission with all regular components, but the Secretary General decided that UNMIN should not be an integrated mission because the required tasks were limited. It remains to be seen what model of operation ultimately would be the right one for UNMIN.

A shared strategic view within the UN systems of what needs to be achieved in the country should be established; this view must be flexible and holistic. Following this, it can be determined how deeply to integrate each of the different sectors concerned, on an individual basis. Some sectors will require full integration while other sectors can operate in parallel with formal lines of communication and ad hoc cooperation. The level and intensity of integration will ultimately depend on the individual needs. It is also true over the course of a mission that at certain times a sector will require deeper integration while, at other times, it will require less integration. It is thus important to manage transitions and re-configurations of the mission better over time to adapt to the shifting needs on the ground. This inherent contradiction within the ‘form follows function’ dictum demonstrates that changes in form must keep up with advances in function.
Similarly, although there is a will to move integration further into the field in some missions, there is an absence of a support system and administrative measures within the UN to back this integration. This is a particularly relevant lesson for headquarters and members states that ostensibly control these processes.

**Integrated Missions and Headquarters - Field Interactions**

Integration at the field level and at headquarters has not kept the same pace. The bottom up, or ‘form follows function,’ premise has been followed, but because the necessity to integrate is often seen first at the field level, department headquarters have had to play catch-up with respect to integration. The Minister stated in her opening remarks, “We need a more unified UN presence in the field, which, in turn, cannot be achieved without a more integrated approach at headquarters.”

Specific thematic capacities, such as security sector reform (SSR), are often found across the larger UN system, involving a variety of departments, programmes, and agencies.6

This does not entail the capacities available in other international organisations, regional organisations, and international NGOs (and only includes international, not in-country, capacities). These capacities will often meet at the country-level first and foremost and then integrate on a case-by-case basis while leaving out the headquarters level. Since international staff rotates frequently, expertise and ‘lessons-learned’ are sometimes lost. For example, there is no common approach towards SSR at the headquarters level, nor is there a proper integration of humanitarian and human rights aspects of a UN operation. Participants stressed the need for a common capacity to collect, analyse, and disseminate best practices on issues relating to when, how, and whom to integrate in a mission.

Participants also stressed a clear need to de-centralise the planning process, combine and delegate necessary authority to implement the in situ planning parameters. Interaction between the field and headquarters is not always easy, and there is sometimes mistrust between the two.

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6 The UN Peacebuilding Capacity Inventory (2006) illustrates this point.
The UN’s shift from a UN that is to a UN that does, and a UN that has become a ‘field-based’ organisation, is not reflected in the current working methods of the UN. Some participants felt that the reform process at the UN and on-going reconfigurations of departments, in particular the recent split of DPKO, has hindered some of these avenues to progress, but at the same time careful optimism was expressed. If managed well, learning from the hard-earned lessons of the 90s where the separation of operational planning and support and service provisions had disastrous results on the ground, these changes could, in the medium- to long-term, lead to improvements.

Multidimensional Mandates and Integrated Mission Frameworks

The divergent mandates of peace forces, whose missions are to bring security to war-torn areas, and humanitarian relief entities, whose focus is on the protection of civilians and the unfettered delivery of relief, must be reconciled. Operationally, there have been tensions when the military has sought to provide some relief to the local communities in the context of ‘hearts and minds’ approaches that undermine the work of humanitarian organisations and NGOs.

A sound mandate for a mission is of critical importance. The mandate determines the key functions and responsibilities of a mission. In the first instance, mandates need to be written with enough time for proper reflection and supported by a clear understanding of needs. Weak mandates invite manipulation that will work at a cross-purpose to the success of the mission. Repeatedly, speakers referred to disconnects between the political context, wherein mandates are drafted in New York, and the operational conditions of mandate implementation.

Integration of new elements does not imply the need to merge mandates. Clearly, inconsistencies will need to be resolved, but differences among organisations’ mandates within a mission can be reconciled on the ground. A speaker pointed out, however, that UN specialised agencies tend to dig deeply into their mandates as a reflex for preserving their independence and ‘corporate culture.’

The courage must exist to review and re-define a mission’s mandate. As has been demonstrated, circumstances and priorities change, and the mandate must be able to change as well. Therefore, mandates must be
adaptable and flexible. This notion is linked to the allocation of financial resources. As the situation on the ground develops, some issues will gain importance and others will be resolved and require fewer or no more resources. The importance of an adaptable approach in terms of mandates and resource allocation should be recognised.

Communications and Public Information

Managing expectations and communicating successes – and failures – need to be handled more effectively. Integrated missions often lack an integrated communication and media policy, strategy, or practical ability to engage the public opinion within the country. Better communication within the international community operating inside a country is also crucial to offset potential misperceptions of roles. Since media attention does not last long, missions need to capitalize on the opportunities that their attention brings rather than miss an opportunity that could become a liability.

Training for Integrated Missions

Training of mission staff who will work in an integrated mission was identified as an issue that required further thought. A focus on joint training and planning exercises – for example, involving all relevant actors – can be a useful method for making integrated missions more effective. Training for chiefs of staff and similar positions would also be useful, in light of future integrated mission management arrangements. Furthermore, there is a need to strengthen the focus on UN systemic issues in the training curricula to better understand the larger integration paradigm.

The Potential Role of the UN Peacebuilding Commission

One of the first tangible results of the UN reform process, the UN Peacebuilding Commission was created in December 2005 and became operational in mid-2006. Thirty-one members of the Commission were identified through a complex procedure to ensure representation across the UN. The integration discussion that has taken place both prior to, during, and after the establishment of the Commission is a key aspect of the Commission itself, as its mandate states that its purpose is to “propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery.” Its efforts must thus continue to ensure that they do not duplicate existing
functions and, rather, make it a priority to assess the larger ‘integrated agenda.’

The main added value of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) will be at the strategic level in identifying gaps and working in close partnership with other national and international actors to build a political consensus to address these critical gaps. But the Commission and Support Office can also contribute in a number of other ways: focusing on the identification of indicators of success and failure in order to better react to signs of relapse; defining qualitative and quantitative markers for smooth re-configurations and eventually exits; encouraging greater coherence and longevity in funding commitments and lastly; the Commission using its inter-governmental character to forge a deeper partnership and commitment to specific post-conflict countries.

Security Sector Reform and the UN

A detailed analysis of integrated missions must adopt a sector-specific approach to analyse the need for integration in specific settings and sectors. The UN has substantial capacities, in post-conflict SSR for instance, but independent analysis has found that the lack of a system-wide approach to this topic has led to negative effects at the field level. With the exception of a Presidential Statement of the Security Council on 20 February 2007, for the time being there is no authoritative UN concept of SSR. Different UN entities will define SSR differently so that, for example, justice is sometimes, but not always, included in the definition of SSR. Therefore, functions of various units and UN entities will sometimes overlap. With a clearer definition from the UN, a better functional division of labour at the field level can occur. Efforts are being made to address this issue: a task force is under development and progress has been made to coordinate more effectively SSR capacities within the UN.

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7 This aspect was mentioned also when discussing the role of crime prevention and of policing, whereby the neglect of certain areas of policing, such as the intelligence sector, can have a negative impact at the field level.

Coordination and integration are key issues in SSR. In Liberia, for instance, sixteen different police entities needed to be included in police reform efforts, coupled with additional challenges of demobilising child soldiers, reintegrating and professionalising the military, and securing the very porous borders in the region. The police and security sector reform efforts require coordination with a wide range of other actors, including those working on justice sector reform, gender and child advocacy programmes, and military operations.

In the DRC, SSR has been recognised as a priority for stabilisation, strengthening the national human rights record, and encouraging the achievement of a sustainable peace. The national army and militias continue to cause humanitarian suffering and displacements through violence and rampage. The humanitarian actors and MONUC eventually agreed to address jointly the SSR and stability through encouraging armed groups to disarm (DDR), assisting in the separation of children associated with armed groups, and organising UN cluster protection meetings at regional and provincial levels.
Cross-Cutting Themes

Throughout the one-day conference, participants raised a number of themes that influence the integrated mission concept at different levels which are presented here as cross-cutting themes: cultural and organisational interoperability, integration and local ownership, and planning for long-term sustainable peace. These are relevant issues which should be revisited at various times when managing an integrated mission.

Cultural and Organisational Interoperability

The discussion touched upon the concept of culture several times and recognized its significance in the peace building process. Considering the cultural context highlights the necessity of implementing culturally sensitive approaches to the conflict at hand, the local structures, and the community. At the same time, it also calls for improved interoperability, respect, and understanding of different organizational cultures. This cultural sensitivity is vital in the interaction between headquarters and field offices, as well as for the different military, civilian, humanitarian, and police communities involved. All actors, internal and external, have preconceived perceptions of roles and responsibilities which must be mitigated through common strategic objectives, priorities, and policies that aim to overcome prejudices in order to achieve shared objectives.

As a result, the early planning, design, and start-up phases of a mission must take into account the national culture in addition to its approaches to fostering peace and security. Similarly, it is also important to reinforce
local capacities in the planning stage of a mission and enable the engagement of relevant local actors. Thus, missions, when designing national programs, should place more focus on fostering local ownership and taking into consideration local absorption capacity and priorities.

Integration and Local Ownership

The ultimate objective of all peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions is to establish conditions for sustainable peace. To achieve this objective, mechanisms to ensure a successful handover to local authorities, to stimulate ownership at the local level, and to attune international programming objectives and processes with local realities should be kept at the forefront of any form of integrated planning. Partnership and cooperation between international and national actors and international capacity-building activities should occur from the beginning of the process and be gradually deepened and re-configured throughout the mission.

Establishing formal lines of communication between the UN mission and the national government is important. This can result in key aspects of the national governments’ strategies in support of peace being better integrated into the international community’s responses. Again, it is important that this process occur early in the planning of the mission. Oftentimes, it was noted, hierarchy precludes early engagement with local authorities. Recent efforts by the Peacebuilding Commission to approach the development of a peacebuilding strategy as a partnership between the UN and the national government were noted in this respect. This principle of partnership is also instituted, though not always sufficiently implemented, in the Peacebuilding Fund, the financial instrument of the Peacebuilding Commission, which decentralises funding and disbursement decisions and places them at the country-level when possible.

All forms of cooperation with local authorities in a post-conflict setting have inherent difficulties. For example, in cases, when the government in power had been responsible for abuses during the conflict or when elements of the government, army, or police continue to perpetuate a climate of fear and intimidation and are undermining the path to peace, the role of the UN finds confluence, on the one hand tasked to ‘support and/or assist’ the incumbent government, and on the other hand charged with enforcing a positive change involving the respect for and compliance with international law. It is also important to recognise the collective knowledge, role and impact of local civil society actors.
Hiring local staff to work in UN missions has both positive and negative effects that are well known, and these should be addressed in a more systematic manner. The risk of creating two parallel public services within a country, one of which will depart, and where the international community attracts the first rung of candidates, should be avoided and a balance struck. The example was drawn from Haiti, where the ministry and mission have agreed on a degree of cross-fertilisation.

Building Peace

Planning from the very early stages of a mission for long-term peace was stressed by participants throughout the discussion. East Timor was one recent example of a country that was at risk of relapsing to conflict following the successful completion of a UN mission. Sustained funding and clear benchmarks of success, beyond the holding of elections, are key aspects in this respect.

Woman voting in Muhira late morning. Reorganisation of elections in Kanyosha, Nyabiraba, Muhuta and Isale communes, Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza Provinces.
ONUB Photo/ Martine Perret, 7 June 2005
Electoral Ripeness

The electoral process should not be viewed as an endpoint in itself, or as an exit strategy. The transition and planning that evolves, from a crisis situation to support of long-term human development, need to be well thought out. Elections do not mark the end in this transition. In addition, there will not be a set timeline which elections stringently follow. The timing for elections will vary depending on multiple factors in the specific country. There was consensus within the discussion that the UN must stay long for a long enough period of time, although exact ideas on the key indicators and benchmarks in the context of exit were recognised as vital to guide any form of constructive engagement, they were beyond the scope of the discussions.

Funding Modalities

It is important to rethink the link between needs assessments, effects-based planning, and the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development. Moreover, issues pertinent to maintaining and attracting long-term investment and job generation were inexorably linked to the debate on how to sustain peace. The Peacebuilding Commission has recognised this link most recently by identifying youth employment strategies and job creation as one of its key focus areas while working with Sierra Leone.

The discussion identified the maintenance of a consistent flow of funding beyond the early stages of a conflict as problematic. As attention is diverted elsewhere, funding for projects aimed at medium to long-term recovery becomes increasingly difficult to acquire. The Peacebuilding Fund, launched in October 2006, is considered a highly decentralized mechanism designed specifically to address the sustainability gap between conflict and recovery. However the Fund remains a new mechanism and analysis of its effectiveness remains premature. Funding pools were also regarded as valuable tools. Their function is to conduct joint analysis in order to determine existing capacities and needs and then disperse funds accordingly. In a final note on funding, the discussion led to a need to be realistic, but to also allow flexibility to evolving needs.
Recommendations

The conclusion of this discussion on multi-dimensional and integrated peace operations takes the form of the following series of recommendations addressing the trends and challenges that characterize contemporary missions:

- Design the course of the operation so that there is less of a palpable UN ‘exit’ and more of a seamless transition from emergency, crisis-oriented deployments to backstop peace agreement, to longer term human development and human security assistance programs for weak states.

- Conceive the integrated missions flexibly over time as the mission evolves in order to better respond to the realities on the ground and to the reconfiguration of mission mandates.

- Plan the mission soundly and allow ample time to draft a well thought-out mandate based on both needs and desired effects. For this effective planning to take place, however, better indicators and benchmarks need to be developed. Mandates and objectives can and should be reviewed and updated throughout the missions.

- Take into account needs assessments and mission evaluations and carry them out with a broad perspective that includes interests of internal and external actors of the UN system. The same actors should be held accountable in the implementation phases of the mission.

- Address the notorious disconnect between the political context, where mandates are drafted in New York, and the operational conditions of mandate implementation. An integrated approach
by governments (and within governments – a so-called ‘whole-of-government’ approach) will positively influence how the UN itself handles integration.

- Encourage the Peacebuilding Commission and its Support Office to develop a role as a strategic planning focal point that identifies long-term peacebuilding priorities and international programming objectives in partnership with national governments.

- Develop more effective and integrated communication strategies (for example, a single common public information office) catering to the complexity of the tasks at hand. This involves developing better impact assessments, public opinion measurement tools, and strategies for the dissemination of mandates, objectives, political agenda, engagement with the local media, and general awareness campaign.

United Nations Operation in Burundi Disarms Rebel Forces
Burundian military groups signed up voluntarily to be disarmed under the auspices of United Nations peacekeepers and observers.
Members of CNDD-FDD rebel forces surrender their weapons and ammunition to United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) peacekeepers in Mbanda, southern Burundi.
UN Photo/Martine Perret, Mbanda, Burundi, 03 February 2005
• Attune training curricula to the specific modalities of an integrated mission in order to operate on a level playing field.

• Encourage integration in the field and at headquarters. The dispersion of capacities at the headquarters level, for example security sector reform, across the UN system, and lack of a common UN approach run counter to integration efforts in the field.

• Analyse the costs and benefits carefully before making the decision to further integrate. The inherent benefits should outweigh the financial and transaction costs of coordination and structural integration.

• Strengthen the authority of the SRSG, specifically in terms of budgetary responsibility, flexibility, and influence over the broad UN system within a country.

• Involve the Force Commander and the Humanitarian Coordinator, in working out the guidelines and consultation mechanisms on issues pertinent to the protection of civilians, to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to general perception-building exercises in local communities.

• Establish common funding pools and a control process for quick impact projects, with an operational ability to approve projects in a timely manner.

Local Capacities

• Cooperate with the local population from the time the mission arrives in the country. The international presence is only temporary, and planning for the inevitable departure needs to start at an early stage. For example, training local actors in various sectors is an important component of any mission.

• Balance the equally strong imperatives of local ownership of the peacebuilding process and the need for an integrated and authoritative UN presence. In this context, increased structural integration should not come at the expense of strategic coherence.

• Develop codes of conduct for hiring nationals in the missions. A two-tier civil service must be avoided where nationals are first hired by the international organisation, and only afterwards by the national government and other local actors.