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In 2002, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) initiated a series of seminars on the broad range of peacekeeping activities.

Every year, these seminars bring together around 30 academics, experts, policy-makers and military to look into a particular aspect of peacekeeping.

The 2002 seminar addressed the issue of peace operations in a post-911 context, and led to a book (Thierry Tardy, ed., *Peace Operations after 11 September 2001*, Frank Cass, London, 2004).

In 2003, the conference was dedicated to the role of the EU in peace operations.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2003 three EU peace operations were created, but in each case following a different pattern:

- a civilian operation with the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina;
- a military operation with resort to NATO assets with operation Concordia in Macedonia;
- a military operation without resort to NATO assets in operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Those operations, together with a number of other major developments in the last few years (establishment of a political-military structure, capability conferences, an EU-NATO permanent arrangement), led the General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting in May 2003 to state that the “EU now has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg Tasks, limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls”. Indeed the three peace operations have practically made the EU an actor in crisis management, and this only five years after the ESDP process began in earnest, and despite the internal political crisis that preceded the Iraq war. Along those lines, the EU may become increasingly involved in a broad range of crisis management activities, both civilian and military, in and outside of Europe.

REMARKS ON OPERATIONS

The followings remarks can be made about the three operations:

- the operations may all be seen as successful;
- the EU is taking responsibility in its continent, to the extent that it is now a credible option for crisis management demands, which was far from being the case two years ago;
- all three operations have been small and not very complex, while the two military ones (Macedonia and DRC) were also limited in length;
- consequently conclusions on EU real capabilities are difficult to draw;
- the ‘framework nation’ arrangement was used for the two military operations, with France playing that role in both cases;
- both member states and third party states have contributed; if large participation is evidence of political support, the question was nevertheless raised whether it made operational sense to have 27 countries for an operation of 350 personnel (in the case of Concordia); the issue of the “openness” of the operations to third states, especially when those states are regional powers (such as Russia) was also mentioned;
- in the cases of EUPM and Concordia the EU has taken over responsibility from other organizations (UN and NATO), while in the case of Artemis it was initiated by the EU in indirect support of a UN operation, which then took over the EU operation;
- the three operations have been useful to test procedures, to test the decision-making process of the EU and to test operational transitions with other actors (UN, NATO);
- Concordia was a test of the EU-NATO agreement (‘Berlin Plus’), which was implemented successfully;

- through Artemis the EU conveys the message that Africa is an area of possible deployment, and that its role is a global one; the “out-of-area” debate within the EU did not last very long;
- Artemis was a test of the ‘framework nation’ model, of an operation on the basis of a UN request, of a Chapter VII operation; it also tested the rapid reaction capability of the EU. The very fact that the operation was conducted on a UN request also shows that the UN sees the EU as a player on the crisis management scene;
- the operations have raised the issue of their financing, about which current texts and practice are very imprecise, with a tricky distinction between operations “having military or defence implications” (to be charged to states) and other operations (to be charged to the budget of the European Communities), a distinction that is in practice difficult to make.

To summarize, the three operations are no doubt a good start and illustrate a will, as well as a certain capacity for the EU to do *some* crisis management, although the modesty of the operations and the remaining significant capability shortfalls should also be noticed.

LEGITIMACY AND OBJECTIVES

The issue of the legitimacy of EU operations proves to be essential. EU operations need to be perceived as legitimate by all protagonists, be they interveners or targets of the intervention. This is related to the issue of ownership of the recipient of any operation, which is key in the EUPM for example. Hence there is a need to act in accordance with internationally recognized norms and in the framework of the UN in particular. This leads to the question of the overall objectives and to the effectiveness of any action. Legitimacy will depend on the balance that EU states strike between serving national interests, conducting crisis management and abiding by internationally recognized norms.

CAPABILITIES

The question as to whether the Headline Goal has been reached or not is a controversial one. Stating that all objectives have been reached can be highly counter-productive as it gives a false impression of what the EU is able to do. This can create expectations that the EU would eventually not be able to match if and when confronted with a situation requiring a crisis management response.

There is yet a broad consensus on the existence of shortfalls that need to be remedied, but no consensus on the way to proceed to remedy them. While the absolute necessity of increasing defence expenditures to make the EU serious about peace operations is stressed, the issue is also about methodology, spending better, and pooling existing capabilities in an intelligent way. A related issue is that of the scope of peace operations. If one considers the upper-limit of the Petersberg Tasks, which imply enforcing a mandate without the consent of the parties, then it is doubtful that the EU lives up to the commitments.

In the civilian field, the EU has considerably developed its internal capacity. There is little doubt that the civilian dimension will become increasingly important in the near future. Yet, the EU still suffers serious shortcomings in this field, such as planning and strategic support. Capacities (in police personnel), rapid reaction (with on-call lists of rapidly deployable people) and political ambition are also problematic.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER ACTORS

The question of the relations between the EU and other major actors is central. The place that the EU will have in the international security architecture will be partly determined by the relations it has with the UN, NATO and the US. As for the UN, the relationship has developed substantially over the last three years, and was translated into practice with the EUPM in Bosnia and with the operation Artemis in the DRC. However, EU-UN relations remain ambiguous, partly due to the EU reluctance to be involved in UN-led operations, especially at the military level.

EU-NATO relations have known major and positive developments with the agreement on Berlin Plus and its first implementation in operation Concordia in Macedonia. Yet, practice is likely to shape further the relationship (with the take-over of the SFOR by the EU as the next test), while the two enlargements raise some questions as to the nature of the relationship, with uncertainties on the eagerness of some new EU members to see the EU developing a crisis management role and capacity.

Finally, the relations with the US is key in many respects. In the field of peace operations, the difference of cultures between Europeans and Americans should be stressed, as the Iraq case demonstrates. It must also be acknowledged that a successful ESDP could only be achieved through a strong relationship with the US.

REGIONAL OR GLOBAL ACTOR

Finally, when assessing the performance of the EU in peace operations one needs to know what the ambitions are. This poses the question as to whether the EU is a regional or a global actor. In areas such as economics or humanitarian aid the Union is undoubtedly a global actor. Furthermore, with the operation Artemis in the DRC, the EU demonstrated that crisis management out of Europe is part of the EU response to instability, which was far from being acknowledged before this specific crisis arose.

At the same time, the regional approach also pervades the EU policy towards peace operations, with the Balkans as an obvious priority. Besides, the implications of the EU to proclaim itself a global actor have not been properly explored. This issue relates to the linkage between global status and global responsibilities. As being a global actor has more to do with demonstrating it than with stating it, the EU will soon have to demonstrate that it is actually a global actor in the security field, thus putting itself in a position where abstention will be increasingly difficult. For the EU the stakes are high: on the one side the pressure to live up to its commitments is strong, beyond Europe; on the other side, a failure in an operation in or out of Europe would be truly detrimental to its credibility and ambitions.



INTRODUCTION

In 2002, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) initiated a series of seminars on the broad range of peacekeeping activities. Every year, these seminars bring together around 30 academics, experts, policy-makers and military to look into a particular aspect of peacekeeping.

The 2002 seminar addressed the issue of peace operations in a post-911 context, and led to a book (Thierry Tardy, ed., *Peace Operations after 11 September 2001*, Frank Cass, London, 2004).

In 2003, the conference was dedicated to the role of the EU in peace operations. During that year three EU peace operations were created, but in each case following a different pattern:

- a civilian operation with the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina;
- a military operation with resort to NATO assets with operation Concordia in Macedonia;
- a military operation without resort to NATO assets in operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Those operations, together with a number of other major developments in the last few years (establishment of a political-military structure, capability conferences, an EU-NATO permanent arrangement), led the General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting in May 2003 to state that the “EU now has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg Tasks, limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls”¹.

Indeed the three peace operations have practically made the EU an actor in crisis management, and this only five years after the ESDP process began in earnest, and despite the internal political crisis that preceded the Iraq war. Along those lines, the EU may become increasingly involved in a broad range of crisis management activities, both civilian and military, in and outside of Europe. For some participants at the 2003 seminar, the EU may even become the natural focus for European security and defense in the coming years.

THESE PRELIMINARY REMARKS LEAD TO A SERIES OF QUESTIONS:

- what do the three operations tell us about the ability of the EU to do crisis management (given their scope)?
- how can one assess the interaction between EU activities on the ground, through the operations, and the lack of cohesion among the 15 at the political level?
- on the civilian aspects of crisis management, what assessment can one have about the EUPM, and what does it tell us about the EU as a civilian actor?
- how do Operation Concordia (Macedonia) and Artemis (DRC) reflect/prefigure relations between the EU and NATO and between the EU and the UN?

¹ See General Affairs and External Relations Council, Final Declaration, Brussels, 19-20 May 2003.

- what does operation Artemis tell us about the ability of the EU to play a political-military role beyond the periphery of Europe?
- what are the prospects of the EU being a full actor in crisis management? what would that imply in terms of the scale of operations, and in terms of geographical remit?

This report summarizes key issues discussed at the workshop; it is organized around several broad themes that emerged in the discussions:

1. **OBSERVATIONS ON THE OPERATIONS**
2. **LEGITIMACY AND OBJECTIVES**
3. **EU CAPABILITIES AND ITS ABILITY TO ACT**
4. **COOPERATION WITH THE UN, NATO AND THE US**
5. **IS THE EU A REGIONAL OR GLOBAL ACTOR?**



1. OBSERVATIONS ON THE OPERATIONS

The three EU peace operations launched in 2003 are the following:

EUPM

The EU Police Mission (EUPM) is a civilian operation and was the first operation created under ESDP. It was deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2003 following a Council Joint Action adopted on 11 March 2002, and on the basis of an invitation from the Bosnian authorities. UN Security Council resolution 1396 (5 March 2002) welcomed the operation, without formally creating it. The EUPM mandate runs until the end of 2005. It took over the UN IPTF Mission that was created with the Dayton Peace Accord in November 1995.

The mandate of the EUPM is “to establish sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with European and international standards”. It is an assistance mission to the Bosnian police forces, with no executive power. It is composed of around 530 police officers, 80% of which are coming from the 15 EU member states and the rest from 18 third countries (mainly European states, including Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey, but also Canada).

CONCORDIA

Operation Concordia was the first military operation of the EU. It was deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in March 2003 following a Council Joint Action adopted on 27 January 2003, and on the basis of an invitation from the Macedonian authorities. No UN Security Council resolution formally created it (UN Security Council resolution 1371 (26 September 2001) supports the “security presence in Macedonia”, but that was a reference to NATO). The operation ended in mid-December 2003². Concordia was conducted by resorting to NATO assets under the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangement agreed upon in December 2002. France acted as the ‘framework nation’.

The operation took over the NATO operation ‘Allied Harmony’, which was one of the missions deployed by NATO to help implementing the August 2001 Ohrid Agreement in Macedonia. Concordia was composed of around 350 personnel coming from 27 countries, of which 13 EU member states.

ARTEMIS

Operation Artemis was created by a Council Joint Action on 5 June 2003 at the request of the UN and following a UN Security Council Resolution adopted on 30 May 2003 (Res. 1484) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It was deployed in the city of Bunia in the north-eastern part of the DRC between 15 June and 1 September 2003.

The operation was mandated to contribute, in close coordination with the UN operation (MONUC), “to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town.”

² In December 2003, an EU Police Mission (operation Proxima) took over the operation Concordia.

It was composed of around 1,800 personnel, with France acting as the 'framework nation' and providing the bulk of the forces. It did not resort to NATO assets.

The operation withdrew as planned on 1 September 2003, with the UN Mission (MONUC) taking over.

Participants stressed that it might be too early to draw far reaching conclusions from those three operations at this stage, not the least since the Union has not presented any lessons-learned dossiers yet. However, some preliminary observations were made:

- the operations may all be seen as successful;
- the EU is taking responsibility in its continent, to the extent that it is now one credible option for crisis management demands, which was far from being the case two years ago;
- all three operations have been small and not very complex, while the two military ones were also limited in length;
- consequently conclusions on EU real capabilities are difficult to draw;
- the 'framework nation' arrangement was used for the two military operations, with France playing that role in both cases;
- both member states and third party states have contributed; if large participation is evidence of political support, the question was nevertheless raised whether it made operational sense to have 27 countries for an operation of 350 personnel (in the case of Concordia); the issue of the "openness" of the operations to third states, especially when those states are regional powers (such as Russia) was also mentioned;
- in the cases of EUPM and Concordia the EU has taken over responsibility from other organizations (UN and NATO), while in the case of Artemis it was initiated by the EU in indirect support of a UN operation, which then took over the EU operation;
- the three operations have been useful to test procedures, to test the decision-making process of the EU and to test operational transitions with other actors (UN, NATO);
- Concordia was a test of the EU-NATO agreement ('Berlin Plus'), which was implemented successfully;
- through Artemis the EU conveys the message that Africa is an area of possible deployment, and that its role is a global one; the "out-of-area" debate within the EU did not last very long;
- Artemis was a test of the 'framework nation' model, of an operation on the basis of a UN request, of a Chapter VII operation; it also tested the rapid reaction capability of the EU. The very fact that the operation was conducted on a UN request also shows that the UN sees the EU as a player on the crisis management scene;
- the operations have raised the issue of their financing, about which current texts and practice are very imprecise, with a tricky distinction between operations "having military or defence implications" (to be charged to states) and other operations (to be charged to the budget of the European Communities), a distinction that is in practice difficult to make.

To summarize, the three operations are no doubt a good start and illustrate a will as well as a certain capacity for the EU to do some crisis management, although the modesty of the operations and the remaining significant capability shortfalls should also be noticed. Taken together, the three operations count for less than 3,000 personnel (to be compared with the 42,000 de-

ployed by NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the 35,000 deployed by the UN in 15 operations), and are limited either in time, or in scope.

Talking about tests and lessons learnt, another important element is the fact that none of the three operations is holistic in its nature, while the holistic approach – the ability to aggregate several dimensions of a crisis management process, i.e. civil and military – is precisely what the EU is supposed to be best at. Such an approach, and ability, are yet to be tested.

THE CASE OF THE EUPM

The seminar devoted some time to the civilian aspects of crisis management (see “Civilian Crisis Management” section below) and to the role of the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular.

The mandate of the EUPM was to “establish sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with European and international standards”.

Within this mandate, two concepts were central: sustainability, that means that institutions are in a phase of exit strategy and that local actors have to be prepared to work on their own; and local ownership, by which local authorities are to be in charge (EUPM has no executive mandate). Here the stress has been put on targeting “mid-level management”, with responsibilities given to mid- to senior level people.

In this context, the following strategic priorities were defined before the operation, taking into account the needs of BiH but also the interests/concerns of participating states:

- fight against organized crime and human trafficking;
- safety of returnees;
- strengthening of state-level law enforcement institutions;
- depoliticisation of police forces;
- financial sustainability of police forces.

Four kind of dilemmas then emerged:

■ interpretation of the mandate

A first dilemma has been whether to strengthen the EUPM mandate to include law enforcement, but that was said to be a “step backwards in the peace process”³. This concern was partly driven by the need to tackle ‘spoilers’, as the only tool at the disposal of the EUPM for enforcement measures is to turn to the Office of the High Representative.

■ local ownership

A second dilemma has come from the constant search for a balance between “providing advice and guidelines”⁴ to local authorities and “allowing for home-grown ideas and concepts”⁵, between imposition and local engagement.

■ depoliticisation

A third dilemma has come from the need to look at the depoliticisation of Bosnian police forces in relation to measures taken on courts, penal institutions, etc. Done in a isolated way, depoliticisation of police forces will remain limited.

³ Quotation from a participant’s remarks.

⁴ Quotation from a participant’s remarks.

⁵ Quotation from a participant’s remarks.

■ transition from the UN to the EU

One lesson learnt from the transition between the UN and the EU has been that the “EU is suitable to provide a follow-on force”⁶. One problem that was however raised was the fact that the EUPM had to implement measures that were not defined by it (but by the IPTF), when the EU’s approach was sometimes different. The EU did not question what the UN had previously done. Furthermore, the two institutions could have done a joint lessons learnt exercise on the transition, instead of conducting these separately.

Besides these dilemmas, the issue of recruitment of police officers was raised, with questions about the sustainability of an individual-based recruitment process, after a few rotations, or after a few operations.

2. LEGITIMACY AND OBJECTIVES

In all talk about peace operations, the issue of legitimacy of these operations, i.e. the right for a particular organization or group of states to project security over a third country, proves to be central.

The success of an operation is partly dependent on its legitimacy, the current operation in Iraq being, for several participants, a telling counter-example.

In the EU context, the nature of the institution itself and of the political message it tries to convey makes the legitimacy of its interventions *a sine qua non*.

Furthermore, EU operations need to be perceived as legitimate by all protagonists, be they interveners or targets of the intervention. This leads to the issue of ownership of the recipient of any operation, which is key in the EUPM for example (and absent, in a totally different context, in Iraq).

Hence there is a need to act in accordance with internationally recognized norms and in the framework of the UN in particular. The role of the UN was unanimously recognized, for legal as well as for political reasons.

Yet, UN backing (through a UNSC resolution) does not of itself deal with the question of legitimacy. With or without UN backing, the question of the EU’s legitimacy for getting involved in Africa was raised. Given Europe’s colonial past in this continent, the very concept of legitimacy has to be approached cautiously in order to avoid the perception of neo-colonialism. Yet, it was argued that the nature of the situation in some parts of Africa makes welcome the presence of any security-provider willing to do something.

This leads to the question of the overall objectives to be aimed for, and to the effectiveness of any action. Legitimacy will depend on the balance that EU states strike between serving national interests, conducting crisis management and abiding by internationally recognized norms.

Insofar as peace operations are ideological in nature, and therefore go far beyond stopping violence or managing a crisis, a key challenge for the EU is to be clear about what it wants to

⁶ Quotation from a participant’s remarks.

achieve through them. As one of the participants put it, the issue of “how much of what we do is about Europe, and how much is about solving problems”⁷, is a central one. The way the EU answers those questions will partly determine the degree of legitimacy and efficacy of its action.

3. EU CAPABILITIES AND ITS ABILITY TO ACT

Five years after the Franco-British St-Malo communiqué (Dec. 1998), and after significant efforts to build structures and develop capabilities, the ESDP has taken shape. Theory has turned into practice with these three operations. But one should avoid judging the EU’s capacities simply on the basis of these three missions. Security policy is much more than peace operations, especially for the EU that has many instruments to play on. Previous EU activities in the Balkans have shown that the Union can play a role without necessarily launching civilian or military operations. But with these operations the Union is undoubtedly on a new game plan. Now it can no longer hide and claim that it is not ready to act – no matter if it is true or not. This was a conclusion shared by many of the participants.

Yet the creation of three operations in 2003, combined with the declaration of operationality, leads to the issue of the reality of EU capacity to do crisis management. This raises the questions of whether the Headline Goal has been actually achieved, and of what EU capacities are actually for.

Participants disagreed on whether the Headline Goal had been reached or not. Some argued that stating that all objectives had been reached could be highly counter-productive as it gave a false and dangerous impression of what the EU was able to do. This could create expectations that the EU would eventually not be able to match if and when confronted with a situation requiring a crisis management response.

It could also lead some countries to conclude that efforts to develop capabilities are no longer necessary.

There was yet a broad consensus on the existence of shortfalls that needed to be remedied, but no consensus on the way to proceed to remedy them. While some stressed the absolute necessity of increasing defence expenditures to make the EU serious about peace operations, others contended that the issue was more about methodology, spending better, and pooling existing capabilities in an intelligent way; especially as it was not realistic to expect an increase in defense spending. An important element here would be to further define the question of burden-sharing. Pooling of resources might not be welcomed by some member states, in particular the non-aligned, but is probably the only way forward if states do not increase military spending.

A related issue was that of the scope of peace operations. If one considers the upper-limit of the Petersberg Tasks, which imply enforcing a mandate without the consent of the parties (in what the EU calls “peacemaking”), then it is doubtful that the EU lives up to the commitments. In that context, the three EU operations do not give an answer to the question as to whether the EU’s military capability on the higher end of the spectrum exists. This debate is further complicated when taking into account the broadening of the Petersberg tasks as defined by the Convention in the Draft Constitution, to include “joint disarmament operations”, “military advice and assistance tasks”, “conflict prevention”, and “post-conflict stabilization”. By the same token, the

⁷ Quotation from a participant’s remarks.

proposed clause by which "All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories"⁸ is another problematic one.

Finally, it is the credibility of the EU that is at stake. Credibility is a key element for any crisis management actor, in the sense that it creates on the ground the respect that is indispensable for an operation to succeed. This is something that NATO has achieved to a great extent, but the EU has still a long way to go.

CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

As previously mentioned, one characteristic of the EU and an added-value of its role in crisis management, derives from its dual nature, combining military and civilian dimensions.

For the EU to be *also* a civilian actor (contrary to NATO) allows it to embrace the whole spectrum of crisis management activities, including (civilian) conflict prevention and (civilian) peace-building activities (and in particular police activities).

The Feira (June 2000)⁹, and Göteborg (June 2001) European Councils defined targets to be met by states in the four categories of civilian crisis management activities (police, rule of law, civil protection and civilian administration). In parallel, the EU considerably developed its internal capacity. In November 2002, EU Ministers "welcomed that the concrete targets" previously defined "had been exceeded through States' voluntary commitments"¹⁰. Yet, as in the military area, the EU still suffers serious shortcomings at the civilian level, such as planning and strategic support. Capacities (in police personnel), rapid reaction (with on-call lists of rapidly deployable people for example) and political ambition are also problematic. One consequence is that the general approach is capacity-driven rather than needs-driven.

Interestingly, the first EU operation under ESDP is a civilian operation, with the EUPM, and there is little doubt that the civilian dimension will become increasingly important in the near future (as the operation Proxima in Macedonia and the talks on a possible EU role in police training in Kinshasa show, and possibly further involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq with police training).

Of course for the EU to be involved in civilian measures is not new. The Commission has played a key role in this field since the very beginning of the European Community. What is new is the approach – in the context of the development of ESDP – and the fact that states put national assets at the disposal of the EU for civilian crisis management, through the CFSP pillar.

As in any crisis management policy, one of the key requirements for successful civil crisis management is good cooperation among different actors, both within the EU and between the EU and other actors (UN, NATO, third states, etc.). The coordination of EU components was stressed as one dimension to be improved to ensure the coherence and visibility of any activity; such a coordination is instrumental between the Commission and the Council, between the second (CFSP/ESDP) and the third pillar (Justice and Home Affairs), but also between the EU bodies and states, which need to feel involved in the structure to remain politically committed (the ownership issue). In that respect, the idea proposed in the Constitution to have an EU Foreign Minister that would be the result of a merge of the two positions of Commissioner for External Relations and High Representative for CFSP was widely praised.

In the short term, a test for EU cohesion, internal coordination, and civil-military relations will be the combination of the EUPM and a likely military operation in Bosnia when the EU takes over the SFOR operation in late 2004.

⁸ See 'Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe', European Convention, Brussels, 18 July 2003.

⁹ EU Member States were asked to provide "up to 5,000 police officers to international missions across the range of crisis prevention and crisis management operations", Presidency Report on ESDP, Feira European Council, June 2000.

¹⁰ EU Civilian Crisis Management Capability Conference at ministerial level, Brussels, 19 November 2002.

Finally, it seems that the political ambitions for using civilian means are too low. Besides a general lack of political will, one explanation is that civilian capabilities touch many areas with no identified authority having the overall responsibility at the state level.

Yet, demands for civilian crisis management are increasing; such activities offer less visibility than military operations, but they are also both cheaper and (normally) safer.

4. COOPERATION WITH THE UN, NATO AND THE US

The relationship between the EU and the UN raises the issue of institutional hierarchy, which is only in its early phase of definition.

Cooperation with the UN was mentioned, to stress the achievements observed over the last four years in terms of defining a framework of cooperation between the two institutions¹¹. This relationship has of course fundamentally changed now that the EU is conducting operations, and is seen by the UN as a possible assets-provider. The EU may cooperate at both the military and the civilian levels, but appears to be more eager to work in close cooperation with the UN in civilian issues than in the military field (an example of this cooperation might come from a possible EU involvement in a police mission in Kinshasa, where the UN is already present).

Of course, EU-UN cooperation in military issues was illustrated by the EU response to the UN request to deploy assets in the DRC (operation Artemis). But the general reluctance of the EU to be involved in UN-led operations was also mentioned, as the EU wants, as much as possible, to retain control over its own activities. In any case, cooperation seems to be easier on the ground than it is at the institutional level (between New York and Brussels).

Furthermore, operation Artemis has prefigured what the EU is ready to do in conjunction with the UN in the field of peace operations: an EU operation that is created by a UN Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (robust mandate), deployed for a limited period of time before a UN operation takes over. Such a model may suit the UN under certain conditions, though the UN is somehow reserved about what is perceived as a form of “ad hocery” which is not what the UN would like the EU to do.

As far as a UN mandate for EU operations is concerned, the EU approach is not entirely clear. EU official documents only refer to the need to act “in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter”¹² and the UN and the OSCE are regularly mentioned as “leading organizations”.

In practice, the need for a UN mandate seems to be determined by the nature of the operation (coercive or non coercive) and the area of deployment (Europe or outside of Europe). In brief, the EU intends to seek a UN mandate for an EU-led operation when the operation contemplated is coercive (Chapter VII of the UN Charter) and/or outside of Europe (case of Artemis in DRC), but assumes that a UN mandate is not legally required when the operation is non coercive and in Europe (case of the EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Concordia in Macedonia). However, the EU policy remains ambiguous on a number of issues, at the junction of political and legal questions. The necessity to seek a UN mandate for an operation taking place in Africa, but that is consent-based and non coercive, is not clearly established. Nor is the necessity to seek a UN mandate

¹¹ The seminar took place a few days before the Joint Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management, issued by the two institutions on 24 September 2003.

¹² Presidency Report on ESDP, Nice European Council, December 2000.

for an operation that would be consent-based *but* coercive. In Europe, such could be the case for an EU force taking over the SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina¹³. In Africa, a parallel could be drawn with the French-led operation Licorne in Ivory Coast that would fall within Chapter VII of the UN Charter had a resolution created it.

As for EU-NATO relations, the agreement on the Berlin Plus arrangements was seen as largely positive. It allowed Operation Concordia to take place as the first implementation of the agreement. But it was stressed that the agreement marked as much the beginning of further cooperation as the end of a negotiation process. The terms of the relationship will be largely defined by practice. This issue is also to be connected with that of the operational planning structure within the EU, and therefore with the whole debate about the EU-NATO relationship, beyond peace operations.

Another element raised was the possible tension between an enlarged NATO and the cohesion within the enlarged EU (on peace operations) in the sense that new NATO (and new EU) members might not be very keen on EU peace operations, or on ESDP more generally. The uncertainty is even stronger regarding an EU involvement outside of Europe, as the new members have a tendency to think regionally rather than globally.

Some participants furthermore argued that in the future, the debate would not so much be between the EU and NATO but between the EU and the US. The experience from Iraq shows that some EU countries tend to give precedence to their relations with the US over EU compromise. Many participants expressed concerns over US foreign policy, stressing (and deploring) the US emphasis on the use of force, which is difficult to accept in Europe. Some doubted whether the US really cared about NATO.

The difference of cultures about the whole concept of peace operations between Europe and the US was also stressed. Such a difference may illustrate the gap that exists between the two sides of the Atlantic, but it also demonstrates the necessity for the two sides to work together on peacekeeping issues.

It was however acknowledged that a successful ESDP could only be achieved through a strong relationship with the US. By the same token, it is difficult to foresee an effective role of the EU on the international scene in the absence of common understanding with the Americans on what the EU should do.

5. IS THE EU A REGIONAL OR GLOBAL ACTOR?

When assessing the performance of the EU in peace operations one needs to know what the ambitions are. Previous EU summits have focused on the Headline Goal and civilian goals, and stressed the EU will to play a role on the international scene, but what that means for the ambitions remained rather vague.

In this sense, the recently released working paper “A Secure Europe in a Better World” is to be commended. Several participants welcomed the idea of the EU writing down a security strategy, i.e. identifying threats, strategic objectives and policy responses.

¹³ The mandate of the SFOR has been renewed every year since 1996. The relevant UNSC resolutions authorize the SFOR to “fulfill the role specified in Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Dayton Peace Agreement”, which only refers to NATO.

This relates to the question whether the EU is a regional or a global actor. The Solana paper states that “the European Union is, like it or not, a global actor”¹⁴, and that “it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security”.

In areas such as economics or humanitarian aid the Union is undoubtedly a global actor. Furthermore, with the operation Artemis in the DRC, the EU demonstrated that crisis management out of Europe was part of the EU response to instability, which was far from being acknowledged before this specific crisis arose. Given the crisis management needs in Africa, it is difficult to imagine the EU playing a role in peace operations and not considering regular involvement in Africa, if required.

At the same time, the regional approach is underlined in Solana’s paper in the first of the three strategic objectives of the EU, which is to “make a particular contribution to stability and good governance in our immediate neighbourhood”¹⁵. This is partly what peace operations are about, and many participants argued that the EU should focus mainly on Europe and its neighbors. To come back to EU capabilities, it is fair to observe that for the moment the Union does not possess the military and civilian capabilities to be a global actor.

Furthermore, it seems that the implications of the EU to proclaim itself a global actor have not been properly explored (especially insofar as crisis management is concerned), and it takes more than projecting forces in the DRC for a few weeks to become a global actor.

This issue leads us back to the question of the cohesion of the EU and the existence of the CFSP, and goes therefore far beyond peace operations. It also relates to the linkage between global status and global responsibilities. As being a global actor has more to do with demonstrating it than with stating it, the EU will soon have to demonstrate that it is actually a global actor in the security field, thus putting itself in a position where abstention will be increasingly difficult. Again, the risk is that of creating expectations that the EU will not be able – or willing – to fulfil. On the crisis management front, the EU is watched today far more closely than it was two years ago. One consequence is that the pressure to “do something” is higher; another is that a failure in an operation would be truly detrimental to the credibility and ambitions of the EU as an institution.

Similarly, for the EU to be involved in different places in the world might undermine the cohesion of EU strategy, or simply lead to a questioning of the existence of such a strategy. Doing a little everywhere may be the sign of a global vocation but not necessarily the sign of a major role.

In the short to medium term, a potential takeover of SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, combined with civil elements, would strengthen the picture of the EU as taking a regional responsibility. So would the creation of an operation in Moldova.

But simultaneously, an involvement in police training in Kinshasa, Afghanistan or even Iraq would of course confirm a global vocation, although just at the civilian level in these specific cases.

14 Javier Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, 20 June 2003, p.2. That draft was revised to become the *European Security Strategy* adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the European Council in Brussels on 12 December 2003.

15 Javier Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, 20 June 2003, p.6.

ANNEX I

PROGRAMME OF THE SEMINAR

Monday, 22 September 2003

Welcome and Introduction

Amb. Gérard STOUDMANN, Director, GCSP

Dr. Thierry TARDY, Faculty Member, GCSP

ESDP: POLITICAL AND OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

Chair: Dr. Thierry TARDY, Faculty Member, GCSP

A Political Overview of ESDP

Speakers: Dr. Anne DEIGHTON, Faculty Member, GCSP
Dr. Julian LINDLEY-FRENCH, Director, European Training Course, GCSP
General Discussion

The Political-Military Structure in Brussels: Capabilities and Limits

Speaker: Maj. Gen. Graham MESSERVY-WHITING, Council of the EU
Discussants: Prof. Jolyon HOWORTH, Yale University
Rear Admiral Jean DUFOURCO, French Deputy Military Representative to the Military Committee of the EU

THE CIVILIAN DIMENSION OF EU PEACE OPERATIONS

Chair: Dr. Fred TANNER, Deputy Director, GCSP

The Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management

Speaker: Mr. Michael MATTHIESSEN, Director, Civilian Crisis Management, DGE, Secretariat General, Council of the EU
Discussants: Dr. Valentin STAN, University of Bucharest
Mr. Johan FRISELL, Political and Security Committee Coordinator, Swedish Permanent Representation to the EU

The EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Achievements and Prospects

Speaker: Dr. Annika HANSEN, Deputy Chief Political Adviser, EUPM
Discussant: Dr. Renata DWAN, SIPRI, Stockholm

Tuesday, 23 September 2003 (morning)

THE EU IN PEACE OPERATIONS: EUROPE AND BEYOND

Chair: Dr. Anne DEIGHTON, Faculty Member, GCSP

Speakers: Dr. Winrich KÜHNE, Director, Center for International Peace Operations, Berlin
Dr. Antonio MISSIROLI, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
Discussants: Mr. Michel SOULA, Head, Crisis Management Policy Section, Operations Division, NATO
Dr. Pál DUNAY, Director, International Training Course, GCSP

ANNEX II

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

- Mr. Fernando ANDRESEN GUIMARAES**, Coordination Officer, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, DPKO, United Nations, New York
- Mr. Christophe BICKERTON**, Project Coordinator for Border Security, International Projects, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
- Ms Pálvi CONCA**, International Rel./Strategy Development, Directorate for Security Policy, Bern
- Dr. Anne DEIGHTON**, Faculty Member, GCSP
- Mr. Roland DITTLI**, Program Officer, Center for Peacebuilding, Swiss Peace, Bern
- Rear Admiral Jean DUFOURCQ**, Deputy Military Representative of France to the Military Committee of the EU
- Dr. Pál DUNAY**, Director, International Training Course (ITC), GCSP
- Dr. Renata DWAN**, SIPRI, Stockholm
- Mr. Aymeric ELLUIN**, GCSP Visiting Researcher, Marne la Vallée, France
- Mr. Johan FRISELL**, Political and Security Committee (PSC) Coordinator, Swedish Permanent Representation to the EU
- Ms. Suzana GAVRILESCU**, Project Assistant, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
- Ms. Claudine HAENNI DALE**, Policy Adviser, Political Affairs Division for Human Security Training, Department of Foreign Affairs, Bern
- Dr. Annika HANSEN**, Deputy Chief Political Adviser, EUPM
- Prof. Jolyon HOWORTH**, Yale University
- Mr. Urban KAUFMANN**, European Security Architecture, Directorate for Security Policy, Bern
- Dr. Winrich KÜHNE**, Director, Center for International Peace Operations, Berlin
- Dr. Julian LINDLEY-FRENCH**, Director, European Training Course (ETC), GCSP
- Ms. Nicole MAAG**, Faculty Assistant, GCSP
- Mr. Michael MATTHIESSEN**, Director, Civilian Crisis Management, Secretariat General, Council of the EU
- Mr. Heinrich MAURER**, Centre for Int. Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bern
- Maj. Gen. Graham MESSERVY-WHITING**, Council of the EU
- Dr. Antonio MISSIROLI**, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
- Ms. Emily MUNRO**, Faculty Assistant, GCSP
- Dr. Dorina NASTASE**, Visiting Researcher, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
- Col. Mike POPE**, Faculty Member, GCSP
- Col. Karl-Heinz RAMBKE**, Faculty Member, GCSP
- Ms. Joanna SCHEMM-SLATKINE**, Research Officer, GCSP
- Mr. Michel SOULA**, Head, Crisis Management Section, Operations Division, NATO
- Ms. Carolina STAMPFER**, Bureau for Security Policy, Ministry of Defence, Vienna
- Dr. Valentin STAN**, University of Bucharest
- Amb. Gérard STOUDMANN**, Director, GCSP
- Dr. Fred TANNER**, Deputy Director, GCSP
- Dr. Thierry TARDY**, Faculty Member, GCSP
- Mr. Erik WINDMAR**, Faculty Member, GCSP

RESEARCH AND SEMINAR ACTIVITIES

To complement and reinforce its training, the GCSP is involved in research and seminar activities related to international security issues. Research is conducted by individual faculty members as well as collectively with experts from other institutions. In addition, and on demand, the GCSP provides expertise to the Swiss authorities, including to the Federal Parliament.

GCSP research and seminar activities, conducted in close co-operation with institutions active in security areas, include round tables and meetings with the participation of experts from the GCSP and affiliated institutions, and eminent leaders presenting their views and insights. Most notably, these joint activities, with such institutions as the RAND Corporation and the International Security Studies at Yale University, are regular events that generate widely circulated discussion papers.

The outcome of these topical research and seminar activities are published in GCSP Occasional Papers and in relevant journals.



THE GENEVA CENTRE FOR SECURITY POLICY (GCSP) IS ENGAGED IN 4 AREAS OF ACTIVITIES:

| TRAINING diplomats, military officers and other civil servants in international security policy

| RESEARCH and seminars to support the training activities

| CONFERENCES and **OUTREACH** to promote dialogue on various security-related issues

| NETWORKING in the security field



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