


Conflict Studies Research Centre

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**Chechnya:
Dynamics of War
Brutality & Stress**

July 2001



P35

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Chechnya: Dynamics Of War Brutality & Stress

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Introduction

This is the first in a series of papers on the Federal counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya which analyse events on the basis of theme, rather than chronological order. This paper notes some of the acts of barbarism that have been committed, focusing on the dynamics of *federaly* and *boyeviki* alike, raising the questions of stress, brutalisation and the need for psychological rehabilitation. It also notes Islamic, extremist views on the question of prisoner execution.

International awareness of alleged criminal acts and wide-scale atrocities by Federal Forces in Chechnya was intensified by the discovery of a mass-burial ground not far from Grozny in February 2001. The trial of the commander of 160 Tank Regiment, Colonel Yuri Budanov, for the unlawful killing of a young Chechen woman has added to world concerns about the plight of the Chechen people. These alleged atrocities have raised difficult questions for the Russian leadership and the judicial system of the Russian Federation in bringing the perpetrators of criminal acts to justice.

There is evidence, too, of a harder line being pursued by the Bush administration in the United States. In a recent interview conducted by Izvestiya, US Secretary of State Colin Powell acknowledged that whilst the International Community accepted Russia's legal right to defend its territory, Russia also had international obligations and responsibilities to preserve constitutional guarantees and the rights of the population domiciled in Chechnya. He also stressed that:

*“Repeated reports concerning the ‘disappeared’, unlawful executions, torture, arbitrary arrests and abduction of people for ransom give serious grounds for concluding that a culture of impunity has been created in Chechnya. **Russia must demonstrate to its own citizens and to the International Community that those responsible for these acts will be brought to book.**”*¹ [Emphasis - mine CWB.]

¹ <http://www.izvestia.ru>, *Izvestiya*, No 79 (25917), 5 May 2001, p1-3, *Kolin Payell: Nam protivostoit raznomastnaya gruppa gosudarstv* - interview.

Map 1



Uncovering Atrocities

In this Second Russo-Chechen conflict in recent times, right from the start it was evident that Moscow was attempting to enforce the total compliance of a 'subject' of the Russian Federation: the methods and extent of the operation at times seemed directed more against the civilian population (perhaps leading even to its possible extermination) than towards the eradication of terrorism. On the other hand, one cannot but be conscious of the aspirations of a large section of the Chechen nation to pursue a campaign for self-determination and independence, inspired and supported by a sense of national interest, ethnicity and common religion. Nevertheless and perhaps with some justification, there were those not only in Moscow but also in Dagestan and Stavropol' Krai who believed that destructive passions, unacceptable barbarity and ferocity were being unleashed in the name of Chechen nationalism. A nationalism side-tracked and fuelled by the appeal and presence of Islamic extremism, funded by external elements, in turn reinforced a sense of community misguidedly based on myths of earlier historical and territorial settlement. Furthermore, evidence of Chechen barbarity was to be found in the first Russo-Chechen conflict in recent times, notably Basayev's raid on Budennovsk in May 1995, a similar raid by Raduyev on Kizlyar in January 1996 and Khattab's destruction of a column of 245 Motor Rifle Regiment at Yarish-Mardy in April 1996 with a display of Russian servicemen's decapitated bodies. Similar actions were revealed on 1 March 2000 following the annihilation of 6th Company, 104th Regiment, 76th (Pskov) Division VDV on Height 766 in an area to the west of the Sharoy Argun River: *"a group of officer volunteers went to the height by night. Having searched the battlefield they did not find anyone alive: soldiers and officers were mutilated (Khattab had ordered that no one was to be taken alive) and several had been decapitated"*.²

However, there is much visible evidence to the effect that Moscow's methods of subjugation have changed little over the years since the Long Caucasian War 1817-1865 when the names of Russian Generals such as *"Yermully"* - Yermolov, *"Uchgez"* (*"Three-eyed"*) - Yevdokimov, *"Shaytan Boklyu"* - Baklanov³, produced a considerable degree of apprehension amongst the beaten Muslim mountain peoples, leading to a voluntary mass-exodus and the establishment of a wide diaspora of North Caucasus peoples in Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries, such as Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. In keeping with that earlier colonial war, accountability for actions and crimes against the local civilian population would appear to be of minimal importance. Moreover, instant global communication has not only increased public awareness of distant events, but have also led to exhaustive investigations by organisations such as Amnesty International, the Russian human rights organisation Memorial, and Human Rights Watch based in New York. Some acts of brutality bearing the hallmarks of past attitudes and behaviour which have given rise to accusations by the Chechens against Federal Forces during the intervention and consolidation phases are listed below.

² *Novaya Gazeta*, No 29 (672), 23-25 April 2001, p6, *O chem ne znala 6-ya Rota* by Yuriy Moiseyenko.

³ Boris Karpov, *VV: Kavkazskiy Krest-2*, FID, *Delovoy Ekspres*, Moskva, 2000, p180.

Box 1 - Acts of Brutality Between October 1999 and April 2000

1. This concerns Maj-Gen Shamanov, Commander of OGV (West) over an incident at Alpatovo in early October 1999 when five inhabitants of Naurskiy rayon were allegedly shot out of hand⁴;
2. The alleged atrocities at Alkhan-Yurt at the beginning of December 1999 when the Commander OGV (West) was in the vicinity⁵;
3. The summary execution of 38 Chechen civilians in the Staropromyslovskiy district of Grozny between late December 1999 and early January 2000⁶;
4. The 'day of slaughter' of Chechen civilians in Novyye Aldi on 5 February 2000⁷;
5. Questions over the process of 'filtration' of Chechens at the Chernokozovo Detention Centre in early January/February 2000⁸;
6. The involvement of a Russian regimental commander in the alleged rape and murder of a Chechen girl, Kheda Kungayeva, on 27 March 2000⁹.

So, as the warmth of spring eventually found its way into the North Caucasus and into Chechnya itself, it is perhaps not altogether surprising that the earth was in the process of relinquishing its hold on a modern Pandora's Box of dark secrets, in the shape of mass graves with mutilated corpses, buried beneath an outer covering of soil, ice and snow. In particular, from February to April 2001 there were widespread demands for international investigation of alleged atrocities and violations of human rights in Chechnya and in particular Grozny. Box 2 below provides some further details.

Box 2 - Action by Human Rights Organisations Over Alleged Federal Atrocities

18 March 2001 Amnesty International asked the United Nations Human Rights Commission to initiate an international investigation into the conflict in Chechnya.¹⁰

21 March 2001 The discovery of a mass grave near the Federal base in Khankala¹¹, together with the publication of a report by Memorial which contained "extensive criticism of the

⁴ See C W Blandy, *Chechnya: Federal Intervention - Encirclement, Forceful Intervention and Isolation*, P34, CSRC, April 2001, p89.

⁵ Ibid, Appendix 1 Box AI.

⁶ <http://www.hrw.org/hrw/pubweb/Webcat-83.htm>, Human Rights Watch, Russia and Chechnya, *Russia/Chechnya - Civilian Killings in Staropromyslovskiy District of Grozny*.

⁷ <http://www.hrw.org/hrw/pubweb/Webcat-83.htm>, Human Rights Watch, Russia-Chechnya, *February 5: A Day of Slaughter in Noviye Aldi*.

⁸ <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/russia-chechnya4/detention-centre.htm>, *The Chernokozovo Detention Center*.

⁹ <http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/chech-bck0226.htm>, Human Rights Watch, *Backgrounder on the Case of Kheda Kungayeva - Trial of Yuri Budanov Set for February 28*.

¹⁰ <http://chechnya.jamestown.org/pubs/view/che-002-013-001.htm>, The Jamestown Foundation, *Chechnya Weekly*, Vol 2, Issue 13, 27 March 2001, p2, "More reports on situation in Chechnya".

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actions of the Russian military in Chechnya”¹² led to remarks by Andrey Cherkessov, a spokesman for Memorial, that “the terrible discovery at Khankala is only the tip of the iceberg”¹³. Human Rights Watch “accused the Russian military of responsibility for a wave of disappearances, alleged torture and summary execution of civilians in Chechnya”¹⁴. Somewhat earlier, at the beginning of February 2001, Human Rights Watch had written that “throughout the past six months, unmarked graves containing the bodies of people who had ‘disappeared’ in the custody of Russian troops were found in several villages, including Stariye Atagi, Dzhalka, Gekhi, Duba-Yurt and Mesker-Yurt”.¹⁵

23 April 2001 “The Russian Human Rights organisation Memorial recently revealed to journalist Yevgenia Borisova that ‘it knows where there are at least three more suspected mass graves in the Chechen capital but is wary of making the information public’”. According to Lipkhan Basayeva of Memorial’s office in Nazran, Ingushetia, the very day that information leaked to the public concerning the discovery in the Oktyabrskiy District of Djohar [Groznyy] of a new mass grave containing seventeen bodies, the authorities ‘blew up the building’.¹⁶

From February 2001 onwards, Colonel Yuri Budanov, Commander of 160 Tank Regiment, was placed on trial for the alleged rape and murder of an 18 year old Chechen, Kheda Kungayeva on 26 March 2000. The court case provided an opportunity for his former commander in Chechnya, the decorated Hero of the Russian Federation and newly elected Governor of Ulyanovsk, Vladimir Shamanov, former Lieutenant General, Commander OGV (West) during the second Russo-Chechen conflict to show support for the Russian Army by his presence at the trial.

¹¹ *Segodnya*, 28 February 2001, p3 and 20 March 2001, p1, 3, *Mass grave in Chechnya: Investigation continues, and opinions vary* by Igor Studnik, translated by A Ignatkin: “Fifty-two bodies were found near the village of Zdorovie, and 17 have been identified. Some bodies show evidence of torture - missing fingers, ears, eyes, and teeth, broken ribs and kneecaps, missing scalps. Some bodies had their hands and feet bound. Actually, this was not a mass grave in the strict sense of the word. The bodies were found lying scattered in yards, in dilapidated buildings, and by the roadside. Those who were identified by relatives had been detained by federal troops in search operations, at checkpoints, or in the street”.

¹² The Jamestown Foundation, *Chechnya Weekly*, Vol 2, Issue 13, 27 March 2001, p2.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ The Jamestown Foundation, *Chechnya Weekly*, Vol 2, Issue 10, 6 March 2001, p4.

¹⁶ <http://chechnya.jamestown.org/pubs/view/che-002-018-001.htm>, The Jamestown Foundation, *Chechnya Weekly*, Vol 2, Issue 18, 8 May 2001, p1, “Still More Mass Graves?”

Filtration Centres

"Welcome to hell. You're lost now. You will die a slow and painful death. We will teach you to respect Russian officers".¹⁷

Wholesale Arrest & Detention of Chechen Population

The outline below is based on a report by Human Rights Watch:

Box 3 - Circumstances of Arrest & Detention of Chechens¹⁸

"As soon as conflict resumed in Chechnya in September 1999, Russian authorities began arresting men and women at checkpoints, during sweeps that followed military hostilities, and in targeted sweeps of communities. Although Russia has not declared a state of emergency in Chechnya, due process rights are routine ignored in the arrest process. Detained persons are frequently held incommunicado, and many remain in unacknowledged detention, 'disappeared' many months after their arrest. The grounds for detention are often wholly arbitrary: men and women are detained simply because they are found in locations that are not their official permanent address, because their documents are incomplete, because they share a surname with a Chechen commander, because they are perceived to have relatives who are fighters, or because they 'look' like fighters".

"Chechens are so commonly detained at checkpoints within Chechnya and along Chechnya's borders with other parts of Russia that many have gone to great lengths to avoid travelling together, even when they need to flee active fighting. Checkpoint officials are often abusive towards fleeing civilians, particularly towards young males. Men were regularly beaten during the detention process [at checkpoints], and frequently subjected to taunts and threats. On occasion women have been raped at checkpoints having been detained."

Sanitising villages, settlements and communities provided further opportunities to detain rebels and their collaborators, particularly after separatists' ambushes and other forms of attack.

Chernokozovo

"Chechen detainees who arrived at the Russian Chernokozovo 'filtration' camp in January 2000 received an ominous welcome. "Welcome to hell" the prison guards would say, and then force them to walk through a human corridor of baton-wielding guards. This was only the beginning of a ghastly cycle of abuse for most detainees in early 2000, who suffered systematic beatings, rape, and other forms of torture. Most were released only after their families managed to pay large sums to Russian officials bent on extortion".

"[The] Human Rights Watch report documents arbitrary arrests and abuses that occur in detention in Chechnya, focussing on Chernokozovo and six other detention facilities identified in the region... It is based on the work of Human Rights Watch researchers who identified and interviewed dozens of former detainees over a four month period from February to May 2000, carefully cross-checking and corroborating individual accounts with the information gathered from other interviews".

Russian journalists also investigated these filtration centres.¹⁹ Chernokozovo filtration centre is situated some 15 kilometres to the southeast of Grozny. It

¹⁷ Reported comments of Russian guards to detainees at Chernokozovo. http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/russia_chechnya4/detention-summary.htm, p1, *The Chernokozovo Detention Center*.

¹⁸ Ibid.

perhaps comes as no surprise therefore that bodies were found in the areas of Stariye Atagi, Dzhalka, Duba-Yurt and Mesker-Yurt, which are all located to the south, southeast and east of Groznyy. Chernokozovo is in the inventory of the Main Directorate of Penal Establishments (GUIN) and listed as part of the Ministry of Justice as an investigative isolation establishment (SIZO). According to official information it is the only SIZO in Chechnya and “*it only holds those people on whom investigations have already started*”.²⁰

The two journalists managed to ascertain that there were a minimum of three ‘filters’ in Chechnya, certainly at Tolstoy Yurt and Urus Martan.²¹ According to Human Rights Watch there were others at Khankala, Stavropol’ and Mozdok in North Osetia.²² In GUIN they did not deny this information and even provided them with several other addresses, “*for example, the stanitsa of Chervlennaya*”.²³ However, there was a distinction between the filtration centre at Chervlennaya and the one at Chernokozovo. The authorities added that Chervlennaya was not a SIZO but an IVS. An IVS is an interim isolation centre or holding centre which does not come under the Ministry of Justice but the Ministry of the Interior, through the Main Directorate for Maintaining Public Order (GUOP).²⁴

There is of course one major difference between the two establishments. The SIZO is a much more serious establishment, for the inmates are already under investigation; in the IVS people are only held on suspicion of having committed some sort of crime. An IVS is the first stage of ‘filtration’. The work in this type of *izolyator* can be compared with that of a remand prison. In Tolstoy-Yurt, Urus-Martan, Chervlennaya and other places they put everyone who have brought suspicion on themselves, they are ‘filtered’ and then processed further up the chain. If a person is suspected of having links with the *boyeviki*, then they are sent on to the SIZO.

According to GUIN at the beginning of March 2000 some 500 people were being held for associating with Chechen separatist *bandformirovaniya*, and some 32 of them at that time had been sent to the SIZO at Pyatigorsk. As Akhmedkhanov and Skvortsova remarked, it is extremely difficult to monitor the number of detainees being ‘filtered’, for every day many more come in and others leave. However, in the words of an MVD employee, 90% of people held there spend a period of 8-9 days, but “*nevertheless according to our information, today in Chechnya in the order of 1,500 people are being held in filtration camps*”.²⁵

How are checks carried out on people? It is somewhat difficult to ascertain whether a person is a bandit or a peaceful citizen. According to an official representative from the investigative organs, “*without fail bandits have a bruise from*

¹⁹ <http://www.nns.ru/press-file/dagestan/expert/dag580.html>, *Obshchaya Gazeta*, 2 March 2000, *Uvidet’ lager’ I umeret’* by Bakhtiyar Akhmedkhanov & Yelena Skvortsova.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Bodies were found at Gekhi, close to Urus-Martan. See Box 2 above.

²² http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/russia_chechnya4/detention-summary.htm

²³ *Obshchaya Gazeta*, 2 March 2000, *Uvidet’ lager’ I umeret’*.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

*a sub-machine gun*²⁶ or automatic weapon. It was said that 80% of the staff belonging to the 'filter' at Chernokozovo were Chechens, even including those in the past who were loyal to the *boyeviki*. The SIZO at Chernokozovo was active during Soviet times. However, cells which were designed "*for six prisoners now hold 20 people*".²⁷

On the question of torture, one of the most senior MVD officers in response to the journalists' questions said that "*it is not ruled out*".²⁸ That led to a testimony that torture is used in pre-trial detention centres in Moscow. The Chechen SIZO and IVS in this sense were no different from the ones in Moscow. Information about shooting those being held was not confirmed by officials, although, the journalists wrote, during the last Russo-Chechen campaign it was common knowledge that there was persecution and harassment of prisoners by dogs, shooting and torture.

Treatment inside a SIZO maybe depends on status, as in the case of Mayrbek Vachegayev, President Maskhadov's official representative in Moscow, who was arrested by the authorities at the beginning of October 1999, following his return to Moscow from the United Kingdom, for allegedly being in possession of a pistol. He has since been held in Butyrskoye SIZO, Moscow, where Vachegayev saw his arrest as being solely a political act against President Maskhadov. In answer to a question about conditions in Butyrskoye SIZO, Vachegayev replied: "*... I do not wish to blame those people who arrested me, those who have held me in the IVS at Petrovka, and then at Butyrskoye. No violent actions have been taken against me and my assistant Nugayev. Also in the "Dorogomilovo" OVD and at Petrovka, as in Butyrskoye, relations towards me have been correct, and sometimes with some sympathy and feeling*".²⁹ Vachegayev enjoys a reputation as a professional and respected historian; even as Presidential Press Secretary "*Vachegayev had never appeared in public dressed in camouflage and with an automatic*".³⁰

²⁶ Ibid.


²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ <http://www.nns.ru/interv/int1043.html>, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 19 February 2000, p2, *Moye zaderzhaniye - Politicheskiy akt protiv Maskhadova* by Il'ya Maksakov.

³⁰ See Blandy, *Chechnya: Federal Intervention - Encirclement, Forceful Intervention and Isolation*, P34, p105.

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Map 2 - Alkhan-Yurt, Alkhan-Kala & Kulary

Alkhan-Yurt December 1999 “The Colonel Who Was Taken Away”

‘Sanitising’ Groznyy

With the crossing of the River Terek by Federal Forces in October 1999 and their later moves to encircle Groznyy it had become obvious that it was only a matter of time before the Federal machine commenced an operation to expel the *boyeviki*, to seize and to occupy the Chechen capital. The operation was dependent on OGV (East) closing in from the north and east, whilst OGV (West) seized Goragorsk, enabling movement along the Terek Ridge to within a few kilometres of Groznyy itself, followed by an additional line of movement along the Sunzha Ridge lying further to the south and parallel to the Terek Ridge. A significantly high proportion of the population were behind the Federal government in any action to cleanse Groznyy of any terrorist elements. The public was prepared for an intensification of military action and subsequent brutalisation of combat operations.³¹

**Table 1 - Regional Spread of Views of Russian Public 10-12 December 1999
“How do you evaluate the Plan of Combat Operations in Sanitising Groznyy
from the *Boyeviki*”?³²**

Reply, %	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Positive	53	70	61	67	63	77	73	81	65	55	66	66	67
Negative	23	14	17	7	14	4	7	7	14	12	11	19	12
Too Difficult	24	16	22	26	23	19	20	12	21	33	23	15	21

Key

1	Moscow & St Petersburg	8	North Caucasus
2	North	9	Urals
3	North West	10	Western Siberia
4	Central	11	Eastern Siberia
5	Volgo-Vyatskiy	12	Russian Far East
6	Central-Chernozem'ye	13	Average for Russia
7	Povolzh'ye		

The North Caucasus shows the most dramatic level of support for the ‘sanitising’ of Groznyy, with 81% in favour.

The Federal Assault on Alkhan-Yurt

Sealing off and cordoning the Chechen capital from the north and east was not such a demanding task. Interdiction of Chechen movement to and from the south was to become the cause of some major engagements and indeed bitter battles between Federal Forces and Chechen *boyeviki*. Situated directly to the southwest of Groznyy in close proximity to the east-west M-29 Autoroute and the railway line is

³¹ See Blandy, “*Chechnya: Federal Retribution*”, p120, Table 21.

³² Obshchestvennoye Mneniye Rossii po Sotsial'no-politicheskim Problemam - *Otchet o Rezul'tatakh issledovaniy Agentstva Regional'nykh Politicheskikh Issledovaniy v 1990-2000 gg.* Ed General Director ARPI dsh A V Milekhin and Scientific Director ARPI dip N P Popova, ARPI, Feb 2000. There is a need for a degree of caution. In column 8, in the North Caucasus, it will be noticed that the ethnic republics such as Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Osetia, Chechnya, Dagestan have not been included, presumably because the Russian population is considered insignificant. In the case of Adygeya of course the Russian population considerably exceeds that of the Adygey people.

the clutch of settlements including Alkhan-Yurt, Alkhan-Kala, Kulary, Shaami-Yurt and Zakan-Yurt which were of great importance to the *boyeviki* not only in their southern escape plans but also because of their proximity to Urus-Martan and Achkhoy-Martan, from where movement to and from the comparative peace of Aushev's Ingushetia was a much needed possibility.

The three settlements of Alkhan-Yurt, Alkhan-Kala and Kulary were in fact suburbs of the Chechen capital, situated some 11 km to the southwest of Groznyy with a complex of routes leading to the south and west. Alkhan-Yurt was a small settlement with a peacetime population of around 9,000 inhabitants consisting of 2,000 family compounds. The settlements provided hardened centres of resistance, giving a degree of security and protection, if held by Chechen *boyeviki* and Islamic extremists, to *bandformirovaniya* making good their escape from the city having conducted combat operations right up to the last possible moment. In fact, Alkhan-Yurt, Alkhan-Kala, Shaami-Yurt and Zakan-Yurt were vital components in the Chechen break-out and withdrawal plan from Groznyy. This of course was the reason for Commander OGV(W) encountering strong resistance towards the end of November 1999. To a thrusting, competitive, uncompromising Russian such as Vladimir Shamanov, Commander OGV (West), it was essential that any resistance by the *boyeviki* holding these three settlements was speedily and effectively destroyed. The tenacity of the Chechen fighter assisted by the Islamic extremist element may well have been instrumental in causing the brutal behaviour of the Federal troops against the local inhabitants.

The gradual but remorseless forward progress of the Federal Forces, even though it "*brought to mind the effect of an overflow of water which flows in the direction of least resistance*"³³, was achieved by indiscriminate artillery and aviation strikes. So when Chechen fighters began to accumulate in Alkhan-Yurt from the beginning of November 1999 in efforts to secure exit routes out of Groznyy - having previously been forced to abandon Goragorskiy - the Terek and Sundzha Ridges and the settlements of Alkhan-Yurt and Alkhan-Kala were subjected to an almost daily routine of terror, receiving their ration of artillery bombardment and air raids. The archives of *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*³⁴ compiled into Table 2 below provide an indication of the punishment meted out to the luckless inhabitants of Alkhan-Yurt and Alkhan-Kala prior to the assault on Alkhan-Yurt on 1 December.

³³ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, No 197 (2013), 21 October 1999, p1, "*Federalnyye voyska podoshli k Groznomu*" by Mikhail Ragimov.

³⁴ <http://www.ng.ru>, *Severnyy Kavkaz: khronika konflikta*. Weekly summaries produced on following dates: 13, 20, 27 November and 4 December 1999.

Table 2 - Scale of Artillery & Aerial Punishment on Alkhan-Yurt Between 6 and 30 November 1999

Date	Weapon System/Sorties	Targets
6 November	Surface-to-surface missile: 8 missiles 'Tochka' Artillery Aviation	Western suburbs of Groznyy Krasnostepanovskiy, Katyr-Yurt 15 strong points
7 November	Aviation - 30 sorties Aviation - mining	Groznyy suburbs , Gudermes, Bamut Argun gorge
8 November	Artillery Aviation - flying halted due to bad weather	Outskirts of Groznyy , Argun, Urus-Martan, Pervomayskaya and Gudermes
9 November	Front aviation - 30 sorties Army aviation helicopters - 18 missions Artillery - salvo fire	Bamut, Duba-Yurt, Chishki Outskirts of Groznyy Samashki, Zakan-Yurt, Kulary , Urus-Martan, Bamut
10 November	Aviation - 60 sorties	Areas of Groznyy , Gudermes, Bamut, Shali, Urus-Martan
11 November	Aviation - 23 sorties Artillery/aviation	Boyeviki positions Groznyy, Argun, Komsomol'skoye, Tangi, Petropavlovskaya, Staraya Sunzha, Shali, Serzhen-Yurt, Mesker- Yurt, Elistanzhi
14 November	Army aviation - 72 sorties	Troop combat support/logistical support
15 November	Aviation - 70 sorties Army aviation helicopters - 45 missions	Bamut, Groznyy, Chernorech'ye, Avtury, Benoy- Yurt, Gekhi, Alkhan-Yurt, Alkhan-Kala, Kulary, Tsa-Vedeno
17 November	Artillery/Aviation	Prigorodnoye, Chechen-Aul, Tashkala, Mesker- Yurt, Petropavlovskoye, Pervomayskaya, Alkhan-Yurt , Urus-Martan, Achkhoy-Martan, Proletarskoye, Pervomayskaya, Vedeno, Akhar, Argun
18 November	Aviation - 50	Urus-Martan, Alkhan-Yurt , Bilinskoy, Gekhi, Groznskoye, Proletarskoye, Raduzhnoye, Koshkel'dy, Novogroznskoye, Bachi-Yurt, Alleroy, Balansu, Bekhoy-Yurt, Nozhay-Yurt, Zandak, Serzhen-Yurt, Shali
20 November	Artillery	Alkhan-Kala and Vetti-Mokkh
21 November	Artillery; Aviation	Prigorodnoye, Petropavlovskaya, Oktyabr'skoye, Shovda, Belorech'ye, Kharachoy, Gekhi-Chu, Alkhan-Yurt , Stariy Achkhoy, Alleroy
22 November	Artillery; Aviation - 50 sorties	Kurchaloy, Argun, Alkhan-Yurt , Novaya Zhizn', Meskher-Yurt, Kiri, Goyty, Urus-Martan, Belorech'ye, Ushkhoy-Yurt, Alleroy, Shatoy, Urus-Martan, Shali, southern suburbs of Groznyy
23 November	Artillery; Aviation - 15 sorties; Army aviation helicopters - 8 missions	Urus-Martan, Alkhan-Yurt , Avtury, Chishki, Tsa-Vedeno, Argun gorge
24 November	Army aviation helicopters - 86 missions	Groznyy, Roshni-Chu, Tangi-Chu, Gekhi-Chu, Martan-Chu
25 November	Aviation - 15 sorties	Groznyy, Urus-Martan, Belgatoy, Avtury, Argun gorge
26 November	Army aviation helicopters - 42 missions	Groznyy, Argun gorge
27 November	Artillery/Aviation	Suburbs of Groznyy

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28 November	Artillery; Aviation - 60 sorties; Army aviation helicopters - 52 missions	Areas of Groznyy, Komsomol'skoye, Argun, Chechen Aul, Alkhan-Yurt
29 November	Aviation - 95 combat missions	Urus-Martan, Chiri-Yurt, Alkhan-Kala
30 November	Artillery/Aviation	Nozhay-Yurt, Alkhazurovo, Alkhan-Yurt

According to Human Rights Watch, Federal forces started shelling Alkhan-Yurt on 6 November 1999. The detail in Table 2 above makes no specific mention of Alkhan-Yurt until 15 November 1999, although the western suburbs and outskirts of Groznyy are mentioned several times. However, there is a reference to bombardment by salvo fire on 9 November of Kulary and Zakan-Yurt, which are 3.5 km and 10 km respectively from Alkhan-Yurt.

Box 4 - Deaths During the Shelling of Alkhan-Yurt³⁵

“Russian Forces began shelling and bombing Alkhan-Yurt on November 6, and the bombardment lasted intermittently until December 1, when Russian forces finally entered Alkhan-Yurt. Shelling was particularly intensive on November 8 and during the final days of November, and caused an unknown number of civilian casualties and the widespread destruction of civilian property in the town. Russian forces indiscriminately shelled Alkhan-Yurt, forsaking their Geneva Convention obligations to take serious precautions to limit the loss of civilian life during military operations”.

Indirect confirmation of the sheer scale and weight of artillery bombardment used in the neutralisation and destruction of targets was underlined in a recent article in *Voyennaya Mysl'*: “On average in the conduct of combat operations to kill one *Mojhakhed* (*boyevik*) in Afghanistan required up to 6,000 bullets and 55 shells, **in Chechnya more than 7,500 bullets and 70 rounds from regimental artillery**”³⁶ [Emphasis mine - CWB]. In other words, assuming that for regimental artillery the authors are basing their calculations on a 152 mm SP Gun/Howitzer M-1973 (2S3) “Acacia”, it required over one *boyevoy komplekt* (Bk)³⁷, over 60 rounds of 152 mm ammunition to destroy one fighter in Chechnya. There were a number of reasons for the high expenditure rate of artillery ammunition³⁸, the chief one being the need to protect Russian servicemen and reduce possible casualties

³⁵ http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/russia_chechnya2/Rusch004-03.htm

³⁶ *Voyennaya Mysl'*, No 3, May-June 2001, p14, *Oborona po printsipu ochagovykh deystviy* by Maj-Gen (Retd) I N Vorob'yev, Doctor of Military Science and Col N F Kuznetsov, Candidate of Military Science. Whilst it is not germane to the point being made, it is of general interest that: “In the exploitation of combat equipment (tanks, BTR, BMP) for 1 kilometre of a combat task 35 kilometres of motor resources are expended. Therefore for the effective engagement of the enemy in the conduct of a dispersed defence it is necessary to revise the volume and order of the ammunition supply of units”.

³⁷ “Unit of fire” for fire planning calculations and logistic purposes.

³⁸ See Blandy, “*Dagestan: The Storm*” Part 2 “*The Federal Assault on the Kadar Complex*”, P32, CSRC, June 2000, p51.

amongst them. But that meant that collateral damage to property and loss of life amongst innocent civilians was greatly increased.³⁹

The elders of Alkhan-Yurt had the problem of trying to convince the *boyeviki* that they should leave the vicinity.

Box 5 - Arrival & Lukewarm Reception of Boyeviki at Alkhan-Yurt⁴⁰

There was little contact between the villagers and the *boyeviki*, for the latter had their positions on the outskirts of the village. The *boyeviki* made use of partially constructed buildings, reinforcing them with sandbags, trenches and dugouts. Right from the start the residents of Alkhan-Yurt had made no moves to invite the *boyeviki* to Alkhan-Yurt. In fact many residents had expressed their anger towards the Chechen fighters, for “the fighters were not defenders, they were not defending us but were there only out of their own interests. Every street of our settlement is visible from the Sunzha Ridge. Our village is not made for defence, but the fighters came anyway. Near the cemetery, there is a stand of woods, and there they dug their trenches. We asked and demanded that they leave, but they told us to leave and threatened to shoot”.

On 16 November 1999, Haji Vakha Muradov and three other respected elders from the village attempted to meet the fighters to convince them to leave the village. The commander of the Chechen fighters replied that they would not leave but, “We cannot retreat from Russian soldiers. We are not going to hand the city over to them. We are not going to let the soldiers get to the city through this village. We are going to fight”. Some of the fighters began threatening the respected village elders, ordering them to leave or be shot. The fighters began shooting their weapons in the air, and the elders decided to leave. The elders tried on several other occasions to convince the fighters to leave without success”.

Another interesting fact was to emerge. According to Human Rights Watch, many villagers stated that the *boyeviki* were divided into two groups. The first group consisted of local Chechens who obeyed the request of the elders and left Alkhan-Yurt around 27 November. The other group which consisted of “*Arabs, Tajiks, Afghans, Kazakhs and Uzbeks*”⁴¹ refused to leave and stayed on until just before the arrival of Federal forces on 1 December on the basis that “*they had taken the vow of Ghazavat*”⁴² to fight Russians. This divergence of approach illustrates the difference between the pure Chechen separatist, respectful of Chechen traditions based on the values and way of life practised by the peoples of the Caucasus on the one hand, and on the other, the new Islamic Fundamentalist approach which goes beyond concepts of nationality or that of a single people, where the tenets of radical Islam have become the most important factor. Nevertheless, the elders met Federal forces’ commanders in an effort to stop the bombing of Alkhan-Yurt.

³⁹ See Blandy, *Chechnya: Federal Retribution - Encirclement, Forceful Intervention and Isolation*, P34, CSRC, March 2001, p104: “One wonders too, whether [Putin’s] comment relating to the need for accurate strikes was signifying an awareness that the strikes were not accurate but indiscriminate, and perhaps even at this stage a realisation that sooner or later the military would have to be reigned in”; the Khasbulatov report in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 29 December 2000, p8; also <http://2001.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2001/15n/n15n-s02.shtml>, *Novaya Gazeta*, No 15, 1 March 2001, p1, *Bes predela - Strelyayut men’she. No i men’she nadezhd* by Anna Politkovskaya.

⁴⁰ http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/russia_chechnya2/Rusch004-02.htm

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

Table 3 - Sequence of Events Between 25 November and 11 December 1999 at Alkhan-Yurt⁴³

Date	Action
25 Nov	Russian ultimatum to Chechen elders: "Remove the fighters from Alkhan-Yurt in exchange for sparing the town from further Russian fire". Chechen elders in Alkhan-Yurt powerless to comply with the Federal demands.
26 Nov	Russians attempt to capture Alkhan-Yurt. Fierce fighting ⁴⁴ . Russians discontinue assault and retreat. Russians did not expect any resistance because the elders had told them the fighters were going to retreat.
30 Nov	Fighters abandon positions and leave Alkhan-Yurt. Chechen fighters of local origin left Alkhan-Yurt on 27 Nov.
1 Dec	Federal forces enter Alkhan-Yurt without meeting any resistance. Russians seal off Alkhan-Yurt, refusing to let civilians in or out. House-to-house search. Serious abuses committed. Live grenades thrown into cellars. Looting starts immediately. Many civilians expelled to Kulary. Some 500 civilians remain when Russian troops go on the rampage, looting, burning homes, summary execution of at least 14 innocent civilians, and rape of a number of Chechen women.
1-10 Dec	Occupation of Alkhan-Yurt by Federal Forces. Systematic and organised looting by large number of soldiers. Loot stored in houses occupied by Russian commanders as well as in soldiers' tents. Transported openly in military vehicles.
11 Dec	News of killing and other abuses starts to leak out. Chechens seek meeting with Comd OGV (West). Human Rights Watch refused entry by Federal military. Accounts of refugees being herded by tanks and harassed by fire from Kulary.
17 Dec	Visit by Federal Plenipotentiary Representative to Chechnya Nikolay Koshman and Malik Saydullayev to Alkhan-Yurt. Saydullayev recognises some of his own crockery in goods looted by troops and awaiting transport. Soldiers of 15 Bn are identified by villagers and Saydullayev as being responsible.

Human Rights Watch state that due to the Chechens' experience of artillery bombardment during the previous conflict in 1994-1996, the inhabitants of Alkhan-Yurt were better prepared and consequently able to take measures to improve their chances of survival: "*We already had some experience, the [first] war lasted many years.⁴⁵ We had good underground shelters, and many people slept there, and many slept in semi-cellar premises*".⁴⁶ Whilst enhanced shelter, basement and cellar may have proved a welcome refuge from air raid and artillery bombardment, the peaceful civilian population confined to underground abodes were vulnerable to the lob of grenade from outside.

⁴³ From materials in http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/russia_chechnya2/Rusch004-02.htm Further reports of events on 1 December can be found in "Chechnya: Federal Retribution "Encirclement, Forceful Intervention & Isolation"" by C W Blandy, CSRC, P34, Appendix 1, March 2001.

⁴⁴ See also http://www.kavkaz.org/news//noyabr/news30_11.htm, "Kratkaya Svodka Novostey", 30 November-1 December 1999, *Poslednyaya novost'*.

⁴⁵ The first Russo-Chechen conflict in recent times lasted from 11 December 1994 until 31 August 1996, scarcely years!

⁴⁶ http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/russia_chechnya2/Rusch004-03.htm

*“At Alkhan-Yurt, another noisy battle, it cannot be managed without the Sibiriyaki (Siberians). The tank company fired 1,000 rounds in support of the infantry assault, in the area of the crossroads by the bridge. There, the boyeviki remained until death in houses made into pillboxes”.*⁴⁷ Map 2 above shows the bridge over the River Martan by the road junction.

According to Vladimir Shamanov, *“When our group in vehicles entered the settlement, all of a sudden it came under surprise short-range concentrated fire. Several vehicles caught fire and people were killed”.*⁴⁸ This is of interest taken in conjunction with the statement made by Yuri Dyomin to Human Rights Watch that *“underground trenches ran through the entire village, and that ‘each house’ had an underground firing position”.*⁴⁹ It will also be remembered that during the second phase of the Federal counter-terrorist operation in Dagestan directed against the Kadar Complex between August and September 1999, one of the defensive features developed by the Wahhaby was that: *“The fighters’ positions took more than a year to prepare with echeloned fire positions protected by reinforced concrete structures and linked together by hidden communication trenches intersecting the terrain, in woods and hollows caches of food and weapons were prepared beforehand”.*⁵⁰ *“The extremists had turned every house in Karamakhi into an impregnable fortress ...”*⁵¹

Perhaps there was more than a ring of truth in Dyomin's remarks, remembering that Emir Khattab had responsibility for war-preparations in the area south of Grozny; or was it simply a matter of measures taken to improve chances of survival? Perhaps too, Haji Vakha Muradov, Mufti of Alkhan-Yurt, had been mistaken with regard to the movements of the two groups of fighters. As Mufti his primary concern would have been for the safety of his people; at the age of 75 he was unlikely to have deviated from the traditional ways of Islamic worship practised by the Sufi Brotherhoods in the Caucasus and willingly welcomed radical Islam and its extremist adherents.⁵²

It has been alleged that *“killings went on for two more weeks, without any apparent attempt by the Russian authorities to stop it”*⁵³ and furthermore that the Chechen

⁴⁷ <http://zavtra.ru/cgi//veil//data/zavtra/00/332/32.html>, *Zavtra*, 15, 11 April 2000, p2, *Budanov v tyur'me i na voyne* by Konstantin Ratiborov. Note that Col Yury Budanov was the Commander 160 Tank Regiment which provided a tank company in support of the operation at Alkhan-Yurt.

⁴⁸ <http://www.nns.ru/interv/int996.html>, *Vek*, 11 February 2000, *Geroy Russii, Major General Vladimir Shamanov: “Toropites’ seyat’ dobroye, a to posevnaya zakonchitsya”*, interview by Vladimir Terekhov and Ol’ga Mishina.

⁴⁹ http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/russia_chechnya2/Rusch004-02.htm “Background”, p3, endnote 8.

⁵⁰ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, No 162 (1978), 2 September 1999, p1, *“Dagestanskaya lovushka”*, by Milrad Fatullayev.

⁵¹ *“Voyna v Dagestane. Khronika sobytii - Boyeviy deystviya 1 September 1999”.*

⁵² See Blandy, *Dagestan: The Storm - Part 2 - The Federal Assault on the “Kadar Complex”*, p16ff.

⁵³ http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/russia_chechnya2/Rusch004-08.htm, Human Rights Watch, *The Response of the Federal Authorities*.

inhabitants of Alkhan-Yurt had tried to meet Major General Vladimir Shamanov, commander OGV (West) on 11 December 1999 about their continued subjection to abuses by Federal troops. According to Human Rights Watch, at around this time General Shamanov was somewhere between Alkhan-Yurt and the neighbouring settlement of Kulary. Shamanov refused to listen to the desperate villagers. The Chechens pleaded with him, *“telling him about the killings by Russian soldiers in Alkhan-Yurt, but after 10 minutes the commander forced the villagers to leave”*.⁵⁴

The report minces no words, but unequivocally notes that *“a leading Russian commander was in such close proximity to Russian forces committing abuses and failed to take appropriate action to stop these abuses, let alone listen to the concerns of residents of Alkhan-Yurt about abuses, raises serious questions about Major General Shamanov’s complicity in the abuses committed in Alkhan-Yurt”*.⁵⁵ It will be remembered that Shamanov had the reputation of a general officer whose *“belief is to be in the front line, to know the real situation, the dispositions of those who risk their lives. In the Western Troop Grouping there was no gap between commander and soldier, complete cooperation, about which I am proud”*.⁵⁶ Many unanswered questions surround the conduct of Vladimir Shamanov, a general basking under the sobriquet of *“The Trench General”*. He was also very much aware of the ill-discipline of contract soldiers.

Box 6 - The Removal of the Unnamed Colonel⁵⁷

“Several sources indicate that because of the heavy losses the Russian forces had encountered during the battle for Alkhan-Yurt, the soldiers were ‘given’ the village to do with as they pleased. ‘Lecha L’, a 33 year-old merchant was able to travel to Alkhan-Yurt on December 11 after paying a hefty bribe to a FSB agent from Moscow who accompanied him to Alkhan-Yurt. When they arrived at Alkhan-Yurt, Lecha L and the FSB agent came across a group of soldiers, including a colonel, loading looted goods onto a truck in Demilkhanov street. A 15 minute argument ensued between the FSB agent and the colonel.

According to Lecha L, the FSB agent asked the colonel what he was doing, and the colonel replied, “We were given this village; we’re allowed to tear this village apart; we took it by storm, we had our way with it for two weeks”. The FSB agent allegedly responded, “Who gave you the right, who gave you the village to do as you please?”, and tried to arrest the colonel... According to Lecha L the colonel then turned to the villagers who had gathered and yelled at them, “You sell petrol to Russian territory and you want an independent state and to buy things with the Russian ruble, feed yourselves with Russian bread! That is not happening! We will destroy you, every last one!” **The argument ended when other military personnel drove up and took the colonel away.**” [Emphasis mine - CWB.]

No less reprehensible on the part of OGV (West) was the method Federal troops used in moving the traumatised civilians from Alkhan-Yurt to Kulary.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ <http://www.nns.ru/interv/int1642.html>, *Novaya Gazeta*, 19 June 2000, p1 of 10, “*Ya Shamanov*” an interview by Anna Politkovskaya, cited in Blandy “Chechnya: Federal Retribution”, where more details of Shamanov and his character can be found.

⁵⁷ http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/russia_chechnya2/Rusch004-08.htm, Human Rights Watch, *The Response of the Federal Authorities*.

Box 7 - Use of Tanks to Herd Refugees on the Way to Kulary⁵⁸

After being detained, Rustam R and the others were finally told "If you want to live, there is the road to Kulary" and started walking in that direction. Rustam R explained what happened as they started walking on the road towards Kulary, confirming what Umarov had told Human Rights Watch: "We had gone about 300 metres, and the tanks were crawling slowly behind us. And so from Kulary, they began, left and right, to hit us with shells. Can you believe it! I swear by Allah, it is the truth! On the road they were not shooting, or mocking, but egging us on. We'd run forward and there would be a shot in that direction, to the left, to the right. When we crossed the bridge, they then stopped. Then I understood this had been taunting, they were directing us like livestock".

Although similarities in the scale of brutality exist between the events at Alkhan-Yurt and the massacre of Chechens by Federal troops at Shamashki in 1995, the statements of Vladimir Shamanov and Yuri Dyomin concerning the construction of underground passages cannot be discounted, particularly bearing in mind Emir Khattab's responsibilities in the Chechen preparations; secondly, the importance that the Chechen Command placed on Alkhan-Yurt, Alkhan-Kala, Kulary and other settlements located around the southern perimeter of Grozny for the evacuation plan; thirdly, the requirement to deposit and store weapons, ammunition and equipment close by the capital ready for any future infiltration, seizure and occupation of Grozny.⁵⁹

Whilst numerous questions surround Major General Shamanov's part in the battles for Alkhan-Yurt and subsequent events, members of the Federal forces obviously need to undergo psycho-medical rehabilitation before returning to normal life. On the question of whether the Ministry of Defence had given any thought to a programme of rehabilitation for officers and servicemen Colonel General Gennadiy Troshev told Timofey Borisov⁶⁰ that they had thought out measures whereby servicemen could go for rest and recuperation on the Black Sea coast and in the sanatoria of Kavminvodskiy rayon. A recent article in *Voyennaya Mysl'*⁶¹ concerned the psychological-morale condition of servicemen; particularly the experience of maintaining morale in a Naval Infantry battalion in the counter-terrorist operation

⁵⁸ http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/russia_chechnya2/Rusch004-04.htm, *Russian Soldiers enter Alkhan-Yurt*.

⁵⁹ Nevertheless, even in July 2001, despite announcements that Federal Forces [according to <http://www.nns.ru/press-file/dagestan/chron/2001/05/04.html>, p2, "42 MRD (MOD) of 15,000 men, 46 MRD Internal Troops MVD 7,000 men and the Itum-Kala Border Troops det of 1,380 men, amounting to between 50,000 and 70,000 men) have complete control of Chechnya, there are reports of terrorist activity in and around Alkhan-Yurt and Alkhan-Kala. According to [Strana.Ru/Yuzhnyy okrug/ V Urus-Martanovskom rayone Chechni](http://Strana.Ru/Yuzhnyy_okrug/V_Urus-Martanovskom_rayone_Chechni), p1, "Employees of law enforcement organs discovered in one of the private houses in Alkhan-Yurt two general purpose 'Strela' air defence complexes with ammunition today". The house was reported to belong to a person in the "Dzhamaad" band led by the not unknown field commander Arbi Barayev, since killed by Federal Forces.

⁶⁰ <http://www.nns.ru/interv/int3339.html>, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 28 March 2001, "Segodnya armiya v Chechne ushla na vtoroy plan, i eto pravil'no", interviewed by Timofey Borisov.

⁶¹ *Voyennaya Mysl'*, No 3, May-June 2001, p41, *Ob opyte moral'no-psikhologicheskogo obespecheniya kontrterroristicheskoy operatsii* by R-Adm A G D'yakonov.

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in Chechnya. The article notes that a 15-20 day rest period was normal for those returning from hot spots, and that over half of them spent this period with their families. It goes on to mention mobile teams of military psychologists and psychiatrists who debriefed each returnee individually and in some cases recommended special programmes for them. However, despite a whole series of articles about psychological preparation and the statement of Colonel General Troshev little attention seems to be paid to long term rehabilitation. What material does appear seems to be preoccupied with preparing soldiers for combat rather than helping them deal with the psychological effects.

The question must be asked, what are the particular ferocities, characteristics and peculiarities of this war which make it so horrendous for the Russian?

Tangi-Chu - 26-27 March 2000 “Unhinged By Stress”

*“In the [first] three and half months of the war he lost only one man. Only one, over the battles along the way from Goragorsk to Duba-Yurt ... For me in this land and in this war perhaps the only trophy is a return ticket home, to Transbaykal, said Budanov. It was evident that the commander, as also many of his officers, was on the very edge”.*⁶²

Tangi-Chu, by the Tangi mountain stream in Urus-Martan rayon, is not the only small Chechen settlement to become notorious for the alleged perpetration of atrocities by Federal forces. During the first Russo-Chechen conflict Roshni-Chu, situated by the Roshni rivulet in the next valley, was the object of an air-raid at the beginning of October 1995 by aircraft with no identification markings. Of particular note in this instance was the gunning down of a small child in the open by a helicopter gunship on its return pass; this took place during the uneasy cease-fire between 31 July and the elections in December 1995. Perhaps the attempted assassination of General Anatoliy Romanov, Commander Internal Troops in Chechnya, on 6 October 1995 in the tunnel by Grozny main station may have been one factor which precipitated this wanton act.

Federal Forces' behaviour in the village of Tangi-Chu was to become even more notorious than Roshni-Chu following the extraordinary events which took place on the night of 26/27 March 2000, when Kheda Kungayeva was taken from her home, beaten, raped and murdered. These crimes are subject to the due processes of law at the North Caucasus Military District court at Rostov-on-Don⁶³, where Colonel Yuriy Budanov has been charged with kidnapping resulting in death, abuse of office accompanied by violence with serious consequences, and the murder of an abductee.⁶⁴

Box 8 - Summary of Events

“On the night of 26/27 March 2000 at about 0100 hrs, the commander of the division [?160 Tank Regiment] 13206 Col Y D Budanov arrived in the village of Tangi-Chu in the Urus-Martan district of the Chechen Republic on APC No 391 together with servicemen Sgt Grigoriyev, Sgt Li-En-Shou and Pte Yegorov.

On the orders of Colonel Budanov, his subordinates forcibly took citizen K V Kungayeva from House No 7 Zarechni Lane and drove her to the division's [? regiment's] encampment on the APC.

⁶² <http://zavtra.ru/cgi//veil/data/zavtra/00/332/32.html>, *Zavtra*, No 15 (332), 11 April 2000, p1, *Budanov v tyurme i na voynye* by Konstantin Ratiborov.

⁶³ Since 27 February 2001. There have been a number of interruptions to the court case, mainly due to the mental and physical state of the defendant.

⁶⁴ <http://south.strana.ru/stories/2001/02/28/983344626/983362977.html>, 28 February 2001, *Pervyy den' suda nad Budanovym* "... Col Yuriy Budanov was born on 24 November 1963 in the town of Khartsysk, Donets Oblast'. In 1987 he completed the Khar'kov Guards Higher Tank School. In 1999 by correspondence - the Armoured Forces Combined Arms Academy. In January 2000 Budanov was decorated with the Order of Bravery. Then he was promoted to Colonel. Resident in the town of Gusinoozersk in Buryatiya, served in 160 Tank Regiment in the Siberian Military District, has a son of 13 years old”.

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Around 0300 hrs on 27 March 2000, Y D Budanov strangled K V Kungayeva in trailer 131 (reportedly Budanov's quarters). On the orders of Col Budanov, Pte Yegorov, Sgt Li-En-Shou and Sgt Grigoriyev took the body of K V Kungayeva and buried her in a forested area near the encampment. Around 1000 hrs on 28 March 2000 Kungayeva's body was exhumed.⁶⁵

"The formal charges read in court when the trial opened early this month incorporate Col Budanov's explanation of Ms Kungayeva's death: that he believed her to be a rebel sniper who had killed soldiers in his regiment two months earlier, and that he killed her in an uncontrollable fit of revenge."⁶⁶

According to Human Rights Watch⁶⁷, in this instance the Federal military were to respond with alacrity by: arresting Budanov and keeping him in custody; giving assistance to the Kungayev family; condemning Budanov at the highest levels, without waiting for the outcome of a trial; returning Kheda Kungayeva's body to the family on 28 March 2000. Furthermore, Major General Aleksandr Verbitskiy informed the villagers about the circumstances leading to Kheda Kungayeva's untimely death and promised that "*justice would be severe and swift*".⁶⁸ Senior Federal military officers attended the funeral on 29 March 2000, which was paid for by the Federal authorities.⁶⁹ "*It is the first and only case in which Russian authorities promptly and publicly acknowledged a crime, perpetrated by Russian federal forces against civilians in Chechnya, that constituted a gross violation of humanitarian and human rights law*".⁷⁰

Whilst Budanov's behaviour was described by the Russian military as an exceptional example of wanton criminality by a serviceman: "*However, the abduction, beating, rape and murder of Kungayeva **reflect a pattern of violations perpetrated by federal forces that has been exhaustively documented by Human Rights Watch and other non-governmental organisations***".⁷¹ Initially, the Federal authorities publicly accused Budanov of raping and murdering Kungayeva, but subsequently were to indict him on murder, kidnapping and abuse of office. Charges of rape were neither brought against Budanov nor anyone else. Possible contributory factors, including Budanov's physical and mental state, are noted below.

⁶⁵ <http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/chech-ck0226.htm>, *Backgrounder on the Case of Kheda Kungayeva*. "Kungayeva had just turned 18 on 22 March 2000. Her given name was El'za, but was known as Kheda."

⁶⁶ <http://www.nytimes.com>, 18 March 2001, *Colonel's Trial Puts Russian Justice to Test* by Michael Wines.

⁶⁷ *Backgrounder on the Case of Kheda Kungayeva*.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid, "... Col-Gen Valeriy Baranov, acting Commander OGV (Chechnya), Maj-Gen Valeriy Gerasimov acting Commander OGV (West) and his deputy Maj-Gen Aleksandr Verbitskiy. Vissa Kungayev said that the generals were very helpful, paid for the funeral, asked for his forgiveness, and expressed sympathy."

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid. Emphasis - CWB.

Box 9 - Earlier Activities at Tangi-Chu

According to Kheda Kungayeva's father, Vissa Kungayev, "Budanov's tank regiment had been encamped just outside Tangi-Chu since February 2000, and Budanov himself had a notorious reputation among the villagers. About 10 days before the rape and murder of Kungayeva, Budanov reportedly arbitrarily searched and looted several homes in Tangi-Chu, and on 25 March he reportedly looted and threatened to torch several other homes".⁷²

Budanov's Previous Erratic Behaviour

"An important witness in the Colonel Yuriy Budanov case testified on Thursday. According to the [vehicle] commander who drove Budanov to the village of Tangi-Chu on the evening the latter murdered the 18 year old Chechen girl Elsa Kungayeva, Budanov and all the officers in his regiment were drunk. Thus the charges against Budanov will become graver.

This is not the first time Budanov's comrades in arms have intended to say something in his favour and ended up saying something absolutely outrageous and detrimental to his defence. **Previously an officer attempting to illustrate the respect that Budanov's subordinates had for him, recalled an incident when Budanov, angry that his order had not been fulfilled fast enough, threw a grenade into an officers' tent. The officers only just managed to get out in time before the grenade exploded.**" [Emphasis - CWB.]⁷³

According to Gazeta.Ru⁷⁴ it had been hard from the outset to believe that Budanov was sober on the night of 26/27 March 2000 for two reasons: first, it was his daughter's third birthday; secondly, it was the day of the presidential elections, in which victory for Vladimir Putin, the Army's 'favourite' was all but a foregone conclusion.

Lunch & Subsequent Events

New York Times Report⁷⁵

Colonel Budanov and his deputy [Lt Col Ivan Fedorov] began drinking vodka at lunch on 26 March 2000 in the officers' canteen at their encampment, about a mile from the village of Tangi.

Colonel Budanov's lawyer, Mr Mukhin, says his client drank about 250 grams of vodka - about six times one and a half ounce shots - and that there was no proof that he was intoxicated.

The prosecution says that by 7pm the two men were drunk. The deputy decided to check the combat readiness of one company, the statement says, by ordering three armoured personnel carriers to open canon and machine gun fire on Tangi.

When the officer in charge of the weapons hesitated, Colonel Budanov's deputy took command himself, shelling and destroying a house on the village's outskirts.

According to the statement, Colonel Budanov heard the gunfire and ordered the shelling halted and then turned on the officer who had delayed the attack, threw him to the ground and ordered him hogtied.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ <http://www.gazeta.ru/2001/05/11/budanovImpl.shtml>, *Budanov Implicated by Comrade in Arms*, with text by Artyom Vernidub.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Op cit, New York Times on the web, 18 March 2001, p3 of 5.

Report from Lenta.Ru of 20 April 2001⁷⁶

The following was established, that the Colonel and his deputy, the Chief of Staff of 160 Tank Regiment Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Fedorov, ordered Senior Lieutenant Bagreyev to open fire at a house in the village of Tangi, which according to intelligence reports was not lived in but used by *boyeviki* as an observation post.

Fedorov ordered fire to be opened fire for its destruction. Bagreyev refused to carry out the order, as a result of which Budanov and Fedorov beat him and threw him into a pit.⁷⁷

Report of Lenta.Ru of 15 May 2001⁷⁸

Former subordinates of Yuriy Budanov maintained that at the time of the move out to Tangi-Chu, where on the night of 26/27 March El'za Kungayeva was abducted, Budanov was in a state of alcoholic intoxication. Crew members of BMP 390 with whom Budanov went to Tangi-Chu and took Kungayeva from the house gave evidence ...

Budanov's Mental State⁷⁹**Evidence of Major Mikhail Selivanets**

"After the battles in Komsomol'skoye⁸⁰, Budanov almost every night went to the doctor and made him give him sedative injections.

The regiment had experienced heavy losses as the result of battles - over the whole time in Chechnya 160 regiment had lost 23 killed (of whom 12 were officers), 70 wounded.

According to Selivanets, representatives of the FSB repeatedly warned Budanov about the fact that the *boyeviki* had sentenced him to death. The regimental commander was in a stressful state, which according to Selivanets, possibly led to his derangement.

Budanov himself not so long before the incident at Tangi-Chu personally made arrangements to remove standard-issue weapons from officers and praporshchiks. As he himself explained, people amass psychological weariness. They could become unhinged. **The first to become unhinged was the regimental commander himself**".

Budanov's War Record

Whilst it is not the place of this article to sit in judgement concerning the alleged crimes that took place in Tangi-Chu, research does provide an insight into some of the circumstances facing Federal forces in the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya, a brutal war without quarter. In an accompanying explanation to a series of articles concerning Budanov and his regiment, the editor of *Zavtra* wrote:

⁷⁶ <http://lenta.ru/vojna/2001/04/20/budanov/>, Lenta.Ru: Chechnya: *Leytenant Bagrayev otkazalsya svidetel'stvovat' protiv Budanova*.

⁷⁷ Appropriate conclusions can be drawn from the fact that Bagreyev refused to testify against Budanov in court.

⁷⁸ <http://lenta.ru/vojna/2001/05/10/>, Lenta.Ru: Chechnya: *Podchinennyye Budanova soobshchili, chto on byl pyan*.

⁷⁹ <http://south.strana.ru/stories/2001/02/28/983344626/988031327.html>, 23 April 2001, *Polkovnik Budanov byl' zakazan boyevikami zadolgo do ubiystva El'zy Kungayeva*.

⁸⁰ Colonel Budanov was involved in the heavy fighting around Volch'i Vorota towards the end of February, and at the beginning of March 2000 with the blockade and battles at Komsomol'skoye, where it was reported that he became involved in hand-to-hand fighting on two occasions.

*“Budanov with his health - and the colonel in this war alone was concussed three times - earned his percentage of the rating “the snake-charmer of Chechnya”. In truth in the Western Group of Forces of Vladimir Shamanov, in all there was one tank regiment which carried out all its tasks, annihilating the fighters’ strongest fortified areas, and the first to move into Groznyy. Budanov’s regiment. The regiment for six months took part in this war’s very fierce battles, the main strike force of the Western Grouping. **For half a year Budanov fought without replacement, and in truth for him it was the second war in Chechnya** [my emphasis - CWB], he was awarded the “Order of Bravery” and [subsequently] a bar”.*⁸¹

On 20 February 2001 Colonel General Gennadiy Troshev, by now Commander North Caucasus Military District, said with regard to Colonel Budanov that: *“He had seen him a few times. Budanov gave him the impression of being an honourable military officer, who would not run away under fire. Yes, and they do not give the Order for Bravery **‘by the back stairs’**”*⁸² and he had two of them”.

In a later interview Colonel General Troshev also made the remark that: *“the occasion which happened with Budanov, of course was unpleasant ... **only a person who himself has been in the war can understand Budanov** [my emphasis - CWB]”.*⁸⁴ In answer to the question that the legal process over Budanov had achieved a wide resonance, who had blamed Budanov and who had openly supported him, Colonel General Troshev gave the following reply:

*“It is not surprising. I most certainly do not defend the conduct of Budanov, but I would like to say that the guilt is different. It’s one thing when they cut off the heads of innocent foreign specialists who have come to restore the republic, or servicemen, when they send sliced off-fingers of hostages through the post demanding ransom ... Here you have a colonel, who over the whole campaign took care of the people in his regiment, having lost only one killed, then within a week lost 10 of his subordinates from a sniper’s bullet, and in such an affected state killed Kungayeva whom he took for a sniper - that’s another thing. At any rate the mothers to whom he returned [their] sons alive and the relatives of those tens of his subordinates mention Budanov by name”.*⁸⁵

The Wider Implications

It was significant that Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov attended the first day of the court hearing at Rostov-on-Don in the case against Colonel Budanov on 28

⁸¹ <http://zavtra.ru/cgi//veil/data/zavtra/00/332/32.html>, *Zavtra*, No 15 (332), 11 April 2000, p1 to 7. The editorial explanation follows the article by Konstantin Ratibov on p6.

⁸² Meaning he had to really earn it, for they do not make these awards like campaign medals, for example.

⁸³ <http://www.nns.ru/interv/int3123.html>, *Trud*, 20 February 2001, *Gennadiy Troshev: Klyuch ot pobedy nad banditam - v rukakh naroda Chechni* interview by Lyudmila Karamysheva, *Trud* special correspondent.

⁸⁴ <http://www.nns.ru/interv/int3339.html>, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 28 March 2001, *Segodnya armiya v Chechne ushla na vtoroy plan, i eto pravil’no* by Timofey Borisov.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

February 2001. Vladimir Shamanov used the trial as a platform to berate the administration of President Putin as *“craven kowtowing to the West”*.⁸⁶

Vladimir Shamanov had been decorated on 28 December 2000 by Boris Yel'tsin with Russia's highest honour, 'Hero of the Russian Federation', secured the governorship of Ul'yanovsk on 24 December 2000 despite the earlier allegations of the Chechens, the detailed investigations and reports of Human Rights Watch and the argument used against him that *“the election of Shamanov, well-known for his vicious campaigns against the Chechens, would provoke terrorist attacks in the region”*.⁸⁷

It is necessary to recall the interview given by General Shamanov, Commander of OGV (West) to *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* in late 1999. The interview had considerable impact, for the General unleashed an unequivocal, robust response to any consideration being given to a premature cessation of combat operations in Chechnya, which came to be seen in some quarters as a warning to politicians:

“I would like to remind [you] that the executive and legislative branches of power have supported forceful anti-terrorist action. The fact is also important that all the subjects of the Federation, besides two or three, support the Army operating within the confines of the Constitution. It is possible to pick out several aspects: first, if they stop the Army, a powerful outflow from the Armed Forces of officers of different ranks, including generals, will happen. It will not be possible to sustain the officer corps of Russia. Some even consider that the country with such a turn of events would lead to the brink of a civil war. Second, one must take into account senior comrades who at the beginning of the 90s, in 1993 and 1996 were very young lieutenants who believed in the importance of service for the New Russia. It is extremely risky to ignore their attitudes. Third, the West does not stop attempting to keep Russia in a state of continuous decay”.⁸⁸

It was not so long ago that the Army was one of the main supports of President Putin. A year ago it seemed that differing from the example of his predecessor, the new President of Russia had finally turned personally to the needs of the Army. The brilliant operations in Chechnya and the promotion of a series of key people in state appointments who were close to the Army and Security Services, and a whole series of sharp announcements about the importance of rearming and re-equipping the Army, the raising of the financial support and maintenance for the military, their social security - *“all this of course rapidly made Putin an unconditional favourite in the presidential race and in the final outcome secured him victory even in the first round”*.⁸⁹

The latest closed questionnaires of the military show a sharp reduction in those whose hopes for the rebirth of Russia and the Army are linked to Putin. If the

⁸⁶ The Jamestown Foundation: Chechnya Crisis, Vol 2, Issue 13, 27 March 2001, p4.

⁸⁷ EastWest Institute, Russian Regional Report, Vol 6, No 1, 10 January 2001.

⁸⁸ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, No 207 (2023), 4 November 1999, *Rossiya ne dol'zhna opravdyvat'sya za svoye stremleniye pokonchit' s terrorizmom* by Vladimir Gutnov.

⁸⁹ <http://zavtra.ru/cgi/veil//data/zavtra/01/379/61.html>, *Zavtra*, No 10 (379), 5 March 2001, *Polkovnik Putin I Polkovnik Budanov* by Capt Vladislav Shurygin.

number of those who support the President remains sufficiently high at 79%, the percentage of those who positively evaluate the activity of Putin on strengthening the Armed Forces has fallen in the last three months from 62% to 45%.⁹⁰ *“This is an alarming sign. An indirect support of that fact are the mass demonstrations of the inhabitants of Rostov-on-Don against the trial of Colonel Budanov”*.⁹¹ People not only express their solidarity with Budanov, but also openly talk about the fact that the Presidential administration has betrayed Budanov and over the last months has in fact surrendered Chechnya to the *boyeviki*.

The telling arrival at Budanov's trial of the former Commander 58 Army, one of the heroes of the Chechen War, Lieutenant General Shamanov, who made a sharp statement in defence of Budanov, was in fact a call for an investigation into Moscow's position. Another general of the Chechen War, General Troshev, spoke in defence of Budanov. In fact both Troshev and Shamanov spoke not simply in defence of their arrested subordinate, but against a campaign of defamation and disparagement of the Army, which was being deployed in the mass media with the authority of Putin, who was incapable of defending his Army from persecution and malicious attack. *“Confidence and trust in the President has begun to fall. Real actions are needed, real steps. But there are none. On the other hand each day brings new evidence of the Kremlin's intrigues against the Army”*.⁹²

Perhaps the media treatment of the arrest of Colonel Budanov was the first alarm signal. From the point of view of the Russian military the story being beamed out on the ORT 'Presidential' channel and RTR's 'with the President' channel became an information time bomb. *“Even then serious analysts stated that such defamation of an army at war, and, yes, on leading television channels could not have taken place without being sanctioned by the Presidential administration”*.⁹³

Is the Governor of Ul'yanovsk lining himself up for the Presidential race in three years time? Perhaps, as some political observers believe, Shamanov could turn out to be a serious political rival to Putin.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid, p5.

⁹² Op cit, *Zavtra*, No 10 (379), 5 March 2001, p5 of 10.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ http://chechnya.jamestown.org/pubs/view/che_002_013_001.htm, The Jamestown Foundation: Chechnya Crisis, *Chechen Weekly*, Vol 2, Issue 13, 27 March 2001.

Islamic Ruling on Execution of Prisoners

"The 1990s bore witness to an appreciable increase in the prominence of Islam in the social life and politics of the Northern Caucasus. This was due, first, to the Islamic revival that has been sweeping all the Muslim regions of the former Soviet Union and, second, to the region's high propensity for conflict. One way or another, all the socio-political events occurring in this region have a so-called Islamic dimension".⁹⁵

The reasons for a 'high propensity for conflict' lie not only in history⁹⁶ but also in the present socio-economic situation. According to Malashenko the *"upswing in Islamic extremism lies in the continuous systemic crisis in the Northern Caucasus which results in the general frustration of the local Muslims ... disillusioned by the inconsistent and incompetent reforms⁹⁷, afflicted by the corruption of local and federal officials, and having lost faith in the ability of their own and Moscow's elites to resolve their problems, many Muslims are trying to find a solution in the so-called Islamic alternative. They believe that reinstating traditional Islamic standards of social life and calling for social justice as declared by Islam, combined with the heavy hand of power as sanctioned by the Almighty, will extricate them from the crisis".⁹⁸*

However, since the end of the 90s, a counter-tendency to the so-called Islamic alternative, the phenomenon of *Islamophobia*⁹⁹, has started to become active in the minds of many Russians, in particular those who were wounded and maimed, others who had relatives who perished in and those who witnessed the devastating explosions in public areas and apartment blocks in Moscow and in Southern Russia.¹⁰⁰ Those wars, those conflicts which are developing in the North Caucasus have created a certain aggressive image of Islam, which in turn to some degree has been strengthened by the approach of the mass media. In the light of *Islamophobia*, perhaps the phrase, *'It is the heavy hand of power as sanctioned by the Almighty'* demands further attention, because within those words lies some perception of an additional form of licence for the Mujahideen to take the lives of Russian servicemen in cold blood.

The Mujahideen made demands that Budanov be handed over to them for execution at their hands. *"The Russian Government was warned that should it fail to surrender Budanov, nine Russian prisoners who were caught marauding in a*

⁹⁵ <http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/2001/03am/summary.asp>, Aleksey Malashenko, Doctor of History, Director of Research Programmes at the Moscow Carnegie Centre *"Islamskiye Orientiry Severnogo Kavkaza"*, March 2001; "Summary".

⁹⁶ See C W Blandy publications passim, most recently *Chechnya: Two Federal Interventions "An Interim Comparison and Assessment"*, P29, CSRC, January 2000, p3ff.

⁹⁷ See Blandy, *Chechnya: Federal Retribution Encirclement, Forceful Intervention and Isolation*, P34, CSRC, March 2001, p15, "Political Considerations".

⁹⁸ Op cit, Aleksey Malashenko, *Islamskiye Orientiry Severnogo Kavkaza*, March 2001.

⁹⁹ Svobodnaya Mysl', No 10 (1488), 1999, p44-50, *"Islam v Rossii - Zametki politologa"* by Aleksey Malashenko.

¹⁰⁰ See Blandy, *Daghestan: The Storm - Part 1 - The 'Invasion' of Avaristan*, p11-12.

Chechen village would be executed".¹⁰¹ Needless to say, the Russian government did not hand over Colonel Budanov and subsequently the nine Russian OMON special police in Mujahideen custody were executed. Unsurprisingly, there were people in the Muslim world who condemned these executions by the Mujahideen in Chechnya, whilst other people critical of these acts demanded that the Mujahideen adhere to the international conventions governing the conditions for POWs, including respect for the rights of each prisoner and the prohibition on executing POWs. Through the medium of Azzam Publications, the Mujahideen put forward a justification for the execution of POWs.

Box 10 - Justification for Executing Prisoners of War
Five Opinions Regarding the Fate of Prisoners¹⁰²

Islamic Divine Law (Shariah) has guaranteed the rights of prisoners of war. Shariah protects the rights of prisoners, but also works to deter the enemy from the gross and deliberate violation of human rights. The Prophet, peace be upon him, treated prisoners in ways that varied according to circumstance and according to the person of each prisoner. Guided by the Shariah and the Sunnah (Prophetic Tradition), we will prove, using established principles from Divine Law, the validity of executing prisoners of war, including the nine Russian soldiers who were recently executed.

The first opinion argues that all unbelieving prisoners must be executed under all circumstances. The opinion states that the unbelieving prisoners of war may not be shown generosity nor ransomed...

The second opinion argues that all unbelieving prisoners, including Jews and Christians, must not be shown generosity or ransomed, and that they should be killed ... The second opinion, however, is broader than the first opinion in that it touches upon two additional points: the second opinion stresses the folly of releasing an enemy combatant to his people, as, freed, a prisoner may fight Muslims at a later occasion; secondly, this opinion validates the ransom of women and children, as they may not be executed. The second opinion also validates ransoming people of the book (Jews and Christians)...

The third opinion argues that prisoners of war may not be executed and that they must be shown generosity or ransomed.

The fourth opinion states that there can be no show of generosity or ransom towards prisoners until a Muslim victory is achieved and the unbelieving enemy is subjugated...

The fifth opinion confirms upon the Imam (commander/leader of the Muslims), or those legally deputized by the Imam, the right to choose any course of action deemed most beneficial to the Ummah. The Imam or his deputies may make their judgement irrespective of time or circumstances (unlike the fourth opinion), and may choose to kill the prisoners, exchange them for ransom, keep them in bondage, or show them mercy.

However, there is nothing even in recent Federal behaviour to suggest that there should be any softening of approach by the Chechen separatist or Islamic extremist toward the 'Russian invader'. Recent events will do nothing to ameliorate the situation, but instead continue to further fuel the hate of the Muslim Chechen separatists, the Islamic extremist and the loathing of the ordinary Chechen for the Russian military: first, the excessive violence in the sanitising of Assinovskaya and Sernovodsk between 1-4 July 2001, when even the pro-Moscow Chechen administration of Akhmed Kadyrov was forced to complain about the fact that *"military servicemen carrying out the special operation in these villages exceeded their authority ... in the course of the 'zachistka' a school and hospital were robbed of*

¹⁰¹ <http://www.qoqaz.co.za/html/articlesexecution.htm>, Azzam Publications, *Jihad in Chechnya: Islamic Ruling on Executing POWs*.

¹⁰² Ibid.

everything, but not one bandit was held, nor any weapons discovered nor explosives found".¹⁰³ Despite the fact that the Procurator of Chechnya Viktor Dakhnov "succeeded in confirming only 10 instances where there had been an illegal application of force"¹⁰⁴, there were additional reports concerning the public rape of a Chechen woman by Russian servicemen carried out in front of Chechen men¹⁰⁵ and subsequently "68 men living in Sernovodsk stated that they had been raped by servicemen carrying out a punitive action".¹⁰⁶ Secondly, the not-so obvious but none the less remorseless forced depopulation of the villages in the Makhety, Tevzana, Khatuni and Sel'mentauzen micro-rayon in Vedenskiy rayon in the south of Chechnya¹⁰⁷ due to neglect by the Federal authorities of basic infrastructure like water and electricity supplies, and the unsympathetic awareness of the situation in prematurely relocating Chechen refugees back to the ruins of Chechnya can only harden Chechen attitudes.

¹⁰³ <http://www.nns.ru/press-file/dagestan> Kavkazskiy krizis, terakty v Rossii, 31 July 2001, p1.

¹⁰⁴ <http://2001.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2001/49n/n49-s06.shtml>, *Novaya Gazeta*, No 49, 16 July 2001, "Novyye podrobnosti Sernovodskoy tragedii" by Anna Politkovskaya.

¹⁰⁵ http://chechnya.jamestown.org/pubs/view/che_002_028-001.htm, *Chechnya Weekly*, Vol 2, Issue 28, 24 July 2001, p1, "Mass rape of Chechen men by Federal Forces".

¹⁰⁶ *Novaya Gazeta*, No 49, 16 July 2001, "Noviye podrobnosti Sernovodskoy tragedii" by Anne Politkovskaya.

¹⁰⁷ <http://2001.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2001/45n/n45n-s16.shtml>, *Novaya Gazeta*, No 45, 2 July 2001, "Makhkety: zhizn' pod ugrozoy rasstrela" by Anna Politkovskaya and <http://2001/novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2001/49n/n49n-20.shtml>, *Novaya Gazeta*, No 49, 16 July 2001, "V Makhketakh ubirayut svideteley - Natsional'naya likvidatsiya kak norma otechestvennoy zhizn'" by Anna Politkovskaya.

Conclusions

It is not only the atrocities committed personally by individual members of the Federal Forces against the Chechen people, but the sheer scale of destruction by artillery bombardment and air strikes, resulting in indiscriminate damage and unnecessary deaths, injuries and psychological damage amongst the civilian population, which deserves censure by the International Community first and foremost: it is the commanders themselves and their planning staffs who cannot escape this opprobrium. The planned programme of bombardment did not take place on the spur of the moment, but was coolly calculated, planned and initiated.

Too much reliance on overwhelming fire, by artillery or aviation, to protect Federal forces may have secured immediate battles, but the application of such wholesale destruction was counter-productive and will remain a severe obstacle for peace in the medium to long term. Chechens have nowhere to live: not exactly the best recipe for 'hearts and minds'. Furthermore, even though a massive application of fire power may have reduced casualties during the so-called period of large-scale operations, deaths of Russian servicemen have not abated since those operations were completed.

Human rights abuses at check points, the SIZO at Chernokozovo and IVSs, together with the intimidating noise, splash, spray and muddy filth from a BTR-80 as it thunders by groups of shabbily dressed civilians, continue to be unpleasant reminders to the local Chechen population that conditions of life in Chechnya remain insecure and hazardous.

Within Federal forces in Chechnya, there would appear to be stress, brutalisation and the need for psychological rehabilitation. Note should also be taken of the words of General Gennadiy Troshev that *"only a person who himself has been in the war can understand Budanov"*.

For the poorly-trained Russian serviceman, inexperienced officer and experienced commander, there must be an additional element of pressure in fighting separatist and extremist, when they realise that neither in spirit nor in the application of individual combat skills are they able to match the fighting qualities of the enemy, knowing at the same time that there is little difference, in the final analysis, between being taken prisoner and death in action.

The extreme approach of the Mujahideen is detrimental for Islam as a whole, unfortunate for the traditional Muslim believer in the North Caucasus and the genuine separatist who desires independence by peaceful means. However, from the separatist and extremist point of view, the justification for the execution of Russian prisoners attains additional strength in view of the continuing excesses and brutalities, the remorseless depopulation of parts of southern Chechnya and the unsympathetic repatriation of Chechen refugees.

In view of Lieutenant General Shamanov's record as Commander OGV (West) before becoming the elected Governor of Ulyanovsk, his strong views on Chechnya and the Russian Army, notice should be taken of the suggestion that he could become a rival to Putin for the Presidency of the Russian Federation at the next election in three years' time. Questions remain over his attitude and behaviour towards the civilian population in Chechnya.

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