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**Dagestan: Birth of
Presidential Republic**

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Key Points

* The previous collective style of government under Magomedali Magomedov which promoted an ethos of endemic corruption must bear responsibility for much of the present escalation of tension, violence and terror in Dagestan.

* The manipulation of the constitutional processes for electing a new leader in Dagestan is characteristic of Moscow's new technique in such matters.

* The Russian federal centre must also take the blame for its previous lack of interest and investment in Dagestan.

* Whilst many doubt whether the "new and first president ever" of Dagestan has the ability to improve the situation, he knows what he wants and he has made a start.

* However, rectification of the situation will not happen overnight.

* With a nascent interest in youth education in president Aliyev's initial reforms, there could be an opportunity for Western countries to provide support, with finance, skills training and equipment.

Contents

Introduction	1
Dagestan's Administrative-Political Structure	2
Box 1	3
Table 1	4
Legacy of Magomedali Magomedov	4
Political Manoeuvres and Speculation	5
Table 2	5
Box 2	6
Box 3	7
Restless Opposition and the Northern Alliance	7
Box 4	10
Box 5	10
New Presidential Government	10
Criticism of Law Enforcement Organs	11
Corruption in Municipal and State Structures	12
Box 6	13
Rehabilitation of Aukhovskiy Rayon	13
Aliyev's Presidency – The Future	14
Appendix	16

Dagestan: Birth of Presidential Republic

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Introduction

*“The retirement of Magomedov was sudden. His authority was coming to an end in June, and as expected in the middle of March, Dmitriy Kozak was required to bring to the attention of the president of the country two candidates for the post of regional head. Therefore the announcement about retirement by Magomedov on Thursday evening [16 February 2006] reverberated like a thunderclap in a cloudless sky”.*¹

In fact the retirement of Magomedali Magomedov was not so sudden. Federal government preparations for the ‘gentle’ removal of Magomedov from his post of collegiate head of Dagestan had been long in the making. Rumours of his impending retirement had been rife around the occasion of his 75th birthday on 15th June 2005. Whilst the Kremlin stayed its hand, it had already made it clear to Magomedov that he would not be granted a further extension in power after June 2006:² Magomedov had already ruled Dagestan for almost two decades, including the time when he was head of Dagestan’s Supreme Soviet. Nevertheless commensurate with his long period in office and his age (a factor which traditionally engenders respect in the Caucasus), care needed to be taken in the manner, method and timing of his retirement. Precipitate action against the “*King of the mountain in the Land of Mountains*”³ could further raise tension, leading to the likelihood of increasing inter-ethnic conflict in Dagestan and electoral malpractices in the period prior to the ‘all Dagestan’ presidential elections that had been scheduled for 6 July 2006. The possibility also existed that the Kremlin at that time had not decided who should replace Magomedov and what would be the least disruptive course to adopt.

Nevertheless, the situation in Dagestan required the urgent attention of the Kremlin, as underlined in Dmitriy Kozak’s unambiguous report to President Putin in May 2005 concerning the systemic crisis of government amongst the North Caucasus republics, which placed particular emphasis on the political, social and economic situation in Dagestan,⁴ where the security situation was fast getting out of control:

*“The situation in this North Caucasus republic has become strained to the limit: from the beginning of the year [2005, to August] more than one hundred terrorist acts have taken place. According to Interior Ministry data, today in Dagestan there are more than two thousand boyeviki who have declared war on the law enforcement organs. Political scientists say that many people have an interest in the escalation of tension: members of the government, opposition representatives, federal officials, religious extremists.”*⁵

News bulletins from Dagestan throughout the summer of 2005 were reminiscent of wartime, for a significant portion of the news was devoted to explosions, shootings, sabotage of gas pipelines and assassinations.⁶ In addition, disruption of the Caucasus rail network, derailment of trains and attempts to put out of action the strategic Gimry vehicle tunnel linking mountainous Dagestan with the plains, were specific features of a widening campaign of violence which had from the beginning of 2004 particularly emphasised damage to the economic infrastructure.⁷ There was no respite from violence during the autumn of 2005. Neither the arrival of winter, nor the New Year brought peace to the republic, in fact quite the reverse.

Dagestan's Administrative-Political Structure

In keeping with the new law introduced in 2004, Polpred (presidential plenipotentiary) Dmitry Kozak was due to present the names of two suitable candidates to replace Magomedov to the Russian President in March. Thus, as in previous regional elections in the North Caucasus, Moscow's choice of regional head would assume office without effective opposition, as exemplified by the installation of presidents Murat Zyazikov of Ingushetia and Alu Alkhanov of Chechnya. In conformity with the amendment to Dagestan's Constitution the new leader of Dagestan would in theory be an executive president elected directly by the people of Dagestan, thus bringing Dagestan into line with other regions in the Russian Federation, and not a collegiate choice as chairman of the State Council, as Magomedov had been.

Nationalities

Dagestan is also known as the 'Mountain of Languages' due to the fact that there are over 32 different nationalities, but for the purposes of government only 14 of them, known as titular nationalities, have a hand in the administrative structure of the republic. Appendix 1 gives an indication of the comparative fluctuations and size of the population of titular nationalities. Numerically the largest nationalities are the Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, Lezgins and Laks. The size of the population of Dagestan has risen from 1,808,200 in 1989 to 2,576,531 in 2002. Perhaps one of the most significant facts is the decline in the ethnic Russian population from 213,800 in 1959 to 165,900 in 1989 to estimated lows of 100,875 (2005) or even as low as 85,000.

The main principles enshrined in Dagestan's constitution following the fall of the Soviet Union were, first, to provide the widest possible representation for the 14 titular nationalities included in the administrative structure of the republic, and second, to eliminate the possibility of any one nationality being able to possess all the levers of political power. "*After three years of painstaking efforts the new Constitution of Dagestan was adopted on 26 July 1994.*"⁸ The Constitution provided for a collective or collegiate form of government based on ethnic quotas. The organs of government consisted of the State Council (executive body of government), the Constitutional Assembly and the National (or Peoples) Assembly. It is also of value to note how carefully the 14 titular nationalities were allotted posts, strictly according to their numerical size and percentage share of the population, in the administrative structure of Dagestan (see Appendix).

Box 1 – Dagestan’s Political System Prior to 20 February 2006⁹**State Council of Dagestan**

At the top of the pyramid of government is the State Council of the republic which consists of one representative from each of the 14 titular nationalities. Members of the State Council are elected by the Constitutional Assembly consisting of 242 members (121 deputies from the Peoples Assembly plus 121 members elected by representatives of local government). The members of the State Council in their turn elect a chairman who in effect becomes the President of the Republic. Members of the State Council then elect the Prime Minister. At the end of the four year term the chairmanship of the State Council must be relinquished in favour of another ethnic group. The Chairman of the State Council is responsible for exercising supervision over external relations and the activities of the republic’s security structures. The Prime Minister is a member of the State Council, but can not belong to the same ethnic group as the chairman, and is responsible for economic and social issues. A Security Council was introduced in August 1996 as a result of the instabilities from emanating from Chechnya.

Constitutional Assembly of Dagestan

The Constitutional Assembly has 242 members, 121 from the Peoples Assembly and a further 121 members elected from rayon assemblies and urban local government. The Constitutional Assembly elects the 14 representatives for the State Council.

National Assembly

The Peoples Assembly, consisting of 121 deputies elected with a term of 4 years on a majority system from constituencies, performs the functions of a representative and legislative body, and also oversees budget allocations. The electoral system is designed to encourage voting across ethnic lines and to ensure that the balance between ethnic groups in the Assembly mirrors that in the population. 65 constituencies are classified as multi-ethnic and each ethnic group living in the constituency is accorded one candidate. The constituencies regarded as mono-ethnic have an ordinary open-candidate system.

However, it rapidly became apparent that, despite the assiduous attention, wide consultation, insertion of specific safeguards¹⁰ and careful drafting by the working party which drew up the Constitution, the republic was vulnerable to “*successful ‘cavalier’ swoops on the Constitution and the more established traditions through adjustment of the Basic Law of the republic to the interests of a single official or their groups*”.¹¹

Even before the Constitution of Dagestan was promulgated, referenda had been held in 1992 and 1993 on establishing the post of President of Dagestan. The population on both occasions clearly expressed their preference for retaining the existing collegiate power structures and a parliamentary system of government. This did not prevent the leadership of the republic changing the Constitution in 1996, and extending its power for two years, making the term in office four years (1994-1998). This meant that the Chairman of the State Council enjoyed an additional two years. However, in 1998 Article 93 which stipulated that the Chairman of the State Council could not serve more than two consecutive terms was abolished: this amendment was instrumental in allowing Magomedali Magomedov to continue to occupy the post of Chairman. In July 2003 the Constitution was further amended to allow direct presidential elections to take place at the end of June 2006, despite the continued opposition of the people of Dagestan.

Table 1 –Referendum on Dagestan having a President¹²

Date of Referendum	For	Against	Remarks
28 Jul 92	10.6%	87.9%	
12 Dec 93	30.8%	68.1%	Voting combined with elections to Russian State Duma.
07 Mar 99	21.6%	74.8%	Referendum combined with elections to Dagestan's National Assembly.

Legacy of Magomedali Magomedov

A recent article summarised the accumulation of negative points which had led to the criminalisation of politics under Magomedov:

“Clan power and criminalisation of the political process. Elections in the National Assembly in a series of rayony had taken place, for example, in a very tense situation accompanied by conflict (including armed ones) with different ethnic clans; conservatism, weak revitalisation [stagnation] (from the time of CPSU) the personnel of the Dagestani elite had practically not changed; adherence to strong government, strict hierarchy, absence of democratic beginnings, the decisive role of the eldest in age and rank, the weak role of women and youth; an insignificant role of parties and civil society, the absence of political competition; secrecy of government. According to a telling remark of Ramazan Abdulatipov ‘people and government only meet at funerals.’”¹³

As Il'ya Maksakov put it in 1997, “one way or another he tied all political and financial elitist groupings, including semi-criminal ones, to himself, having handed out to their leaders profitable and influential positions.”¹⁴ This highlights questions of organised crime, law and order, and security of the individual, some of the major causes of instability in the republic at the present time. The immunity of deputies of the National Assembly from prosecution aided and abetted corruption and improper behaviour by those at the highest levels of power. An area of particular concern in any democracy must be the separation of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. No less important are restrictions on the interests of parliamentary deputies and ministers, the combination of government posts, or a government post with outside interests, and the method of appointment to government posts.

There can be no doubt that the personal distribution of ‘slices from the large cake of central subsidisation’ stultified any form of economic growth in the republic, other than advantage for the Dargin elites. The Kozak Commission’s unambiguous report to President Putin in May 2005 recommended eliminating corruption through the removal or severe reduction of subsidies from the centre to regions as a means of tackling entrenched clan power and its concomitant abuses, such as those which had flourished under Magomedov. Subsidies from the federal centre in Dagestan’s case amounted to 81.3% of its budget for 2005.¹⁵ High levels of unemployment and low living standards for the majority of the population contribute to their feeling of despair. Levels of abduction, contract killing and assassination have increased. Victims have included ministers, politicians, rayon administrators, businessmen and leading members of law enforcement organisations. Perhaps more worrying for the federal centre are subversive anti-government campaigns waged by religious and political extremists with possible connections to separatist and extreme elements in Chechnya.

However, in fairness to Magomedov, it should be remembered that his overriding concern during his long period in office was to avoid inter-ethnic violence leading to large scale conflict within the republic after the fall of Communist power. A good example which aptly demonstrated his attitude and approach was the immediate aftermath of Salman Raduyev's abortive raid on Kizlyar on 9 January 1996, when Magomedov and Prime Minister Abdurazak Mirzabekov managed to meet with Chechen commanders in Kizlyar and through negotiation initiate what would (but for federal intervention) have been the bloodless departure of the Chechen band from Dagestan.¹⁶ Similar positive actions were his coolness during the Brothers Khachilayev's seizure of the parliament and government buildings in Makhachkala in 1998 and his robust call to arms in the autumn of 1999 to throw out the invasion of Basayev and Khattab.¹⁷

Political Manoeuvres and Speculation

Notwithstanding the miasma of negative factors which have tended to complicate any analysis concerning the state of affairs in Dagestan, the process of Magomedov's unexpected flight to Moscow, his retirement, the ensuing political manoeuvres and speculation about the selection of his successor are illuminating. Whilst Moscow might now have the final choice with regard to a successor, Magomedov has laid the foundations for a return to power of his ethnic group at some later date.

Table 2 – Outline of Major Events from 15 – 20 February 2006

Date	Events and Remarks
Wed 15 Feb 06	Magomedov flies to Moscow
Thu 16 Feb 06	Magomedov has audience with President Putin, gives reasons for resignation and discusses possible successors
Thu 16 Feb 06	Magomedov returns to Makhachkala & announces retirement
Thu 16 Feb 06	Magomedov holds extraordinary session of State Council
Fri 17 Feb 06	Kozak arrives in Makhachkala
Sat 18 Feb 06	Magomedov, Kozak & Aliyev fly to Moscow to meet President Putin
Sun 19 Feb 06	Aliyev has meeting with 'opposition' group
Mon 20 Feb 06	National Assembly supports nomination of Aliyev for President of Dagestan

15/16 February

Magomedov unexpectedly flew to Moscow and met President Putin. He tendered his resignation and returned to Makhachkala at about 6pm on 16 February. He publicly announced his resignation at the airport, on the grounds of age and declining health. Magomedov together with several members of the State Council, the Prime Minister Atay Aliyev (Kumyk), Speaker of the National Assembly Mukhu Aliyev and representatives of the republic power structures proceeded to a closed meeting of the State Council.

*“Not waiting for the appearance in Makhachkala of Dmitriy Kozak, Magomedov using his political weight and authority finally negotiated with the State Council about the candidature of his successor. Although there was no official announcement it appeared unofficially that the successor was the Avar, Mukhu Aliyev.”*¹⁸

17 February

Dmitry Kozak, having hurriedly flown to Makhachkala, conducted a meeting with representatives of Dagestani society. According to comments made by participants, namely local deputies, heads of public establishments, political parties and directors of mass media outlets, it was clear that the meeting had been very carefully arranged and organised. Kozak gave a briefing on the proposed nominations of candidates for the presidency: *“First, the Speaker of the Dagestani Parliament Mukhu Gimbatovich Aliyev, the head of the Federal Treasury for Dagestan [Saygidguseyn] Magomedov and the mayor of Makhachkala Said Amirov.”*¹⁹ Atay Aliyev, the Prime Minister, was also a contender for the office of president. The question arose as to Magomedov’s motives for holding a closed meeting without the presence of Kozak. As everyone was very much aware, all the key posts in Dagestan were divided between the four dominant ethnic groups, namely the Avars, Dargins, Kumyks and Lezgins. Leadership changes would lead not only to cadre but also to ethnic transpositions. *Gazeta.ru* put forward the view that in order to get round any possibility of inter-ethnic conflict, the Dargin Magomedov initially prepared for Said Amirov, mayor of Makhachkala and also a Dargin, to succeed him. Kozak decisively opposed the nomination. Kozak’s refusal to meet the mayor of Makhachkala in the middle of 2005 was perhaps an indication of the Polpred’s attitude towards him.

Box 2 – Pen-Picture of Said Amirov, Mayor of Makhachkala²⁰

In the republic as a minimum are two extremely influential political-oligarchic clans [Dargin]: those of Magomedali Magomedov and Said Amirov. The position of the Mayor of Makhachkala Said Amirov amongst the Dargins is firm. He has great leadership experience and moreover opinion about the city infrastructure has substantially improved. Thus, in 2003 the republic’s capital in the category of towns with a population of more than 300,000 was given the title of the “most well-appointed town of Russia”.

The problem with Amirov is the fact that he has acquired a reputation of being too confrontational as a leader, with 15 attempts on his life. The mayor of the Dagestani capital is not without unspoken support from the government executive, although he has serious problems with the Dagestan Interior Minister Adul’giryi Magomedtagirov (Avar). Amirov and the head of the State Council are allies. People who control almost all the spheres of trade in Makhachkala are close to him: markets, restaurants, construction businesses, and raw materials and refining. Naturally, it is not without the silent agreement of the State Council.

Observers remark that the mayor of Makhachkala is a realist: most of all the top post of Dagestan is not for him, for he is paralysed and confined to an invalid chair. Today, according to his closest circle he is inclined to the ideas of a Russian official. Such a person in Dagestan is a native of Kizlyar, the present head of the federal fishing agency, Stanislav Il’yasov. A former prime minister of Stavropol’ kray and Chechnya – Il’yasov and Amirov are well acquainted.

There were other unofficial suggestions about a successor to Magomedov. One in particular was the possible nomination of the 32 year old Abusup'yan Kharkharov, the head of the port of Makhachkala, a close friend of Magomedov's son, and of course by implication Amirov on account of his interest in trade. But once again Kozak categorically opposed the nomination on the grounds that the "*young politician was not equal to the task with such a difficult region*".²¹ As a result of the Polpred's intractability it would appear that Magomedov had no option but to nominate Aliyev for the post of president of Dagestan. At the meeting, the Kremlin's preference had become clear, and Mukhu Aliyev was now the front runner. Over the last 10 years of complicated political events Aliyev, an Avar, had maintained a position of constant loyalty to the outgoing head of the republic regardless of belonging to a rival ethnic group, but perhaps of greater importance he had also been loyal to Moscow. Moreover, the smear of corruption had not tarnished his name. The preference for Aliyev preserved the ethnic principle. Aliyev is a representative of the largest ethnic group in Dagestan, the Avars. This principle had been distorted by the continued presence of a Dargin as head of the state council in what should have been a rotational post.

Box 3 – Mukhu Aliyev

Mukhu Gimbatovich Aliyev was born on 6 August 1940 in the village of Tanusi, Khunzakhskiy rayon of the Dagestan ASSR. In 1962 he graduated from Dagestan State University. He worked as Director of Studies, then Director of a middle school in Tsumadinskiy rayon. From 1964 to 1985 Mukhu Aliyev was secretary of the Komsomol Committee at the Dagestan State University, first secretary of the Makhachkala Komsomol committee, first secretary of the CPSU Makhachkala committee. From 1985 to 1990 he managed the department of party-organisation and cadre work of the Dagestan CPSU, and in 1990 he became its first secretary. In 1991 he was elected deputy chairman of the Dagestani Supreme Soviet. Since 1995 he has been chairman/speaker of the National Assembly of Dagestan. Married with two children.

(Nezavisimaya Gazeta 21 February 2006 page 2 "Glavoy Dagestana stal zhestkiy upravlenets" by Sergey Migalin)

Restless Opposition and the Northern Alliance

A struggle for power had quickly developed between those supporting the candidacy of Aliyev and the backers of another Avar, Saygidguseyn Magomedov, head of the Federal Treasury for Dagestan. This was indicative of the tensions not so much between nationalities as between the old guard and younger, capable men such as the head of Khasavyurt Saygidpasha Umakhanov, a deputy of the National Assembly Saygid Murtazaliyev and a deputy of the State Duma Gadzhi Makachev.²²

This could have developed into a serious conflict especially after Polpred Kozak, Magomedali Magomedov and Mukhu Aliyev flew off to Moscow but did not take the alternative candidate Saygidguseyn Magomedov with them. The opposition attempted to charter an aircraft, but received a refusal from the airport director. When Saygidguseyn Magomedov tried to take a regular flight to Moscow, the aircraft was held up for three hours without any explanation. This stage-management of

what would have been a real choice led to considerable anger amongst members of the opposition.

It is apposite at this stage to devote some time to the Avar 'Northern Alliance' which included the mayor of Khasavyurt Saygidpasha Umakhanov, re-elected in 2005 (an Olympic wrestling champion in 2000), and the State Duma Deputy Gadzhi Makhachev, who supported the candidacy of Saygidguseyn Magomedov. The alliance was initially created to contest the government of the Dargin Magomedov and his possible successor. The Northern Alliance was the most active and consistent enemy of the regime, and strong in Avar mountain areas. Umakhanov and Makhachev had been the mainspring of the alliance, but there was little chance of the alliance gaining a firm foothold on account of the fact that there was little unity of thought: Makhachev had lately distanced himself from the alliance, preferring to play his own game. Many of the alliance's representatives had no access to the main riches of Dagestan, namely, oil, gas, and maritime produce.²³ According to people close to the alliance the prominent Moscow based businessman Suleyman Kerimov (Lezgin), a Duma Deputy from the LDPR had offered support (in the main financial) from the beginning of 2003 to opposition politicians, although wisely he did not see himself as a politician in Dagestan.

The Alliance needed to find a figure who was not involved in inter-clan confrontations, and chose Saygidguseyn Magomedov. Whilst he had no experience as a public politician he had influential contacts with the central government. For almost 10 years he studied and worked in St Petersburg, was personally acquainted with the head of the federal economic and trade ministry German Gref and the Minister of Finance Aleksey Kudrin. He had written on the "Concept of an Independent Policy of the Federal Level" which had begun to appear in the pages of a local paper, *Molodezh Dagestana*, and discussed the financial problems of the republic. In another opposition paper, *Chernovik*. This was followed by the collection of signatures for a petition supporting the candidacy of Saygidguseyn Magomedov, which was sent to Kozak. Regrettably part of the petition appeared with false names and signatures. More pertinent was the fact that "*Saygid-Guseyn Magomedov himself, was married to a sister of Gazimagomed Gimrinskiy, who possessed serious authority in the criminal world of Dagestan, Chechnya and beyond their borders, whose people were noted for not just one grubby history which included abduction and murder*".²⁴

Without doubt one of the reasons for such semi-criminal organisations was that with one dominant clan controlling the State Council for so long a period it was virtually impossible for other interested parties to trade legally. It must have been galling for the Avars, the largest ethnic group in Dagestan, to find themselves in a less influential position than the Dargins, half this number. On the other hand, with Saygidpasha Umakhanov as mayor of Khasavyurt and Vyacheslav Burov in Kizlyar, the alliance probably controlled 15% of Dagestan's territory.

The rumour-mill whispered that one of the conditions that Magomedov had laid down for his departure three months earlier than need be, would be that his son Magomed-Salam would become the Parliamentary Speaker. Dargin power and influence thus would be maintained not only in the upper reaches of the government and the economy.²⁵ Magomed-Salam Magomedov was an economist at Dagestan State University and who was reckoned in some quarters to be "*the first of the young and talented, to whom the road has been opened*".²⁶ With Magomed-Salam Magomedov taking up the post of Speaker, the Dargins were content that Mukhu Aliyev would take over as the first President of Dagestan. Because of his age Aliyev

(65) would probably only serve one term, leaving the way clear for Magomedov junior to become the next president, perhaps?

As a possible new Prime Minister, attention was drawn towards Khizri Shikhsaidov (a Kumyk), head of the National Audit Office, continuing the triangular leadership of Dagestan with an Avar president, a Dargin speaker and a Kumyk prime minister. However, as it was to turn out the post went to 59 year old Kumyk Shamil' Zaynalov²⁷ on 6 March.

18 February

President Putin appeared with Magomedov and Aliyev, who had travelled to Moscow, in front of television cameras. This must have been an unambiguous indication of the Russian president's preference to the Dagestan National Assembly, for normally Putin avoided public demonstrations of interest until it was absolutely necessary for him to perform the official introduction of a candidate.²⁸

19 February

The situation was cooled down by Mukhu Aliyev when he had a meeting with opposition leaders in his office in the evening before the session scheduled for 20 February in the National Assembly. They talked for a little more than one hour. State Duma Deputy Gadzhi Makhachev²⁹ called the meeting 'constructive' and stated that: *"They would support Mukhu Gimbatovich Aliyev, because he is a fitting comrade. He sees what Dagestan requires, and with his help we will prove to the centre that Dagestan can be a region."*³⁰

To the question of how the opposition succeeded in coming to an understanding with the new presidential candidate, Makhachev replied: *"Aliyev is considered the successor in all senses to Magomedali Magomedov, but this is not so. He intends to carry out cadre rearrangements and... the leadership of the republic, but this is an indicator that the man wishes to work seriously. Our government was corrupt, ministers sat in their places, because they had understandings with Magomedali Magomedov. That will not happen now."*³¹

Perhaps Aliyev's ability to soften the bruised feelings of the opposition should not come as a surprise, because of his long political experience and his ability to look for compromises. The belief was that he would undoubtedly *"find a common language with many influential figures, such as the mayor of Makhachkala Said Amirov, State Duma Deputy Gadzhi Makhachev and the mayor of Khasavyurt Saygidpasha Umakhanov"*.³²

20 February

So the next morning, with Makhachkala ringed by armoured vehicles and its centre closed by military subunits, the National Assembly became the venue which witnessed Aliyev's confirmation as president by 101 votes out of 102. After Magomedali Magomedov had unrelentingly asked deputies *"in the name of Dagestan and Russia"* to support candidate Aliyev, even if *"the fact does not please"*, the deputies could hardly vote against the motion.³³ This session of the National Assembly not only masked Magomedov's step down from power, but also the termination of the *"functioning of the system created by him"*.³⁴ In response to Polpred Kozak's remarks, President Aliyev briefly said:

“It’s important to begin with administrative reform and reform of the state service. We have become stuck and have somewhat lagged behind other regions and for a long time have needed to start this. Today our system of government is a serious brake in uncovering that potential which we possess. Besides, one of our main tasks is the renewal of cadres. For 10 years, one person or other has sat in one post. And there are many young talented people for whom it is necessary to open the road.”³⁵

Box 4 – Enver Kisriev’s Assessment of Mukhu Aliyev³⁶

Although in the past I have rarely seen correct decisions by the centre in relation to Dagestan, on this occasion the nomination of Mukhu Aliyev as the head of Dagestan is the most proper one that could be. First, a change of leader has taken place which had long been imminent. Second, tradition is preserved when a person of different nationality comes to power... Mukhu Aliyev is equally distanced from ethnic groups, both those that utilise crude force and those of oligarchs and economists. I think that with Mukhu Aliyev there will be no trading of posts in Dagestan which one heard often took place before.

Saygidguseyn Magomedov was less convinced of the scope for fundamental change.

Box 5 – Extracts from an Interview with Saygidguseyn Magomedov³⁷

There was no opposition, but an initiative group. People who were included in it wanted to bring about change in Dagestan, in order to stop the continuation of those problems which existed during Magomedali Magomedov’s government. He did little that was bad as a politician, but the economy of the republic was and remains in a very serious state. The structure which I head fulfils the function of controlling the disbursement of monies, and in the process of our work one often meets with different situations.

The initiative group, which includes 15 parliamentary deputies, public figures and journalists, has worked out the necessary requirements so that when the new person arrives, a manager, it will change the social-economic situation in the republic as a whole. This is what people want. But this was not so much an overt opposition which was ready to carry out some sort of action. It was a Dagestani multi-ethnic initiative group which wanted the President of Russia to listen to its opinion. But in this every one said that they would agree with the decision which the president adopted. His authority is very high in Dagestan, therefore the voting was not so much about the Dagestan presidential candidate Aliyev, but more for the decision of the Russian President.

Mukhu Gimbatovich [Aliyev]... unfortunately will not be able leave the previous government. In essence, the former chairman of the State Council will continue to direct the republic thanks to the fact that his son has become the Speaker. With the nomination of Mukhu Gimbatovich and with the election of Magomedsalam Magomedov nothing in Dagestan will change, and therefore all those past problems will remain. However, it seems to me that in such a complicated region as Dagestan today it is necessary to have a stronger person than Magomedsalam, although son of the chairman of the State Council and a Doctor of Science.

New Presidential Government

One of the most urgent tasks for President Aliyev was the reform of governance, underlined by his promise to get rid of a number of ministers and, in the words of

Kozak, *“to make the government transparent, effective and understandable to the people. That is to spend less money and also to work more effectively.”*³⁸

To take one example, in accordance with Law of the Russian President, people occupied in state employment at all levels of government – from local government up to republic and federal structures are obliged annually to make a declaration of their income and acquired possessions no later than 1 April. Only 20.5% out of 19,000 officials did not conceal their income (3,895). Thus in theory it could be possible to charge/dismiss almost 80% of Dagestani officials. Dagestani statistics put the number of public officials at 19,072 divided into three categories:

Local government organs:	5,800;
Republic government structures:	5,000
Part of federal government structures:	8,200 ³⁹

On 6 March 2006 the Dagestan parliament elected a new Prime Minister, Shamil' Zaynalov. Zaynalov is a native of Khasavyurt, a town dominated by Avars, Chechen and Kumyks and a centre of the Northern Alliance. President Aliyev through Zaynalov could find a way to widen and deepen contacts with the opposition, as Zaynalov for a long time had been closely linked with the leaders of this group, in contrast to his predecessor Atay Aliyev. Zaynalov wasted no time in joining the team of the new president, bringing with him an assortment of political experience and business acumen, in particular knowledge of natural resources, membership of the commission on cooperation with the National Audit Office, and a reputation of being a strong economist.⁴⁰

President Aliyev's first action was to rid himself of a number of unsalaried deputy prime ministers, whose exalted positions in themselves did not require an official salary, for they already enjoyed positions of influence and power. He reduced the cabinet posts to four from seven. As a result, the State Council lost its former weight and authority.

Aliyev, as far as the options allowed, cleaned out from the apparatus of government those who, according to a tradition formed in Dagestan, paid for their high appointments. In this President Aliyev had to resolve a practically insoluble problem: to shake out the hierarchy in a way that did not violate the delicate ethnic balance and at the same time not cause discontent in the federal centre. It would appear that Aliyev for the moment has been successful in an elusive and fragile reorganisation of the cabinet of ministers, but of course with the powerful support of the Polpred.

On 30 March 2006 Mukhu Aliyev as the first president of Dagestan set out his message to a collection of Dagestani political and economic elites. *“From the first words it became clear that the message of Aliyev differed fundamentally from the run-of-the-mill speeches which his predecessor the former chairman of the State Council used to make.”*⁴¹ It focused on three main areas.

Criticism of Law Enforcement Organs

Aliyev accused the law enforcement organs and officials of actively and passively pushing part of the population towards radicalism and Wahhabism. According to the president a terrorist underground network exists amounting to more than 1,000 people.

“People are being faced with injustice, callousness and indifferent bureaucracy, have lost faith in the government, have become disillusioned and cannot find their place in life. It’s time for us to understand this, to make the correct deductions, to work persistently on the elimination of public mistakes, oversights and causes leading people to extremism. It is necessary to develop genuine effective and urgent measures, not only to carry out special operations, which people’s homes and apartments are destroyed.”⁴²

The unsuccessful ‘Black Forest’ operation in the area of Gimry in Untsukul rayon at the beginning of January 2006 provides a good illustration of the views of the local population with regard to military counter measures: *“Local inhabitants were not enraptured by the fact that fighting was claiming the lives of young men in this undeclared war... Locals were unhappy about the inconvenience, tension, lack of warning and rudeness of servicemen and police. The last named do not trust the locals.”⁴³*

Another incident which took place on 30 January 2006 in Khasavyurt typified the indifference of the power wielding structures, who destroyed a house on the crossroads of Sultanov and Biybulatov streets at 5.30 in the morning: *“Everything was in place: since in the Caucasus special operations are started with the destruction of part of an accommodation block together with whoever lodged there. A grenade launcher has long been used as military-engineer equipment: to make a gap in a wall, and it’s not important who is behind it.”⁴⁴*

Corruption in Municipal and State Structures

President Aliyev fell on the social-economic sphere despite the reported upswing of the economy, because it was in deep crisis. Official statistics have given false figures,⁴⁵ the shadow economy has attained astronomic proportions, and the volume of corruption in municipal and state structures has exceeded all conceivable levels, he said.⁴⁶ *“The people have lost faith in the fact that it is possible to resolve any sort of question without bribes... I further consider that the work of the law enforcement and control organs in the campaign against economic crime is extremely inefficiently organised,”⁴⁷* a fact elaborated upon in the Kozak report.⁴⁸

Another controversial matter concerns the completion of the Irganay hydro-electric power station some 20 years after the idea was first mooted. Irganay is situated on the Avarskoye Kousu, a little upstream from Shamil’kala. The river is slightly wider in the stretch between Arakani, Irganay and Shamil’kala and possesses features favourable to a dam for the production of electricity, but: *“Five villages lying by the stretch of river are due to be flooded and submerged beneath the level of the lake. Even after some 20 years and with completion imminent local people still do not know where the government has provided alternative accommodation and moreover compensation terms have not been agreed. However, the villagers staged a protest on 3 January 2006 obstructing the road to the dam, which according to the villagers later was not connected to the anti-terrorist operation.”⁴⁹*

The Dagestani president stressed the need for heads of municipal structures to improve observance of financial discipline, the need to implement crime prevention measures. In particular, rayon and urban departments of the republic interior ministry with local government must work towards the creation of militia strong points and the provision of assistance to district militia inspectors. The president continued his address by saying that henceforth state organs will be formed on the

principle of criteria of effectiveness, professionalism, and honesty, and not by ethnic clan and family connections.⁵⁰

Box 6 – Irregularities in Local Government Organs

31 October 2005 - Dokuzparinskiy rayon.⁵¹ A large meeting took place to demand the resignation of Kerimkhan Abasov, the rayon head, who was accused of misappropriating budget money.

20 March 2006 in Kumtorkalinskiy rayon.⁵² Several hundred locals went to a meeting to protest against the municipal head of administration Sapiyully Karachayev and his method of land allotment.

20 March 2006 – Boundary dispute between villages of Torkmaskala and Tarki.⁵³

25 April 2006 In Usukhchay, Dokuzparinskiy rayon 700 villagers, mainly Lezgins, blocked the road Usukhchay-Akhty with the demand that the rayon head Kerimkhan Abasov relinquish his post on the grounds that he had falsified election results. Abasov was also accused of misappropriating 20 mln rubles from the budget. In militia shooting to disperse the crowd one man was killed, 10 were wounded and 70 arrested.⁵⁴

26 April 2006 In the main square of Makhachkala, several hundred people from different rayony of Dagestan gathered to protest about the death of two men who had had their cars seized by employees of the Internal Ministry. Two employees of Kulinskiy ROVD (district militia) and Levashinskiy ROVD were accused of murdering a 22 year old student in Karabudankentskiy rayon on 22 March and on 3 April not far from Makhachkala a 19 year old student.⁵⁵ Dokuzparinskiy rayon borders northern Azerbaijan where there are a similar number of Lezgins.

Rehabilitation of Aukhovskiy Rayon

There was an interesting statement towards the end of Aliyev's address which was concerned with "*the fulfilment of the Programme of resettling the Lak population to a new location and the rehabilitation of Aukhovskiy rayon*".⁵⁶ The problem of the Chechen-Akkin, the Laks and Aukhovskiy rayon (at present Novolakskiy rayon) is one of long standing. It dates back to the mass deportations of Chechens in 1944 and their return to Dagestan between 1957 and 1960 without being able to return to their original homes and property. The problem entwines the interests of Chechens, Laks, Avars and Kumyks and to date nothing has been resolved. The state of affairs has been exacerbated by the unwillingness of the Dagestan government since 1957 to properly resolve the issue. Refreshingly, the newly elected president directed his government to take additional measures for accelerating the existing decisions of the Third Session of National Deputies of the Dagestan ASSR in 1991 when "*a decision was agreed concerning the restoration of Aukhovskiy rayon and the rehabilitation of the Chechens of Dagestan with the initiation of a parallel government resolution for financing the resettlement of the Laks occupying Chechen homes and land*".⁵⁷

The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation had recently again emphasised that the state was obliged to return houses and land which were requisitioned in 1944. Possibly one can see the hand of Kozak here, particularly after his efforts to resolve the Ingush-North Osetian impasse over Prigorodnyy rayon. Implementation

of the 1991 decision could help to lessen tension in the area around Khasavyurt. However from the Chechen side, Groznyy under the sway of Ramzan Kadyrov would probably 'demand' the return of Aukhovskiy Rayon⁵⁸ which it lost to Dagestan on 7 March 1944.

Aliyev's Presidency – The Future

President Aliyev's address received wide public acclaim, attaining a 72% approval rating from those who were questioned. However, experts considered that despite wide public support there was the realisation that there were certain points in his policy where Aliyev could encounter serious problems from those to whom the course was not attractive. Nevertheless, there are certain problems which require urgent attention.⁵⁹

There were doubts about President Aliyev's ability to prevent the internal security situation in Dagestan deteriorating further,⁶⁰ and some were sceptical about his ability to change politics in Dagestan for the better, which were borne out by the number of terrorist acts in his first month in office:

"24 February – police patrol attacked in Khasavyurt; 10 March Magomed Magomedov deputy head of the republic CID killed by a bomb planted under his car in Makhachkala; 12 March a senior officer from the department to counter organised crime was shot dead in Makhachkala; another senior police officer killed in Buynaksk on 21 March; 29 March two policemen wounded in shoot out with rebels in Makhachkala. In a security sweep of several villages in Khasavyurt rayon, Russian troops desecrated a Koran. In addition to the stand-off between militancy and security officials, Dagestan was also hit by waves of criminal violence in March. On 20 March the family of a businessman were killed in Makhachkala. There have been three brazen robberies in Dagestan during the last two months, including two attacks on pension delivery vehicles in Khasavyurt and Makhachkala and one robbery at a pension payment office in Babayur ...There were also two attacks on two administration heads – an attempted assassination of the head of Magaramakent rayon and on 22 March Ruslan Aliyev head of Botlikh rayon was shot dead in Makhachkala after attending a meeting with President Aliyev."

The president's move to establish a rejuvenated youth policy, to wean young people away from the temptations of crime and terrorism and to provide them with useful skills, is a step in the right direction. Ibrahim Magomedov, deputy chairman of the non-governmental Congress of the Peoples of Dagestan, argued that poverty was the prime cause of violence in the republic: *"Ninety percent of the young people in Dagestan have nothing to do. Vocational schools have long since closed due to understaffing. No one trains lathe operators, metal workers or tractor drivers anymore, and few can afford to go to college. When they see nothing good coming from the government, many choose the path of banditry, paid for by the foreign supporters of terrorism"*.⁶¹

A terrorist agreed:

"It was my elder brother Khadzhi-Magomed who assisted in my conversion We talked and he always made an emphasis of the crying injustice every Dagestani encounters every day of his life (let's face it). Hands have to be greased for every minor document. A lot of my friends and acquaintances are unemployed. They would do anything to

Dagestan: Birth of Presidential Republic

earn at least some money. On the other hand, there are the fat cats rolling in dough. You cannot walk to the Caspian coast from the airport anymore – stone palaces everywhere. Even the centre of Makhachkala is not free for traffic. Magomedov of the State Council closed Lezgintsev street for traffic because he has a mansion on this street . . . ”⁶²

The logic for targeting law enforcement organs by the terrorist underground becomes clear:

“The point my brother was making in every conversation. He said that it was not being done by the will of Allah but in defiance of it. Whoever wields power invents rules and laws that are an affront for ordinary Moslems and collide with the legacy of Messiah Mohammed. It follows that corruption and debauchery have to be fought, Shariah should be enforced in accordance with what Allah demands. And since it is the police that maintain the existing state of affairs, it is the policemen who should be exterminated first and foremost”.⁶³

Whilst many are not confident that President Aliyev will be able to turn the situation round in Dagestan it must be noted that he knows what he wants and has actually made a start. He has made efforts to rationalise ministries and departments and remove duplication of posts. He is also very much aware of the negative effects of callous, brutal and insensitive behaviour on the part of law enforcement organs, the Interior Ministry and the military. Merit and skill, not ethnicity are now the criteria he wants to promote in the sphere of law enforcement. Moreover, he has touched on one of the keys to reduce poverty in the longer term, and provide a more positive perspective for youth training under an education ministry, to wean them away from crime and terrorism. He has the attributes of loyalty and a personal clean slate as far as corruption is concerned. He also has the backing of Polpred Dmitriy Kozak. The measures that President Aliyev has initiated will take time to work through the system, but whether 4 years is enough remains an open question.

Planned parliamentary elections in Dagestan are scheduled to take place in March/April 2007. But, in contrast to Ingushetia where President Zyazikov was brought in from outside, the manipulation of the Dagestani presidential ‘election’ has brought to power one of Dagestan’s own. It is therefore likely that his efforts to remove the underlying factors contributing to the republic’s endemic poverty and violence will have a reasonable chance of success.

Appendix 1**Table 1 – Dagestan Titular Nationalities - 1989 Census, 1998 (estimate), 2002 Census and 2005 (estimate)**

Ethnicity & Date	1989 Census Totals⁶⁴	1989 Census Ethnic %	1998 Totals⁶⁵	1998 Ethnic %	2002 Census Totals⁶⁶	2002 Census Ethnic %	2005
Dagestan	1,808,200		2,167,100		2,576,531		
Avars	496,100	27.4	630,000	29.1	758,438	29.4	
Dargins	280,400	15.5	357,000	16.5	425,526	16.5	
Kumyks	231,800	12.8	273,000	12.6	365,804	14.2	
Lezgin	204,400	11.3	252,000	11.6	336,698	13.1	
Laks	91,700	5.1	105,000	4.8	139,732	5.4	
Tabasaran	78,200	4.3	105,000	4.8	110,162	4.3	
Nogay	28,300	1.6	42,000	1.9	38,168	1.5	
Rutuls	15,000	0.8			24,298	0.9	
Aguls	13,800	0.8	63,000 ⁶⁷	2.9	23,314	0.9	
Tsakhurs	5,200	0.3			8,168	0.3	
Russians	165,900	9.2	157,500	7.3	120,875	4.7	100,875 ⁶⁸
Azerbaijanis	75,500	4.2	93,578	4.3	111,656	4.3	
Jews	9,400	0.5			1,478	0.1	
Mtn Jews					1,066	0.04	
Chechens	57,900	3.2	73,000		87,867	3.4	
Ukrainians					2,869	0.1	
Armenians					6,702	0.3	
Tatars					4,659	0.2	
Tats	12,900	0.7			825	0.03	

Table 2 – Titular Nationalities in Administrative Structure of Dagestan⁶⁹

Ethnicity	Government Senior Posts	Share in Senior Posts (%)	Parliament Share (%)	Population Share (%)
Avar	11	28.21	28.93	29.4
Dargin	8	20.51	17.36	16.5
Kumyk	7	17.95	13.22	14.2
Lezgin	4	10.26	11.57	13.1
Lak	3	7.69	4.96	5.4
Russian	2	5.13	7.44	4.7
Azeri	1	2.56	4.13	4.3
Tabasaran	2	2.56	4.13	4.3
Chechen	1	2.56	3.31	3.4
Nogay	0	0.00	1.65	1.5
Rutul	0	0.00	0.83	0.9
Agul	1	2.56	0.83	0.9
Tsakhir	0	0.00	0.83	0.3
Tat	0	0.00	0.83	0.03

Endnotes

- ¹ <http://www.izvestia.ru/politic/article3076589> "Glava Dagestana mozhet ostavit, vmesto sebya syna".
- ² IWPR, Caucasus Reporting Service No 291, 16 June 2005, Internet version "Dagestan: Magomedov's Days Numbered?" by Magomed Isayev. "I have irrefutable information that Magomedov's days as chairman of the Dagestani State Council are numbered," a high ranking source in the Dagestani government told IWPR. "The Kremlin has declined his request to grant him one more term in office."
- ³ <http://reporter-ufo.ru/article.cfm?issue=54&article=992> Yuzhnyy Reporter No 41, 6 February 2006, "Tsar' gory v Strane gor".
- ⁴ See C W Blandy "North Caucasus: On the Brink of Far-Reaching Destabilisation", CSRC Caucasus Series 05/36, August 2005.
- ⁵ <http://www.newizv.ru/news/2005-08-22/30237/> Novyye Izvestia, 22 August 2005 "Dagestanskiy zapal" by Sergey Bekov.
- ⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷ See also C W Blandy "Chechnya: Centre of Unabated Instability & Conflict", Caucasus Series 04/11, May 2004, page 9, page 10 - Map 1.
- ⁸ <http://www.ca-c.org/journal/cac-10-2000/20.kisriev.shtml> Tsentral'naya Aziya i Kavkaz No 4 (10) 2000 "Dagestan: Prichiny konfliktov i factory stabil'nosti" by Enver Kisriev.
- ⁹ C W Blandy "Dagestan: The Gathering Storm" S38, CSRC, June 1998, page 6, updated Box 2.
- ¹⁰ Ibid. page 7.
- ¹¹ Nezavisimaya Gazeta 23 April 1998 page 5.
- ¹² <http://www.politcom.ru/article.php?id=2247> 21 February 2006 "Dagestan: ot Magomedova k Aliyevu" by Sergey Makedonov.
- ¹³ Ibid.
- ¹⁴ Nezavisimaya Gazeta 19 September 1997 page 3 "Problemy Dagestana razreshit" by Il'ya Maksakov
- ¹⁵ See C W Blandy "Whither Ingushetia" CSRC, Caucasus Series 06/03, January 2006, page 14, Table 4.
- ¹⁶ See C W Blandy "The Siege of Pervomayskoye" P19, CSRC, April 1996, page 27.
- ¹⁷ <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?docId=651675> Kommersant 21 February 2006 "Ne synom yedinym" by Ol'ga b-Allenova.
- ¹⁸ http://www.gazeta.ru/2006/02/17oa_189116.shtml "Kreml' pomenyal tityl'niye natsii"
- ¹⁹ <http://www.izvestia.ru/politic/article3076589> 20 February 2006 "Glava Dagestana mozhet ostavit' vmesto sebya syna".
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- ²³ <http://reporter-ufo.ru/article.cfm?issue=54&article=992> Yuzhnyy Reporter No 41, 6 February 2006, "Tsar' gory v Strane gor".
- ²⁴ <http://2006.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2006/13n/n13n-s14.shtml> Novaya Gazeta 20 February 2006,.
- ²⁵ Eurasia Daily Monitor, Internet version Volume 3, Number 42, 30 March 2006.
- ²⁶ <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?docId=651675> Kommersant No 31 (No 3362) of 21 February 2006 "Ne synom yedinym" by Ol'ga b-Allenova.
- ²⁷ <http://www.vremya.ru/2006/39/51/146970.html> Vremya Novostey: March 2006 "Shamil' – Stroitel" by Ivan Sukhov.
- ²⁸ <http://www.izvestia.ru/politic/article3076589> Izvestiya.ru, 20 February 2006 "Glava Dagestana mozhet ostavit' vmesto sebya syna".
- ²⁹ Who had been a presidential contender himself. <http://reporter-ufo.ru/article.cfm?issue=54&article=992> Yuzhnyy Reporter No 41, 6 February 2006, "Tsar' gory v Strane gor". "In March 2004 concerning the intention to fight for the presidential post an announcement was made about two well known Avar leaders – the chairman of the directors of OAO "NK Rosneft' – Dagneft" Gadzhi Makhachev and member of the Federation Council Ramazan Abdulatipov. In a joint tour throughout the republic Makhachev and Abdulatipov announced that they would act as a 'bundle'

keeping together. The bundle lasted no longer than May 2005. Ramazan Abdulatipov occupied in higher leadership of organs of federal governments, but having no real influence in Dagestan, became the Plenipotentiary Ambassador Extraordinary to Tajikistan.”

³⁰ <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?docId=651675> *Kommersant* 21 February 2006 “*Ne synom yedinyim*” by Ol’ga b-Allenova.

³¹ Ibid.

³² <http://www.politcom.ru/article.php?id=2247> *Politcom.Ru* 21 February 2006, “*Dagestan: ot Magomeda k Aliyevu*” by Sergey Markedonov.

³³ <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?docId=651675> *Kommersant* 21 February 2006 “*Ne synom yedinyim*” by Ol’ga b-Allenova.

³⁴ <http://www.politcom.ru/article.php?id=2247> *Politcom.Ru* 21 February 2006, “*Dagestan: ot Magomeda k Aliyevu*” by Sergey Markedonov.

³⁵ <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?docId=651675> *Kommersant* 21 February 2006 page 6 “*Ne synom yedinyim*” by Ol’ga b-Allenova.

³⁶ http://www.ng.ru/regions/2006-02-21/4_dagestan.html “*Glavoy Dagestana stal zhestkiy upravlenets*” by Sergey Migalin.

³⁷ <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?docId=651675> *Kommersant* 21 February 2006 “*Golosovali ne za kandidata ve prezidenty Dagestana, a za resheniye prezidenta Rossii*” .

³⁸ <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?docId=651675> *Kommersant* 21 February 2006 “*Ne synom yedinyim*” by Ol’ga b-Allenova.

³⁹ <http://reporter-ufo.ru/article.cfm?issue=19&article79> *Yuzhnyy Reporter* No 11, 27 June 2005 “*Dagestanskiye Chinovniki skryvayut svoi dokhody*” by Yevgeniy Rasul’.

⁴⁰ <http://www.vremya.ru/2006/39/51/146970.html> “*Shamil-stroitel*” by Ivan Sukhov. “Before 1998 the new premier was successful in doing some work as deputy chairman of the Dagestan Supreme soviet, which at that time was headed by the present Dagestan president. Next Zaynalov switched to work in the government: from the beginning in the secretariat of the prime minister, and then in the ministry of industry and trade. In 2001 they transferred him to the Federation Council, which is known to be the reservist bench for regional leaders.”

⁴¹ <http://reporter-ufo.ru/.cfm?issue=61&article=1150> *Yuzhnyy Reporter* No 49, 31 March 2006 “*Novyy zavet prezidenta Aliyeva*” by Timur Markov.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Musayev, Op cit.

⁴⁴ <http://2006.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2006/07n/n07n--s13.shtml> *Novaya Gazeta* 2 February 2006 “*Kak v Rossii shturmyut doma*” by Anna Politkovskaya.

⁴⁵ <http://www.kommersant.ru/archive/archive-material.html?docId=650687> “In 1985 the average monthly wage was 141 rub. By 2005 this indicator reached 4,014 rub. (average Russian monthly wage 8,931 rub). Average financial income from 81 rub. in 1985 rose to 5,435 in 2005. Over the time of Magomedali Magomedov in Dagestan the level of unemployment increased from 14.5% (first data 1992) up to 20.1 % (2003). The index of industrial production in 1981-1985 on average was 104%, but by 2004 had grown to 107% (All-Russia indicator for 2004 was 106.1%). The sharp growth in Dagestan over 20 years in the turnover of retail goods was from 1.1 mlrd rub. in 1985 up to 99 mlrd rub. in 2005. Growth is observed even in the construction of living accommodation: from 559 thousand sq m in 1985 up to 608 thousand sq m in 2005. Despite the fact that Dagestan is considered to be one of the most criminal regions, the number of crimes committed, according to official statistics, is steadily falling. If in 1985 10.5 thousand crimes were registered, then in January-November 2005 only 3.7 thousand.”

⁴⁶ Blandy “*North Caucasus: On the Brink of Far-Reaching Destabilisation*”, CSRC Caucasus Series 05/36, August 2005, page 5: “The shadow economy, the criminal sector, is estimated at 26% of the whole regional economy (in Dagestan it is 44%, compared to the average in Russia of 17%)”.

⁴⁷ <http://reporter-ufo.ru/.cfm?issue=61&article=1150> *Yuzhnyy Reporter* No 49, 3 April 2006 “*Novyy zavet prezidenta Aliyeva*” by Timur Markov.

⁴⁸ See Blandy “*North Caucasus: On the Brink of Far-Reaching Destabilisation*”, CSRC Caucasus Series 05/36, August 2005, page 5: “Courts maintain a negative stance and

without exception are organs of unscrupulous economic competition. Between 54 and 90% of enterprises (depending on the region) are convinced that they do not have the slightest chance in court in disputes with regional authorities. 44% to 88% have suffered from the scandalous practices of the militia. Sociological polls testify that the main regional obstacles to business are extortions and requisitions by the authorities, which businessmen fear more than actions by criminals.”

⁴⁹ Musayev, Op cit.

⁵⁰ <http://www.e-dag.ru/cgi-bin/news/show.pl?id=1143847086&part=07full=1>

Respublika Dagestan ofitsial'nyy sayt pravitel'stva 31 March 2006 “*Obsuzhdeny voprosy obespecheniya bezopatnosti I borba s korruptsiyey*”.

⁵¹ <http://reporter-ufo.ru/article.cfm?issue=66&article=1284> Yuzhnyy Reporter No 53, May 2006 “*Aliyeva proveryayut na dorogakh*” by Timur Markov.

⁵² <http://www.vremya.ru/2006/74/51/150831.html> Vremya No 74, 27 April 2006 “*Ch P rayonnogo masshtaba*” by Tat'yana Grishenko.

⁵³ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* 31 March 2006 page 4 “*Naznacheniya noviyeye – Kadry*” by Milrad Fatullayev.

⁵⁴ <http://reporter-ufo.ru/article.cfm?issue=66&article=1284> Yuzhnyy Reporter No 53, May 2006.

⁵⁵ <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?docId=670451> *Kommersant* No 75, 27 April 2006 page 3 “*MVD Dagestana obvinuli v pokrovitel'stve banditam*” by Yuliya b-Rybina.

⁵⁶ <http://www.e-dag.ru/cgi-bin/news/show.pl?id=1143847086&part=07full=1>

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⁵⁷ Op cit Blandy “*Dagestan: The Gathering Storm*” S38, CSRC, June 1998, pages 23-26.

⁵⁸ http://www.ng.ru/regions/2005-12-06/1_dudaev.html *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* 6 December 2005 page 5 “*Po stopam Dudayeva*” by Andrey Riskin, Maria Selina.

⁵⁹ <http://reporter-ufo.ru/.cfm?issue=61&article=1150> *Yuzhnyy Reporter* No 49, 3 April 2006

⁶⁰ *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Volume 3, Number 42, 30 March 2006.

⁶¹ Caucasus Reporting Service No 322, 11 Jan 06 Internet version “*Dagestan Assault Fails to Deliver*” by Musa Musayev.

⁶² *Trud* 31 January 2006, page 1 “*Once in, Never out – Conversation with a Dagestani terrorist*” by Vladimir Yanchenkov, Vladimir Alexandrov and translated by A Ignatkin.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ V. M. Kabuzan “*Naseleniye Severnogo Kavkaza v XIX – XX vekakh – Ethnostaticheskoye issledovaniye*” Izdatel'stvo “Russko-Baltiyskiy informatsionniy tesntr BLITS” St.Petersburg, 1996, extracted from Table 43, pages 175-176.

⁶⁵ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* No 72, 23 April 1998 page 5 “*Dagestan stal politicheskim poligonom Rossii*” by Magomed-Zarid Varisov - Director of the Information-Analytical Department of the Peoples Assembly of Dagestan.

⁶⁶ Rossiyskaya Federatsiya Federal'naya Sluzhba Gosudarstvenoy Statistiki “*Svodniye Itogi Vserossiyskoy Peregisi Naseleniya 2002*, Volume 14, Moskva, Statistika Rossii, 2005, Table 4.2, pages 276-335.

⁶⁷ Combined total of Rutuls, Aguls, Tsakhurs and Tats.

⁶⁸ <http://www.mk.ru/numbers/1682/article55887.htm> *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*, 16 June 2005.

⁶⁹ <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?docId=651675> *Kommersant* No 31, 21 February 2006 page 6 “*Ne synom yedinym Ol'ga b-Allenova*.”

Want to Know More ...?

See:

C W Blandy "*Dagestan: The Gathering Storm*" S38, CSRC, June 1998

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