

Conflict Studies Research Centre

Caucasus Series

06/54



**Chechnya:
Continued Violence**

C W Blandy

December 2006

Defence Academy of the United Kingdom

Chechnya: Continued Violence

C W Blandy

Key Points

- * Whilst Doku Umarov inherited a North Caucasus underground network, there are questions about his authority not only in Chechnya, but also in the North Caucasus as a whole.
- * Federal special services have demonstrated their ability to liquidate separatist and extremist leaders when the time is propitious for the Kremlin.
- * The Nalchik operation in October 2005 was not a great success for the insurgents and demonstrated many weak points in planning and leadership at all levels.
- * Dissident Kabardins and Balkars might not be so willing to become involved in a 'spectacular' in the future.
- * Within Chechnya, attacks have moved on from occasional mining of roads to attacks on federal bases in the mountainous south.
- * Uncoordinated minor attacks still provide a serious problem for federal forces. There is always the factor of leaked information too.
- * Estimates of fighting strengths vary: the pro-Russian Chechen view is that there are only a few (70) bandits, whilst federal forces believe there are some 700 dispersed in small groups. More young Chechens are joining them in the southern mountains.
- * Chechnya will remain a problem until the rule of law is applied by the present leadership. President Alu Alkhanov has lost significant authority in relation to Kadyrov.
- * Public opinion believes assassination of Movladi Baysarov was a result of his refusal to give in to Ramzan Kadyrov.

Contents

Introduction	1
Doku Umarov	1
Box 1 - Russian and Chechen Separatist views Of Doku Umarov	2
Box 2 - Doku Umarov's Deal with Special Services In 2000	3
Fragmented Threats	3
Box 3 - Doku Umarov's Reorganisation of Armed Forces of ChRI	4
Table 1 – Estimates of Boyeviki Numerical Strength	4
Accident, Coincidence or Necessity?	5
Federal Views on Threat	7
Box 4 - Terrorist System in Chechnya and North Caucasus	8
The Underground Network & and its Limitations	9
Box 5 - Raid by Boyeviki on Nal'chik 13 October 2005	10
Present Situation Facing Federal and Republic Forces	11
Appendix 1: Anti-Terrorist Special Operations in the North Caucasus 11 January to 14 June 06	17

Chechnya: Continued Violence

C W Blandy

Introduction

*“Federaly have got a two-three month breathing space. Then in the place of Basayev another boyevik leader will be established.”*¹

More than three months have now passed since the death of Shamil' Basayev on 9/10 July 2006. Will the radical extremists be able to continue their campaign of terror and violence without Basayev, for he was instrumental in creating a North Caucasus terrorist underground network of *dzhamaats* outside Chechnya over the last four to five years? Has Chechen separatism received a final deathblow with the demise of Basayev following that of Abdul-Khakim Saydulayev, Aslan Maskhadov's successor on 17 June 2006? Does Doku Umarov, the 42 year old successor to Saydulayev, have the same authority inside and outside Chechnya? What are the likely effects of the alterations to the presence, posture and structure of the federal organs of power for countering terrorism in Chechnya and throughout the North Caucasus?

Doku Umarov

Whilst Umarov has inherited a well-prepared organisation traversing the North Caucasus, there are some doubts as to whether people believe that he could be considered an authoritative commander in Chechnya, let alone whether he possesses the qualities, both political and military, required in a separatist leader embracing the whole of the North Caucasus region in the struggle for independence against Moscow. Umarov belongs to traditional Sufi Islam practised in the Caucasus, but regards it as a supplementary instrument for uniting the Chechen population in the campaign for independence.² Mayrbek Vachagayev has suggested that the reasons for the selection of Umarov as vice president in line to be Saydulayev's successor were based upon the need to *“balance the influence of the radicals and the Sufis”*,³ in fact giving Sufism a greater part to play; of course the Sufi approach would be more in tune with the thoughts and feelings of the Chechen population in the first place.

One also wonders whether as a result of the tragedy at No.1 Middle School at Beslan in September 2004, the separatist movement felt the need to disassociate itself from the indiscriminate acts of violence perpetrated by extremist radical elements, as demonstrated by Basayev. Even though Basayev was no religious extremist, he had had strong links with Arabs and other outsiders who had come to fight against Russia.⁴ Box 1 provides contrasting pictures of Umarov:

Box 1 – Russian and Chechen Separatist Views of Doku Umarov**Russian View⁵**

Diversions and terrorist acts in Grozny 1995-1996, the killing of law enforcement organ operatives and people working in the government structures under the leadership of Zavgayev. Kidnapping and murder of people together with Arbi Barayev in the period from 1997-1999, including nine members of the Ingush militia in autumn 1997, militia general Gennadiy Shpigun in March 1999. Autumn 1999, in the second Chechen campaign, Umarov's detachments offered fierce resistance to federal troops in Urus-Martan and Achkhoy-Martan rayony. Umarov's detachment carried out beheadings, including Salautdin Temirbolatov (Traktorist) beheading Russian soldiers. In 2001-2002 participated in organising attacks on populated points in Urus-Martan and Vedeno rayony. According to information from the FSB (Federal Security Service) organised the blowing up of the FSB Directorate in Magas (Ingushetia). He was one of the organisers of the bandit raid on Ingushetia on the night of 22 June 2004 and killed around 100 law enforcement operatives. Law enforcement organs have linked the names of Basayev and Umarov with the organisation of the assault on Beslan middle school No.1.

Chechen Separatist View⁶

Doku Umarov was born in 1964 in the village of Kharsenoy in the Shatoy rayon (10 km north west of Vashindoroy). He is a member of the Mulkhoy teip.⁷ He is married and is the father of two children. He has lived in the Achoy-Martan rayon and Grozny. He has been active in the resistance movement and is one of the few veterans of the military-political establishment still completely committed to independence. Before the first war in 1994, Umarov served in the Borz special division under Ruslan Gelayev. Following a quarrel with Gelayev in 1996, he left the Borz special division to command his own group of 200 fighters as a colonel. After the war he was elevated to the rank of general and actively backed Aslan Maskhadov in the presidential elections. In 1997 he was nominated to the position of Defence Secretary by President Maskhadov, but later he had some disagreements with Maskhadov and the post was abolished. In 1999 shortly before conflict was resumed he was re-appointed to the post. He was severely wounded during the federal battle for Grozny in 2000. When he returned to Chechnya in 2003 after treatment he took over the Southwestern Front. Whilst Maskhadov was still alive, Umarov was again appointed to the post of Ichkerian defence minister, but after Maskhadov's death the new president Saydulayev named him vice-president, thus becoming next in line for the presidency on Saydulayev's death.

Umarov now holds the positions of President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Emir of the Governmental Committee for Defence of the Majhlis Shura of the Caucasus, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of Chechnya [Ichkerian Republic] and the Emir of the Mujahadeen of the Caucasus. According to Vachagayev he has some influence in south-western Chechnya, but has greater popularity in other regions of the republic. Umarov is a follower of the Sufi (Qadiri) tarikat, in the wird (subdivision)⁸ of Sheikh Kunta-Khadzhi. Umarov is fully convinced that Islam in its traditional Sufi form should remain the basis of Chechen society.

Recently there has been some speculation over the fact that Umarov's elder brother has been a 'resident' within Tsenteroy, Prime Minister Kadyrov 'fortified' village for the past year. It is unclear whether he is there of his own free will.

However, another story of interest⁹ had its roots in the breakout from the siege of Grozny in 2000 and could be of some relevance in the future. Umarov received a severe jaw wound which required urgent surgery. Box 2 below demonstrates a degree of flexibility and resourcefulness in an otherwise seemingly “*irreconcilable and uncompromising*” man.¹⁰

Box 2 – Doku Umarov’s Deal with Special Services in 2000¹¹

Umarov arranged through an intermediary to go the Russian special services and negotiate treatment at the surgical department dealing with the jawbone in Nal’chik. In exchange Umarov assisted in the transfer of the body of militia general Gennadiy Shpigun to the GUBOP [regional directorate of the campaign against organised crime], and in the freeing of two female Polish students who had been kidnapped in Dagestan in the summer of 1999. Incidentally President Chirac of France turned to President Putin with a request for help in freeing a French journalist. Our president fulfilled the request through the intervention of Doku Umarov. When Russian special services related to Umarov that the time allotted to freeing hostages had expired, that treatment in Nal’chik had finished and would continue in the torture chambers of Lefortovo, he discharged himself from hospital fled to Georgia. But in 2001 he returned to Chechnya.

Fragmented Threats

One of the first tasks of Doku Umarov as the new President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) was to carry out a wide scale reorganisation of the terrorist underground with a reallocation of armed forces’ fronts, zones of responsibility and promotions for commanders.¹² All Umarov’s decrees were signed on 24 September 2006, and posted on the “*Chechenpress*” website on 30 September. Details of the reorganisation are in Box 3 below.

However one of the obvious shortcomings is the a lack of military training, preparation and experience at any higher leadership level. If Umarov is liquidated or decides to give himself up, the situation could become much more fragmented if there is no overall separatist/extremist commander, leading to the demise of any effective network. Alexander Golts made the point that in 2000/2001 the federal command in Chechnya reported that the organised resistance in the republic had been destroyed. Whilst that was true, the exact nature of the problem, Golts wrote, lay in the fact that unorganised resistance was more difficult to counter than organised resistance:

*When the actions of the enemy are controlled from a single centre, it is always possible to infiltrate it and to learn of his plans. There is always the possibility, with help and technology and good intelligence, of learning where the enemy is concentrated in order to prepare for his blows. When the resistance is decentralised... the problems are only increased, because it is impossible to track the activity of 10 or 20 or 50 field commanders who don’t take orders from anyone and who prepared their operations based only on their own ideas. I suspect that Basayev’s death, of course, will weaken Chechen resistance, since Basayev was a sort of symbol. But at the same time, on the operational and tactical levels, it will make the work of our special forces much more complicated.*¹³

Box 3 – Doku Umarov’s Reorganisation of Armed Forces of ChRI¹⁴

(As a result of Decrees 115 to 127 in conformity with Article 73 of the Constitution of ChRI)

Promotions

Suleiman Imurzayev (Khayrulla) from Colonel to Brigadier General wef 24 September 2006.

Rabbani Khalilov from Colonel to Brigadier General wef 24 September 2006.

Akhmed Yevloyev from Colonel to Brigadier General wef 24 September 2006.

Front Alterations

On the basis of the Northern Front of the Chechen Armed Forces (VS ChRI) the formation of two new fronts: the Northeast Front VS ChRI and the Northwest Front. The renaming of the Eastern Front VS ChRI to the Southeastern front.

Front Commanders

Northeastern Front: Colonel Tagir Batayev

Southeastern Front: Brigadier Suleiman Imurzayev (Khayrulla)

Southwestern Front: Brigadier General Tarkhan Gazuyev

Northwestern Front: Colonel Abubakar El'muradov

Central Front: Colonel Abubakar Basayev

Dagestan Front: Brigadier General Rabbani Khalilov, sometimes called "Rappani"

Kavkaz Front: Brigadier General Akhmed Yevloyev (Magas). Organiser of practically all the major diversionary operations of the last few years in Ingushetia, he has fighters subordinated to him who operate in all the North Caucasus republics with the exceptions of Chechnya and Dagestan.

Volga Front: Colonel Abdurakhman Kamalutdinov (Dzhundulla)

Ural Front: Colonel Mikhail Zakharov (Asadulla)

It is instructive to note the various estimates produced by politicians and military commanders concerning the numerical strength of *boyeviki* made over the last 15 months or so:

Table 1 – Estimates of Boyeviki Numerical Strength¹⁵

Date	Strength of Boyeviki	Person making Estimate
15 August 2005	Around 800-1,000	Chairman of Chechen State Council Taus Dzhabrailov
18 September 2005	Around 1,500	Presidential Plenipotentiary for the Southern Federal District, Dmitriy Kozak
11 October 2005	800: 700 under Basayev, Umarov and Saydulayev; 100 foreign mercenaries	Federal Forces Commander Arkadiy Yedelev
17 January 2006	70-75 bandit groups, up to 730 fighters	Commander Interior Ministry Group in North Caucasus Oleg Khotin.
18 January 2006	From 150 – 250 fighters	Premier of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov

9 July 2006	Umarov – 13 men Basayev – 20 men Foreign mercenaries – 60 to 70 men	Premier of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov
29 August 2006	90 men – in the mountains around 60 boyeviki and 20/30 foreign mercenaries	Deputy Premier of Chechnya Adam Delimkhanov
3 November 2006	Around 700 bandits on Chechen territory and neighbouring regions	Federal Forces Commander Yevgenniy Baryayev

According to Colonel General Yevgenniy Baryayev, there are now 700 *boyeviki* situated in the south of Chechnya,¹⁶ who operate not only on Chechen territory but in neighbouring regions. However in August 2006 Ramzan Kadyrov, prime minister of Chechnya, maintained that there were only 50-60 active *boyeviki* within the republic and those who were hopeful for the recreation of Ichkeria were no more than 120-150 people. Furthermore some 300 had taken up the offer of an amnesty and handed in their weapons.

What kind of threat could these pose to the inhabitants of the North Caucasus? A clue comes with the announcement by Nikolay Patrushev, head of the Federal Security Service that the *boyeviki* are planning diversionary-sabotage operations. Patrushev at a meeting of the national anti-terrorist committee in Moscow announced that the special services had received information that terrorists are planning diversionary-sabotage operations on the Volgograd reservoir, the Tsimlyan hydro-electric structure, and other hydro-electric structures in Saratov oblast' and in Dagestan.¹⁷ The current condition of the powerful dams and reservoirs on the River Don and Volga built and put into service more than 50 years ago raises many questions, especially if it is taken into account that the Tsimlyan hydro-electric structure, highlighted in the Guinness Book of Records, is the largest structure built from sand. This is possible evidence that underground network planning by Umarov's new structures has been completed.

Accident, Coincidence or Necessity?

Can the federal forces cope? Some time before the recent G8 summit was due to be held in Saint Petersburg, amongst the federal law enforcement organs there was an assumption that Chechen radical extremists would stage some form of 'spectacular' prior to or during the summit itself.

*"Russia received a significant political dividend from the death of the most successful Chechen terrorist",*¹⁸ when "less than 100 hours before the start of the 'big eight' in Saint Petersburg the head of the FSB Nikolay Patrushev reported the liquidation of Russian terrorist number one Shamil' Basayev to the President of the RF".¹⁹ There is a temptation to view the elimination of Basayev as part of a chain of operations which commenced with the earlier liquidations of Dzhokhar Dudayev way back in April 1996, of Khattab by poisoned letter on 19 March 2002 Aslan Maskhadov (8 March 2005) and Sadulayev (17 June 2006). Perhaps they can be seen as acts of political necessity at a date and time crucial for the Kremlin's other plans. The remarks of a military intelligence officer²⁰ at the time of Maskhadov's death in March 2005 could have relevance to the later elimination of Basayev. *"The GRU kept a constant watch on Basayev. We know everything about him. We have our clear cut orders. Neither seize nor eliminate, just watch him."*²¹

In the case of Maskhadov it will be remembered that by the end of 2004 within the Russian heartland there was mounting unease amongst the population as seemingly unending acts of terrorism spilled over from Chechnya into other regions of the North Caucasus.²² Despite repeated calls for them to do so, the federal government had set its face against any form of negotiation with Chechen separatists. The Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia had met Akhmad Zakayev, the separatists' representative in London and signed a memorandum calling for a peaceful settlement of the war in Chechnya.²³ Moreover, the critical tone of articles in the press covered a much greater diapason of condemnation than just the war in the Southern Federal District, noting the general decline in President Putin's ratings amongst the general public.²⁴

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe's (PACE) 'Round Table' scheduled for 21 March 2005 threatened to become another humiliation for Russia. Moscow's sense of growing isolation from Europe on Chechnya and human rights was compounded by events in Ukraine and Georgia's increasingly trenchant line over the removal of Russian military bases. Whilst Aslan Maskhadov reportedly had little influence over the radical extremists such as Basayev, his power lay in his credentials as a legally elected former president, which had become the focus of a concerned following in the 'liberal West'. Maskhadov's death on 8 March 2005 or thereabouts, as the federal authorities had planned, resulted in a complete about turn in the approach of PACE to the Chechen problem, almost to the extent of turning their round table into farce. "*On 21 March 2005 Russia gained a final victory over Chechen separatists.*"²⁵ The event allowed Russian and official Chechen politicians to confirm that "*the main aim of the round table was confirmation of the fact that alternatives of normalising the situation in the Chechen Republic besides those within the framework of the constitution of the RF do not exist*".²⁶ There were no longer two legitimate sides in Chechnya.

The 'betrayal for a fix of heroin',²⁷ followed by the news of a 'chance' engagement in Argun on 17 June 2006 as part of a special operation conducted by federal forces resulted in the death of Abdul-Khalim Saydulayev, Maskhadov's nominated successor. However, it is worth noting the views of Mayrbek Vachagaev on Saydulayev:

*He was the representative of a new generation of Chechen leaders who managed not only to become the leader of Chechen resistance, but the leader of the entire resistance in the North Caucasus. He successfully combined the roles of a young fighter and a knowledgeable theologian, and thus avoided relying upon Middle Eastern emigrants... While Maskhadov was seen by non-Chechen combatants as merely a Chechen national leader, Saydulayev was thought of as rising above his ethnic background to be the leader of all the ethnicities in the region. This is a quality that is very crucial in the North Caucasus, as it contains close to a hundred different ethnic groups.*²⁸

Even though Saydulayev's accession to the Ichkerian Presidency in the event of Maskhadov's death had been agreed amongst the separatist hierarchy some time before, Saydulayev was little-known to the world at large. Therefore it was not surprising that his death did not command the same world-wide attention as that of Maskhadov's. Saydulayev's death therefore did little to support the assertion that Moscow was at the very forefront in countering the ever-widening spread of global terrorism. Three weeks later there came the news that Basayev had been killed.

It could be argued that the Kremlin believed the time had come to dispose of Basayev and gain the maximum benefit from his liquidation, highlighting not only

its participation in the fight against global terrorism by the liquidation of Russian Terrorist No. 1, but also in emphasising Russia's reliability on the eve of the G8 summit.

There is a similarity of approach between a Russian policy which acquires economic levers in order at some later date to gain the maximum advantage against other countries and the possible thought processes in these cases. Allowing terrorist acts to take place justifies tighter counter-terrorist measures and a valid reason for the existence and improvement of the MOD, interior troops and special services. Then, when the time is judged most advantageous for the standing of Russia, the Kremlin plays the trump card of eliminating the terrorists at a time and place of its own choosing. Their November 2006 'special operation' to kill Doku Umarov only wounded him, however. Perhaps their true operational effectiveness still leaves something to be desired.

Federal Views on the Threat

The elimination of Shamil' Basayev gave rise to a feeling of relief not only in the minds of certain politicians, but also more understandably amongst some of the indigenous peoples and the ever-dwindling residue of the Russian population in the northeast Caucasus.²⁹ Many believed that the situation in Chechnya after Basayev's death on 10 July 2006, if not at a decisive culminating point, then at least had reached an important turning point, edging closer to normalisation. However, whilst the situation in Chechnya may have quietened down in early 2006, this was certainly not so throughout the North Caucasus, especially in Dagestan³⁰ and Ingushetia,³¹ despite the scale of anti-terrorist special operations carried out in the first six months of the year shown at Appendix 1. This was recognised by Nikolay Patrushev, Director of the FSB and Head of the National Anti-Terrorist Committee on 25 August at Rostov-on-Don, when he described the operational situation as continuing to remain extremely complex.³² As if to underline and add emphasis to his words:

On Saturday 26 August 2006 in Ingushetia just within 24 hours there were three attacks on servicemen and militia. Three servicemen were killed, there were wounded among servicemen and members of the law enforcement organs. On Saturday they fought against boyeviki in Dagestan. Here they again stormed a house occupied by boyeviki. Three fighters and the owner of the house were killed, the house was destroyed, causing casualties amongst the local population.³³

Nevertheless, according to senior federal officers:

The elimination of one of the separatist leaders can hardly bring about a fundamental change of situation in the North Caucasus. The fact of the matter is that the system of terrorism is a multi-layered organisation which has been constructed and developed over 10 years of war. With the liquidation of Basayev one of the elements of this system has been broken. But principally it remains intact. And, like the American robot-terminators it is capable of regeneration. Therefore no matter how many terrorists are liquidated the system is automatically capable of reacting to changes. How many years running have hundreds of boyeviki been killed; however representatives from the federal authorities from year to year have said that there are around 1,000 fighters.³⁴

Vachagayev goes further and attributes the existence of an underground network to Basayev's reputation, status and charisma facilitated by "*ease in mingling with the other ethnicities in the region*,"³⁵ much aided and supported by the Dagestani dzhamaat³⁶ "Shariat" in the development of other dzhamaats, such as the "Yarmuk" dzhamaat in Kabardino-Balkaria, the "Kataib al-Khoul" dzhamaat in North Osetia, Nogay dzhamaat and other undertakings with the Ingush, Karachay and the Adyghe peoples. In Vachagayev's opinion it was the sum of all these undertakings that "*meant Basayev could [have] successfully oppos[ed] Russia on territory stretching from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. . . Dokku Umarov, the current leader of Chechen guerrillas, has thus inherited a well-organised force capable of fighting across almost the entirety of the North Caucasus.*"³⁷

An outline of the multi-layered structure of the terrorist, radical extremist organisation which federal structures believe exists in Chechnya and the North Caucasus is shown in Box 4 below. Not unexpectedly it adheres to a concept dependent on direction and support from outside Chechnya as part of a campaign of global terrorism.

Box 4 – Terrorist System in Chechnya and North Caucasus³⁸

First Level

The first level of the terrorist system in Chechnya is the ordinary rank and file member who is directly and immediately involved in the actual act of terror itself. They do not know the customer, or the structure of the organisation, but they simply carry out the act given to them for money or for ideological beliefs.

Second Level

Organisational structures on the ground are on the look out for and find candidates interested in terrorism and then instruct them. They also have no knowledge who are the actual organisers, who controls and directs terrorism, nor do they have knowledge of the financial arrangements.

Third Level

These are the band leaders who are involved in organisation. They are employed in providing the money for the conduct of operations and the terrorist war, they have contacts abroad and are directly linked with the organisers of terrorist acts. For example bin Laden is one such 'general'. Such a category includes Shamil' Basayev... Aslan Maskhadov, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and certain other extremist leaders. At the moment in Chechnya Doku Umarov personifies this role along with certain less-well known imitators.

Fourth (Higher) Level

These are the sponsors, scenario writers, and directors of terrorist acts who allot the tasks for bloody spectacles with not so small sums of money. From time to time the special services are able to catch or eliminate terrorists from the first three levels, but those at the fourth level remain beyond the reach of special services.

However, in the opinion of Vachagayev too much emphasis has been placed on the presence of foreigners in the Chechen resistance movement. Shishani also notes that "*there are substantive reasons for the weakening presence of Arab fighters in Chechnya. Their presence is no longer legitimate given the lack of logistic support and the fact that they are no longer welcome by the Chechens.*"³⁹

It appears that Colonel Anatoliy Tsyganok was convinced that even with the liquidation of Basayev, the terrorist system in the North Caucasus by itself would not fall apart.⁴⁰ At that time it was reckoned that the *federaly* had a two to three month breathing space which has now drawn to a close as winter approaches. They believed that in the place of Basayev a new *boyevik* leader would be established. Links with sponsors would be reactivated. Simultaneously, the command system controlling the lowest levels would be restored: the terrorist war would be continued. A similar view was held by Major General Zolotarev: *“In truth the social base of terrorism remains constant and after a certain amount of time everything is able to return to its own circle.”*⁴¹

The Underground Network and its Limitations

Analysis after the Beslan tragedy provided some pertinent insights. Basayev’s constant, immediate followers amounted to 10-15 people, mainly childhood friends, out of a fighter band of 1,200-1,300 men, but the reason why Russian special services could not catch him was the 13,000 people who had never fought against Russians with weapons in their hands.⁴² There was also the additional element of Basayev’s charisma. It was unthinkable that anyone would give information to the law enforcement agencies even with a reward of \$US10,000,000. For many Chechens, especially the young men, Basayev was the very ideal of a fighter, a benchmark, a hero with a reputation of being a clever, intelligent man. Chechens and Russians had been fighting between peaceful intervals for over 300 years. And Basayev was still fighting Russians. For many Chechen women, he was also an idol.⁴³ Without the support of the local population and elements of the militia there would be *“no guarantee of safety on routes, no transport on routes, no provision of observation and surveillance of military objects, ground reconnaissance, no supply of food, documents and weapons, no medical assistance, no shelter, no silence about their appearance, no concealment”*.⁴⁴

A serious drawback for the *federaly* seems to be that operational intelligence divulged officially in the course of operations to local militia forces immediately became available to the very people that the special services were trying to apprehend: *“up to 30% of the Chechen MVD were accomplices of the boyeviki”*.⁴⁵

Even after nearly 12 years of conflict, according to Vachagaev *“the movement is still popular among the general population, with perhaps the majority applauding it and supporting its successes”*,⁴⁶ but the Chechen population has to live under pressure from both federal and republic special services, which in turn makes people appear ‘neutral’ in public. There is also a deep weariness and desire amongst the population to return to normality: no more the knock on the door at midnight.

Even though a viable underground network had been developed by Basayev, the terrorist operation of 13 October 2005, with almost simultaneous attacks on various targets in Nal’chik, was not a great success, even though both federal and republic special services and law enforcement organs had their own serious failings. Some 92 *boyeviki* were killed, 65 people were arrested, and 35 members of the power structures and 12 civilians were killed.⁴⁷

The 13 objectives of the boyeviki were:⁴⁸ Centre T (counter-terrorist centre), 43rd Border Detachment, the FSB Directorate building, the republic Interior Ministry, three police stations, the Directorate for the Struggle Against Organised Crime (BOP) 6th Department, Directorate of the Federal Prison Service (FSIN), a static patrol post

regiment, the hunting shop “Arsenal”, road patrol service post “Khasan’ya” and an OMON (Internal Special Troops) base. Reports also mentioned attacks on a company from 135 Motor Rifle regiment which was deployed at the airport and a prison.⁴⁹ Fighting continued for two days. Basayev took full responsibility for the raid: he had full operational command and Anzor Astemirov had tactical control of the Kabardino-Balkar sector of the “Caucasus Front of the VS ChRI”.⁵⁰

A number of shortcomings not only tended to work against achieving the full objective of the operation but which more importantly could also have a negative long term effect on support in the pan-Caucasus campaign against Russian ‘occupation’ of the North Caucasus. Box 5 below summarises the weak points in the raid on Nal’chik.

Box 5 – Raid by Boyeviki on Nal’chik 13 October 2005⁵¹

In the majority of groups not only did the ordinary rank and file have no combat experience but neither did the commanders; for many it was the first time they had handled weapons. Out of 150 fighters only 20 had some sort of acquaintance with military business. The majority of the raiders were not familiar with the plan of attack on their objective. Group leaders only allotted subgroups on the approach to the objective.

The planning for the raid on the OMON was mindless. At 0900 hrs a group of 15 fighters in three vehicles moved to the OMON base, the vehicles halted 500 metres away, and only then were weapons issued to the ‘raiders’. In the approach to the building the *boyeviki* were fired on, two were killed immediately, after which part of the raiders scattered.

The most important thing – there was no general plan of withdrawal from the town having completed the tasks. During the time of the battle Basayev was located on the cable route area on Mt Sosruko from where he could see the whole town, observing the events taking place, but did not throw his own detachment which numbered 100 to 150 men into the battle, quietly leaving along the route planned beforehand.

The position of Astemirov also raises questions. He also did not lead his ‘troops’ by personal example in the storm. There was no information about the fact Astemirov led the attack on any power object or appeared to participate directly in combat actions. During the battle he was situated together with Basayev on Mt Sosruko.

At first glance in Nal’chik Basayev acted like a classical military adviser. In the 1990s this sketch of military skill became universal. Normally military advisers do not participate in combat operations, but only instruct local armed formations and arrange a supply of weapons. Judging as a whole, Basayev dropped into Kabardino-Balkaria just for this. However, he violated the rules: having supplied weapons and worked out a plan of action, he did not carry out training of local cadres.

It is possible that an impression was created in the minds of the [Kabardin and Balkar] *boyeviki* that Basayev had simply used them.⁵² The important question is whether this realisation will affect future recruitment for participation in terrorist acts in Kabardino-Balkaria against republic and federal authorities: relations between Chechens and Kabardins have not always enjoyed unity of purpose, with Kabardins being more entrenched within the Russian system. Even Imam Shamil’ III in April 1846 at the height of his power was unable to obtain strong military backing from the Kabardins against Russian imperial forces.

The government of Kabardino-Balkaria has an unprecedented task in modern Russian history over the sheer scale of numbers in the preparation of the judicial process of bringing to trial some 67 participants of the raid.⁵³ Too often the complaint has been made that the *boyeviki* and their leaders are very rarely brought to justice: they tend to be liquidated on the spot. In a civilised society it is important that miscreants are brought to court, tried and sentenced if found guilty.⁵⁴ Due to the large numbers involved in the raid it becomes doubly important.

There is one further point to be made. By disrupting the gradual reconciliation between Ingush and North Osetia over return of Ingush displaced persons to their former homes in Prigorodnyy Rayon, Beslan was an ideal target with which to set the North Caucasus alight. In the Nal'chik raid Basayev used predominantly Balkar territory as a base from which to attack the Russo-Kabardin capital Nal'chik. Neither event in fact had the effect the terrorists hoped for.

Present Situation Facing Federal and Republic Forces

On 2 November 2006 at Rostov-on-Don, under the leadership of the Commander of North Caucasus Military District (NCMD) Army General Aleksandr Baranov a scientific-military study period took place on the "Use of troops in carrying out the task of counter-terrorist activities. Lessons and conclusions".⁵⁵ More than 300 generals and officers of the central apparatus of the Russian ministry of defence, field force formations units and establishments, together with subunits belonging to Federal Internal Troops, the FSB and other power structures took part in the study period. Participants exchanged their experience on training, preparation, organisation and conduct of counter-terrorist operations. On the eve of the study period Nikolay Patrushev chaired a meeting in the National anti-terrorist committee of the Federal Operational Headquarters (FOSh) in which the results of the formation of the operational headquarters in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan were considered.

Despite the announcement of an amnesty and forceful measures for ensuring security the situation in the region as a whole remains restless and troubled. For example on 7 November there was an attack on a militia detachment at Troitskaya in Ingushetia and three days before that law enforcement organs came across three *boyeviki* whom they liquidated at the Ingush stanitsa of Nesterovskaya.

Recently in the high mountain Vedenno rayon of Chechnya as a result of a clash between *boyevik* and the Vostok battalion two servicemen were wounded and one *boyevik* was killed. On 3 November close to a vehicle checkpoint on the outskirts of Groznyy a vehicle with members of OMON from Orel was blown up – the second in command was killed and three wounded. Almost every day some kind of action takes place. Near Bol'shaya Varandy in Shatoy rayon Vostok discovered a cache of weapons and ammunition. Another bandit cache was found by militiamen in the Zavodskiy district of Groznyy in a partially ruined building. This is doubtless the reason why the leadership of the country is keeping a significant grouping of troops in Chechnya despite plans for a staged withdrawal. The commander of Russian Internal Troops Colonel General Nikolay Rogozhkin announced recently that the numerical strength of 46 Brigade Internal Troops deployed in the republic has been increased by 5,000 men to around 15,000 servicemen.⁵⁶

The heavy losses sustained by federal forces in Chechnya in recent weeks has forced Colonel General Barayev to make yet another statement. Earlier the general has had to acknowledge that the number of *boyeviki* in the republic had risen to 700 despite the fact that some 380 people had surrendered their weapons in the amnesty.⁵⁷ The previous week he reported that the illegal armed formations had succeeded in regrouping after the serious blows inflicted on them during the spring and summer.⁵⁸ Thus they have succeeded in re-establishing communications and forces, new field commanders have appeared few of whom are well known, but having the ability to fight no worse than their predecessors, he said. This has allowed them to switch from occasional explosions on roads to active armed clashes including even audacious attacks on bases belonging to the military and law enforcement organisations, the general reported.

Barayev on another occasion⁵⁹ opined that the outflow of young men to the mountains was increasing. Speaking about this he called for active participation of heads of rayon, settlement and village administrations in resolving the problem; in essence the general is now accusing some of them of treachery in making advances to the illegal armed groups or turning a blind eye to their activities, but perhaps the accusation is more than a little unjustified. For instance, according to the Chechen prosecutor between 2000 and 2006 some 71 criminal acts have been committed against administration heads, including murder and kidnapping. Only nine cases have been presented to the courts. Local officials in such a situation have to tread carefully in order not to bring anger on themselves from Grozny or from the *boyeviki*, whilst the latter are able to move without hindrance to mountain villages, robbing the inhabitants and replenishing supplies. According to National Assembly deputy Aslambek Borshchigov there is not one populated point in Sharoy rayon besides the rayon centre which has a federal forces 'blokpost'. (It will be remembered that seven OMON from Mordovia were killed in Sharoy rayon recently.)

With the election of the Chechen parliament many talked about the fact that it was the most legitimate form of all the branches of government power in the republic. Formally there is government in Chechnya; whether it is effective raises serious doubts. Government power exists only in Grozny and large rayon centres. However, in distant villages and settlements no belief exists in the ability of the government to protect people from bandits. In fact "*what is taking place now is just the same as after the Civil war*".⁶⁰

So it is perhaps understandable that no one in the federal centre will hurry to transfer power to the present prime minister Ramzan Kadyrov and/or replace Alu Alkhanov as president. Whilst Kadyrov is the main support of the federal centre in the Kremlin, he has not achieved his main task of bringing stability to the republic. In truth it is Kadyrov himself who is at the core of the problem. It is Kadyrov who controls the republic power structures, and he maintains that the Chechen law enforcement structures are capable of ensuring stability in the region. In fact stability is a long way off.

In addition to Ramzan Kadyrov's several thousand strong republican Interior Ministry forces, the federal forces have several Chechen units at their disposal. The Chechen Interior ministry has several hundred special forces.

The Oil/Gas Protection Regiment, as its name implies, was specially designated for the protection of oil installations in the republic. It was formed at the beginning of 2004 after several terrorist acts against oil installations. The permanent establishment of the regiment which is subordinated to the Chechen Interior Ministry consists of 2,000 men. It is made up of 11 guard companies and two rapid-reaction companies which guard and protect 122 installations comprising the oil-

gas complex in eight rayony of the republic. From 1 July 2004 the financing of the regiment came from the federal budget. The regiment is commanded by Deputy Prime Minister Adam Delimkhanov, a first cousin of prime minister Kadyrov. Taking into account that earlier up to 90% of the population of Chechnya was occupied in the illegal oil business, the regiment is not without work.

At the present time the two battalions “Vostok” and “Zapad” (East and West) manned by Chechens operate within the structure of the Combined Group of Forces (OGV) in the North Caucasus and 42 MRD. The formation commander directly commands and controls their actions.⁶¹ No one else has the right, besides the commander in chief, to direct these units. All Federal army and Interior Ministry forces in the North Caucasus come under the OGV and the Operational Headquarters in conducting the counter-terrorist operation. However, it is possible that “Vostok” and “Zapad” also carry out different tasks as ordered by military intelligence (GRU). (More than once media reports have appeared that they have been directly subordinated to the GRU.) Therefore the head of the government Ramzan Kadyrov is in no position to issue orders independently. These battalions were formed some years ago from ethnic Chechens, who had earlier served in military units specially designated for operating on the territory of the republic and particularly mountainous areas. They are included in the mountain grouping of the MOD. Their structure is similar to that of a motor rifle battalion consisting of three rifle companies, with communications and logistic subunits, together with additional support (mortar battery, sniper detachment, additional automatic grenade launcher detachments). “Vostok” and “Zapad” are regarded as the elite of 42 motor rifle division. They combine manoeuvrability over difficult terrain with expert local knowledge.

More recently in 2006 two other battalions, “Sever” and “Yug” (North and South) were formed from Chechen personnel and included within the framework of 46 Brigade Internal troops. They are subordinated through it to the commander North Caucasus District Internal Troops. At the present time these two battalions carry out operations against the terrorist underground. As with all other Internal Troops they are under command of Colonel General Nikolay Rogozhkin, commander Internal Troops. Whilst the Republic Interior Ministry functions within the republic it is dovetailed into the federal ministry. The republic authorities can only operate within the parameters of their own authority, thus the head of the Chechen government Ramzan Kadyrov does not have the authority to give directions to operate in another Russian region.

There is one other group which requires to be mentioned, namely the “Gorets” operational combat group which was under the command of Movladi Baysarov, formerly a bodyguard of President Akhmat-Khadzhi-Kadyrov. In 2004, following a personality clash with Kadyrov junior, Baysarov and his group were subordinated to the operational-coordination directorate of the FSB North Caucasus. In June 2006 there had been a stand-off between the ‘Gortsy’ and Kadyrov junior’s men, who surrounded the Gorets base location at Pobedinsloye. The situation then was only resolved without bloodshed by the support of Kakiyev’s Zapad battalion on the side of the “Gortsy” and also that of President Alu Alkhanov. There were two real problems. The first was that Baysarov and his men refused to be subordinated to Kadyrov: Kadyrov demanded that they surrender their weapons. Second, there was an allegation that Basayrov had murdered the Musayev family in 2003 as a result of them causing the death of Baysarov’s brother Shakhrani in October 2003. Baysarov was allegedly put on a wanted list. It is believed that Kadyrov ordered Chechen special services to liquidate Baysarov; Baysarov was killed by Chechen police in Moscow on 19 November. The whole Baysarov affair further indicates the growing

weakness of President Alkhanov in relation to Kadyrov junior, and the risk of Kadyrov proving a troublesome partner for the federal centre.

Endnotes

- ¹ *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye* No 24, 14-20 July 2006 pages 1 and 7. “*Federal’nyye sily poluchil peredyshku*” by Vadim Solov’yev, Vladimir Ivanov.
- ² Jamestown Foundation Conference 14 September 2006 presentation by Mayrbek Vachagaev, page 10 <http://chechnya.jamestown.org/nccp-91406.php>.
- ³ Ibid, page 3.
- ⁴ <http://2001.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2001/71n/n71n-s03.shtml>, *Novaya Gazeta*, No 71, 1 October 2001, “*S kem vesti peregovory v Chechne*” by Anna Politkovskaya. “Basayev and Khattab are situated in a “friendly” bunch, but the basis of the present cordial misalliance is shortlived – it is money and “legitimacy”: Basayev demands money from Khattab, Khattab needs the connection with Basayev for there is no other possibility of attaining that Chechen reality.”
- ⁵ <http://2006.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2006/46n/n46n-s21.shtml> *Novaya Gazeta* No 46 22 June 2006.
- ⁶ Jamestown Foundation, Mayrbek Vachagaev, Op. Cit page 10.
- ⁷ Mayrbek Vachagayev, “*Sovremennoye Chechenskoye Obshchenstvo*”, *Tsentral’naya Azia i Kavkaz*, No 2, 2003 page 16.
- ⁸ Alexandre Bennigsen, S Enders Wimbush “*Mystics and Commissars – Sufism in the Soviet Union*”, C. Hurst & Company, London, 1985, page 183, Glossary: “Wird. Subdivision of the Qadiriya in the North Caucasus”.
- ⁹ <http://2006.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2006/46n/n46n-s21.shtml> *Novaya Gazeta* No 46 22 June 2006.
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ Ibid.
- ¹² <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?docId=709250> *Kommersant* No 183/P 2 October 2006 “*Doku Umarov reformiroval podpol’e*” by Nikolay b-Sergeyev, Yelena b-Pashutinskaya.
- ¹³ RFE/RL 10 July 2006 Internet version “*Chechnya: Decentralised Resistance Presents New Dangers*” by Alexander Golts.
- ¹⁴ <http://chechenpress.net/events/2006/09/30/09.shtml> Chechechenpress - State News Agency, 30 September 2006. Ukazy Prezidenta Doku Umarova Frontalh VS CHRI
- ¹⁵ <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?docId=719397> *Kommersant* No 207/B 7 November 2006 “*Chechenskikh boyevikov peredali polkovniku iz Sochi*” by Musa b Muradov.
- ¹⁶ http://www.ng.ru/regions/2006-11-07/6_prizyv.html *Nezavisimaya Gazeta Regiony* 7 November 2006/ “*Oseniy prizyv*” by Andrey Riskin
- ¹⁷ <http://2006.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2006/85n/n85n-s03.shtml> *Novaya Gazeta* No 85, 9 November 2006 “*Komu dadut za treshchiru?*” by Anna Lebedeva.
- ¹⁸ <http://www.politcom.ru/article.php?id=3053> *Poitcom.ru* 12 July 2006 “*Smert’ Basayeva: Politicheskkiye posledstviya dlya Severnogo Kavkaza*” by Sergey Markedonov
- ¹⁹ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* No 140, 11 July 2006 “*Podarok k sammity*” by Andrey Riskin, Vladimir Mukhin,
- ²⁰ Another pertinent factor with regard to the GRU intelligence officer’s remarks was that the “Zapad” Battalion (West Battalion) operated under GRU control in the west of Chechnya.
- ²¹ <http://www.mk.ru/numbers/1550/article49527.htm> *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*, 21 March 2005, “*Ubit Basayeva*” by Svetlana Meteleva. See also <http://www.izvestia.ru/conflict/article819043> *Izvestiya.Ru* 9 December 2004 “*Marshruty Basayeva*” “[According to Akhmed] commander of one of the many Chechen spetsnaz “We will catch Basayev one of these days – the routes and times are known. “There were also rumours that Basayev had connections with military intelligence during the time when the so-called Abkhaz Battalion consisting of volunteers from the North Caucasus under the command of Basayev were assisting the Abkhaz against the Georgians in 1992.
- ²² C W Blandy “*Chechnya: Centre of Unabated Instability and Conflict*” CSRC Caucasus Series 04/11 May 2004 and “*North Caucasus: Escalation of Terrorism into Ingushetia*” CSRC Caucasus Series 04/17 June 2004.
- ²³ *NG Regiony*, No 4, 28 February 2005, “*Strelyat’ nel’zya dogovariatsya*” by Andrey Riskin. “Meanwhile last Friday [25 February] in London representatives of Union of Committees of

Soldiers' Mothers of Russia met Aslan Maskhadov's emissary Akhmed Zakayev and signed a memorandum 'The Way to Peace in Chechnya'. The meeting took place in the presence of Deputies from the European Parliament ... added V Mel'inkova Chairwoman MKSM 'The terror in Chechnya was born through the ten year war and to liquidate it is only possible within the framework of a peaceful process'".

²⁴ <http://www.politcom.ru/2005/pvz596.php>, Politcom.Ru, 1 February 2005, "Reyting prezidenta pod davleniyem" by Ta'yana Stanovaya. According to the Public Opinion Foundation on 20 Jan 05 'trust' ratings of President Putin had declined from 47% in Dec 04 to 43% in Jan 05, and according to the Levada Centre on 26 January, from 39% 32% in the same period. "As a whole those not approving the activities of the president increased from 22% to 25%, and the number of those approving the activities of the president dropped from 71% (December 2004) to 65%." See also

<http://2005.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2005/10n/n10n-s00.shtml>, *Novaya Gazeta*, No 10, 10 February 2005, *Prezident prostoy i lozhnyy* by Boris Nemtsov & Vladimir Pribbylovskiy.

²⁵ <http://vip.lenta.ru/news/2005/03/22/pace>, "Sovet Yevropy zabyl slovo "Ichkeria"" by Yelena Lyubovskaya.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?DocID=683215&IssueId=30124> *Kommersant* No 108/P 19 June 2006 "V Ichkerii stalo odnim prezidentom men'she" " ... In all for one and a half thousand roubles. 'A person in the circle of Saydulayev needed the money to buy narcotics' Ramzan Kadyrov explained."

²⁸ <http://chechnya.jamestown.org/nccp-91406.php> Jamestown Foundation, Mayrbek Vachagaev. Op. Cit pages 2 and 3.

²⁹ Dr Steven J Main "Russia's 'Golden Bridge' is Crumbling: Demographic Crisis in the Russian Federation" CSRC Russian Series 06/39, August 2006, page 13. See also C W Blandy "Dagestan: Birth of Presidential Republic" CSRC, Caucasus Series 06/25, June 2006, page 16, Appendix 1, Table 1.

³⁰ <http://reporter-ufu.ru/article.cfm?issue=81&article=1638> *Yuzhnyy Reporter* No 68, 14 August 2006 "Okhota na 'Zhivtza'" by Timur Markov. "Last week in the course of one hour in Dagestan two assassination attempts were made. The first on the prosecutor of Buynaksk Bitarov, the second on the head of the republic MVD Adil'girer Magomedtagirov. The prosecutor died in hospital, but the armoured automobile saved the minister." See also Jamestown Foundation Conference 14 September "Islam in the North Caucasus – Dagestan" by Mikhail Roschin, page 14: "The assassination attempt against the Minister of Internal Affairs of Dagestan A. Magomedtagirov and the killing of the district attorney of Buynaksk B. Bitarov (which occurred on the Tolgin highway near Makhachkala on August 8th, 2006) are evidence of a well developed armed underground." <http://chechnya.jamestown.org/nccp-91406.php>

³¹ IWPR, Caucasus Reporting Service No. 344 part 2, 21 June 2006 "Ingushetia: Just who's behind the violence"? by Marina Ausheva. Assassinations of: senior police official Musa Nalgiev; acting deputy head of the Ingush interior ministry Jabrail Kostoyev. Healthcare minister Magomet Aliakhanov narrowly escaped with his life; assassination of Galina Gubina, senior figure in the Suzhenskiy rayon administration responsible for resettlement of Russians in Ingushetia. Five reasons given for assassinations: with situation calming down in Chechnya police chiefs have lost emergency powers; work of supporters of territorial and administrative reunification of Chechnya and Ingushetia; violence being fomented by North Osetians to take Ingush minds off Prigorodnyy rayon; Ingush are opposed to resettlement of Russians in Ingushetia, and simple blood revenge.

³² *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* No 181, 28 August 2006. "Tri Chechni Vmesto Obnoy" by Andrey Riskin.

³³ Riskin also drew attention to the fact that President Mukhu Aliyev in June 2006 had issued a decree forbidding the storming of houses occupied by fighters because of attendant casualties, "evidently, to the spetsnaz such a document was not a decree". See also C W Blandy "Dagestan: The Birth of Presidential Republic" CSRC Caucasus Series 06/25 June 2006.

³⁴ *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye* No 24 14-20 July 2006.

³⁵ Jamestown Foundation, Mayrbek Vachagaev, Op. Cit page 10.

³⁶ <http://www.izvestia.ru/conflict/article828314> *Izvestiya* 10 December 2004, "Ideologiya Basayeva", by Vadim Rechkalov: [According to] "Aleksy an operative of one of the FSB

spetsnaz subunits, call sign '103' ... I think that excepting mountain farmsteads, there are dzhamaats in every village, where there are 20-30 people. Wahhabitism in truth is more a social than religious idea”.

³⁷ Jamestown Foundation, Mayrbek Vachagaev, Op Cit. page 10.

³⁸ *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye* No 24, 14-20 July 2006.

³⁹ Op cit <http://chechnya.jamestown.org/nccp-91406.php> Jamestown Foundation Conference 14 September, presentation by Murad Batal Shishan, <http://chechnya.jamestown.org/nccp-91406.php>.

⁴⁰ *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye* No 24, 14-20 July 2006.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² <http://www.izvestia.ru/conflict/article793673> *Izvestia.ru* 6 December 2004. “*Armiya Basayeva*” by Vadim Rechkalov.

⁴³ <http://www.izvestia.ru/conflict/article793673> *Izvestia.ru* 6 December 2004.

⁴⁴ Ibid,

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Jamestown Foundation, Mayrbek Vachagaev, Op. Cit.

⁴⁷ <http://2006.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2006/46n/n46n-s19.shtml> *Novaya Gazeta* No. 46, 22 June 2006 “*Basayev brosil boyevikov v bedu*” by Irina Borogan, Andrey Soldatov. Previous articles on the same subject are in *Novaya Gazeta* No 77, 17 October 2005, “*Siloviki prut po obychnomu stsenariyu*” by Ol’ga Bobrova and in the same issue “*Shturm nachali otlichno podgotovlenniye lyudi.*” by Vitaliy Yaroshevskiy.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ http://www.ng.ru/regions/2005-10-14/1_shok.html *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* 14 October 2005 “*Skok I rasteryannost*” by Andrey Riskin, Vladimir Mukhin, Maria Bondarenko.

⁵⁰ <http://2006.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2006/46n/n46n-s19.shtml> *Novaya Gazeta* No. 46, 22 June 2006.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ <http://www.vremya.ru/2006/202/46/164607.html> *Vremya Novostey* No 202, 2 November 2006.

⁵⁴ *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye* No 24, 14-20 July 2006. Tsyganok made the point that “Many boyeviki leaders were simply destroyed and not brought before a court and tried. Their testimony was not needed by those who were interested in preserving the status quo of a military conflict. There was one exception – Salman Raduyev who after trial and sentence perished in an FSB prison. From the other side without evidence of third level terrorist leaders it was not possible to go after their sponsors. The circle was closed.”

⁵⁵ *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye* 10 November 2006 pages 1 to 6 “*Aktyvnykh Shtykov*” *pribavilos*’ by Vladimir Mukhin.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* No 246, 13 November 2006 page 3 “*Otlozhennaya perspektiva* – by Andrey Riskin.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* No 246, 13 November 2006 page 3 “*Otlozhennaya perspektiva* by Andrey Riskin.

⁶¹ *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye* No 33, 15-21 September 2006 page 3 “*Chechenskiye batal’ony vydvynulis’ na gostgranitsu* by Aleksandr Babakin.

Appendix 1

**Anti-Terrorist Special Operations in the North Caucasus
11 January to 14 June 06**

Date	Combat Operations
Total in 2005	North Caucasus grouping Internal Troops MVD conducted 1,450 special preventative measures, in which on the territory of Chechnya 85 boyeviki were killed and 423 people were captured for association with bandit formations.
11 Jan 06	In Dagestan members of FSB & MVD caught Turkish mercenary Ali Soytekin, who fought with boyeviki in Chechnya from 2002. In July 2004 he participated in a major action seizing 12 hostages in the village Avtury.
30 Jan 06	Special operation in Dagestan. Three boyeviki killed, one of whom was "Commander of the North front of Ichkeria".
31 Jan 06	In Khasavyurt emir of three northern rayony of Chechnya, Lechi Eskiyev, killed.
7 Feb 06	Special operation in rural settlement of suburban Kaspiysk. Two leaders of "Dzhamaat" group killed.
10 Feb 06	Spetsnaz operation for liquidation of of boyeviki in the village of Tekuy-Mekteb, Neftekumskiy rayon, Stavropol' kray. 11 boyeviki killed.
23 Mar 06	Dagestani militia seized vehicle with participants of a criminal attempt on the life of the administration head of Botlikh rayon Ruslan Aliyev.
10 Apr 06	Special operation for the liquidation of a bandit group in Makhachkala. Two members of militia killed, one seriously wounded.
11 Apr 06	Special operation for the annihilation of illegal armed formation in Ingushetia. Two boyeviki killed known as 'Saat' and 'Gaga'. At the same time in the Ingush village of Ekazhevo five accomplices of illegal armed formations held.
19 Apr 06	Operation to render a group of boyeviki harmless in the forest massif by the village of Nizhniy Dzhengutay, Buynaksk rayon, Dagestan. Liquidated Radzhab Guseynov emir of Buynaksk grouping.
28 Apr 06	In Karachayevo-Cherkessia group of boyeviki liquidated preparing a terrorist act for 'Day of Victory'. Several light vehicles were being prepared for explosives.
17 May 06	Special operation in Dagestan. Two boyeviki liquidated in one of the apartment blocks in Kizilyurt. Both were members of 'Buynaksk' underground.
22 May 06	Special operation in Dagestan town of Khasavyurt. Bulat Abdulayev killed.
24 May 06	In Vedeno rayon, Chechnya, special operation on detecting and killing group of boyeviki which had attacked Internal troops in Chechnya.
1 Jun 06	Special operation in stanitsa Nesterovskaya (Ingushetia), Chechen OMON blocked and killed group of boyeviki.
14 Jun 06	Special operation conducted in Ingushetia to seize boyeviki – bandit group blocked in Nazran rayon, in the forest on the southern boundary of the village of Ali-Yurt.

Want to Know More ...?

See:

Mayrbak Vachagayev “*Chechnya and the North Caucasus without Shamil Basayev*” Jamestown Foundation. <http://chechnya.jamestown.org/nccp-91406.php>

Murad Batal Shishani, “*The Rise and Fall of Arab Fighters in Chechnya*” Jamestown Foundation. <http://chechnya.jamestown.org/nccp-91406.php>

Mosle Gammer, “*Muslim Resistance to the Tsar – Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnia and Dagestan*” Goss & Co 1994.

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this paper are entirely and solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect official thinking and policy either of Her Majesty’s Government or of the Ministry of Defence.

ISBN 1-905058-99-3

Published By:

**Defence Academy of the
United Kingdom**

Conflict Studies Research Centre

Defence Academy of the UK

Watchfield

Swindon

SN6 8TS

England

Telephone: (44) 1793 788856

Fax: (44) 1793 788841

Email: csrc@da.mod.uk

<http://www.defac.ac.uk/csrc>

ISBN 1-905058-99-3