The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration

By John Young
The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. It serves as the principal source of public information on all aspects of small arms and as a resource centre for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activists.

Established in 1999, the project is supported by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, and by sustained or current contributions from the Governments of Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Survey is also grateful for past and current project-specific support received from Australia, Denmark, and New Zealand. Further funding has been provided by the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the Geneva International Academic Network, and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. The Small Arms Survey collaborates with research institutes and non-governmental organizations in many countries, including Brazil, Canada, Georgia, Germany, India, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Norway, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Small Arms Survey
Graduate Institute of International Studies
47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland

Phone: +41 22 908 5777
Fax: +41 22 732 2738
Email: smallarm@hei.unige.ch
Web site: www.smallarmssurvey.org
The Human Security Baseline Assessment

The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) is a two-year research project (2005–07) administered by the Small Arms Survey. It has been developed in cooperation with the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UN Mission in Sudan, the UN Development Programme, and a wide array of international and Sudanese NGO partners. Through the active generation and dissemination of timely empirical research, the HSBA project works to support disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), and arms control interventions to promote security.

The Assessment is being carried out by a multidisciplinary team of regional, security, and public health specialists. It reviews the spatial distribution of armed violence throughout Sudan and offers policy-relevant advice to redress insecurity.

HSBA Working Papers are topical and user-friendly reports on current research activities and are produced in English and Arabic. Future papers will focus on victimization and perceptions of security, the trade and transfer of small arms into and out of Sudan, and local security arrangements. The project also generates a series of Issue Briefs.

The HSBA Issue Brief and Working Paper series are supported by Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada and the UK Department for International Development (DFID).

For more details contact:

Claire Mc Evoy
HSBA Project Coordinator, Small Arms Survey
47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland

E-mail: mcevoy@hei.unige.ch
Web site: www.smallarmssurvey.org (click on Sudan)

Contents

Illustrations ................................................................. 6
Acronyms and abbreviations ........................................ 7
About the author .......................................................... 8
Introduction ................................................................. 9
I. The SSDF prior to the Juba Declaration .............................. 13
Early roots of the SSDF ................................................ 13
Khartoum Peace Agreement and its aftermath ..................... 15
SSDF areas of operation and leadership as of January 2006 ...... 19
SSDF–GoS relations .................................................... 23
SSDF–SPLM/A relations ............................................. 24
II. The Juba Declaration and its aftermath ............................. 26
Integration successes and challenges ................................ 26
The rump SSDF .......................................................... 28
III. Divided SSDF components ........................................ 30
Conclusion .................................................................. 39
Appendix: Status of Other Armed Groups (OAGs) in South Sudan as of September 2006 42
Endnotes .................................................................... 49
Bibliography .................................................................. 51
Illustrations

Map
Other Armed Groups in South Sudan: main areas of operation as of September 2006 ........................................ 12

Table 1
Major tribal groups, South Sudan .......................................................... 16

Table 2
Historical development of the SSDF ......................................................... 18

Box 1
SPLM/A and SSDF key players ................................................................. 14

Box 2
Estimating the size of the SSDF ............................................................... 19

Box 3
Components of the CPA ........................................................................... 24

Box 4
The problem of rank assignments ......................................................... 26

Acronyms and abbreviations

CPMT Civilian Protection Monitoring Team
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
EDF Equatoria Defence Force
GoS Government of Sudan
GoSS Government of South Sudan
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
JIU Joint Integrated Units
MI Military Intelligence
NCP National Congress Party
OAG Other Armed Group
PDF Popular Defence Force
SAF Sudan Armed Forces
SPDF Sudan People’s Democratic Front
SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
SSDF South Sudan Defence Forces
SSLM South Sudan Liberation Movement
SSIM/A South Sudan Independence Movement/Army
SSUM South Sudan Unity Movement
UDSF United Democratic Salvation Front
UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan
WUN Western Upper Nile
About the author

John Young is a Canadian academic who first arrived in Sudan in 1986 to work as a journalist with the Sudan Times and stayed for three years. He then returned to Canada and completed a Ph.D. in Political Science at Simon Fraser University, where he is currently a Research Associate with the Institute of Governance Studies.

Young spent most of the 1990s in Ethiopia as a professor at Addis Ababa University and doing field research in the areas of ethnic federalism, political parties, and the Ethiopian–Eritrean War. He then worked for the Canadian International Development Agency in Addis Ababa as an adviser on the Sudanese peace process. Leaving Addis, he moved to Nairobi and was assigned to work as an adviser to Ambassador Daniel Mboya, Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan for the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) secretariat. After serving as the head of information analysis for the UN news agency IRIN in Nairobi, he took a position as a monitor with the recently established Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) in Sudan. He subsequently worked with the African Union Cease Fire Commission for two years.

Since leaving the CPMT in October 2004 he has lived in Khartoum, working as an independent consultant and carrying out academic research in the areas of peace, security, and regional relations. Young has published one book, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia (Cambridge University Press, 1997), and has published widely in academic journals. His most recent publications were on the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF), an analysis of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), a consideration of the legacy of John Garang, and a review of the regional security implications of the conflict in Eastern Sudan.

Introduction

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 9 January 2005 brought a formal end to the state of hostilities between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), but it did not end the many ongoing internal conflicts in South Sudan. One of the major challenges to peace in the post-CPA period has been the need to neutralize or otherwise absorb a number of so-called Other Armed Groups (OAGs) that were not party to the CPA. Among them, the Khartoum-aligned South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), a broad and in many cases loose coalition of distinct forces, has been of singular importance.

The SSDF posed a serious military threat to the SPLM/A, had the capacity to disrupt the lives of many civilians in South Sudan, provided security for Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) garrisons in the South and for the oil fields, and later threatened the peace process. Although largely under the control of the Sudanese army, members of the SSDF were at all times deeply distrustful of the GoS, and the relationship was always unstable and at risk of collapsing.

Efforts by former SPLM/A leader John Garang to win over individual SSDF commanders or stamp out the SSDF militarily proved a failure. In fact, his tenure was marked by growing fears of a major conflagration between the two groups. After Garang’s death on 30 July 2005, his successor, Salva Kiir, took a radically different approach, emphasizing southern unity and reconciliation. This quickly improved the political climate in the South, and led to increased dialogue between the SPLM/A and the SSDF.

The détente laid the foundation for the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the South Sudan Defence Forces (hereafter ‘Juba Declaration’), signed on 8 January 2006. Its primary objective was to achieve a ‘complete and unconditional unity’ between the two groups.

This report examines the extent to which that unity has been achieved. In so doing, it describes what institutional obstacles remain to the further integra-
tion of the two groups, discusses which particular former SSDF groups and leaders are resisting integration, and suggests how security has improved or deteriorated as a result of the Juba Declaration. It finds that:

- The Juba Declaration, a diplomatic triumph for Salva Kiir, rescued a deteriorating situation in which widespread, renewed conflict between the SPLM/A and the SSDF was increasingly likely during the tenure of his predecessor, John Garang.
- In the wake of the Juba Declaration the large majority of SSDF soldiers have joined the SPLM/A. At least one senior SSDF officer has been given an important position in the SPLM/A: former SSDF chief of staff, Maj.-Gen. Paulino Matieb is now deputy to Salva Kiir.
- Widespread integration of the SSDF into the SPLM/A appears to have generated some ‘peace dividends’ in the form of improved security across the areas of South Sudan in which the SSDF formerly operated. However, the Juba Declaration set off a struggle between the SAF and the SPLM/A to gain the allegiance of the former SSDF members, resulting in some insecurity in isolated parts of the South, particularly Upper Nile. Currently, a small rump SSDF still remains aligned with SAF, but its ability to challenge the SPLM/A or undermine the peace process, while not extinguished, is greatly reduced.
- Khartoum is still supporting some rump SSDF groups and their leaders, leaving open the possibility that they could be used to disrupt the peace process in the future, including through their participation in the elite Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) mandated by the CPA. This inhibits prospects for improved security in the region.
- A small number of additional SSDF troops have not declared their allegiance and others have been integrated into existing or newly created components of the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), a government paramilitary group. This fragmentation threatens to affect Upper Nile in particular.
- As of October 2006, a number of problems persist in both the integration of the SSDF and the assignment of ranks to its officers. Further reductions in security incidents depend on the SPLM/A’s ability to integrate the remainder of the SSDF rump and successfully transform all former SSDF members into an army accountable to the Government of South Sudan (GoSS).

Part I of this report proceeds by examining the history and background of the SSDF, including its numerous separate components and their respective leaderships. By drawing on existing research, including a number of publications by the author, it explores the relationship of these various elements with both the GoS and the SPLM/A. Part II of the report reviews the consequences of the Juba Declaration and its implementation on the SSDF. This section draws on two four-week field visits to South Sudan in 2006, where more than 60 key informant interviews were conducted. The report concludes with a consideration of the challenges that remain to integration and the internal and external pressures affecting the SPLM/A as it attempts to absorb these numerous, formerly enemy forces.

This paper should not be considered a comprehensive guide to the SSDF but rather a broad description and analysis of the group’s major components and their dispositions following the Juba Declaration. A consideration of all the many groups that were under its umbrella since its inception is beyond the scope of the present project. A full list of these groups, however, prepared by the Small Arms Survey in September 2006, is found in the Appendix. But it should be noted that both the groups and the areas of operation listed in that table are liable to frequent change.
1. The SSDF prior to the Juba Declaration

Early roots of the SSDF

Sudan’s first civil war ended when the rebel movement Anyanya signed the Addis Ababa Agreement with the GoS in 1972, but only six years later dissi- dents of Anyanya II took up arms in Eastern Upper Nile. In 1983 the rebels were joined by southern soldiers from the garrison town of Bor who fled east, where they gained the support of the Ethiopian military regime and formed the SPLM/A under the leadership of the late John Garang (Adwok, 1997).

The two groups developed different alliances and tribal origins. The SPLM/A, led largely by Dinka commanders, was aligned with Ethiopia, while the Nuer-domintated Anyanya II was eventually aligned with the GoS. In the struggle for the mantle of leading rebel group in the South the SPLM/A triumphed. The victory led to the absorption of some Anyanya II members into the SPLM/A; those remaining aligned with the government of Gen. Jaafar Nimeiri. The forces that did not integrate eventually constituted one source of recruits to the future SSDF.

Another source of future SSDF recruits was the tribal militias that initially took form in Equatoria in response to the ill discipline and abuse of citizens by some SPLM/A fighters in areas the movement occupied. Militias arose among the Bari, Latuka, Mundari, Didinga, and Tapos of Equatoria, the Murle in south-eastern Upper Nile, among the Fertit of western Bahr El Ghazal, and among some of the Dinkas from Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile. In time these groups received weapons from Khartoum, which was happy to gain allies to fight the SPLM/A.

Unlike other largely Muslim and Arab militias that operated in the North, the relationship of the southern militias to the government was tactical, not ideological. On the contrary, most tribal militia members shared the same sensibilities and goals of other southerners, including those that took up arms in Anyanya II and the SPLM/A (Young, 2003). That is, they hated the jallaba (northerners) and rejected the imposition of Arabism and political Islam. To
Box 1
SPLM/A and SSDF key players

John Garang (Full name: John Garang de Mabior)
A Bor Dinka, Garang was the founder and commander in chief of the SPLA and chairman of its political affiliate, the SPLM. Briefly a member of Anyanya at the end of the first civil war in 1972, he was then incorporated into the Sudanese army. He rose to the rank of colonel until he mutinied in 1983 in Bor and reorganized the existing Anyanya insurrection into the SPLM/A from Ethiopia, demanding the abolition of shari’ah law. He led the SPLM/A up through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of December 2005, after which he was appointed Sudan’s vice-president, a position he held until his death on 30 July 2005 in a helicopter crash. Garang always declared himself to be working for the creation of a united, democratic, secular Sudan.

Salva Kiir (Full name: Salva Kiir Mayardit)
A Rek Dinka, Salva first joined the SPLM/A as a major in Anyanya II, and was appointed SPLM/A deputy chief of staff for operations and security in 1986. He was confirmed as deputy chairman of the SPLM/A high command in 1994. Upon the death of John Garang in July 2005, Salva became president of the autonomous GoSS and the vice-president of Sudan. It is widely believed that Salva, unlike his predecessor, favours South Sudanese independence instead of autonomy within a federal Sudan.

Paulino Matieb (Full name: Paulino Matieb Nhial)
A Bul Nuer, Paulino founded the South Sudan Unity Movement/Army (SSUM/A), a militia based in Bentiu. He was deputy commander of the Anyanya II in 1987 with the rank of brigadier. Armed and supported by the government, he joined Riek Machar’s breakaway SPLM/A-Nasir in 1991. Under the Khartoum Peace Agreement in 1997, his forces were absorbed by the SSDF. Backed by the government, he became a major-general in the national army in 1998 and fought on its behalf around the oil fields. He became the SSDF chief of staff in 2002, but after the Juba Declaration he joined the SPLA and currently serves as deputy to Salva Kiir with the rank of lieutenant general.

Riek Machar (Full name: Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon)
A Dok Nuer, Riek was number three in the SPLM/A after John Garang and Salva Kiir. As a supporter of succession for southern Sudan, he split from the SPLM/A in 1991 with Lam Akol and Gordon Kong to form the SPLM/A-United faction (1991–94). In 1995, he became leader of the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A) while Lam Akol took the name of SPLM/A-United for his faction in west-central Upper Nile. In April 1996, Riek signed a deal with the government, and the SSIM/A merged with the other rebel factions who signed the April 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement. He became commander-in-chief of the SSDF in 1997. During the same period, he was assistant to the president of the Republic of the Sudan and the president of the Southern Sudan Coordinating Council, the body established by the Khartoum Peace Agreement to administer the southern areas controlled by the government. He also formed and became head of the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF) political party. He resigned from government in 2000 and recreated an army in the South, the Sudan People’s Democratic Front, which he merged with the SPLM/A in January 2002.

Lam Akol (Full name: Lam Akol Ajawin)
A Shilluk, Lam was a senior member of the SPLM/A before breaking away with Riek Machar and Gordon Kong to form the SPLM/A-United in a rebellion that split the movement in 1991. He broke with Riek in 1995, becoming chairman of SPLM/A-United, signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement with the government in 1997 and then served as its transport minister for five years. In 2002 he resigned from the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), and became a key member of the newly formed opposition Justice Party. He rejoined the SPLM/A in October 2003 with the support of most of his militia. Since September 2005 Lam has served as Foreign Minister of Sudan.

Source: IRIN (2004), updated 2006
Credits: John Garang, © Khalil Senosi/AP Photo; Salva Kiir, © Chip East/Reuters; Paulino Matieb, © Abd Raouf/AP Photo; Riek Machar, © Chip East/Reuters; Lam Akol, © Mehdi Fedouach/AFP/Getty Images

the extent that they entertained political objectives it was for the separation of the South and rejection of ‘New Sudan’, the programme of a united Sudan espoused by John Garang. But ultimately these groups never developed to the stage of being liberation armies or forming viable political parties. They were simply local-level organizations tied to the GoS and primarily concerned with the defence of their immediate communities.

Khartoum Peace Agreement and its aftermath
By far the largest component of the SSDF derives its origins from the split in the SPLM/A of 1991, which established two camps: SPLM/A-Mainstream of John Garang and SPLM/A-United of Riek Machar (a Nuer) and Lam Akol (a Shilluk). While elements of power struggle, tribal competition, and demands
for democracy figured in the dispute, what critically separated the two camps was SPLM/A-Mainstream’s appeal for a new but united Sudan, while SPLM/A-United made an unambiguous demand for southern self-determination. The struggle between the two groups proved to be among the most violent of the entire war and is still affecting the unfolding political life of South Sudan.

Within a year the better-supplied Garang-led SPLM/A-Mainstream prevailed and Riek and Lam turned to the government for support, which was formalized with the signing of a cooperative agreement in 1992. Although SPLM/A-United was the clear loser militarily, its appeal for southern self-determination almost certainly had the support of the large majority of southerners and this, too, has a continuing influence on present politics in the SPLM/A.

The alliance between Riek and Lam, however, soon ended with the latter retaining the name SPLM/A-United and Riek forming the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM). Equatorians initially clung to the SSIM, but before too long many of them departed to form their own organization, the Equatoria Defence Force (EDF). Having effectively joined the government camp, in 1996 SSIM, SPLM/A-United, and the EDF signed a Political Charter and moved to Khartoum. The following year SSIM, together with the EDF, the SPLM Bahr El Ghazal Group, the South Sudan Independence Group (SSIG), and the Bor Group, signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement, while Lam’s SPLM/A-United signed the Fashoda Agreement in 1997.

The Khartoum Peace Agreement was a far-reaching document, committing the national government to hold a vote on southern self-determination at the end of an unspecified interim period. It also brought together the various military components as the SSDF and called for the establishment of its political wing, the UDSF. In addition, it created a South Sudan Coordinating Council to serve as a centre to administer the areas controlled by the government in the South. For the SSDF these were important steps towards the realization of their goal of southern self-determination. For Khartoum the agreement was valuable because it weakened the SPLM/A and permitted the development of the oil industry, since a substantial number of Riek’s forces came from the oil-rich Western Upper Nile, which it controlled.

While the SSDF was of enormous importance to the GoS, its strength also posed a significant military threat and hence Military Intelligence (MI), the agency of the army that has largely assumed responsibility for directing the SSDF, simultaneously worked to undermine its power. MI’s job was made easier given local SSDF commanders’ tendency to carve out their own semi-independent domains. As a result, the organization never developed a disciplined overall command structure or political clout.

Without strong organization-wide leadership the SSDF and the UDSF were unable to provide the necessary pressure to ensure the implementation of many of the provisions of the Khartoum Peace Agreement. In particular, they were not able to force the referendum on southern self-determination. Eventually overcome with frustration, Riek ended his alliance with the GoS, moved to Kenya, and briefly formed another armed group (the SPDF) and a political party before rejoining the SPLM/A in early 2002. Nevertheless, the commanders and supporters he left behind remained committed to the Khartoum Peace

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribal group</th>
<th>State(s) of origin</th>
<th>Approximate % of South Sudan population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dinka</td>
<td>Bahr El Ghazal (west and north), Warab, Abyei, Jonglei, Upper Nile, Lakes</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuer</td>
<td>Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azande</td>
<td>Western Equatoria</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toposa</td>
<td>Eastern Equatoria</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shilluk</td>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murle</td>
<td>Jonglei</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anyuak</td>
<td>Jonglei</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mundari</td>
<td>Bahr El Jabal</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bari</td>
<td>Bahr El Jabal</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didinga</td>
<td>Eastern Equatoria</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Agreement because of the financial benefits accruing from GoS support, fears of Dinka domination of the SPLM/A, and the high-handed rule of John Garang.

With the departure of Riek, Gatluak Deng became chairman of the Southern Sudan Coordinating Council. In April 2001 he brought together the parties to the Khartoum Peace Agreement and the various militias at a conference in Juba at which they joined the SSDF and appointed Paulino Matieb chief of staff. This display of unity, however, did little to disguise the fact that the SSDF largely remained a tool of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).

**Table 2**

**Historical development of the SSDF**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Addis Ababa Agreement ending first Sudanese civil war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Anayana II rebels take up arms in eastern Upper Nile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>John Garang and supporters break away from GoS to form SPLM/A with support from Ethiopian military regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983–84</td>
<td>SPLM/A wins power struggle with Anayana II, which it partially absorbs; the remainder aligns with GoS, forming one source of the future SSDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid- to late 1980s</td>
<td>Tribal militias rise in Equatoria in response to the ill-discipline and abuse of citizens by some SPLM/A fighters; eventually they receive arms from the government and form another source of the future SSDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Riek Machar and Lam Akol split from John Garang to form SPLM/A-United, whose goals include southern self-determination, and enter into fierce conflict with Garang’s SPLM/A-Mainstream</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>SPLM/A-United sign cooperative agreement with GoS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Riek Machar splits from SPLM/A-United to form SSIM; Lam Akol retains the name SPLM/A-United; Equatorians form Equatoria Defence Force (EDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Signing of Khartoum Peace Agreement between Government of Sudan and SPLM/A-United, SSIM, EDF, and other groups (now known collectively as SSDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Riek Machar abandons SSDF and GoS alliance and forms SPDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Riek Machar rejoins SPLM/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement ends second Sudanese civil war between SPLM/A and GoS, outlaws OAGs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Juba Declaration merges most of SSDF into SPLA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SSDF areas of operation and leadership as of January 2006**

In the context of the second civil war, the territorial boundaries of southern Sudanese armed groups were never clearly demarcated and the loyalties of individual members to their groups were typically temporary and transient. The turnover of both territory and group affiliation was high—including routine ‘side switching’ between GoS-supported and rebel groups. This is indicative of the fact that in South Sudan, tribal, clan, or regional loyalties and the pursuit of personal interest regularly trumped ideology. Similarly, while to outsiders the objectives of certain groups appear incomprehensible, they are typically easily explicable in reference to particular local contexts.

With these observations in mind, the following provides a brief outline of the key individuals and groups within the SSDF and their areas of operation on the eve of the Juba Declaration.

**Paulino Matieb and his challengers (WUN)**

Paulino Matieb was the chief of staff of the SSDF and held (and still holds) considerable power in the Bentiu-Mayoum-Mankin area of Western Upper Nile (WUN) through his South Sudan Unity Movement, the armed group that he led in WUN. He also exerted influence over Nuers in the traditional spheres of Upper Nile, other groups affiliated with the SSDF, and a scattering of people,

**Box 2**

**Estimating the size of the SSDF**

There is no doubt that the SSDF comprised a significant number of fighting forces at its peak of activity. During the latter stages of the second civil war various components of the SSDF (of which there are over 30) controlled large parts of Western, Central, and Eastern Upper Nile, parts of northern and western Bahr El Ghazal, areas of Eastern Equatoria, provided security for GoS garrisons in South Sudan, and were critical in making possible the development and operation of the country’s emerging oil industry. These achievements required large numbers of men in different locations simultaneously.

But arriving at an accurate count of SSDF members remains highly problematic. First, the numbers change constantly as recruitment within some groups is ongoing. Secondly, the SSDF is largely made up of non-regular forces—and the dividing line between civilians and combatants is extremely grey. Thirdly, some individuals may identify themselves as affiliated at one moment but then reject the label once a particular objective has been achieved or given up.
primarily Nuers, living in the northern internally displaced person camps and urban centres. However, his title was largely symbolic, and Paulino was regularly challenged by ambitious commanders of rival SSDF groups in WUN such as Peter Dor, who headed Riek Machar’s original SSIM, and Peter Gedet.

**Gordon Kong (Eastern Upper Nile)**
The Nasir area of Eastern Upper Nile was the base of the Nuer forces of Gordon Kong. Though Gordon was technically Paulino’s deputy, his military pedigree matches his commander’s. Gordon’s forces provided security along the Sobat Corridor, but they also stretched east along the Ethiopian Gambella border and south to Akobo. Nominally under Gordon’s control was Chayout, based in Bolgock and Longchuck, north of Nasir and adjacent to the Eastern Upper Nile oil fields, which his forces played a critical role in defending. Gordon’s deputy was Garouth Garkoth, who (in the period prior to the CPA) also served as the commissioner of Sobat.

**Choal Gagak (Eastern Upper Nile)**
This area also included the forces of Choal Gagak, who proclaimed his allegiance to Riek’s SPDF, although effectively he was under Gordon. Choal repeatedly took and lost control of Mading, a village some 60 km north of Nasir. Northeastern Upper Nile was particularly turbulent because of the strength of the white army and its habit of alternately aligning with the SSDF and the SPLM/A.

**Maj.-Gen. Benson Kuany’s Mobile Forces (Malakal)**
The Mobile Forces, which were formed as a result of the Juba Conference of April 2001 and drew elements from all the SSDF components, were initially based in Juba, but moved to the Malakal area under the leadership of Maj.-Gen. Benson Kuany, a leading member of both Anyanya I and II. Although initially established as an elite organization, it quickly took on the appearance of the other SSDF components.

**Maj.-Gen. James Othow (Malakal)**
With the defection of Lam to the SPLM/A in late 2003, James Othow assumed control of the remaining forces of the SPLM/A-United, although in practice they were under the SSDF, which in turn reported to SAF’s Military Intelligence. These forces continued to operate in the Shilluk villages along the Nile north and south of Malakal. Faced with a weakening security situation after Lam’s defection, the army brought in SSDF Nuer troops from Central Upper Nile. This produced widespread fighting and the burning down of dozens of villages on the west bank of the Nile and the displacement of thousands of people.

**Maj.-Gen. Gabriel Tangyangi (Central Upper Nile)**
Maj.-Gen. Gabriel Tangyangi, a long time ally of the GoS and who is deemed to be closer to the national army than most of the other SSDF commanders, operated from bases in the Fanjak area of Central Upper Nile.

**South Sudan Liberation Movement (Akobo)**
A much smaller organization was the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), a largely Nuer body, although its membership also included Anuak and Murle. It was established in the late 1990s after rejecting both SSIM and the Garang-led SPLM/A. Its leaders included Michael Wal Duany, an American citizen, professor of political science at Indiana University, and currently a representative in the GoSS Assembly; Timothy Taban Joch, the senior military commander and currently a minister in the Jonglei state government; and Gabriel Yoal Doc. The former judge and current Minister of Sports and Culture in the GoSS, John Luc, also played a critical role in the establishment of the SSLM before returning with Riek Machar to the SPLM/A. In late 2004 Gabriel Yoal defected to the SPLM/A, but a tiny SSLM force remained in the Nasir area and Akobo continued to be highly unstable.

**EDF (Juba and Torit)**
The most politically effective component within the SSDF was the EDF, which operated in the area around Juba and Torit and the area north and south of the Torit–Juba–Kapoeta Road and sometimes as far as Lafon. In early 2004, however, the EDF’s military leader, Martin Kenyi, and its political leader, Theophilous Ochang, defected to the SPLM/A. Rump military and political wings of the EDF remained in the SSDF and maintained their allegiance to the GoS, but the official wing was dissolved.
Mundari Forces (Central Equatoria)
The largest group among the original militias was the Mundari Forces led by Kelement Wani, who was one of the few surviving officers of Anyanya I. In addition to being a major-general in the Sudanese army, in late 2004 he was appointed wali (governor) of Bahr Al Jabal State (now called Central Equatoria), and this position was confirmed on an interim basis by John Garang after the signing of the CPA, thus making clear the significance of Kelement’s forces to the security of the area. Made up largely of former SPLM/A members, the Mundari Defence Force took form in the mid-1980s as a self-defence organization, but became a major component of the SSDF and critical to the defence of Juba.

Maj.-Gen. Ismael Konye (Jonglei State)
The Murle also formed a militia under the control of Ismael Konye, a major-general, sultan, and wali of Jonglei State (until new governors were appointed as a result of the CPA) in which most of the Murle reside, although they rank third in numbers after the Dinka and Nuer. Ismael gained his position as wali in part because he provided fighters for the government and EDF forces that retook the crucial Equatorian town of Torit from the SPLM/A in 2002.

Sultan Abdel Bagi (northern Bahr El Ghazal)
Also active in the SSDF were the Dinka forces of the elderly Sultan Abdel Bagi and his son, Hussein, which operated from a central base in Meiram in northern Bahr El Ghazal. Abdel Bagi provided soldiers along a swath of the railway line north of Aweil to the Bahr Al-Arab River; however, as a result of SPLM/A attacks on a number of bridges, the railway has not been functioning for the past four years. To the west, in Abyei, the GoS supported the formation of an Ngok Dinka component of the SSDF in mid-2003 after a group of SSDF fighters defected from Sultan Abdel Bagi.

The Peace Defence Forces of Atom Al-Nour (western Bahr El Ghazal)
Another group operating in Bahr El Ghazal and with a base of support among the approximately 24 tribes that make up the Fertit, is the Peace Defence Forces of Atom Al-Nour, who is a major-general in the Sudanese army. It provided security on the trade route from Wau to Raja and in a number of villages around Wau.

As these thumbnail descriptions make clear, the SSDF was a broad collective containing groups created by the SSIM, SPLM/A-United, EDF and a number of what originally were tribal militias. They were linked in the first instance by their shared commitment to the Khartoum Peace Agreement, and secondly by their opposition to the SPLM/A and its then leader, John Garang. The Khartoum Agreement gave SSDF members a sense of identity, a rationale for their tactical alliance with the government, and a measure of assurance that others would come to their defence if they were attacked. It also served as a rallying point for a large group of southerners who were excluded by Garang from the formal peace process but who wanted their interests recognized. The signing of the CPA on 9 January 2005 effectively nullified the Khartoum Agreement by outlawing OAGs, the foremost of which was the SSDF.

SSDF–GoS relations
The SSDF was a most effective ally of the GoS in the conduct of the war. Militarily, it proved to be a force well able to challenge the SPLA at a time when the GoS army was increasingly reluctant to engage its enemy in the lead-up to the CPA. The SSDF also successfully assisted in the defence of government assets, particularly the oil fields. It managed all of this on the cheap—most of its members were unpaid and received little training and few weapons.

Politically, the use of the SSDF by the GoS deepened divisions in the South, weakening the appeal of the SPLM/A. At the same time, SSDF casualties assumed a portion of the death toll that would have fallen on northern fighters, and this reduced some of the political costs incurred by the GoS.

Despite these advantages to the GoS, the relationship with the SSDF was a tenuous one. The SSDF had little genuine loyalty to the government and hence its members could never be entirely relied upon. Indeed, SSDF soldiers almost universally thought they were manipulated by MI, hated the North, and favoured the separation of the South. Since the GoS failed to abide by the Khartoum Peace Agreement, which was in any case overtaken by the CPA, the main reasons...
The peace process thus provided a radically different context from war time, when the SSDF used hatred of Garang, the SPLM/A, and the Dinka, together with heavy-handed measures, to manage civilians and to justify their alliance to the government. As the negotiations continued, even anti-Garang sentiment faded, as his leading role in the peace process raised his stature.

In this changed environment, the more perceptive among the SSDF leadership faced one of two options: collective reconciliation with the SPLM/A or individual defection. The former was preferable, as it held the possibility of closure of old animosities and the provision of positions of respect and dignity in the South. But Garang repeatedly made clear that collective reconciliation would not be pursued.

Southerners’ strong desire for reconciliation did eventually force Garang to give ground, however. But he did not move until the SPLM/A’s position in South Sudan was secured by the CPA and his own leadership was virtually unassailable. Even then his efforts were largely perfunctory. In April 2005 he arranged a South–South reconciliation conference in the Kenyan town of Karen. But MI did not permit the SSDF to attend and the meeting achieved nothing. After the ensuing uproar, a second conference was arranged in the first week of July in Nairobi, Kenya, this time with the SSDF present, but it only produced a restatement of previous positions and broke up in acrimony.

In the context of the CPA’s outlawing of OAGs, Garang’s foot-dragging was rekindling animosities. But in July 2005 he died in a helicopter crash, and his non-cooperative, belligerent approach died with him. The incoming SPLM/A leader, Salva Kiir, took a diametrically different approach to the SSDF. During Salva’s inauguration visit to Khartoum on 11 August 2005 he held a series of informal meetings with the SSDF leadership during which he made clear that he favoured reconciliation and looked forward to an early conference to achieve this objective. Indeed, Salva and a team that included Riek Machar and Lam Akol went far in a few days to overcome the animosity and suspicion between the SPLM/A and the SSDF. Salva followed this up with a decision (without any quid pro quo) to appoint some 20 people from the SSDF as commissioners, three as members of the regional assembly in Juba, later one as a minister, and to assign an unspecified number to state legislatures. This gesture furthered good feeling on the part of the SSDF to both the SPLM/A in general and Salva in particular.

for SSDF members remaining in the government camp were material incentives, a desire for recognition, and inertia.

By keeping the SSDF organizationally weak, divided, and politically leaderless, MI effectively reduced any kind of challenge these irregular forces could pose to the government. At the same time, MI ensured that neither the SSDF, nor its would-be southern political allies, could successfully confront the SPLM/A in the political sphere, which rapidly gained significance with the end of the war.

SSDF–SPLM/A relations

An unfortunate impact of the IGAD peace process was that it intensified the antagonism between the SSDF and the SPLM/A. Between the signing of the Machakos protocol, the first component of the CPA, and the Juba Declaration of January 2006, violence between the two groups increased significantly. The political marginalization of the SSDF was undoubtedly a motivating factor in the violence.

The SSDF was already angered at its isolation from the peace process, but it came as a shock when the agreement on security arrangements stipulated its outright dissolution. Furthermore, since the southern community massively supported the peace process, opposing it would only mean further isolation and ridicule.

Box 3

Components of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

The CPA consists of several separate agreements drawn up before 31 December 2004 and signed in a formal ceremony on 9 January 2005. The agreements include:

- The Machakos protocol (20 July 2002)
- The agreement on security arrangements (25 September 2003)
- The agreement on wealth sharing (7 January 2004)
- The protocol on power sharing (26 May 2004)
- The protocol on the resolution of conflict in southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile states (26 May 2004)
- The protocol on the resolution of the conflict in Abyei area (26 May 2004)
- The implementation modalities of the protocol on power sharing (31 December 2004)
- The permanent ceasefire and security arrangements implementation modalities (31 December 2004).
II. The Juba Declaration and its aftermath

Integration successes and challenges
The process of reconciliation reached its formal conclusion with the signing of the Juba Declaration on 8 January 2006, which called for the SSDF to be absorbed into the SPLA. Salva rejected the SSDF request to establish a Government of South Sudan army, but he did appoint Paulino Matieb as his deputy, making him one of the most powerful men in the SPLA. Salva further agreed to the formation of a ten-person committee made up of five senior officers from each side to report on progress towards integration and to make recommendations on the ranks that SSDF officers joining the SPLA should hold (see Box 4).

Field research in South Sudan indicates that the Juba Declaration has unquestionably led to the large majority of regular SSDF commanders and soldiers declaring their allegiance to the SPLA. But the integration process has not gone smoothly everywhere. In some places, problems have led to open fighting. According to one UN official in Juba, the failure of the SPLA to fully integrate the SSIM forces of Peter Dor in WUN has produced growing dissatisfaction and indiscipline. On a number of occasions over the last few months, this has turned minor disputes between SSIM and SAF in the Bentiu market area into armed conflict, with considerable loss of life.

Apart from isolated tensions and conflict, a number of largely organizational challenges are limiting integration. Provisioning the incoming SSDF members remains an ongoing problem. It appears that large amounts of dura (a staple food) were sent to its various components upon the signing of the Juba Declaration. This may have an initial pacifying effect, but the continuing loyalty and good behaviour of these forces cannot be purchased with a one-time payment. As noted above, many SSDF officers are poorly educated and during their years with SAF few were offered training and professional opportunities. Furthermore, officers have been told that they can expect to be transferred out of their home areas, which is certain to cause disappointment and resentment.

The major effort under way to reorganize the army also presents a problem for integration. Garang’s obsession with the army’s loyalty outranked his concerns about the force’s effectiveness. The military future of the former SSDF officers will thus to some extent hang on the outcome of a broader SPLA reform exercise, which is still in its early stages.

Salva’s efforts towards reconciliation, if further pursued, could continue to reverberate, according to one senior SPLA officer. Whether intended or not, his warm welcome to the SSDF has not only served to strengthen unity in the South, it has also had the effect of vastly increasing his support base. The incoming soldiers are both loyal to their new leader and frequently still at odds with the Garangists. This dynamic may well have an impact on the process of integration of the former SSDF soldiers.

Box 4
The problem of rank assignments
The Juba Declaration does not explicitly address rank assignments for incoming SSDF members. The general principle agreed upon was that SSDF officers who were previously members of the SPLA would hold the same rank as those who joined the army at the same time as they did, while the status of whose who were never members of the SPLA would be decided on an individual basis. A balanced committee of senior SPLA and former SSDF officers was appointed to oversee this process.

As of November 2006, the assigning ranks was still plagued by a number of thorny challenges:

- First, SSDF officers had been rapidly (and without merit) promoted by SAF to gain their allegiance.
- Second, under Garang’s leadership, incoming SSDF officers transferring allegiance to the SPLA were either retired or made non-active. It is unclear whether this policy will continue under Salva.
- Third, high-ranking SPLA officers may find it difficult to accept integrating new officers of a higher rank, effectively reducing their position in the military hierarchy and bringing former enemies into positions of leadership.
- Fourth, and perhaps most crucially, the SPLA is poorly organized and its capacity to adequately accommodate a large incoming force remains questionable.

The committee on ranks completed its mandate in early August. Senior sources indicate that a generally calm environment reigns because of the commitment of Salva—and to some extent Paulino—to reconciliation; nevertheless, the fact remains that only non-commissioned officers and below have had their ranks confirmed. As of late August, officers were still in limbo.
The rump SSDF

A far smaller number of former SSDF soldiers have opted to align with SAF. This has been actively encouraged by MI. On the eve of the Juba Declaration, MI officers visited various components of the SSDF and convinced soldiers to go to Malakal, where they were told that they would receive training to join the JIUs, the CPA-mandated elite soldiers composed of both SAF and SPLM forces that will become the national army of Sudan upon a referendum vote for unity. It is believed that the number undergoing training at this base in February could not have been more than 300. Six months later Brig. Murial estimated the number to be about 400, made up of components from Ismael Konye, Gabriel Tangyangi, Thomas Maboir, and a scattering of others. Since the signing of the CPA, SAF officers have been telling their SSDF counterparts that 6,000 of their members (one half of SAF’s assigned contingent in the South) will come from SSDF. This promise remains doubtful because the loyalty of the SSDF cannot be assured and most of their members do not have the necessary professional qualifications. It is more likely that the recruitment of SSDF into SAF was designed to drive a wedge between the SSDF and the SPLM/A because the latter could not be expected to provide the SSDF with a comparable number of positions in its JIU.

Whatever the case, SAF officers, such as those in Nasir, and senior SSDF officers, such as Maj.-Gen. Gabriel Tangyangi and Brig. James Doth, have continued to claim that the SSDF will take 6,000 positions from SAF’s 12,000 in the southern JIU. But unless SAF actively recruits among non-SSDF individuals, which is not permitted under the CPA, it could not possibly raise anything close to 6,000 soldiers from among those who are currently loyal to SAF.

Despite the SAF’s relatively good treatment of SSDF officers, it practically ignored rank-and-file soldiers, providing them with nothing except guns and ammunition and leaving them, in many cases, to survive by looting. This policy seemed designed to simultaneously maintain the loyalty of the officers, reduce the costs of supplying large numbers of soldiers, and ensure antagonistic relations with local communities.

The policy of favouring SSDF officers has continued after the Juba Declaration. The speculation is that SAF would like to retain a contingent of loyal officers who—with the provision of sufficient financial resources—could draw upon the support of local constituencies in the future if called upon. Retaining the loyalty of senior officers provides SAF with back-up should it wish to actively undermine the CPA, or in the case that the agreement breaks down for other reasons.

On the other hand, the Juba Declaration has seriously undermined the prospects of building up an alternative force of armed southerners that could be used to challenge the SPLA or cause widespread insecurity in the South. It is clear from many interviews of ordinary South Sudanese that those officers and men who maintain ties with SAF and the North are assumed to be traitors.

In the following section a number of SSDF components that suffered major divisions following the Juba Declaration will be considered. None of the groups analysed appears to have aligned in its entirety to the SPLA or to SAF. Some of the SSDF components that suffered major divisions are at the centre of many of the current security problems in the South.
III. Divided SSDF components

This section examines the status of SSDF groups that divided after the Juba Declaration, and discusses security incidents arising from these separations. In most cases, divided forces are associated with senior SSDF leaders who draw particularly strong loyalties. Local and regional ethnic and political dynamics are often important to understanding the fragmentation and division of formerly coherent forces.

Forces of Maj.-Gen. Gabriel Tanyangi (Faim)

Among the major SSDF leaders who remained with SAF is Maj.-Gen. Gabriel Tanyangi, whose headquarters is in Faim (also known as New Fanjak) in Central Upper Nile, but who also has a number of bases along the Nile. When Lam defected to the SPLA in late 2003, SAF feared losing the entire area, and thus equipped Gabriel’s largely Nuer forces with boats, trucks, guns, and ammunition, with which he launched attacks on Shilluk villages. With the signing of the Juba Declaration the forces divided. Gabriel retained the headquarters of Faim and some other centres, but after a fight the major base of Kaldak fell to his opponents under the leadership of Brig. John Both, who took an estimated 70 per cent of the original force to the SPLA. At the time of the field visits, an uneasy peace divided the two wings, with each group threatening to attack the other.

After a series of negotiations, in June 2006 the SPLM/A made a good-faith effort to win over Gabriel by offering him the position of Commissioner of Fanjak, which he coveted, in exchange for his loyalty. Gabriel appeared to accept, but insisted on keeping his SAF position, which is not permitted under the terms of the CPA. At this point, the reconciliation stalled and tensions increased.

On 16 August 2006, Gabriel’s forces were involved in an exchange of fire with SPLA forces in which a Bangladeshi UNMIS soldier was shot. Gabriel’s forces subsequently fled and burned a few villages, killing three civilians. In the aftermath, 4,000 SPLA soldiers under John Both blockaded Faim in an operation that is still ongoing as of late August. Although Gabriel’s forces were estimated by one UN official to number less than 500, the SPLA feared that engaging them would lead to civilian causalities and draw a battalion of SAF forces. The SAF will eventually be required to depart from the Fanjak area, as mandated by the CPA, at which point Gabriel’s position will become untenable.

Forces of Thomas Maboir (Doleib Hill)

Like Gabriel, Thomas Maboir had forces in the Shilluk Kingdom and a base at Doleib Hill, some 20 km from Malakal near where the Sobat River flows into the Nile. These forces destroyed the Shilluk villages along the Nile and wreaked havoc in the Doleib Hill area. After the signing of the Juba Declaration some of Thomas’s forces followed the SSDF Mobile Forces (which also operated in the area) into the SPLA, but there were approximately 80 remaining at the time of the field visit in February. These forces caused concern within the GoSS’s security committee in Malakal, leading to the stationing of some JIU personnel in Doleib Hill some 300 m away from Thomas’s forces.

Interviews with Thomas’s forces in February 2006 indicated that they are armed with light weapons and come from a variety of tribes but are largely inhabitants of the area. They were clearly very confused about the situation they found themselves in, were frightened by the presence of the SPLM/A, which had initially threatened to shoot them, and repeatedly said that they were waiting for ‘enlightenment’ from Thomas, who remained in Khartoum. Despite denials, SAF components of the JIU were undoubtedly assisting the Maboir people and providing them with food. The SPLA leader of the JIU, Capt. Arak Mayen, wanted the issue resolved peacefully, but he stressed that these forces were ill-disciplined and by carrying weapons while in the village threatened the inhabitants.

A second field visit six months later found less than 100 forces of Thomas still residing in the same location, still receiving supplies from SAF, and still leaderless, although their general lack of capacity has led the SPLA to downgrade their threat, the more so because they had stopped carrying their weapons into the town. Consequently, the JIU force that had moved to Doleib Hill returned to Malakal.
Maj.-Gen. Benson Kwany’s Mobile Forces (Doleib Hill)
Maj.-Gen. Benson Kwany’s Mobile Forces, at one time considered the elite component of the SSDF, were also based in the Doleib Hill area on the south bank of the Sobat River. Their elite status, however, rapidly faded and they soon functioned like most other components of the SSDF. Their isolation made them very difficult to visit, but from various reports it appears that they divided, with most of the soldiers aligned with the SPLA, and some remaining with SAF. Somewhat unusually, there appear to be no soldiers of undeclared status.

Former forces of James Othow (Doleib Hill)
In the same area, James Othow took charge of the forces of Lam Akol that did not defect to the SPLM/A. James was quick to join the SPLA after the Juba Declaration and has been assigned as an operational commander in WUN. But SAF was equally quick in recruiting a number of his officers and men. Perhaps 100 of them were undergoing military training at the base near the Malakal airport at the time of the first field visit (February 2006).

Forces of Chayout (Belgock and Longchuck)
As noted above, Chayout was originally a commander under Gen. Gordon Kong, but broke away to form his separate SSDF group in the Belgock and Longchuck areas (Young, 2003). Despite apparently close connections to SAF, Chayout defected to the SPLA in the wake of the Juba Declaration. Returning home in February from an extended stay in Juba he found his forces badly divided.

At the time of the first field visit in Belgock, which hosts a SAF garrison, the town was in a heightened state of anxiety because of the division. Many of the townspeople had fled to the countryside and the local SPLA administration was in disarray. Fighting was expected and did break out briefly, but with the assistance of SPLA, Chayout was able to regain control of the area.

Although SAF still retains a small contingent in Belgock, the divisions within Chayout’s organization have been overcome and calm prevails in the area. Given the proximity of the area to oil fields and to a major SAF base at Adar, tensions continue to simmer and the possibility of future conflict remains high.

Former forces of Gen. Gordon Kong (Ketbec and Nasir Region)
The Commissioner of Sobat, Maj.-Gen. Garouth Garkouth, had been the long-time deputy of Gen. Gordon, but the two separated over whether to join the SPLM/A. Indeed, the Commissioner had been a major figure in formulating the Juba Declaration. He took an estimated 1,000 soldiers to the SPLA and Gordon was left with a small minority that are based in Ketbec, his traditional headquarters.

Brig. James Doth, Gordon’s second in command, claimed to have led a force of 500, but the local SAF commander, Capt. Sadig, acknowledged this to be an exaggeration. In August, Garouth estimated there to be about 80 soldiers loyal to Gordon, but some are old and unfit for combat. Some of Gordon’s forces went to Malakal for SAF training. Chayout and others also report that about 100 of Gordon’s soldiers are in Adar, which continues to have a major SAF and police contingent. Since SAF has only a small contingent that serves in the JIU in Nasir, the SPLA’s control of Nasir and the adjacent Sobat basin is not threatened; however, elements of the white army and forces of Gordon (mostly operating from Adar) are still the cause of isolated problems in the area north of Nasir.

Residents in the Nasir area believe that Gordon’s affiliation with SAF is the result of ‘bribes’ and contend that if the SPLA was in a position to offer similar inducements he would join the movement. Unease over Gordon’s continued relations with SAF has led to fighting among factions of his group. The general assessment of former SSDF leaders in Juba in August is that Gordon will not be persuaded to leave his alliance with SAF because to do so would threaten his large property holdings in Khartoum and Ketbec. According to Commissioner Garouth, Gordon was recently informed that he had until December to declare his affiliation with the SPLM/A, after which his soldiers would be forcibly removed from Nasir.

Murle forces of Maj.-Gen. Ismael Konye (Pibor)
In a press conference held with Salva Kiir on 22 September in Juba, the Murle leader, Maj.-Gen. Ismael Konye, announced that he had joined the SPLA. At that point, his forces had steadily moved into the SPLA camp and a disarmament campaign was imminent. Although feared for their military prowess...
and cattle rustling skills, the Murle are a small tribe that have always had to tread a careful path between their much larger Nuer and Bor Dinka neighbours. The forcible and potentially problematic disarmament of the Murle had to go ahead because neighbouring tribes, and notably the Bor Dinka and Lou Nuer, had been disarmed and hence were very vulnerable to Murle raiding parties. Nonetheless, and despite growing impatience, Salva and Riek, who had taken the lead in efforts to bring Ismael into the SPLA, never gave up their efforts to win him over. Salva resisted demands that he dismiss Ismael from his position as a representative in the GoSS legislature.

**Mundari forces of Kelement Wani (central Bahr El Jabal)**

Kelement Wani also attempted to walk a middle path similar to that of Ismael in Juba, although from a much stronger position. Kelement is a paramount chief of the Mundari and thus has a strong traditional base of support spreading out from his headquarters of Terekaka, some 80 km north of Juba (Young, 2003). As an Anyanya I leader he is also widely respected. Given his stature, the GoS endeavoured to win his support by granting him the rank of major-general and appointing him the deputy to Riek Gai in the Southern Coordinating Council. Ultimately his political survival depended upon the unique circumstances in the Juba area where many of the local Bari-speaking population hold negative views of the Dinka. Fearing the reception that the SPLA would receive in Juba and appreciating that Kelement’s Mundari forces alone had the capacity to provide security, Garang took the surprising decision to appoint Kelement as governor of Bahr El Jabal (in August 2006 the state was renamed Central Equatoria) during the interim period (six years following the signing of the CPA). This proved to be a wise decision, as Kelement’s forces provided able security.

Kelement is also respected locally for his political skills, which were sorely tested when many of his Mundari forces quickly defected to the SPLA. Nonetheless, officially he continued to hold the position as deputy to Gordon Kong among the SSDF rump, and until recently claimed to be still a member of the National Congress Party, the national ruling party. Like Ismael, Kelement accepted the defection of his forces, but his continued membership in the NCP remained problematic because the CPA clearly stipulated that the NCP can only hold one governorship in the South, and the party previously selected Upper Nile. It is a mark of the respect that both the GoS and the GoSS had for Kelement that virtually nothing was said about this open breach of the agreement. Indeed, as one senior SPLM official said, both sides were reluctant to press him on his ultimate loyalties. Kelement eventually announced that he had left the NCP and officially joined the SPLM/A. The governor said that apart from a group of the Mundari who will take up positions in the JIU, all his forces have followed him into the SPLA.

**Peace Defence Forces of Maj.-Gen. Atom Al-Nour (Western Bahr El Ghazal)**

Of further concern are the problems associated with the division among Maj.-Gen. Atom Al-Nour’s Peace Defence Forces in western Bahr El Ghazal. Although a Misseriya, Atom led a force made up of a wide variety of tribes that are known together as Fertit. As farmers in the region the Fertit have always had an uneasy relationship with the pastoralist Dinka. Because the Dinka in turn have always been closely aligned with Garang’s SPLM/A, the GoS and SAF have assiduously cultivated relations with these western tribes, as a means of providing security to the town of Wau and to the long rail link north to Aweil and Bana-nusa (Young, 2003). Successive governments in Khartoum have also maintained close military links with the Arab Muslim Baggara who graze their cattle in the border lands of Northern Bahr El Ghazal.

Formally closely aligned with the Umma Party of Sadig Al-Mahdi, the NCP endeavoured to gain the allegiance of the Baggara and use armed groups from among their members to stop the northern and western thrust of the SPLA. One means to do this was to play on and develop tensions between the Fertit and the Dinka, and Atom (as a Baggara but born and brought up in Wau) was well placed to execute this strategy. Over the years his Fertit have carried out a number of military actions against Dinka civilians, which have aroused considerable anger. As a result, tensions are still near the surface. Indeed, numerous people, including a senior church official, reported that it was the crimes that Al-Nour and his group had committed against the Dinka that made it so difficult for them to leave SAF and join the SPLA. Although making clear his continuing allegiance to SAF and now becoming the third man in the SSDF rump hierarchy, Al-Nour has not visited his home area of Wau-Raja
in more than a year. In his absence Brig. Stance Kamilo has assumed the leadership and in numerous meetings with the local citizenry in Wau and with state legislators it was clear that he was held in awe.

Equatoria Defence Force (Torit-Laria Area)

Although the leadership and the bulk of the membership of the EDF joined the SPLA before the Juba Declaration, a small group continued their alliance with SAF and then found themselves alone in the Torit-Laria area after SAF suddenly decamped in July. According to UN sources, 400–600 soldiers were roaming about the area in mid-August, still receiving salaries and supplies from SAF and posing a security risk to the inhabitants. Martin Kenyi, however, former military leader of the group and now a major-general in the SPLA, said that the group numbered less than 200, was in negotiations with the SPLA, and that apart from a few officers who will probably maintain their allegiance with the GoS and leave for Khartoum, that the bulk of the soldiers will soon join the SPLA (Juba, 15 August 2006). A month later that still had not happened and the remaining group was being led by Peter Lorot, who, UN sources said, remained aligned with SAF. These sources also say that the group is based about 5 km west of Torit and that they had reports of the continuing harassment of civilians and even the death of some.

Forces of Sultan Abdel Bagi (Mariem)

The last major SSDF group that divided was that of Sultan Abdel Bagi, a largely Dinka group that inhabits the area around Aweil and are headquartered north of there in Mariem (Young, 2003). Although Abdel Bagi has chosen (apparently for health reasons) to remain in the Abyei and Khartoum areas, he retains the position of deputy to Paulino. The sultan is in his mid-eighties and reputedly has 67 wives and hundreds of children, some of whom are in the SPLA and others who fought the SPLA. Both he and Hussein, the son he most relies upon in leading his SSDF contingent, opted to join the SPLM/A in the wake of the Juba Declaration. But that decision was violently objected to by other members of his family, and in mid-January 2006 four of his soldiers in Add Hussein, a suburb of Khartoum, and a local policeman were killed during a struggle for supremacy among the rival factions. The sultan and Hussein won the contest and continue to hold their base area in Mariem. Also under Hussein, Abdel Bagi’s forces were ambushed outside Abyei in March by a force under Atom Al-Nour and more than 60 were believed killed. Since then little is known of this forces. Further, a small group broke away from Abdel Bagi before the Juba Declaration. Calling themselves SSDF and receiving support from MI, they began operating out of Abyei town. Nothing more is known about this group.

In addition to the groups that split, two other forces deserve mention. These are not strictly split groups, but simply forces that have caused or are causing security concerns in the region.

Southern Kordofan forces (Kaka Island)

Although it is not clear whether it can be declared an OAG, a group from Southern Kordofan made up of SAF-supported Baggara occupied the island of Kaka about 20 km north of Melut. The island has long been in contention among different groups seeking lucrative gum arabic and charcoal trades. Most observers in the area believe, however, that the conflict also concerns the borders between Kordofan and Upper Nile. Kaka served as a port for Southern Kordofan during British times and two Shilluk followers of Hassan Al-Turabi signed an agreement in the early 1990s seceding this area to the northern state. Subsequently, the Government of Upper Nile informed the Government of Southern Kordofan that Kaka was in its territory; a strong SPLA force then moved in to occupy the island and security problems have dropped to zero.

Forsan forces (Wau)

Maj.-Gen. Atom Al-Nour’s group is also linked through SAF with Forsan, a term that refers to armed horsemen and may be associated with the Jingaweeds (Janjaweed) in Darfur. Numerous local residents reported seeing members of Al-Nour’s group carrying out military actions with those they identified as Forsan. And indeed, a field visit confirmed that Forsan has an office in Wau with a sign outside it and a large painting of a man on a horseback. Residents report that most of the members of Forsan are Baggara merchants who trade in the local souk. Police authorities in Wau confirmed this and said that many of the northern merchants were armed and as such were open to prosecution. Since the field visit all SAF soldiers outside the JIU have left the city and the
security climate is reportedly much improved. The SPLA, however, is clearly not satisfied with the situation in north-western Bahr El Ghazal, and Paulino Matieb, who has been assigned responsibility for the area, said that he would soon be travelling there to bring it lasting security.54

Conclusion

Before the Juba Declaration, the SSDF placed the peace process in peril, was a menace to many people in South Sudan, and represented a direct military threat to the SPLM/A. After the signing of the Juba Declaration those members of the SSDF that aligned with the SPLA embraced the peace process and the CPA, while the rump remaining with SAF only had the ability to disrupt the lives of people in a few pockets of the South, and could not challenge the authority of the SPLA.

As a military force, the SSDF has been broken. This was accomplished by the diplomatic skills of Salva Kiir—not the strong-armed approach of John Garang which, had he lived, might well have brought about another civil war between these two armies. The Juba Declaration should be recognized as standing not far behind the CPA in its significance to the peace process. It may well prove to be Salva’s finest achievement.

Despite these accomplishments, however, a considerable number of South Sudanese are still living in conditions of insecurity or have reason to fear descent into insecurity. The reasons are twofold: first, SAF’s continuing efforts to foster instability, and second, SPLM/A militarism and failure to develop viable systems of conflict resolution and public administration.

The departure of the national army from Juba and Equatoria suggest that MI no longer retains the immediate objective of reimposing northern hegemony on the South. But its continuing support of the Ugandan Lord Resistance Army rebel group (which operates in South Sudan), the SSDF rump, southern PDF groups, the white army, and a host of other minor armed groups and factions, can only be interpreted as part of an effort to foster insecurity and destabilize the GoSS. It appears that the major objectives of MI are twofold: first, to make it as difficult as possible for the SPLM/A to effectively challenge SAF’s strong position in the oil fields of Abyei, Western Upper Nile, Northern Upper Nile, and Malakal, all of which are rapidly becoming focal points in the conflict between the SPLM/A and the SAF; secondly, to foster enough insecurity...
to convince southerners to vote against independence in the referendum, or generate the conditions that would necessitate its postponement. Khartoum used this last strategy to avoid a similar promise of a referendum made in the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997.

While the absorption of the SSDF into the SPLM/A stopped the fighting between these two groups, the failure to fully integrate this body is worrying. Moreover, the SPLM/A has by no means always been a highly disciplined force that respects the residents of the areas in which it operates. Indeed, the rise of tribal-based militias in Equatoria, the white army in Eastern Upper Nile, and their counterparts elsewhere in South Sudan were largely a response to the bad behaviour of SPLA soldiers. In addition, SSDF troops who have migrated to the SPLA carry with them the resentment and hatred for the grievous crimes they committed against Shilluk villagers and other South Sudanese.

There is some, but not much, understanding on the part of SPLM/A leaders of the extent of the problematic relations between its armed forces and the people of South Sudan. Salva and his team are currently making the reorganization of the army a major priority and this may produce a more professional force, but much more will have to be done to ensure that the SPLM/A is made accountable to its constituents. While Salva stands out for his support for dialogue, reconciliation, and reluctance to employ the army to overcome grievances, this is not always the prevailing view in the SPLM/A leadership.

Indeed, in the long term the biggest threat to the security of South Sudan is not posed by northern subversion, but by the inability of the SPLM/A to effectively transform itself from a rebel movement into a governing party. While comparable revolutionary groups in the Horn of Africa placed considerable emphasis on building up structures of governance during the course of their armed struggles, and hence found the transition to leading governments relatively smooth, the SPLM/A did not (Young, 2002). Its leadership came almost exclusively from the military sphere, resources were disproportionately directed to the military, and the civil sphere within its liberated territories was largely relinquished to the international NGOs.

The SPLM/A was thus ill-prepared for assuming the responsibilities of government. Almost two years after the signing of the CPA it is still struggling. As this analysis has made clear, the SPLM/A has for the most part successfully disengaged the SSDF from its SAF benefactors and is making progress with respect to the other security problems in the South. But unless it can move quickly to establish effective systems of administration, oversee programmes of development, and respond to widespread grievances, there is a real danger that the achievements in the security sphere will be squandered and dissent will emerge. Given the SPLA’s past proclivity to respond to dissension with force, and for the recipients to respond aggressively, such a scenario could prove disastrous for South Sudan.
## Appendix: Status of Other Armed Groups (OAGs) in South Sudan as of September 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Associated commander/leader</th>
<th>Area(s) of operations</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Merged with SPLA prior to the signing of the CPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SSIM (SPLA)</td>
<td>James Leah</td>
<td>Nimni</td>
<td>Reunited/merged with SPLA prior to the signing of the CPA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>SPLM/A-U Main</td>
<td>Lam Akol</td>
<td>Tonga, Warjok, Wau, Shilluk, Wadokana, Dhor</td>
<td>Reunited/merged with SPLA prior to the signing of the CPA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>EDF Main</td>
<td>Col. Martin Kenyi</td>
<td>Magwe County</td>
<td>Reunited/merged with SPLA prior to the signing of the CPA.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### New units formed by SPLA comprising OAGs aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Associated commander/leader</th>
<th>Area(s) of operations</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Cdr. Mading Mer Agang</td>
<td>Unknown or unavailable at the time of writing</td>
<td>These units are newly established by SPLA comprising OAGs aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Col. Erinio Ladu</td>
<td>Juba, Mongalia, Gadokoro Island, around Juba, Rajaf West</td>
<td>These units are newly established by SPLA comprising OAGs aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Yohaus Krok</td>
<td>Pibor and around Pibor</td>
<td>These units are newly established by SPLA comprising OAGs aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### OAGs aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Associated commander/leader</th>
<th>Area(s) of operations</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>SSUM</td>
<td>Maj.-Gen. Paulino Marieb</td>
<td>Bentiu, Rubkona, Majom, Mankien, Wankay, Nyaladui, Heglig, Kharanza</td>
<td>Aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration, but integration process not yet finalized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>SSIM (SAF)</td>
<td>Maj.-Gen. Peter Dor</td>
<td>K-7 (HQ, 7 km south of Rubkona), Rubkona, Mimir, Kaj El Sherika, along the Rubkona-Leer oil road</td>
<td>Aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration, but integration process not yet finalized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Pariang National Forces (GUM)</td>
<td>Maj.-Gen. Samuel Mayek</td>
<td>Pariang, Mankwa, Beo El Mardara, El Gor</td>
<td>Aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration, but integration process not yet finalized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Peter Gadet’s Forces</td>
<td>Maj.-Gen. Peter Gadet</td>
<td>Wankay, Bentiu, Rubkona</td>
<td>Aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Fangak Forces (Jebel Forces II)</td>
<td>Brig. John Both</td>
<td>Kaldak, Doleib Hill, Canal Mouth</td>
<td>Aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Sobat Force</td>
<td>Simon Yei</td>
<td>Khor Flus</td>
<td>Aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Group Name</td>
<td>Leader/Representative</td>
<td>Area of Operations/Location</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Mading Forces/Chol Gagak Group</td>
<td>Col. Chol Gagak</td>
<td>Nasir, Ketbek, Mading, Malual, with an area of operations overlapping with Gordon Kong’s Thorjikany</td>
<td>Aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Simon Gatwitch’s Group</td>
<td>Maj.-Gen. Simon Gatwitch</td>
<td>Yuei, Malut, Waat</td>
<td>Aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration, but integration process not yet finalized. A small splinter group went to Doleib Hill after the SPLA disarmament in Jonglei.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Peace and Reconstruction Brigade (Aweil Group I)</td>
<td>Sultan Abdel Bagi</td>
<td>El Miram, Bahr El Arab, Agok, Malual, Tadama, Um Driesi, Futa, Bringi</td>
<td>Aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration, but integration process not yet finalized. One component, led by Abdel Bagi’s son, refused to join SPLA after the Juba Declaration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Peace and Reconstruction Brigade (Aweil Group II)</td>
<td>Maj.-Gen. Abdel Aki Akol</td>
<td>Unknown or unavailable at the time of writing</td>
<td>After violent struggle with Abdel Bagi’s forces after the Juba Declaration, aligned with the SPLM/A in October 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Mundari Forces I</td>
<td>Maj.-Gen. Kelement Wani</td>
<td>Terekeka, Juba Road, Tali, Rejaf East, Kahluk, Jemeiza, Sudan Safari, Jebel Lado, Tali Road</td>
<td>Aligned with SPLA after the Juba Declaration, but integration process not yet finalized. Note that Kelement Wani, although aligned with SPLA, has kept one sub-component as his private militia and one sub-component joined SAF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Bahr El Jebel Peace Forces (Bari Forces)</td>
<td>Mohamed El Laj/Col. Paulino Tombe (Lonyombe)</td>
<td>Juba, Mongalia, Gadokoro Island, around Juba, Rajaf West</td>
<td>Some of the Bari Forces have joined SPLA after the Juba Declaration, but SAF claims that one component of BPF is aligned with them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>SSLM/A</td>
<td>Brig. Gabriel Yoal Doc</td>
<td>Akobo</td>
<td>SSLA has been divided in two components since the failed integration process in 2005. One component is aligned with SPLA and the other one (Akobo Forces) is aligned with SAF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Not on recent SAF/SPLA lists: probably absorbed or disintegrated</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Adong Peace Forces II</td>
<td>Unknown or unavailable at the time of writing</td>
<td>Adong, Baiet, Olang</td>
<td>Has previously been reported by SPLA as aligned group. However, does not appear on the recent SAF/SPLA lists. Possibly absorbed or disintegrated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>OAGs aligned with SAF after the Juba Declaration comprising some SSDF groups and several splinter groups</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>James Gai’s faction</td>
<td>Col. James Gai</td>
<td>Bentiu, Rubkona</td>
<td>Small splinter group after SSUM and SSIM (SAF) when they decided to join SPLA after the Juba Declaration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Tut Galuak’s faction</td>
<td>Col. Tut Galuak</td>
<td>Mayom, Wankay</td>
<td>Small splinter group after SSUM and SSIM (SAF) when they decided to join SPLA after the Juba Declaration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Bafanj Mantuel’s faction</td>
<td>Col. Bafanj Mantuel</td>
<td>Fariang, Mankien, Kwach</td>
<td>Small splinter group, most likely after GUM (Pariang National Forces) when they decided to join SPLA after the Juba Declaration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Fariang faction</td>
<td>Col. Denis Kor</td>
<td>Unknown or unavailable at the time of writing</td>
<td>Small splinter group, most likely after GUM (Pariang National Forces) when they decided to join SPLA after the Juba Declaration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Abyei Forces (SSDF Abyei)</td>
<td>Thomas Thiel</td>
<td>Fariang, El Tor, Fanshien, Biu, Mankwao</td>
<td>Thomas Thiel was recalled to Khartoum when his harassment of the UN became an embarrassment for SAF, but his group is still located in Abyei.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Nasir Group (Thorjikany)</td>
<td>Maj.-Gen. Gordon Kong</td>
<td>Keblek (HQ, 3 km south of Nasir), Nasir, Mading, Ulang, Kadbit, El Desin</td>
<td>As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Fangak Forces (Jebel Forces)</td>
<td>Maj.-Gen. Gabriel Tanggany</td>
<td>Bashlakon, Fangak, Deil, Kwerkan, Kwerdaf, Faguer, Fag, Klasak, Dor</td>
<td>As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Sabri Achol’s Forces</td>
<td>Col. Sabri Achol</td>
<td>Akoka, Fanmariel, Rom</td>
<td>As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Forces Name</td>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
<td>Areas of Operations</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Akobo Forces (SSLM/A II)</td>
<td>Maj.-Gen. Timothy Taban</td>
<td>Akobo, Wanding, Lankeny</td>
<td>As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Dinni Forces</td>
<td>Brig. Hassan Doyak</td>
<td>Dinni, Glasheik</td>
<td>As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>The United Faction (SPLM/A-U II)</td>
<td>Brig. Ashuaang Arop</td>
<td>Tonga, Wajjak, Wau, Shilluk, Wadokana, Dhor</td>
<td>As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee. A splinter group from James Othow’s group when he decided to join SPLA after the Juba Declaration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Doleib Forces</td>
<td>Maj.-Gen. Thomas Maboir</td>
<td>Doleib, Waj Mabor, Khor Flus, Wat</td>
<td>As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Mobile Force</td>
<td>Maj.-Gen. Benson Kuany</td>
<td>Waj Mabor, Magal, Balmyang, Wangar, Khor Flus</td>
<td>As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Yuai Faction</td>
<td>Col. David Hoth Lual</td>
<td>Doleib, Waj Mabor, Khor Flus, Wat</td>
<td>As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Bor Salvation Forces (Bor Group)</td>
<td>Col. Kelia Deng Kelly</td>
<td>Bor</td>
<td>As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee. However, sources within SPLA also claim that the Bor Group has decided to join SPLA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Balkok Forces</td>
<td>Maj.-Gen. John Duet</td>
<td>Balkok, Langshek, Ruam, Khor Machar, Makual Gauth, Luak, Adar</td>
<td>As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Mohamed Chol Al Ahmar’s Faction (Northern Upper Nile Group)</td>
<td>Brig. Mohamed Chol Al Ahmar</td>
<td>Renk, Shomdi</td>
<td>As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>William Deng Faction (Melut Peace Force, Northern Upper Nile Group)</td>
<td>Col. William Deng</td>
<td>Melut, Kom</td>
<td>As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Musa Doula’s Faction (Northern Upper Nile Group)</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Musa Doula</td>
<td>El Jamam, Kajari</td>
<td>As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Allak Deng Faction (Northern Upper Nile Group)</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Allak Deng</td>
<td>Melut, Falloj</td>
<td>As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Mading Forces</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Peter Tuaj</td>
<td>Nasir, Ketbek, Mading, Makual, with an area of operations overlapping with Gordon Kong’s Thorjikany</td>
<td>As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>El Naser Popular Defence</td>
<td>John Jok</td>
<td>Nasir, El Doshin, Ded</td>
<td>As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Kaltok Forces</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Gabriel Mading Fon</td>
<td>Kaltok</td>
<td>As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Mundari Forces II</td>
<td>Maj.-Gen. Kelement Wani</td>
<td>Terekeka, Juba Road, Tal, Rejaf East, Kaltok, Jemeiza, Sudan Safari, Jebel Lado, Tali Road</td>
<td>As reported by SAF to the OAG Collaborative Committee.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Young South Sudan Defence Forces

Endnotes

1 The acronym for Riek Machar’s group has sometimes been erroneously used to mean Sudan People’s Defence Force.
2 The full text of the Juba Declaration is available at <http://www.issafrica.org/AF/profiles/sudan/darfur/jubadecljan06.pdf>
3 The two site visits to South Sudan took place from mid-February to mid-March and from mid-August to mid-September 2006.
4 This list does not necessarily reflect the views of the author.
5 Tensions between the SPLM/A and local inhabitants may have been exacerbated when Equatorians supported Nimeiri’s decision to divide the South, which led to the abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement and precipitated Sudan’s second civil war.
6 This working paper follows the South Sudanese convention of referring to people by their first names, with some exceptions (for example, John Garang is commonly referred to by his surname).
7 These were also known as the Torit and Nasir factions, respectively.
8 This was understood as separation.
9 The white army, collectives of armed Sudanese civilians who become active on an ad hoc basis, will be explored in a forthcoming HSBA Working Paper.
10 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Article 7(6).
11 Author interview with SPLA brigadier, Juba, 13 August 2006.
12 The presumption is that many (but not all) officers will be retired following the CPA-stipulated referendum on southern self-determination in 2011.
13 Author interview with SPLA brigadier, Juba, 13 August 2006.
14 Author interview with senior SPLM/A officer, Juba, 16 August 2006.
15 Author interview with UN official, Juba, 13 August 2006.
17 In fact, the SPLM/A has a mediocre record of provisioning and paying its own soldiers. The new director of procurement for the SPLM/A, Maj.-Gen. Martin Kenyi, said that all units of the army were now receiving their rations and equipment and no distinction was made between former SSDF units and other units (Juba, 16 August 2006). He acknowledged that there had been problems with theft by traders supplying the army, but said this was being confronted aggressively. Yet there is anecdotal evidence that dispirited SPLM/A soldiers are turning to robbery and petty theft, and without remuneration it can be anticipated that SSDF soldiers, who are generally less well behaved than SPLM/A soldiers, may follow suit.
18 It appears that the SPLA intends to disperse SSDF around South Sudan to break down local loyalties and build national sentiments. This was the strategy of dealing with the earlier defection of the EDF, which has now been completely absorbed into the SPLA and its members sent to all corners of South Sudan. (Author interview with UN official, Juba, 14 August 2006).
19 Author interview with senior SPLM/A officer, Juba, 15 August 2006.
20 Author interview with SPLA head of Upper Nile JIU, Malakal, 17 February 2006.
21 Security conditions precluded a visit to this camp, which is situated near the airport, but this estimate is based on a number of key informant interviews.
22 Author interview with SPLA head of Upper Nile JIU, Malakal, 20 August 2006.


Author interview with Brig. James Doth, Nasir, 24 February 2006.

See reports of the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team at <http://www.cpmtsudan>

Author interview with UN official, Malakal, 22 August 2006.

The Governor of Jonglei originally appointed John Melut as Commissioner of Fanjak, which Gabriel opposed because he wanted the position and because Melut was his junior (Faim, 18 February 2006). Wanting a peaceful settlement of the problem, the Jonglei Governor said that if Gabriel publicly stated his commitment to the SPLM/A, arrangements could be made for him to assume the position of commissioner (Telephone Interview, Malakal, 20 February 2006). This was followed up by a conference in June in Fanjak at which the SPLM/A agreed to Gabriel becoming commissioner in order to end the threat of violence.

Author interview with SPLA head of JIU in Upper Nile, Malakal, 21 August 2006.

Author interview with UN official, Malakal, 21 August 2006.

See Civilian Protection Monitoring Team Reports at <http://www.cpmtsudan>

Author interviews with unidentified Maboir soldiers, Doleib Hill, 19 February 2006.

Author interview with SPLA head of JIU in Upper Nile, 19 February 2006.

Author interview with Capt. Arak Mayen, Doleib Hill, 19 February 2006.

Author interview with Brig. Murial, Malakal, 21 August 2006.

Author interview with Brig. Murial, Malakal, 21 August 2006.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Author interview, Juba, 23 August 2006.

Author interviews, Juba, 11 August 2006.

Author interview with Commissioner Garouth, Malakal, 23 August 2006.


Resentment was the product of years of Dinka domination during the first period of southern autonomy and the perception of high-handedness among Bor Dinka pastoralists who moved to the area in recent years.

Author interview with senior SPLM official, Juba, 3 March 2006.

Author interview with Governor Kelem Wani, Juba, 16 August 2006.

Author interviews, Wau, 9 March 2006.

Author correspondence with Matthew LeRiche, 16 September 2006.

Author interview with SPLA head of JIU in Upper Nile, Malakal, 20 August 2006. The state of Upper Nile is facing border problems with White Nile and South Blue Nile states and because of its proximity to Fanjak. SPLA forces in its territory have assumed most of the responsibility for dealing with Gabriel Tangyangi, which they are not entirely happy with since under the new dispensation Fanjak falls under the administration of Jonglei State (author interview with Spokesman for the Upper Nile State Security Committee, Malakal, 23 August 2006).

Author interviews, Wau, 9 March 2006.

Author interview with Paulino Matieb, Juba, 14 August 2006.

Bibliography


Civilian Protection Monitoring Team Reports. <http://www.cpmtsudan.org>


Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the South Sudan Defence Forces. 2006. 8 January.


