Demanding Attention:
Addressing the Dynamics of
Small Arms Demand

By David Atwood, Anne-Kathrin Glatz, and Robert Muggah
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**Acronyms and abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BMS</td>
<td>Biennial Meeting of States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERAC</td>
<td>Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos (Conflict Analysis Resource Center)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Central Firearms Register (South Africa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration</td>
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<td>FCA</td>
<td>Firearms Control Act (South Africa)</td>
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<td>FFZ</td>
<td>Firearms-free Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFSA</td>
<td>Gun-free South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFZ</td>
<td>Gun-free Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFM</td>
<td>Isatabu Freedom Movement (Solomon Islands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Malaita Eagle Force (Solomon Islands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Peace Council (Solomon Islands), previously Peace Monitoring Council (PMC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMC</td>
<td>Peace Monitoring Council, later renamed NPC—National Peace Council (Solomon Islands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUNO</td>
<td>Quaker United Nations Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSIP</td>
<td>Royal Solomon Islands Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAPS</td>
<td>South African Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>security sector reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPA</td>
<td>Townsville Peace Agreement (Solomon Islands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFV</td>
<td>Weapons-free Village (Solomon Islands)</td>
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Summary

When UN member states gather in July 2006 to review progress on the implementation of the 2001 *Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects* (*Programme* hereafter), they will be challenged from many quarters to commit themselves to effective action to reduce the effects of the spread and misuse of small arms and light weapons. This Review Conference will be instrumental in setting the tone and direction for global action on this issue for the years ahead.

This paper aims to inform the debates that will shape the outcomes of the 2006 Review Conference by bringing what we call a *demand optic* to bear on the issue. In doing so, the goal is to broaden the understanding of factors that can be seen to underpin and drive small arms dynamics and to give exposure to a range of strategies that are essential complements to supply-side initiatives. This is important because the areas likely to be focused on at the conference—regulating arms brokers, establishing controls on arms transfers, and perhaps including ammunition as a necessary part of small arms management—reflect the supply-side bias that has dominated international small arms control debates to date.

Despite the historical dominance of supply-side approaches, many actors have begun to recognize that an emphasis on this side of the small arms equation alone will not succeed. Why? Because effective small arms control and disarmament depend not only on the cooperation of states and local governments, but also on the participation of non-state actors, both groups and individuals. Further, effective solutions to preventing, combating, and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons require not only an understanding of the roles and behaviour of such actors, but also of their competing *motivations* and *means*.

Though this perspective is underemphasized in the *Programme*, since 2001 a growing number of disarmament specialists and development practitioners have increasingly refined their thinking about it, and have begun to advocate that demand-side approaches be increasingly included in small arms control
initiatives. Interventions to restrict the supply of weapons will only succeed if factors driving demand are carefully diagnosed and acted upon.

**What can a demand optic reveal about small arms control requirements?**

While an awareness of the demand perspective may only now be emerging in international small arms control debates, demand-reduction initiatives have been taking place on the ground for some time. Small arms control from a demand perspective—understood and acted upon in a broad range of activities by municipal and state-level governments, non-governmental agencies, and community-based organizations—focuses on the motivations for and means of weapon acquisition as necessary components of successful small arms action.

A demand optic reveals a number of important features relevant to the planning of small arms control interventions. Firstly, local civil society actors are frequently the catalysts for demand-reduction activities. Demand-reduction efforts typically begin and are sustained at the local level. This is a dimension that is almost completely overlooked in most supply-side initiatives. Secondly, demand-reduction efforts are most effective when they are undertaken in effective partnerships between state and local authorities and civil society actors. Thirdly, there are intrinsic connections between demand and security-first and development-driven approaches to arms reduction. These connections are acknowledged in general ways in the *Programme* and are increasingly recognized at the global level in steps taken since 2001. The recent 2005 World Summit: High Level Plenary Meeting of the 60th Session of the General Assembly (2005 World Summit) in September 2005, for example, explicitly made these security / development connections, and a subsequent First Committee resolution strengthened them (UNGA, 2005). Appropriate combinations of security guarantees and developmental incentives could reduce both the demand and supply of small arms. There is also a growing understanding that the reform of the security sector can positively influence demand reduction.

A theoretical approach to understanding demand factors has been developed and is presented here. This approach to understanding the motivations and means for weapons acquisition focuses on individual and group preferences.
for weapons; the monetary and non-monetary resources required to obtain them; and real and relative prices of firearms. All three clusters of factors are interactive, and it is important to evaluate them jointly to appreciate how demand is manifested. This demand model reveals that specific policy interventions, if uninformed by an understanding of all three factors, can generate counterproductive results. For example, monetary and non-monetary incentive schemes designed to provide alternatives to illegal users in return for their firearms may in fact increase the resources available for the acquisition of new weapons. Where preferences—such as the attraction and status associated with arms—are not adequately considered, demand reduction efforts are counterproductive or short-lived. The model also suggests that policy choices may be enriched by examining why some individuals and groups ultimately choose not to acquire small arms.

Five case studies focusing on the motivations and means shaping firearms demand and interventions undertaken to reduce demand have recently been completed. These studies, commissioned by the Small Arms Survey, focus on a diverse range of settings heavily affected by small arms violence: Brazil, Colombia, South Africa, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. Emerging from these studies are a number of key cross-cutting themes of relevance to those seeking to strengthen normative and practical approaches to small arms control, particularly with respect to demand reduction. The studies illustrate that the motivations for weapons acquisition are heavily conditioned by historical and social environments. In addition, the motivations and means for weapons acquisition are affected by shifts in structural factors—including governance and the macro-economic and labour environments. Regime changes, rapid military interventions, sudden changes in the quality of political or economic governance, or dramatic shifts in social norms can open spaces for demand reduction. As is to be expected, the studies also show that demand itself is indirectly influenced by the supply of weapons. Thus, the sudden and unexpected availability of small arms that may become available in the aftermath of regime collapse, conflict, or economic shock can contribute to the motivations and means for acquiring them. Similarly, the regulation and removal of weapons from society—through improved registration, more stringent licensing arrangements, well-promoted collection and
destruction activities, and other regulatory efforts—can positively influence demand reduction. Supply and demand are thus closely interacting variables.

The studies also show that motivations and means for acquiring small arms often differ between individuals and groups. Hence, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to small arms reduction; interventions need to be tailored to the differing situations and changing conditions of groups and individuals. In each of the cases, interventions focused less on technical aspects of arms collection and destruction per se than on influencing the preferences, prices, and resources available for acquiring weapons in the first place. Interventions in all the cases incorporated the environmental factors that conditioned use and not just the instruments themselves. For example, initiatives included temporal restrictions on carrying and possession of firearms; specific time-bound controls on external vectors—such as the sale of alcohol—that influence the resort to arms; the engineering or strengthening of normative and social stigmas associated with weapons possession; focused training and advocacy directed at security sector institutions; and altering legal and social controls associated with both legal and illegal possession. Each of the studies also demonstrates that effective communication and sensitization are cornerstones of demand reduction. Thus local-level civil society networks that can capitalize on existing information networks are key elements in demand reduction. This is particularly true where state presence is weak or faltering. Ultimately, states can reap considerable dividends through active engagement in demand-reduction approaches and by contributing to meaningful improvements in human welfare.

How can a demand optic be brought to bear on the 2006 Review Conference?

As the 2006 Review Conference rapidly approaches, there will be a tendency by states to narrow the range of issue areas and topics covered. Those who have not yet adopted a demand optic on the small arms problem may feel that including demand reduction in the agenda for the five-year period beyond 2006 is a bridge too far. This paper argues instead that demand factors can critically shape the effectiveness of supply-side initiatives. It also reveals that demand is not a new element: motivations and means have for some time been shaping
the ways in which actors relate to small arms control initiatives. Demand-reduction interventions are not only as crucial as attempts to control supply, but they are also currently being used in a great variety and number in small-arms-affected settings around the world.

Demand considerations offer a number of key means both for judging real progress on the implementation of the current Programme and for promoting an enhanced action agenda for the future. Recommendations for an outcome document from the 2006 Review Conference include the following:

- **Build in the linkage between security and development.** This paper vividly illustrates how underdevelopment, inequality, and insecurity factors manifest themselves in terms of small arms demand and how their alleviation can lead to reduced demand. The Review Conference needs to assess the degree to which this fundamental dimension is currently being incorporated in the policies and programmes of states, international agencies, and others. The action agenda needs to bring these critical linkages to the fore. For example, efforts should be made to incorporate arms-demand reduction into overall frameworks for sustainable development.

- **Envision demand reduction as part of governance and security sector reform.** Supply- and demand-related interventions will only be successful where there is a perception of security and reasonable levels of credibility and legitimacy accorded to the security sector. States need to be encouraged to strengthen security sector reform (SSR) as an essential part of successful small arms control. Successful SSR translates into better governance, which ultimately reduces demand.

- **Incorporate the local dimension.** Genuinely participatory, bottom-up approaches to arms reduction are essential. By actively soliciting local engagement, such approaches have a greater chance of influencing the reduction in demand for weapons. The importance of how local approaches have made a contribution to furthering the goals of the Programme needs to be part of the review process and to be built consciously into the action agenda strategies that emerge from the Review Conference.

- **Build partnerships with civil society.** In reviewing progress since the inception of the Programme, the contributions of civil society need to be recognized and accounted for. In setting targets and recommendations for the period
beyond the Review Conference, states need to adopt specific commitments to encouraging collaborative and inclusive approaches.

- **Understand demand reduction as part of conflict-resolution and peace-promotion interventions.** Demand reduction is synergetic with other forms of non-violent conflict management within societies. Actors are encouraged to fund and support comprehensive peace education programmes as integral parts of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), development, and arms control initiatives; support the development of programmes directed towards longer-term reconciliation processes; and explore the appropriate inclusion of indigenous methods of conflict management.

- **Give attention to specifically affected groups.** The impact of small arms violence and demand varies considerably among men, women, boys, and girls. Youth represents a particularly vulnerable group. These factors especially need to be accounted for in the design of interventions.

- **Support and undertake focused and action-oriented research to evaluate the effectiveness of demand reduction.** Although important first steps in understanding demand dynamics have been made, our knowledge of the complex and interrelated elements of supply and demand remains limited. There is an urgent need for further research in the years ahead to capture compelling, robust, and programmatically relevant insights into supply, misuse, and demand relationships and possible entry points for intervention activities. Host governments, donor governments, and non-governmental agencies are encouraged to sponsor such research.

An outcome of the Review Conference that fails to incorporate a demand optic in substantial ways will neglect crucial factors that continue to shape small arms realities in our world. At a minimum, an outcome document from the Review Conference will need to explicitly take note of the requirement to address the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects from both a supply and a demand perspective; incorporate demand-side references into supply-side initiatives that are given new direction and emphasis; and encourage the integration of a demand discourse in the conceptualization of practical steps aimed at violence reduction, such as in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of SSR, DDR, and weapons-reduction programmes, and other types of micro-disarmament initiatives.
Although these suggested directions have been written specifically for the Review Conference, they are applicable to the spectrum of small-arms-related actors and processes, regardless of the outcomes of the conference. Effective and sustainable programmes aimed at reducing the human impact of small arms violence ultimately depend on demand reduction.
Introduction

In July 2006, member states of the United Nations will gather in New York to review progress on the implementation of the 2001 *Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects* (*Programme* hereafter). The event will probably mark a critical turning point. Not only will the meeting provide an occasion for states to review their progress since the agenda was set out in 2001, but the Review Conference will also be instrumental in setting the tone and direction for global action on the issue for the years ahead.

This paper has been prepared to serve as a user-friendly guide to inform debates that will ultimately shape the outcomes of the 2006 Review Conference. It finds that while understandings of the complex dimensions and dynamics of the small arms issue have greatly matured over the past five years, disarmament negotiations nevertheless remain heavily influenced by a supply-side perspective. Specifically, the discourse and practice of small arms control privilege solutions that emphasize the control of production, stocks, and transfers. Policy attention to the motivations and means that influence arms acquisition to begin with remains in the shadows by comparison.

Despite the pervasive and persistent supply-side bias in international arms control debates, the paper finds that consciousness of the value of demand-side perspectives is growing. It explores how the integration of a demand optic to arms control initiatives can significantly improve their sustainability and effectiveness. Indeed, drawing on a sample of cases where the Small Arms Survey has recently commissioned research—Brazil, Colombia, South Africa, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands—the paper observes that demand reduction must be treated as an essential component of small arms control in both theory and practice.¹

The first section of the paper begins with a discussion of why supply- and demand-side perspectives are vital to sustainable arms control. It finds that while a supply-side discourse predominated during the 1990s, there has recently
been a growing acceptance of a demand optic on small arms. Importantly, the section reveals that demand-side approaches to disarmament are in fact not new: they have been carried out for years on the ground. The section also notes that state–civil society partnerships are essential to actualizing effective demand reduction. Further, demand reduction is best achieved through bottom-up and local-level interventions that identify and target the motivations and means for arms acquisition. Another observation is that successful demand reduction must adopt integrated approaches that build on the relationships between security and development. Finally, the section finds that security sector reform (SSR), when carried out in a participatory fashion, can meaningfully influence demand reduction. Each of these lessons is reflected in the case studies and conclusions below.

Section II briefly revisits the conceptual framework in which demand can be understood. Demand is neither esoteric nor intangible. The paper proposes a model that describes demand as a combination of preferences, real and relative prices, and monetary and non-monetary resources. Demand is only actualized when preferences, prices, and resources are aligned. Of course, demand is not static, but varies across time and location. Nevertheless, recognizing that many factors combine to affect demand is an important first step in proposing possible solutions to the problem of reducing the misuse of small arms.

Section III reviews the preliminary findings from several country case studies where arms control interventions advanced both supply- and demand-side approaches. The case studies were deliberately selected to highlight ways in which demand reduction is being undertaken in different regions and widely divergent contexts outside of the glare of international disarmament negotiations. Though the case studies present complex and contrasting dynamics, a number of common patterns are emerging that offer valuable insights for disarmament negotiators at the 2006 Review Conference and those responsible for the implementation of the Programme more generally. For example, the paper emphasizes the importance of historical context, governance and economic environments, and individual and group interests in shaping demand. Also, it finds that discrete arms control initiatives may be made most effective by adopting a demand optic, particularly because of its emphasis on causes and locally appropriate incentives.
The paper closes with a number of practical suggestions on how demand issues may be more actively taken on board in the lead-up to the 2006 Review Conference (see Box 2). These lessons are distilled from the case study material and a growing body of expertise in the non-governmental sector, and offer a practical set of inputs to promote the demand optic in relation to the Programme and to strengthen arms control efforts on the ground. The suggested language for the Review Conference negotiations included in Box 2 provides the reader with a preliminary roadmap for how the level of discourse around demand-side approaches to small arms proliferation can be raised most effectively. 📚
Section I
Reflections on supply and demand

The supply-side bias

Though a demand perspective has come to be recognized as important by progressive disarmament diplomats and practitioners, multilateral deliberations on small arms control have nevertheless remained nested in supply-side terms. Since the late 1980s, proposed interventions have assumed the existence of a continuum, encompassing the regulation of small arms manufacturing and production; the design and implementation of mechanisms to control stockpiles, brokering, legal and illicit trade, and trafficking; the strengthening of border controls, police, and intelligence services and customs; and associated penalties for non-compliance (Boutwell, Klare, and Reed, 1995; Singh, 1995; Klare, 1999; Wood and Peleman, 1999). By the mid-1990s, the model of a ‘supply-side chain’ was axiomatic among disarmament diplomats, and subsequently influenced many aspects of the design and implementation of interventions to control the availability of illicit small arms (see Box 1). Nevertheless, many of the points along this supply-side chain remain underaddressed.

From the beginning, the supply-side discourse was a product of states and state interests. The 1997 Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (UNGA, 1997) and the 1999 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (UNGA, 1999), for example, defined the small arms debate largely in terms of export and import controls, marking and tracing, reinining in brokers, and to a lesser extent practical measures to take illegal weapons out of circulation. The actions and interventions proposed in the Programme were also closely aligned with this supply-side logic.

Because supply-side approaches to small arms control have been ultimately conditioned by states (though non-state actors have also influenced the debate), interventions have been typically top-down, formulaic, and standardized. Thus, many internationally sanctioned practical disarmament efforts in the 1990s—whether disarmament, demobilization, and reinteg ration (DDR) in
Central America, the Caribbean, or the Balkans; weapons collection and destruction activities; or elements of SSR in Africa and South-East Asia—focused on collecting hardware, leaving the intrinsically complex issues of human motivation unaddressed.

A complementary demand perspective has until recently not figured prominently in international debates on the control of small arms and light weapons. Though the issue of demand was raised on occasions in multilateral forums during the 1990s, it remained an unknown quantity in disarmament circles.³ At the same time, an interest in the relationships between development and dis-

Box 1

**Interventions along the small arms chain**

Supply and demand for weapons should be viewed as interrelated variables along the full continuum that stretches from their original ‘production’ to their ‘end use’ on the ground. The figure below traces a possible interpretation of this continuum, or chain:

production→stockpiles and stockpile management→brokering→trade and transfer→end use

Conventional approaches to understanding supply conceive of interventions (i.e. efforts at arms control or disarmament) as actions taken at different points along this chain. At each stage of the chain, specific actions are elaborated that might reduce or control the stocks and flows of weapons—from conversion in the manufacturing sector to the marking and tracing of individual firearms—with the ultimate aim of reducing their availability. Conceptually, all the mechanisms articulated in the UN PoA can be aligned along this chain.

The demand for weapons is also evident at all points along the chain. A unified approach that incorporates motivations and means would focus on a reverse view of the chain. It would ask, at each stage of the continuum, what factors influence the flow of weapons? For example, at the end-user point on the continuum, an array of variables can be seen to influence the choices made by civilians, armed groups, and state forces. Moving back along the chain, other demand factors may be seen to stimulate the movement of weapons at each stage as they are traded, brokered, leaked from stockpiles, and manufactured.

This framework draws attention not only to the conventional understanding of the mutually dependent relationship between supply and demand, but also to the need, when suggesting policy directions, to take into account both supply and demand variables along the chain. Understanding demand, therefore, requires more than making a list of mitigating or independent factors or influences. It requires a shift in traditional arms control and disarmament thinking when applied to policy interventions.

**Source:** Reprinted from Atwood and Jackman (2005, pp. 6–7)
armament began to flourish, and concepts such as ‘human security’ and ‘human development’ acquired new prominence. These developments, however, were slow to affect the disarmament discourse. One reason was simply that international policy-makers had a difficult time determining what exactly was meant by ‘demand reduction’—much less what kinds of obligations might accompany it. Disarmament experts and diplomats were thus content to leave it aside, opting instead for the more comfortable supply-side language and priorities.

But many in the disarmament community began to recognize that the small arms issue could not be tackled by just increasing the number of top-down supply-side approaches. For one, effective disarmament depends not just on the cooperation of states and local governments, but also on that of non-state actors. Without taking them into account, conventional normative regimes designed to contain and regulate (state) behaviour and cooperation can be only marginally effective. Disarmament experts began to recognize that non-state armed groups and individuals not only needed to be identified, but that their competing interests and motivations had to be better grasped if adequate solutions to control arms availability were to be identified and implemented. By 2004, this fact was confirmed by the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, where it was noted that the state’s already precarious monopoly of force was being increasingly undermined by well-armed civilians, combatants, and non-state actors (UN, 2004, pp. 52–5). It was with grim resignation, then, that disarmament specialists came to acknowledge that small arms supply efforts would have to be carefully complemented by more sophisticated approaches that recognize the motivations and means that govern weapons acquisition by a range of actors.

The emergence of a demand optic

Since 2001, a growing number of disarmament specialists and development practitioners have refined and advocated what can be described as a demand optic. As will be discussed below, this gradual awareness is being complemented by a growing evidence base. For example, during the Second Biennial Meeting of States (BMS) to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in July 2005, representatives of more than 77 states, regional organizations, and multilateral agencies addressed various facets of demand during their presentations (Jackman, 2005, p. 3). As a World Health Organization representative noted at the time, ‘we can continue much as we have done and focus on attempting to control and curtail the supplies of small arms. Our alternative way forward is to recognise and develop those aspects [of the Programme] that are underdeveloped, notably the call to simultaneously address demand for small arms’ (Meddings, 2005, p. 5).

It is important to stress that while awareness of demand may be emerging in international disarmament debates, demand reduction is not new: it has been taking place on the ground for some time. In fact, even while international policy-makers in New York and capitals around the world have negotiated instruments and mechanisms to reduce and regulate the supplies of small arms, literally thousands of activities have been quietly implemented by municipal and state-level governments, non-governmental agencies, and community-based organizations to reduce small arms availability, while simultaneously addressing the motivations and means for small arms acquisition. This progress on demand reduction is rarely acknowledged or appreciated in international disarmament circles.\(^5\)

Civil society actors are frequently the catalysts for demand reduction activities. As the Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO) has found, where states are unable or unwilling to undertake disarmament and demand-reduction activities seriously, civil society entities have frequently filled the gap, often in ingenious and innovative ways.\(^6\) As the case studies below show, demand-reduction efforts are most effective when situated within a progressive and enabling normative environment, but also when administered in partnerships between state authorities and civil society actors. The collective identification of interests, assignment of priorities, division of labour, and agreement on monitoring and enforcement are all core features of effective state–civil society partnerships in promoting demand reduction.

Related recent evidence also indicates that demand-reduction efforts frequently begin and are sustained at the local level. Traditional supply-side arms control interventions have prioritized international, regional, and national controls and measures to mitigate the leakage, trade, and transfer of small arms, often
at the expense of local actors and activities. While these international efforts are of critical importance for setting standards, they nevertheless privilege top-down and deductive interventions. Moreover, they regularly draw on assumptions of rational choice and anticipate a predetermined response to incentives and penalties, though these may not resonate with the intended beneficiaries. These interventions have seldom adequately considered the complexity of civil society, much less its members’ competing motivations and means for arms acquisition. The case studies show that more genuinely participatory and bottom-up approaches to arms reduction that actively solicit local engagement are more likely to reduce the demand for weapons.

The demand optic explicitly recognizes and builds on the intrinsic connections between a security-first and development-driven approach to arms reduction. This is significant, given the experience described above in the 1990s. There is growing acknowledgement in the mainstream security studies and development sectors of the dynamic causal relationships between insecurity and underdevelopment. The UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change noted that: ‘[d]evelopment has to be the first line of defence . . . combating poverty will not only save millions of lives but also strengthen the states’ capacity to combat terrorism, organised crime and weapons proliferation’ (UN, 2004, p. 3). In the past, despite pragmatic and self-interested motivations for linking security and development (e.g. to prevent the onset of conflict or even state collapse), conventional supply-side disarmament experts failed to take this nexus seriously. Development agencies and NGOs were, however, out front in acknowledging these relationships from the beginning, as evidenced in their ‘weapons for development’ programmes during the late 1990s (see Batchelor and Demetriou, 2005, p. 23; Muggah, 2006; Muggah and Batchelor, 2002). They understood instinctively that security and development were inextricably woven together and that an appropriate combination of security guarantees and developmental incentives could reduce both the demand for and supply of small arms.

There is also a growing sense that the reform of the security sector can positively influence demand reduction. Practitioners were finding that particularly where state security services were absent, were unwilling or unable to provide public safety, or were themselves predatory, the availability and likeli-
hood of small arms misuse increased. Indeed, the Programme (sec. II, paras. 17, 18) explicitly recognized the contribution of SSR toward containing the flow and trade of illicit small arms. The case studies below demonstrate that constructive interventions to strengthen the legitimacy, credibility, and capacity of the state to provide security and the rule of law can potentially mitigate both the supply of and demand for weapons. Thus SSR, when undertaken with the active engagement of the end-users and reflecting local interests and needs, can be a positive instrument of demand reduction.
Section II
Theoretical approaches to demand

While a demand optic has emerged in international policy making circles and has long been present within many development agencies and among practitioners, practical research has lagged behind. Empirical evidence on demand-side issues—which could point to how demand is manifest, how it informs behaviour, and how it can be influenced and shaped—remains scarce. Much of the existing demand-related research has thus far been rather general, and little is known about how demand factors—or ‘triggers’—relate to each other, or to what extent interventions designed to reduce demand genuinely affect the incidence of armed violence (Muggah et al., 2005; Brauer and Muggah, 2006). In some cases, demand for firearms is equated with demand for violence, an assumption that does not apply across all scenarios. The research that does exist has been comparatively slow to filter up to policy-makers and diplomats. For this and other reasons, the demand perspective continues to be undervalued and ignored.

Demand has traditionally been conceptualized by economists as a manifestation and aggregation of individuals’ preferences among possible consumption options. A recent paper has introduced a more focused way to think about demand, new at any rate for much of the pertinent community of diplomats, researchers, and field workers (Muggah and Brauer, 2004). This approach rests on the concepts of motivations and means. The former refers to the factors influencing individual and group preferences for weapons, while the latter includes both the monetary and non-monetary resources required to obtain them and the real and relative prices that must be paid for them. Preferences are further subdivided into deep and derived preferences. Deep preferences are unchangeable and include elements such as personal security and socio-economic security (see Table 1); derived preferences are substitute goods that relate to the same deep preference (or satisfy the same underlying demand). As is shown in the case study on Brazil, for example, for many Brazilian middle-class gun
Table 1
Motivations, means, and entry points for policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motivations</th>
<th>Deep preferences (unchangeable)</th>
<th>Possible policy responses leading to derived preferences other than SALW acquisition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal security</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Institute or strengthen community policing;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Reform justice (courts, penal) and security (police, military) sectors;</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Take firearms out of circulation;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Improve public infrastructure (e.g. street lighting);</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Promote gun-free zones in schools, work places, churches, markets, shopping places,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and sporting facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social and economic security</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide education and employment opportunities, particularly for youth;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Stigmatize corruption;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Support reintegration of ex-combatants and ex-criminals;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual status and social identity</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Challenge norms of violent masculinity and offer alternatives;</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Reverse the role of media, entertainment, and recreation in normalizing and</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>endorsing gun possession and misuse;</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Encourage social customs dissociating guns from power, pride, and manhood</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict, political identity, and</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Increase capacity for non-violent conflict resolution;</td>
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<tr>
<td>representation</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Improve public access to and participation in government at the municipal and</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>national levels;</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Acknowledge and act to redress inequalities and injustice, which can influence</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>recourse to (armed) violence and human rights abuses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means</td>
<td>Prices</td>
<td>Possible policy responses leading to derived preferences other than SALW acquisition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monetary value of guns (relative to other goods, particularly substitutes)</td>
<td>• Restrict supplies and thereby effect an increase in the prices of small arms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Individual cost of/benefit from illicit possession and misuse | Increase the penalties of illicit possession and misuse:  
• Strengthen national gun control laws to ensure small arms ownership is subject to specific criteria (e.g. age, proof of need, safe storage), renewable licensing, and universal registration;  
• Improve response and efficiency rates of police to requests for assistance from citizens |
| Social cost of/benefit from firearms acquisition and ownership | Make gun acquisition and ownership more costly by strengthening social and customary controls:  
• Engage communities in development and disarmament schemes (e.g. weapons for development programmes) rather than buy-backs;  
• Initiate public education programmes to stigmatize guns and gun violence and to generate support for alternative behaviour (e.g. through the establishment of gun-free zones) |
| Difficulty/ease of access | Make access to firearms more costly:  
• Crack down on open gun markets;  
• Subject firearms acquisition to owner licensing, registration of weapons, stockpile management, storing guns away from ammunition, and other controls |
| Resources |  |  
Income and wealth (including credit) | • Combat illicit trafficking in drugs;  
• Encourage the evolution and improvement of justice and security sectors |
owners, firearms are seen as substitutes for effective policing, which is scarce (since it is relatively expensive). In Rio’s poorer favelas, however, ‘security’ is provided by the drug factions; consequently, there is little or no demand for a substitute in the form of firearms.

Preferences, resources, and prices are interdependent, and it is important to evaluate them jointly to appreciate how demand is manifest. For example, a seemingly tranquil, gun-free community may in fact be seething with desire for weapons (strong preferences), only to be prevented from implementing its desire by lack of hard currency (low resources) and/or weapons prices regarded as too high relative to other needs (high prices). Table 1 disaggregates motivations and means by individual factors and reveals a number of entry points for prospective interventions.

The majority of activist and policy-oriented studies of demand have focused almost exclusively on the preferences for arming, rather than the opportunities and constraints associated with prices and resources. Demand from this narrower perspective is seen as a cluster of mutually reinforcing cultural, economic, and political preferences for acquiring and owning a weapon. The entirety of demand, then, includes inherited and socially constructed norms associated with masculinity and status, the seemingly rational pursuit of self-protection, and/or a means to fulfilling a legitimate (or illegitimate) livelihood option. Multiple preferences can operate simultaneously, and are dynamic across time and location. For example, a homeowner’s conviction that a weapon is crucial for family protection may change if she feels community-watch schemes are now providing sufficient security, even though her deep preference—security for her family—remains an important motivating concern.

But demand is also a function of real and relative prices, which can act as a constraint on the realization of preferences. The extent to which one’s preference for gun ownership can be actualized is in part a function of the price of the weapon, the price of necessary complements (e.g. ammunition, maintenance expenses, time spent on training, even the psychological discomfort of carrying a gun), and the price of acceptable offensive or defensive substitutes (e.g. private security, time devoted to community policing). The examples listed in the case studies below illustrate that the price set for a weapon is not restricted narrowly in a financial sense. Rather, the monetary price set for an AK-47 in
a particular context may be relatively low, but the penalties for illegal possession and the demonstrated enforcement capacity may raise the effective cost of acquisition and thereby deter demand.

The relationships determining demand are expressed in the marketplace and are thus also conditioned by resources. One may have a high preference for obtaining a weapon and the price may be comparatively low, but if individual or group resources are inadequate, demand cannot be fulfilled. Resources may be monetary, but may also draw on tradable commodities (e.g. livestock, timber, and even women), as well as social capital and access to enabling networks. The availability of resources can negatively or positively influence demand. For example, individual or group access to customary resources such as conflict management mechanisms (e.g. councils of elders or village courts) may in fact constitute a resource that can positively influence demand—thus reshaping the means for weapons acquisition even in a context where some community members express high preferences.

This demand model reveals that specific policy interventions, if uninformed by an understanding of all three clusters of factors, can generate counterproductive results. For example, schemes designed to provide monetary or non-monetary incentives to illegal users in return for their firearms may in fact simply increase the pool of resources available for the acquisition of new weapons. Where preferences—such as the attraction and status associated with arms—are not adequately considered, demand remains constant. Many buy-back schemes have in fact unwittingly contributed to driving up demand. These perverse effects are particularly notable in contexts where the choice to acquire weapons is not individually determined, but rather influenced by a series of collective decision-making processes. The demand model also suggests that policy choices may be enriched by examining why some individuals and groups ultimately do not choose to acquire small arms. 🍾
Section III
Illustrating the model: The dynamics of demand in five settings

The measure of a model is the extent to which it adequately explains behaviour and practice. In order to assess the model’s reliability and explanatory power, it needs to be tested on the ground. The Small Arms Survey commissioned a series of case studies to test the applicability of the demand model in relation to specific arms-reduction interventions in different settings. Case studies were selected from different parts of the world and thus offer heterogeneous contexts and varying levels of data availability. In order to improve comparability across settings, the case studies adopted a common set of approaches and instruments to analysing demand (Brauer and Muggah, 2006). In each case, a combination of household surveys, focus groups, and key informant interviews were undertaken to test the extent to which demand was affected by discrete interventions.

This section reviews all of the case studies for the first time. It also considers the core themes emerging from demand- and arms-reduction efforts in Brazil, Colombia, South Africa, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. Each case is divided into sub-sections, focusing on (i) the national and local context in which the intervention took place; (ii) a review of the motivations and means that influenced arms acquisition and ownership; (iii) a short treatment of the interventions launched in each case; and (iv) consideration of some of the factors that determined the success or failure of these interventions. Table 2 provides a comparative summary of the case studies.

Brazil

Context
Brazil has one of the most unequal distributions of wealth and income in the world. In many of its cities, as in the case of Rio de Janeiro, residential areas of both extremes are found in close proximity. While class differences have
serious and predictable implications for access to public services, with wealthier citizens generally enjoying better provision, policing is considered inadequate across all income levels. Material wealth is a risk factor for armed violence, and property crime is widespread. As a result, private security manpower rivals that of the police, and demand for firearms is considerable.

In Brazil, political–ideological factors have been less important in determining firearms demand in recent years than material factors driven by extreme
disparities in income and social status. Strictly political violence is rare, and party allegiance is very weak. Nonetheless, a range of overlapping preferences such as honour, masculinity/virility, and status do play a role in shaping demand. The pro-arms lobby has emphasized the links between these values and firearms, while the anti-gun lobby has recently tried to reverse them. In terms of institutions, the criminal justice system has serious gaps affecting all citizens: a 1994 study of the criminal system in Rio found that the vast majority of homicides and other crimes associated with criminal careers are not investigated, showing that both the police and the criminal justice system have been grossly inefficient (Soares, 1996, quoted in Lessing, 2005b, p. 205).

**Means and motivations determining firearms demand in Brazil**

On 23 October 2005, 64 per cent of Brazilians who took part in a referendum to ban the sale of firearms to civilians voted ‘no’. The ban had been proposed by the government (the referendum was provided for in the new firearms legislation of 2003), following the initiative of civil society organizations such as Viva Rio, Convive, Sou da Paz, the National Confederation of Brazilian Bishops, the National Christian Churches Council, the Latin American Church Council, World Vision, and others (BBC, 2005; Viva Rio, 2005). The ‘no’ campaign targeted people’s real and perceived insecurity and argued that firearms ownership should remain a lawful response to this problem (Muello, 2005). The ‘no’ vote thus reflects that in Brazil demand for firearms as a means of protection remains strong. This applies to all parts of Brazilian society, including people with a high income, the middle class, as well as *favela* residents. On the other hand, prior to the referendum media campaign, 72 per cent of the public supported the ban, suggesting that the final result reflected a response to the ‘no’ camp’s arguments about rights rather than a long-held preference for firearms.15

While the results of the referendum suggest that firearms demand linked to security concerns appears high among all social groups in Brazil, there are differences in demand between middle-class and *favela* residents. For the middle- and higher-income classes, social and economic status are relatively accessible via legal and regular employment. Property security, on the other hand, is scarce. As such, firearms demand among Rio’s middle class derives
from a deep preference for security on the one hand and deficiencies in the law enforcement and judicial systems on the other. The relative prices for these ‘goods’ are comparatively high for Rio’s middle class.

The situation in the *favelas* looks very different. Generalizations across *favelas* are difficult—much depends on whether a *favela* is dominated by a few local drug factions, as in Rio de Janeiro, or whether a larger number of drug factions and individual *traficantes* (drug dealers or traffickers) operate alongside each other without patterns of domination, as in the cases of São Paulo, Porto Alegre, and Recife. In Rio’s *favelas*, levels of property security are rather high as a result of the ‘law enforcement’ provided by the drug factions, and communities are strong.

The drug factions also carry out a form of ‘gun control’, determining, through threat of force, who may own and carry guns. In contrast to middle-class areas, property crime and street violence unrelated to fighting among drug factions are rare in these *favelas* because of strong faction control. And while confrontation with police is more common inside the *favela* than outside, and police action more likely to be lethal, this is not a situation in which possessing a firearm is likely to increase security.

*Favela* residents endure entrenched poverty and limited educational and professional opportunities and have few options for securing their livelihoods. Many unemployed young men join drug factions in order to make ends meet. Drug faction membership is directly linked to firearms acquisition in this context, and can thus be used as a proxy for demand, even if it is the faction, not the individual, that collectively acquires and owns the firearms. Firearm possession indicates membership in a faction, which in turn indicates wealth and power.

The deep preference linked to demand in this scenario is social and economic status; in addition to their functional role in actually obtaining economic profits, firearms become symbols of power, both material and sexual. As a result, strategies for reducing demand have to provide alternative ways to obtain such status. Of course, in *favelas* with multiple, competing factions, such as those seen in other Brazilian cities, protection and security will also be major factors influencing firearm demand, though the symbolic value of heavy armament remains potent.
**Intervention programme**

In the Brazilian case, intervention took the form of a national buy-back programme, which was mandated by the Disarmament Statute of December 2003 and received overwhelming support. It consisted of a three-month amnesty and financial compensation (USD 40–120) for any firearm handed in to the government. When more than 200,000 arms had been turned in after three months, the programme was extended for another six months (Small Arms Survey, 2005, p. 74; Instituto Sou da Paz, 2005). By mid-2005, a total of 400,000 weapons had been handed in (Dyer, 2005). The gun buy-back programme, as well as the other measures that are part of the Disarmament Statute, may have contributed to an observed 8 per cent drop in the number of deaths resulting from firearms violence in 2004 compared to 2003 (Kingstone, 2005).

While buy-back programmes are normally understood as supply-side measures, they do impact on and/or reflect demand patterns. Firstly, decreasing the supply of firearms in circulation indirectly affects demand by changing the means side of the demand equation. Reduced supply leads to higher prices, and an individual must spend more resources in order to acquire a firearm. Secondly, participation in gun buy-back programmes such as the one in Brazil can be understood as an expression of a ‘negative’ demand for firearms.

People handing in their firearms to a certain extent expressed a desire to be rid of those arms, a desire complemented by, but likely in excess of, simple interest in the financial compensation. Participants also benefited from an amnesty, thus avoiding higher penalties for illegal possession. In this and other ways, the relative price of possessing firearms rose because of the strict provisions in the Disarmament Statute and because of informational, public gun control campaigns. Registration and renewal fees for firearms increased, and penalties for holding an illicit weapon became stricter. Gun control campaigns have emphasized the dangers of keeping a firearm at home. This factor appears to have had the greatest impact, according to the responses in a survey conducted by Viva Rio.

The results of the October 2005 referendum, however, show that small arms demand in Brazil remains strong, and will not change if no further demand-reduction interventions are carried out.
Colombia

Context

Over the last 30 years, Colombia has registered some of the highest levels of gun deaths in the world. Firearms are responsible for 11 per cent of all deaths in the country, and 50 per cent of all deaths due to external cause. Approxi-
mately 10 per cent of the country’s gun deaths take place in the capital, Bogotá, where they peaked in 1993 with 62.7 per 100,000 inhabitants, but subsequently tapered to about 23 per 100,000 in 2002. Firearms are the primary driver of homicides in both Bogotá and the country as a whole—90 per cent of all gun deaths are homicides—and the reduction in homicides since 1993 is almost completely due to the reduction in firearms homicides.

Armed violence in Colombia is driven by a number of complex, interrelated factors. One is the 40-year, three-sided conflict between the army, irregular paramilitary forces, and the left-wing guerrilla groups Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC—Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN—National Liberation Army), which has resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and an estimated 1.6 million internally displaced persons, including children and indigenous persons whose livelihoods are directly dependent on the communities and lands they have been forced to flee. The multiparty conflict has been marked by repeatedly documented violations of international humanitarian law, including disappearances, hostage taking, the use of child soldiers, the targeting of medical staff, and the widespread use of anti-personnel landmines (ICRC, 2004). A current effort to disarm and demobilize the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC—United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia), the largest faction of the paramilitaries, has achieved some notable gains, but is under threat due to the leaders’ fears of arrest (UPI, 2005).

The existence of entrenched criminal organizations, many engaged in illicit coca-based drug manufacture and trafficking, is another factor in the violence. Growing greatly in size and sophistication since the 1970s, so-called narco-trafficking organizations in Colombia transformed themselves into an enormously well-funded multinational criminal industry with a huge capacity to corrupt and intimidate the judiciary, security institutions, political parties, and the press. Whereas the drug trade was formerly primarily controlled by two major cartels based in Medellín and Cali, both have now largely been disbanded. The resulting fragmentation of the industry into smaller groupings represented an opportunity for the growing involvement of both the Marxist insurgents and the right-wing paramilitaries in drug production and the drug trade. As one in-depth investigation indicated, ‘both sides in an on-going
civil war are able to reap huge profits from the drug industry which are then
turned into guns for further fighting’ (PBS, n.d.).

Urban criminality is not alien to Colombia. With the rise of the narcotics trade
and the diversion of government security resources to fight the guerrillas,
Colombian cities have experienced large increases in violent crime since the
mid-1980s. In some cities, for example in Medellín and Bogotá, homicide rates
reached epidemic proportions. The lack of efficiency of police and judicial
institutions reduced the dissuasive effect against firearms-related crimes—both
with licensed and with illegally owned weapons.

As a result, legal access to firearms began to be regulated in Colombia. Indumil,
a government-owned firm, has had the monopoly on arms imports, production,
and commercialization since the early 20th century, which has provided an
opportunity to strengthen arms regulation. A restrictive legal framework was
adopted in the early 1990s. As a legal development of the 1991 Constitution,
Decree 2535 (Republic of Colombia, 1993) established a regulatory framework
for the production, transfer, possession, and carrying of firearms. Under this
framework, the state is the owner of all legally held weapons, and it can license
them to individuals and firms. Legal gun licensees are permitted either to keep
registered guns in a place of residence or work, or to carry them if their risk
conditions require that. The pool of legally owned domestically made weapons
is relatively small, being limited mostly to guns manufactured by Indumil.
Civilians and firms can only request small-calibre revolvers, pistols, shotguns,
and, in general, non-automatic weapons.

The state allows private citizens to possess guns for self-defence, sport, or
collection, but there is no ‘right’ to bear arms. Upon demonstration of a legi-
timate need by an applicant, the Ministry of Defence Office for Control and
Trade of Arms and Explosives grants a permit, which it can revoke at any
time. Municipal authorities also have the power to restrict temporarily the
carrying of firearms in order to control urban criminal violence. The city of
Bogotá has availed itself of this rule on a number of occasions.

Outside legal channels, a large illegal market for firearms thrives, driven
by the demand for weapons among criminal organizations and politically
motivated parties to the conflict. Gauging the size and nature of this market
has been extremely challenging, as discussed below.
Means and motivations determining firearms demand in Bogotá and Colombia

Any analysis of the demand for guns in Bogotá and Colombia must distinguish between legal and illegal users (and consequently between legal and illegal guns).

Legal users. In Bogotá, legal users are more likely—compared to those in the rest of the country (75 per cent compared to 61 per cent)—to obtain a ‘permit to carry’ rather than a permit to keep guns at home. This suggests that individuals and firms are motivated by a need for self-defence against violent crimes such as armed assaults and kidnappings. Indeed, gun licensees in Bogotá show a preference for pistols over revolvers and shotguns—that is, they seek more powerful guns with greater ‘stopping power’. Given that legal purchasers must pass a series of administrative hurdles—the demonstration of need, permit to purchase (including medical and psychological screening, as well as safety training), gun registration, permit to carry—motivations for security can be considered deep-seated. Interestingly, the most commonly seized guns are among those who hold a carrying permit (about 5 per cent of all guns seized). This shows that enforcement of the regulatory framework is successful to some degree.

The economic costs for purchasing and legally holding and carrying a gun in Colombia are relatively high. A typical revolver costs in excess of USD 400 and permits to possess and carry are USD 46 each (renewal every ten years at a cost of USD 12). The average daily wage in Colombia is USD 5, making the cost of even the cheapest revolver equivalent to several months’ average wages. Despite these costs, more than 700,000 arms are legally licensed to be kept at a fixed location or carried.

Illegal users. It is extremely difficult to ascertain the motivations for any particular act of illegal firearm acquisition, since no records are kept of such transactions. An unknown percentage of illegal acquisitions will be made by individuals who are prohibited from legally purchasing guns, or because they intend to commit crimes. In the absence of baseline data on these choices, the confiscation of illegally held guns provides some insight into illicit users. Since 1994, the National Police have dramatically stepped up efforts to search for and seize illegally held or carried guns.
Of the guns seized in Bogotá in 2004, the percentage recovered from non-permit holders, though relatively small compared to all guns seized, varied greatly by weapon type, with 80 per cent of shotguns, 40 per cent of carbines, and 17 per cent of revolvers seized from non-permit holders. In terms of volume, however, pistols were the primary weapon seized from illegal owners—representing 62 per cent of all weapons seized from non-permit holders and more than 10 per cent of all weapons recovered. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority (84 per cent) of guns recovered in Bogotá by police had been held by people who had legitimate ‘possession’ or ‘carrying’ permits but had violated the terms of those permits.

Very recently, information has become available about the crimes associated with the guns confiscated in Bogotá. Based on preliminary 2005 data, three-quarters of guns recovered from homicides and thefts were from users without a permit to purchase or carry, whereas crimes involving injuries (assaults) were split almost equally between permit holders and non-permit holders. All seizures following crimes related to production, trafficking, banned weapons, destruction of property, and money laundering were from non-permit holders. The conclusion is that demand for weapons used in violent crimes, such as homicide, is satisfied overwhelmingly by the illegal market.

The significant monetary resources of organized criminal groupings—as well as paramilitaries and rebels involved in the drug trade—suggest that financing is not a significant issue in the acquisition of illegal firearms for these groups. In fact, the glut of illicit firearms available means that the prices for illicit arms are probably a fraction of those for legal guns. Further, successful prosecutions for violent crimes such as homicide are notoriously uncommon in Colombia, making fear of arrest and jail time an insufficient deterrent. As noted above, the vast majority of gun-related crimes are for non-compliance with permit terms.

*Intervention programmes*

Since the early 1990s, Colombia has taken strong initiatives at the national and local levels to tighten legal gun ownership, reduce gun violence, and make citizens feel safer without recourse to weapon acquisition. As noted above, a sweeping new national legal framework was adopted in 1993. In
addition, a range of local measures have been instituted by the municipalities, including investments in urban infrastructure, public education campaigns, and tougher penalties for firearms violations (up to 15 years in jail for some offences). Here we consider a number of efforts instituted by successive mayoral administrations in Bogotá.

*Strengthening law enforcement structures.* An increase in investment in police infrastructure began in the 1990s. Roadblocks and random checks of cars for illicit weapons became a common sight and reinforced the disapprobation attached to illicit gun carrying. From 1994 to 2000, the number of arrests increased by 280 per cent. At the same time, the city of Bogotá took steps to improve the collection and processing of detailed and reliable data on urban crime, making it possible for the first time to monitor trends and measure the impacts of particular interventions.

The establishment of a municipal Security and Vigilance Fund made a significant impact not only by adding to the Bogotá Municipal Police Department’s tiny budget, but by giving the Mayor’s Office leverage in influencing policies of law enforcement measures and their implementation. This has brought some balance to the historically difficult relationship between the administration and the police, a relationship that has vital consequences for how law enforcement is conducted in the city. These investments appear to have paid off in the public perceptions of security: half of respondents polled in 2003 indicated that they felt safer because of the increased police efforts.

*Restrictions on gun carrying.* Using the option provided to municipalities in the 1993 national decree (Republic of Colombia, 1993), Bogotá has experimented with a ban on gun carrying on particular days. Early on, bans were instituted on national election days and were then extended to include weekends, days after paydays, and some holidays. The entire holiday season from 17 December 1996 to 7 January 1997 was accompanied by a carrying ban; the following year the ban included weekdays and extended through June. At that point, a controversy over the legality of the municipality’s measure led to the prohibition being lifted. Since 1999, a Friday evening to Monday morning ban on carrying has been in effect in 59 municipalities, including Bogotá. Although Villaveces et al. (2000) found that homicides dropped between 15 and 20 per cent on days when the
carrying ban was in effect, a recent analysis based on districts within the city finds that the association with a reduction in homicide is strongest where an institutional police presence and enforcement mechanisms are strongest. The reduction is also most apparent among young males, the highest-risk group.

*Alcohol and firearms interdiction efforts.* With access to more comprehensive data on homicides, police quickly identified that one-third of all firearms-related fatalities were associated with alcohol consumption. As a result, the Bogotá municipality instituted restrictions on the sale of alcohol, including in bars and restaurants, which had to close after 1.00 a.m.20 A number of studies concluded that this intervention alone was responsible for at least an 8 per cent reduction in homicides in the 1990s (Llorente, Núñez, and Rubio, 2000). When the ban was pushed back to 2.00 a.m. in 1998, a rise in homicides led to a return to the original curfew. After four years of success, in 2002 the mayor called on citizens to police themselves and set the ban to 3.00 a.m.21 In 2003, more than three-quarters of the Bogotá public indicated that the restrictions had improved their safety. New evidence has again suggested that these curfews are associated with a reduction of armed homicide in the city.

*Normalizing compliance with the law.* The 1993 national decree provided for an amnesty for illegally held guns: an unconditional waiver was issued to any individual holding a gun at the time of the decree, and citizens were also encouraged to turn in guns, for which they were compensated. Later, the Bogotá administration instituted a voluntary disarmament programme as a result of which 5,000 guns were claimed to have been turned in (unconfirmed). Surveys of public impressions of safety and security before and after the disarmament plan suggested that the acceptability of carrying guns dropped significantly in the wake of the turn-in. Two-thirds of respondents indicated that the turn-in made them feel safer.

*Promoting community engagement in crime prevention.* Through the development of so-called Local Security Fronts, the municipality of Bogotá encouraged informal neighbourhood-based networks of concerned residents to establish a common sense of shared property and investment in the community. This was tied to efforts to get citizens to increase their personal involvement in security by reporting crimes. The police also created conflict resolution units for the peaceful
conclusion of disputes without recourse to violence. These units in particular
appear to have generated a degree of public satisfaction: almost two-thirds of
respondents in a 2003 poll said that the existence of the units made them feel
more secure in their homes.

The multipronged and multilevel approach to reducing the demand for small
arms in Colombia, and in Bogotá in particular, has undoubtedly made a contri-
bution to the dramatic drop in firearms homicides nationally and locally. Much
work needs to be done to ensure that the current trend continues. Strong
municipality–police relationships and further investments in urban develop-
ment and community participation are essential to achieving that aim. At the
same time, dealing with the influx of weapons that fuel both the long-standing
armed conflict and criminal drug organizations is needed to clamp down on
the supply of illicit weapons on the market.

South Africa

Context

The preferences for small arms and light weapons in South Africa are histori-
cally and socially conditioned. During the more than four decades of apartheid,
the South African state was highly militarized. White government soldiers,
white civilian–military commandos, and leaders of ‘homelands militia’ bran-
dished a range of arms. The apartheid state reacted to the creation of the
mass-based United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 with increased armed
oppression and the declaration of a state of emergency between 1985 and 1990.
Members of the liberation movements, especially youth members of self-defence
or self-protection units, armed themselves in response, and many black town-
ships installed self-governing structures, including ‘people’s courts’, which
were able to enforce their decisions, sometimes through armed violence. In
the late 1980s, some members of self-defence units began to pursue criminal
instead of political goals. Demand for guns thus increased, and greater numbers
of weapons moved into black communities. On the one hand, therefore, fire-
arms were crucial to maintaining the apartheid system of oppression. On the
other hand, weapons—in particular the AK-47, which was the weapon of the
liberation armies—came to symbolize freedom for the majority of disenfran-
chised South Africans. In the post-apartheid period, when black South Africans were no longer denied firearms ownership, firearms became a symbol of full citizenship for many. At the same time, weapons were, and continue to be, linked to masculine identity and social status (Keegan, 2005, p. 13).

In 1996, two million South Africans owned 3.5 million licensed firearms (1.75 weapons per citizen). In 2004, this number had risen to 3.7 million owned by 2.5 million citizens (1.5 weapons per citizen) (Gould et al., 2004, p. 133; Kirsten, 2005). Gun owners began to hand in some of their weapons in anticipation of the Firearms Control Act (FCA) of 2000, which came into force in 2004 (see below). Furthermore, the majority of new licences since 1994 have been one-gun handgun licences. Even if the number of black South Africans applying for firearms licences has increased in recent years, the majority of licensed weapons are still owned by whites.

The latest available breakdown of firearms licences by weapon type from the Central Firearms Register (CFR) shows that until 1998, the number of handguns surpassed that of shotguns by more than one million, which probably indicates that the demand for firearms as a means of protection and security was greater than the demand for sporting and hunting weapons (Gould et al., 2004, pp. 196–7).  

The number of illegal firearms in South Africa is not known; it is estimated to be between 500,000 and 4 million (Keegan, 2005, p. 5). During the negotiations to end apartheid in the early 1990s, criminal violence, particularly armed violence, had become increasingly widespread in South Africa. As a result of illegal supplies from Mozambique and Angola, insufficient disarmament, and lost and stolen legal weapons within South Africa, firearms had become widely available and accessible to members of all social groups and races, in addition to the state (police and defence forces). Access was thus possible not only for criminal and paramilitary groups, but also for sports shooters, hunters, mercenaries, citizens, and private security companies. This contributed to a South African gun culture, the militarization of social identities, and an increase in firearms-related crime between 1994 and 2000 (Cock, 2000, p. 82; Gould et al., 2004, p. 134).

Moreover, conflicts—domestic as well as within and between communities—became more violent. During the mid- to late 1990s, crime rates continued to...
rise, but began to stabilize around 2000. Even so, the rates of firearms ownership and firearms-related homicides in South Africa settled among the highest in the world. In 1998, there were 29.1 firearms homicides per 100,000 of population (Chetty, 2000, p. 19). While the number of homicides declined marginally during the mid-1990s, the percentage of firearms-related homicides as a share of all homicides increased from 41 per cent in 1993 to almost 50 per cent by 1999. Between 1999 and 2003, the share of firearms-related homicides among all homicides fell again to 42.2 per cent (Keegan, 2005, p. 84). The rise in crime rates between 1994 and 2000 has been attributed to four main factors: the social tensions resulting from the transition from an authoritarian government to a democratic one, a burgeoning culture of violence, increasing income and wealth inequalities, and the proliferation of firearms.

**Means and motivations determining firearms demand in South Africa**

Firearms demand in South Africa is multifaceted, due to the variety of social groups and their different interests. It is influenced by a combination of deep preferences such as political identity and group status, individual status and identity, and personal security. As outlined above, guns became symbols of citizenship and political emancipation towards the end of the apartheid period. In the context of deep preferences for political identity and group status, firearms demand increased during the late 1980s and early to mid-1990s among the (formerly) oppressed social groups.

The association of firearms with ‘full citizenship’ coincides with the idea of weapons as symbols of masculinity and virility, and is linked to a deep preference for individual status. A symbolic connection between firearms and masculinity has been important among many South African men, irrespective of race. Men in both the South African Defence Force and the armed wings of the liberation movements had their identities shaped by a militaristic nationalism. Among South African women, there seems to be an emerging preference for firearms as well—in some cases linked to a feminist identity, in others to an increased perceived need for self-protection (Cock, 2000, pp. 85–7).

Personal security, both real and perceived, has also been very important in the context of small arms demand in South Africa. Hence, demand has been influenced not only by people’s perceptions of threat, but also by a real lack...
of confidence in the police services. Since the transition period, there have been high levels of perceived as well as real insecurity, triggering high demand for firearms (Cock, 2000, pp. 83–4). In this context, people acquire firearms because they believe that in this way they are better able to provide for their own and their families’ security. Since the 1990s, this high-demand situation has been compounded by easy supply. Demand increased before the 1994 elections among white South Africans, who anticipated outbreaks of violence, and within government departments, which stockpiled firearms without proper record keeping before the elections (Gould et al., 2004, pp. 161–2). The increase in the number of legal firearms among the civilian population between 1992 and 1999 indicates an increase in demand for firearms among all parts of the population.27

**Interventions**

Two kinds of interventions in South Africa have been carried out with the aim of reducing demand for firearms: civil society initiatives culminating in the Gun-free Zone (GFZ) project, and legal intervention, including the provision of Firearms-free Zones (FFZs) modelled on GFZs in the FCA of 2000. The FCA only came into force in 2004, and it is still too early to assess FFZs. The Act’s other provisions, such as its licensing requirements, can be expected to raise the relative prices of firearms and thereby possibly reduce demand as well. Evidence of two different developments confirm this expectation. First, over the last two to three years, about 200 gun dealers have closed their shops. Second, the last firearms amnesty, which was held from January to June 2005, yielded by far the largest number of voluntarily surrendered weapons to date. The analysis below looks in more detail at the GFZ project and its effects on firearms demand.

The gun control movement began to take shape in 1994, the year of the first post-apartheid democratic elections, in reaction to rising gun violence in South Africa. The movement’s first success was a 24-hour national amnesty for handing in weapons, announced in December 1994 and promoted and organized by the government and civil society. The number of guns turned in was low—a mere 900 firearms and explosive devices—but the issue of gun control acquired national prominence as a result of the amnesty. Building on this early effort
and recognizing that disarmament was going to require a significant investment and much time, gun control activists founded the NGO Gun-free South Africa (GFSA) in 1995.

GFSA initiated the GFZ project in 1995 with two broad objectives: to provide ‘safe spaces’ where people do not feel threatened by guns, and to change people’s attitudes towards firearms from seeing them as security enabling to security threatening. GFZs are spaces where firearms and ammunition are not welcome. They aim to provide individuals with alternative derived preferences to fulfill the deep preference for protection and security, as well as means to obtain individual status and group status without carrying firearms. GFZs can include schools, hospitals, businesses, churches, recreation centres, and other public spaces. No legal mechanism exists to enforce them; compliance is voluntary and relies on self-enforcement. Examples are health clinics, bars, libraries, and high schools in Fothane in Mapela district, Limpopo Province; Diepkloof in Soweto, Gauteng Province; and Khayelitsha in Cape Town City Metropole, Western Cape Province.

GFZs are marked by ‘no gun’ signs—an encircled gun with a slash through it in red. To promote compliance, they rely on three principles: facilitation by individual or group stakeholders; participation of and consultation between stakeholders; and flexibility in terms of design and implementation. One person or a small group of people living in a community or working for an organization may initiate the GFZ process. As part of this initiative, stakeholders meet to discuss gun control and GFZ implementation and how to ensure that a GFZ remains gun free. The GFZ model is very flexible because the shape of each GFZ is determined by the ideas and initiatives of the particular people involved. In this way, the GFZ concept can easily be adapted to each local context by citizens themselves.

The number of GFZs has grown significantly since the start of the project. In 2000 a GFZ survey found that businesses were more likely to be GFZs than government institutions. GFZs were either enforced with metal detectors or body searches (this was common in the private sector), or were based on trust, mostly in the case of villages, communities, and schools, many of whom have been unable to acquire and maintain expensive metal detectors. The GFZ programme has yielded some important dividends. Because there is a sense
that some spaces are now gun-free, some former gun owners have actually increased their status within their communities by participating in the community-level implementation of the GFZ programme. Furthermore, a new ‘norm’ around the GFZ concept has emerged: compliance fosters further compliance, and a functioning GFZ creates a virtuous circle.

The results of the GFZ intervention vary across cases, however. In places like Fothane, where there is a high degree of social cohesion, the model works best in challenging social norms such as gun carrying, whereas it is much more difficult to obtain this result in areas such as Diepkloof or Khayelitsha, where social cohesion is low. As GFZs are based on trust, success crucially depends on the participatory principle. All stakeholder groups have to be included in the process in order for a GFZ to function. Moreover, the example of Fothane shows that GFZs are not only valuable in challenging the norm of gun carrying through a publicly displayed sign, but also through the ‘socially inclusive process of establishing GFZ’. In Diepkloof, real and perceived insecurity dominates in many areas between GFZs, which means that people feel that they still need firearms for protection in order to get to a GFZ. Consequently, if there are several GFZs in an area, this does not automatically mean that the whole area is gun free, and that the demand for guns abates. Overall, however, the GFZ project has definitely reduced demand at least in the areas where GFZs are located, and it remains to be seen what impact the FFZs and the other provisions of the FCA may have on firearms demand in South Africa.

Papua New Guinea

Context

Papua New Guinea (PNG) is one of the most diverse countries on earth, with an estimated population of 5.5 million drawn from more than 700 Melanesian tribal groups speaking almost as many languages (CIA, 2005a). Despite repeated interventions from Australia and New Zealand, the country is also one of the world’s most underdeveloped and poor. After independence in 1975, labour migration to the main cities, including Port Moresby and Lae, began. Because of comparatively limited prospects for employment in the formal sectors, and a rapidly deteriorating and dysfunctional security sector, levels of armed
criminality began to soar. Criminal actors soon began to coalesce into small
gangs, locally known as *raskols*, and their demand for firearms began to grow.
The effects of gang violence have been astounding: levels of violent crime in
the capital, Port Moresby, are currently twice as high as that of Johannesburg
or Rio de Janeiro. Moreover, PNG’s rate of domestic violence is among the
most severe in the world.\(^{29}\)

But armed violence in PNG is not limited to its urban coastal areas. Rather,
inter-tribal and domestic violence have been a feature of day-to-day life in
PNG for centuries. This is especially the case in the interior, particularly the
Southern Highlands and Enga Provinces. So-called tribal violence has also
carried-over into urban centres such as the shanty-town settlements in the
National Capital District. Pre-existing and simmering tensions in the highland
provinces have been exacerbated by the relatively recent introduction of fire-
arms in the late 1980s, which effectively increased the lethality of long-standing
conflicts (Capie, 2003, p. 92; Small Arms Survey, 2006). Armed violence in and
around Mendi, the capital of the Southern Highlands, peaked in 2001 and 2002,
when an ongoing conflict between the Tungujup and Urum tribes reached its
apex.

The types of weapons in circulation throughout PNG are hugely diverse.
Indeed, weapons employed in criminal and tribal violence include a combi-
nation of automatic and semi-automatic rifles and pistols, home-made firearms,
and even hand grenades. Far from spilling across borders from neighbouring
countries\(^{30}\), weapons are sourced primarily from the PNG Defence Force and
the police through a combination of theft and corruption. While some 27,000
guns are legally registered in PNG, with only 250 registered in the Southern
Highlands, the number of illicit arms in the country is believed to be much
higher (Alpers, 2005, pp. 37–44; Haley and Muggah, 2006). Indeed, an estimated
2,500 manufactured firearms are believed to be in circulation in the Southern
Highlands—some ten times the registered number. Many of these weapons are
not necessarily held by individuals, but rather collectively by tribes, with leasing
and loaning of assault and sniper rifles between allied rural tribes occurring
with increasing frequency (Capie, 2003, p. 93; Alpers, 2005, p. 95).

There is a compelling relationship between firearms demand, misuse, and
political violence. Indeed, firearms have been used by candidates for political
office and their supporters to influence national, provincial, and municipal elections, particularly in remote areas, through intimidation of prospective voters. As noted above, these weapons have been supplied by politicians and elements within the defence establishment (Capie, 2003, p. 94). The electoral process in 2002 was particularly chaotic; candidates (as well as their supporters) carried and brandished firearms during their campaigns, and large numbers of police and Defence Force personnel were deployed. In the Highlands in particular, intimidation of voters and a climate of fear were reported.

Given that PNG is lacking basic census data and surveillance capacities, it is fortunate that the scale and magnitude of gun violence in the country are finally being recognized. This has largely been due to ongoing research carried out on the island and its dissemination through a variety of channels. The government has also recently launched a series of large-scale consultations around the country that culminated in a Gun Summit in July 2005. These meetings highlighted public support for greater curbs on domestic stockpiles and illegal transfers, and underlined the importance of transparent and accountable weapons management.

Means and motivations determining firearms demand in PNG

Despite the comparatively recent introduction of firearms to civilians in PNG, demand for firearms has been growing. There are a number of interconnected reasons for this. For one, the police and justice systems are notoriously compromised and dysfunctional. Moreover, tribal communities and clans regularly clash over common property resources, with firearms easily being substituted for spears and arrows to pursue deep-seated grievances. More recently, the status and personal security afforded by firearms are proving important in driving up acquisition. The relatively persistent levels of demand are thus principally a function of motivations (deep and derived preferences), since means are generally low. Put another way, resources to acquire firearms are scarce, and firearms prices remain relatively high as a result of the limited supply of manufactured weapons.

In addition to a long tradition of tribal violence, other important factors contribute to the derived preference for firearms. These include (locally-produced) alcohol and marijuana abuse, and dysfunctional and corrupt security and
judicial systems. The army and police have been routinely accused of human rights violations, often involving the use of heavy weaponry. Indeed, local and regional media frequently describe how unarmed criminal suspects are killed by police, and how firearms are used against unarmed protesters (Capie, 2003, pp. 93–4). To be sure, despite its high rates, gun violence remains under-reported and weapon types used in crimes are seldom reported.

That weapons demand has persisted although the means for acquiring firearms are relatively limited points to at least two trends. First, craft production has increased since the late 1970s—with a wide assortment of calibres now available. Second, individuals and communities have devised a host of creative (and non-monetary) approaches to acquiring weapons, wherein manufactured firearms are often bartered for property, sometimes even women. In many cases, communities collectively acquire a single firearm, and collectively-owned or rented weapons are used for specific conflicts. In some cases, adept ‘shooters’ from particular tribes sell their labour to other tribes that are lacking firearms.31 With the increasing availability of factory-produced weapons, however, the demand for craft-produced firearms appears to have decreased.32

At present, demand for illicit firearms appears to have been concentrated in urban areas and in more remote Highlands provinces. There can be little doubt, however, that the introduction of firearms in PNG has contributed to an intensification of a vicious cycle of violence: increased levels of violence have led to increased demand for ever greater firepower, either for protection or retribution. It has also increased the number of people holding and demanding firearms in PNG, whether members of the police, correctional services, auxiliaries of the PNG Defence Force, politicians, raskols, or tribal shooters. In urban areas, it appears that at least two categories of demanders exist: young gang members with limited resources, mainly demanding craft-produced weapons, and middle- and upper-class civilians with comparatively greater resources, demanding factory-made guns.

**Intervention programme**

In the absence of credible public security services, Papua New Guineans have devised a host of innovative approaches to reducing gun demand. One such
example includes the Mendi Peace Commission, which was established in 2002 to resolve a specific armed dispute between two tribes and their allies in the Southern Highlands. It was motivated out of a concern with the escalating human costs of the conflict: at least 100 people had been killed since 1998 (LeBrun and Muggah, 2005, p. 10). The commission was chaired by a local businessman and the bishops of the Catholic and United Churches. As a result of the commission’s mediation efforts, the two tribes signed a peace agreement on 3 May 2002. The agreement itself placed a major emphasis on reconciliation, including the negotiation of ‘compensation payments’ and forgiveness. Particularly important were public apologies issued by leaders of the Tungujup and Urum tribes, a vital symbolic overture that counts for much in the region. Other important elements of the peace agreement included the tribes’ commitment to end the hostilities, to allow people freedom of movement, to respect each other’s tribal boundaries, to dismiss mercenaries and shooters, to put all firearms under the control of the tribal leaders, to end the public display of weapons, and to cooperate with the police in efforts to curb alcohol and marijuana abuse. Equally important was the return of stolen property to their owners.

As indicated above, the deep preferences for the acquisition and use of firearms in PNG are in many ways historically and culturally determined. There has been an entrenched tradition of tribal conflict—much of it designed to regulate local mercantile exchanges and social orderings among groups—which has included the practice of retaliatory killing. As Haley and Muggah (2006) have observed, the importance of reciprocity and the understanding of complex local dynamics in explaining firearms demand cannot be overstated. The availability and acquisition of firearms has also had an insidious effect on the country’s nascent political culture. In the case of elections—the implicit purpose of which is to resolve conflict non-violently—candidates and parties have regularly used firearms to intimidate voters. The organizers of the peace agreement recognised that any programme or intervention to mitigate gun violence would have to take into account these complex sets of preferences. Collectively based reconciliation processes are one way of reducing firearms demand on this level. Other factors driving demand, such as substance abuse and malfunctioning or non-existing policing and judicial services, should be addressed by parallel intervention programmes.
Given the long tradition of tribal conflict in rural PNG, there is no easy way to reduce firearms demand. The rising incidence of tribal conflicts in the settlements lining the outskirts of the capital, Port Moresby, is also a cause for concern (Haley and Muggah, 2006). There are no catch-all approaches to reducing gun violence in the country. There are, however, some potential entry points. Reconciliation processes are crucial in tackling some of these issues and ultimately contributing to perceived safety and security. If small-scale interventions are introduced, they should advocate collective incentives and be carried out in a reciprocal fashion with other armed groups. Of paramount importance is the strengthening of the police and judicial sectors and reductions in corruption and the influence of wantok over government stockpiles. Recent research has also revealed a strong community preference for modest investments in social and economic infrastructure as a mechanism to reduce resort to arms.

**Solomon Islands**

*Context*

The Solomon Islands is a comparatively small country demographically, with a population of approximately 538,000 (2005 estimate). But it has a remarkably heterogeneous and diverse population consisting of over 300 cultural and linguistic groups spread out over 347 of its 922 islands. Like its neighbour, Papua New Guinea, the overwhelming majority of the population is ethnically Melanesian, while a small fraction is either Polynesian or Micronesian (1999 census) (CIA, 2005b).

Though frequently cast as an ‘island paradise’, the Solomon Islands were in fact engulfed by protracted armed violence between 1998 and 2002, a period colloquially referred to as ‘the tensions’. Though the causes of the tensions were in fact quite complex, fighting was triggered by ethnically-tinged land disputes between the inhabitants of the two largest islands, Guadalcanal, where the capital Honiara is located, and Malaita to the east. For many years, Malaitans had been settling on Guadalcanal, whose ‘original’ inhabitants became increasingly concerned with encroachments and alleged accumulation of property. The tensions were in fact organised between two primary non-state actors. The Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM), a militant armed group consisting pri-
marily of Gualese, began a systematic campaign against Malaitan encroachers. Their efforts largely achieved the intended effect: by 1999, some 20,000 people, the majority of them Malaitans, were forced to leave their homes on Guadalcanal or pushed into marginal areas of the island. Human rights agencies and

Table 2

Comparative summary of small arms demand in the context of the five case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Intervention programme</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Target group(s)</th>
<th>Main deep preference(s) as proxy(ies) for demand</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Various mayoral disarmament programmes</td>
<td>Since 1995</td>
<td>Urban population of Bogotá</td>
<td>Security; Protection</td>
<td>Mostly support for disarmament; Demand reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Disarmament Statute</td>
<td>Since December 2003; Referendum of 23 October 2005 resulted in vote against banning civilian ownership</td>
<td>General population</td>
<td>Security; Protection; Social and economic stability</td>
<td>Support for disarmament not sufficient for banning civilian ownership; Demand reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>GFZ project</td>
<td>Since 1995</td>
<td>General population</td>
<td>Political identity</td>
<td>Demand reduction partially successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Mendi Peace Agreement</td>
<td>3 May 2002</td>
<td>Armed non-state tribal groups; General population</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Little success of demand-reduction efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Since July 2003</td>
<td>Armed non-state tribal groups; General population</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>RAMSI: demand reduction successful; WFV: demand reduction partially successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WFV campaign</td>
<td>Since 2002</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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others documented how many homes were looted and inhabitants raped or murdered. In November 1999, Malaitans rapidly formed their own militia, the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF), in the wake of a failed peace process. The Honiara-based MEF, supported by prominent Malaitans and their wantok in the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP), retaliated by attacking villages and IFM supporters in and around Honiara. By June 2000, the MEF successfully took over the police armoury in the capital and forced the resignation of the prime minister at gunpoint. Though violence continued unabated, formal negotiations soon yielded the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) of October 2000. Despite the introduction of a ceasefire, the islands remained comparatively unstable for the following two years (Kabutaulaka, 2004, pp. 2–3; LeBrun and Muggah, 2005, pp. 29–31). It was only after the intervention of a Regional Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in August 2003 that the situation rapidly stabilized.

**Means and motivations determining firearms demand in the Solomon Islands**

During the tensions, demand for small arms was manifestly high among the members of the two militant groups, the IFM and MEF. But economic insecurity, which was largely due to displacement and the collapse of local markets, and which itself is a potentially important factor associated with firearms demand, also grew. This had not always been the case: Honiara has typically registered higher indicators of well-being than villages in either Malaita or other parts of Guadalcanal. Nevertheless, as a result of the tensions, economic performance fell below subsistence level across the two islands, while rapidly improving in the wake of the arrival of RAMSI. Despite meaningful improvements in socio-economic well-being, however, a pervasive sense of personal insecurity lingers throughout rural areas of the Solomon Islands, particularly among women and girls.

Levels of interpersonal violence had been relatively low before the outbreak of the tensions in the communities surveyed. During the conflict, virtually all communities felt under siege, with respondents from settlements on the outskirts of Honiara indicating that they felt more threatened in the post-conflict period than they had before. This confirms findings from the Small Arms
Survey (2005) that post-conflict environments do not necessarily return to pre-conflict-levels of security. But these perceptions are not felt equally between the sexes. Indeed, men residing in villages on both Guadalcanal and Malaita indicated that their sense of personal and familial security had meaningfully improved. Though women in Guadalcanal also claimed to feel more secure since 2003, women in Malaita appeared more fearful than before.

The Solomon Islands experience reinforces the claim that a small number of weapons can have a devastating impact. It is estimated that in the Solomon Islands as a whole there were only 3,500 weapons in circulation in mid-2003—whether commercially manufactured or home-made (Muggah, 2004, p. 5). But it is also important to recognize the origins and distribution of these weapons between groups in order to appreciate demand. Indeed, Malaitan firearms stocks were reportedly low prior to the onset of the tensions, with respondents reporting only a small collection of hunting rifles for pest control and personal protection. But stocks grew after the outbreak of violence in 1998, when Malaitans acquired weapons from existing state inventories in addition to producing craft weapons and funnelling them into existing trade and exchange networks. Equally, in Guadalcanal, while weapons were craft-produced during the tensions, respondents were emphatic that these had not been traded or exchanged during that period. It is useful to mention, then, that even if constraints had been introduced to reduce supplies of illegal manufactured weapons, a vibrant industry would nevertheless have persisted in the production and trade of home-made arms.

**Intervention: The Weapons-free Village campaign**

Even prior to the arrival of the Australian-led RAMSI mission in 2003, a variety of local initiatives had been launched to reduce armed violence and arms availability. For example, in October 2000, International Peace Monitoring (IPC) teams were created by the Peace Monitoring Council (PMC), itself a mechanism introduced to monitor the ceasefire, with the objective of promoting weapons returns and reconciliation in affected communities. Under the terms of the TPA, a weapons amnesty was launched soon after. By July 2001, some 1,034 firearms and 3,600 rounds of ammunition had been surrendered to the IPC teams (Muggah, 2003, p. 11). In March 2002 more than 10,000 people took
part in the *Wokabaot fo Pis* (‘Walkabout for Peace’). Building on these early successes, two additional weapon amnesties were organized in April and May 2002, netting a total of 2,043 firearms and 2.86 tons of explosives (Nelson and Muggah, 2004, p. 15).

In order to consolidate these promising returns, the PMC launched a series of innovative campaigns. Suspecting that a number of weapons continued to circulate after the three successive amnesties and recognizing that even Second World War relics were available, the PMC launched the Weapons-free Village (WFV) campaign in August 2002. The design and administration of the WFV was to be overseen by the PMC itself, an indigenous organization established with the participation of the Solomon Islands government, representatives of the former IFM and MEF groups, and regular inputs from the provincial governments. The PMC aimed at four primary outcomes: national reconciliation; continued weapons surrenders; the promotion of village leadership, traditions, and values; and good governance. In addition to supporting the implementation of the WFV campaign, local peace monitors in 11 monitoring facilities on Guadalcanal and Malaita kept a close watch for any acts of violence. They also accepted without prosecution any further weapons returned voluntarily.

The WFV programme functions through a combination of incentives and deterrence. By publicly recognizing villages on both islands that give up their remaining weapons, it expects to stimulate increased weapons returns and stigmatize those villages that do not return weapons. Once the PMC is satisfied that a village no longer contains weapons, a local ceremony is held where village leaders and selected villagers together sign a ‘weapons-free declaration’, a solemn pledge that they will work to keep the village free of all weapons in the future. The village is then presented with a certificate and a ‘weapons-free’ sign proclaiming its status. The sign asks others to respect the wishes of the villagers not to bring guns back into their community, a strategy similar to the Gun-free Zones discussed in the South Africa section of this report (LeBrun and Muggah, 2005, p. 30).

The WFV campaign itself had been launched because of a widespread perception of weapons persisting in communities despite the amnesties. Its originators recognised that many affected populations continued to feel threatened despite the peace agreement and ceasefire. It was also widely recognized that public
security was still limited, largely due to the breakdown of the police forces in rural areas. PMC monitors thus functioned as a kind of ‘surrogate police force’ in Guadalcanal and Malaita because the RSIP was notably absent from many areas (Nelson and Muggah, 2004, p. 16, fn. 8).

The WFV campaign introduced a number of innovative mechanisms to reducing the demand for small arms. For example, the intervention consciously took into account the fact that guns are seldom individually owned in the Solomon Islands context, but rather integrated in a complex pattern of ethnic and clan obligations. Thus, it introduced a combination of collective deterrents, capitalizing on the wantok system to apply pressure and stigma for groups to return weapons. The WFV also recognized that national-level programmes designed in Honiara would yield only limited returns at the local level. Thus, they introduced ‘peace promoters’, themselves grounded in rural areas, to undertake a process of case-by-case negotiation with affected communities. The WFV promoters saw that if efforts were not grounded in local custom and experience, and if affected populations were themselves not actively engaged in programme implementation, demand reduction would likely fail.

Reflections on the case studies
While the case studies yield a wide range of findings and insights, a number of pertinent cross-cutting themes emerge. These issues may have utility for negotiators and diplomats seeking to strengthen their normative and practical approaches to arms control, particularly with respect to demand reduction. While by no means constituting an exhaustive list, a number of common issues are the following: (i) demand appears to be historically and socially determined, and interventions cannot be blind to these factors; (ii) the intensity of demand is often conditioned by structural factors—such as the quality and quantity of governance, as well as economic and labour dynamics—and these factors can influence the outcomes of interventions; (iii) demand is affected by the availability of arms; (iv) demand is differentially experienced by individuals and groups; (v) demand reduction focuses less on small arms collection than on other means of influencing behaviour; and (vi) demand reduction requires redressing asymmetries in information. These will be discussed more fully below.
A key finding emerging from the qualitative research undertaken in all five cases is that the motivations for weapons acquisition are heavily conditioned by the historical and social environments. For example, as the South African case amply demonstrates, guns are objects imbued with highly symbolic meanings in relation to the anti-apartheid movement, continued injustice, status, and inequality. Demand therefore does not occur in a vacuum, but is rather embedded in a complex and dynamic cluster of social experiences, meanings, and world views. Thus technical, ahistoric, and formulaic interventions designed to disarm individuals or reduce misuse through the pricing mechanism alone will likely yield poor returns unless they take into account how weapons themselves are socially constructed. As the case studies show, interventions should harness and adopt appropriate local understandings, symbols, logos, and the like in order to shape preferences.

Related, another core finding from the case studies is that motivations and means are affected by shifts in structural factors—from governance to the macro-economy and the labour environment. Regime changes, rapid military interventions, sudden changes in the quality of political or economic governance, or dramatic shifts in social norms, while potential sources of instability, can also open spaces for demand reduction. In South Africa and Brazil, motivations and means for weapons acquisition were heavily influenced by rapid changes in income and social inequality. By way of contrast, the large-scale military intervention in the Solomon Islands, the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), sufficiently raised the real and relative price of arms and reshaped the preferences for weapons such that it led to a considerable fall in demand (with the support of the national Weapons-free Village campaign). Thus, demand is not static and is strongly susceptible to exogenous factors. Interventions that focus primarily on micro-level factors at the expense of the broader, structural, and environmental issues may not generate the desired impacts.

Another compelling finding across all case studies is that demand was itself influenced by the availability (or supply) of weapons. Thus, the sudden and unexpected availability of small arms that may become available in the aftermath of a dramatic regime collapse, conflict, or economic shock can contribute to the motivations and means to acquire them at the time. This vicious circle
has been explored by a number of economists and public health specialists in the US context, and requires still further testing.\textsuperscript{38} Even so, the policy implication seems to be that the regulation and removal of weapons from society—through improved registration, more stringent licensing arrangements, well-promoted collection and destruction activities, and the like—can positively influence demand reduction.

The case studies also highlight the fact that \textit{motivations and means for acquiring small arms often differ between individuals and groups}. The cases of Brazil and South Africa highlight the distinct preferences that have conditioned acquisition between middle- and upper-class residents, on the one hand, and gang members and syndicates, on the other. By way of contrast, in PNG and the Solomon Islands, groups often developed a set of collective preferences that conditioned the types of weapons acquired, how they were stored and managed, who used them, and under what circumstances. Clearly, interventions that are designed for each group must be radically adapted to reflect these dynamics. Interventions targeting individuals in PNG and the Solomon Islands that do not consider the communal pressures and customary norms associated with demand may fail miserably to collect arms. While they often seem easier to conceive and administer, there are obvious risks with ‘one-size-fits-all’ approaches to arms reduction, particularly those that emphasize parity and homogeneity among ‘beneficiaries’.

In each of the case studies, \textit{interventions focused less on technical aspects of arms collection and destruction per se, and more on influencing the preferences, prices, and resources available to acquire weapons} in the first place. This approach runs counter to the conventional wisdom in arms control practice, which often measures success as a function of material outcomes, notably weapons returned (e.g. the cost-per-weapon ratio). But interventions undertaken in all cases recognized the environmental factors that conditioned use and not just the instruments themselves. For example, initiatives included temporal restrictions on carrying and possession of firearms, specific time-bound controls on external vectors—such as alcohol and narcotics—that influence resort to arms, engineering or strengthening normative and social stigmas associated with weapons possession, focused training and advocacy directed at security sector institutions, and altering legal and social controls associated with both legal and illegal
possession. Thus, the success of demand reduction may not be measured as a function of guns collected, but rather the extent to which guns are put beyond use, out of reach, and under ground.

Demand can be shaped negatively and positively in environments where informational asymmetries are commonplace. Each of the case studies demonstrates, however, that *effective communication and sensitization make up a cornerstone of demand reduction*. Thus, the value of local-level civil society networks that capitalize on existing informational networks cannot be overstated—particularly in contexts where state presence is weak or faltering (as in the Solomon Islands, PNG, and elsewhere). Ultimately, states can reap considerable morale and political dividends from active engagement in demand reduction, in addition to contributing to meaningful improvements in human welfare.
Section IV
Next steps: The *Programme of Action* and beyond

As states undertake their preparations for the 2006 Review Conference, they will face a number of challenges. Not only will they be asked to assess how successfully they have managed so far to implement the 2001 *Programme*, but they will also need to set the directions for the next stage of global commitment on small arms control. In this paper, we have shown how adopting a demand optic can draw attention to critical dimensions that must be taken into account if small arms control efforts are to be successful. In this final section, we return to some of the themes outlined in Section I and illustrated by the case studies in Section III. These are, in our opinion, key not only to a better understanding of the full spectrum of small arms control initiatives actually taking place in many affected settings around the world, but also to addressing small arms in a more inclusive way in evolving policies and approaches by state actors and others in the years ahead.

Before going further, however, we wish to underline two important points that emerge from this study and other examinations to date on small arms demand. A common reaction by states to discussions about demand is that it is impossible to take on board any new element while the *Programme* remains only partially implemented. But by introducing a demand optic, we are not arguing for adding a completely new element to the small arms agenda. On the contrary, what has been shown in this paper is that demand factors will crucially determine the outcome of supply-side initiatives, even in a small arms control approach that focuses only on the ‘illicit trade in small arms and light weapons’. A demand optic is essential to understanding what is being done and what needs to be done.

Secondly, the term ‘demand’ itself should not be allowed to get in the way of this understanding. We use the term because the economic approach of supply and demand is useful in understanding important variables underpinning...
the spread and distribution of small arms in our world today. Our emphasis here on motivations and means should demonstrate that our use of the term is only meant as a collective representation of a broad range of factors at work inside societies that call out for attention if the problems associated with small arms are to be effectively and sustainably addressed. ‘Demand’ simply seems to be the best term available for describing the phenomena that we have noted. The evidence from our study strongly supports the fundamental orientation of the Programme, i.e. that it is at the state level that the largest responsibility lies in seeking to control the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, even if demand-reduction interventions are most promising at the local level and when addressing local realities.

Indeed, there are grounds for cautious optimism in state willingness to take demand issues on board. Earlier in this paper, we noted the growing understanding among states that successful action to reduce the impact of violence caused by small arms requires both supply- and demand-related initiatives, noted at the July 2005 BMS. An increasing number of states and agencies are already approaching small arms control in a comprehensive fashion, linking supply with demand (Jackman, 2005, p. 5). States have begun to identify a range of promising entry points: from adequately addressing civilian perceptions of insecurity and establishing more robust linkages between development and security, to building conflict-resolution capacities and institutions in violence-prone areas, strengthening DDR and SSR interventions, and reiterating the value of community and civil society participation in arms control activities.

This recognition by states of the demand components of small arms control can be seen in a certain sense as evidence of the multilateral system coming to terms with changing realities on the ground. The case studies in the previous section, together with the considerable evidence now emerging on the ground, show that many actors are now simply getting on with the job—practice appears to be leading both theory and policy. But the picture emerging from the 2005 BMS provides encouraging evidence that many states now clearly feel that the small arms agenda must be enhanced by a demand perspective. In this view, the comprehensive and realistic action agenda that needs to emerge from the 2006 Review Conference must not only endorse strengthened supply-side measures (e.g. controls on brokers, new arms transfer guidelines, and more
effective national legislation on civilian ownership), but also pragmatic and practical steps to reduce demand.

The findings of this study support these developments. Our call for a demand optic suggests a number of key orientations for judging real progress to date on the implementation of the *Programme* and promoting an enhanced action agenda. We present these as suggested elements that could usefully be incorporated in an outcome document from the Review Conference.

*Build in the linkage between security and development.* The dynamic and causal relationships between insecurity and underdevelopment are increasingly well understood (Small Arms Survey, 2003). As noted in the 2005 Human Development Report, ‘Insecurity linked to armed conflict remains one of the greatest obstacles to human development. It is both a cause and a consequence of mass poverty’ (UNDP, 2005, p. 151). The 2005 World Summit outcome document made important general references to these linkages, including:

> We acknowledge that peace and security, development and human rights are the pillars of the United Nations system and the foundations for collective security and well-being. We recognize that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing (UN, 2005, sec. I, para. 9).

The First Committee of the General Assembly went further in the autumn of 2005 in recommending by a vote of 160–1 the adoption of a resolution addressing the negative humanitarian and development impact of the illicit manufacture, transfer, and circulation of small arms and light weapons and their excessive accumulation. This resolution notes that ‘the 2006 review conference on the Programme of Action represents an opportunity to address interconnected peace and security and development challenges, which are relevant to the agenda of the said conference’ (UNGA, 2005).

Our case studies illustrate vividly the importance of these linkages: how lack of development, inequality, and insecurity factors manifest themselves in terms of small arms demand and how their alleviation can contribute to reduced demand. However, the *Programme* pays scant attention to these security/development linkages. The 2006 review of progress since 2001 needs to assess the degree to which this fundamental dimension is currently being incorporated
in the policies and programmes of states, international agencies, and others. The action agenda for the coming period needs to bring these critical linkages front and centre.

Related to this, the findings of this study and others suggest that efforts should be made to incorporate arms demand reduction into overall frameworks for sustainable development. Doing so can help ensure that poverty reduction and infrastructure development are undertaken also as preventive measures to reduce motivations for arms acquisition. These findings also indicate that arms control programmes are more successful when they include a combination of measures related to development, such as initiatives that target at-risk youth, promote infrastructure improvement and employment projects, facilitate access to education, and promote security sector and judicial reform. Together, such programmes can respond to the system of issues that foster insecurity and gun violence in a local setting. The integration of demand should, for example, usefully be considered in a country’s poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs).

As the chair of the 2005 BMS noted in his concluding statement to that meeting, ‘Aligning action against small arms trafficking, proliferation and misuse with broader development goals makes sense and already works in many places. . . . Simply put, the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals also requires effective action on small arms’ (Patokallio, 2005, p. 2). Any outcome of the 2006 Review Conference that fails to take note of this crucial dimension and to suggest concrete actions to deal with it would justifiably be considered as having failed in a fundamental way.

_Envision demand reduction as part of governance and SSR programmes._ All of our cases have demonstrated the crucial nature of the relationship between the perceptions of the effectiveness and fairness of police and judicial systems and small arms demand. While so-called SSR is increasingly focused on as part of post-conflict programming, the relationship of governance and SSR issues to small arms demand, as opposed to their relationship to tackling the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, goes unmentioned in the _Programme._ However, the findings of this study and others indicate that both supply- and demand-related interventions will only be successful where there is a perception of security and reasonable levels of credibility and legitimacy accorded
States meeting in New York in July 2006 will make every effort to see that the 2006 Review Conference produces a final document that not only notes what the review has revealed about the experience of the first five years of the life of the Programme of Action, but also sets out concrete steps for further action by states, regions, and the international community as a whole. Preparation of the basic elements of such a final document will begin to take shape in earnest in early 2006.

The following language is illustrative of that which might be contained in a final document that truly reflects developments since 2001 if a ‘demand optic’ is applied and that incorporates such an optic in setting the agenda for the coming five-year period.

For the ‘Declaration of Principles’ part of the final document:

1. *Recalling* the concern expressed in the Programme of Action about the ‘implications that poverty and underdevelopment may have for the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects’ (I.3),

2. *Recalling further* the concern expressed in the Programme of Action about the ‘close link between terrorism, organized crime, trafficking in drugs and precious minerals and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, and stressing the urgency of international efforts and cooperation aimed at combating this trade simultaneously from both a supply and demand perspective’ (I.7),

3. *Noting* that in September 2005 world leaders emphasized in the outcome document of the World Summit ‘that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing’ (A/60/L.1, 9),

4. *Recognizing* with new understanding how the lack of development, inequality, and insecurity can result in an increase in the motivations for small arms and light weapons acquisition and possession and how their alleviation can lead to reducing this demand,

5. *Noting* the further evidence since 2001 of the importance of security sector reform and good governance for successful small arms and light weapons management and, further, their relationship to civilian perceptions of security and thus the demand for small arms and light weapons,

6. *Reaffirming* the importance of post-conflict demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration processes outlined in the Programme of Action (I.22(c), II.21, II.30, II.34, II.35, III.16) and stressing the particular need for more attention to effective reintegration processes as a key step in reducing resort to the use of small arms in post-conflict settings,

7. *Concerned* that post-conflict situations often also leave small arms and light weapons in the hands of a wide range of groups and individuals in addition to combatants and noting the need for conflict settlement processes also to set in place mechanisms for their recuperation and destruction as part of the prevention of renewed conflict and ensuring the sustainability of peace processes,
8. **Recalling** the importance expressed in the Programme of Action of support for ‘action-oriented research aimed at facilitating greater awareness and better understanding of the nature and scope of the problems associated with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects’ (III.18) and noting how such research has revealed critical evidence about the causal factors in the illicit manufacture, transfer, and circulation of small arms and light weapons and their excessive accumulation,

9. **Acknowledging** the general recognition expressed in the Programme of Action of the contribution to the promotion of a ‘culture of peace’ of national and global efforts to prevent, control, and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects (I.4) and the commitment to promoting and assisting ‘the pursuit of negotiated solutions to conflicts, including addressing their root causes’ (III.4),

10. **Recalling** the recognition in the Programme of Action of the ways in which the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons affects particular groups in society (e.g. I.6) and noting the growing evidence that supports this view, including ways in which gender factors can be seen to play a role and youth can be seen to be particularly vulnerable,

11. **Recalling further** that the Programme of Action takes note of the important contribution of civil society actors in ‘assisting Governments to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects’ (I.16) and recognizing the considerable evidence of the role played by civil society actors, often working in partnership with Government, at the local level in undertaking positive programmes to reduce the demand for small arms and light weapons.

*For the ‘Programme of Implementation’ part of the final document:*

We, the States participating in this Review Conference, undertake in the period prior to the next Review Conference in 2011:

1. To ensure in action steps undertaken here on marking and tracing, brokering, transfer guidelines (etc.) that consideration be included of the expected impact of such measures on the demand for small arms and light weapons and the demand-related actions that will also be necessary for these steps to be successful,

2. To seek to incorporate steps for small arms demand reduction into overall frameworks for sustainable development, thus ensuring that poverty reduction and infrastructure development are undertaken also as prevention measures to reduce motivations for arms acquisition,

3. To give enhanced attention—including through financial and other assistance efforts—to strengthening security sector reform initiatives, including especially policing programmes, in recognition of the critical function that perceptions of security and justice play in individual choices about acquiring arms,

4. To seek to include the range of relevant community stakeholders—youth, women, religious bodies, marginalized or conflicting groups, NGOs, professional associations, traditional leaders, and former combatants—in the shaping of new legislation and other initiatives related to small arms and light weapons management and demand reduction,
in recognition of the evidence that such inclusiveness and sense of ownership is key to the design and sustainability of effective programmes,

5. To consider in the next Biennial Meeting of States in 2007 a review of how civil society organizations, particularly those working at the local level, have contributed to furthering the goals of the Programme of Action and the commitments made here, including their contribution to the reduction in demand for small arms and light weapons and the overall reduction in armed violence,

6. To systematically include national measures to regulate small arms and light weapons in longer-term post-conflict peace-building strategies and programmes,

7. To fund and support comprehensive peace education programmes as integral parts of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; development; and arms control initiatives,

8. To support the development of programmes directed towards longer-term reconciliation processes, including trauma healing programmes and, as appropriate, including indigenous methods of conflict management,

9. To ensure that gender and youth considerations are at the forefront of security and peace-building programmes,

10. To sponsor through donor support further action-oriented research into how the demand for arms is constructed; the dynamic interplay of factors relating to supply, misuse, and demand; and appropriate entry points for programmes aimed at influencing the motivations and means for small arms acquisition and possession.

...to the security sector. In many cases, the relative impact of the law depends not exclusively on how effectively it is enforced, but also on how fairly it is felt to be enforced and how adequate civilian protection is felt to be.

A comprehensive small arms action programme emerging from the 2006 Review Conference needs to recognize more fully the governance and SSR dimensions of small arms control from both a supply and a demand perspective. Research suggests a number of important dimensions that should be seen as priority areas for the coming period. States should recommit themselves to further strengthen their SSR efforts and donors to support such programmes. States need to be encouraged to strengthen SSR on the ground as an essential part of successful small arms control, ensuring that small arms reduction requirements are incorporated into any analysis of SSR needs. Donors should be encouraged to give support to such initiatives.

Critical to successful governance and SSR strategies in relation to small arms demand reduction will be the degree to which efforts have been made to draw
on community perceptions of need in the design and planning stages and to engage community stakeholders in the shaping of new legislation, where appropriate. States and other actors should be encouraged to initiate and support, where applicable, community policing and restorative justice programmes. A growing indicator of felt insecurity and a small arms demand driver is the increasing privatization of security (e.g. security firms). States could commit themselves to developing appropriate control or reform measures and be encouraged to end the practice of creating informal, armed civilian security groups, which undermines community perceptions of security and increases civilian demand for weapons.

Finally, a major gap in the existing Programme needs to be filled: the absence of any recognition of the protection of human rights as critical to the goal of eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. If the basic rights of people—self-determination, land resources, freedom—are denied, one likely recourse for them is to turn to the threat or use of weapons. A demand optic on small arms control makes this omission in the Programme especially glaring.

Incorporate the local dimension. The case studies have shown the importance of genuinely participatory, bottom-up approaches to arms reduction. By actively soliciting local engagement, these approaches have a greater chance of influencing the reduction in demand for weapons. No attention is given to this important dimension in the current Programme. And yet, as we have shown here, it is often at the local or community level that the most imaginative and effective approaches to reducing the demand for weapons are developed. Related to this is the recognition of the need to ensure that all stakeholders are included in community dialogue on security, including, for example, youth, women, religious bodies, marginalized or conflicting groups, traditional leaders, business, and former combatants. A sense of local ownership is key to successful demand-reduction programmes. The incorporation of a demand optic draws attention to this key local dimension. The importance of how local approaches have contributed to furthering the goals of the Programme needs to be part of the review process and this local dimension needs to be built consciously into the action agenda strategies that emerge from the Review Conference.
Build partnerships with civil society. Approaching small arms control with a demand optic also reveals that successful small arms interventions cannot be pursued by states in isolation. The case studies show how important civil society actors can be as catalysts to demand-reduction activities and how essential state–civil society partnerships are to successful small arms control interventions. At the multilateral level, there is a need to give expression to the understanding that effective small arms action depends on the engagement of a range of actions at a range of levels by a range of actors, including civil society organizations. In reviewing progress since the inception of the Programme, the contributions made by actors beyond the state, including civil society organizations, need to be accounted for. In setting targets and recommendations for the period beyond the 2006 Review Conference, states need to adopt language that moves beyond the rhetoric about the importance of civil society to specific commitments to encouraging collaborative and inclusive approaches.

These four dimensions with special implications for the Review Conference process emerge in significant ways from the case studies outlined earlier. This research and other demand-related observations reveal a number of additional directions as well, which are discussed below.

Understand demand reduction as part of conflict-resolution and peace-promotion interventions. While the strengthening of the formal justice and security sectors is crucial to individual and group demand for small arms, demand can also be seen to be linked to the access to, and capacity to make effective use of, other forms of non-violent conflict solving within societies. Actors should be encouraged to fund and support comprehensive peace education programmes as integral parts of DDR, development, and arms control initiatives; support the development of programmes directed toward longer-term reconciliation processes, including trauma-healing programmes; and explore the appropriate inclusion of indigenous methods of conflict management.

Give attention to specifically affected groups. Different sectors of society are affected differently by small arms violence. Hence, the impact on small arms demand varies. This seems particularly important in the ways in which gender factors play a role. In addition, youth represent a particularly vulnerable group. Actors could be encouraged to promote approaches that ensure that gender consider-
ations are at the forefront of DDR and peace-building programmes, including fostering alternative models of masculinity and recognizing the specific concerns of women and girls. Arms reduction interventions need to have integrated and multidimensional activities for children and youth at risk, well-funded and long-term support for youth-focused work that is complementary to wider development goals, and specific programmes that strengthen family units.

Support and undertake focused and action-oriented research to evaluate the effectiveness of demand reduction. The Small Arms Survey case studies demonstrate that understanding demand factors and the development of appropriate policy responses require research into the cultural, economic, and political dynamics of the actors within a particular setting. Although important first steps in understanding these dynamics have been made, knowledge of the complex and interrelated elements of supply and demand remains limited. Hence, there is an urgent need for further research in the years ahead, including action-oriented research that generates compelling, robust, and programmatically relevant insights into how the demand for arms is manifested; the dynamic interplay of factors relating to supply, misuse, and demand; and entry points for demand-reduction activities. In support of steps towards realizing an enhanced action agenda emerging from the Review Conference, donors, host governments, and non-governmental agencies should be encouraged to sponsor such research. Donors should also be called upon to support studies that help develop knowledge about insufficiently examined or poorly understood dimensions of small arms violence, such as the gender dimensions of small arms use and violence, how small arms violence undermines post-conflict interventions, and the actual impact on small arms demand reduction of programmes that build capacity in conflict-management and peace-building skills.

The immediate short-term challenge will be to turn any of the above desirable goals into reality in the form of explicit language in an outcome document of the 2006 Review Conference. At a minimum, it is hoped that such a document would explicitly take note of the requirement to address the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects from both a supply and a demand perspective; incorporate demand-side references as part of any supply-side initiatives given new direction and emphasis, e.g. brokering and arms
transfer guidelines; and encourage the integration of a demand discourse in
the conceptualization of practical steps aimed at armed-violence reduction, such
as in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of SSR, DDR, and weapons-
reduction programmes, and other types of micro-disarmament initiatives.43

It must be recalled, however, that the Review Conference will be a consensus-
driven political process, the results of which will be shaped by many factors,
however compelling the logic of demand may be. It is important to observe,
therefore, that the future of small arms demand-reduction work does not
hinge on this single multilateral process. Progress to date on demand has not
depended either on the Programme process or on what states have actually done
to implement it. Indeed, as we have demonstrated, international agencies,
donors, municipal authorities, and community-development groups have
already been integrating small arms demand awareness and action into their
own work. This is not something new, as this paper has shown; it is happen-
ing already.

Although our suggested directions have been written very much with the
Review Conference in mind, they should be understood also to be applicable
to the spectrum of small-arms-related actors and processes that will continue.
It is thus vital that all those actors, especially disarmament negotiators, who
are not yet fully aware of it should come to understand that the development
and implementation of effective and sustainable programmes aimed at reduc-
ing the human impact of small arms violence ultimately depend on demand
reduction. ☞
Endnotes

1. The chapter on small arms demand in the Small Arms Survey 2006 builds on the results of these case studies, examines the demand issue from a more theoretical perspective, and points to avenues for further research and policy (Small Arms Survey, 2006).

2. See, for example, Laurance and Stohl (2002), who discuss the evolution and formation of (international) public policy priorities in relation to the small arms issue.

3. To be fair, while the Programme focuses exclusively on the ‘illicit trade’ in small arms, it nevertheless appears to intimate a relationship between supply and demand in some places. For example, in paragraph 7 of the Preamble, the ‘close link between terrorism, organized crime, trafficking in drugs and precious minerals and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons’ is noted, and states stress ‘the urgency of international efforts and co-operation aimed at combating this trade simultaneously from both a supply and demand perspective.’ Indirect references to a demand perspective can also be found elsewhere in the Programme. For example, there is an acknowledged concern for the ‘implications that poverty and under-development may have for the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons’ and other language that implies the need to understand and address demand factors, including the focus on DDR of ex-combatants, the recognition of the need to make ‘greater efforts to address problems related to human and sustainable development’, and the need to address areas now commonly referred to as ‘security sector reform’. See the analysis of the Programme for its demand content in Regehr (2004). For an outline of the demand language of the Programme, see Jackman (2004).

4. During this period, lip service was paid to the so-called ‘root causes’ of armed violence and the presumed causal relationships between arms availability and the onset of conflict, but the discussion was abstract and woolly.

5. See, for example, Small Arms Survey (2003, pp. 255–75; 2005, pp. 267–301) and Faltas, McDonald, and Waszink (2001) for a review of weapons-collection activities.

6. In 1999, QUNO launched a series of workshops to ascertain how ‘demand’ was understood and conceived at the community level and outlined the types of communally articulated responses most suited to mitigate the motivations for individuals to acquire weapons. See the series of reports prepared by QUNO on the topic of demand (<http://www.quno.org>), including Buchanan and Atwood (2002) and Atwood and Jackman (2005).

7. See, for example, the work of Mark Duffield (2001) and Frances Stewart and Valpy Fitzgerald (2001). Many multilateral agencies—including the EU, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee, NATO, and others—have taken these issues explicitly on board. The securitization of development is also increasingly manifest in the priorities and activities of certain core donors. The UK, for example, has recently created a global pool that coordinates and integrates certain activities—including efforts to promote SSR and arms control—through the Department for International Development, the Home Office, and the Department for Defence. Canada has also adopted a ‘3D’ strategy, integrating diplomatic, development, and defence activities.
A small arms demand optic can be seen to be applicable across relevant actors—from armed forces and state institutions (so-called state demand), to armed groups, communities, and civilians. Although the material presented here reflects largely the last two of these categories, factors affecting state demand are also very important variables to be considered. Demand at this level—determined by such factors as defence postures, procurement cycles, budgetary constraints, and historical precedents—is a key feature of the flows of weapons within and between states. Jurgen Brauer has noted: ‘In principle, the theory of demand applies to all types of buyers but in the case of buyers representing groups, such as a state’s demand for small arms and light weapons, the purchasing decision is not a private, individual choice but a public, collective choice’ (Small Arms Survey, 2006). State demand factors and their actual intersection with group- and individual-level demand represent an area where further research is needed.

Demand for violence and demand for firearms overlap, but they are not identical concepts: the former includes demand for violence that is not perpetrated with firearms, while the latter includes demand for firearms that are not used for violent purposes (but for hunting or sports shooting, for example). The focus of this paper is on the areas where the two do overlap, however.

As discussed below, a seemingly benign buy-back scheme may fail spectacularly for the simple reason that while the purchase price set is comparatively high, it inadequately considers the group and individual preferences for weapons to begin with. Perversely, the influx of new resources (both monetary and non-monetary) for small arms in a context where preferences are high directly increases the resources available to purchase new weapons. While the observation that buy-backs can contribute to illicit markets in weapons is not novel, the method of analyzing the reasons for this is.

This table is based in large part on Atwood, Muggah, and Widmer (2005, pp. 100–1).

See, for example, Brauer and Muggah (2006) and Muggah and Brauer (2004) for a review of the literature on demand from criminological, public health, sociological, psychological, and economic perspectives.

The material on which the following synopsis draws can be found in Alpers and Twyford (2003), Kirsten et al. (2006), Lessing (2005a; 2005b), Muggah (2003; 2004), Nelson and Muggah (2004), and Aguirre et al. (2005), among others. These case studies and the demand issue as a whole will be further explored in Small Arms Survey (2006).

This case study is based on Lessing (2005a; 2005b), unless otherwise noted.

A number of reasons may be able to explain the ‘no’ vote in the Brazilian referendum. As in other countries where such popular voting processes have taken place, Brazil’s first referendum served as a vehicle for Brazilian citizens to voice discontent with the Lula administration, itself recently affected by widely publicized public scandals. Second, the ‘yes’ campaigners faced a formidable opposition from the industry-backed ‘no’ lobby. The ‘no’ vote also signals the lingering concerns Brazilians have had with perceived weaknesses in the public security environment. The Small Arms Survey is preparing a study together with Viva Rio on the lessons emerging from the process, which is to be published in 2006.

This case study is based on Aguirre et al. (2005), unless otherwise noted.

There is in fact an ongoing debate between the government authorities and human rights organizations over the absolute number of displaced people in the country, with arguments hinging on when displacement is said to have begun and ended (Muggah, 2000).
The presence in Bogotá of multinational firms and a significant population of foreigners probably also affects the increase in the percentage of carry permits issued there.

The number of guns seized from property damage and money laundering amounts to only 2 per cent of weapons recovered.

This measure was called *Hora Zanahoria* (‘Carrot Hour’). In Colombia, ‘carrot’ colloquially refers to a person who goes to bed early and drinks little alcohol.

This measure was called *Hora Optimista*.

This case study is based on Kirsten et al. (2006), unless otherwise noted.

The UDF was a broad coalition of churches, civic associations, trade unions, student organizations, and sports associations (Keegan, 2005, p. 13).

No data is yet available to determine trends in demand by weapon type over time in South Africa.

For detailed information on lost and stolen weapons from the police, the military, and the homeland administrations, see Gould et al. (2004).

This downward trend based on data from the Central Firearms Register (CFR), which is cited by Keegan (2005, p. 84), is confirmed by National Injury Mortality Surveillance System (NIMSS) data including the year 2004 (SA HealthInfo, 2005). NIMSS data shows a slight but significant decrease in the number of homicides in general as well as a decrease in the use of firearms in non-natural deaths across the three major cities, Cape Town, Durban, and Johannesburg.

At the same time, the pro-gun lobby in South Africa is dominated by white South Africans (Gould et al., 2004, p. 207).

This case study is based on Muggah (2004) and Alpers and Twyford (2003), unless otherwise noted.

Recent studies undertaken by the Small Arms Survey have also found that domestic and sexual violence is the leading type of victimization in the country, in both urban and rural areas (Small Arms Survey, 2006; Haley and Muggah, 2006).

Low-level trafficking from the island of Bougainville, also the site of armed conflict, is a secondary source of weapons (Capie, 2003, p. 92; Alpers, 2005, pp. 69–70).

Those who ultimately acquire manufactured weapons achieve significant prestige and notoriety.

Interviews carried out by the Small Arms Survey (2006) also reveal that gun culture is widespread in the Southern Highlands of PNG. Many respondents felt it legitimate to hold a firearm. More than 60 per cent of interviewees would buy firearms if they were able to, and more than 30 per cent would either buy or borrow a weapon.

‘The term “wantok” (one talk) in Melanesian Pidgin literally means someone who speaks the same language. In popular usage it refers to the relations of obligation binding relatives, members of the same clan or tribe, as well as looser forms of association’ (Dinnen, 1997, p. 13).

Though this is a gross simplification, the Malaitans can be described as generally patrilineal and the Gualese as matrilineal. A key contention among residents in Guadalcanal was that by marrying into their families, Malaitans were gaining possession over ostensibly Gualese property, and subsequently bringing across their households and cementing customary rights of residency.
36 See, for example, LeBrun and Muggah (2005) for a review of ‘community perceptions’ of insecurity in rural island communities in the South Pacific.

37 The PNC was renamed National Peace Council (NPC) in 2002.


39 Paragraph 3 of the Programme notes the following: ‘Concerned also by the implications that poverty and underdevelopment may have for the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects’ (UN, 2001).

40 Small arms programmes have recently been added to the list of conflict, peacebuilding, and security expenditures that can be covered by the programme of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. The DAC directives on small arms include supply- as well as demand-side measures (OECD, 2005).

41 Such processes are focused on the goal of affecting the self-images and identities of those who have been exposed to violent conflict, abuse, injustice, and ethnic discrimination—whether as victims, perpetrators, or both.

42 In their statement to the 2005 BMS on the impact of small arms, the UN inter-agency Coordinating Action on Small Arms Mechanism (CASA) said the following about the need for ‘action-oriented research’: ‘Careful documentation and evaluation of violence prevention strategies through action-oriented research could provide the evidentiary basis upon which to determine what constitute best practices and to guide policy making of donor states and affected countries. There is a great need to develop a knowledge base in this area and establish a repertoire of “lessons learned”. Action-oriented research places the emphasis on intervening while systematically documenting the effects of an intervention. As such, it is an ideal mechanism by which States, international organisations, and civil society can draw appropriate conclusions and policy guidance for the future’ (CASA, 2005, p. 6).

43 For example, it is important that increased emphasis and support be given to the ‘reintegration’ dimension of DDR, recognized as the least developed so far and yet one that is most critically related to aspects of demand in post-conflict settings.
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