A Security Strategy for Germany

by Dr. Andreas Schockenhoff

Preliminary Remarks

In these days, security is an important precondition for freedom. In a world of changing security challenges and threats, political leaders must present new answers in order to guarantee security for their citizens. Germany’s contribution to international peace missions in Afghanistan or in the Balkan region is an evident result of the new role Germany is playing in the field of security policy today. Increasing of security threats - such as terrorism, proliferation, dependence on energy and raw material, or the consequences of climate change - require an overarching concept integrating all fields of security policy. The prevailing discussion about current military missions accentuates the need for an intensified dialogue at all levels of society in order to reach a consensus on national security policy.

As a contribution to this and to initiate the necessary strategic debate, the CDU/CSU parliamentary group has presented their draft for a “Security Strategy for Germany” at a Congress in Berlin on May 7th 2008. On this occasion, the draft was put up for discussion with international security experts such as Prof. Dr. Francois Heisbourg (IISS), Baroness Pauline Neville Jones (Shadow Security Minister UK), Leo Michel (National Defense University Washington D.C.), and Prof. Dr. Volker Perthes (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP).

To fight all possible security threats, an integrated approach is essential as no nation can handle these challenges on its own. This is the reason why a better international interconnectedness of security experts, scientists and politicians is required. But already at a national level, a better co-ordination of security actors is indispensable. Therefore, the CDU/CSU parliamentary group calls for a “National Security Council”, chaired by the chancellor, in order to create an effective key institution for analysis- and decision making.

A Security Strategy for Germany

Germany, embedded in the European Union and NATO in an area of freedom, security and justice, is one of the safest countries in the world. Yet there are many threats and risks to our security such as terrorism, organised crime, dependence on energy and raw materials, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and arms build-up, regional conflicts, failing states, migration, pandemics and diseases; the impact of climate change may exacerbate these security risks even further.
Globalisation and the increasing interconnectedness of countries are fuelling the pace of development of these risks. Developments which appear at first to be remote from our territory can spread more quickly and compromise our security. Germany is part of the global infrastructure of transport, energy, information and financial markets and, as an importing and exporting nation, is particularly reliant on these critical infrastructures being kept open and functioning, as well as on access to capital, sales and procurement markets, communication networks, transport infrastructure and pipelines. Modern mass communications, above all the Internet, increasing worldwide mobility and growing global awareness are linking our citizens, companies and civil society structures together in ever denser international networks.

Our environment is being changed by the emergence of new non-state actors, by the rise of new powers such as India and China, and by the growing importance of non-governmental organisations. These changes are creating new necessities and possibilities in terms of working together to resolve global and regional security problems, but shifts of power at international level can give rise to new conflicts.

All this has a direct or indirect influence on Germany’s security situation. Germany can respond effectively to these security risks in a globalised world only if it works in an alliance with other countries. Addressing these challenges requires a security strategy which takes a broad-based approach and which, along with the classical fields of foreign, European, defence, human rights and development policy, also includes domestic, economic, energy, environmental, financial, research and education policy networked together to provide a broad set of instruments which are employed in collaboration with other countries, non-state actors and organisations such as the United Nations, NATO and the European Union. The aim is to work pre-emptively to minimise security risks and to intervene rapidly and effectively where crises which have a bearing on our security threaten to escalate into conflicts.

I. German security interests in the framework of the European Security Strategy

The task of the German state, in accordance with the values enshrined in the Basic Law, is to uphold justice and freedom, democracy, security and welfare for the citizens of our country, to protect them from threats and safeguard the sovereignty and inviolability of German state territory. Added to this are the tasks and obligations arising from Germany’s membership of alliances such as NATO and the EU.

In the face of the above risks to our security, it is therefore in our interest

- whenever possible, to prevent regional crises and conflicts which could compromise our security and interests or to help to resolve them at their point of origin,
- to counter global challenges such as the threat posed by international terrorism, the spread of WMDs and the consequences of climate change,
- to contribute to the upholding of human rights and the spreading of freedom, democracy and the rule of law,
- to promote free and unimpeded world trade including a secure supply of energy and raw materials as the basis for our prosperity and to narrow the gap between poor and rich regions of the world on the basis of the model of the social market economy,
- to strengthen the cohesion of the European Union, NATO and the transatlantic partnership and their ability to take effective political, economic and military action,
- to deepen relations with those states which share our goals and values into strategic partnerships, and
to help strengthen a viable multilateral international order based on international law.

II. Central challenges and strategic objectives

The following challenges are of central importance to security in Germany.

1. Fighting terrorism

Our country’s security today faces completely different but no less dangerous threats than it did during the Cold War. Today international terrorism is the biggest threat to our security.

This danger emanates from non-state actors who deliberately conduct asymmetric conflicts. Unlike the terrorist actions of the German terrorist group RAF (Red Army Faction) in the 1970s and 1980s, these terrorists do not have their sights set on those who hold power in the state and society; they select soft targets. Using quasi military means they seek to create the maximum numbers of victims in order to shake the very foundations of the state and society.

This changed threat situation demands a completely new understanding of security policy. Since this form of terrorism does not stop at state borders and is deliberately organised and networked internationally, the traditional distinction between internal and external security or between a state of war and a time of peace no longer applies.

European countries are both targets of attack and logistical bases for terrorism. Germany’s basic order founded on freedom and democracy is threatened from both outside and inside. So far attacks on German soil have been successfully thwarted, but the possibility of future attacks cannot be excluded.

Pulling our punches in foreign policy in an effort to reduce the danger of terrorist attack is not a real option for Germany; the impression of weakness it would create would make terrorist networks even more dangerous.

Fighting terrorism calls for the active deployment of political, diplomatic, civil, development policy and police instruments. When terrorist networks operate out of weak states or use them as a retreat, as in the case of Afghanistan prior to 9/11, it may also be necessary, however, to use armed forces in the fight against terrorism. The military has a role in such operations when there is a need to neutralise violent actors in order to establish security for civilian forces, rebuild the country in question and develop good governance. Preventing access to safe havens to which terrorists can withdraw is a central goal of security policy. This can only be achieved in close cooperation with the international community and is a task of both domestic and foreign policy.

Terrorists use the global infrastructure as a target for attack but also as a means of enabling them to operate internationally. A further objective of German security policy is therefore to prevent terrorist operations and at the same time to protect the global infrastructure. Measures to block the financing, communications and movement of terrorist groups can be used to uncover and prevent attacks. Parallel to this, further precautions need to be taken in this country to reduce the vulnerability of critical infrastructure. This also includes giving the Federal Criminal Police Office powers to combat the danger of international terrorism nationwide, ensuring secure communication between all the security authorities and deploying the Bundeswehr to work alongside the Land (federal state) and federal police
internally in situations of particular danger. The aim is to prevent terrorist attacks and/or to minimise the impact of attacks, hence making Germany less vulnerable to terrorists.

If democracy is to survive in the fight against terrorism, it is important to understand that freedom and security are mutually dependent and are not in opposition to each other. Our readiness to defend our values and their observance including in the fight against terrorism is our greatest strength in this respect. Thus legal provisions conceived to defend the rights of citizens vis-à-vis the state need to be adapted to ensure that they continue in future to contribute to enabling people to live in freedom and security.

2. Preventing proliferation and driving forward disarmament

It has so far proved impossible to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Indeed there is a danger of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and in South and East Asia. The uncontrolled spread of ballistic missile technology, including through the criminal smuggling of technology and know-how, threatens not only the stability of the regions in question but the security of Germany and its alliance partners. The danger of attack will increase if biological, chemical or nuclear materials fall into the hands of terrorist organisations and non-state actors who are prepared to use violence. Preventing the proliferation of WMDs and hence also their possible acquisition by terrorists is therefore a central objective of our security policy. Our long-term goal continues to be the complete abolition of all weapons of mass destruction.

Disarmament and arms control must in future be understood more emphatically as a strategic instrument of German and European security policy. Germany with its rigid and restrictive arms export and control policy cannot contain the danger on its own. It is essential therefore to work multilaterally, too, to strengthen existing arms control and global non-proliferation regimes and close existing gaps. Likewise at European level, the member states need to adopt a unified position with regard to issues surrounding export controls for dual-use products and the improvement of the internal control regime.

To stop the spread of nuclear material, technology and know-how, countries which want to use nuclear energy must be offered as safe an alternative as possible. A strengthened International Atomic Energy Agency should therefore oversee the controlled supply of nuclear energy to such countries. The enrichment of nuclear material should in future as far as possible be carried out in a multilateral process under the oversight of the IAEA.

Another aim of our security policy, however, is to help build up systems of collective security in other regions similar to those which have contributed to our security in Europe. We will be able to convince other countries to renounce nuclear weapons only if the regional environment is secure.

Alongside conventions, export controls and sanctions in non-proliferation policy, we also rely on the nuclear deterrence capabilities of NATO and our alliance partners to protect us from attacks with WMDs. Nuclear participation which has existed for a long time within NATO guarantees Germany influence in this respect. Systems such as missile defence and other components of protection render the acquisition of nuclear weapons less attractive and are therefore in Germany’s interest. At national level, sufficient capacities must be available in terms of NBC defence, vaccines, antidotes and supply infrastructure for the population to reduce our vulnerability to terrorist attacks with WMDs.
Our security in Europe was substantially enhanced after the end of the East-West conflict in part by cooperative conventional arms control. It is in the interest of our security to continue and to step up conventional arms control.

3. Safeguarding the supply of energy and raw materials

Our dependence on energy and raw materials and on a secure supply infrastructure constitutes a further risk. By 2030 Europe will have to import around two thirds of its energy supplies, principally from Russia, the Gulf region and North Africa. Even today the steep worldwide increase in demand for energy and raw materials, particularly in China and India, is likely to lead to shortages, resource conflicts and rising prices. Critical developments, terrorism and violent conflicts in supply countries could jeopardise our supply of energy and raw materials and damage our economy. There is also a danger, however, that our dependence may be used against us and that we may be put under pressure politically.

In view of this dual risk we need a national energy and raw materials strategy embedded in a European energy strategy which dovetails energy and environmental policy from a security perspective with other necessary policy fields such as climate, development, finance, research and foreign trade. By stabilising politics, the economy and society in developing and newly industrialising countries, development policy in particular can make a significant contribution to guaranteeing our supply of energy and raw materials and minimise import risks.

Working together with industry, we must deepen our dialogue with transit and supply countries. The security policy objective in this respect is to diversify energy sources, supply countries and transport routes and to build our own strategic reserves.

Beyond this, at European level, foreign and security policy concerns must be linked more strongly with trade policy with respect to important energy and raw materials partners and energy partnerships must be further expanded. A single EU foreign energy policy with joint negotiating strength could increase supply security and be far more effective than bilateral agreements. In this context, the EU must do far more to capitalise on its leading role with respect to concepts and technologies in the area of energy saving, energy efficiency and renewable energies as well as fusion technology and nuclear safety research.

We are seeking a European Energy Security Union in which the members would act in solidarity with each other in the event of supply problems; in order for this to happen member states must be networked together and apply the same standards with respect to stockpiling.

To establish energy security and protect supplies of raw materials, it may be necessary to use military means to safeguard the relevant infrastructure - production facilities, pipelines and ports, etc. This is already happening today under NATO and the EU. One such example is participation in the OEF in the Horn of Africa and the Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean to protect vulnerable sea trade routes. China and India, who as major consumers have a similar interest in a stable supply situation, must be integrated into systems to secure the global energy supply chain.

4. Mitigating the impact of climate change

Climate change is not only an environmental and energy-related problem but a security risk, too. The consequences of climate change are already apparent and will increase in the form of floods, heat waves, food crises, droughts, forest fires and rising sea levels. If no progress is
made in reversing this trend, there will be a considerable increase in conflicts over the distribution of water, land and food, over migrations and refugee movements which will make their way as far as Germany, and over the payment of compensation between those who are most responsible for climate change and the countries most affected. This is likely to fan the spread of local and regional conflicts right up to international wars, lead to a destabilisation of the international system and pose a threat to global economic development. The same applies, albeit to a lesser extent, to other environmental damage such as desertification, soil salting, erosion and the toxic contamination of waterways and soils.

German security policy needs to focus on the effects of climate change and to help to address the security-related consequences.

**Germany and the EU countries must meet the emission reduction targets** agreed in 2007 and persuade the other industrialised countries as well as the emerging economies and developing countries to renew their efforts in the area of climate protection with the aim of setting a standard per capita consumption target.

**Assisting the developing countries** to adapt to climate change and deal with other environmental damage must be an integral part of development cooperation. In particular, cooperation to avoid water crises must be deepened, agricultural development strategies re-oriented and disaster prevention stepped up. More effective funding instruments are needed to cope with the high costs of adaptation.

The United Nations must tackle the security risks of climate change more effectively and, above all, pre-emptively. International law needs to be further developed, moreover, to empower the UN Security Council to take action in cases of grave environmental destruction and serious breaches of environmental law.

In the face of increasing environmental disasters, there is a need for **action at European level**, too, to ensure that civil protection and emergency response personnel and the armed forces of member states work more closely together, are called in early and are effectively coordinated.

5. **Preventing, containing and resolving conflicts**

Weak states or areas with limited or no functioning government structures are vulnerable to security risks and equally a source of threat to other countries. They provide an ideal retreat for internationally operating terrorist groups and criminals, can hinder the supply of important raw materials to our economy, provoke extremism, fuel the demand for WMDs and trigger refugee movements, human trafficking and illegal immigrant smuggling. They also compromise global standards in areas such as the safeguarding of human dignity or the state’s monopoly on power.

The increasing spread of organised crime in weak states aggravates the threat of terrorism. Acts of war, extremism and terrorism are funded from the proceeds of criminal activities, above all from the drugs trade but also from illicit trafficking of weapons and humans, money laundering and piracy.

It is therefore necessary for us to strengthen weak states – in particular through development-policy measures – and thereby help to create new state structures or consolidate existing ones. In order to prevent conflicts and crises, we must work together with our partners to **strengthen our capabilities in terms of prevention** to enable us to offer culturally and religiously sensitive stabilisation approaches.
Since migration within and between countries will increase, greater efforts must be made to address this challenge in international migration policy which must be oriented to the interests of both the destination countries and the transit countries and countries of origin.

Weak states are a global problem. German security policy must give priority to working with our European partners to stabilise our neighbourhood. Successes in the Balkans need to be consolidated. We must continue to work in the EU towards ensuring the emergence of a ring of responsible states on our eastern borders and around the Mediterranean with whom we can foster partnership-based relations. In view of the rich natural gas and oil deposits in the greater Middle East, the Black Sea, the Caspian area and in Central Asia, it is in our interests, not least for our energy supply, to make a contribution to stability in these areas.

We also have an interest in the stable development of Africa. Here security policy also means promoting good governance, sustainable economic growth and education and health systems, as well as strengthening rural development and needs-oriented food production. Cooperation with African countries also needs to be stepped up to address the security-related consequences of climate and environmental change.

In order to help meet security-related challenges in Asia and to be able to exploit our opportunities in the best possible way, we Europeans need to adopt a strategic approach which must also be coordinated with our transatlantic partners. We want to strengthen the efforts of Asian countries to bolster democracy, the rule of law, political stability and development, to make progress in the fight against terrorism, and to establish closer regional cooperation. We must work more consistently than before to create a network of allies and like-minded partners in the region with whom we can pursue shared goals. We must try to involve China to a greater extent in the process of meeting security challenges, in particular in the areas of climate protection, disarmament, energy and raw materials supply and the establishment of good governance in developing countries.

We must make efforts to ensure that Latin America, which has always perceived itself as part of the western world and the democratic community, becomes a partner for global governance in order to establish a rule-based order. To do so, we must step up the political dialogue, intensify economic and development cooperation and expand security networking. In addition to helping to consolidate democracy and remove deficits in the area of the rule of law, our security interests in Latin America mainly centre on fighting drug-related crime, human trafficking, the kidnapping industry and terrorism.

We must expand our alliance capability and enable alliances which have a bearing on our security to act more effectively. As the largest contributor to the EU, second largest to the North Atlantic alliance and third largest to the UN, we have an interest in ensuring that the resources we commit are used effectively and in line with our strategic goals. This means that we must further strengthen the European Security and Defence Policy in terms of its specific civil-military response capability and expand it to make it complementary to and interoperable with NATO. To do so we need to create appropriate strategic capabilities at national and European level, for example, a European Gendarmerie Force or civil rapid response teams comprising diplomats, legal experts, administrative experts and development professionals.

There is likewise a need to further develop the transatlantic partnership, strengthen the United Nations and adapt international law to central challenges.
The North Atlantic Alliance must push forward with its political and military transformation. In addition to continuing to develop collective military capabilities and conducting ongoing missions to stabilise the Balkans and Afghanistan, this involves admitting new members in so far as they fulfil the criteria and contribute thereby to the security and stability of Europe and North America; continuing to develop a constructive relationship with Russia; broadening and differentiating existing partnerships even from a global perspective; countering risks with respect to problem states through strategic missile defence; including security-relevant subjects such as cyber-defence or particular aspects of energy security in the range of tasks.

III. The consequences for German security policy

In order to pursue our interests and strategic goals, we must be more proactive and ready to act early, rapidly, coherently and, when necessary, robustly. This applies to all the instruments and capabilities at our disposal for crisis management and conflict prevention, which need to be networked together more effectively.

1. Networked homeland defence to provide effective civil protection and disaster management

In order to respond to major emergencies such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks or disasters with biological, chemical or nuclear materials, the Federation and the Länder must work together to provide networked homeland defence. All agencies concerned must be ready to respond to emergencies in line with the principles of cooperative federalism. The organs, instruments and capabilities of internal and external security must be dovetailed better together and must also include the numerous non-governmental organisations in accordance with their capabilities. Sufficient coordination between the Federation, Länder and local authorities must be ensured. Increasing Germany’s ability to defend itself vis-à-vis both the outside and the inside is the only effective way of fighting terrorism.

European coordination of civil protection and disaster relief needs to be improved – both for joint missions in Europe and in non-European countries.

In particularly critical situations, provision must be made to enable the Bundeswehr, with its specific capabilities in the area of disaster management and responding to terrorist threats, to be deployed internally within specified boundaries alongside the Länder and federal police forces. Clear legal bases for this need to be established and responsibilities defined.

Sufficient Bundeswehr personnel must be available for homeland defence tasks such as military engineer missions, paramedical service and NBC defence. Compulsory military service also has a role to play here, since it creates the conditions for effective national and alliance defence. Along with the reservists of the Bundeswehr, conscripts provide a potential pool of qualified military personnel who can be deployed in particular in the area of homeland defence and can also provide cover for their comrades on foreign deployment.

In addition to missions abroad, it is important not to lose sight of national defence tasks. The Bundeswehr must continue in future to be able to assist efficiently in disaster situations. The new civil-military cooperation established at Land and district level will help in this respect and needs to be made more efficient.

Homeland defence also includes protecting against possible terrorist attacks from the sea. To safeguard Germany with its roughly 2,400 km of coastline, we need a national coastguard
service which would coordinate all national and, where appropriate, international efforts in the area of risk analysis and prevention for all German territorial waters.

2. Strengthening civil-military instruments of crisis management and prevention abroad

Germany, together with its alliance partners and NGOs, is already actively engaged in crisis management. But we need enhanced capabilities in order to be able to make a more effective contribution to crisis management and prevention. We must be in a position to act before a crisis erupts.

Where a crisis management operation becomes necessary, the cross-departmental procedure must be made more coherent right from the mission planning stage in Germany and all available instruments dovetailed together more efficiently.

Where violent conflict cannot be prevented, we must be prepared to intervene at the point of origin to ensure that any consequences do not pose a threat to the security of Germany and its citizens. To ensure the success of civil-military crisis management operations abroad, there is a need to tighten the security policy dialogue and coordination between partners in the EU, NATO, UN, regional organisations and NGOs and to dismantle existing obstacles. In deployment areas, we need more transparency in relation to services provided by government and non-governmental agencies such as emergency relief, reconstruction and development activities, as well as a better coordinated division of labour and cooperation between civil society actors.

Civilian personnel and police are becoming increasingly important for stabilisation missions. There are insufficient qualified personnel available in Germany. In order to meet demand and fulfill Germany’s international responsibilities, there is a need to adopt a similar procedure to that involved in the transformation of the Bundeswehr. This will involve evaluating personnel requirements and setting operational targets in order to fill gaps in terms of personnel, training and equipment and create the necessary legal bases as rapidly as possible.

The Bundeswehr is an important element of crisis management and prevention abroad. Decisions on Bundeswehr deployments are taken in conjunction with our alliance partners on the basis of our alliance commitments and objectives on a case-by-case, interest-led basis, and therefore also in the interest of safeguarding Germany’s security and at the same time exerting national influence on international developments.

In view of the increasing number of crises which could impact negatively on our country, Germany must prepare for further, longer lasting deployments of the Bundeswehr to stabilise and enforce peace. In order for us to be able to act effectively in this broad sense, the population needs to develop a new understanding of the security risks and strategic tasks of German security policy. It is up to our politicians, above all, to convince people, through better communication and information, that Germany must be prepared, in collaboration with our partners, to shoulder responsibility for global security.

The Basic Law and international law form the legal basis for all deployments of German armed forces, including the fight against international terrorism. The armed forces may hence be deployed under our collective defence commitment in NATO or the EU, on the basis of a mandate from the UN or also without such a mandate but to exercise the right of self defence enshrined in Article 51 or in pursuit of the goals of the UN Charter (humanitarian intervention).
The Bundeswehr must also be prepared to be deployed at short notice as part of a multinational intervention force for military crisis management even if there is not time for the German Bundestag to take the appropriate decision. The Act Governing Parliamentary Participation in Decisions on the Deployment of Armed Forces Abroad needs to be amended accordingly.

The Bundeswehr must be able to operate in a multinational environment across the entire deployment spectrum. For this, there is a need to continue to force through the transformation of the Bundeswehr to turn it into a flexible, sustainable force with a long-range capability. In addition there is a need to make more efficient use of financial resources to fully exploit potential European synergies. Germany’s own competitive core skills in the area of arms technology are therefore of strategic importance, not least to secure our influence on decisions in NATO and the EU and to enable us to participate in framing European arms policy.

3. Ensuring effective security policy through a National Security Council

A National Security Council needs to be established as a centre for political analysis, coordination and decision-making to ensure that all forces involved in internal and external security work together coherently. The Länder must also participate in accordance with their responsibilities. The National Security Council should fulfil three tasks:

Firstly: comprehensive cross-departmental analysis of possible threats to internal and external security. Translation of all information on security-relevant changes received from foreign missions, security services and development institutions into pre-emptive, timely and targeted foreign, security and development policy measures.

Secondly: coordination of civil-military crisis management and crisis prevention operations abroad.

Thirdly: coordination of the introduction of appropriate defence measures and emergency planning as well as deployment of homeland defence forces where disasters or similar events overstretch the capacities of individual Länder.

Taking due consideration of the federal arrangement of competences in the Federal Republic of Germany and the responsibilities of the departments of the Federal Government and their subordinate agencies, the aim of the Council will be to ensure unified political management and the best possible crisis management at home and abroad.

To this effect, the Federal Security Council chaired by the Federal Chancellor should be upgraded and, using existing resources and provided with an effective staff, the members of which will work on an interdisciplinary, cross-departmental basis, it should develop scenarios based on standardised situation reports and prepare options for action for the executive.

4. Security partnership with industry and the scientific community

We need advanced intelligent solutions to the above threats which offer us security and strengthen our culture of freedom. Appropriate technologies and action strategies need to be developed in the framework of security research.

There is a particular need for research and implementation in the area of sensitive communication infrastructures and providing a “secure identity”. Epidemiology for disease
prevention, a long neglected area, and the development of terahertz technologies for improved detection are likewise of key importance to security.

It is not only a matter of technical solutions, however. Germany has a great deal of catching up to do in research in the humanities, social sciences and linguistics in order to ensure that a better understanding of the world leads to a better security policy.

Companies as the key to our economic efficiency but also as owners and operators of critical infrastructure are particularly exposed to the new security challenges both at home and abroad and must therefore also be included in an expanded security environment. National security protection at home and abroad must be further strengthened by joint risk assessments, the exchange of security-related information and the development of joint protection and defence measures to counter terrorism and organised crime, and the protection of critical infrastructure must also be stepped up.

IV. Conclusion

We are living in a world which brings new risks but also new opportunities. Germany, together with its EU and NATO partners, has an important role to play in responding to the challenges which face us. Holding true to our democratic and constitutional values offers an excellent basis for a successful security policy and, at the same time, a great opportunity to take a pro-active role in shaping globalisation.

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Remarks: Opinions expressed in this contribution are those of the author.

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