Implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in the Latin America and Caribbean Region

By Eric Rosand, Alistair Millar, and Jason Ipe
Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation
September 2008
Authors

Eric Rosand is a senior fellow at the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation in New York and a nonresident fellow at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation. Previously, he served in the U.S. Department of State for nine years, working on counterterrorism issues both in the Office of the Counterterrorism Coordinator and at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. He is the author of numerous articles, book chapters, and reports on the role for the UN and other multilateral bodies in the global counterterrorism campaign. He has a LLM from Cambridge University, a JD from Columbia University Law School, and a BA from Haverford College.

Alistair Millar is the director of the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation. He also teaches graduate level courses on counterterrorism and U.S. foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University and The George Washington University. He has written numerous chapters, articles, and reports on international counterterrorism efforts, sanctions regimes, and nonproliferation. He is the author, with Eric Rosand, of Allied against Terrorism: What’s Needed to Strengthen Worldwide Commitment (2006). He has an MA from Leeds University and is a PhD candidate at the University of Bradford in the United Kingdom.

Jason Ipe is a senior analyst for the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation. He has provided research and written contributions to numerous book chapters and reports on issues of counterterrorism, money laundering, and nonproliferation. He received his BA in international relations from Connecticut College in New London, Connecticut, and his MA in international security policy from the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C.

Acknowledgements

The Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation gratefully acknowledges the support of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations in New York for hosting a workshop on 31 March 2008, which brought together representatives from member states of the Organization of American States (OAS), both from their missions to the United Nations in New York and their missions to the OAS in Washington, D.C.; UN Secretariat officials; officials from the OAS Secretariat for Multidimensional Security; and some leading academic and other nongovernmental experts on the region. The rich discussions at that workshop helped inform this report. The Center is particularly grateful for the input it received on earlier drafts of this report from Alan Bowman, Carol Fuller, Pablo Martinez, and Curtis Ward.

The Center benefited from the research assistance of Gina LeVeque and Liat Shetret and is grateful to the staff of the Fourth Freedom Forum for their support over the course of the project. The Center is grateful to Brian Allen for editing and Daniel Laender for the layout of the report. Invaluable information and analysis of the counterterrorism-related activities of various international, regional, and subregional bodies were provided by representatives of those organizations too numerous to identify here but without whose cooperation this project would not have been possible.

This report is the fourth in a series on enhancing implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in different regions around the world. The Center published assessments of the Asia-Pacific region in April 2007, southern Africa in November 2008, and East Africa in June 2008. It will conduct a similar assessment of South Asia by early 2009. The goal is to reinforce ongoing efforts to implement the Strategy at the national, regional, and international levels, particularly those of the Secretary-General’s Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. The UN General Assembly’s Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. The Americas: Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Capacity Gaps</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. The Role of the UN System</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. The Role of International Specialized Bodies and Organizations</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Promoting Strategy Implementation in the Region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. The Role of Regional and Subregional Bodies</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. The Role of the United States and Other Bilateral Donors in</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furthering Strategy Implementation Efforts in the Americas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASC</td>
<td>Central American Security Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CICAD</td>
<td>Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CICTE</td>
<td>Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (OAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ComSec</td>
<td>Commonwealth Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Committee (UN Security Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTCB</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building (Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTED</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (UN Security Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATF</td>
<td>Financial Action Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSRB</td>
<td>FATF-Style Regional Body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAFISUD</td>
<td>South American Financial Action Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IACHR</td>
<td>Inter-American Commission on Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IADB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpol</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISPS</td>
<td>International Ship and Port Facility Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LACR</td>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Southern Common Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIA</td>
<td>Preliminary Implementation Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SICA</td>
<td>Central American Integration System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBA</td>
<td>Tri-Border Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>UN Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This report provides an overview of issues relevant to the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in the Western Hemisphere, paying particular attention to the Latin America and Caribbean region (LACR). It outlines some of the security-related threats in the region, including those related to international and domestic terrorism, and discusses the region's preparedness to address these real and perceived vulnerabilities. Rather than focusing on domestic terrorism, this report concentrates on international terrorism, which has been the focus of the United Nations post-2001 counterterrorism efforts, and includes a comprehensive analysis of the Strategy-related counterterrorism efforts of a number of important stakeholders in the region, including relevant elements of the UN system, in particular a number of entities represented on the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force; the Organization of American States (OAS); and subregional bodies and frameworks such as the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, the South American Financial Action Task Force, the Caribbean Community, MERCOSUR, the Central American Integration System, and the 3+1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security. In particular, it highlights the comparative advantages of the United Nations and the OAS in combating terrorism in the region, how counterterrorism cooperation within and between these bodies could be strengthened, and how the Strategy could be used to further not only this cooperation but also broader regional efforts to combat terrorism in the Western Hemisphere.

This report also identifies gaps in ongoing efforts to implement the Strategy in the LACR and offers a series of recommendations (below) focused on concrete steps that a range of different stakeholders should take, alone and in partnership with each other and bilateral donors, to help fill those gaps and further implementation of the Strategy. The report details and expands on these recommendations.

Unlike many other regions, the LACR has the advantage of having a well-established regional organization in the OAS. Key to Strategy implementation efforts in the region will be the ability of its Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) to enhance its coordination and cooperation with the United Nations, which needs to do more to tailor its work to regional conditions and increase and sustain its interaction with CICTE and other parts of the OAS.

The UN system, in particular the entities on its Task Force, has a critical role to play in assisting states to implement the full range of commitments they undertook in the Strategy. These range from improving maritime security to improving respect for human rights, from short-term law enforcement and other preventive measures to longer-term measures to address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, such as lack of development, poverty, corruption, political and social marginalization, and human rights abuses. All of the individual members of the Task Force, especially those that have as yet proven reluctant to engage on the Strategy, such as the United Nations Development Programme, need to take policy decisions at the headquarters level to actively support its implementation. Critical to the success of the efforts of the Task Force and other UN actors will be reaching out to local stakeholders and engaging in the field. Coordinated, strategic, and sustained engagement by the different parts of the UN system will be needed to help countries in the LACR seize the opportunity presented by the Strategy and ensure that states seek to implement it in an integrated manner.

The Strategy offers the LACR a framework to develop a more coherent and coordinated response to the terrorist threat. Its holistic approach encourages a broader focus on issues such as poverty and improving governance, in addition to security-focused measures that are unlikely to receive widespread political support.
Recommendations

1. **Enhance understanding and assessments of the threats and vulnerabilities in and priorities and needs of the region.** The Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) should take a leading role, in conjunction with regional experts and CICTE, in identifying regional priorities and capacity gaps. With its greater UN resources, the CTED could then provide this information to donors, technical assistance providers, and other stakeholders, including relevant parts of the United Nations and civil society, to better facilitate a tailor-made approach to Strategy implementation in the region.

2. **Raise awareness of the Strategy.** Steps should be taken to raise and sustain awareness of the Strategy outside of New York. A number of steps could be taken in this regard. For example, the Task Force should ensure that capitals in the Western Hemisphere are not only made fully aware of its work and larger Strategy implementation efforts, but also that they recognize the practical relevance of the Strategy to their own domestic priorities. A first step in this direction could be the establishment of a newsletter or Web site to share information on its work. The Task Force should also coordinate with the CICTE Secretariat to provide information that can be shared with the CICTE National Points of Contact network. Finally, more ways need to be found to raise awareness with civil society in the countries of the Western Hemisphere through public diplomacy initiatives.

3. **Identify the United Nations’ comparative advantage in the Western Hemisphere.** Efforts should be made to clearly identify the comparative advantage of the United Nations in the region in the context of its Strategy implementation efforts.

4. **Deepen cooperation between the CTED and CICTE and the entire OAS Secretariat for Multidimensional Security.** As the CTED seeks to implement its revised organizational plan, it should seek to deepen and broaden its cooperation with CICTE and the OAS Secretariat for Multidimensional Security. Recognizing the political sensitivities that continue to surround its work in much of the Western Hemisphere, the CTED should become more proactive in identifying opportunities in which to work with the OAS and subregional bodies in the Western Hemisphere, which have broader political support among their members. These efforts might allow the CTED to become more involved in the technical assistance and other capacity-building activities of those organizations and allow for more engagement with national counterterrorism officials on the ground.

5. **Enhance CTED political engagement in the region.** The CTED should identify ways in which it can engage at the political level with states in the region as part of an effort to prod them to move more rapidly to implement their obligations under Security Council Resolution 1373. To make progress in this area, the CTED should consistently seek to place its work in the broader context of the Strategy, which all UN member states endorsed.

6. **Enhance information sharing between the Task Force and the region.** If given more access to information about the work of the Task Force and its working groups, CICTE could become the focal point for Strategy-related issues in the region. This could be done informally through information exchanges such as newsletters, following the model of CICTE’s own newsletter, or regular briefings or more formally by expanding the composition of the Task Force and some of its working groups to include CICTE and other relevant parts of the OAS. Creating a cross-cutting mechanism within the Task Force’s working groups by region instead of only organizing on themes would also be an efficient way to implement the latter suggestion.
7. **Identify models for the sharing of information and other coordination and consider adapting them to Strategy implementation efforts in the region.** There might be examples of successful information sharing or other coordination mechanisms (outside of the field of counterterrorism) that have been developed in the United Nations and other multilateral bodies, or at the national level, that have helped enhance synergies, reduce duplication, and facilitate better coordination, which could be adapted and applied to improve coordination and information sharing among stakeholders on Strategy implementation in the region.

8. **Identify and enhance synergies on Strategy-relevant issues.** Given that there is greater recognition and support for anti-organized crime, rule of law, and anticorruption activities in the region than there often is for counterterrorism measures, synergies should be enhanced to ensure common objectives are met as efficiently as possible. Coordination between the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission and CICTE, for example, could be further expanded into other areas, such as enhancing border security training and monitoring, where the same or similar objectives are being sought.

9. **Develop strategic and operational, interagency partnerships within national governments in the region.** These should focus on common concerns and points of overlap, such as border security, law enforcement, technical and regional expertise, critical infrastructure protection, and the sharing of information. This type of relationship is not only essential within governments, but in outreach to the United Nations, regional and subregional bodies, the private sector, and civil society.

10. **Enhance civil society and private sector partnerships.** Efforts should be made to establish broad-based civil society groups and partnerships consisting of a range of nongovernmental organizations and other civil society groups and the private sector that embrace the holistic approach to addressing terrorism enshrined in the Strategy. This could be done, for example, by enabling more interaction between the Task Force and CICTE and civil society actors on human rights and other Strategy issues and the involvement of appropriate civil society groups and private sector entities in the work of relevant Task Force working groups.
I. The UN General Assembly’s Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly on 8 September 2006, includes a broad range of measures aimed at addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, preventing and combating terrorism, building states’ counterterrorism capacities, strengthening the role of the UN system in the provision and facilitation of capacity-building assistance, and ensuring respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism. The Strategy identifies national governments as having primary responsibility for its implementation, while highlighting the supporting role that different parts of the UN system, regional and subregional bodies, and civil society should play in ensuring its effective implementation. By enumerating a holistic approach to addressing terrorism, the Strategy represents a convergence of the global North’s post–11 September counterterrorism priorities with the development and socioeconomic agenda of the global South.

After September 2001, the UN system, in particular the Security Council, concentrated its efforts on getting states to implement law enforcement and other security-related measures to prevent and combat terrorism. Signaling a shift to a broader response to the threat, the Strategy promotes a comprehensive and coordinated approach at the national, regional, and international levels to counter terrorism and to deal with those conditions that it deems conducive to the spread of terrorism, including prolonged unresolved conflicts; dehumanization of victims of terrorism; lack of rule of law and violations of human rights; ethnic, national, and religious discrimination; political exclusion; socioeconomic marginalization; and lack of good governance. In doing so, the Strategy reinforces the notion that development and respect for human rights and the rule of law are essential elements of a comprehensive approach to counterterrorism.
II. The Americas: Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Capacity Gaps

Although several countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region (LACR)\(^1\) have been struggling with domestic terrorism for many years and there were instances of international terrorism in the Americas prior to 11 September 2001,\(^2\) most LACR countries have historically treated transnational criminal activities—drug trafficking, illicit trade in small arms, smuggling of contraband and money laundering, and other crime-related issues—with far greater urgency than they did the growing terrorism phenomenon. Internal armed conflict in Colombia, which is the only country in the region to link itself to the U.S. “War on Terror,”\(^3\) and other existing or latent conflicts in countries including Bolivia, Ecuador, Haiti, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela, have also been sources of instability.\(^4\) However, as Professor Arlene B. Tickner from the Universidad de los Andes and the Universidad Nacional de Colombia points out, “There is no credible evidence that Latin America and the Caribbean is a base for international terrorist organizations or state-sponsored terrorist activities.”\(^5\)

Although the LACR in general and governments in the region may not seem likely targets of international terrorism, the region is full of high-visibility “Western” targets, including foreign tourists and businesses, which could be attractive to terrorists. In addition, there are a host of challenges to effectively addressing the threats, real or perceived, in the LACR, including vulnerable areas, the influence and policies of outspoken populist leaders who may tolerate or support terrorist or transnational criminal organizations, high levels of crime and violence, drug trafficking and money laundering, the widespread possession and availability of firearms, homicide rates that are among the highest in the world, lack of civilian leadership of the military, lack of public trust in the police and judiciary, lack of civilian support for certain governments, lack of effective governance, weak education systems, and a lack of law enforcement cooperation among countries in the region. Further, the distinctions often blur between the roles of the police and the military, as well as that of private security companies, which have increased in number in recent years.

The above-mentioned vulnerabilities in the LACR can potentially facilitate recruitment from marginalized communities in the region by international terrorist groups, criminal gangs, and drug traffickers in the region. Despite these potential targets and vulnerabilities, however, terrorism, particularly international terrorism, is not generally perceived by the people in the region to be as pressing a threat as criminal and other violent activities.

In general, the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States did alert more officials and analysts about the possible impact of international terrorism in the LACR and instilled a greater sense of urgency in dealing with it.

---

\(^1\) The LACR is comprised of all of the countries of the Americas except Canada and the United States.

\(^2\) Major terrorist acts in the Americas (other than in the United States) prior to 11 September 2001 include the 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner off the coast of Barbados, killing 73; the 1992 bombing at the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 22 people; the 1994 bombing of the Argentine Israeli Mutual Association building, in which 86 died; and the 1996 seizure of the Japanese embassy in Peru by rebels who held 72 dignitaries for more than four months.


\(^4\) For information on conflicts in the region, see http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1094&sr=2 (International Crisis Group reports on Latin America and the Caribbean).

For most LACR countries, the reaction to those attacks was not so much because they considered themselves possible targets of or directly threatened by terrorism, but was in part in solidarity with the United States and because of the economic fallout, which was immediate for a number of these countries. Commerce and tourism were severely affected throughout the region in the immediate post–11 September period. In addition, many countries in the region lost nationals in the attack on the World Trade Center. Greater awareness of the vulnerability of the global supply chain and the potential impact of a terrorist attack brought further attention to the weakness of countries in the region, many of which are heavily dependent on trade for their economic survival. As a result, the countries of the region are now required to implement new security requirements on travel and trade imposed by developed countries of the global North and new security standards developed by international specialized agencies since 2001, with many struggling to meet these new requirements.

**Vulnerable Areas**

Although there may not be operational cells of Islamist terrorists in the Western Hemisphere and the LACR has yet to be victimized by an international terrorist attack since 2001, pockets of ideological supporters and facilitators in South America and the Caribbean may lend financial, logistical, and moral support to terrorist groups in the Middle East, which should be cause for concern. This issue is particularly complicated because some groups, designated as terrorist organizations by some countries in the region but not by others, may receive funding for social projects as well as for terrorist objectives. There are areas with high levels of illicit trade in drugs, weapons, and other materials, which may provide resources to terrorists.

One such area sometimes referred to as the Tri-Border Area (TBA) or the Triple Frontier is bounded by Puerto Iguazu in Argentina, Ciudad del Este in Paraguay, and Foz do Iguacu in Brazil. As a center of drug smuggling activity and money laundering, the area has been a source of revenue for criminals, and there is concern that it may also be a source of support for terrorist groups. For example, the Argentine government launched an investigation into alleged links between suspects from the area and the bombing of the Israeli embassy and a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in the early 1990s. Egyptian authorities claim that two men arrested in the TBA were involved in a terrorist attack on tourists in Luxor in 1997. More recently, U.S. officials

---


8 Examples include the U.S. Container Security Initiative, the Megaports Initiative, and travel documents requirements under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, the IMO’s International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, ICAO’s new security standards for travel documents, and the WCO safe trade facilitation program.


have expressed concern that Hezbollah and Hamas were raising funds in the TBA by participating in illicit activities and soliciting donations from extremists within the sizable Muslim communities in the region and elsewhere in the territories of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. This charge has repeatedly been rebutted by Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, including in a December 2006 joint declaration. In response, the United States has acknowledged that although these groups are raising funds in the region, there was no corroborated information that these or other Islamic extremist groups had an operational presence in the area.

Further north, hundreds of square miles within the Darien Gap between Colombia and Panama and including parts of western Venezuela and northwestern Brazil allegedly serve as staging grounds for insurgent and paramilitary groups that facilitate and receive revenue from the production and trade of narcotics. Some groups operating in that region have also been connected to weapons smuggling in Suriname, which, along with Guyana and French Guyana, is host to another region where document fraud linked to Hezbollah activists has been reported.

The Venezuelan free-trade zone on Margarita Island has been cited by U.S. officials as a host to fundraising activity by Hezbollah members. As Chris Zambelis, writing for the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor, points out, however, “the alleged threat emanating from Margarita Island is receiving far more attention in Washington, but is as much a product of the simmering tensions between the Bush Administration and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.”

The Chavez “Revolution”

In the context of preventing the spread of terrorism in the region, Chavez’s toleration of activity by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in his country is troubling. Also, his developing relationship with Iran, which the United States labels as a “state sponsor of terrorism,” may increase tensions within the subregion. In addition, Chavez has derived political clout from Venezuela’s oil wealth, which is allegedly being used to buy weapons and to provide support for populist governments in the region. These leaders also have deteriorating relationships with the United States, which is impeding Washington’s ability to garner support for counterterrorism activities in the region. Chavez’s reaction to Colombia’s recent crossing into Ecuador to kill a FARC rebel leader, which included the closing of Venezuela’s embassy in Bogota and sending thousands of troops to the border, showed the volatility of the situation. Negotiations under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS) to resolve this crisis also revealed the tensions between hemispheric commitments to condemn and prosecute terrorists and issues of sovereignty.

12 State Department Western Hemisphere terrorism overview.
14 Ibid.
18 Farah, “Growing Terrorism Challenges From Latin America.”
With respect to the United States, Chavez continues to complain of the double standard that he sees in Washington’s position on terrorism, exemplified by its continued refusal to extradite Luis Posada Carriles, whom Venezuela and Cuba accuse of planning the 1976 bombing of a Cuban passenger jet that killed 76 people. Since 2005, both Cuba and Venezuela have repeatedly raised this issue in Security Council open meetings to discuss the work of the council’s counterterrorism machinery, as well as in the General Assembly and within the OAS.

**Narcotics Production and Trafficking**

The illicit production and sale of drugs in certain parts of Latin America is a severe and destabilizing threat in the region and beyond, as it provides revenue for criminal elements, involves many of the same illicit networks used by terrorists, and more generally contributes to the degradation of government control and the rule of law. According to the U.S. Department of State, “[T]errorism in the Western Hemisphere [is] primarily perpetrated by narco-terrorist organizations based in Colombia and by the remnants of radical leftist Andean groups.” For example, rebel groups in Colombia, most notably the FARC and the National Liberation Army, control large swaths of territory and have been estimated to generate hundreds of millions of dollars of revenue per year. These groups and insurgent groups in other parts of the region, including the Shining Path in Peru, are on the U.S. Department of State’s list of foreign terrorist organizations; and U.S. officials often express concern over alleged links between these groups and terrorist organizations located outside the region, such as Hezbollah.

Efforts by the United States to address the problem of drug trafficking in the region, notably in the 1980s, and the ongoing “Plan Colombia,” which have involved training and funding national militaries and widespread crop eradication efforts, have also helped to stoke pockets of anti-U.S. sentiment in Latin America. Accordingly, foreign-led efforts to link the threat of transnational terrorism with the region’s illicit drug problems have often

---


been resisted by countries in the region. This in turn has complicated U.S. efforts to deepen its counterterrorism cooperation with some countries in the region.

**Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing**

Money laundering associated with the drug trade has been a long-standing issue in the LACR. A combination of factors, including porous borders, corruption, and lack of resources, have hampered efforts to detect and prosecute these activities in many parts of the hemisphere, where additional concerns were raised after September 2001 due to lax regulation in many offshore jurisdictions. Although only a small percentage of suspicious activity reports by financial institutions to financial regulatory authorities demonstrate a link between instances of money laundering and terrorism, the amount of money transferred in connection with other dangerous illicit activity in the region presents a major concern to North American authorities. As detailed below, by working with bilateral donors, principally the United States and Canada, and multilateral partners, many countries in the region have made important strides in building their capacity to address the problem of money laundering and terrorist financing in recent years. As a result of the sheer volume of transactions linked to illicit crime in the region and the LACR’s proximity to the United States, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence continues to see money laundering and its link to terrorist financing in the LACR as “very real threats.” Nevertheless, many countries in the region continue to dispute the connection.

In general, LACR countries have been reluctant to allow what are perceived as Northern security-related concerns, particularly the U.S.-led “War on Terror,” and by extension the U.S.-dominated Security Council counterterrorism agenda, to take priority over other issues that have been at the top of national and regional agendas for decades in Latin America, such as sustainable development.

**The Strategy’s Potential in the Americas**

The Strategy offers an opportunity for the UN system to reshape its counterterrorism engagement with the region. Doing so will allow the United Nations to place counterterrorism concerns in the context of issues that are more salient to the region, including development, poverty reduction, and efforts to combat corruption, drug trafficking, and other criminal activities. Security threats presented by criminal activities continue to receive priority treatment from many LACR states, where the impact of these transnational criminal activities appears to pose a far greater threat to security and development than does the threat of international terrorism. However, the links between these vulnerabilities and development have made it imperative for states in the region to seek to

---


strengthen their capacities to deal with money laundering and improve their customs and border control and airport and seaport security.

Going forward, the general public needs to understand that these security measures to control terrorism are similarly useful in other security areas. More emphasis must be placed on the benefits that can accrue from counterterrorism security measures. Therefore, to build public support for combating terrorism and for the Strategy more specifically, the United Nations and other interested stakeholders must emphasize the contributions such measures make to strengthening security in general and to tackling higher priorities in the region, such as addressing corruption and drug trafficking.

The OAS General Assembly has recognized the importance of adopting a “multidimensional approach to hemispheric security,” noting that “security threats, concerns and other challenges in the hemispheric context are of diverse nature and multidimensional scope, and that the traditional concept and approach must be expanded to encompass new and non-traditional threats, which include political, economic, social, health, and environmental aspects.” The Strategy, by taking into consideration security, development, good governance, and human rights components, reflects this same approach, which should enhance its relevance to the region, by contributing to addressing the region’s development deficiencies and other pressing issues, such as crime and violence and related socioeconomic issues.

To help mobilize countries in the region and their populations to respond to the calls in the Strategy, a document that is not well known outside of foreign ministries, it will be necessary to articulate more clearly the political narrative of the Strategy and communicate its broad-based approach, which reflects the multidimensional approach to addressing security threats contained in the 2003 Declaration on Security in the Americas.

---

Although overcoming the challenges and vulnerabilities in the Western Hemisphere remains the primary responsibility of states, sustained involvement by the United Nations and relevant regional stakeholders such as the OAS will be essential. Identifying the comparative advantages of the United Nations, regional bodies, and national governments is essential. The United Nations, because of its global membership and the legitimacy it offers, can help reinforce regional and local activity. Acting as a global norm-setter, the General Assembly and UN specialized agencies have helped develop a global counterterrorism legal framework via the adoption of 16 international treaties that criminalize nearly every imaginable terrorist offense and facilitate international legal cooperation in this area. Of particular importance, the United Nations continues to help train criminal justice officials in developing countries on how to implement the global counterterrorism framework, and it regularly brings together criminal justice officials at the regional level to try to build the trust needed to create effective transnational law enforcement networks. The United Nations also has a convening power that is often underestimated. It offers a forum for the cross-regional sharing of information and experiences on a range of thematic issues related to addressing today’s terrorist threat.

Different parts of the UN system, whether in areas such as development, human rights, or education, can contribute to addressing some of the underlying conditions that may contribute to the spread of terrorism, whether it be lack of rule of law, failure to respect human rights, or political, social, and economic marginalization.

The United Nations can also provide a universal assessment of how countries are doing in their efforts to combat terrorism, something that benefits all governments. It is well placed to identify common shortcomings and challenges in different parts of the world and identify ways of addressing them, drawing on best practices and experiences from other regions. For some governments, having the United Nations provide advice on their counterterrorism efforts, rather than one of the major bilateral counterterrorism players such as the United States, may be more politically acceptable.

Finally and perhaps most significantly, the United Nations can contribute to the development and promotion of a narrative to counter the one of hate and violence being espoused by extremists. It can do this through its promotion of peace, tolerance, dialogue among cultures and religion, and far-reaching efforts to address some of the social, political, and economic marginalization that is part of the reason young people turn to violence.30

Coordinated, strategic, and sustained engagement by the different parts of the UN system is needed to maximize its contributions to Strategy implementation in the region. These different parts of the UN system include traditional counterterrorism bodies such as the various Security Council bodies and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB), as well as entities not traditionally associated with counterterrorism such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the

30 Mike Smith, “The Role of the United Nations in Counter-Terrorism” (presentation, New York, 30 April 2008) (Executive Director of the United Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate [CTED]) (on file with the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation).
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the World Customs Organization (WCO). Many of these actors, though not all, are represented on the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. By bringing together traditional counterterrorism actors with development and human rights bodies operating in the region, the Task Force offers a framework to allow the UN system to help its member states to pursue the holistic approach outlined in the Strategy.

In order to be an effective medium for advancing implementation of the Strategy in the LACR, the nascent Task Force needs to become an effective clearinghouse for the programs of its 24 participating bodies, including the sharing of best practices and experiences gained from working within the region. The Task Force “secretariat” must be able to gather information on the relevant programs (current and planned) of each UN body and analyze and disseminate the data to all Task Force participants to inform them of possible opportunities for cooperation and collaboration, as well as allow them the opportunity to target in a timely manner scarce resources to areas of need and avoid duplication of efforts. The Task Force should also seek to engage donor states operating in the LACR to leverage their contributions in the process.

**UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate**

The Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), with the support of its expert group, the CTED, is charged with monitoring the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373, which imposed a range of security-related counterterrorism obligations on all UN member states. Given that the CTED has only 36 staff members and an annual budget of just $8 million, one needs to have realistic expectations of the impact the CTED can have in any particular country or region.

Among other things, the CTC/CTED is responsible for facilitating the delivery of counterterrorism technical assistance to states that it has identified as needing help implementing the provisions of the resolution, as well as engaging with and coordinating the counterterrorism activities of international, regional, and subregional bodies. Despite the significant capacity gaps in the region, to date the CTC/CTED’s impact in the Americas has been limited.

The CTC/CTED’s limited engagement with the region is partially the result of some resistance from certain LACR countries on the Security Council and the CTC, which did not view the region as a priority area for the CTC/CTED and therefore showed little inclination for a proactive CTC/CTED role in the region. This attitude may have arisen from the general perception in the region that the risk for international terrorism was low in the LACR and that, as part of the Security Council, the CTC/CTED is pursuing a U.S. agenda. As a result,

---

31 There are a number of UN peacekeeping and other activities related to addressing the long-standing conflicts in the subregion that are relevant to elements of the Strategy but that will not be addressed in this report due to space limitations.

32 The 24 different entities represented on the Task Force are the Counter-Terrorism Committee’s (CTC) CTED; the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs; the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations; the UN Department of Political Affairs; the UN Department of Public Information; the UN Department for Safety and Security; the Expert Staff of the 1540 Committee; the International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO; the IMO; the International Monetary Fund; the International Criminal Police Organization; the Monitoring Team of the 1267 Committee; OHCHR; the UN Office of Legal Affairs; the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism; UNDP; UNESCO; the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute; UNODC; the WCO; the World Bank; and the World Health Organization.
the LACR is the only region that has yet to consent to receive a visit from the CTC/CTED pursuant to Resolution 1535. Without country visits, the CTC/CTED has had difficulty determining the extent to which states are implementing the requirements of Resolution 1373 on the ground. Unable to conduct a proper assessment of the region’s deficiencies, the CTC/CTED is significantly impeded in its ability to carry out its monitoring and assistance facilitation mandate effectively in the region.

In addition, LACR countries have generally objected to CTED attempts to refer to issues that might be connected with terrorism, such as drug trafficking, trafficking in small arms and lights weapons, and corruption, arguing that they fall outside the scope of Resolution 1373 and thus the CTC/CTED’s mandate, despite the fact that the resolution explicitly “[n]otes with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, and in this regard emphasizes the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security.”

Given the political challenges the CTC/CTED has faced in connecting with countries in the LACR, it should come as little surprise that, apart from facilitating legislative drafting assistance by UNODC’s TPB, the CTC/CTED has so far not had much success in facilitating the delivery of technical assistance to states in the region. Apparently in only two instances—Paraguay and Jamaica—has the CTC/CTED been able to move beyond the exchange of letters and reviews of reports submitted by each state and work on the ground with an individual state.

The first was precipitated by a letter from Paraguay to the CTC Chairman indicating that it was unable to adopt the legislation necessary to comply with Resolution 1373. In response, the CTC/CTED has actively engaged with Paraguayan officials to try to help overcome the parliamentary objections to the revised penal law, which were based in large part on fears that the law would be used against the political opposition. CTED officials, including its Executive Director and other CTED experts, in close coordination with UNODC and OHCHR, met with members of parliament and civil society groups to explain the importance of adopting the law so as to comply with the country’s international obligations and to reassure them that the revised law conformed with international human rights norms, thus trying to mitigate concerns regarding potential abuse.

The second was an early 2008 CTED fact-finding mission, as opposed to an assessment visit—putting the Executive Director’s new approach into practice—to Jamaica, where two CTED experts visited the capital for two and a half days to gather updated information from the Jamaican authorities on efforts to implement Resolution 1373 and to explore the possibility of having Jamaica provide technical assistance to other Caribbean states. The CTED also took the opportunity to meet with embassy officials of a number of the key bilateral donors to learn more about assistance currently being provided to Jamaica and to try to match donor interest and capabilities with identified needs. The CTED proposed this mission to respond to the frustration Jamaica expressed at being asked to prepare a sixth report to the CTC, given the government’s limited resources and the fact that it had yet to receive anything tangible in return for submitting its first five submissions. These sorts of shorter, targeted visits, which require significantly fewer resources to undertake and focus on information gathering and other issues related to allowing CTED to perform its technical assistance facilitation function more effectively and not on assessing on the ground implementation efforts, are less likely to present the political problems that the assessment visits have.

---

In addition to its limited and often superficial interactions with states in the region, the CTC/CTED has struggled in its attempts to deepen its relationships with regional and subregional bodies in the LACR. Although CTED officials continue to meet and share information with the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) Secretariat, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)\(^{34}\) Secretariat, and the South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD)\(^{35}\) Executive Secretariat, it is not clear the extent to which either the CTC/CTED or these regional and subregional bodies have benefited from this engagement, which has generally been neither strategic in nature nor coordinated with the other relevant UN counterterrorism actors.

One obstacle to effective CTC/CTED engagement among the small island countries in the Americas has been the lack of a dedicated counterterrorism unit in the CARICOM Secretariat. Partly as a result, rather than choosing to work with the CTC/CTED, individual CARICOM countries have tended to leverage their traditional bilateral relationships to seek counterterrorism-related capacity-building assistance from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom and from international specialized organizations and other partners. Programs of assistance that have emerged from these relationships are developed and pursued primarily on the basis of shared security-related interests with each respective partner. Although most of these programs are provided directly on a bilateral basis, others have been provided through the OAS (CICTE and the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission [CICAD]) and the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF),\(^{36}\) as well as UNODC on its own and in cooperation with the OAS.

There are, however, some signs that the situation is starting to improve, including the appointment of an experienced new CTED Executive Director, who is aware of the CTED’s historic shortcomings and has put forward a strategy for addressing them. The revised organizational plan for the CTED, which the Executive Director drafted and the CTC endorsed in early February 2008, an endorsement the Security Council “welcome[d] and affirm[ed]” in its March 2008 resolution renewing the CTED mandate until the end of 2010, contemplates tailor-made country and regional visits encompassing several countries at a time, each focusing on specific aspects of Resolution 1373 rather than the resolution as a whole.\(^{37}\) Such visits should enable the CTC/CTED to overcome some of the political opposition it has heretofore faced from LACR members of the CTC and assist states in the region more effectively, particularly as the CTC/CTED moves away from relying on written country reports and seeks to engage more directly and informally with experts in capitals, as opposed to diplomats in New York. The CTED has produced preliminary implementation assessments (PIAs) for each country in the Americas, which provide a comprehensive overview of national efforts to implement Resolution 1373. These PIAs, which are in the process of being shared and discussed with the states concerned, are meant to serve as the basis of the CTC/CTED’s intensified and tailored dialogue with them. The CTED has also put together a directory of best practices

\(^{34}\) CARICOM has 15 member states (Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago) and five associate members (Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, and Turks and Caicos Islands).

\(^{35}\) The members of GAFISUD are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

\(^{36}\) The members of the CFATF are Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Montserrat, the Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Turks and Caicos Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.

related to the different provisions of Resolution 1373; incorporated the needs of countries in the LACR into its Technical Assistance Matrix, which provides information on states’ needs; and updated the Directory of Assistance, which contains information on available technical assistance. In addition, the CTED is also exploring bringing regional and subregional actors and donors together, which may help facilitate and improve the coordination of capacity-building assistance.

Further, recognizing the political sensitivities that continue to surround its work in much of the LACR, the CTED is becoming more proactive in identifying opportunities in which to work with regional and subregional bodies that have broader political support among their members. The CTED should seek to play a more significant role in collecting and distributing information as well as to improve cooperation with the CICTE leadership and secretariat, with a view to maximizing use of resources, avoiding duplication, and taking advantage of CICTE’s regional expertise whenever possible. These efforts might allow the CTED to become more involved in the technical assistance and other capacity-building activities of key regional stakeholders and allow for more engagement with national counterterrorism officials on the ground. The CTED still needs to identify ways in which it can engage at the political level with states in the region as part of an effort to prod them to move more rapidly to implement their obligations under Resolution 1373. To make progress in this area, the CTED should consistently seek to place its work in the broader context of the Strategy, which all UN member states endorsed.

1267 Committee and Al-Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions Monitoring Team

The 1267 Committee, the Security Council committee responsible for maintaining and overseeing implementation of the financial sanctions, arms embargoes, and travel bans against the Taliban, al-Qaida, and associated individuals, is a critical means for internationalizing sanctions against individuals on its Consolidated List. With no one on the list from or operating from the LACR, however, both the committee and the Al-Qaida/Taliban Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, the group responsible for helping the committee monitor sanctions’ implementation, have paid scant attention to the region. The Monitoring Team has had some interactions with countries in the Caribbean, in particular with Trinidad and Tobago, where a group—Abu Bakr Bashir—that may have had links to individuals or entities on the list had a presence, although most members are dead or have been arrested. The arrests on 2 June 2007 of several individuals from the region in an alleged plot to attack John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York raised awareness of the potential threat emanating from the region and brought heightened scrutiny over the threat of terrorist cells developing across the Caribbean and the potential it offers as a base to launch attacks against the United States.38 For the Monitoring Team, however, it did not meet the credibility threshold of having possible links to those on the list to warrant its attention.

A number of LACR countries have neither the legal nor institutional framework in place to implement the mandated asset freezes nor the capacity to implement the travel ban and arms embargo. Further, nine LACR countries have failed to submit reports to the committee on implementation of the mandated sanctions.39

Recognizing the capacity limitations in the region, the Monitoring Team has played an instrumental role, together with UNODC’s TPB and the other Security Council counterterrorism-related expert groups, in designing an assistance program to assist a number of CARICOM countries with the preparation of the necessary reports to

39 Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Uruguay have not submitted reports to the 1267 Committee.
the different council counterterrorism-related bodies. Canada provided the funds for a consultant who has begun to make the rounds to the relevant capitals.

**UN Office on Drugs and Crime**

UNODC, through its TPB and Global Programme against Money Laundering, is the principal provider of counterterrorism technical assistance within the UN system. UNODC’s role in the region is to provide technical assistance in the areas of drug trafficking, money laundering, and counterterrorism capacity building. In particular, UNODC in partnership with CICTE has been involved in assisting states in drafting counterterrorism legislation and helping them develop and maintain effective criminal justice systems.

With funding support from the governments of Canada, Italy, and Spain, TPB in partnership with CICTE and CICAD has been engaged in specific areas of legal assistance and capacity-building support, in cooperation with other UNODC entities and specialized organizations operating in the region, in particular the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with regard to money laundering and financing of terrorism. In fact, UNODC’s TPB partners with the CICTE Secretariat on almost every activity it undertakes in the region, with the latter providing significant funding and logistical support for the former’s activities.

TPB and CICTE have engaged extensively together on the ground both at the national and regional levels with a view to, *inter alia*, (1) increasing awareness among policymakers and political leaders of the importance of joining and implementing the universal instruments against terrorism and complying with Security Council counterterrorism resolutions; (2) increasing expertise and capacity at the national level, particularly that of judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement officials, to implement these instruments and the relevant counterterrorism legislation; (3) enhancing the specialized counterterrorism skills of relevant criminal justice officials through targeted training; and (4) reinforcing and promoting the use of extradition and mutual legal assistance and other forms of international cooperation in criminal matters.

In 2007 alone, TPB convened 12 national legislative workshops to provide drafting assistance to relevant government authorities to ratify the universal instruments and draft the necessary legislation to implement them, as well as training of criminal justice officials on how to use these new tools. In addition, during this same year, TPB conducted three specialized training workshops for criminal justice officials, as well as three other regional conferences and workshops aimed at mobilizing political support for implementing the relevant counterterrorism instruments and laws.\(^{40}\) Perhaps most significantly in the context of building political support in the region for implementation of the Strategy, TPB co-organized with CICTE a ministerial conference hosted by the Dominican Republic that produced the Declaration of Santo Domingo, whereby the participating Caribbean countries requested “UNODC, including its Terrorism Prevention Branch and its relevant regional offices, to strengthen and sustain the implementation” of the Strategy.\(^{41}\) UNODC’s regional offices are a comparative advantage that allow for the sustained follow-up essential for the effective delivery of capacity-building assistance. Thus, the

---

\(^{40}\) UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Summary of TPB Achievements in Latin America and the Caribbean,” February 2008 (on file with the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation). Partly as a result of TPB’s efforts, the LACR has seen 12 new ratifications of the universal legal instruments against terrorism since April 2006, four new national laws adopted, eight draft laws tabled before the legislature, and the training or briefing of more than 900 criminal justice officials on issues surrounding international cooperation on terrorism matters.

recent decision to close the UNODC field office in the Bahamas, apparently the result of funding shortfalls, which is a matter of concern for countries in the Caribbean, should be reversed.

TPB has an ambitious program planned for 2008 in the region. It has already conducted a specialized training workshop for prosecutors, judges, and judicial officials on counterterrorism in El Salvador, “seeking to promote a dynamic dialogue based on comparative experiences related to terrorism and to have the opportunity to share common experiences, successes, difficulties and challenges.” Of particular note, this workshop brought together experts from the OAS and OHCHR, as well as from countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Mexico, Spain, and the United States. It included a session on “terrorism and due process,” where OHCHR’s regional representative for the LACR delivered a presentation emphasizing the need to respect international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law in the fight against terrorism, and the message that an effective strategy against terrorism should be within a human rights framework. Terrorism, she said, “cannot be fought at the expense of the rights and values that are at the base of the democratic state. The state must not become a terrorist to fight terrorism.”

In cooperation with Colombia, UNODC is also developing a Practitioner’s Manual of Terrorism Cases, which “will focus on the most relevant counterterrorism judicial issues that have arisen through the course of investigating and prosecuting cases of real life terrorist acts.” The intended target audience is judges and judicial and investigative police. As an example of a regional initiative complementary to UNODC’s global efforts, CICTE’s “Guide to the Prevention, Detention and Suppression of Terrorist Financing,” developed in conjunction with CICAD, also serves as a useful reference tool. UNODC also participates in seminars on terrorist financing organized by the two OAS secretariat bodies.

Although UNODC has concentrated a great deal of its efforts in the region on advancing the legislative framework for the universal legal instruments against terrorism, the overall ratification and accession rates in LACR countries for the original 12 instruments are mixed. Most countries in South and Central America are parties to at least 10 of these instruments; only three are not. This participation rate contrasts with eight of 14 CARICOM member states having ratified or acceded to fewer than 10. Of particular concern is the fact that 18 of the LACR countries have yet to become parties to the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing. In addition to the varying degrees of participation in these different treaty regimes, many states that have become parties continue to lack the capacity and expertise to respond to the legislative and operational requirements of these conventions. In the meantime, however, 23 OAS member states are party to the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, which makes explicit reference to the universal instruments.

43 Ibid.
44 The three South and Central America countries that are not parties to at least 10 of the international antiterrorism instruments are Colombia (9), Dominican Republic (3), and Venezuela (7). Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2006,” 30 April 2007, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/83238.htm (“International Conventions and Protocols on Terrorism”).
45 The eight CARICOM member states that have ratified or acceded to fewer than 10 of the international antiterrorism instruments are Antigua and Barbuda (7), the Bahamas (8), Belize (8), Guyana (6), Haiti (6), Saint Kitts and Nevis (5), Saint Lucia (6), and Suriname (6). Ibid.
46 Ibid.
UNODC has an important role in helping countries in the region to implement the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three Protocols, which receive explicit mention in the Strategy. It provides technical assistance in legislative drafting to implement the criminal provisions, to adopt new frameworks for mutual legal assistance, and to facilitate extradition, law enforcement cooperation, and training.\(^{48}\)

One should look carefully at some of the reasons for UNODC’s success, particularly when compared with the CTC/CTED, in engaging with countries in the region on terrorism and other security issues as there may be lessons to be applied as the United Nations seeks to further Strategy implementation in the region. First, UNODC, unlike the CTC/CTED, has a sustained presence in the region via its South American field offices in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru and a network of regional consultants with the necessary specialized legal expertise on which to draw when convening workshops in the region. This regional presence not only gives UNODC a certain level of credibility in the region, but also has placed it in a better position to develop and maintain partnerships with local stakeholders, including the OAS and subregional bodies, which are essential to ensuring local buy-in and making certain that capacity-building activities receive the necessary follow-up attention. Second, unlike the CTC/CTED, UNODC, in particular its TPB, offers states something concrete in return for their cooperation, namely, training and other forms of technical assistance.

**UN Development Programme**

UNDP, with programs in 166 countries and 135 offices around the world, has a central role in helping states address a number of conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism identified in the Strategy, including through the promotion of good governance, the rule of law, and human rights compliance as part of an effort to support sustained economic and social development. In partnership with states, other UN agencies, international partners, civil society organizations, and the private sector, UNDP undertakes work in four focus areas: poverty reduction and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, and environment and sustainable development, with the development of national and local capacity a priority that cuts across all four areas.\(^{49}\)

Although UNDP has steered clear of associating with counterterrorism efforts in the past, it is the UN body best positioned, because of its worldwide outreach and in-country presence, to coordinate technical assistance across all disciplines to help states implement the Strategy. It could serve as a focal point in each country, thereby bringing synergy to UN efforts. As a member of the Task Force, UNDP has yet to define its role in a practical way, most likely due to the sensitivity with which most members of the United Nations view its role. UNDP should not be perceived to be diverting development resources to counterterrorism efforts, except perhaps where it is accepted that there is a nexus between security, including counterterrorism-related security, and development. However, in helping to alleviate regional conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, UNDP has an indispensable role in the overall scheme of helping countries implement the Strategy.

In addition, because of its success in forging partnerships “across diverse spheres of influence, from national, municipal and local governing bodies to non-governmental and civil society organizations,”\(^{50}\) UNDP is well positioned to play an important role in raising awareness of the Strategy among a wide range of

\(^{48}\) For information on the organized crime convention and its protocols, as well as on UNODC technical assistance programs in this area, see http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized_crime/index.html.


\(^{50}\) Ibid.
nongovernmental stakeholders, reducing the tensions that often exist between the state and the public surrounding the implementation of counterterrorism measures, and most importantly, building the national ownership of the Strategy that is a prerequisite to its effective implementation.

Political challenges to getting UNDP headquarters in New York to associate itself more closely with the Strategy and counterterrorism efforts more broadly are indeed formidable. Pillar I of the Strategy, which focuses on addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, explicitly links attaining the Millennium Development Goals with Strategy implementation and should be emphasized more in most regions, including the LACR. There is a need for the Secretary-General and member states, including those from the LACR, to call on UNDP to become more engaged while remaining sensitive to its concern about not wishing to be too closely associated with or have its ongoing work labeled as “counterterrorism.” In this regard, the goal should be trying to identify complementarities between UNDP and other nontraditional counterterrorism actors and the traditional counterterrorism actors on the Task Force and encourage better coordination, including regular information sharing, among them.

UNDP engagement with the Task Force and on Strategy issues is of particular importance in the LACR, where crime and other forms of antisocial behavior may be related to the slow pace of development and a lack of hope in certain parts of the region, which may increase the regional vulnerabilities to international terrorism. As a result, development programs should be enhanced and delivered with a view to offering people hope (e.g., through employment schemes to help members of society, particularly youth, know that there are alternatives to criminal activity and political violence).

UNDP already has several Strategy-relevant initiatives underway in the LACR. For example, it has been working with the University of the West Indies since January 2007 to set up a center for crime research in Jamaica. The Caribbean Institute of Public Safety and Justice aims to provide education and training to regional law enforcement personnel and will provide policy advice through consultants to governments in the region.51 Also, UNDP’s Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery is implementing rule of law projects in Guatemala and Haiti, which are aimed at, among other things, strengthening the capacity of rule of law institutions to deliver basic justice and security services to the people and building social cohesion and restoring confidence between war-affected communities and the state. Perhaps most significantly, through its democratic governance programs, UNDP offices in the LACR are working with countries in the region on issues such as public administration reform and anticorruption, justice and human rights, parliamentary development, and capacity building for the conduct of free and fair elections. In fact, nearly one-half of the $1.2 billion in resources allocated to UNDP democratic governance programs around the world in 2007 was spent in the LACR.52 A UN Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean is currently under development in Panama City. With the new center in place, UNDP will be able to work more closely and coherently with other collocated UN regional offices, including Task Force partners such as OHCHR and the World Health Organization, to provide “further opportunities for collaboration in tackling important regional challenges and supporting developmental, environmental and humanitarian priorities, to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.”53

UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

With its program involvement in some 143 countries, UNESCO is another UN body with broad outreach with UN member states and the potential to assist in the implementation of the Strategy. Moreover, the Strategy specifically identifies UNESCO as having a lead role in promoting ethnic, national, and religious tolerance and respect for all religions, religious values, beliefs, or cultures by establishing and encouraging education and public awareness programs. UNESCO has recognized terrorism as an attack against humanity and has worked to create conditions for dialogue among peoples based on respect for commonly shared values.  

In addition, with quality education recognized as a crucial component of any effective long-term strategy to counterterrorism, UNESCO is seeking to scale up existing programs for strengthening the capacities of educational systems worldwide to integrate human rights education, internationally shared values, conflict prevention, and critical thinking into every aspect of these systems, including the development of curriculum standards, the training of teachers, and the approval of school textbooks.

With its 11 field offices in the LACR, which include five clusters and three regional bureaus, UNESCO is working to improve textbooks in the Caribbean, improve higher education throughout the region, encourage cooperation with civil society and governments in education, educate teachers as part of its efforts to promote a culture of peace in schools, and promote interreligious dialogue. There have been significant improvements in school enrollment in recent years in the region, with a recent UNESCO report noting that there is a “high chance of achieving universal primary enrollment by 2015.” These and other initiatives to promote educational reforms across the LACR are relevant to furthering Strategy implementation in the region.

Without giving these activities or UNESCO a “counterterrorism” label, UNESCO should become more involved in the work of the Task Force, including by engaging more with Task Force members at the regional and local level, and should ensure that information concerning the growing number of UNESCO initiatives at the local, national, subregional, and regional levels aimed at promoting education reform and interreligious and cultural dialogue are shared within the Task Force and, more broadly, with experts outside the education field.

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

The Strategy makes clear both in its fourth pillar and as a cross-cutting issue that promotion and protection of human rights should be an integral part of Strategy implementation in all regions. The human rights records of a number of countries in the LACR have improved in recent years, and there is a wider recognition among governments that adherence to the rule of law can strengthen public support for counterterrorism. However, the

---

55 UNESCO field offices in the LACR are in Brazil, Chile (Regional Bureau), Costa Rica (Cluster), Cuba (Cluster and Regional Bureau), Ecuador (Cluster), Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica (Cluster), Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay (Cluster and Regional Bureau). See http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=34016&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.HTML.
lack of sufficient oversight or training of the police and the military and the blurred line between the functions of the police and the military remain a concern. Thus, those who undertake efforts to promote implementation of the Strategy and other counterterrorism measures in the LACR will need to be particularly mindful to do so in a way that safeguards international human rights norms.

The Strategy gives OHCHR a lead role in addressing the question of protecting human rights while countering terrorism. Although devoting few resources to the “human rights and counterterrorism” portfolio at its headquarters in Geneva, OHCHR is seeking to develop a number of relevant tools in this area. These aim at “assisting practitioners; providing technical assistance to Member States upon their request, in developing human rights-compliant legislation and policies; and supporting relevant human rights mechanisms.”

With its 10 presences in the LACR, OHCHR is well placed to work with countries in the region to ensure that human rights issues remain at the center of Strategy implementation. As the High Commissioner recently stated, “[T]he challenge for both the United Nations system and Member States is to ensure that the human rights-based approach is reflected in all Strategy implementation efforts, rather than remaining simply of rhetorical value.”

To date, OHCHR has yet to focus attention in the region on the Strategy per se. However, much of its ongoing work does relate to the Strategy, for example, in raising awareness of human rights among governments, national human rights institutions, members of parliament, and human rights defenders and in fighting against impunity, poverty, inequality, and discrimination. For the 2008–2009 biennium, OHCHR will continue to seek to ensure that national institutions, laws, and programs comply with human rights standards; that governments implement the recommendations of UN human rights mechanisms and bodies; and that more steps are taken to allow marginalized groups to participate in the political process, all of which will further the objectives of the Strategy as well. Going forward, however, OHCHR should ensure that its regional office in Panama has the necessary counterterrorism expertise to make sure that OHCHR’s ongoing activities in the LACR can take the Strategy into account. In addition, OHCHR should seek to complement its ongoing regional programs with more counterterrorism-focused activities, including, for example, providing training to judges, lawyers, and law enforcement in counterterrorism and human rights, as it has already done in other regions, and convening regional meetings on “Human Rights and Counter Terrorism” in order to initiate a dialogue on human rights obligations and commitments of states in matters related to counterterrorism.

58 Ibid.
59 See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/LACRegion/Latin AmericaSummary0809.aspx (OHCHR Latin America Regional Office).
IV. The Role of International Specialized Bodies and Organizations in Promoting Strategy Implementation in the Region

A number of specialized and other international organizations are actively engaged with OAS countries on issues relevant to Strategy implementation. For example, ICAO, the IMO, the WCO, and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) have developed and will continue to develop new security standards and programs at the urging and with the assistance of developed countries. Many of these new standards deal with security issues in general, but a plethora of new ones deal specifically with security in the context of the terrorist threat. These international specialized agencies offer standards and best practices in areas such as travel documents issuance and security and aviation and airport facilities security (ICAO), international supply-chain security (WCO), maritime and port facilities security (IMO), and the tracking and policing of international criminal networks and terrorists and the tracking of lost and stolen travel documents (Interpol). Implementing these new international standards requires human expertise and significant financial resources to purchase and operate high-cost, technologically advanced security equipment, the cost of which some countries in the region either cannot afford or find disproportionate to their value to small economies.

The Strategy highlights the importance of the capacity-building and standard-setting work that these functional bodies perform, which is of particular importance in a region where there are a number of small island states, nearly all states are highly dependent on international trade, and many lack the necessary human and financial resources to be able to meet these standards. Many of these functional organizations, which are represented on the Task Force, have a presence in the Americas through which they provide different forms of technical assistance and engage in varying degrees of cooperation with the OAS and subregional bodies on the ground.

**Interpol**

In addition to its standard-setting work mentioned above, Interpol, including through its subregional bureau in El Salvador, which is staffed by law enforcement officials from LACR countries, has developed a number of practical, region-specific counterterrorism or security-related initiatives. For example, it developed Project Amazon, which focuses on identifying members of terrorist organizations active in the region and allows Interpol

---

60 For ICAO standards and programs on travel documents and aviation security facilitation, see http://www.icao.int/ath/sfbranch/index.asp.

61 The WCO Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade, when implemented, should “contribute positively to economic and social development, act as a deterrent to international terrorism, secure revenue collections and promote trade facilitation world-wide.” See http://www.wcoomd.org/.

62 For a list of the IMO conventions on safety and security, see http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=260.

63 For information on Interpol’s programs, see http://www.interpol.int/.

member countries to oversee the collection of information regarding groups and key figures involved in transregional terrorist activities and support groups in the region. Another aspect of this project focuses on the analysis and collection of information related to weapons smuggling and financing methods such as drug trafficking. The project, in which 23 countries are participating, will hold its fourth working group meeting in Argentina in October 2008, which will concentrate on the terrorist threat in the region and the movement of terrorists to neighboring countries.

Further, Interpol contributed to efforts to enhance the border security within and among the nine Caribbean countries that hosted the 2007 Cricket World Cup. It helped those countries extend access to the Interpol I-24/7 global police communication system to their immigration and border services. It also assisted with the installation of the necessary technical equipment at the host country airports to allow law enforcement officers to check passports instantly against Interpol’s global database of lost and stolen travel documents.

**The World Bank and International Monetary Fund**

The IMF and World Bank are not only making important contributions to reducing poverty and promoting development and good governance, which are central components of the Strategy, but are also contributing more specifically to the region’s efforts to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. They conduct joint assessments of member countries’ compliance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards under the Financial Sector and Offshore Financial Center Assessment Programs. These programs aim to increase the effectiveness of efforts to promote the soundness of financial systems in member economies. Supported by experts from a range of national agencies and standard-setting bodies, activities carried out under these programs seek to identify the strengths and vulnerabilities of a member economy, to determine how key sources of risk are being managed, and to ascertain the sector’s developmental and technical capacity. So far, eight countries in the Americas have been reviewed under the Financial Sector Assessment Program and another four under the Offshore Financial Center Assessment Program. The IMF and World Bank also provide technical assistance on implementing anti–money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism legislation at the request of member states. Within the Americas, the IMF has established a subregional training center in the Caribbean (Caribbean Region Technical Assistance Centre) located in Barbados, in which 20 countries and territories participate. The IMF and World Bank also work with the two FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) in the region, sharing assessments and on training and implementation.

**Commonwealth Secretariat**

The Commonwealth Secretariat (ComSec) undertakes a number of programs in the Caribbean subregion in areas such as counterterrorism legislation drafting and capacity building and measures to combat corruption that are relevant to Strategy implementation. Its programs also help Caribbean states to develop capacities to deal with

---

65 Interpol, “Counter-Terrorism Activities Undertaken by the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) in the Americas,” 4 June 2008 (on file with the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation).  
66 Under the auspices of its Financial Sector Assessment Program, the IMF has conducted assessments of Barbados, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay. See http://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/fsap.asp.  
68 The Commonwealth Secretariat is the operational body of the Commonwealth of Nations, which consists of 53 independent states (the United Kingdom and 52 former colonies of the United Kingdom).  
69 Haiti and Suriname are not members of ComSec.
transnational crime, in particular in areas of international cooperation, such as extradition, mutual legal assistance, and cross-border restraint and confiscation of proceeds of crime. In addition, the ComSec develops programs to assist its member countries in areas relating to the rule of law and the promotion of democratic values and in policy development on the administration of and access to justice and the speedy and effective resolution of disputes. It further collaborates with other international donors, in particular Canada and the United Kingdom, and specialized bodies in the conduct of its programs in the region, including collaboration with ICAO on conducting aviation security audits in a number of CARICOM states.

---

V. The Role of Regional and Subregional Bodies

Regional and subregional bodies have a number of comparative advantages in terms of contributing to Strategy implementation. As practical realities vary from region to region and even country to country, regional and subregional bodies, which often have at their disposal knowledge and expertise of local, regional, and subregional conditions, can play a critical role in increasing a sense of local ownership of Strategy implementation efforts. They can contribute to capacity-building efforts in the relevant region or subregion, including by identifying the needs and priorities of their members, helping to bring together states with a common set of interests and objectives, facilitating technical assistance delivery, and serving both as implementation partners of the actual providers of assistance and as the focal points for capacity-building programs to minimize the likelihood of duplication of efforts. They can lend political support for Strategy implementation efforts, including by adding calls in regional and subregional ministerial statements for states to implement the Strategy. Finally, they can help ensure that regional and subregional priorities reinforce those reflected in the Strategy’s global framework.

The Task Force has made some progress in improving the information flow among, if not the coordination of, UN entities. However, its different thematic working groups currently only share information among themselves, and contact and information sharing with stakeholders outside the United Nations, including member states and regional bodies, has been limited. The Secretary-General’s first report on the UN system’s role in implementing the Strategy, released in July 2008, acknowledges the valuable contributions that regional and subregional bodies can make to the implementation of the Strategy and that the UN system has yet to fully tap the resource they offer.\(^7^1\) This is particularly so in the case of the OAS.

In the OAS, the Americas has perhaps the most developed and effective regional organization in the world outside of Europe. The OAS has played an important role throughout the region in promoting development, democracy, and rule of law and human rights; building security capacity to deal with drug trafficking, illicit firearms trafficking, and border control; and facilitating and providing counterterrorism capacity-building assistance. Nevertheless, institutional fragmentation with the OAS system, the financial limitations of its secretariat, and the fact that some regional actors see the organization as “an instrument of direct or indirect domination”\(^7^2\) have somewhat hindered its ability to implement its wide-ranging mandates effectively.

The work of the OAS is complemented by a number of less well-funded subregional organizations, including the CFATF, GAFISUD, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, and the Central American Integration System (SICA). A number of these bodies have leveraged the support of the international community through multilateral and bilateral assistance to carry out programs in the region that have helped to enhance the counterterrorism and other security-related capacities of states in the region. In addition, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), through its loans and grants, helps finance development projects and supports strategies to reduce poverty, expand growth, increase trade and investment, promote regional integration, and foster private sector development and modernization of the state, all of which are critical to furthering holistic implementation of the Strategy in the region. Each of these bodies has a role to play in furthering Strategy implementation in the region. The Task


\(^7^2\) Tickner, “Latin America and the Caribbean,” p. 8.
Force needs to become better acquainted with their activities and then seek to create synergies between these activities and those of the relevant UN actors in the region.

**Organization of American States**

*Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE)*

The OAS carries out its counterterrorism capacity-building work primarily through CICTE, which was created in 1999 and endowed with a small secretariat. The CICTE Secretariat, along with the Executive Secretariat of CICAD and the new Department of Public Security, is now a part of the OAS Secretariat for Multidimensional Security that was established in 2005 to enhance secretariat cooperation and coordination on a range of overlapping security-related issues.

The CICTE Secretariat was established in 2002 to support the member states and help them develop the capacity to comply with their international commitments and to implement CICTE’s annual Work Plan. Its main purpose is to promote and develop cooperation among OAS member states to prevent, combat, and eliminate terrorism. States in the region are required to do so in accordance with the principles of the OAS Charter and with the 2002 Inter-American Convention against Terrorism and with full respect for the sovereignty of states and the rule of law, including international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law.

The CICTE Secretariat leverages the financial and technical support of its partners, which include functional organizations and bilateral donors, to offer technical assistance and capacity-building training programs to assist OAS member states in their efforts to prevent, combat, and eliminate terrorism. These programs offer technical assistance, including specialized training, in areas such as border control, financial controls, critical infrastructure protection, legislative assistance and consultations, crisis management exercises, and policy development and coordination. These programs are further concentrated in areas such as port security, aviation security, document security and fraud prevention, immigration and customs, counterterrorism legislation, counterterrorism exercises, cybersecurity, tourism and recreational facilities security, policy development and coordination, and terrorist financing.

Through the work of the CICTE Secretariat, the countries of the region have stepped up their cooperation on a range of terrorism-related issues, such as improving the quality of identification and travel documents and adopting financial controls to prevent money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities. The CICTE Secretariat is working on a plan to strengthen cybersecurity in the region, including the establishment of a cybersecurity 24/7 alert and warning network for the Americas.

---

71 The CICTE acronym is taken from its Spanish name (Comité Interamericano contra el Terrorismo).
73 For detailed information on the current CICTE Work Plan, see http://www.oas.org/rev/en/About/Structure.asp.
74 In total, the CICTE Secretariat has conducted 61 training courses and technical assistance missions in 2007, benefiting some 2,692 participants in the hemisphere. *Report on the Activities of the Secretariat of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism, Eighth Regional Session*, 5–7 March 2008, OAS/Ser.L/X.2.8.
75 Ibid.
CICTE has developed some innovative and cost-effective ways to keep states and other key stakeholders informed of its work that offer models for others, including the CTED and the Task Force. For example, the CICTE network of National Points of Contact serves as the principal means by which the secretariat communicates with states on technical issues and organizes in-country training activities to allow for more direct contact with security experts in capitals. The CICTE Secretariat also regularly circulates a newsletter to keep its members and other interested parties aware of its past, current, and future work.

In addition to these outreach efforts, the CICTE Secretariat maintains cooperation relationships with some 30 international, regional, and subregional organizations, as well as the private sector. Foremost among these in the UN system are ICAO, the IMO, UNODC, the UN Inter-Regional Crime Institute, and most recently the WCO. These relationships and tailored training programs offer an excellent example of how a regional organization can help countries to implement international standards set by UN entities.

In addition to expanding and improving international, regional, subregional, and domestic cooperation, organizations operating in the Western Hemisphere have also worked to expand cooperation across these levels (e.g., CICTE has worked closely with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum on port and cybersecurity projects and with the private sector). In fact, various CICTE programs, such as security for major events, tourism security, and cybersecurity, focus heavily on the private sector and could provide a platform to promote a broader dialogue with nonstate stakeholders and greater awareness for security measures and implementation of the Strategy.

As noted above, CICTE’s interactions with the CTC/CTED have so far been somewhat limited. However, the CTED Executive Director’s briefing to CICTE’s Eighth Regular Session in March 2008, which outlined the new, more proactive, and tailored approach the CTED will be taking with stakeholders, including organizations such as CICTE, may signal the start of more sustained interaction between the two bodies. Such interactions should include the participation of CTED experts in relevant CICTE training sessions.

Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD)

CICAD is a technical body that promotes interagency collaboration at the national level, as well as cooperation with global, regional, and private sector partners to address the continuing drug production and trafficking problems in the Western Hemisphere. The Executive Secretariat partners with the CICTE Secretariat and a number of other regional and international organizations, including UNODC. Its program areas include, inter alia, demand reduction, supply reduction, alternative development, anti-money laundering, and institutional development. It is a partner in the Port Security Assistance Program created by CICTE to strengthen the capacity of OAS member states to effectively comply with the security requirements of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Other partners are the Inter-American Committee on Ports, Transport Canada, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the U.S. Department of State. The Anti-Money Laundering Unit of the CICAD Executive Secretariat also partners with the CICTE Secretariat on training related to terrorist financing, especially for judges, prosecutors, police, and financial intelligence units.

CICAD’s assistance programs that are relevant to implementing the Strategy include regional training seminars for police and customs officials on topics such as control of chemical substances; security of officers and officials; maritime cooperation; profiles of suspicious containers and passengers; inspection of cargo and private

---

78 Ibid.
sector participation in seaport and airport security; and money-laundering control training programs. Much like CICTE, CICAD has relied on effective partnerships with a range of other multilateral bodies to carry out its mandate, including the IADB, UNODC, and the Pan American Health Organization.

The strategic and operational partnerships like the ones that CICAD promotes at the national level are critical, whether they relate to efforts to combat drugs or terrorism. In addition, interagency collaborative efforts should be encouraged between states in the region focusing on common concerns and points of overlap such as border security, law enforcement, technical and regional expertise, critical infrastructure protection, and the sharing of information. This type of relationship is not only essential within governments, but in outreach to the United Nations, regional and subregional bodies, the private sector, and civil society.

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Inter-American Court of Human Rights

The protection of human rights in the region, including adherence to human rights norms while fighting terrorism, falls within the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The decisions of the Court and the IACHR with regard to the protection of human rights as it relates to state action against individuals implicated in terrorist offenses have been cited extensively in the Digest of Jurisprudence of the UN and Regional Organizations on the Protection of Human Rights While Countering Terrorism.

Perhaps most importantly, the Court, at the request of an OAS member state, may provide advisory opinions concerning the compatibility of its domestic laws with OAS human rights norms. Access to this important facility by states in the region as they seek to adopt new domestic laws to implement Security Council–mandated counterterrorism requirements is not limited to states–parties to the Court or states that have accepted its compulsory jurisdiction. Where appropriate, the CTC/CTED should be encouraging states in the region to seek advisory opinions on their counterterrorism legislation and practice through the facilities provided by the Court and the IACHR.

The IACHR has also convened meetings of government experts “to exchange best practices and national experiences, from a human rights perspective, in adopting counterterrorism measures.” Secretariat officials from CICTE and the IACHR attend the other’s annual meetings, although they do not participate in each other’s training sessions. Upon the decision of the OAS General Assembly, the IACHR and CICTE have also collaborated closely in the preparation and consideration of a set of recommendations for the protection of human rights by OAS member states in the fight against terrorism. The 2007 OAS General Assembly directed the Permanent Council to begin consultations with CICTE and its member states on the above-mentioned recommendations, which were prepared by the IACHR, with a view to “compiling current international standards based on applicable international law, as well as best practices, for consideration by the [OAS] General Assembly.”

---

79 Both institutions were created by the American Convention on Human Rights.
The IACHR and CICTE have yet to develop the programmatic or day-to-day cooperation that is ultimately needed to ensure that the OAS promotes in practice the human rights-based approach to combating terrorism that is envisioned in its various policy documents. However, even the limited cooperation taking place between the human rights and counterterrorism arms of this regional organization can serve as a best practice for other regional entities.

As this brief overview of the work of the OAS system indicates, it is well positioned to contribute in a range of ways to promote Strategy implementation among its members. It is thus an institution with which the Task Force needs to find as many ways as possible to engage. Unfortunately, the interactions between the Task Force and the OAS have been limited, partially due to the former’s lack of staff and resources. For example, despite its willingness to share its considerable expertise with the Task Force and otherwise assist it, the CICTE Secretariat has had minimal contact with it or its constituent working groups, with any communication generally being initiated by CICTE.

The onus is on the Task Force in consultation with the OAS Secretariat to determine how best to leverage the mandates of the UN agencies and programs to take advantage of the OAS’s positioning in the region and the operational capacities of its agencies and departments. The countries of the region have ownership in the OAS system, and the OAS as an integral part of the region understands well the region’s dynamics, its peculiarities, strengths, and weaknesses. A first step could be a meeting between the OAS Assistant Secretary of Multidimensional Security and the directors of each of the units under his purview and the head of the Task Force and representatives of those UN entities with greatest relevance to the region’s needs. They could discuss priorities for Strategy implementation in the region and the complementary roles that the two organizations should play in helping states in the region address these priorities.

At the more operational level, the CICTE Secretariat offers a best practice in terms of its organization, ability to engage effectively with a wide range of multilateral and bilateral stakeholders, operational modalities, and execution of its counterterrorism capacity-building mandate. All of this could guide the CTC/CTED and the broader Task Force in helping other regional and subregional bodies to develop the necessary counterterrorism architecture to enable them to engage effectively with the United Nations and other stakeholders, with a view to strengthening their ability not only to promote Strategy implementation among their member states, but hemispheric counterterrorism cooperation more generally.


The CFATF and GAFISUD are the two FSRBs in the Americas. With a combined membership of 41 countries, each has a small secretariat. Their main objectives are to achieve implementation of and compliance by their members with the FATF 40 Recommendations on money laundering and nine Special Recommendations on terrorist financing.

The FSRBs undertake mutual evaluations of their members and are able to help them identify areas of deficiencies in their implementation of the recommendations and help them in meeting international standards. Ongoing mutual evaluation reports have identified a number of deficiencies in some of the countries evaluated. These countries need a significant infusion of technical assistance, training, and financial support to meet required standards. For example, a number of countries in the region still have not adopted the requisite legislation, including implementing legislation, for the International Convention against the Financing of Terrorism nor have in place appropriately operational financial intelligence capacity. To address this and other needs, the FSRBs have worked closely with and received support from the Governments of Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Cooperating and Supporting Nations).
addition, the FSRBs have collaborated on a number of programs with the OAS/CICAD, the IADB, the Caribbean Development Bank, the ComSec, UNODC, the World Bank, IMF, Interpol, the FATF, and the Egmont Group in training and other capacity-building programs of their members.

**Caribbean Community**

CARICOM’s primary objectives are Caribbean economic integration and development, a common external trade policy, a coordinated foreign policy, and regional security. As previously noted, the CARICOM Secretariat does not include staff dedicated to counterterrorism, which limits the secretariat’s role in helping its members implement counterterrorism measures. Further, CARICOM’s Regional Task Force on Crime and Security, an expert group that examines the major causes of crime and recommends approaches to deal with the interrelated problems of crime, illicit drugs and firearms, and terrorism, is not a policy or decision-making body and does not have executive functions. Except in special circumstances, such as the regional cooperation on providing security for the 2007 Cricket World Cup, execution of security policy recommendations has usually been left to each country to implement individually on the basis of each one’s access to resources and expertise. To offset CARICOM’s institutional limitations, CARICOM members rely heavily on counterterrorism and security-related bilateral assistance from Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as from international specialized bodies and other partners. This approach can leave the region’s smaller and less developed countries at a disadvantage in accessing technical assistance in general and counterterrorism assistance in particular. A number of counterterrorism and other security-related programs, primarily training, have been provided in the subregion through the OAS (CICTE and CICAD) and CFATF, as well as UNODC in cooperation with the OAS and other regional and international bodies.

In addition, at the Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM in 2006, the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security emerged as the implementation arm of the regional architecture for the management of crime and security in the subregion. It remains to be seen whether the agency could play a role in promoting implementation of the Strategy in the subregion.

**MERCOSUR**

The primary focus of the five-member trading bloc MERCOSUR since its inception has been on furthering regional economic integration. However, progress on its economic agenda has stalled as a result of a diversity of

---

84 CARICOM has 15 member states and five associate members. Its membership includes 10 English-speaking independent island states in the Caribbean, plus Guyana and Suriname in South America, Belize in Central America, Haiti, and Montserrat (a self-governing British territory).


86 Security policy and decision-making in CARICOM is carried out by its Council of Ministers Responsible for National Security and Law Enforcement as well as policymaking at the heads of government level.

87 The Cricket World Cup 2007 regional security approach was successfully employed by nine CARICOM member states to create a seamless security space, which produced temporarily a common external border employing state-of-the-art technology and methodologies in cooperation and assistance from bilateral partners: Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Interpol.

88 MERCOSUR, “the Common Market of the South,” is the largest trading bloc in South America. Its full members are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Its five associate members are Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.
national interests among its members and associate members and the related lack of shared understanding on how best to advance its major goal of creating a common market, with some observers citing lack of political will among some of its members. 89 With work on its economic priorities largely stalled, the group has still been able to make progress in furthering its noneconomic integrationist agenda, including in the field of counterterrorism. For example, following the attacks of 11 September, MERCOSUR established a Standing Working Group on Terrorism in the framework of its meetings of interior ministers. This working group, which holds monthly organizational meetings and is responsible for coordinating the countries’ antiterrorism efforts in the area of intelligence and efficient contacts and exchange of information, has benefited from contributions from all the region’s intelligence services and security and police forces. In addition, MERCOSUR’s Committee on the Prevention of Money-Laundering has prepared a number of agreements and protocols, which have been adopted by MERCOSUR members aimed at enhancing regional cooperation in this area. 90

Although MERCOSUR has had some success in deepening counterterrorism cooperation among its members, its counterterrorism mandate will need to be strengthened and secretariat resources enhanced if it is to play a meaningful role in promoting Strategy implementation in South America and if it is to engage on a sustained basis with the Task Force in New York.

The Central American Integration System (SICA)

One of the political cornerstones of SICA, 91 an organization founded in 1991 to promote economic integration among its members, is the 1995 Framework Treaty on Democratic Security and the work of the Central American Security Commission (CASC) and the Defence and Legal Subcommittees, the aim of which is to develop a model for democratic security in the region through the adoption of common strategies and regional action plans for dealing with the serious threats to the security of citizens in the subregion. SICA has adopted a series of security-related action plans of relevance to Strategy implementation, including ones related to drugs and organized crime. 92

Of greatest relevance to the Strategy, however, is the counterterrorism framework and action plan adopted by the CASC in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks, largely mirroring the measures included in Security Council Resolution 1373. The Central American Plan for Comprehensive Cooperation to Prevent and Combat Terrorism incorporates decisions “to form national inter-agency committees to coordinate the elaboration of sectoral plans for implementing guidelines and strategic actions; to initiate the Plan’s implementation within 30 days; and to evaluate the sectoral plans on an ongoing basis.” 93 The “actions” involve the exchange of information; the strengthening of security at borders, ports, and airports; increased monitoring and control of migration flows to halt any movement of persons associated with terrorism; and the strengthening of criminal legislation.

90 For information regarding the counterterrorism initiatives in MERCOSUR, see http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/countryreports.shtml.
91 SICA’s members are Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.
With both the CASC and SICA General Secretariat lacking the necessary resources or mandate to work with its members to implement this plan, however, the burden has fallen entirely on the member states, which themselves have significant capacity needs and are faced with other pressing priorities. The SICA institutional limitations have also hindered efforts to reach out to bilateral and multilateral donors in order to build the partnerships necessary to strengthen counterterrorism capacities in the subregion. Therefore, much like MERCOSUR, the Central American subregional mechanism will need to be strengthened if one hopes for it to play a meaningful role in promoting Strategy implementation in Central America.

**Inter-American Development Bank**

The IADB, with membership of 47 countries, is the main source of multilateral financing in the Americas for economic, social, and institutional development. With its loans and grants targeting financing for development projects and supporting strategies to reduce poverty, expand growth, and increase trade and investment, the IADB is instrumental in implementing the Strategy. The IADB has a mandate to devote at least one-half of its operations and 40 percent of its lending volume to social programs that promote social equity and target the poor. Increasing the IADB’s grant funding facility, which is currently a small fraction of its loan portfolio, could potentially become a source for increased funding for efforts to reduce poverty in less developed countries of the region, thereby helping to reduce conditions regarded as conducive to the spread of terrorism.94

---

94 Ibid. By the end of 2006, the IADB had approved more than $145 billion in loans and $2.2 billion in grants.
VI. The Role of the United States and Other Bilateral Donors in Furthering Strategy Implementation Efforts in the Americas

In addition to functional organizations in the region, there is an added advantage of having the presence of donor countries active in the region both as it relates to development and security-related assistance. Key donors include Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. As a result, Strategy implementation efforts in the region stand to benefit from partnering with these donor states, especially the United States, which has developed and is implementing a number of security-related programs throughout the region, driven in part by the U.S. desire and commitment to secure its southern flank.

The United States regards the countries of the Americas as “the frontline of American national security.” As part of its national security strategy, the United States holds that its own security requires that it work “with regional partners to make multi-lateral institutions such as the OAS and the IADB more effective and better able to foster concerted action to address threats that may arise to the region’s stability, security, prosperity, or democratic progress.” The United States “four strategic priorities for the region: bolstering security, strengthening democratic institutions, promoting prosperity, and investing in people” are in keeping with the goals of the Strategy.

The United States is investing heavily to secure its southern border with Mexico and has imposed new security travel requirements from countries within the Western Hemisphere to the United States. Furthermore, the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection have actively pursued new security requirements in port facilities and customs entry throughout the Americas, including by providing assistance to some countries to implement the IMO’s ISPS Code. The United States has also added security as a component of its Third Border Initiative with CARICOM states and the Dominican Republic.

Because of its concerns about terrorist fundraising in the TBA, the United States accepted the invitation from Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay to join their existing mechanism to tackle arms and drugs smuggling, document fraud, money laundering, and the manufacture and movement of contraband goods in the subregion. The 3+1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security brings together national counterterrorism officials from each of the countries with a view to strengthening the capacity of the three South American countries “to address cross-border crime and thwart money laundering and potential terrorist fundraising activities.” As noted above, despite this cooperation, sharp differences remain between the United States and the “3” over the existence of terrorism active in this vulnerable area.

96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative is a result of the Intelligence Reform and Prevention Act of 2004, requiring all travelers to present a passport or other document that denotes identity and citizenship when entering the United States. It went into effect 23 January 2007, for all persons entering or reentering the United States by air. For more information, see http://travel.state.gov/travel/cbpmc/cbpme_2223.html#.
99 For a full description of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection programs, see http://www.cbp.gov/.
101 The 3+1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security is comprised of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, plus the United States.
102 State Department Western Hemisphere terrorism overview.
Canada is also a major provider of counterterrorism capacity-building assistance in the region, bilaterally and through multilateral and international functional organizations such as the OAS and IMO. Through its Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building (CTCB) assistance program, Canada provides $15 million annually for "training, funding, equipment, technical and legal assistance to other states to enable them to prevent and respond to terrorist activity, within international counterterrorism and human rights norms, standards and obligations." The program focuses on seven areas, including border security, transportation security, terrorism financing, cybersecurity, and critical infrastructure protection and is managed by a committee of relevant federal agencies that seek to take a “whole of government” approach to capacity building.

Since 2006, Canada has provided substantial resources through the CTCB program to CICTE training programs in port and airport security, document security, and terrorist financing. In February 2007, Transport Canada formed the Port Security Assistance Partnership Program with other partners, as noted above. Canada is actively considering the formation of other partnerships with the OAS to leverage resources and enhance the impact of its efforts in the region.

Both the United States and Canada have provided financial and technical support to the development, crime, and security initiatives of the OAS. Given the central role that these two states play in supporting the programs of the OAS and other multilateral and functional bodies that have relevance to the Strategy, it will be important for the Task Force to engage regularly with them, as well as the other potential bilateral donors, as it seeks to promote activities aimed at furthering Strategy implementation in the Americas.

105 Spain has also become a major provider of financial resources to the OAS since 2006 and funds CICTE and CICAD programs. Several Spanish ministries coordinate seminars for Latin American countries at its training centers in the hemisphere in conjunction with the CICTE Secretariat and the UN Inter-Regional Crime Institute. Consideration is currently being given to provide technical assistance in partnership with the OAS.
Conclusion

The Strategy offers the LACR region a framework to develop a more coherent and coordinated response to the terrorist threat. Its holistic approach encourages a broader focus on issues, such as poverty and governance improvements in addition to security-focused measures that alone are unlikely to receive widespread political support.

Unlike many other regions, the LACR has the advantage of having a well-established regional organization in the OAS. Key to effective Strategy implementation, however, will be CICTE’s ability to enhance its coordination and cooperation with the United Nations, particularly an adequately resourced Task Force with active participation from all its members. If regional mechanisms are used to their potential, implementation of the Strategy will be enhanced among its members. This will require active efforts from member states and other stakeholders, including civil society, the United Nations, and, not least, the CTC/CTED, which should do more to tailor its work to regional conditions and increase and sustain its interaction with other relevant parts of the UN system and CICTE to enhance counterterrorism activities on the ground and to achieve the more coherent and comprehensive region-wide response advocated in the Strategy.
The Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation is a nonpartisan research and policy institute that works to improve coordination of the international community’s response to terrorism by providing governments and international organizations with timely, policy-relevant research and analysis. The Center has analyzed multilateral counterterrorism efforts on behalf of over a dozen governments, the UN, and private foundations and is the only research center in the world focused on strengthening global counterterrorism cooperation.

To learn more, visit www.globalct.org.