

NO COMMUNITY WITHOUT COOPERATION: REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND ASIA'S SECURITY ORDER

17–18 January 2008
SINGAPORE
REPORT OF THE SENTOSA ROUNDTABLE ON ASIAN SECURITY 2007–2008

PONDER THE IMPROBABLE

NO COMMUNITY WITHOUT COOPERATION: REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND ASIA'S SECURITY ORDER

REPORT OF THE SENTOSA ROUNDTABLE ON ASIAN SECURITY 2007–2008

17 - 18 JANUARY 2008
SINGAPORE

MULTILATERALISM AND REGIONALISM PROGRAMME
S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY

CONTENTS

OVERVIEW OF THE ROUNDTABLE

Dr. Seki arriving at the Roundtable, being met by the rountable convenor, Assoc. Prof Tan See Seng (RSIS)

On 17–18 January 2008, the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) held the second Sentosa Roundtable on Asian Security in Singapore, sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation of Japan. An annual dialogue for exploring new ideas and approaches to the management of peace and security in the region, the Roundtable is aimed at ascertaining the prospects for, the problems of and the pathways to security community in Asia. The participants included a group of respected academics, non-governmental policy experts, civil-society activists as well as government officials, both serving as well as retired, from Asia and beyond.

Are regional inter-governmental institutions significant or merely adjunct to the process of regional community building in East Asia? This was the question that participants to the second Sentosa Roundtable sought to answer. To that end, the Roundtable assessed the relevance of Asia's inter-governmental institutions—the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). A series of related issues were examined: whether their aims and agendas cohere and complement or compete with one another's; whether they were best defined in geographical or functional terms (i.e. issues-based and/or problem-oriented); the question of regional leadership; the effect of great as well as rising powers on their efficacy; and so on.

However, it was not enough simply to look at formal arrangements. As such, the Six Party Talks (SPT), as an ad hoc inter-governmental arrangement, was also examined in terms of its prospect as the basis for the future construction of regional security architecture in Northeast Asia. At the same time, it was acknowledged that community building is not simply a "top-down" project fashioned by regional governments. "Bottom-up" processes were deemed equally crucial. In this respect, the Roundtable also assessed the contributions of regional non-governmental or non-official networks, such as the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC); trans-national civil society arrangements, such as the ASEAN Peoples' Assembly (APA) and the Solidarity for Asian Peoples Advocacy (SAPA); the regional media and other ancillary processes to community building.

The Roundtable concluded that the process of regionalism in East Asia—that is, of regional cooperation and community formation—has benefited from the contributions of both "top-down" (inter-governmental) as well as "bottom-up" (non-governmental) forces. However, these contributions are by the same token considerably qualified by the region's characteristics—great-power dynamics, dependence on sovereignty and non-intervention norms, lack of state capacity, and so on—which invariably delimit the content and scope of institutional progress. For a list of policy implications and recommendations based on the Roundtable's deliberations, please see Annex A.

Today, East Asia is nowhere near becoming a community, not least in terms of satisfying the demanding conditions hypothesized by theorists of security community. At the same time, it has not degenerated into the "cockpit of great power conflict"[1] that some have assumed it would become following the end of the Cold War. Therein lies the hope for East Asia in its quest for community, and the role of the region's institutions in that process.

1 Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia", International Security, Vol. 18 No. 3 (1993/94), pp. 5–33, see p. 7.

APPRECIATION

Sincere gratitude is due the following for their instrumental contributions, without which the Roundtable would not have been possible:

- President Akinori Seki and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, for their munificence and counsel
- Dr. Christopher Roberts, for his outstanding contributions to every conceivable aspect of the Roundtable
- Belinda Chng, for her fine work on the Roundtable report
- Phyllis Quek, Theresa Ng, Eugene Tan and other RSIS corporate support staff, for their meticulous management of all Roundtable activities
- All Roundtable participants, for the debates that so enlivened and enriched the proceedings and their commitment to making Asia a safer and more secure place

Assoc Prof Tan See Seng
Convenor
The Sentosa Roundtable on Asian Security

REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENTOSA ROUNDTABLE ON ASIAN SECURITY

Opening Remarks

Ambassador Barry Desker, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, extended a warm welcome to the participants and thanked Dr. Akinori Seki, President of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, and Mr. Richard Smith, former Secretary to the Australian Department of Defence and the Roundtable's distinguished speaker, for their presence. Ambassador Desker noted that Asia's future stability lies in its ability to develop a sense of community that would provide for regional and world order. Hence, the purpose of the Sentosa Roundtable is to bring together scholars and practitioners who would contribute to building an epistemic community in East Asia. The second edition of the Roundtable would focus on regional institutions, one of the three drivers of security community.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Dr. Seki, presenting the keynote address

Dr. Akinori Seki, President of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, observed that the globalized world is now facing serious threats from non-state actors, epidemics and trans-national crimes. For instance, he noted that the Straits of Malacca is one of the busiest and most volatile sea lanes in the world that is under the constant threat of piracy. In response to the challenges posed by globalization, the study of security has expanded to include non-traditional security. While the concept of human security has become more prevalent amidst sharp criticism, the Foundation has been working to hasten implementation of the concept since 2000.

SESSION 1

Regional Institutions and their Relevance to Regional Community Building

Roundtable participants

Regional trends of East Asia suggest growing integration and new interest in regional cooperation and regional frameworks. Scholars and policymakers alike believe regionalism is the means for countries in East Asia to become a more secure and influential actor in the international system. With that said, it often remains unclear what the roles and functions of these regional institutions are. When compared to their counterparts in Europe and North America, East Asian regional institutions are less formal and less institutionalized, which makes it difficult for observers or even practitioners to precisely explain how regional institutions temper the expectations of member states and build stronger relations among members. Regardless, the quest is on for regional community building, a concept that is marked by a sense of a common identity or "we" feeling. Panellists were invited to explain and clarify the relevance of existing regional institutions to regional community building.

Defining Community

The participants' deliberations reflected a deep concern over the given terms of reference underlying this discussion. Many were of the view that the terms should be better defined and applied more definitively to specific institutions. For example, the term "regionalism" was perceived by one panellist as being nebulous because of the ambiguity over the definition of geographical boundaries. Such ambiguity cannot be understated because, in cultivating a sense of belonging and unity, it would be important to differentiate between members of the community and the actors who have strategic interests in the region. It was also suggested that the security concept is overly demanding and it would be best to avoid the concept of a security community and conceive other forms of community building. Regionalism, as a community-building project, must not only be about a community of states, but also of peoples and communities. Therefore, domestic communities need to be stabilized first before an inclusive regional community can be established.

Regionalism through Realistic Expectations

In setting targets and expectations of East Asian regionalism, the panellists noted that the constant comparison with the European Union was both inappropriate and unrealistic. The building of a security community would be impaired by the differences that exist across a broad spectrum in member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Most notably, the extent of democratization or authoritarianism in ASEAN states has underscored the difficulty of establishing institutional processes such as the ASEAN Charter. In pointing out the cultural heterogeneity of ASEAN, a panellist remarked that the achievement of a pluralistic community would be more conceivable than an amalgamated community. This said, a panellist called attention to the often-neglected strategic strengths of East Asian regionalism and highlighted the achievement of peace amidst multi-civilizations, the geopolitical competence of policymakers in preventing inter-state war, and rapid economic growth in the region. Concern was also raised over the lack of institutional mechanisms to reconcile the diverse national interests of states and upgrade the common interests of different parties.

Regionalism through Institutions

On the topic of community building through institutions, it was observed that effective institutions are founded on a utilitarian calculus of states and that a top-down approach to regional community building has been generally successful in the European Union. The institutional design of East Asian institutions, though, could limit the kinds of functions that are undertaken. With regards to the "ASEAN Way", it was noted that while an informal approach has worked well for ASEAN, an evolution of procedures would be necessary as the institution matures, in order for it to remain relevant. On the other hand, some participants questioned if the top-down approach would be artificial, and suggested that instead of attempting to create a community through institutional means, it could prove more effective if the business and cultural communities lead efforts of community building, as in the case of the European Union, as well as Australia and New Zealand. A panellist who spoke from a practitioner's point of view noted that regional institutions have failed to recognize the gap between their institutional capacities and the communities that are envisaged.

Regionalism through Common Identity

The building of a regional community requires attitudinal change, a sense of identity and shared values, and beliefs among regional states. While acknowledging the difficulty of operationalizing the "we" feeling, it was suggested that attitudinal change among state leaders and the people could be assessed. For example, the presence of a redistribution function in the institutions could imply the making of a community of states. In this regard, it was noted that redistribution mechanisms would be crucial in ensuring that the region's prosperity would be extended to the rural poor in order to foster a sense of solidarity. However, caution was raised over overstating the importance of commonality among heterogeneous communities, as individual players could play different roles and still make up a community.

REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS: CAN THEY STEP UP? MR. RICHARD C. SMITH

Regional Institutions and their Relevance

Mr. Richard Smith, presenting the distinguished lunch talk. (Mr. Smith is the former Secretary to the Australian Department of Defence.)

East Asian regional institutions have successfully maintained stability in the region and enhanced relationships among their member states. However, the speaker cautioned against complacency and underscored the need for these institutions to perform more efficiently, improve credibility and renew efforts to handle future challenges. These goals could be accomplished through clear statesmanship and the adoption of bold agendas and policies. Institutions also need to play a key role in encouraging members to engage in free discourse, and recognize that they are components of a wider region. The core functions institutions in the future would be to maintain the twin pillars of conflict avoidance and economic growth. Institutions, though, cannot be expected to be crisis managers as such issues are beyond the capacities of regional institutions, and should continue to be undertaken by neutral bodies such as non-governmental organizations or the United Nations. As the great powers of the world grow increasingly cognizant that the moment of unipolarity has passed, and cooperation among states is vital, the role of regional institutions would continue to grow. In response to a panellist who noted the glaring absence of the United Nations in East Asia's regional crises, the speaker remarked that the United Nations has intervened in cases where regional consensus was apparent, and its role in the region often hinges on regional cooperation.

SESSION 2

Non-Governmental Effects on Institutional Development and Community Building

Post-Cold War Asia has seen a proliferation of regional epistemic communities and the emergence of trans-national civil society within the region. Since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, ASEAN and its dialogue partners have strived to create regional mechanisms and institutions that would contribute to community building. Regional community building has also become a buzzword since the ASEAN community idea was launched with the signing of the Bali Concord II in 2003. Panellists were invited to share their views regarding the role of "Track 2" and "Track 3" civil-society networks on regional community building. How significant has Track 2 and Track 3 actors such as the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), Network of East Asian Think-tanks (NEAT), East Asia Vision Group (EAVG), Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) and the ASEAN Peoples Assembly (APA) been to regional community building? Do these "bottom-up" processes herald the rise of participatory regionalism (albeit patchy) in Asia?

Limited Contribution to Community Building

There was a general consensus that civil society has been playing a more significant role in institutional shaping and community building in recent years, but panellists were in agreement that these bottom-up processes do not herald the rise of participatory regionalism. Track 2 advocates could cite instances in the past where they played a catalytic role in generating ideas but such influence are few and far between. Past successes include the proposal for an ASEAN Charter, and civil society engagement in the Vientiane Action Programme and the occupation of Cambodia by Vietnam. Nonetheless, there is potential for Track 3 initiatives to facilitate social integration and enhance the system of checks and balances in the region. One panellist noted that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have an important role to play in bringing power to elected legislators and helping governments to shape policies. Community building would also necessitate looking into epistemic foundations and social culture. Hence, in reference to CSCAP, it was proposed that epistemic and ideational criteria be established to evaluate the expectations of CSCAP functioning as a prominent Regional Epistemic Community.

Structural Impediments to Participatory Regionalism

The advent of participatory regionalism in ASEAN on a large scale is unlikely unless member states believe in the values of democracy. Several participants noted that the region's bureaucratic culture and remnants of colonial authoritarianism impede greater participation from civil societies. "Bottom-up" processes are regularly hindered by policymakers who are resistant to ideas and proposals that do not coincide with their own views. In an attempt to bypass the bureaucratic processes, a suggestion was raised for a new institutional platform that would pave the way for a consultative process between top ASEAN leaders and Track 3 participants. However, the move would be futile unless ASEAN leaders became more receptive to new ideas. The ASEAN leaders' preference to limit interaction with civil societies is apparent from the hierarchy of the existing Tracks and also the indirect role of the ASEAN Peoples' Assembly and Solidarity for Asian Peoples Advocacy in confidence building rather than as a direct consultative member. While greater participation by the public is hampered by the significant divergence between ASEAN Track 2 and Track 3 and the governments, civil-society groups are nonetheless also plagued by internal problems that diminish their political influence.

Track 3 Internal Obstacles

A major impediment to the influence of NGOs over policymakers is the lack of support and cooperation among civil-society organizations. In the case of the

ASEAN Peoples' Assembly, civil societies are often unable to agree on a consolidated position and to express their views in a singular voice. The difficulty of coordination is again aggravated by the fact that some civil societies have strong governmental links that shape their positions and agendas in opposition to the other civil-society members. A panellist who has had extensive involvement in Track 3 argued that civil societies lacked a coherent voice because they are often in competition for funding. The lack of resources for capacity building and limited financial assistance and support from local governments also weakens the workings of civil societies. One panellist expressed disappointment that the ASEAN Charter has omitted a number of proposals from the Solidarity for Asian Peoples Advocacy. Contrary to the prevailing view that ASEAN leaders are reluctant to adopt new ideas from civil societies, a participant and former practitioner pointed out that the proposals from Track 2 and Track 3 lack originality and often fall below the expectations of Track 1. In order to generate more attention and credibility, both Track 2 and Track 3 require broader representation and a renewal of ideas. For a start, increased interaction and cooperation between the two Tracks could help to generate a louder voice in ASEAN.

SESSION 3

Regional Powers: Interactive Effects on Regional Institutions and Community Building

From L to R: Prof. Leszek Buszynski (International University of Japan); Prof. Michel Wesley (Director of Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, Australia); Dr. Chin Kin Wah (Deputy Director, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore); and Dr. Evelyn Goh (St. Anne's College, University of Oxford)

ASEAN is currently taking the driver's seat in the East Asian community-building process through the ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). Major regional powers such as China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have acknowledged ASEAN's leading role. However, ASEAN should be mindful of the nature of the ties among the major powers, which may affect the prospect for peace or conflict in the region. In this session, the panellists discussed the relations among the major powers and their effects on regional institutions and community building.

Interactions Among the Major Powers

The discussion focused on the interactions between China, Japan and the ROK in East Asia. China and Japan are thought to engage in a competition to play a leading role in the East Asian community-building process. Japan wants to balance China's influence in the region by inviting Australia, New Zealand and India into the EAS.

Meanwhile, the ROK considers itself to have an important role in East Asian cooperation by acting as a bridge between China and Japan. The ROK wishes to play a role in the East Asian community-building process by suggesting and coordinating initiatives such as the East Asian Vision Group and the East Asian Study Group. Its aim is to partner ASEAN as a co-driver in East Asian community-building. The ROK views its role as the software provider in the form of the above initiatives, while ASEAN provides the hardware such as the ASEAN+3 meeting. However, it remains to be seen if ASEAN is willing to share its leading position with the ROK in the community-building process.

One of the by-products of the ASEAN+3 and the EAS is the promotion of interaction between China, Japan and the ROK on the fringes of the meeting. There is some concern that Northeast Asia may in time hijack the ASEAN+3 process and take over the leading role from ASEAN. However, due to the China-Japan rivalry, such an occurrence is deemed unlikely.

Effects on Community Building

Dr. Tang Siew Mun (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia)

Community building in East Asia is not possible without the China-Japan rapprochement. However, some panellists thought that a security community is unlikely to exist in the future due to positional competitionsand balancing among the countries, as the strategic calculations are still coloured by Cold War dynamics. One panellist envisioned that economic integration might be the key to community building.

Another panellist said that the end point of the community-building process is to achieve a regional hierarchy, maintaining that the community-building process does not conflict with the idea of hierarchy. She gave an analogy of a family that comprises grandparents, parents and children who, though not equal in stature, still form a happy family. Hence what is important is whether the units in the system have a mutually reciprocal understanding of an acceptable set of relationships. In her view, states in Southeast Asia have a preference for a regional hierarchy with the United States on top, followed by China.

One panellist lamented the lack of discussion surrounding the role of the United States and India in this issue. Most panellists were in the agreement that the United States is an indispensable player and should be involved in the process. The issue of what constitutes East Asia was also raised, with panellists questioning whether Australia and New Zealand do belong there.

Conclusively, community building in East Asia cannot be divorced from the interactive effects of the major powers. ASEAN, as a driver of the process, should be mindful of that, and should strive to translate lessons of history into developing stable regional institutions to realize a prosperous, sustainable, responsible, sensitive and peaceful East Asian Community.

SESSION 4

Constructing a New Security Architecture for Northeast Asia

From L to R: Assoc. Prof. Ralf Emmers (Head of Graduate Studies, RSIS); Ambassador K. Kesavapany (Director, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore); and behind Amb. Kesavapany is Prof. Dennis Trinidad (Head, International Studies Department, De la Salle University, Philippines)

Northeast Asia, with its Cold War legacy, is perhaps the most volatile geopolitical region in the world. Currently, it has two hotspots that may potentially develop into eyes of storms, namely North Korea and Taiwan. To deal with the former, there is currently a security mechanism in the form of the Six Party Talks (SPT) involving the United States, China, Russia, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The panellists in this session pondered the possibility of the SPT developing into a regional security mechanism in the future, roles of ASEAN member countries in the process of the creation of a new security mechanism in Northeast Asia, as well as the role of the United States as an outsider to the region.

Role and Future of the SPT

There were differing views about the SPT and its alleged success in solving the North Korean nuclear crisis. One panellist described the SPT as engaging in "triple-level" diplomacy, which incorporates multilateral, bilateral and domestic diplomacy, aimed at the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the continuation of strategic stability in the region. Another panellist said that the SPT has a bilateral diplomacy setting, with the DPRK on one side and the other five countries on the other. Nevertheless, the SPT is a new phenomenon, as this is the first time the four major powers—namely the United States, China, Russia and Japan—have come together to discuss issues of importance to each country's national interests.

Some panellists were optimistic that the SPT can potentially move beyond its current role of solving North Korea's nuclear crisis to become a future regional security mechanism, while others were less sanguine about its prospect, pointing to the lack of unity among the countries involved. Nevertheless, the success of the SPT in solving the nuclear crisis will be a desired public good that can benefit all countries in Northeast Asia. If the SPT fails, there is a possibility of a new divide forming between China and Russia on one side, and the U.S.-Japan alliance on the other.

One panellist pointed out that in order to turn the SPT into a new multilateral-security arrangement in Northeast Asia, countries need to adopt parallel thinking, which combines the traditional realist perspective of considering the worst-case scenario and the cooperative security perspective. The latter requires states to think more in cooperative terms rather than building alliances against one another. Beyond the traditional security concern, one also needs to consider rising non-traditional security concerns (NTS) such as environmental and energy issues, which may potentially turn into a new security architecture.

The Role of ASEAN

ASEAN offers both positive and negative lessons for the development of a new security architecture in Northeast Asia. ASEAN's success in mitigating conflict among its member countries offers positive lessons for Northeast Asia, such as the concepts of inclusiveness and non-interference. The ASEAN+3 is another useful platform that provides a neutral arena to discuss common security and economic interests, and pursue a cooperative security agenda. Through the dialogue platform of the ASEAN+3, countries can learn the behavioural norms and patterns of dialogue: non-confrontation, self-restraint, moderation, and pragmatism.

However, one panellist opined that ASEAN should first get its own house in order before immersing itself in a role in Northeast Asia. Another panellist pointed out that the regionalism in Northeast Asia in general is lagging behind that of Southeast Asia due to three factors, namely, rising nationalism in individual countries, unresolved security issues such as North Korea, and the U.S. containment policy towards China.

The Role of the United States

In general, there was common agreement that the United States has a role to play in developing a regional security mechanism in Northeast Asia. From the U.S. camp, this issue has also featured the current presidential election, with Hillary Clinton calling for the creation of a security architecture in Northeast Asia. Currently, the SPT is the only mechanism that involves the United States in Northeast Asia. The United States needs to make up its mind clearly on whether it wants to change the North Korean regime or simply modify its behaviour.

The United States also needs to adjust itself in playing its role as the era of unilateralism has ceased, and thus it has to learn to play by the rules of multilateralism. The trilateral dialogue involving the United States, Japan and China is a good starting point.

SESSION 5

Building The ASEAN Community in Southeast Asia

The recent signing of the ASEAN Charter in November 2007 signifies a shift in the regional grouping to move towards a rules-based regionalism. During the drafting process of the Charter, the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was tasked to come out with recommendations for the drafting body. Some of the recommendations have found their way into the Charter, while some did not. In this session, the panellists discussed ASEAN's progress since its inception, the role of the ASEAN Charter in regional community building and the way forward for ASEAN.

The Transformation of ASEAN

Most of the panellists agreed that ASEAN needed to change. One panellist highlighted that so far little headway has been made in ASEAN to deepen integration and community building. ASEAN tends to function well as an inter-governmental organization, with its members jealously guarding their own national sovereignty, rather than a grouping that demonstrates concrete political will to pull sovereignty and move forward in the direction of supra-nationalism.

The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation signed in 1976 contributes to this stalemate in the regionalism process due to its emphasis on the principle of non-interference. The ASEAN strategic culture tends to gravitate towards consensus-based decision making, avoidance of issues that can disrupt the consensus and strategic ambiguity to allow room for compromise and resolution of controversial issues to later date.

Another weakness of ASEAN that was highlighted pertains to the ambiguity of ASEAN's legalism, which is due to the weak legal culture in ASEAN for building strong and cohesive community bonds, shared values and norms. On dispute settlement, members of ASEAN still prefer to use extra-ASEAN mechanisms such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rather than the intra-ASEAN machinery like the High Counsel. This suggests a lack of confidence in ASEAN-based mechanisms to settle territorial claims and sovereignty issues.

So far, the role of people's participation in community building in ASEAN is limited, as most governments in ASEAN tend to fall into the category of either soft authoritarianism or military political regime, which emphasize good governance and frown upon any form of public protest. Another challenge to regional integration and community building also pertains to the failure to close the development gaps within ASEAN countries.

On the other hand, some panellists questioned whether ASEAN needed to change, citing the success of ASEAN members in avoiding conflicts among its members since its inception. Those who were in this camp argued that ASEAN's status quo of the quasi-family orientation should be preserved. Panellists who countered this argument pointed to the changing security agenda, such as terrorism (which is now a cross-border issue), domestic political transformation in some member countries and the changing wider geopolitical environment such as the rise of China and India. In their view, all these factors necessitated the transformation in ASEAN.

The Role of the ASEAN Charter

The efficacy of the ASEAN Charter was hotly debated among the panellists. Some lamented that the drafters did not include what the EPG had listed in its recommendations. Another panellist said that the drafters themselves faced constraints in doing so, as ASEAN is a huge grouping with diverse ideologies as wll as political and socio-economic systems.

One panellist pointed out that the Charter might not be the right document for community building in Southeast Asia. As it remains inside the traditional boundary of the ASEAN way of doing things, it does not change the way ASEAN member countries conduct their relations. There is also the absence of a compliance mechanism (such as sanction), the lack of a stronger Secretariat and over-reliance on consensus.

One panellist pointed out the lack of inclusion of civil-society groups in drafting the Charter. Another countered the argument, citing Article XVI in the Charter, which enshrines the role of civil society and non-governmental organizations in the ASEAN grouping. Certainly, the diverse nature of ASEAN prevents all voices from being heard and included, but the drafting body has tried to include as many as possible through discussion sessions at town hall meetings prior to drafting the Charter.

A question also arose on whether the EPG's recommendations should have been published, as the report may give analysts too high an expectation of what the Charter might potentially look like. One panellist argued that the publication of the EPG's recommendations is good as it enhances the transparency of the decision-making process in ASEAN. Nevertheless, the ASEAN Charter is a good first step in community building, as it sets a benchmark for what ASEAN aspires to be.

The Future of ASEAN

One panellist asked a thought-provoking question pertaining to the end goal of ASEAN community building. Another panellist said that community building is a continuously evolving process, citing the examples of the European Union (EU) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The EU experience tells us that deeper political, economic and social integration must be accompanied by the harmonization of standards and procedures, legal community buildings, systems, as well as delivery mechanisms. However, there is also a potential problem in developing a rules-based organization, as illustrated by the increasing bureaucratic control in the EU, which has contributed to the divide between common citizens and the perceived elitism of the EU itself.

Conclusively, the ASEAN Charter, though not perfect, has set a roadmap forward for ASEAN, and in the bottom-up, top-down drafting process, some members of the public have been included, which is a welcome sign of increasing transparency in ASEAN's decision making.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Roundtable deliberations generated eight related sets of policy implications and recommendations. The first set focuses on the role and relevance of regional inter-governmental institutions in East Asia. The second set looks at how the plethora of institutions can minimize or avoid the detrimental aspects of inter-institution competition that undermine community-building, and complement one another in more synergistic ways. The third set makes a case for Asian institutions as issue-specific, problem-oriented organizations. The fourth set touches on the controversial yet crucial issue of regional leadership, without which the community-building process could suffer. Fifth, the role of regional powers, both established and emerging, is significant to the success of Asia's institutions and, more broadly, regional order and community. The sixth and seventh sets focus exclusively on East Asia's sub-regions—Northeast and Southeast Asia respectively—and the regionalisms therein. The eighth and final set looks at regionalization (or "bottom-up") forces and processes that arguably contribute to community building in East Asia.

Relevance of Regional Institutions

- Asia's inter-governmental institutions contribute to the peace, security and stability of East Asia. They function not only as arenas for discussion but also as a means to construct a stable yet adaptive structure for regional community.
- East Asian institutions are clearly limited, deliberately so, in terms of what they can accomplish. They continue to rely on principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention as their diplomatic foundation for inter-state cooperation. Upon this institutional basis, member states exchange different views on security issues, learn to understand the dominant international norms, attempt to persuade one another through principled argumentation and, as a result, alter each other's behaviour. Criticisms that East Asian institutions are little more than "talk shops" tend to miss this point.
- With the right conditions in place, institutional change and community formation will evolve. While an informal approach has worked well for ASEAN, an evolution of procedures would be necessary as pan-Asian institutions (ARF, ASEAN+3, EAS) predicated on the ASEAN Way of consensus, consultation and informality mature in order to remain relevant.
- East Asia's institutions have failed to recognize the gap between their institutional capacities and the communities that are envisaged. Instead of attempting to create a community through institutional means, it could prove more effective if the business and cultural communities lead efforts to build community. In this respect, the current effort to concentrate energies on establishing the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015 is a welcome development. That said, more effort is needed to ensure that the building of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community does not lag behind; ASEAN governments should strongly support ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan's vision of a robust socio-cultural community in Southeast Asia.
- The enterprise of community building will likely fail if it is not supported by a viable redistribution policy for the East Asian region. As such, redistribution mechanisms would be crucial in ensuring that the region's prosperity is extended to the region's rural poor in order to foster a sense of solidarity. Regional institutions with economic functions such as ASEAN, the ASEAN+3, the EAS and APEC could be appropriate rubrics under which to locate these redistribution mechanisms.
- The core functions of East Asian institutions in the future will likely be conflict avoidance and economic growth. However, the limited capacities of these institutions are such that the function of crisis management is best undertaken by the United Nations, with Asian states working under the UN framework.

Institutional Congruence or Competition

- There is no overarching architecture/structure or vision guiding the regional enterprise in East Asia. Nor is there a formal division of labour among the region's institutions. It seems little thought has been given to what they are for and how they relate to one another. How best to move the region beyond the mere proliferation of institutional forms to substantive and meaningful cooperation and community building will be the principal challenge for East Asian states. In short, no further expansion is necessary. Rather, the key is to deepen regional cooperation within and among extant institutions.
- Despite the lack of strategic coherence in the regional architecture, the ARF and APEC complement each other in terms of their near-identical memberships and their division of labour (the ARF on security, APEC on economics). As such, the two institutions could find greater synergy from the creation of a common secretariat and the coordinated hosting of their annual meetings back-to-back in the same city.

Building Issue-Specific, Problem-Oriented Institutions

- For greater efficacy, East Asia's institutions need to address specific issues and problems. They ought to adopt problem-oriented and problem-solving approaches to regional cooperation. As "talk shops", they serve a useful purpose but talk needs to be balanced with substantive cooperation. For example, although the ASEAN Way has been useful for establishing a level of comfort and building confidence among member states, an incremental shift to a rules-based cooperation in specific issues should be adopted. In fact, inter-governmental support among Asian states for a problem-oriented approach already exists. For some ASEAN leaders, the experience of early post-war European integration offers useful lessons for ASEAN's efforts to establish the AFTA/AEC by 2015.
- Pursuit of functional cooperation could subsequently lead to the creation of issue-driven rules that are binding. For example, despite criticism against ASEAN for its longstanding reluctance to arm its provisions with enforceable rules, the Chiang Mai Initiative, established in response to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, is an early indication that East Asian states are not opposed to moving in a rules-based direction so long as regional conditions merit it.
- As the recent China-Japan debate over the rationale for the EAS suggests, consensus over the need for issue-specific institutions does not mean Asian countries necessarily agree over which particular institution should handle which particular issue. This confusion likely happens when institutional agendas are perceived to be in competition with each other, such as those of the EAS and ASEAN+3.
- The inclusion of countries like Australia and India in the EAS membership for economic, political and strategic reasons suggests that East Asian regionalism, despite the heated debate over membership and geography, ultimately has not restricted itself to a geographical definition, but is an issue-specific one.

Regional Leadership

- Although ASEAN by default remains the politically safest option to occupy the "driver's seat" of East Asian institutions (except APEC), the role of and cooperation among non-ASEAN members, especially regional powers, are crucial. While this has been true of the region's institutions in general, the recent dispute between China and Japan over the founding of the EAS underscored the influence of regional powers on the state of East Asian regionalism.
- The divergence in China and Japan's economic visions hints at the predominance of geopolitical considerations. This is not a bad thing as East Asian institutions play a key role in facilitating the "normalization" or socialization of its members as sovereign states. Indeed, confidence building in Europe first started with the adoption of fundamental principles. As such, the construction of a stable regional order in East Asia could begin by establishing a code of conduct to guide regional multilateral security dialogue and cooperation efforts, not least where China-Japan ties are concerned.

The Role of Great and Rising Powers

- The effectiveness of East Asia's institutions is inextricably linked to the role and influence of the great powers. That the United States, China and Japan are not quite at a stage where they are prepared to subject their wider bilateral relationships to the discipline and constraints of an institutionalized process implies that regional institutions will remain indefinitely limited in aim and agenda. Hence, greater efforts need to be undertaken by ASEAN and other members to lock the commitment of great powers to the region and its institutions.

- The current rapprochement in China-Japan ties is crucial, without which East Asian regionalism would in all likelihood fail. For instance, Franco-German post-war rapprochement was integral to the success of the European Community (now Union), as was Argentine-Brazilian reconciliation vital to the success of the Common Market of the South (better known as MERCOSUR). Hence, a key prerequisite of East Asian order and community is the need for great powers to establish and maintain cooperative ties with one another. Another possibility is a concert of great powers as the basis on which the East Asian Community could be built.

- The question of U.S. participation in East Asia's regional institutions remains significant. Its absence in the EAS became an issue with the inclusion of Australia, New Zealand and India—all seen by China and others as U.S. proxies—in the summit. The United States is clearly concerned over whatever gains China may have made at its expense. Moreover, given the United States' membership in the ARF and its leadership of APEC, it is unlikely that any attempt to make the ARF and APEC more complementary could ever happen without U.S. input.

- Assuming that the community-building process does not conflict with the idea of hierarchy, one plausible end point of the community-building process in East Asia could be to achieve a regional hierarchy. This involves a mutually reciprocal understanding of an acceptable set of relationships, where regional states are generally contented or satisfied with their position within that hierarchy. Arguably, Southeast Asian states have a preference for regional hierarchy, with the United States on top, followed by China. This implies ASEAN states' engagement of China may require socializing China regarding this preference—without antagonizing China, of course. Related to this is the task to keep China committed to its peaceful rise policy and its continuing developing as a responsible power.

Constructing Security Architecture in Northeast Asia

- To turn the Six Party Talks (SPT) into a new multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia, countries need to adopt parallel thinking, which combines together the traditional realist perspective of considering worst-case scenarios and the cooperative security perspective. The latter requires states to think more in cooperative terms rather than building alliances against one another.

- Beyond traditional security concerns, Northeast Asian states should also consider collective attending to rising non-traditional security concerns (NTS) such as environmental and energy issues. Functional cooperation over NTS issues could provide a basis for building a new security architecture in the region.

- Regionalism in Northeast Asia in general is lagging behind that of Southeast Asia, due to three factors, namely, rising nationalism in individual countries, unresolved security issues such as North Korea and the U.S. containment policy towards China. ASEAN's success in minimizing if not avoiding conflict among its member countries offers positive lessons for Northeast Asia, such as the concepts of inclusiveness and non-interference.

- The ASEAN+3 is a useful platform and neutral arena for discussing common security and economic interests and pursuing a cooperative security agenda. Through this dialogue platform, Northeast Asian countries can learn the behavioural norms and patterns of dialogue: non-confrontation, self-restraint, moderation and pragmatism.

- The United States has a role to play in developing a regional security mechanism in Northeast Asia. The United States also needs to adjust itself in playing its role as the era of unilateralism has ceased, and thus it has to learn to play by the rules of multilateralism. The trilateral dialogue involving the United States, Japan and China is one good starting point.

Building the ASEAN Community in Southeast Asia

- Despite its professed aims, ASEAN has hitherto made little headway in deepening integration and community building. ASEAN tends to function well as an inter-governmental organization with its members jealously guarding their own national sovereignty. The ASEAN Way and the weak legal culture of ASEAN states impede the building of strong and cohesive community bonds, shared values and norms. The role of peoples' participation in community building in ASEAN is limited so far, as most governments in ASEAN are either soft autocracies or military regimes that emphasize good governance and frown upon any form of public protest.

- On dispute settlement, ASEAN members still resort to extra-ASEAN mechanisms such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rather than ASEAN-based mechanisms like the High Council. This suggests the lack of confidence in ASEAN mechanisms to settle territorial claims and sovereignty issues. However, the resort by ASEAN countries to essentially peaceful means of dispute settlement, albeit extra-regional, is clearly a norm promoted within ASEAN and hitherto observed, not least in terms of Indonesia-Malaysia (Sipadan and Ligitan) and Malaysia-Singapore (Pedra Branca) territorial disputes.

- Failure to close the development gaps within and across ASEAN countries has hindered and continues to hinder regional integration and community building. Existing policies of national economic development may need to be enhanced with a concomitant regional policy of redistribution to help close development gaps.

- The changing security agenda of the region, which now includes various trans-national issues along with the changing wider geopolitical environment such as the rise of China and India, all necessitate a transformation in ASEAN. The elitist and exclusive ASEAN has served the region well in the past. But present and future challenges call for a revamped ASEAN.

- At present, the ASEAN Charter does not fundamentally change the way ASEAN member countries conduct their relations. It does not provide compliance mechanisms such as sanctions and it lacks financial provision for the enhanced Secretariat that it seeks. But the Charter is best understood as an evolving document.

- While the drafting of the Charter lacked the inclusion of civil-society groups, the drafting process did include some members of the public and various town-hall-styled meetings, which is a welcome sign of increasing transparency in ASEAN's decision making. Importantly, Article XVI of the Charter enshrines the role of civil society and NGOs in the ASEAN grouping.

- The wisdom of publishing the Eminent Persons Group's (EPG) recommendations has been questioned for having unwittingly raised the peoples' expectations in light of the diluted quality of the ASEAN Charter. But the publication of the EPG recommendations was useful in that it enhanced the transparency of the decision-making process in ASEAN. The ASEAN Charter is a good first step in community building as it sets a benchmark for what ASEAN aspires to be.

- The EU experience teaches us that deeper political, economic and social integration must be accompanied by the harmonization of standards and procedures, legal community building, systems as well as delivery mechanisms. However, the EU experience also points to a potential problem in developing a rules-based organization, as illustrated by the increasing bureaucratization of the EU, leading to a divide between its common citizens and the group itself. How ASEAN can avoid this problem while seeking to enhance its own integration will be a key future challenge.

Regionalization Processes in Asia

From L to R: Assoc. Prof. Alice Ba (University of Delaware, USA); Prof. Kishore Mahbubani (Dean of Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore); and Dr. Seki

- Civil society has been playing a more significant role in institution shaping and community building in recent years but these bottom-up processes do not yet herald the rise of participatory regionalism in East Asia. Nonetheless, there is potential for Track 3 initiatives to facilitate social integration and enhance the system of checks and balances in the region. NGOs have an important role to play in bringing power to elected legislators and helping governments to shape policies. ASEAN needs to do more to engage Track 3.

- The Southeast Asian sub-region's bureaucratic culture and remnants of colonial authoritarianism continue to impede greater participation by its civil societies. Bottom-up processes are regularly hindered by policymakers who are resistant to ideas and proposals that do not coincide with their own views. This is apparent from the hierarchy of existing Tracks as well as the indirect role of the ASEAN Peoples' Assembly (APA) and Solidarity for Asian Peoples Advocacy (SAPA) in confidence building rather than as a direct consultative member. To bypass the extant bureaucratic controls, a new institutional platform that would pave the way for a consultative process between top ASEAN leaders and Track 3 participants is needed.

- Civil-society groups are also plagued with internal problems that hamper their influence. In the case of APA, its various members are often unable to agree on a consolidated position and express their views in a singular voice. The difficulty of coordination is also aggravated by the strong governmental links some civil-society groups have, which shape their positions and agendas in opposition to the other civil-society groups. The lack of a coherent voice among them can also be attributed to their competition for funding.

- Track 2 advocates could cite instances in the past where they had played a catalytic role in generating ideas but such influence today has considerably lessened. Past successes include the proposal for an ASEAN Charter, and civil society engagement in the Vientiane Action Programme and the occupation of Cambodia by Vietnam. More epistemic and ideational criteria need to be established in order to better evaluate expectations and contributions of Track 2 networks such as ASEAN-ISIS, CSCAP and PECC.

- Contrary to the prevailing view that ASEAN leaders have been reluctant to adopt new ideas from civil societies, the issue could be that proposals from Track 2 and Track 3 lacked originality and often fell below the expectations of Track 1. In order to generate more attention and credibility, both Track 2 and Track 3 require broader representation and a renewal of ideas. For a start, increased interaction and cooperation between the second and third Tracks could help to generate a more coherent and cogent voice in ASEAN.

THE SENTOSA ROUNDTABLE ON ASIAN SECURITY 2007–2008

The Sentosa Resort and Spa, Singapore
17 and 18 January 2008

Background Brief

The Sentosa Roundtable on Asian Security aims to bring together academics, analysts and practitioners from Asia and beyond to ponder the challenges and prospects for regional community building in Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, various politicians, journalists and academics have heralded the coming of a Pacific Community, an East Asian Community and so forth. Proponents of the community idea highlight Asia's growing economic prosperity and trade links, the proliferation therein of regional institutions (the ARF, APEC, the ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit) and a perceived, emerging sense of regional identity and shared diplomatic norms among Asian countries as plausible indicators, if not drivers, of regional cooperation and regional community building.

Sceptics, however, argue that the primacy of national interests, mutual mistrust and suspicion among societies, the relative lack of political will and capacity of various regional governments, and the prevalence of great power rivalry within the region act as significant roadblocks to Asian regional cooperation and community building. For some, whether increasing interdependence, regionalism and collective identity formation are truly fashioning a security community of Asian societies and states remains unclear partly since interdependence may also foster a greater sense of sensitivity and vulnerability among affected states. Further, because regionalism in Asia has historically been process-oriented rather than product-oriented, critics see little if any institutional progress and regional change.

Against this backdrop, Roundtable 2007 will consider the role of regional institutions as another possible driver of community building. Building on the inaugural roundtable of 2006, which assessed economic prosperity and interdependence as a possible driver of security community, the upcoming roundtable will consist of five sessions, each of which will be guided by a set of suggested questions as follows.

SESSION 1

Regional Institutions and Their Relevance to Regional Community Building

- It is claimed that institutions contribute to regional peace and security by facilitating reciprocity among members, providing information, reducing transaction costs, making commitments more credible and/or establishing policy coordination among members.
- Has this been the case for Asia's institutions, such as the ARF, APEC, the ASEAN+3, and the EAS?
- Do the mandates and agendas of these institutions complement one another and provide a strong basis for regional community building? Or do they compete against each other?
- If it is the latter, how might competition/conflict be minimized?
- Are Asian regionalisms best conceived as issue-specific institutions—political-security (ARF), economic (ASEAN+3), possibly energy security and climate change (EAS), etc.?
- Or does issue-specificity impede regionalism by undermining Asia's very region-ness?

- Do Asian regional institutions, ostensibly predicated on multilateral principles, complement or compete with the extant system of bilateral, U.S.-led defence alliances in Asia?
- Is institutional congruence integral to regional security and regional community formation?
- Other considerations

SESSION 2

Non-governmental Effects on Institutional Development and Community Building

- A key feature of post-Cold War Asia has been the proliferation of regional epistemic communities and emergence of trans-national civil society within the region. As regionalizing processes, how significant have Track 2 networks and/or dialogue processes—ASEAN-ISIS, CSCAP, PECC, Network of East Asian Think-tanks (NEAT), East Asia Vision Group (EAVG), Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), etc.—been to regional community building?
- Likewise, how significant have Track 3 or civil-society networks such as the ASEAN Peoples Assembly and others been?
- How have processes such as the media contributed or impeded community formation?
- Do these bottom-up processes herald the rise of participatory regionalism (albeit patchy) in Asia? What transformative effects, if any, have they had on regional diplomacy and security? Do they facilitate the societal integration of Asia?
- What tensions, if any, define the relationship between bottom-up regionalization and top-down regionalism in Asia? How might these be best reconciled?
- Other considerations

SESSION 3

Regional Powers: Interactive Effects on Regional Institutions and Community Building

- A core rationale of Asian regionalism is the institutionalization of ties between regional powers (China, Japan, India, the United States, etc.) and ties between regional powers and the ASEAN states. This ostensibly helps to secure the commitment of the regional powers to the promotion of the region's peace, prosperity and security. How true is this in the light of the empirical record?
- It is claimed that China favours the ASEAN+3 whereas Japan is more supportive of the EAS. How might this apparent bifurcation undermine community building? To what extent does it reflect a divergence of collective identities and strategic interests?
- How might potential Sino-Indian strategic competition affect institutionalization and community building in the region?
- What implications for regional institutionalism and community building might a potential Sino-Indian strategic competition, and the new Australian-Indian-Japan-U.S. "strategic partnership" (ostensibly aimed at China, according to some), have?
- Other considerations

SESSION 4

Constructing a New Security Architecture for Northeast Asia

- The relative success of the Six Party Talks (SPT) towards denuclearizing the Korean peninsula has led some to speculate about the future creation of a regional security mechanism or institution in Northeast Asia. What are the prospects for such a development?
- How might such a mechanism complement and/or compete with extant U.S.-led alliances with Japan and South Korea? Are Northeast Asia's Cold War structures obsolete?
- Given its role in the genesis of the Four Party Talks, is the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) still a relevant basis for Northeast Asian security multilateralism?
- Is there more to the SPT than nuclear security cooperation? Given the growing importance of so-called non-traditional security concerns in Asia today, how might disaster relief, refugee issues, environment and energy, and other functional issues such as joint investment and economic development contribute to regional institution and community building in the region?
- How significant is the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) and/or other Track 2 processes to institution and community building in Northeast Asia?
- Other considerations

SESSION 5

Building the ASEAN Community in Southeast Asia

- What challenges and prospects for ASEAN community building after the unveiling of the ASEAN Charter? Is the charter representative of rules-based regionalism? Does it radically alter the way ASEAN has traditionally operated?
- ASEAN remains divided structurally between the more developed senior member states and the less developed CLMV countries. What challenges and prospects for regional community building as a result of this division?
- Other considerations

ROUNDTABLE PROGRAMME

Day 1 – 16th January

All day Arrival and check-in

1900h Welcome drinks and dinner for international participants

Day 2 – 17th January

08:15 Registration

09:00 Welcome
AMB. BARRY DESKER, Dean of RSIS

9:15 Keynote Address
DR. AKINORI SEKI,
President of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation

9:45 Introduction
DR. TAN SEE SENG, roundtable convenor

10:00 Session 1: Regional Institutions and Their Relevance to Regional Community Building
Chair: PROF. KISHORE MAHBUBANI,
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy,
National University of Singapore

1. PROF. ALICE BA,
University of Delaware, US
2. DR. XIAOMING HUANG,
Victoria University of Wellington
3. PROF. SORPONG PEOU,
Sophia University, Japan

Discussants

1. PROF. JOHN RAVENHILL, RSIS/ANU
2. DR. PRANEE THIPARAT,
Chulalongkorn University
3. PROF. MELY C ANTHONY, RSIS

11:00 Tea Break

11:15 Q&A (Session 1 continued)

12:00 Lunch
Distinguished Address:
"Regional Institutions: Can They Step Up?"
MR RICHARD SMITH, Former Secretary to the Australian Department of Defence

14:00 Session 2: Non-Governmental Effects on Institutional Development and Community Building
Chair: DR. MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS,
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

1. PROF. NOEL MORADA,
University of the Philippines
2. DR. DAVID CAPIE,
University of Victoria, Wellington,
New Zealand
3. DR. SHIGEMASA KIMIKAZU,
Otsuma University, Japan
4. DR ALEXANDER C. CHANDRA,
Institute for Global Justice

Discussants

1. PROF. PUSHPA THAMBIPI LLAI,
University of Brunei
2. MR. KAVI CHONGKITTAVORN,
The Nation
3. DATO' MOHD ANNUAR BIN ZAINI,
Chairman, Malaysian National
News Agency
Q&A

15:45 Tea Break

16:00 Session 3: Regional Powers: Interactive Effects on Regional Institutions and Community Building
Chair: DR. CHIN KIN WAH,
Deputy Director – ISEAS

1. DR. EVELYN GOH, St Anne's College,
Oxford University, UK
2. PROF. MICHAEL WESLEY,
Griffith University
3. DR. CAI PENGHONG,
Asia-Pacific Institute of the Shanghai
Academy of Social Sciences, China

4. PROF. LESZEK BUSZYNSKI, International University of Japan
5. PROF. HYUG BAEG IM, Korea University

Discussants
1. MR. MANOJ GUPTA, UNSW@ADFA
2. DR. TANG SIEW MUN, University Kebangsaan Malaysia
3. PROF. LEE LAI TO, National University of Singapore

Q&A

17:45 End of Day 1

19:00 Dinner (@ poolside)

Day 3 – 18th January

08:15 Session 4: Constructing a New Security Architecture for Northeast Asia
Chair: PROF. TAN SEE SENG, RSIS
1. PROF. SU HAO, China Foreign Affairs University
2. DR. NICHOLAS THOMAS, University of Hong Kong
3. PROF. TAKASHI KAWAKAMI, Takusyoku University
4. PROF. SUNG CHULL KIM, Hiroshima Peace Institute

Discussants
1. DR. PETER VAN NESS, Australian National University
2. PROF. AILEEN BAVIERA, University of the Philippines
3. PROF. JAMES COTTON, UNSW@ADFA

Q&A

9:15 Tea Break

9:45 Session 5: Building the ASEAN Community in Southeast Asia
Chair: MR. RODOLFO SEVERINO, ISEAS
1. DR. RIZAL SUKMA, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia
2. DR. CHRISTOPHER ROBERTS, RSIS
3. DR. YUKIKO NISHIKAWA, Mahidol University
4. MR. HERMAN KRAFT, University of the Philippines

Discussants
1. MR. SONGKANE LUANGMUNINTHONE, Laos Foreign Ministry
2. PROF. K.S. NATHAN, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
3. PROF. RALPH EMMERS, RSIS

Q&A

10:00 Closing Remarks
DR. TAN SEE SENG, roundtable convenor

11:00 Lunch (@ café)

GENERAL PARTICIPANTS

1. MR. MASATO SEKO, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation

2. PROF. HYUG-BAEG IM, Department of Political Science, Korea University

3. PROF. DATO' DR. ZAKARIA AHMAD, HELP University College, Malaysia

4. MR. AUGUSTO MICLAT, Executive Director, Initiatives for International Dialogue

5. PROF. ANN FLORINI, Visiting Professor and Director, Centre on Asia and Globalisation, NUS (Singapore)

6. MR. ASAD-UL IQBAL LATIF, Visiting Research Fellow, ISEAS (Singapore)

7. DR. CHANDRAN JESHURAN, Malaysian Forum for International Affairs

8. PROF. YONGJIN ZHANG, Director, New Zealand Asia Institute

9. DR. HELEN NESADURAI, Senior Lecturer, Monash University Malaysia

10. PROF. NATASHA HAMILTON-HART, Southeast Asian Studies Programme, NUS (Singapore)

11. MR. STEPHAN SAKALIAN, International Committee of the Red Cross, Malaysia

12. MS. LEENA GHOSH, International Committee of the Red Cross, Malaysia

13. PROF. ARUNA GOPINATH, Head – Department of Politics and International Relations, HELP University College

14. MR. JOSHUA HO, Coordinator of Maritime Security Programme, RSIS

15. MS. ELINA NOOR, ISIS, Malaysia

16. PROF. YAOWALAK APICHATVULLUP, Dean, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Khon Kaen University

17. MR. CHRISTOPHER KAVANAGH, First Secretary (Political), US Embassy

18. MR. UDAY BHASKAR, Commodore (rtd), India

19. PROF. UMMU SALMA BAVA, Coordinator – The Netherlands PM's Grant Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

20. PROF. DENNIS D. TRINIDAD, Head, International Studies Department, De La Salle University, Manila

21. MR. PHILIPPE DENIER, Delegation of the European Commission to Singapore

22. DR. ALAN CHONG, National University of Singapore

23. DR. TIN MAUNG MAUNG THAN, ISEAS (Singapore)

24. MR. RORY MEDCALF, Lowy Institute

25. PROF. MUHADI SUGIONO, Head, Center for Security and Peace Studies, Gadjah Mada University

26. MR. YOSHIFUMI MURASE, Executive Director, JETRO (Singapore)

27. MS. BEVERLEY LOKE, Graduate Student (Masters), Department of International Relations, Australian National University

28. DR. TOMOTAKA SHOJI, National Institute of Defence Studies, Japan

29. DR. CHAP SOTHARITH, Executive Director, Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace

30. PROF. GEOFFREY TILL, Joint Services and Staff College, United Kingdom

31. MR. PRATAP PARAMESWARAN, Head of ARF Unit, The ASEAN Secretariat

32. MR. SANTI INTHISONE, Deputy Director of Research Division, Institute of Foreign Affairs (MFA, Laos PDR)

33. PROF. MARTIN HOLLAND, Director, NCRE and EU Centres Network, University of Canterbury

34. MR. KWA CHONG GUAN, Head of External Programmes, RSIS

35. MR. BARRY LOWENKRON, MacArthur Foundation

36. MR. MATTHEW STUMPF, MacArthur Foundation

REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENTOSA ROUNDTABLE STUDY GROUP 2007–2008

On 25 October 2007, the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) convened, in Singapore, the Sentosa Roundtable Study Group, whose remit was to prepare a report exploring the links between regional institutions, on one hand, and regional security and community building in East Asia, on the other. The discussions of the October meeting were further embellished by a series of independently commissioned briefs. The report would serve as the basis for discussion at the second Sentosa Roundtable, to be held again on the island of Sentosa, off Singapore, on 17 and 18 January 2008.

The members of the 2007–2008 Sentosa Roundtable Study Group (hereafter called SRSG) comprised leading and upcoming analysts of East Asian security from the region as well as from Australia and Europe. (A list of the members of the SRSG is provided in the Appendix.) The second of three annual workshops, the SRSG focused specifically on the relationship between institutions and security. The first SRSG of the project examined the links between economics and East Asian security, while the third SRSG will explore the nexus between cultural factors and the security of East Asia.

Whether and how the aforementioned factors shape the security of the East Asian region and facilitate the building of regional community therein are concerns crucial to the Sentosa Roundtable, a three-year project sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation of Japan. In Sanskrit, the term sentosa means contentment or satisfaction. The Roundtable explores the simultaneous existence and emergence of great powers in the region—including China, India, Japan, the United States and aspirants such as North Korea—and, together with member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ramifications of their interactions for Asian security order and community. The project aims to find pathways to peace and security—contentment and satisfaction, in short—among these countries as they relate to one another amid contemporary regional conditions of growing interdependence and institutionalization.

This report on the proceedings of the 2007–2008 SRSG reflects an attempt to highlight some of the themes and recommendations put forward during the meeting. (The project brief for the study group has been included in the Appendix.) Consisting of contributions to the meeting as well as a series of commissioned briefs, the group sought to accomplish four aims.

Institutional Relevance

First, the SRSG assessed whether the region's institutions—such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN+3, the East Asia Summit and so forth—and, crucially, the way they relate to one another, matter in the establishment of East Asia's regional security order and in the formation of the regional community. In short, the group participants wanted to know whether institutions are central or adjunct to regional order and regional community building.

1. There was general agreement that regional institutions contribute to the peace, security and stability of East Asia. In one participant's words, those institutions "function not only as the arena for discussion, but also as a means to construct stable, elastic, and adaptive regional community structure".

2. At the same time, it was also agreed that East Asia's institutions are clearly limited, deliberately so, in terms of what they can accomplish. At present, they are arguably more than mere adjuncts but far from being central elements of regional order and community. A participant argued that although Westphalian principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states continue to serve as the diplomatic foundation for the region's institutions, it nonetheless provides the social-cum-historical basis upon which regional cooperation has developed and evolved. As one participant noted:

> *Regardless of their effectiveness, at the bare minimum, these organizations are communicative arenas in which participants exchange their different views on security issues, learn to understand the dominant international norms, attempt to persuade one another through principled argumentation, and alter each other's behaviour.*

3. The effectiveness of East Asia's institutions is inextricably linked to the role and influence of the great powers. It was insisted that no amount of institutional efficacy would have been possible without the endorsement of and contributions by great powers—namely, China, Japan and the United States—to regional security. In this regard, one participant argued there could be no East Asian Community without a concert of great powers as its foundation. That said, another participant opined that all those three powers "are not yet prepared to subject their wider bilateral relationship[s] to the discipline and constraints of an institutionalized process".

4. In view of the salience of great powers to East Asian regionalism and regional security, a participant suggested that the (future) order and community of East Asia might be hegemonic rather than cooperation-based. It was observed, for instance, that no institutional system—understood in this context as a set of rules and principles—can emerge without the imposition of order by a preponderant power, such as the United States had done in post-war Western Europe and Japan, and the Soviet Union had done in Eastern Europe. If so, it remains unclear in the East Asian context, whether the United States, China or Japan (or a combination of these powers)—or, less likely, ASEAN—could conceivably play the role of hegemonic rule-maker.

5. It was noted that the key challenge would be China and the ability of ASEAN and the others to keep the Chinese committed to developing as a responsible power.

6. SRSG members also allowed that institutional change and community formation could—and usually does—occur in an evolutionary fashion, particularly with the right conditions in place. It was argued that institutional change in East Asia is unlikely without the commitment and participation of the great powers.

Institutional Congruence or Competition

Second, the SRSG explored whether the so-called "noodle bowl" of regional institutions in East Asia resembles a strategically coherent regional architecture and foundation for an East Asian community, or complicates the community building process as a result of competing mandates, agendas and conflicting memberships and definitions of "region-ness". This question is of fundamental concern, given the divergence in views among Asian countries regarding which regional institution constitutes the most appropriate foundation upon which the East Asia region should build the East Asian community. This difference was most evident in the debate over the ostensible role and membership of the East Asia Summit.

1. There was agreement that there is no overarching structure or vision guiding the regional enterprise in East Asia. In one participant's view, there is no formal division of labour among institutions. Rather, the noodle-bowl quality of East Asian regionalism is seemingly driven by a penchant to create new organizations with little thought for what they are for and how they relate to one another. The creation of the East Asia Summit in December 2005, for example, prompted bafflement even among some proponents of East Asian institutionalism regarding the summit's raison d'être. As such, how best to move the region beyond the mere proliferation of institutional forms to substantive and meaningful cooperation and community building would be the principal challenge for East Asian states. As former ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong once put it, the region has sufficient "talk shops"; the key is to deepen regional cooperation.

2. On the other hand, it has been argued that, despite the evident lack of strategic coherence in the regional architecture, some institutions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), "complement each other nicely", given their near-identical memberships and the corresponding focus of the ARF on security and that of the APEC on economics. One participant proposed the creation of a common secretariat for both organizations in order to encourage greater synergy between them.

3. The issue of leadership in East Asia and its contribution to inter-institution congruence or rivalry was a key concern for SRSG members. It was acknowledged that ASEAN by default remains the politically safest option to occupy the "driver's seat" vis-à-vis the region, even though the Association's contribution has essentially been to preserve the regional status quo and its hold over regional institutions that it helped to establish. That said, the importance of great power cooperation (or, more accurately, its lack) to East Asia's security was glaringly obvious in the debate over the East Asia Summit (EAS) and its relationship to the ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3).

a. China had initially assumed that the EAS would adopt contours and composition commensurate with those of the ASEAN+3. However, when it became clear by the commencement of the inaugural EAS that Australia, India and New Zealand would be included as members—presumably as countervailing forces against perceived Chinese predominance—China then memorably proposed a two-tiered summit: a core tier comprising the ASEAN+3 and entrusted with the responsibility of building the East Asian community and an outer tier made up of the three "outsiders" and presumably non-participants in regional community formation. In an official commentary released in July 2006, Beijing affirmed its support for the ASEAN+3 as "the main channel for building the East Asian Community, to be completed by the East Asia Summit and other mechanisms"[2]. China's concern stems from its belief that the ASEAN+3 constitutes the proper vehicle for realizing the collective aspiration towards the East Asian Community.

b. This view is more or less shared by South Korea, Myanmar, Malaysia and Thailand. At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Hanoi in November 2006, Malaysia's Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi insisted that the ASEAN+3 constitutes the "primary vehicle" for community building in the region, while the EAS could complement it as a useful forum for dialogue on strategic issues involving additional participants in support of community building in the region. He further urged that the integrity and distinctiveness of the two respective processes be preserved.

c. On the other hand, Japan's preference is that newcomers India, Australia and New Zealand be more than mere passengers on the road to the East Asian Community. Indonesia, Singapore and others share Tokyo's view of the EAS as a regional platform conducive for facilitating the formation of regional community. The choice to provide an economic rationale for the EAS—a proposal that, while not necessarily in competition with the idea of the ASEAN+3 as the appropriate vehicle for regional economic integration, would likely have irritated the Chinese—makes good sense, given India's rise as an economic player. At the same time, the emergence of a new quadripartite strategic partnership between Australia, India, Japan and the United States—of whom the first three countries are EAS members—might have fuelled Chinese suspicions regarding Japanese intentions behind their strong support for the EAS.

d. As such, it is likely no substantial progress by the EAS is possible unless and until the leadership issue is resolved. In one SRSG member's view, "the settlement of this dispute over the summit's leadership will be a vital issue in the new balancing game within the East Asian region building process.

4. The divergence in economic visions of China and Japan hint at the predominance of geopolitical considerations. Not all SRSG members saw this as a necessarily bad thing, in view of China's status as a "late, late developer" in the process of becoming a "normal" power, which involves learning and respecting sovereignty norms and other diplomatic principles of the modern state system. In this regard, East Asia's regional institutions play a key role as arenas facilitating the so-called "normalization" of its members as sovereign states—much as ASEAN played a similar role for post-colonial Southeast Asian countries. As one participant noted, confidence building in Europe first started with the adoption of fundamental principles. As such, the construction of a stable regional order in East Asia could begin "by establishing a code of conduct" to guide regional multilateral security dialogue and cooperation efforts, not least where Sino-Japanese ties are concerned.

---

2 Cited in Frank Frost and Ann Rann, "The East Asia Summit, Cebu, 2007: Issues and prospects", E-Brief, 1 December 2006 (updated 20 December 2006). Canberra: Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia. <www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/FAD/eastasia_summit2007.htm>

5. The current rapprochement effort between Beijing and Tokyo was seen as crucial, without which East Asian regionalism would in all likelihood fail. According to a recent commentary, "The future of the region depends on the rise of China and the revitalization of Japan; one cannot happen without the other. In other words, the future now depends on China and Japan thinking together."[3] The SRSG participants observed, for instance, that Franco-German post-war rapprochement was integral to the success of the European Community (now Union), as was Argentine-Brazilian reconciliation vital to the success of the Common Market of the South (better known as MERCOSUR). As had been pointed out earlier, it is clearly a key prerequisite of East Asian order and community is the need for great powers to establish and maintain cooperative ties with one another. Also, as earlier noted, a proposal was to have a concert of great powers as the basis on which the East Asian Community could be built.

6. The question of U.S. participation in East Asia's regional institutions was also a concern. America's absence in the EAS became an issue with the inclusion of Australia, New Zealand and India—all of whom were seen by China and others as U.S. proxies, unofficial or otherwise—in the summit. Despite Washington's politic endorsement of Beijing's proactive efforts in regionalism and multilateral diplomacy, participants agreed that the United States is clearly concerned over whatever gains China may have made at its expense. Moreover, given America's membership in the ARF and its leadership of the APEC, it is inconceivable that any attempt to make these two institutions—or, arguably, the other East Asian institutions—more complementary must necessarily involve the U.S. input.

Issue-Specificity

Third, the group members assessed whether the utility of East Asian regional institutions is best defined in geographical or in functional (i.e. issue-specific) terms. The general aim of issue-based institutions is to solve common problems caused by interdependence. There is therefore the possibility that functionally oriented institutions could impede regionalism and hence community formation because they do not hold strictly to a geographically bounded conception of region and specifications.[4]

1. There was agreement that for East Asia's regional institutions to be effective, they need to address specific issues and problems. It was argued that East Asian institutions ought to adopt a problem-oriented and problem-solving approach to regional cooperation. While SRSG participants readily conceded that regional "talk shops" serve a useful purpose, they argued that East Asian institutions needed to balance talk with substantive cooperation. For example, although the ASEAN Way of consensus and consultation was seen as useful, there nonetheless was concurrence that movement towards a rules-based regionalism—as exemplified by the ASEAN Charter—was a welcome development despite reservations regarding the watered-down quality of the Charter when it was officially unveiled in November 2007.

2. In a sense, there is inter-governmental support for the view that East Asian regionalism should be problem-oriented. For some ASEAN leaders, the experience of early post-war European integration offers useful lessons for ASEAN's efforts to establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)—and, by extension, the ASEAN Economic Community—by 2015. According to one participant, the European experience involved myriad aspects of "boring" yet necessary functional or technical cooperation among Western European economies that provided a basis for further cooperation in non-economic areas.

3. It was agreed that pursuit of functional cooperation could subsequently lead to another promising development: the creation of issue-driven rules that are binding. For example, despite criticism against ASEAN for its longstanding reluctance to arm its provisions with enforceable rules, the Chiang Mai Initiative, established in response to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, is an early indication that East Asian states are not opposed to moving in a rules-based direction so long as regional conditions merit it.

---

3 Shiping Tang and Haruko Satoh, "Can China and Japan Think Together?", PACNET 52, 29 December 2007.

4 This argument is made by Andrew Hurrell, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective", in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and Regional Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 37–73.relations.

4. At present, no formal division of labour exists among East Asian institutions. To be sure, the ARF has long been seen as the appropriate forum for regional security, whereas the APEC and ASEAN+3 are seen as fora for regional economic affairs. However, as the Sino-Japanese debate over the rationale for the EAS has shown, concurrence over the need for issue-specific institutions does not mean East Asian countries necessarily agree over which particular institution should handle which particular issue.

5. The inclusion of countries like Australia and India in the EAS membership for economic, political and strategic reasons suggests that East Asian regionalism, despite the heated debate over membership and geography, has not restricted itself to a geographical definition.

Theoretical and Analytical Considerations

Finally, concerns of a more academic nature were discussed. The SRSG examined whether the region's institutions, in terms of their extant institutional design, process and practice, are predominantly sociological, contractual or realpolitik (or a combination of these) in orientation.[5] Given the pervasive adherence by East Asian countries to principles like state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference—norms enshrined within the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), of which all EAS members are signatories—and the continued existence in the region of Cold War-era bilateral security alliances, it was clear to the participants that realpolitik considerations still predominate.

1. However, in view of the ongoing institutional creep in East Asia and the rise of a loosely defined normative framework, participants saw East Asia as a region in transition towards a more complex architecture that, in the foreseeable future, would likely include more contractually and sociologically oriented features. Indeed, the emerging consensus among students of East Asian security today is that no single analytical perspective adequately explains the complex character of the contemporary East Asian region.[6] Nonetheless, the predominance of sovereignty norms in East Asia today should not preclude the appreciation that their emergence was a development of recent vintage (i.e. post-war and post-colonial).

2. In this respect, if the concept of regionalism refers to a pan-regional enmeshment, if not integration, then insofar as the extant institutionalism of East Asia—with its proliferation of institutional forms without a commensurate strategic coherence and substantive cooperation—is concerned, it might make sense to avoid treating regionalism and institutionalism as interchangeable concepts when defining and describing East Asia.

3. The SRSG also explored the challenges and prospects for institutional change. The need for analysis to be guided by a viable theory of institutional change was also raised. In this respect, it was suggested that a conceptual distinction needs to be made between institution and organization, where "institution" refers to rules and principles, and "organization" refers to the collection of actors or members that constitute the organization. To be sure, all organizations require a modicum of rules and conventions in order to exist and function. Thus understood, East Asian institutions are therefore regional organizations presently engaged in the process of institutionalization, i.e. becoming institutions.

4. The argument that East Asian institutions should pursue a problem-oriented agenda and focus on functional cooperation raises the question of whether past theories of regional integration, such as neo-functionalism popularized by Ernst B. Haas, are of use in analysing East Asian institutionalism. This has also been prompted by recent comments by regional leaders regarding the importance of learning from Europe's integration experience. It bears reminding that Haas himself rejected the utility of his own theoretical model for the study of European integration on the basis that

5 These three orientations correspond respectively with the constructivist, neo-liberal and realist perspectives in international relations.

6 This is the conclusion of the sweeping anthology authored by leading scholars in Muthiah Alagappa (Ed.), Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.

the rise of the European Union had as much to do with external causes—notably, concern in the 1990s over the apparent regionalization of world trade—as internal ones.[7] That East Asia's institutions also arose partially if not largely due to external considerations—the formation of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the rise of China and India, etc.—therefore suggests that discrepancies between East Asia and Europe could be less than previously assumed.

Note

The Study Group was convened under the Chatham House Rule. This report of its proceedings does not therefore reflect the official views of any of the participants.

7 Haas' neo-functionalist theory of regional integration relies principally on internal or "endogenous" factors. See, Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Economic and Social Forces, 1950–1957, 2nd edition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), and The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1975).

Rapporteurs:
Assoc. Prof Tan See Seng

THE SENTOSA ROUNDTABLE STUDY GROUP 2007–2008

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 25 October 2007

PROJECT BRIEF

The aim of the Sentosa Roundtable Study Group (SRSG) is to produce a report assessing the role and relevance of Asian regional institutions in and to community building in Asia. When completed, the report will be presented to the Sentosa Roundtable on Asian Security (to be held at Sentosa, Singapore, on 17–18 January 2008) for consideration. The study group will comprise a small team of experts from Asia, Europe and North America on Asian regional institutions and regional security.

Competing Perspectives on International Institutions

The literature on international institutions comprises contractual and sociological perspectives. On one hand, contractual institutionalism emphasizes responses by the institution's members to incentives and disincentives provided externally by the institution (e.g. rules, membership requirements) or by certain principal actors within the institution. Contractually-based institutions arguably contribute to international security and stability through the following.

- Facilitating reciprocity among their member countries
- Providing them information to facilitate their decision making
- Reducing transaction costs that would have otherwise blighted those not institutionally linked
- Making their commitments more credible
- Establishing policy coordination among member states

On the other hand, sociological (or constructivist) institutionalism emphasizes socialization processes and the formation of habits of cooperation. By ostensibly embodying a non-realpolitik ideology, it is argued that institutions relatively low in level of institutionalization may nonetheless do reasonably well in cooperation despite being mere "talk shops". Such socially-based institutions conceivably contribute to security through an institutional structure conducive to persuasion and that facilitates the development of habits of cooperation among members in the absence of external motivations. Regional security dialogue processes hence take on significance as platforms through which cooperation-enhancing—or, at the very least, status quo-promoting—norms and conventions can be generated and diffused. Its features likely include the following.

- A relatively small membership with some consistency over time in the participants to the institution
- A decision-making process that is consensus-based
- An institutional mandate that emphasizes information sharing, consultation and deliberation rather than negotiation and legislation

Against the above perspectives stands the reapolitik view on international institutions. Expressly less optimistic than the foregoing, realpolitik readings of institutions make the following points.

- States do cooperate in an anarchic world, but cooperation is more often than not inhibited by relative gains considerations and concerns over free-riding and cheating.
- Influence of institutions on state behaviour is minimal as institutions are created and shaped by the most powerful states for maintaining or increasing their power.

- Contractual institutionalism has limited explanatory utility vis-à-vis the security realm since it ignores relative gains.
- The empirical record of international institutions argues against the claims of contractual and sociological institutionalisms.

Institutions in Asian Regionalism

The institutional landscape of post-Cold War Asia boasts a panoply of regional institutions (ARF, APEC, ASEAN+3 and EAS), accompanied by various informal, regional dialogue processes (ASEAN-ISIS, CSCAP, PECC, NEAT, etc.). Other than APEC, the rest of these institutions (ARF, ASEAN+3, EAS) all share a common hub in ASEAN. This latter group of ASEAN-based institutions have long been known for their collective emphasis on open regionalism, soft institutionalism, flexible consensus and comprehensive and cooperative security. However, ASEAN's attempt to move to a more rules-based regionalism implies the likelihood of institutional creep—likely confined to Southeast Asia for the foreseeable future—in Asian regionalism.

Proponents of sociological institutionalism see Asian institutions as arenas where norm socialization and transmission, and habits of cooperation take place. Some see incipient signs of regional security cooperation and identity formation, while others contend to argue it is precisely the historical socialization (or localization) of norms of state sovereignty, non-intervention and non-interference that have ensured the security and stability of the region, even as they alert us about ongoing regional transition. Proponents of realpolitik institutionalism see Asian institutions as arenas where balances of power—more political than military, on one hand, and possibly more communal/associational than competitive/adversarial, on the other—are played out. Given the primacy of national interests, institutions are thereby seen as the lowest-common-denominator organizations and insurance in the event self-help approaches become less viable.

For the most part, Asian institutions have not been regarded as exemplars of contractual institutionalism. This said, some analysts point to the creeping legalization in the Asian region in the economic realm—and, where the upcoming ASEAN Charter is concerned, the political—as indication of an incipient contractual institutionalization.

Research Questions

The study group report will be guided by the following questions.

1. Do Asia's institutions matter in the construction of Asian security order? Are they central or adjunct to regional order?

2. Do Asia's institutions matter in the formation of Asian security community? Are they central or adjunct to regional community?

3. Do they reflect largely institutional features of the sociological variety, or do they show promise towards a more contractual variety? Or is Asian regionalism still predominantly realpolitik in orientation? What are the related challenges and prospects?

4. Do they resemble a strategically coherent regional architecture and foundation for an Asian community, or do they complicate the community-building process as a result of competing mandates-cum-agendas and conflicting memberships and definitions of "region-ness"?

5. Do Asian regional institutions exhibit characteristics, ironically, of institutions that are non-region-based and issue-specific (for solving common problems caused by interdependence), which as such, could impede regionalism and hence community formation?

6. Other concerns

Project Requirements

Participants are invited to contribute a discussion paper (2,000–3,000 words long) that addresses the above research questions. No citations or footnotes are necessary. Paper writers are urged to offer policy-oriented, actionable recommendations that flow from their analysis.

Members of Study Group

Dr. Shin-Wha Lee
Professor and Chair
Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University

Dr. Ralf Emmers
Associate Professor and Head of Graduate Studies, RSIS

Dr. Ron Huisken
Senior Fellow
Strategic Defence Studies Centre,
Australian National University

Dr. Hiro Katsumata
Research Associate
Centre for Governance and International Affairs, University of Bristol

Dr. Tang Shiping
Senior Fellow and Coordinator of China Programme, RSIS

Dr. Christopher B. Roberts
Post-Doctoral Fellow, RSIS

Dr. Tang Siew Mun
Lecturer
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia

Mr. Yongwook Ryu
Doctoral Candidate
Department of Government, Harvard University

Dr. Tan See Seng
Associate Professor and
Programme Coordinator for Multilateralism and Regionalism, RSIS

ABOUT RSIS

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) was established in January 2007 as an autonomous School within the Nanyang Technological University. RSIS's mission is to be a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the Asia Pacific. To accomplish this mission, it will:

- Provide a rigorous professional graduate education in international affairs with a strong practical and area emphasis
- Conduct policy-relevant research in national security, defence and strategic studies, diplomacy and international relations
- Collaborate with like-minded schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence

Graduate Training in International Affairs

RSIS offers an exacting graduate education in international affairs, taught by an international faculty of leading thinkers and practitioners. The teaching programme consists of the Master of Science (MSc) degrees in Strategic Studies, International Relations, International Political Economy, and Asian Studies as well as an MBA in International Studies taught jointly with the Nanyang Business School. The graduate teaching is distinguished by their focus on the Asia Pacific, the professional practice of international affairs, and the cultivation of academic depth. Over 150 students, the majority from abroad, are enrolled with the School. A small and select Ph.D. programme caters to advanced students whose interests match those of specific faculty members.

Research

RSIS research is conducted by five constituent Institutes and Centres: the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS, founded 1996), the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR, 2002), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS, 2006), the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in ASIA (NTS-Asia, 2007); and the Temasek Foundation Centre for Negotiations (2008). The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region. The School has three professorships that bring distinguished scholars and practitioners to teach and to do research at the School. They are the S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies, the Ngee Ann Kongsi Professorship in International Relations, and the NTUC Professorship in International Economic Relations.

International Collaboration

Collaboration with other professional Schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence is a RSIS priority. RSIS will initiate links with other like-minded schools so as to enrich its research and teaching activities as well as adopt the best practices of successful schools.

S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University

Design by Oxygen Studio Designs

S. Rajaratnam School Of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University,
Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
TEL 65-6790-6982 | FAX 65-6793-2991 | EMAIL wwwrsis@ntu.edu.sg | WEBSITE www.rsis.edu.sg