



mini atlas of HUMAN SECURITY



HSRP

What is human security?

The goal of *national security* is the defense of the state from external threats. The focus of *human security*, by contrast, is the protection of individuals.

Secure states do not automatically mean secure peoples. Protecting citizens from foreign attack is certainly a necessary condition for the security of individuals, but it is not a sufficient one. Indeed, during the past century, far more people have been killed by their own governments than by armies from abroad.

The term *human security* is now widely used to describe the complex of interrelated threats associated with international war, civil war, genocide, and the displacement of populations. Human security means, at minimum, freedom from violence, and from the fear of violence.

Human security and national security should be – and often are – mutually reinforcing. But this is not always the case. Human security can be threatened both by weak states which allow warlords and militias to flourish,

and by strong states which themselves commit abuses such as torture and summary execution.

Everyone who uses the term *human security* agrees that its primary goal is the protection of individuals. But which threats individuals should be protected from remains contested.

The “broad” concept of human security, first outlined in the 1994 *Human Development Report* from the United Nations Development Programme, argues that human security rests on two pillars: freedom from want and freedom from fear. The broader view of human security includes food security, adequate shelter, security from poverty, and sometimes from “threats to human dignity.” Its proponents rightly argue that hunger, disease, and natural disasters kill far more people than war, genocide, and terrorism combined. And these threats are often inter-related.

The “narrow” concept of human security focuses on freedom from violence. This includes criminal as well as political violence, for the

boundary between the two is not always easy to draw. Is there any practical difference between a criminal gang which grows narcotics and guards its crop with guns, and insurgents who grow drugs to finance their rebellion? Just where does the boundary lie between an off-duty soldier who sexually assaults someone, and a deliberate military campaign of rape, which can be a war crime?

These two approaches to human security are both people-centered, and are complementary rather than contradictory. But because the “broad” concept includes everything from poverty to genocide, it has so far proved too all-embracing to be helpful in policy development.

This atlas, based on data from the *Human Security Report 2005* (Oxford University Press) and the *Human Security Brief 2006*, uses the *narrow* concept of human security, and maps the incidence and severity of global violence.

It is divided into five parts.

Part 1: When States Go to War looks at the decline in armed conflicts which involve government forces – both conflicts between states, and conflicts within states.

Part 2: Warlords and Killing Fields examines armed conflicts which do not involve government forces, as well as genocides and other “one-sided” mass killings of civilians.

Part 3: Counting the Dead asks how far we can rely on the reported death tolls, from all forms of armed conflict as well as from one-sided violence.

Part 4: Measuring Human Rights Abuse shows that we have few reliable figures on torture, child soldiers, ethnic cleansing, and other gross human rights violations, but that some comparisons can be made between different states.

Part 5: Causes of War, Causes of Peace explores the reasons why armed conflicts and their death tolls have declined, and still seem to be declining.

Preface

In a world afflicted by major wars, gross human rights abuse, and the threat of ever-more-deadly terrorist attacks, it is not surprising that most people believe political violence to be on the increase.

But, as the *miniAtlas of Human Security* demonstrates, the conventional wisdom is quite wrong. There were 40 percent fewer armed conflicts in 2005 than at the end of the Cold War a decade and a half earlier. The decline in high-casualty conflicts (those with 1,000 or more reported battle-deaths each year) has been even greater – an 80 percent drop over the same period.

The number of refugees has also declined since the end of the Cold War, reflecting the reduction in the political violence that is a major cause of people fleeing their homes. And, although there is little reliable information, it seems likely that the number of children serving as soldiers in rebel and government forces has declined too.

War has aptly been described as “development in reverse.” Its consequences include death, injury, increased disease and malnutrition, large-scale destruction of infrastructure and health services, massive capital flight, and loss of investment. According to Paul Collier, the cost of a typical civil war is around \$50 billion.

The fact that wars exacerbate poverty is hardly surprising, but the evidence strongly suggests that poverty may also be a driver of war. Low incomes per capita mean weak state capacity and create incentives for impoverished, unemployed, and often desperate youth to join rebel movements.

The maps and graphics in the *miniAtlas of Human Security* reveal the surprising changes in war trends since the end of the Cold War. They also highlight the associations between armed conflicts and economic and political development. The text that accompanies the map spreads provides concise analyses of the issues being reviewed.

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that there can be no development without security – and no security without development. The *miniAtlas of Human Security*, created by the team that produces the influential *Human Security Report*, helps explain why.

Timor-Leste
Eskinder
Debebe/
UN Photo




THE WORLD BY REGION


- Americas
- Central & South Asia
- East & SE Asia & Oceania
- Europe
- Middle East & North Africa
- Sub-Saharan Africa

The World by Region

These geographic regions are used throughout this atlas. Data are included for those countries with populations of 500,000 or more.



Human security is primarily about people, not about states. Well over half the world's people live in only two regions – Central & South Asia and East & SE Asia & Oceania. And another two regions – Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa – contain almost half the world's countries. It is useful to remember these disparities when interpreting the regional figures and country-by-country maps in this atlas.





Since the end of the Cold War, armed conflicts around the world have declined substantially.

When States Go to War

The world is becoming less war-prone. The number of civil wars dropped by three-quarters from 1992 to 2005. And the number of international conflicts has been falling since the mid-1970s – the most sustained decline in two centuries.

The 1945 United Nations Charter promised “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Today, the UN collects statistics on everything from schools and hunger to measles and coal mines. But on war, it has no official figures. Why not?

The short answer is politics. In 2005, all armed conflicts were being fought within states, not between them. Many governments believe that internal violence is a domestic matter, and no business of the UN. So they will not provide details.

Existing global statistics on wars, conflicts and genocides come from a handful of research institutes. Each uses different methods, and few update their figures annually. This atlas draws on data from the *Human Security Report 2005* and the *Human Security Brief 2006*.

The main types of armed conflict are described overleaf. Some individual conflicts are a hybrid of different types of violence. The 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, for example, started as an inter-state conflict but soon became an internationalized intra-state conflict. Iraq also suffers from non-state conflicts between sectarian militias.

Worldwide, the number of state-based conflicts increased steadily from the early 1950s until the end of the Cold War. 1992 marks the beginning of a sharp decline. But this trend was not the same across all regions. On the one hand, the Cold War had frozen many tensions, which in some regions exploded into violence. And on the other hand, the post-Cold War era reduced superpower sponsorship of civil wars and allowed a surge of international peacemaking. These various causes of war and peace are explored in the final section of the atlas.

Overall, the trends in state-based conflicts are remarkably encouraging. The next section of this atlas examines the two other main forms of organized political violence: non-state conflicts and one-sided violence.

Israel/
Gaza Strip
Ahikam Seri /
Panos Pictures

Definitions

Wars are high-intensity armed conflicts. Whether a conflict qualifies as a war depends on the number of battle-deaths that occur in a year.


Battle-deaths include civilians caught in the crossfire as well as combatants, but not deaths from war-induced disease and starvation, nor the deliberate killing of unarmed civilians.

An *armed conflict* with over 1,000 battle-deaths in a year is called a *war*. When the number of battle-deaths in an armed conflict falls below 25 per year, it is no longer counted as a conflict.

There are two main types of *armed conflict*. This section of the atlas covers *state-based conflicts*: those that involve at least one national government. *Non-state conflicts*, fought between militias, warlords, or ethnic groups, without the involvement of the national government, are covered in the next section.

There are four forms of state-based conflict (called *wars* if they cause more than 1,000 battle-deaths a year):

- **Inter-state conflicts** are between states. Few in number, these have declined unevenly since the late 1980s.
- **Extra-state conflicts** are between a state and an armed group outside the state's own territory. These are mostly colonial conflicts.
- **Intra-state conflicts** (which include civil wars) are between a government and a non-state group. In 1946, 47% of conflicts were intra-state. By 2005, the figure was 100%.
- **Internationalized intra-state conflicts** occur when the government, or an armed group opposing it, receives military support from one or more foreign states, as in Afghanistan since 2001.




The number of armed conflicts trebled from 1946 to the end of the Cold War, then declined sharply.

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF STATE-BASED CONFLICTS 2005




REGIONAL TRENDS

Number of conflicts 1946–2005




Americas: Armed conflicts, driven in part by Cold War politics, increased from the 1960s to the end of the 1980s, especially in Central America, and then fell significantly.

Sub-Saharan Africa: Conflicts rose unevenly during the post-colonial period from the mid-1960s to the end of the century, but have been falling since 1999.



Europe: The Cold War was associated with four decades of uneasy peace from the 1950s until the end of the 1980s. Violence in the Balkans followed the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Middle East & North Africa: Armed conflicts increased unevenly from the 1940s to 1980, but with growing political repression they have since declined by nearly 40%.



Central & South Asia: The region's conflicts were mainly in South Asia until the 1970s. The 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union triggered fresh conflicts in Central Asia (including the Caucasus).

East & SE Asia & Oceania: Conflicts have dropped by 46% since 1978, a decline associated with rising prosperity, democratization, and the end of large-scale foreign military intervention.

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

Total number of conflicts in which a country has been involved 1946–2005



All but a quarter of the states for which data are available have been involved in one or more international armed conflicts during the past 60 years. The map shows the total number of international armed conflicts that have resulted in 25 or more battle-deaths in a year. It includes inter-state conflicts, extra-state conflicts (mostly colonial), and internationalized intra-state conflicts – civil wars with some external military involvement. It does not cover civil wars and other intra-state conflicts, or non-state conflicts (conflicts not involving the state, usually between rival militias or warlords).


International Armed Conflicts

Between 1946 and 2005, three-quarters of the world's states were involved in one or more international conflict.

All these conflicts involved at least 25 battle-deaths per year, and some of them tens of thousands. A handful caused half a million or more.

Since 1946, Chad has been involved in international conflicts with or against: Algeria, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya (twice), Nigeria, and Sudan.

THE MOST WAR-PRONE STATES
Countries involved in highest number of international conflicts 1946–2005



Seven of the nine most conflict-prone states are former colonial powers or Cold War superpowers.

WAR AT HOME


Number of armed conflicts involving government forces fought within a country or its territorial waters 1946–2005



The previous map counted all international wars. For colonial states and for the “great powers,” many of these were fought abroad. This map only counts conflicts involving government forces fought wholly or partially on a state’s home soil or in its territorial waters. It excludes non-state conflicts – those between rival warlords and militias – and genocide and other acts of one-sided violence. Of the nine most conflict-prone states identified in the previous map, three (Australia, Netherlands and Portugal) have had no home-soil conflicts at all; France had one and the UK had two.

State-Based Conflicts on Home Soil


Three-quarters of countries have had one or more state-based armed conflicts within their own borders since 1946.



All but one of Myanmar's nine home-soil conflicts, that with China in 1969, pitted the government against a rebel group.

India's 13 home-soil conflicts include war with Pakistan, and insurgencies in Punjab, in Kashmir, and in five states in the north-east.

MOST HOME-SOIL CONFLICTS
Countries that have fought the highest number of conflicts at home 1946–2005



Apart from Israel, these are all developing countries with large, multi-ethnic populations. Most of these conflicts have involved insurgents seeking secession or greater autonomy.

YEARS IN CONFLICT

Total number of years in which a country has been involved in at least one conflict 1946–2005



Time Spent in Conflict

Only 21 of the world's states have been entirely free from state-based armed conflicts since World War II.

The UK has been engaged in an armed conflict, at home or abroad, for four years out of every five since 1946.


As with other struggles for independence, Algeria's nine years of anti-colonial warfare are not shown on the map.

Israel has been engaged in armed conflict for every one of the 58 years since its creation in 1948.

In spite of the worldwide decline in armed conflict, the overwhelming majority of human beings aged over 60 have lived through at least one period in which their government was actively engaged in armed conflict. The countries shown in red on the map have spent more years in conflict than at peace. Only conflicts involving government forces have been counted, and counts started only when a state became independent, so the sometimes bitter years of fighting for independence from colonial rule are not included.

STATES MOST OFTEN IN COMBAT

Countries with the highest number of years in conflict 1946–2005



These figures capture the experience of a state's armed forces, but not necessarily of its people. In many countries in conflict, most citizens live a long way from the fighting.



Around half of all armed conflicts are between warlords and militias, and do not involve government forces.

2

Warlords and Killing Fields

As well as conflicts involving governments, there are two other major forms of political violence: *non-state conflicts*, which are fought between militias, warlords, and ethnic or religious groups, without the involvement of a government, and *one-sided violence*, which includes genocides and other mass killings of defenseless civilians.

If a city or a village turns into a war zone, it makes little difference to the victims whether the perpetrators are foreign soldiers, government forces or local militia. But to understand global patterns of political violence, such distinctions are crucial.

Until very recently, there were no reliable records of non-state conflicts. To fill this gap, Uppsala University in Sweden has produced a new set of figures for the *Human Security Report*. These statistics, so far covering 2002 to 2005, confirm that the previously unrecorded non-state conflicts are almost as numerous as the state-based conflicts on which global conflict analysis used to rely exclusively. Between 2002 and 2005, there were on average 30 non-state conflicts per year, compared with 31 state-based conflicts.

Non-state conflicts tend to occur in poor countries with weak governments – from 2002 to 2005, most of them were in Sub-Saharan Africa. But they are much less deadly; battle-deaths in non-state conflicts are a quarter of those in state-based conflicts.

Are non-state conflicts, like state-based conflicts, decreasing in number? We cannot be sure, because four years is too short a period over which to detect trends with any reliability, and no one has any reliable statistics for longer than that. But non-state conflicts remained more-or-less steady from 2002 to 2005 in all regions of the world, except for Sub-Saharan Africa, where they fell sharply.

The third major type of organized killing is what the experts call “one-sided violence.” This refers not to fighting between armed groups, but to the deliberate massacre of unarmed people, perpetrated either by non-state militias or by government forces.

One-sided violence includes genocide, which is defined by international law as “acts committed with the intent to destroy, in

Nepal
Tomas van
Houtryve /
Panos Pictures


whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” Such crimes often occur during or immediately after a civil war. In practice, it is hard to judge the *intent* of one-sided violence, as is shown by the controversy over whether or not the killings in Darfur (Sudan) qualify as genocide.

The legal definition of genocide includes massacring people for their religious beliefs, but not for their politics. On that basis, the 1975–79 killings in Cambodia under Pol Pot, in which several million Cambodians perished, were not genocide except where they targeted religious and ethnic groups. Some experts use the term *politicide* to describe deliberate slaughter aimed at a group defined by its political views.


A count by the US-based Political Instability Task Force (PITF) of genocides, politicides, and similar mass slaughters shows that the number increased tenfold from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, remained roughly steady until 1989, and then declined sharply.

Uppsala University has made a separate count of all significant deadly campaigns directed at civilians, irrespective of whether or not they were genocides or politicides. The Uppsala figures only start from 1989, but they show a clear, though uneven, upward trend over the last 17 years.

Which picture is correct? The answer is that both are – for they are not counting the same things. The PITF figures are limited to campaigns killing thousands, while the Uppsala counts include all campaigns involving 25 or more deaths in a year. So, since the end of the Cold War, genocides and other large-scale killings of civilians have indeed declined in number, but small-scale campaigns of one-sided violence have increased.



Between 2002 and 2005, Sub-Saharan Africa suffered well over half of the armed conflicts that did not involve a government.




More than two-thirds of deadly campaigns against unarmed civilians between 2002 and 2005 were perpetrated by non-state forces.

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION

Total number of campaigns of one-sided violence
1989–2005



Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East & North Africa, and Central & South Asia suffered 74% of the campaigns of one-sided violence between 1989 and 2005. The total number of campaigns has been rising in recent years.



The Uppsala figures show that while the number of campaigns of one-sided violence by governments has remained steady, campaigns by insurgents, warlords, and militias have doubled. Of 412 such events logged by Uppsala between 1989 and 2005, three-quarters were in three regions of the world: 35% in Sub-Saharan Africa, 22% in Central & South Asia, and another 18% in the Middle East & North Africa. The remaining quarter was shared among the Americas, East & Southeast Asia & Oceania, and Europe. From 2002 onwards, there was a sharp increase in violent campaigns against civilians in the Middle East & North Africa, notably in Iraq and Sudan. The other regions showed no clear trends.

The next section of this atlas looks at death tolls and compares the number of people who die in the three main forms of organized killing: state-based conflicts, non-state conflicts, and one-sided violence.

YEARS IN CONFLICT

The number of years in which a country has experienced at least one non-state conflict 2002–05





Non-State Conflicts

All recent non-state conflicts – those between rival warlords and militias – are in developing countries. Figures are only available for the years 2002 to 2005.

In India's north-east there were five non-state conflicts between 2002 and 2005. Hindu-Muslim fighting in Gujarat in 2002 killed at least 1,500 people.

About half of all conflicts do not involve the armed forces of any government, but are fought between various guerrilla groups and ethnic or religious militias. Until recently, there were no reliable global data for these non-state conflicts, which tend to be shorter and less deadly than state-based conflicts. The *Human Security Report* now publishes annual figures, but the counts only go back to 2002. When government forces fail to suppress armed groups, it is a sign of limited state capacity. At present, all non-state conflicts take place in developing countries.

In 2002, the Democratic Republic of Congo experienced five non-state conflicts. By 2005, there were none.



Most non-state armed conflicts in these countries involve ethno-nationalist grievances or disputes. The existence of such conflicts suggests that the state is failing in one of its most fundamental functions: to maintain a monopoly over the use of armed force.


KILLING OF UNARMED CIVILIANS

Total number of years in which a country has experienced one or more campaigns of one-sided violence killing 25 or more people 1989–2005




One-Sided Violence

Between 1989 and 2005 nearly one-third of all states experienced killing campaigns against civilians.



After state-based and non-state conflicts, the third major type of political violence includes genocides, politicides, and other campaigns that deliberately target unarmed civilians. These deadly assaults are called “one-sided” because the victims cannot generally fight back. While the number of armed conflicts has been declining since 1992, campaigns of one-sided violence have increased by more than half – although their death tolls are substantially lower than those from armed conflict.

LONGEST-SUFFERING
Countries experiencing highest number of years of one-sided violence 1989–2005



In all nine countries, one-sided violence is closely associated with long-standing insurrections, civil wars or non-state conflicts. India has suffered campaigns of deadly violence against unarmed civilians in all 17 of the years covered.



The death toll from armed conflict has been declining since the late 1960s. The best available figures under-count the real totals, but no one knows by how much.

Counting the Dead

The decline in battle-deaths has been even more remarkable than the fall in the number of armed conflicts. In wars involving a state, for every 30 people killed in 1950, only one was killed in 2005. But how accurate are the death-toll statistics?

While the number of wars, conflicts, genocides and other slaughters of civilians is relatively well-documented, the deaths that result from them are difficult to count. On the world's battlegrounds and killing fields, there is little accurate book-keeping.

Some bodies are never found. The commander of an organized army knows how many of his own soldiers remain after a battle, but he cannot be sure if those missing have been killed or have deserted; leaders of hastily recruited militias and fast-moving guerrilla bands are even less certain. Military units rarely count enemy or civilian dead. And massacres of civilians are not usually documented, with many victims deliberately made to "disappear."

In all three forms of organized political violence – state-based, non-state and one-sided – the perpetrators and others often lie. One group may exaggerate deaths on its own side to demonstrate the enemy's brutality. Another may understate its casualties to appear stronger than it really is. But for policymakers, absolute numbers are not essential. What matters is that death counts can be compared – year by year, conflict by conflict, country by country. Without such evidence, there is no objective way of evaluating long-term policies or one-off interventions, or of establishing whether economic sanctions, ceasefires or peacekeeping missions are effective.

Until recently, no such comprehensive numbers existed for non-state conflict and one-sided violence. But the University of Uppsala recently completed a new set of global figures for the *Human Security Report* which counts "reported deaths" from all three main forms of organized violence. This dataset does not provide a true measure of total deaths. Rather, it is a careful count of only those fatalities that satisfy a series of strict, consistent and published criteria. In essence, these are minimum figures. Uppsala follows three basic rules in counting deaths. First, a death must be documented by a reasonably

Angola
J.B. Russell /
Panos Pictures

reliable source. Second, there must be enough evidence to attribute a death to a specific conflict, or to a specific campaign of political killing. Third, the conflict or campaign must have caused at least 25 deaths in a calendar year.


These stringent criteria mean that Uppsala's annual counts of "reported deaths" are almost invariably lower – sometimes far lower – than the real death tolls, especially for one-sided violence. But year by year and conflict by conflict, data are now being collected using the same standard criteria – data that can be used with confidence to explore three key issues: the year-on-year trends, the relative deadliness of the three main forms of organized political violence, and the geographical spread.

Battle-deaths in state-based armed conflicts have been on a downward trend since the late 1960s. Deaths from non-state conflicts dropped by more than two-thirds from 2002 to 2005, although four years is much too short a time to draw firm conclusions about trends.


Between 1989 and 2005, the only years for which we have figures, there is no clear trend in deaths from one-sided violence. Fatalities from this form of organized political violence are especially difficult to record accurately, as has been evident recently in Darfur (Sudan) and Iraq.

Most deaths from organized political violence are in armed conflicts involving states – 69 percent in 2005. Three regions – Central & South Asia, the Middle East & North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa – accounted for nearly 80 percent of battle-deaths in state-based conflicts in 2005. For non-state conflicts, the pattern was different, with more than 40 percent of battle-deaths occurring in Sub-Saharan Africa. And for one-sided violence, almost half of all deaths were in the Middle East & North Africa, where attacks in Iraq and Darfur (Sudan) drove up the death tolls.


One widely publicized form of violence against civilians – terrorism –



The peak in 1950 was caused by the Korean War, and the peak in 1968 is associated with the Vietnam War. Overall there has been a dramatic decrease in battle-deaths since World War II.




There has been a remarkable four-year decline, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and Central & South Asia.





DEATHS FROM POLITICAL VIOLENCE
Reported in 2005
Total deaths: 17,400

DEATHS FROM POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN EACH REGION
2005




Americas
Central & South Asia
East & SE Asia & Oceania
Europe
Middle East & North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa



While useful for tracking trends, these figures underestimate the real death tolls. This is particularly true in the case of Iraq, where fatality estimates are wildly divergent and intensely controversial.


HUMAN COSTS OF WAR

Number of reported battle-deaths in state-based conflicts on home soil 1946–2005



Battle-Deaths in State-Based Conflicts

Over the past 60 years, only 16 countries have experienced state-based conflicts that killed 100,000 or more people on their home soil.




The total for the United States includes the deaths from the September 11 attack on the Pentagon.

From 1946 until 1975, the wars in Indo-China killed more than 2 million people.


The 1980–88 Iran–Iraq war was by far the bloodiest since Vietnam, with 644,000 reported battle-deaths.

These totals only include those killed on the soil or in the waters of the country experiencing a state-based conflict. Reported battle-deaths are deaths of combatants, and civilians caught in the crossfire, recorded by a reliable source, and linked to a specific conflict with 25 or more battle-deaths a year. The real death-tolls are almost always higher, and will never be known. There are no global figures for those who die from war-induced disease or malnutrition.



DEATHS FROM POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Number of reported battle-deaths from state-based and non-state conflict, plus deaths from one-sided violence 2005




These death tolls are likely to be underestimates because deaths are often not reported.

Most of the reported deaths in Russia were associated with the violence in Chechnya.

In Iraq and Sudan, many deaths were not counted because they could not be reliably attributed to one of several simultaneous conflicts or killing campaigns.

This map shows only "reported deaths" – those recorded by a reliable source – in circumstances where there are 25 or more battle-deaths, or deaths linked to a specific campaign of one-sided violence, in a year. Real death-tolls are almost always higher than reported death totals, sometimes substantially so. But, on balance, these trends are grounds for cautious optimism.



Deaths from Political Violence

Although warfare remains common, the great majority of people live in countries free of all forms of deadly political violence.



Ethnic cleansing, death squads, child soldiers and other extreme assaults on human rights are not uncommon, but there are almost no reliable global figures.

Measuring Human Rights Abuse

Rape, burned villages, and poisoned wells have long been associated with warfare and rebellion. And torture and concentration camps are widely used by dictatorships to impose order on the streets. What are the long-term trends, and can we make reliable comparisons between countries?

Some of the worst human rights violations take place in secret. Certain governments, for example, admit they deliberately inflict pain to extract information from suspects. But they do not publish annual reports, or allow independent observers into their torture chambers. Most human rights organizations do not collect statistics even on the worst cruelties, in case this implies that abusing one person is more acceptable than abusing a hundred. But without quantitative annual audits, such as those now available for wars and genocides, it is hard to devise policies against rights violations, or to evaluate whether those policies are effective.

Child soldiers (aged under 18, according to international law) represent one human rights abuse that has been widely publicized. Children are recruited into both rebel and government forces, to become sentries, spies, killers of civilians, clearers of minefields, or sex slaves. Many are under 14, and 40 percent are said to be girls.

Child soldiers are cheap, obedient, plentiful, and treated as expendable. It is a high-risk occupation, with an estimated 100,000 Iranian child soldiers killed during the 1980–88 Iran–Iraq War. Yet there are no reliable global figures on their use. The widely reported total of 300,000 worldwide first appeared in 1996, but with no indication of how it was calculated. It was quoted in a UN report, and is still being uncritically recycled as a “UN figure.” Even if it was approximately correct ten years ago, the total has almost certainly fallen since, because today there are significantly fewer conflicts, and some of those that most notoriously employed child soldiers have now ended.

The same lack of convincing and reliable figures applies to death squads, the “disappeared” and nearly all other gross human rights abuses. There is little solid information on country-by-country occurrence, the numbers involved, or trends over time.

Albania
Andrew Testa /
Panos Pictures

Two yardsticks – refugees and the Political Terror Scale – may reflect, but cannot measure, the sum total of all these various human rights violations. Violence and abuse may force people to flee their homes. If they cross a national border, they become refugees, and if they escape within their own countries, they are “internally displaced persons” (IDPs). The global number of refugees and IDPs rose tenfold in the 30 years from the mid-1960s. Then, after the decline in armed conflicts at the end of the Cold War, they started to fall. But while refugee totals continued to drop, IDP numbers increased sharply from 1998 to 2002, and have changed little since. It is not clear why.


However, refugee and IDP numbers are at best an indirect indication of the combined effect of many different human rights violations. An authoritarian state may prevent people leaving home, and it can be hard to distinguish refugees from economic migrants.

The Political Terror Scale (PTS) from the University of North Carolina uses Amnesty International and US State Department annual reports to rank countries on a five-point scale – from Level 1 (secure rule of law, no political prisoners, torture rare) to Level 5 (political murder, brutality, and terror with a nationwide impact). But the PTS scores are based on subjective judgments that may have become stricter over the decades, so the level of repression in recent years is possibly lower than the trend lines indicate.


DISPLACED PEOPLE

Total number of refugees and IDPs by region of origin 2005



- Americas
- Central & South Asia
- East & SE Asia & Oceania
- Europe
- Middle East & North Africa
- Sub-Saharan Africa



Almost two-thirds of the world's displaced people are from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East & North Africa.



Between 1998 and 2005, the number of refugees (displaced persons who cross a national border) declined, while the number of IDPs (internally displaced persons) increased.



The Political Terror Scale (PTS) estimates human rights abuse, not terrorism. It is useful for comparing regional trends.


- Central & South Asia
- East & SE Asia & Oceania
- Middle East & North Africa

There are two other ways of identifying the countries where human rights abuses are pervasive. The first is by counting deaths from political violence per 100,000 people, and the second is by using a World Bank index of the estimated risk that violence will destabilize a government. Together, these three very different methods can be used to identify with some confidence where human rights are most outrageously violated. But with respect to specific abuses, the available figures are inadequate and incomplete.

It is clear that human rights are better respected in democracies than under authoritarian regimes. The next section of this atlas looks at the causes of armed conflict, and explores what types of government are most likely to go to war.

INDICATORS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE

Score on Political Terror Scale
2005



★ one of the 10 countries with most deaths from political violence per 100,000 population, 2005


★ one of the 10 countries with worst scores in the World Bank Political Stability & Absence of Violence Index, 2005

There are few reliable figures on human rights abuse, but combining three different measures of abuse – the Political Terror Scale, deaths from political violence, and the World Bank's Political Stability Index – in a single map presents a reasonably comprehensive picture of where such abuse occurs. Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Nepal, and Sudan are in the first 10 in all three categories. Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, and Uganda are in the first 10 in two out of the three lists. The states most likely to abuse human rights are autocracies, and those experiencing long-term civil war, severe economic crisis, or painful political transitions.

PTS SCORES: GETTING BETTER – AND WORSE

The ten countries showing the greatest change in PTS scores 1992–2005


■ score in 1992
■ score in 2005



The five states with scores that deteriorated all underwent severe political or economic crises, or became more authoritarian.

Human Rights Abuse

Measuring human rights abuse is difficult, controversial, and rarely attempted on a global scale. But three quite different measures provide some insight into the scope of the problem.



Comoros and Bhutan are the only low-income countries to get the best possible PTS score. The US and UK have the worst scores among high-income countries.

CHILD SOLDIERS

Ratification of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the 2002 Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict (OPCAC).
December 2005


- ratified CRC only
- ratified OPCAC only
- ratified both
- ratified neither
- no data

Child soldiers used in active combat 2001–04


- governments used child soldiers
- ✕ non-state armed groups used child soldiers
- ✕ governments and non-state armed groups used child soldiers

Child Soldiers

From 2001 to 2004, children aged under 18 were used in combat in at least 20 states – and probably in many more.



Because there are few reliable figures, the map understates the recent use of child soldiers. International law on the subject is not robust. The CRC (see above) allows the recruitment of soldiers aged under 18, but not under 15. OPCAC prohibits non-state armed groups from using under-18s as soldiers. The state is forbidden to recruit them compulsorily, but can accept voluntary recruits. Only the USA and Somalia have not ratified the CRC, and most states have ratified OPCAC. Of the 12 African governments that used child soldiers between 2001 and 2004, five have ratified both treaties.



RATIFICATION OF OPCAC
Percentage of states in each region that had ratified OPCAC
December 2005



The decline in armed conflict since 1992 is likely a result of the increased effectiveness of the UN in stopping wars.

5

Causes of War, Causes of Peace

Since 1945 there have been three broad shifts in the pattern of armed conflict: the end of colonial warfare, the virtual disappearance of conflicts between states, and a rapid rise in fighting within states, followed by a steep fall.

These historic changes have been associated with two epochal events: the end of European colonialism and the end of the Cold War. After World War II, nearly all of Africa, much of Asia, and parts of Latin America were under colonial rule. By 1980, all but a few small colonies were independent. A major cause of warfare had disappeared. But what of fighting between states in the post-colonial era? And why the post-Cold War reduction in conflicts within states? Here, the answers are more complex.

The low level of post-1945 inter-state warfare has been a response to three major factors. The first was democratization: the steady rise in the proportion of democracies to dictatorships. Democracies hardly ever fight each other. Second, was globalization. It is now almost always cheaper to buy resources on the global market than to seize them by force. States have found less costly ways than war to achieve their goals. Third, global sentiment has shifted firmly away from war. Until World War I, warfare was seen as an inevitable part of human experience, and an accepted instrument of statecraft. In most (though not all) societies, this is no longer so. An increasingly war-averse world has declared acts of aggression illegal, and that armed force is only justified in self-defense, or with the authority of the Security Council. These rules are still sometimes broken, but they are increasingly accepted as legitimate.

The United Nations was established in 1945, but for nearly 50 years it rarely played the global security role that its founders envisaged. The 40-year peace between the major powers during the Cold War was linked to the mutual possession of weapons of mass destruction. But the Cold War also stoked proxy wars in many poor countries. By 1992, conflicts within states were at an all-time high.

When the Cold War ended, a major driver of armed conflict vanished. But the break-up of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia


Guatemala
Paul Smith/
Panos Pictures

revealed new tensions – and brought new conflicts – to the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Indeed, twice as many conflicts started in the 1990s as in the 1980s. But the 1990s also saw an even greater increase in the number of wars coming to an end, leading to the net decline in conflict numbers.


One explanation for this decline is the explosion in international activism, spearheaded by the UN, which took place in the wake of the Cold War. UN peacemaking missions (diplomacy to halt ongoing wars) rose from four in 1990 to 15 in 2002. UN peacekeeping operations (involving troops on the



Following the end of the Cold War, the number of armed conflicts declined. During the same period the number of peacekeeping operations increased.



In 1975, only 26% of states were democracies. By 2005, the figure was 58%. Democracy is characterized here by constraints on the exercise of executive power, free elections and guaranteed civil liberties.



From the beginning of the 1960s to the end of the 1980s, more armed conflicts started than stopped each decade. Since then, more have ended than have begun.

ground) rose from 10 in 1990 to 17 in 2005, and have fundamentally changed in character. While the missions of the Cold War era rarely involved more than monitoring ceasefire lines, most of today's peace operations aim to rebuild national institutions and prevent the resumption of violence.

This upsurge of UN activity, backed by initiatives from regional organizations and NGOs, has often been poorly planned and implemented. But the fact that as international activism increased in the 1990s, conflicts declined, suggests – but does not prove – that the former caused the latter.

There is also an important association between armed conflict and poverty. The poor are, of course, not inherently more violent than the rich. But higher per capita income tends to mean a stronger state, which means more resources to crush rebellions or to address the grievances that drive them.

The end of the Cold War was associated with another important change. Since the beginning of the 1990s, more conflicts have ended in negotiated settlements, fewer in victories, in large part because peacemaking efforts are increasingly successful. Unfortunately, nearly 30 percent of negotiated settlements break down in under five years. This is why the UN and other international organizations are now putting so much effort into “post-conflict peacebuilding” – policies designed to prevent wars from starting up again.

Will the present downward trends in armed conflict continue? The answer depends on how successful the international community is in stopping existing wars, and in ensuring that peace agreements are durable.

INCOME AND ARMED CONFLICT

World Bank income categories based on Gross National Income per capita 2005



War and Poverty

Conflicts are more prevalent in low-income countries.



90% of armed conflicts in 2005 took place in low- and lower-middle-income countries.

Recent studies reveal that as incomes rise, the risk of armed conflict falls quite dramatically.


There is a close association between war and poverty for several reasons. First, armed conflicts create or exacerbate poverty – war has aptly been described as “development in reverse.” Second, poor countries, unlike rich ones, lack the resources that can spark armed uprisings. Third, poor countries tend to have weak security forces and so find it difficult to deter rebellions and to crush those that cannot be deterred.

INCOME-BANDS AND ARMED CONFLICTS

Percentage of states in each income-band with armed conflict 2005



The lower the income, the higher the number of armed conflicts.



REGIME TYPE AND ARMED CONFLICT

Type of regime
2005



Number and type of armed conflict
2005




Conflict and Regime Type

Anocracies – regimes that are neither dictatorships nor full democracies – are the most prone to armed conflict.

Political regimes can be broadly divided into three types. Democracies almost never go to war with each other, and because they have political structures and procedures for addressing grievances, have relatively few internal conflicts. Autocracies (dictatorships) tend to suppress ruthlessly any dissent or insurrection, and so they too also have relatively few armed conflicts. The third category, anocracies, which are neither fully democratic nor wholly authoritarian, experience most armed conflicts.


Europe and the Americas are overwhelmingly democratic, and have relatively few armed conflicts.

In 2005, one-third of the world's armed conflicts were in Sub-Saharan Africa, where over half the states are classified as anocracies.



REGIME TYPE BY REGION


Percentage of states with each type of regime 2005




Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East & North Africa, and Central & South Asia all have a high proportion of anocracies. In 2005, 45 of the world's 59 armed conflicts were in these three regions.

BATTLE-DEATHS AND UN PEACE OPERATIONS

Reported state-based
battle-deaths
2000–2005




ongoing UN
peacekeeping
operation 2005
(name and start
date given)



In December 2005,
the UN had almost
70,000 peacekeepers
and civilian police
deployed worldwide.

The UN mission
in Sudan in 2005
was deployed after the civil
war ended in the south.

As peacekeeping operations increased in number in the 1990s, armed conflict and battle-death numbers fell. A few countries where peacekeepers are deployed experience continuing political violence, but the death toll is usually low and almost always less than it was prior to the deployment of the peacekeeping mission. With peace agreements in place, the presence of peacekeepers and international reconstruction programs can help prevent conflicts from starting again. This is important because, until now, almost 30% of negotiated settlements have failed within five years.



TOP TEN TROOP CONTRIBUTORS
Number of uniformed
UN peacekeepers
December 2005

The 10 states contributing the most uniformed UN peacekeepers were all low-income states, except for South Africa and Uruguay (upper-middle), and Jordan (lower-middle).

Peacekeeping and Armed Conflict

UN peacekeeping operations are normally deployed following a peace agreement and help prevent the resumption of armed conflict.

Countries	Years of existence as state	Number of international armed conflicts	State-based armed conflicts				Non-state armed conflicts			Score on Political Terror Scale	Number of refugees by country of origin	Number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)	Use of child soldiers (under 18s) in active combat *	Regime type
			Number of years in conflict	Number of battle-deaths on home soil	Number of conflicts		Number of years in conflict	Number of conflicts	Campaigns of one-sided violence					
			1946–2005	1946–2005	2005		2002–2005	2005	2005					
Afghanistan	60	2	28	562,628	1		2	0	1	5	1,908,052	176,596	Yes	Anocracy
Albania	60	2	3	38	0		0	0	0	2.5	12,702	0 or no data	No	Democracy
Algeria	44	2	16	343,113	1		0	0	0	4	12,006	500,000	Inconclusive	Anocracy
Angola	31	3	29	233,799	0		0	0	0	3.5	215,777	61,700	Yes	Anocracy
Argentina	60	2	9	4,215	0		0	0	0	2	856	0 or no data	No	Democracy
Armenia	15	2	3	0	0		0	0	0	2	13,965	8,000	Inconclusive	Anocracy
Australia	60	8	27	0	0		0	0	0	1.5	44	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy
Austria	51	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	1.5	66	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy
Azerbaijan	15	2	6	20,372	1		0	0	0	3	233,675	558,387	Inconclusive	Autocracy
Bahrain	35	1	1	0	0		0	0	0	1.5	41	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Autocracy
Bangladesh	34	1	19	53,500	0		0	0	0	4	7,294	500,000	Inconclusive	Democracy
Belarus	15	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	2.5	8,857	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Autocracy
Belgium	60	5	7	0	0		0	0	0	1.5	95	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy
Benin	46	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	3	411	0 or no data	No	Democracy
Bhutan	57	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	1	106,537	0 or no data	No	Autocracy
Bolivia	60	0	3	1,682	0		0	0	0	2.5	269	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy
Bosnia and Herzegovina	14	3	5	55,000	0		0	0	0	2	109,930	183,400	No	Anocracy
Botswana	40	1	1	0	0		0	0	0	2	4	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy
Brazil	60	0	0	0	0		1	0	1	4	370	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy
Bulgaria	60	1	2	0	0		0	0	0	2.5	4,254	0 or no data	No	Democracy
Burkina Faso	46	1	2	150	0		0	0	0	2	607	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Anocracy
Burundi	44	0	15	8,605	1		2	0	1	4.5	438,663	117,000	Yes	Democracy
Cambodia	52	3	33	342,949	0		0	0	0	3	17,806	0 or no data	No	Anocracy
Cameroon	46	1	2	4,820	0		0	0	0	3.5	9,016	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Anocracy
Canada	60	5	10	0	0		0	0	0	1	122	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy
Central African Republic	46	1	2	219	0		0	0	0	3.5	42,890	212,000	Yes	Anocracy
Chad	46	7	39	43,921	1		0	0	0	3	48,400	200,000	Yes	Anocracy
Chile	60	0	1	2,095	0		0	0	0	1	938	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy
China	60	6	24	1,309,146	0		0	0	0	4	144,228	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Autocracy
Colombia	60	1	43	28,681	1		4	1	2	4.5	60,415	2,684,650	Yes	Democracy
Comoros	31	0	2	83	0		0	0	0	1	61	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy
Congo, Dem. Rep.	46	3	16	181,345	0		3	0	2	4.5	430,625	1,664,000	Yes	Anocracy
Congo, Rep.	46	1	6	9,791	0		0	0	0	2.5	24,413	123,500	Inconclusive	Anocracy
Costa Rica	60	0	1	2,000	0		0	0	0	1	178	0 or no data	No	Democracy
Côte d'Ivoire	46	0	3	1,200	0		3	2	0	4	18,303	500,000	Yes	Anocracy
Croatia	15	4	4	10,000	0		0	0	0	2	119,148	4,900	No	Democracy
Cuba	60	3	19	5,307	0		0	0	0	2.5	19,000	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Autocracy
Cyprus	46	1	1	6,311	0		0	0	0	2.5	5	265,000	Inconclusive	Democracy
Czech Republic	13**	4**	3**	0**	0		0	0	0	2	3,589	0 or no data	No	Democracy
Denmark	60	5	6	0	0		0	0	0	1	12	0 or no data	No	Democracy
Dominican Republic	60	1	2	3,276	0		0	0	0	3	67	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy
Ecuador	60	1	1	39	0		1	0	0	3	770	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy
Egypt, Arab Rep.	60	6	22	22,774	0		0	0	2	3.5	6,291	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Anocracy

Countries	Years of existence as state	Number of international armed conflicts	State-based armed conflicts			Non-state armed conflicts			Campaigns of one-sided violence	Score on Political Terror Scale	Number of refugees by country of origin	Number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)	Use of child soldiers (under 18s) in active combat *	Regime type
			Number of years in conflict	Number of battle-deaths on home soil	Number of conflicts	Number of years in conflict	Number of conflicts	2005						
			1946–2005	1946–2005	2005	2002–2005	2005	2005						
El Salvador	60	2	17	56,353	0	0	0	0	2.5	4,281	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Equatorial Guinea	38	0	1	185	0	0	0	0	3	477	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Anocracy	
Eritrea	13	1	5	225,391	0	0	0	0	3	143,594	50,509	Inconclusive	Autocracy	
Estonia	15	3	2	667	0	0	0	0	1.5	743	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Ethiopia	60	4	44	83,592	2	4	2	0	4	65,293	207,500	Inconclusive	Anocracy	
Fiji	36	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	1,379	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Finland	60	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	5	0 or no data	No	Democracy	
France	60	19	24	1,180	0	0	0	0	2	286	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Gabon	46	1	1	30	0	0	0	0	3	81	0 or no data	No	Anocracy	
Gambia, The	41	1	1	650	0	0	0	0	2	1,678	0 or no data	No	Anocracy	
Georgia	15	1	5	3,717	0	0	0	0	3	7,301	240,000	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Germany	57	3***	5***	0***	0	0	0	0	1.5	78	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Ghana	49	0	3	103	0	1	0	0	2	18,432	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Greece	60	4	11	154,000	0	0	0	0	2	331	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Guatemala	60	0	33	46,388	0	1	1	0	3.5	3,379	242,000	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Guinea	48	1	5	1,400	0	0	0	0	2.5	5,820	82,000	Yes	Anocracy	
Guinea-Bissau	32	1	2	9,005	0	0	0	0	2.5	1,050	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Guyana	40	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.5	406	0 or no data	No	Democracy	
Haiti	60	0	3	419	0	0	0	1	4	13,542	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Anocracy	
Honduras	60	4	4	1,072	0	0	0	0	3	535	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Hungary	60	2	2	3,171	0	0	0	0	2	3,519	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
India	59	4	48	83,130	5	4	2	2	3.5	16,275	600,000	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Indonesia	60	2	41	63,585	1	1	0	0	3.5	34,384	471,000	Yes	Democracy	
Iran, Islamic Rep.	60	4	28	340,127	1	0	0	0	3.5	98,772	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Autocracy	
Iraq	60	5	41	462,133	1	4	1	4	5	262,142	1,300,000	Yes	Anocracy	
Ireland	60	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	21	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Israel	58	6	58	27,983	1	0	0	2	4	632	225,000	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Italy	60	5	7	0	0	0	0	0	2	217	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Jamaica	44	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	450	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Japan	60	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	13	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Jordan	60	5	9	4,222	0	0	0	1	2.5	1,789	160,000	Inconclusive	Anocracy	
Kazakhstan	15	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	2.5	4,316	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Autocracy	
Kenya	43	0	1	13,273	0	1	1	0	3.5	4,620	381,924	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Korea, Dem. Rep.	58	2	16	627,418	0	0	0	0	4	288	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Autocracy	
Korea, Rep.	58	4	19	658,670	0	0	0	0	1.5	268	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Kuwait	45	2	2	14,586	0	0	0	0	2	381	0 or no data	No	Autocracy	
Kyrgyz Republic	15	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	2.5	3,122	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Anocracy	
Lao P.D.R.	52	3	19	24,005	0	0	0	0	3	24,442	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Autocracy	
Latvia	15	1	2	735	0	0	0	0	2	2,430	0 or no data	No	Democracy	
Lebanon	60	2	19	149,622	0	0	0	0	3	18,323	325,000	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Lesotho	40	1	1	114	0	0	0	0	2	6	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Liberia	60	0	12	12,684	0	0	0	0	3	231,114	48,000	Yes	Anocracy	
Libya	55	4	25	4,250	0	0	0	0	3	1,535	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Autocracy	

Countries	Years of existence as state	Number of international armed conflicts	State-based armed conflicts				Non-state armed conflicts		Campaigns of one-sided violence	Score on Political Terror Scale	Number of refugees by country of origin	Number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)	Use of child soldiers (under 18s) in active combat *	Regime type
			Number of years in conflict	Number of battle-deaths on home soil	Number of conflicts		Number of years in conflict	Number of conflicts						
			1946–2005	1946–2005	2005		2002–2005	2005						
Lithuania	15	2	3	8,620	0	0	0	0	1	1,448	0 or no data	No	Democracy	
Macedonia, F.Y.R.	15	1	3	145	0	0	0	0	2	8,599	770	No	Democracy	
Madagascar	46	0	1	7,080	0	1	0	0	2	203	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Malawi	42	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	101	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Malaysia	49	2	10	11,744	0	0	0	0	2.5	394	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Anocracy	
Mali	46	2	4	350	0	0	0	0	2	520	0 or no data	No	Democracy	
Mauritania	46	1	5	392	0	0	0	0	3	31,651	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Anocracy	
Mauritius	38	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	—	27	0 or no data	No	Democracy	
Mexico	60	0	2	144	0	3	1	0	3	2,313	11,000	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Moldova	15	1	3	650	0	0	0	0	2.5	12,063	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Mongolia	60	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	2.5	654	0 or no data	No	Democracy	
Morocco	50	3	18	16,514	0	0	0	0	3	93,572 ⁺	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Autocracy	
Mozambique	31	1	16	139,749	0	0	0	0	3	104	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Myanmar	58	2	57	72,573	3	2	1	1	4	164,864	540,000	Yes	Autocracy	
Namibia	16	2	5	25,000	0	0	0	0	2	1,226	0 or no data	No	Democracy	
Nepal	60	0	13	11,021	1	0	0	1	5	2,065	150,000	Inconclusive	Autocracy	
Netherlands	60	8	15	0	0	0	0	0	1	159	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
New Zealand	60	5	23	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Nicaragua	60	2	13	40,017	0	0	0	0	2.5	1,463	0 or no data	No	Democracy	
Niger	46	2	6	489	0	0	0	0	2	655	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Nigeria	46	2	8	75,812	0	4	3	1	4	22,098	200,000	Inconclusive	Anocracy	
Norway	60	5	6	0	0	0	0	0	1	15	0 or no data	No	Democracy	
Oman	60	3	6	2,032	0	0	0	0	1.5	12	0 or no data	No	Autocracy	
Pakistan	59	4	25	23,506	0	3	1	0	4	29,698	20,000	Inconclusive	Anocracy	
Panama	60	1	1	426	0	0	0	0	1	42	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Papua New Guinea	31	0	7	323	0	0	0	0	3	23	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Paraguay	60	0	3	4,250	0	0	0	0	2.5	44	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Peru	60	1	21	31,046	0	0	0	0	2.5	4,865	60,000	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Philippines	60	3	50	77,295	2	0	0	0	4	465	60,000	Yes	Democracy	
Poland	60	4	6	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	19,641	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Portugal	60	8	18	0	0	0	0	0	2	74	0 or no data	No	Democracy	
Qatar	35	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	11	0 or no data	No	Autocracy	
Romania	60	3	5	909	0	0	0	0	2.5	11,492	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Russian Federation	60 ⁺	7 ⁺	33 ⁺	98,251 ⁺	1	0	0	0	4	102,965	265,000	Yes	Democracy	
Rwanda	44	2	12	9,759	0	0	0	1	2.5	100,244	Yes ⁺⁺	Yes	Anocracy	
Saudi Arabia	60	2	3	358	0	0	0	0	3	151	0 or no data	No	Autocracy	
Senegal	46	3	12	1,644	0	0	0	0	2	8,671	64,000	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Serbia and Montenegro	60 ⁺	3 ⁺	5 ⁺	4,500 ⁺	0	0	0	0	2.5	189,850	247,500	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Sierra Leone	45	1	10	12,997	0	0	0	0	2.5	40,447	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Anocracy	
Singapore	41	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	39	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Anocracy	
Slovak Republic	13 ^{**}	3 ^{**}	2 ^{**}	0 ^{**}	0	0	0	0	1	791	0 or no data	No	Democracy	
Slovenia	15	0	0	63	0	0	0	0	1	155	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	
Solomon Islands	28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	27	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy	

Countries	State-based armed conflicts					Non-state armed conflicts					Number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)	Use of child soldiers (under 18s) in active combat *	Regime type
	Years of existence as state	Number of international armed conflicts	Number of years in conflict	Number of battle-deaths on home soil	Number of conflicts	Number of years in conflict	Number of conflicts	Campaigns of one-sided violence	Score on Political Terror Scale	Number of refugees by country of origin			
	1946–2005	1946–2005	1946–2005	1946–2005	2005	2002–2005	2005	2005	2005	2005			
Somalia	46	1	22	68,435	0	4	6	0	4	394,760	385,000	Yes	Anocracy
South Africa	60	3	28	3,775	0	0	0	0	3	268	0 or no data	No	Democracy
Spain	60	7	11	245	0	0	0	0	2	49	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy
Sri Lanka	58	0	22	62,044	1	2	1	0	4.5	108,059	341,175	Yes	Anocracy
Sudan	50	2	34	81,866	1	4	2	3	5	693,267	5,355,000	Yes	Anocracy
Swaziland	38	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.5	13	0 or no data	No	Autocracy
Sweden	60	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	75	0 or no data	No	Democracy
Switzerland	60	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	16	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy
Syrian Arab Rep.	60	4	22	19,972	0	1	0	0	3	16,281	305,000	Inconclusive	Autocracy
Tajikistan	15	1	6	41,400	0	0	0	0	3	54,753	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Anocracy
Tanzania	45	1	2	1,923	0	0	0	0	3	1,544	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Anocracy
Thailand	60	6	31	6,200	1	0	0	1	4	424	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy
Timor-Leste	4	0	0	33,525	0	0	0	0	2	251	0 or no data	No	Democracy
Togo	46	0	2	55	0	0	0	0	4.5	51,107	3,000	No	Anocracy
Trinidad and Tobago	44	0	1	30	0	0	0	0	3	63	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy
Tunisia	50	1	2	3,435	0	0	0	0	2.5	3,129	0 or no data	No	Anocracy
Turkey	60	5	27	36,299	2	0	0	0	3.5	170,131	677,904	Inconclusive	Democracy
Turkmenistan	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	820	Yes ^{††}	Inconclusive	Autocracy
Uganda	44	2	28	120,484	1	2	0	1	4.5	34,170	1,740,498	Yes	Anocracy
Ukraine	15	1	2	17,619	0	0	0	0	2.5	84,213	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy
United Arab Emirates	35	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	30	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Autocracy
United Kingdom	60	22	49	3,407	0	0	0	0	2.5	135	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy
United States	60	17	32	189	1	0	0	0	3	683	0 or no data	Yes	Democracy
Uruguay	60	0	1	53	0	0	0	0	1	111	0 or no data	No	Democracy
Uzbekistan	15	2	4	107	0	0	0	0	4	8,323	3,400	No	Autocracy
Venezuela, R. B.	60	0	2	583	0	0	0	0	3	2,590	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Democracy
Vietnam	52 ^{††}	5 ^{††}	27 ^{††}	2,488,532 ^{††}	0	0	0	0	3	358,248	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Autocracy
West Bank & Gaza	—	see Israel	see Israel	see Israel	see Israel	see Israel	see Israel	see Israel	4	349,673	35,571	Yes	—
Yemen, Rep.	60 ^{†††}	2 ^{†††}	17 ^{†††}	72,421 ^{†††}	0	0	0	0	4	1,325	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Anocracy
Zambia	42	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	151	0 or no data	Inconclusive	Anocracy
Zimbabwe	41	2	18	27,000	0	0	0	0	4	10,793	569,685	Inconclusive	Anocracy

Countries with a population under 500,000 are not included in this atlas, and neither are non-sovereign territories/dependencies, with the exception of the West Bank and Gaza.

* “Yes” means that the government and/or non-state groups used children in active combat. “Inconclusive” means unverified reports of children in active combat, or an unclear or under-18 recruitment age. “No” means that neither the government nor any non-state groups is suspected of using child soldiers.

^{††} These data start in 1993, when the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic were created. From 1946 to 1992, Czechoslovakia had one international conflict, one year in conflict, but no home-soil battle-deaths.

^{†††} Pre-1990 data cover the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), created 1949, but not the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), a separate state from 1949 until it joined the Federal Republic in 1990. East Germany (1949–90) had no international conflicts, years in conflict or home-soil battle-deaths.

[†] This number includes 90,652 refugees from the Western Sahara.

^{††} As the Russian Federation is the successor state to the Soviet Union, pre-1991 data are for the Soviet Union as a whole. From 1991 to 2005, data cover Russia only.

^{†††} Rwanda and Turkmenistan are known to have had IDPs in 2005, but there are no reliable numbers.

[†] As Serbia is the successor state to Yugoslavia, pre-1992 data are for Yugoslavia as a whole. From 1992 to 2005, data cover Serbia & Montenegro. In 2006, Serbia and Montenegro became separate states.

^{††} From 1954 to 1975, Vietnam was two separate entities: Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). In 1976, North Vietnam defeated South Vietnam, forming the reunified Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Data for 1954–75 include both North and South Vietnam; in that period, South Vietnam had four international conflicts, 21 years in conflict and 1,130,298 home-soil battle-deaths.

^{†††} In 1967, the former British-controlled territory of Aden became independent as the People’s Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). In 1990, South Yemen merged with the Arab Republic of Yemen (North Yemen) to form today’s Republic of Yemen. Data for 1946–67 cover only North Yemen. Data for 1967–90 include both North and South Yemen; in that period, South Yemen had two international conflicts, seven years in conflict and 12,296 home-soil battle-deaths.

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1 When States Go to War

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NUMBER AND TYPE OF STATE-BASED ARMED CONFLICTS, 1946–2005

UCDP/PRIO dataset, 2006.

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REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF STATE-BASED CONFLICTS, 2005

UCDP/HSRP dataset, 2006.

REGIONAL TRENDS, 1946–2005

UCDP/PRIO dataset, 2006.

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INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, 1946–2005

PRIO, 2006.

THE MOST WAR-PRONE STATES

The data are similar to that in a table in the *Human Security Report 2005*. However, the time-span and the coding rules differ slightly.

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STATE-BASED CONFLICTS ON HOME SOIL, 1946–2005

UCDP/PRIO dataset, 2006.

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TIME SPENT IN CONFLICT, 1946–2005

PRIO, 2006.

2 Warlords and Killing Fields

Data for all of the graphics in this section are from the UCDP/HSRP dataset, 2006. The Political Instability Task Force data on genocides and politicides discussed in the text is compiled by Barbara Harff.

See Barbara Harff, 'Genocide', www.humansecurityreport.info

3 Counting the Dead

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BATTLE-DEATHS IN STATE-BASED CONFLICTS, 1946–2005

Lacina/Gleditsch dataset, 2006.

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BATTLES-DEATHS IN NON-STATE CONFLICTS, 2002–2005

DEATHS FROM POLITICAL VIOLENCE, 2005

DEATHS FROM POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN EACH REGION, 2005

UCDP/HSRP dataset, 2006.

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BATTLE-DEATHS IN STATE-BASED CONFLICTS, 1946–2005

Lacina/Gleditsch dataset, 2006 and UCDP/PRIO dataset, 2006.

THE MOST DEADLY CONFLICTS, 1946–2005

Lacina/Gleditsch dataset, 2006.

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DEATHS FROM POLITICAL VIOLENCE, 2005

UCDP/HSRP dataset, 2006.

4 Measuring Human Rights Abuse

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DISPLACED PEOPLE, 2005

NUMBER OF REFUGEES AND IDPS WORLDWIDE, 1970–2005

Data from various sources collated by Phil Orchard, University of British Columbia, 2007.

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5 Causes of War, Causes of Peace

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CONFLICTS BEGINNING AND ENDING, 1950–2005

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CONFLICT AND REGIME TYPE, 2005

Data on regime type from the Polity IV Project.

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
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
Documents a dramatic decline in the number of wars, genocides and human rights abuse over the past decade. Published by Oxford University Press, the *Report* argues that the single most compelling explanation for these changes is found in the unprecedented upsurge of international activism, spearheaded by the UN, which took place in the wake of the Cold War.

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Human Security Brief 2006

Updates the *Human Security Report 2005's* conflict trend data and documents continuing declines in the number of genocides and other mass slaughters of civilians, and a drop in refugee numbers and military coups. Sub-Saharan Africa saw the greatest decrease in political violence in the period under review. Less encouraging was the finding that four of the world's six regions have experienced an increase in the number of conflicts since 2002.

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Notes on Terminology

Anocracy: see Democracy.

Armed conflict: political violence between two parties involving armed force, and causing at least 25 reported battle-deaths a year.

Armed group: any political group (other than a state) which employs armed force.

Autocracy: see Democracy

Battle-death: a death that is directly related to combat during an armed conflict. Can be a death of either a combatant or a civilian caught in crossfire. Does not include deaths from war-exacerbated disease.

Child soldier: individual aged under 18 in the armed forces of the state or of an armed group, whether or not the child is armed or is used in combat.

Civil war: an intra-state conflict causing at least 1,000 reported battle-deaths in a calendar year.

Civilian: an individual not in the armed forces of the state or of a non-state group; a non-combatant.

Combatant: an active and armed participant in an armed conflict, who may or may not be in uniform.

Conflict: in this atlas, always means an armed conflict. See also War.

Democracy, autocracy, anocracy: as used in the graph on p 44 and the map-spread on pp 48–49, a democracy is a state with well-established procedures for political participation, and with a freely elected chief executive who is subject to substantial checks and balances. An autocracy suppresses or sharply restricts political participation; selects its chief executive from within the political elite; and is governed with few or no legislative or judicial checks. An anocracy is neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic, and may be in transition from one to the other.

Displaced people: see Refugee.

Ethnic cleansing: the deliberate, organized and usually violent expulsion of people from an area because of their perceived ethnicity.

Extra-state conflict: an armed conflict involving a state which takes place outside its geographical borders. Most have been colonial wars.

Genocide: acts intended to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, racial or religious group: see pp 19–20. See also Politicide.

Home soil: a state or its territorial waters.

Human rights abuse: organized or sustained breach of human rights, such as torture or imprisonment without trial.

Income-band: the World Bank divides states into four groups by average income: see pp 46–47.

Internally displaced person (IDP): See Refugee.

International conflict: an armed conflict involving more than one state.

International war: an international conflict causing 1,000 or more reported battle-deaths in a calendar year.

Internationalized intra-state conflict: a conflict inside a state in which one or more outside states have sent their own armed forces to support one side or another.

Inter-state conflict: an armed conflict between two or more states.

Intra-state conflict: an armed conflict inside a state. See Civil war.

Militia: normally refers to the armed forces of insurgents, warlords, political parties or non-state groups. Also sometimes used for some armed forces associated with the state, usually those who are non-professional, part-time or raised during an emergency.

Non-state conflict: an armed conflict, usually between warlords or political, religious or ethnic groups, which does not actively involve the state. See also State-based conflict.

One-sided violence: organized and sustained attacks on defenseless civilians, by the state or by an armed group, causing at least 25 reported deaths in a calendar year.

Peacebuilding: measures designed to reduce tension or build confidence between opposing states or political, religious or ethnic groups, in order to prevent the start or resumption of armed conflict.

Peacekeeping: activities carried out primarily by foreign military personnel, usually under the mandate of the UN or a regional security organization, intended to maintain the peace in a post-conflict environment.

Peacemaking: a range of political and diplomatic activities intended to halt ongoing conflicts.

Political Stability and Absence of Violence

Index: a World Bank ranking of states by the probability that their governments will be destabilized or overthrown unconstitutionally or violently. See pp 37–39.

Political Terror Scale (PTS): a University of North Carolina ranking of states by their human rights violations. See pp 37–39.

Political violence: organized or systematic violence whose motive is primarily political rather than criminal (though an overlap exists). “Deadly political violence” is where such violence causes death. If it causes at least 25 reported deaths a year, it becomes either an armed conflict or a campaign of one-sided violence.

Politicide: acts intended to destroy, in whole or in part, a group defined by its political views. See also Genocide.

Poor, rich: comparative terms, based on income and/or wealth. States in the lowest World Bank income-band (see Income-band) are often referred to as poor, and in the highest band as rich.

Proxy war: a civil war, and occasionally an inter-state war, in which one or both sides are covertly or openly controlled or supported, financially, militarily or diplomatically, by an outside state which is not itself directly involved in the fighting.

Refugee: someone who is outside their country of nationality and is unwilling to return because of a well-founded fear of persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, social status or political opinion. An internally displaced person (IDP) is someone who has fled home for similar reasons, or because of a conflict or natural disaster, but has not crossed an international border. The term “displaced people” includes both refugees and IDPs.

Region: the six regions used in this atlas are shown on pp 6–7. They differ slightly from the regions normally used by the World Bank and the United Nations.

Reported death: the figures given in this atlas are “reported deaths”: deaths which have been documented by a reliable source, and which can be attributed to a specific armed conflict or campaign of one-sided violence. Counts of reported deaths are almost always lower, and sometimes much lower, than estimates of total deaths.

State-based conflict: an armed conflict in which one or more parties is a state. For the four main types of state-based conflict, see p 10. See also Non-state conflict.

Terrorism: the use of organized violence against civilians to create fear or terror for political or ideological goals.

Uppsala: the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University, Sweden, maintains many of the annual datasets on which this atlas is based.

War: an armed conflict causing 1,000 or more reported battle-deaths in a calendar year.

War-exacerbated: disease and malnutrition often increase, sometimes substantially so, during and after armed conflict. The resulting mortality is sometimes described as war-induced or (more correctly) war-exacerbated. These “indirect deaths” are often more numerous, sometimes far more so, than battle-deaths (also known as “direct deaths”).

Warlord: leader of an armed group whose power derives more from armed force than from political legitimacy.

Further information

For more information about the data included in this miniatlas, visit the Human Security Report Project website at www.hsrgroup.org or send an email to humansi@sfu.ca

For more information about World Bank publications, visit <http://www.worldbank.org/publications> or email books@worldbank.org

The *miniAtlas of Human Security* is also available in French and Spanish, and is available on the web at www.miniatlasofhumansecurity.info