

**EDUCATING SLOVAKIA'S SENIOR OFFICERS**

**by Otto Doornbos**



## HARMONIE PAPER 7

### Educating Slovakia's Senior Officers / by Otto Doornbos

Otto Doornbos wrote this monograph while studying at the University of Groningen. It reports research conducted in 1998-99 for the Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) and funded by The Netherlands' *Stichting Fondswerving Militaire Oorlogs- en Dienstslichtoffers* (SFMO). The author wishes to thank Sipke de Hoop for encouraging him to undertake the assignment and for commenting on earlier drafts. He is grateful also to those in the Slovak Republic who provided information and consented to interviews; and to the staff at CESS who prepared his typescript for publication.

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## FOREWORD

by Peter Volten

We called the territory *Czechoslovakia*. Then, briefly, it was the *Czech and Slovak Republic*. Soon, though, there was the velvet divorce which produced the *Czech Republic* and the *Slovak Republic*.

That led to a division of the military assets and the armed forces of the original unitary state. In this the Slovaks received facilities lying within their new country's frontiers and a nominal one-third of the personnel and equipment of the former entity. However, the settlement left them without a defence ministry and without a high command (because these had been Prague-based); and it left them with an emasculated military education system (the top colleges having been in Moravia, in and near Brno).

The training challenge was a daunting one, especially with respect to provision of the advanced instruction needed to prepare people for key appointments in the new ministry and on the new General Staff, for command posts at home and senior jobs in missions abroad. It was met – as it continues to be met – by a combination of local endeavour and external assistance, the former having assumed progressively greater importance with the passage of time.

Early 'outside' help included programmes offered by the Centre for European Security Studies (CESS); and we remain active in Slovakia. In addition, though, we have maintained an interest in the evolution of 'domestic' arrangements for higher military education in the country ever since independence in 1993. Thus, when the opportunity arose to review the Slovak experience in this connection – to elucidate what had been attempted and to evaluate what had been accomplished – we accepted the assignment readily. (A Dutch foundation kindly provided funding.)

What follows is an objective account and a thoughtful appraisal. It records a new state's effort to address an (almost) unique problem: starting from scratch in the provision of higher military education. It shows how political pressures and institutional inadequacies have been overcome to put in place arrangements which appear to be serving Slovakia tolerably well.

At the same time, the author does not shirk critical comment. Quite the contrary: Otto Doornbos clearly has doubts about the breadth and depth of the professional preparation for top jobs that senior Slovak officers receive. One can see his point. Their new government wants to join NATO. As everyone knows, this raises 'interoperability' issues. What people forget is that these cover language skills and strategic understanding as well as radio frequencies and fuel-hose sizes.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Since becoming an independent state after the so-called 'velvet divorce' from the Czech Republic in 1993, Slovakia had to build up a defence organisation from scratch. A brand new Ministry of Defence (MoD) was created in Bratislava, as was a General Staff in Trencin. Besides forming the organisational structures, policy-makers also had to work out new defence concepts and goals. A defence doctrine was adopted in 1994, in which the country expressed its wish to co-operate with the western security structures. One of the main objectives of this policy document was to 'pave the way for achieving a degree of compatibility and interoperability between armed forces in Slovakia ... and the armed forces in developed democratic countries'.<sup>1</sup> The Republic became an active participant in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in 1994, because it regards the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as the most important factor in the present European security situation. To achieve the foreign policy goals of co-operation with NATO and a possible future integration into its military structures, Slovakia of course has to meet a number of conditions. The transformation of the Armed Forces into a modern, well-armed and trained instrument is one of them. An important requirement of this restructuring is to ensure the democratic control of the armed forces. In general, security and defence policy making has to be democratised.

Transforming the defence establishment to reach a level of consistency with NATO countries means changing the military's way of thinking. Only when this occurs can reforms be effective. The military personnel will have to adjust to the new politico-strategic environment, which brings forth new military tasks and new values. A key role in this process is played by military education. It is also in this field that Slovakia has had to work out new structures and concepts. At least the country had at its disposal a network of schools in 1993. But the reorganisation of the military educational system became a major task, that continues to the present day. Options had to be considered, choices made and challenges faced. In accordance with the country's orientation towards the Euro-Atlantic structures, international input was frequently sought in the process.

The focus of this study is on the higher military education of senior officers in the Slovak Republic since 1993 and the role international co-operation played in its development. The senior officers were chosen because they are the ones taking on the most responsible positions in the current defence organisation and the way in which they, as leading men, are educated will give some perspective on the future development of the Slovak armed forces. In turn, this development will partially determine whether or not Slovakia shall be incorporated in NATO.

The structure of this paper was designed in such a way that it would work its way down from the most general frameworks to what actually happened in practice on the level of the officers' education. Consequently, political backgrounds were examined first. It was within this political context that the defence establishment had to build its structures and these included the ones for military education. These structures in turn were guided by and produced their general policies, which were worked out and had a practical outcome.

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<sup>1</sup> *Defence of the native country: Army of the Slovak Republic*, Slovak MoD (Bratislava, 1994), p.6.

This methodology had its implications for the actual research. General policy documents could be accessed through the kind co-operation of the Slovak MoD, but to what extent policies were actually carried out and their objectives achieved remained to be seen. This question made a trip to Slovakia an absolute necessity. At the MoD a selection of key persons who in the last years have played a significant role in the process of educational policy-making was interviewed. The man who currently has the highest authority in the field of military education (i.e. the head of the Section of Personnel Management) was questioned as well. However, also in this case, the method was to hear from people in the highest positions in the educational structures down to those actually involved in educating the officers. This meant that staff members from the Military Academy in Liptovsky Mikulas (the place where Slovak senior officers receive their career education) were interviewed as well.

## II. POLITICAL BACKGROUNDS

A complicating factor in the formation of the defence establishment was the hectic political situation in which it had to take place. On a general level, Slovakia was (and still is) in the process of building a democracy and creating a market economy while structuring its armed forces and defence institutions. Starting up an entirely *new*, western-style state with all the additional problems of a communist legacy was a more difficult task when compared to the situation in many other Central and Eastern European countries.<sup>2</sup> Within this general framework lay the problems that were specific to the Slovak situation. They can be summarised with the term 'political instability'. To begin with, the country has had three governments in less than five years. One of them was an interim cabinet while the other two suffered from regular tensions between the coalition partners. With regard to the military, three governments also meant three different defence ministers. In a period of construction this must have been a great disadvantage. Yet, it was not so much the number of cabinets that caused the instability. It was more the authoritarian way in which Vladimir Meciar led (two of) them.<sup>3</sup> As prime minister, this leader of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) left his mark on the period after independence.

Symptomatic of his style of governing were the constant fights with the country's president, Michal Kovac. By using certain deficiencies in the Constitution he actually undermined the presidential powers in favour of himself, which raised constitutional questions. This probably also obscured the situation for the military with regard to the exact authority of the president as their commander-in-chief. An example was an amendment from 1995 which suddenly removed the president's power to appoint and dismiss the Chief of the General Staff by giving it to the government.<sup>4</sup> Besides this, Meciar's co-operation with extremist parties led to an increasing appeal to nationalism. In his politics of confrontation and intolerance enemies were pointed out everywhere. Opposition was thwarted and marked as harming Slovakia's interests. The country's 'sovereignty' (which in practice meant the indisputable ability of the ruling elite to govern Slovakia as it saw fit) was made into something sacred. Regularly this viewpoint obscured Meciar's position on integration into NATO.

Although he often expressed the country's wish to join this organisation as soon as possible, he also criticised it. At times he even questioned the benefits of joining.<sup>5</sup> A complicating factor was that the ultranationalist Slovak National Party (SNS) and the left-wing Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS), which were Meciar's coalition partners during most of the period after independence, frequently expressed their opposition to

<sup>2</sup> In this respect Slovakia belonged to the same category as countries like Belarus, Ukraine and the Baltic States.

<sup>3</sup> At the beginning of 1994 Meciar's first government was toppled and replaced by an interim coalition that was composed of the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), the Christian-Democratic Movement (KDH) and politicians that used to belong to Meciar's party, but turned their back on him. This government, led by Jozef Moravcik, organised new elections in the fall of 1994. These were won by Meciar, who this time completed his term. So in the whole period until the fall of 1998 he was out of power for less than a year.

<sup>4</sup> Jeffrey Simon, *NATO enlargement and Central Europe: A study in civil-military relations* (Washington D.C, 1996), p.278.

<sup>5</sup> Sharon Fisher, 'Slovakia plans referendum on EU, NATO', *OMRI Daily Digest* (25 October 1996).

NATO membership. According to them a neutral position would be a better option. In the same light Meciar himself always took Russia's position into account when dealing with western integration. His relations with Moscow were very friendly. A bit too friendly according to many critics. Under Meciar, Slovakia concluded a large number of bilateral agreements with the Russian Federation in the economic, but also in the military technological sphere. Leading Slovak intelligence expert Igor Cibula, who was a co-founder of the Slovak Intelligence Service (SIS), stated that treaties on co-operation in the military sector threatened the country's declared intention of joining NATO.<sup>6</sup> In general, all the accords led opposition leader Jan Langos<sup>7</sup> (of the centre-right Democratic Party) to conclude in 1997 that Meciar's policies supported the interests of Russia. He said the government had gotten the country not only into economic dependence on Russia, but into political and military dependence as well.<sup>8</sup> Eduard Kukan<sup>9</sup> of the Democratic Union expressed similar concerns: 'This government ... is concentrating in an undesirable manner economic and military co-operation on a one-sided orientation toward Russia. ... from a political standpoint, this is harmful to Slovakia'.<sup>10</sup> An analyst of Slovak relations with Russia in the independent Research Center of the Slovak Society for Foreign Policy, Alexander Duleba, elaborated on this. He said it had been clear since 1995 that, because of his close relations with Moscow, Meciar was both unwilling and incapable of leading Slovakia into NATO and the European Union.<sup>11</sup>

This last remark expressed the general criticism. In spite of all the rhetoric Meciar did not actually want to join the Euro-Atlantic structures. Membership of NATO and the EU would mean giving up his authoritarian methods of governing, which meant losing his powerful position. It would jeopardise his government. He knew that for Slovakia to be integrated in the West he had to step down first.<sup>12</sup> So that was the background of the mixed signals he and his coalition partners sent out on western integration. This also must have affected the defence establishment and their restructuring efforts. Although entering NATO was the official and recorded policy goal, it was possible and likely that confusion occurred and interfered with policies. In Meciar's second cabinet a member of his party, Jozef Gajdos, was State Secretary of Defence while Jan Sitek of the SNS was Defence minister. The fact that Gajdos competed with Sitek on policy regarding NATO and Russia could be an illustration of confusing ulterior motives.<sup>13</sup> In general, any effort from the military with regard to meeting NATO standards was overshadowed by Meciar's ruling methods, which obviously blocked any chance of ever getting near admittance to this military organisation. Anyway, military reforms became subordinate to the unstable political situation and its problems.

However, the September 1998 elections seemed to have turned the tide. They resulted in a constitutional majority in parliament for the parties of the democratic

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<sup>6</sup> Jolyon Naegele, 'Slovakia: Ties to Moscow strengthen, relations with Brussels strained (part of 'Slovakia: A status report')', *RFE/RL Special Report* (Bratislava, 1997).

<sup>7</sup> Langos was also the Interior minister of Czechoslovakia from 1990 till 1992.

<sup>8</sup> Naegele, 'Slovakia'.

<sup>9</sup> A former Slovak foreign minister and former ambassador to the United Nations. Since the last elections he resumed the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs

<sup>10</sup> Naegele, 'Slovakia'.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Martin Simecka, 'Slovakia's lonely independence', *Transitions*, 4.3 (August 1997), p.17.

<sup>13</sup> Simon, *NATO enlargement*, p.279.

opposition. This urged Meciar to hand over his power to a new government, led by Mikulas Dzurinda. It consisted of the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) and the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP). This broad coalition expressed its firm devotion to democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law. It pledged to carry out the political and economic reforms that would put Slovakia back on track for EU and NATO membership. Integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures was a main focus of the government's programme. Considering the previous administration it was obvious that there was a lot of work to do. The Meciar period really had taken its toll. The question if this last statement also had any specific meaning with regard to the field of (higher) military education will be examined below.

### III. BUILDING A SYSTEM OF EDUCATION

When it came to military education, one of the first issues that had to be addressed in 1993 was, of course, to establish under which authority it would fall. This decision was very important with regard to the initiation of reforms. In the discussions on this subject there were two streams of opinion.<sup>14</sup> The first one claimed that military education should be subordinated to the MoD. The second, however, wanted it to fall completely under the authority of the General Staff. In the end the first position came out on top. The reason for this was the fact that in Slovakia education provided at military schools, is regarded by law as the equivalent of education at civilian schools. This means that both are under the aegis of the state administration.<sup>15</sup> They also fall under the same (educational) laws and it was this legislation that awarded the authority to the MoD. This outcome can be regarded as positive and necessary for a number of reasons.

First of all, this was very much a civil-military issue. General Staffs in Eastern Europe are still considered as bulwarks of military conservatism.<sup>16</sup> During communism they were the Party's direct executive power. The fact that Slovakia created an entirely new General Staff did not necessarily mean that it consisted only of 'new', open-minded people. Quite a few old-style officers who had held high positions in Czechoslovakia came east after the split in 1993 and played their role in starting up the defence establishment. If the General Staff had gotten authority over military education, reforms in this field could easily have been at risk. Governments should always be the direct instigators of democratic military reforms. This cannot be left to the armed forces themselves, because they have their own interests which could block the implementation of certain changes. Also, General Staff authority in this field would have made the task of the Slovak parliament to effectively control what the Army Command did with this power much more difficult. So it was more desirable to have military education directly under the political control of the defence minister.

Be that as it may, the objection to this could be that the General Staff was in fact under the control of the Slovak Minister of Defence. So reform in education could have been politically controlled. This might be true, but in this particular area Slovakia had some problems. Since the spring of 1994 there were tensions between the Army Command in Trencin and the MoD.<sup>17</sup> These had to do with the fact that the former was created prior to the latter. The decision that the Command was not workable and would be transformed into a General Staff in September 1994 added to the tense relations. The Army commanders probably also had difficulties with complying to civilian authorities and lower ranked officers at the MoD. In 1995 defence minister Sitek wanted to amend the Law on the Army because of the vagueness of his jurisdiction over the General Staff.<sup>18</sup> Up until then his ability to co-ordinate its activities had remained limited. The

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<sup>14</sup> Interview with Dr. Milan Jelenak and Ing. Dusan Krizan, members of the science and education division (Section of the Development of Human Resources of the Slovak Ministry of Defence), 8 February 1999.

<sup>15</sup> Interview with Jelenak and Krizan.

<sup>16</sup> Theo van den Doel, 'From co-operation towards integration? Some criteria for entering NATO/WEU', in Jan Geert Siccamo and Theo van den Doel (eds), *Restructuring armed forces in East and West* (Boulder and Oxford, 1994), p.116.

<sup>17</sup> Simon, *NATO enlargement*, p.279.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p.267.

cabinet approved the amendment, but in spite of this legal framework difficulties continued. The fact that the General Staff retained its seat in Trencin and thus was separated from Bratislava kept on hindering co-ordination and ministerial oversight.<sup>19</sup> So, looking back, a possible General Staff authority over reforms in military education would have been difficult to control in this starting period. All this would have further delayed the transformation process in the educational sphere. In any case, the MoD solution was the better option. Nonetheless, a critical observation had to be added. It was a disadvantage that the ratio between civilian and military personnel at the MoD was thirty per cent against seventy. When compared to what was standard within NATO in terms of civil-military relations, this ideally had to be the other way around. One of the explanations could have been the fact that it proved to be very difficult to attract civilians to work at the Ministry. In general, civilians with a sufficient amount of knowledge on both issues of defence and modern methods of management were extremely hard to come by.

### **Structures within MoD**

The Ministry itself went through quite a few organisational changes during its first years. These restructuring efforts also affected the divisions dealing with education.<sup>20</sup> Until the major reorganisation of the MoD in 1994, there was a separate department for military education. With the restructuring this division was abolished. As of then the department for military education was placed under the newly formed Section of Social and Humanitarian Affairs.<sup>21</sup> In 1995 this section was reorganised and changed into the Section of the Development and Provision of Human Resources. The 'Division of the Development of Science and Education' remained a part of this section. It was this division that worked out the policies and managed the transformation process. Its personnel were drawn from people with teaching or academic staff experience at the Slovak military schools, but people from other state institutions and members of the armed forces were chosen as well.<sup>22</sup> However, this division was not the only structure within the MoD that dealt with education.

There were two divisions, concerned with educational activities that involved foreign co-operation, namely the Personnel Division (PD) and the Administration and Organisation section (AOS) of the International Co-operation Support Office (ICSO). To start with the first, this department was an integrated part of the Human Resources Section (formerly the Section of Social and Humanitarian Affairs) from the beginning. However, in 1996 it was moved under the direct authority of the Office of the Minister of Defence.<sup>23</sup> Its task in the educational field was to provide that part of the education

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p.279.

<sup>20</sup> Milan Jelenak and Dusan Krizan, *Minulost, sucasny stav a perspektivy Slovenskeho vojenskeho skolstva* (Past, present state and perspectives of the Slovak military educational system), (Slovak MoD, Section Development and Provision of Human Resources; unpublished, Bratislava, 1998), p.15.

<sup>21</sup> This was one of the five major sections, which also included: Defence policy and Army development, Logistics, Economic Policy and Foreign Relations.

<sup>22</sup> For example, the former director of the division had been a dean at the Military Academy in Liptovsky Mikulas; interview with Jelenak and Krizan.

<sup>23</sup> Interview with Jelenak and Krizan.

which could not be acquired in Slovakia itself. ICSO was a substructure of the Foreign Relations Section and its main purpose was to logistically and administratively support that Section.<sup>24</sup> The division was established on the creation of the MoD. In the beginning of 1995 AOS was created and subordinated to ICSO. Organising different kinds of international conferences, seminars, workshops and courses became its task. But of course, besides these ‘foreign’ activities, the most education by far was given at the military schools and academies, which by law fell directly under the MoD.




Figure 1. MoD structures

<sup>24</sup> It provided services like interpretation, visa arrangement and the booking of accommodation.



## The military schooling system

As of 1993 Slovakia of course took over the military schools that already existed on its soil before the split. An analysis of the situation showed that this particular system of schools did not meet the requirements of the Slovak Army.<sup>25</sup> A transformation was necessary, also to reduce the need of personnel and financial assets. The structure of the system was judged as ineffective and unbalanced; there were too many secondary schools and many fields of study and specialisations were missing. Arising from this assessment a major restructuring effort was launched. The basis for this process was a document called *Transformation of the military schooling system of the Slovak Republic*. It was approved by the Collegium of the Minister of Defence in May 1993 and a month later by the State Defence Council.<sup>26</sup> The primary goal of the transformation was formulated as 'creating a future modern, economical and integrated system of military education that will guarantee a qualitatively good preparation of the professional soldiers of the Slovak Army'.<sup>27</sup>

This final aim had to be realised in three stages, each with its own objective:<sup>28</sup>

- First stage: lay the foundation for the system, before 1 October 1993.
- Second stage: transition to a new model of military education, before 1 September 1994.
- Third stage: finally attain an integrated military schooling system, before 31 August 1995.

Since this study is devoted to higher education, I will now focus only on developments in this field. Starting with the first stage, they included the establishment of the Military Academy in Liptovsky Mikulas. That was done by the Slovak National Council Act no. 185/1993 of 15 July (so on parliamentary decision). The Academy was a fusion of the Military Technical University in Liptovsky Mikulas and the Military Pedagogical College in Bratislava.<sup>29</sup> It was to start on 1 September 1993, at the beginning of the new school year. The same law also renamed the air force college in Kosice as the General M. R. Stefanik Military Academy of Aviation. So the three military universities which Slovakia had before its independence were reduced to two.

The task in the second stage was the elaboration of new basic educational documentation for the courses. This also involved the preparation of academic and specialised courses as the highest forms of military education.<sup>30</sup> These courses were to be introduced beginning of the school year 1994/1995. As of that year the Military Academy in Liptovsky Mikulas had to be *the* centre for the higher education of senior officers. However, there was some delay.<sup>31</sup> A new system for this continuing career education was not implemented until the adoption of the *Concept of Academic and*

<sup>25</sup> Jelenak and Krizan, *Minulost, súčasny stav a perspektivy*, p.10.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p.11.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p.37 (figure 5).

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Slovak National Council Act no. 185/1993, paragraph 1, section 1.

<sup>30</sup> Jelenak and Krizan, *Minulost, súčasny stav a perspektivy*, pp.13-14.

<sup>31</sup> This was mainly due to the adoption of basic and formative policy documents, like the *Concept of the construction of the Slovak Army until the year 2000*, which also had their implications for the transformation of the schooling system.

*Specialised Courses* at the beginning of 1995. So, as of the school year 1995/1996, senior officers structurally received their further education at the Academy.

As for the third stage, it took until 1997 for the transformation process to end. That happened after the approval of the *Concept of military education* in 1996<sup>32</sup>. This document was the general policy concept for military education.

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<sup>32</sup> *Koncepcia vojenskeho vzdelavania a vychovy v rezorte ministerstva obrany.*

#### IV. THE GENERAL POLICY ON MILITARY EDUCATION

At the time when the document *Transformation of the military schooling system* was adopted, policy makers in charge of military education realised that the new model of education should have a conceptual basis.<sup>33</sup> But, although there were talks about drafting an educational concept, work on this was not started until the first half of 1995. The given reason for this postponement was the fact that at the time there was a lot of work involved on drafting the more fundamental documents.<sup>34</sup> These were the concepts that defined the general policy on the development of the Slovak Army, for example the concept of the construction of the Slovak Army until the year 2000 and the defence doctrine. Of course these documents would also have their effects on educational policy. When the process of drafting a concept of education was eventually started, the date for the approval of the document (by the Collegium of the Minister) was set for December 1995. In reality the *Concept of military education* was adopted by the Collegium only on 13 March 1996<sup>35</sup> and by the State Defence Council on 16 May.

What was behind this delay was the system of drafting and approving such documents.<sup>36</sup> Although the Education Division of the Human Resources Section initiated and managed the drafting process other elements of the MoD also participated in it. These included the Defence Policy Section and the Personnel Division. Specifically the last one played a very significant role. The General Staff was also involved. In fact, all the MoD elements with expertise in this field plus the General Staff had to discuss the drafts, voice their objections and make recommendations. All this had to be taken into account. Apparently, there was a lot to discuss, because that whole process of negotiation caused the earlier mentioned postponement.<sup>37</sup> This also meant that officially there was no general policy formulated until 1996. Before the adoption of the concept policies were developed on a case-by-case, *ad hoc* basis.<sup>38</sup> There were some individual concepts implemented on specific subjects that needed attention. For the schools there were ministerial guidelines for each individual year. There were even the regulations issued by the supreme commander of the Armed Forces. But all this was not based on recorded principles and ideas on the future development of military education. The *Concept of military education* filled this void.

<sup>33</sup> Interview with Jelenak and Krizan.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> It was issued as Ministerial Order no. 58/1996. By this order it became the binding document for all elements dealing with education within the Slovak defence establishment.

<sup>36</sup> Interview with Jelenak and Krizan.

<sup>37</sup> Eventually, the actual text of the concept was written by two members of the education division who were appointed by the director of the Human Resources Section, namely Milan Jelenak and Dusan Krizan.

<sup>38</sup> Interview with Jelenak and Krizan.

## Point of departure and basic principles

In its introduction the *Concept of military education* (hereafter *Concept*) stated that its content was in accordance with the Slovak defence doctrine (among other documents).<sup>39</sup> Although this starting point may seem self-evident, it is nonetheless very important. A defence doctrine can be a firm declaration, which sends a certain message to other countries. But for it to have a real effect it has to be translated into policies which will actually be carried out. The doctrine has to be anchored firmly in the defence forces.<sup>40</sup> In their structures, but especially in training and education, i.e. in the minds of their personnel. It has to be worked intensively and must not become just a piece of paper. So this line in the *Concept* is significant, despite the fact that correct concepts on paper of course will not guarantee their full implementation in practice.

Since the Slovak defence doctrine stated the country's orientation towards obtaining full membership of NATO, it was to be expected that there would be reference to this. In actual fact, the *Concept* said it '[reflected] the requirements that followed from international agreements and [aimed] at obtaining full membership of the European Union and NATO for the Slovak Republic'.<sup>41</sup> So the document recognised that military education would play an important role in the process of becoming integrated in western structures. Actually, this aspiration was described as one of the main cornerstones for the further development of the Slovak armed forces.<sup>42</sup>

In part A of the *Concept* the basic principles for the functioning and development of the educational system were set. These were:

1. military education as a part of constitutional law,
2. military education as a factor that contributes to personal development,
3. military education as a factor that contributes to social adaptability and occupational mobility,
4. military education as a factor that contributes to the construction and development of the army within a democratic society,
5. military education as a factor that contributes to the development of science, technology and culture,
6. military education as a factor that contributes to social development,
7. military education as a factor that contributes to the integration in European and transatlantic structures.

All the principles were subdivided in a series of basic goals. I will now highlight the ones which I think have a special importance for the education of senior officers.

In explanation of the fourth principle the *Concept* stated that the military schools are places for the cultivation of loyalty to a civil democratic society.<sup>43</sup> Here the professional soldiers should learn to have confidence in this type of society. Therefore there has to be a social and psychological atmosphere in these institutions which fits this

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<sup>39</sup> Slovak MoD, *Koncepcia vojenskeho vzdelavania a vychovy v rezorte ministerstva obrany*, (unpublished; Bratislava, 1996), p.1.

<sup>40</sup> Van den Doel, 'From cooperation towards integration?', p.116.

<sup>41</sup> Slovak MoD, *Koncepcia*, p.1.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p.4.

goal. To create such an atmosphere the *Concept* suggested the improvement of, inter alia, the following types of education: sociological and humanitarian education, general education, language education and psychological education. Improving these was called a condition for the schooling of highly-qualified soldiers, considering their 'professional and in these times also social competence'.<sup>44</sup> All this related partly to the concept of civil-military relations, although it was not worked out very extensively. Still it recognised the social role of the professional soldier. Also, the emphasis placed on the above-mentioned educational types reflected the international trend. This was the trend towards the growing importance of a more liberal (as opposed to technical/professional) military education.<sup>45</sup> However, it has to be noted that the concept only mentioned an 'improvement' of these educational types, which was not a very precise statement. For example, it did not say anything on actually increasing their share in the military curricula and it did not give any leads on how things could or should be improved.

Speaking about international trends, the last principle the *Concept* mentioned was of course a very crucial one. Since it also has special relevance to the subject of this study, I will now sum up all the goals related to this principle. According to the *Concept*, gaining access to international conventions, standards and customs required that the system of military education:<sup>46</sup>

- developed and supported all activities of international co-operation in the form of contracts, agreements, exchanges and practical temporary studies of different character, up to international co-operation projects,
- secured that the universities developed co-ordinated and informative activities in the field of international co-operation,
- created conditions for the study by members from NATO armed forces and the forces of countries within the PfP programme at the Slovak military universities, as well as for the study by members of the Slovak Army at universities in NATO member-states and the co-operating countries within the PfP programme,
- accomplished an essential improvement in the language abilities of the students at military schools and in the language abilities of the teaching staff (the 'pedagogical cadre') of military schools, in those of high officials, commanders and officers performing functions in the separate battalions, brigades, corps, the General Staff and the MoD.

Gaining this access also required that in the content of the basic study documentation conditions for the interoperability of the Slovak Army were introduced. These objectives sounded very promising. Seriously pursuing them would have major implications for the curriculum of senior officers. The part of receiving education abroad as well as the language preparation part seemed important issues. The fact that both received some more attention later on in the *Concept* could reflect this. To be precise, part E of the document was called 'Education and training abroad' while part F had the title 'Language education'.

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p.5.

<sup>45</sup> See David R. Segal, 'Military education: Technical versus liberal perspectives', in Ernest Gilman and Detlef E. Herold (eds), *The role of military education in the restructuring of armed forces* (Rome, 1993), pp.57-76.

<sup>46</sup> Slovak MoD, *Koncepcia*, p.7.

## Education abroad

The *Concept* noted that especially schools and courses in the United States, France, Great Britain, Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Belgium and Poland had contributed to the education of experts of the Slovak Army. The reason why specifically these countries had the biggest share in Slovakia's foreign military education was not explained. Of course all the major members of NATO and the EU were represented, as well as two neighbouring states. Perhaps The Netherlands and Belgium were chosen as partners because these also were small countries within Europe. The diversity in states could also point to the possible fact that Slovakia only responded to the various offers it received from abroad. The costs related to study abroad trips could also have played a determining role, favouring dispersed sources.

Anyhow, up to March 1996 there were 190 army members who had finished foreign courses while another 52 had attended such courses. The *Concept* labelled these developments as positive tendencies that had to be expanded.<sup>47</sup> To this end the document stated that Slovakia should take advantage of the offers of the foreign partners. However, it also said that the development of this kind of co-operation with other countries within NATO, the EU and the PfP programme depended on whether or not the costs could be covered.<sup>48</sup> Elaborating on these future goals it mentioned the *Perspective plan of Selection, Preparation and Attendance of the members of the Slovak Defence Forces to foreign schools* for the years 1996-1998. In connection with this plan members of the armed forces were to be prepared for future placement abroad. Apparently there was not an official policy or selection plan before. An *ad hoc* appointment of officers could perhaps also contribute to the above-mentioned theory that there was not a structural policy on attaining foreign courses yet.

Finally, there was a remarkable passage in this part of the *Concept*. Based on the results of the political negotiations between the Slovak MoD and its Russian counterpart on co-operation in the preparation of professional soldiers, a new possibility was created at the Military Academy of the General Staff in Moscow for experts of the Slovak Army.<sup>49</sup> Apparently the MoD had put a lot of effort in getting such an option. Also, it did not concern just any Russian military school, but the centre for the highest education. This did not seem to fit in the general policy that clearly looked west and placed emphasis on adapting to western methods. It is highly probable that the political situation, as described in section II, caused this move.

When asked for an explanation members of the MoD said there had been only one higher course in 1997 based on the Russo-Slovak agreement. Two officers from the General Staff and one from the MoD had studied in Moscow for one year. Reportedly there were no subsequent attendances. On the reasons why the co-operation was not continued these sources commented that there probably was no interest anymore, 'neither personal nor political'.<sup>50</sup> So political considerations were involved. The question why Slovakia needed this option in the first place naturally came up next. Their answer was that it was generally known that the Russian Academy represented a very high level of

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<sup>47</sup> Slovak MoD, *Koncepcia*, pp.23-24.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p.24.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> Interview with Jelenak and Krizan.

education. Not only soldiers from the former Warsaw Pact studied there, officers from West European countries took courses in Moscow as well. According to the same sources Slovakia simply wanted to get acquainted with this high quality of teaching. The country wanted to learn the lessons from this part of Europe as well.<sup>51</sup> The course at the Russian Military Academy could be compared with Slovakia's own Higher Academic Course of the General Staff, the top course for senior officers.

This answer may create the impression that it was not uncommon – perhaps even a natural process – for Slovakia to turn to Moscow. But still it was peculiar to say the least. Considering the future goals a comparison of the country's own top-level course with the one taught in Russia for one whole year did not seem to have much priority. Why would the country want to mirror its higher education on that of a state that could be seen as taking an adversary position towards NATO? Certainly the Russian Federation was not bound to the same values and standards that applied to the NATO and PfP countries. Of course, what was done with the acquired knowledge and how it was used (if it was used) remains unclear. However, the course participants assumed higher positions in the Slovak defence establishment, so in principle any influence from this study could have had some sizeable effects. These officers were certainly in a position to assert themselves and any ideas they picked up.

### Language education

Part F of the *Concept* called language preparation a basic and structural element in the education of experts of the Slovak armed forces. 'Due to the developing international contacts and the co-operation with armies from NATO and with the co-operating countries within the PfP programme' the demands on foreign language skills had increased. As a result the requirements for the selection of candidates for the study of foreign languages were heightened. The level of language education at the military schools as well as of basic and higher language preparation for experts of the Army was also raised.<sup>52</sup> According to the *Concept* the goal of this education was 'the creation of favourable conditions for the achievement of the desirable level of language skills by the experts of the Slovak Army'. The document then explained what this would mean. A situation should be reached in which all divisions of the MoD, the General Staff and the elements belonging to it would be able to meet the basic requirements for co-operation with foreign partners.<sup>53</sup> This was to happen by means of their own employees who had to have good foreign language skills. With such skills the necessary knowledge about the functioning of armies from NATO and PfP countries could be attained. Finally, this information could be used in performing military tasks.

The *Concept* also named a few necessary conditions to accomplish the goal that was mentioned. Among others, a selection system should be introduced in the language education of army experts, the amount of language lessons should increase, the quality of the teaching methods should be raised and there should be an improvement in the

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Slovak MoD, *Koncepcia*, p.32.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

methods of measuring the results.<sup>54</sup> Finally the text summed up the systematic and basic measures for the improvement of language education.<sup>55</sup> The ones that were of relevance for higher education are summarised in Appendix A. Apparently, until the adoption of the *Concept*, the NATO norms for language proficiency were not institutionalised (see the first measure). Also, the *Concept* did not give any approximate terms for the realisation of these goals. However, its objectives did look like a serious attempt to improve language preparation. But this was still only policy on paper, which indeed could be applied to the whole *Concept*. How it all worked out in practice was a more crucial question. Section V examines this matter by analysing the developments in the higher military education of senior officers in Slovakia since 1993. What were the implications of all that has been mentioned here on this particular form of education?

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., pp.33-34.



## V. THE EDUCATION OF SENIOR OFFICERS

During the first half-year of Slovakia's independence there was still a joint education of personnel from the Czech and Slovak Republics. Anyone who started the school year 1992/1993 somewhere could finish it there. This also applied to higher education. In the united state that type of education was provided exclusively at the Military Academy in Brno, so in the Czech part. All this meant that as of 30 July 1993 Slovakia did not have a system for further education. Also, there could not have been a lot of experience in educating people for senior leadership. Accordingly, a new system was needed. To this end the Collegium of the Minister initiated the drafting of the *Concept of Academic and Specialised Courses* in 1994. As usual, the education division managed this process, but all elements from the MoD and the General Staff with expertise in this field participated. Individual sections from the military schools took part as well.<sup>56</sup> After the period of negotiation, the document was adopted in the first half of 1995.<sup>57</sup> So the system could be implemented as of the school year 1995/1996. Before that year there were some special professional courses that senior officers could take, but there was no system behind it.<sup>58</sup> Colonel Miroslav Zak, vice-rector for education at the Military Academy in Liptovsky Mikulas, mentioned that prior to 1995/1996 Slovakia did not have the staff to provide this higher education.<sup>59</sup> The void was only very partially filled by some foreign courses.

### **The *Concept of Academic and Specialised Courses***

According to the members of the Education Division that were interviewed, the creation of the Slovak system for further education specifically involved the use of the experiences that were gathered from the educational systems of NATO and PfP countries. Different foreign models were compared. The experiences from higher education in the former Czechoslovakia were used as well, so that there exists a certain continuity between the prior and the present system.<sup>60</sup> A difference with the previous preparation was that the new one was a two-level system of academic and specialised courses. The academic courses consisted of the Academic Course (AC) (first level) and the Higher Academic Course of the General Staff (HAC GS) (second level), while the specialised courses were made up of Purposive Courses (PCs) I and II.

To start with AC, this course would take up to eleven months. A requirement for entering was graduation from a military university and adequate experience. Furthermore, the content of AC proceeded on the knowledge that was acquired in PC I. The course had to prepare its participants for the following functions: Brigade Commander, air force Base Commander, Commander of a separated Battalion

<sup>56</sup> Interview with Jelenak and Krizan.

<sup>57</sup> It was approved during the third round of negotiation and implemented from the fifth Collegium of the Minister of Defence on 19 April 1995.

<sup>58</sup> Interview with Jelenak and Krizan.

<sup>59</sup> Interview with Colonel Prof. Ing. Miroslav Zak, vice-rector for Study and Pedagogical Activities at the Military Academy in Liptovsky Mikulas, 9 February 1999.

<sup>60</sup> Interview with Jelenak and Krizan. See appendix B for the situation before Slovakia's independence and the one after the adoption of the *Concept of Academic and Specialised Courses*.

(detachment), Branch Chief, Staff-officer on the Corps level and chief official at the MoD, the General Staff and their divisions.<sup>61</sup> The planned rank for graduates from this course was Lieutenant Colonel/Colonel. Graduation from AC or PC II<sup>62</sup> was a requirement for taking the Higher Academic Course (HAC GS). Again, adequate experience was demanded as well. HAC GS took eleven months and prepared its students for: Corps Commander, Commander of a separated Brigade and high-level functions at the MoD and the General Staff.<sup>63</sup> Graduates could be promoted to Colonel and General.

The entrance requirements for the first-level specialised course (PC I) were graduation from a military university (Military Academy) and active duty at the level of Company Commander. This course prepared officers to perform functions up to the level of Battalion Commander and could take five months. The intended rank would be Major. After finishing PC I and a number of years service, officers could take PC II, which lasted five months. Graduates from this course could perform the following functions: Staff-officer on the Corps level or at the MoD/General Staff.<sup>64</sup> In this case Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel were the planned ranks. Figure 2 shows a schematic view of the intended system.

Apart from establishing the structure of the higher courses, the concept also prescribed the content of the academic courses.<sup>65</sup> Both AC and HAC GS were to have four thematic blocks. The first was devoted to military management (it was to cover 20 per cent of the total hours in both courses), the second to security policy and legal issues (10 per cent), number three dealt with language education (10 per cent), while the last block was called specialised (i.e. military-professional) preparation (60 per cent). For AC the following two topics were mentioned in the first block: (a) basics of peace-time management and preparative management and (b) personnel management (sociological, pedagogical aspects and resolving modelled situations). With regard to HAC GS this block was to consist of one topic on current issues relating to these three types of management plus a second topic on modelling combat activities and operations. Under the second block of AC the concept stipulated three subjects called 'security policy', 'defence policy' and 'civil, international and humanitarian law'. The last two were also a part of the second theme of HAC GS, which in addition consisted of topics called 'strategic concept of defence', 'preparation of the state's territory for defence' and 'current issues of international politics'. For HAC GS the section on language preparation was not elaborated, while for AC this block mentioned an obligatory choice to study either the English, German or French language.

Unfortunately, information on the thematic blocks (percentages and topics) that the specialised courses were designed to have is not available. The concept stated that the Human Resources section would work out the design and exact duration of these courses in co-operation with the rector of the Military Academy in Liptovsky Mikulas, based on the requirements of the Chief of the General Staff.<sup>66</sup> It can be assumed that the organisation and structure of PC I and II were similar to the ones in the academic courses,

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<sup>61</sup> Slovak MoD, *Koncepcia Akademických kurzov*, p.1.

<sup>62</sup> Which one depended on the officer's career order.

<sup>63</sup> Slovak MoD, *Koncepcia Akademických kurzov*, p.1.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p.2.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.3-4.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p.5.




Figure 2: Schematic overview of the higher forms of education  
 Source: Slovak MoD, *Koncepcia Akademickych kurzov*.

considering the integrated nature of the system. A schema for the courses in terms of academic years was presented as well. It is displayed in Figure 3. As this figure shows,

the system could produce its first graduates from PC I in the school year 1995/1996, while the first participants in PC II and AC were expected to have finished their course in 1997. Taking into account that the Slovak Army already had been functioning since 1993 this could be considered a late start.

In practice, the number of prepared officers proved to be too small with regard to the needs of the armed forces. This was one of the reasons why, for selected officers who had served at the needed levels of functionality for ten years and longer, the qualification requirements were waived.<sup>67</sup> That meant they did not have to go through these courses. As Colonel Zak put it, the Army was not used to a career system like this. In the past officers had only needed practical experience to go up in the ranks. Now this new system was introduced the armed forces stood on a threshold. That called for measures like these, by which in selected cases experience was equally as valid as formal education.<sup>68</sup> In this context members of the Education Division at the MoD mentioned a law from 1997<sup>69</sup> in which the exemptions from educational requirements were stated. The rules concerning these exemptions were temporarily in force, for a period of five years. After 31 December 2002 there will be no exceptions concerning the educational requirements.<sup>70</sup> Consequently, officers who had been assigned somewhere without the proper level of education had until 2002 to meet the requirements. If they did not they would have to leave the Army.

Nevertheless, from 1993 a lot of higher functions in the Slovak defence establishment were carried out by senior officers who had not received further education in accordance with modern standards. The exemptions probably suited the older officers, who had been in military service for decades and may have had neither the ability nor the willingness to change. They could stay and preserve their old methods, procedures and connections. The fact that in some cases long-standing practice counted for as much as modernised education probably did not benefit the transformation of the armed forces. The experience that officers had had in their respective functions for ten years and longer was at least dated and in many instances obsolete. Of course all this must have had its impact on the modernisation process and thus on achieving the interoperability objective. A good illustration is the fact that these selected officers did not have to learn foreign languages while this might have been needed considering their function.

Name of the	School year
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<sup>67</sup> E-mailed response from Colonel Professor Michal Pruzinsky, member of the academic staff in Liptovsky Mikulas, to earlier questions, 15 February 1999.

<sup>68</sup> Interview with Colonel Zak.

<sup>69</sup> Act No. 370 of the Law Code on the Military Service, passed by the Slovak National Council in 1997.

<sup>70</sup> Interview with Jelenak and Krizan.

course	1995/1996	1996/1997	1997/1998	1998/1999	1999/2000
AC		X	X	X	X
HAC GS			X	X	X
PC I	X		X		X
PC II		X		X	

Figure 3. Planning of the academic and specialised courses  
Source: Slovak MoD, *Koncepcia Akademických kurzov*.

### Curriculum development

As mentioned before, military academies in Slovakia fall under the same legislation as civil universities. The Slovak law no. 172/1990 on universities stated that 'the study programmes and fields of study [of these academies] shall be the subject of approval by the Ministry of Defence'.<sup>71</sup> But of course approval only points to a final stage. The law did not say anything about who should draft the curricula before they could finally be approved by the MoD. In practice, officers from the institutions prepared these drafts in co-ordination with professionals from the General Staff.<sup>72</sup> Then there was a second stage which consisted of a negotiation process. A very broad spectrum of people – from all divisions of the MoD and the General Staff that were in some way involved in educational matters – could give their opinion.

After these curricula were approved and implemented, modifications could be made based on experience. There were specific regulations for this, written down in a publication called *Skol-1*, which contained guidelines for the military universities. According to this document the academic staff could change ten per cent of the curriculum in any one academic year.<sup>73</sup> So when new ideas came in, the staff could revise a syllabus. Mr. Dusan Krizan of the Education Division stated one of the probable reasons why this opportunity was given to the academies. In this way the curriculum could reflect the newest changes in terms of the requirements for interoperability.

The extensive interaction with the MoD and the General Staff on curriculum development seems very time-consuming and somewhat unusual. When speaking about this issue to Colonel Milan Smida –as of 1 March 1999, director of the newly formed Section of Personnel Management and, thereby, the man with the highest authority with regard to military education in the Slovak Republic – he expressed his personal view on the matter. He found it peculiar that when curricula were drafted at the Military Academy, they were then sent to the MoD, where someone started to adjust them by

<sup>71</sup> Higher Education Act No. 172/1990 of the Law Code of May 4, 1990, as amended by later the changes and supplements, part 11, paragraph 30, section 1.g.

<sup>72</sup> Interview with Jelenak and Krizan.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

deciding what could or could not be done.<sup>74</sup> His personal opinion was that the MoD staff did not have the competence to perform this task. These were administrative people who had a lot of knowledge, but they were not teachers or academic staff members. Curriculum content surely was very specific material. Colonel Smida also called this relation between the Academy and the MoD very non-productive. Indeed, the fact that everything had to be approved by the Ministry probably made the academic staff less inclined to take initiatives. In this context Smida pointed to the Military Academy in Brno (Czech Republic) which on its own – with foreign assistance – had accomplished a lot more in the field of curriculum development for senior officers.

In general, the MoD had too much power and influence over the military academies, according to the Colonel's own feeling.<sup>75</sup> These universities should be given back to the academics. Almost the same rules should apply to them as are applied to the civilian universities. In that way the academic staff would direct intellectual movement and development at the Academy, while the MoD provided the basic framework (i.e. the transparent definition of long-term goals, the handling of financial matters, the definition of the legislation applied).<sup>76</sup> However, changes in the guidelines and legislation since 1993 supported the not-so-productive situation that was described above. It was Colonel Smida's personal thesis that before Slovakia's independence some changes had caused the Academy to be even more subordinated to the MoD than it used to be.<sup>77</sup> He said that this situation had to be changed, which was also his ambition as the new man in charge. Already there was preparation on a new law for the universities. Perhaps Slovakia would even take the situation in some western countries as a starting-point in this respect. In any case, changing things would require a lot of discussion.

Returning to curriculum development for senior officers, the Military Academy in Liptovsky Mikulas did not have a particular foreign organisation or defence institution that structurally co-operated with it in this field.<sup>78</sup> Considering what was mentioned before in this text, this might not come as a surprise. According to Colonel Zak such concrete assistance was not necessary.<sup>79</sup> The Academy just used the information and insights its staff acquired during foreign trips. Countries that the Colonel explicitly mentioned were Poland and the Czech Republic. Since orientation towards NATO was the official policy, however, knowledge on how things were done in western countries was also utilised in the process of transforming the curriculum. Besides this, several foreigners visited the Academy. But all this was within the realm of information exchange. Eventually it was the interaction with the MoD and the General Staff that produced the curriculum. Moreover, the parameters for it were already fixed by the *Concept of Academic and Specialised Courses*.

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<sup>74</sup> Interview with Colonel Dr. Milan Smida, director of the International Security and Law division (a substructure of the Foreign Relations Section) and as of March 1, 1999 head of the newly formed Section of Personnel Management, under which also military education would fall, 10 February 1999.

<sup>75</sup> Interview with Colonel Smida.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> The Military Academy in Brno, for example, developed its top courses in co-operation with the Dutch National Defence College (IDL) and two NGOs, the Centre for Defence Studies (University of Aberdeen) and the Centre for European Security Studies (University of Groningen, the Netherlands).

<sup>79</sup> Interview with Colonel Zak.

## Curriculum content

To get more insight on how things worked out in practice it is useful to take a closer look at the last edition of the curricula for the academic and specialised courses.<sup>80</sup> The midlevel courses, PC II and AC, both had a Part A and Part B. The first was a common part for all course participants and the second for specialised preparation. Part A was subdivided into four sections covering: security and defence policy, military and personnel management, general preparation and language preparation. A comparison of these sections revealed that in both PC II and AC general preparation consumed the most amount of time.<sup>81</sup> This education mainly consisted of operational art, general tactics and the deployment of troops in regular combat. Physical preparation made up a great part of this section as well. The Security and Defence Policy component was given only about seven per cent of the amount of time in Part A of the PC II. For AC this percentage was even lower (6.2). In both courses this section consisted of two topics. The first was called ‘security and defence policy of the Slovak Republic’ and the second dealt with civil and international law. The section ‘Military and Personnel Management’ in PC II and AC made up roughly 12 per cent and 10.5 per cent respectively. That left the language education with approximately 20 per cent in both courses.

Part B of PC II made up about 30 per cent of the whole course, while this was around 40 percent for AC. In both courses this part consisted of the same type of education that was taught under the heading ‘general preparation’ in Part A, only now more specialised.<sup>82</sup> When this is taken into consideration then approximately 60 per cent of the whole PC II and more than 75 per cent of AC was devoted to the study of use of force in regular military deployment plus physical preparation. Security and defence policy issues got barely 5 per cent (PC II) and 3.5 per cent (AC) of the total amount of time. For the Military and Personnel Management these figures were 7-8 per cent (PC II) and 5.8 per cent (AC). This meant that the language preparation made up around 15 per cent and 11 per cent respectively.

The top course, HAC GS, obviously had a different structure. Naturally the B part was missing. There were five sections: Military-political topics and management matters, topics of strategic-operational preparation, humanitarian matters, language preparation and finally exercises and case studies. In the first section there were three topics which related to security: ‘International and security policy of the Slovak Republic’, ‘European security and the international security organisation’ and ‘Current issues of international relations’. They made up 3.4 per cent of the whole course. The rest of this section dealt with issues of management (9 per cent of the whole course). The second section was the equivalent of the ‘General preparation’ in PC II and AC, but now of course on a higher level (the military-strategic level). Almost 45 per cent of the total amount of time was dedicated to this section. However, if one very related topic from section five (‘Position and task of army corps in the strategic arrangement of the Slovak Army on defending the Slovak Republic’) plus the physical preparation from section

<sup>80</sup> See Appendices C, D and E.

<sup>81</sup> As for PC II the total amount of hours spent on this preparation made up around 50 per cent of the time that was taught in the common part of the course. For AC this percentage was 63.6.

<sup>82</sup> The three main specialisations were: Ground forces, Air Force and Logistics.

three were added, then this proportion increased to over 60 percent. Section three (minus the physical training) consisted of topics on civil, international and humanitarian law, military history and diplomacy, all on a total of 4.6 per cent. The language education took 10.2 per cent.

All these courses (PC II, AC and HAC GS) showed a similar picture. By far the greatest emphasis was on practical military matters, physical training included. In this respect the curricula were very traditional. There was relatively little room for security studies, area studies and international relations. Still these were the topics that seemed to have an increasing relevance for senior military leadership, especially in the Euro-Atlantic military context. Views on this were first promulgated by Morris Janowitz.<sup>83</sup> His position assumed that in the context of weaponry that could destroy opposing armies plus the infrastructure of society itself, the mission of the armed forces increasingly came to be the deterrence, containment or avoidance of war.<sup>84</sup> A reestablishment of viable international relations became the all-important goal for the military in case war did break out. But under the likely future conditions of warfare commanders could find themselves in very delicate political situations. All this meant that officers had to have a deeper understanding of the international political context of military operations than ever before.<sup>85</sup> Besides this, in the future officers would probably be responsible for integrating units into international missions. This also will require knowledge of the specific context of international security issues.<sup>86</sup>

The social sciences also appeared in only a relatively small share of the courses, although these subjects have become increasingly important in international military education as well. As one expert put it: '... changing principles of organizational dynamics require military professionals to have a firmer understanding of the behavioral and social sciences in order to effectively perform their roles as leaders and managers'.<sup>87</sup> Moreover, officers in democratic societies must be able to understand all the processes and trends in social development that influence the military profession.<sup>88</sup> They would be confronted by the altering patterns of behaviour and the changing motivations of society at large.<sup>89</sup>

This requirement of social awareness also brings us to civil-military relations. Since the defence establishment is subordinated to the political power in a democracy, the military must be capable of understanding this political power as well as making itself understood.<sup>90</sup> Otherwise, it cannot be effective. It is hard to say whether the concept of civil-military relations was a major theme within all the subjects that were taught in the courses. It appeared a bit snowed under. The only topic that could be related explicitly to this concept was 'The army in a democratic society and the defence policy of the state'

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<sup>83</sup> Author of *The professional soldier* (New York, 1960), in which he expressed his view on the nature of the military profession. His position was opposed to the one Samuel Huntington defended in his book *The soldier and the state* (Cambridge, 1957). Debate on the nature of officer education in western countries became rooted in the two different views that these experts represented. Segal, 'Military education', p.72.

<sup>84</sup> Segal, 'Military education', p.73.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Detlef E. Herold and Hans E. Radbruch, 'Overview: Military education in the context of the Euro-Atlantic security area', in Gilman and Herold (eds.), *The role of military education*, p. 2.

<sup>87</sup> Segal, 'Military education', p.74.

<sup>88</sup> Herold and Radbruch, 'Overview', p.2.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., p.2.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., p.13.



in HAC GS. Perhaps the subject on civil and international law in all three of the courses also dealt with it in a more specific way. Anyway, Colonel Smida mentioned that more attention had to be given to the concept in future curricula. In general, his opinion was that the social sciences should account for a much larger part of the study programme, as they did in the western models.<sup>91</sup> Reform in this field had been slow.

All in all, the courses basically reflected the parameters that were laid down in the *Concept of Academic and Specialised Courses*. Most time was devoted to professional education (with an emphasis on mainstream military competence), while 40 per cent was left for general education. According to members of the Education Division there currently were discussions on changing this ratio.<sup>92</sup> Apparently, such discussions had not taken place before. This would also fulfil Colonel Smida's vision that future changes in the curricula should reflect the new role of the professional soldier in the contemporary world. However for change actually to occur, other problems needed to be solved as well. Colonel Pruzinsky, a staff member of the Military Academy in Liptovsky Mikulas who until December 1998 was the vice-rector for International Affairs for three years, said that it was necessary to address various subjects<sup>93</sup>, but that Slovakia did not have enough officers who had been educated in the West for more than three months and subsequently could teach these topics.<sup>94</sup> This brings us to the issue of the education that senior officers received abroad and other aspects of international co-operation.

### **Foreign courses and other forms of international co-operation**

So far as education abroad is concerned, the *Perspective plan of Selection, Preparation and Attendance of the members of the Slovak Defence Forces to foreign schools* was the basis for this kind of international co-operation. The intended procedure was that this document should be regularly updated. There was a plan for 1996-1998, and, reportedly, also a new one for 1999-2000 was put in force.<sup>95</sup> The MoD element that co-ordinated all aspects of this policy was the Personnel Division of the Office of the Minister of Defence (PD). This department selected the courses which Slovak officers could attend abroad. The procedure was that the PD submitted the offers from foreign countries<sup>96</sup> to the Human Resources section and the military academies to take their advice.<sup>97</sup> But eventually the PD had the final word. Participants to these courses were nominated by the academies and the section of Human Resources, but the latter actually selected them.<sup>98</sup> So again it was the MoD that had all the authority.

<sup>91</sup> Interview with Colonel Smida.

<sup>92</sup> Interview with Jelenak and Krizan.

<sup>93</sup> He explicitly mentioned topics like: emerging security issues in Europe, parliament and national security, ethnic conflict in international politics, Balkan security and its influence on Europe, transatlantic security issues, defence budgeting and planning, evolution of low intensity conflict, weapons proliferation and military conflict, legal aspects of conflicts and operations other than war.

<sup>94</sup> E-mailed response from Colonel Pruzinsky to earlier questions.

<sup>95</sup> Interview with Jelenak and Krizan. I did not hear of the existence of such a policy concept prior to 1996.

<sup>96</sup> These were discussed through bilateral talks on an annual basis.

<sup>97</sup> Interview with Dr. Margita Havlikova, deputy director of the education and science division (Human Resources Section), 8 February 1999.

<sup>98</sup> Interview with Mrs Havlikova.

In this context it was a remarkable development that as of 1996 the PD was moved from the Human Resources section and brought under the direct authority of the Minister of Defence. This was not such an obvious move at all. The PD, which did not deal specifically with education, was now no longer an integrated part of the section in charge of educational development. It took with it some responsibilities, which with regard to certain tasks was not beneficial to co-operation and co-ordination. Reportedly there was some overlap on certain levels. Most of the people interviewed called this organisational change ineffective or even counter-productive. Nevertheless, this move did probably fit the political style of that period. With this alteration the Minister's Office could directly control what happened in this field. During Meciar's rule the political power wanted to keep a hold on all developments as much as possible. Apparently, education abroad was something that was important enough to be managed by the Office of the Slovak defence minister himself.

Then there was also the issue of the selection of officers. When asked about whether the right people were always chosen to go abroad, Colonel Smida openly doubted this.<sup>99</sup> He said that not all the selections had been the correct choices. Perhaps the situation that the PD had to co-ordinate all activities in this particular field contributed to the problem. The fact that the military academies could only recommend students, while it was the MoD that eventually appointed the participants, could also have been detrimental. A definite problem was related to language. There were courses where the ability to speak a foreign language was a requirement or at least an advantage on entering them.<sup>100</sup> Language skill thus became a selection criterion, instead of expertise or need for the course. Finally there were some hints that foreign trips were considered as rewards for certain officers.

Anyway, a crucial aspect of the whole undertaking of courses abroad was of course that the acquired knowledge could have its impact. However, I did not get any information on a formal system of debriefing yielding a written record. Reportedly there were annual meetings of officers who attended these courses.<sup>101</sup> It is unclear to me what was done with the outcome of these gatherings, provided there was one. Be that as it may, it was usual that people who had taken education abroad were rewarded with a higher position.<sup>102</sup> However, even this was not a guarantee that their acquired training was used to the optimum. On many occasions the time or space for utilising particular knowledge in the practical, everyday work of these officers was lacking.<sup>103</sup> Only when they were enabled to work at the level of the MoD or the General Staff did they have an opportunity to use their insights. Of course then they might have some influence on concepts and policies. Apart from this, Colonel Smida had another critical view on the whole issue of the transfer of knowledge. Since the Slovak military had more than a hundred members who studied at western schools, it would have been much more efficient if these people, after finishing their courses, would have come to the Military Academy and passed on what they had learned.<sup>104</sup> Even if they were not professional

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<sup>99</sup> Interview with Colonel Smida.

<sup>100</sup> Consequently, the MoD preferably chose courses which had language requirements that were not too high; Interview with Mrs Havlikova.

<sup>101</sup> Interview with Mrs Havlikova.

<sup>102</sup> Interview with Colonel Smida.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

teachers they could have translated the lessons learnt on the attended course to the Slovak situation. According to the Colonel, this in turn would have opened up the school to new ideas, which was necessary since very traditional perspectives still prevailed there.

Speaking of the Academy, foreign courses were also given in Slovakia itself, some at Liptovský Mikuláš. Here other forms of international co-operation took place as well. This happened in the form of contacts with foreign schools. Currently there were treaties with seven academies. Primarily these covered institutions in the surrounding countries. This was also a question of economics.<sup>105</sup> Once again, the MoD was the coordinator in all of the fields. Colonel Zak told us that first of all an agreement between the Ministry and a foreign counterpart was needed.<sup>106</sup> After that particular bilateral agreements between military academies in the two countries could be discussed. The MoD provided guidelines for the drafting of the contractual documents.<sup>107</sup> In both the cases of foreign courses and contacts with academies abroad, the Ministry was monitoring the effectiveness of the activities. It also checked if these activities were 'in harmony with the major focus of the school' or not.<sup>108</sup> The continuous engagement of the MoD may well have slowed down developments. A very vertical and centralised organisational model like this one probably had a negative influence on desirable horizontal contacts with other academies.

Finally, there was a possibility for senior officers to participate in international conferences, courses and seminars organised by the MoD element AOS (ICSO). For its activities the section co-operated with foreign NGOs and IGOs, including NATO. AOS had an interesting history. In September 1994, during the interim government of Prime Minister Moravčík<sup>109</sup>, an international Consultation and Education Centre NATO/PfP was established at the MoD. This was on the initiative of defence minister Pavol Kanis, with the objective to prove the sincere interest of the country to join NATO.<sup>110</sup> The Centre aspired to be a subsidiary branch of the Marshall Center. It was designed to have three divisions: one for running different kinds of conferences, seminars and workshops; the second for language education; and a third for research purposes (studies and analysis). The first and second divisions were actually established, but soon after the elections (when Mečiar took over again) work on the Centre was stopped. Out of its two divisions AOS was formed and subordinated to ICSO. The section not surprisingly had very limited rights to take decisions. It had to report to the Human Resources Section with regard to language education and to the Section of Foreign Relations when it came to the international activities.

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<sup>105</sup> Interview with Colonel Zak.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> Interview with Jelenak and Krizan.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> This government initiated significant changes in the country's defence structures and policy. Its prime minister Moravčík appointed Pavol Kanis as Slovakia's first minister of Defence with a civilian background. Under him the MoD and General Staff were restructured and significantly reduced in size to become more efficient and prevent overlap. This government also reworked the Defence doctrine. After this revision the document placed greater emphasis on the development of closer relations with European and transatlantic security structures. Moreover it now clearly stated Slovakia's fundamental orientation, namely obtaining full NATO membership. Simon, *NATO enlargement*, pp.258-261.

<sup>110</sup> Faxed response from Captain Peter Toth, who was a member of AOS, to earlier questions, 5 March 1999.

## Language preparation

As noted, approximately 10 per cent of the curricula for the academic courses was officially devoted to language education. The percentages in the specialised courses would have been approximately the same. In the last version of the curriculum for PC II, for example, this percentage was about 15, but of course there were earlier editions in which this might have been different. In any case, a certain level of foreign language knowledge was not a requirement for entering PC I, PC II, AC and HAC GS. Thus the level of education within these courses could not be very high. However, the Academy did not have any influence on the list of people selected for the courses and, also, its staff was not able to enforce the rule that participants had to meet certain language requirements before entering.<sup>111</sup> Apparently, such a policy was blocked by a higher authority. According to various sources, the political will for policies like these was lacking. The people that drew up the educational requirements would have excluded themselves by making them too high. Obviously they did not want that. It might have meant a loss of influence.

Anyway, after graduating from AC and HAC GS (and only those courses) the students did have to have a certain level of language proficiency as laid down in a NATO Standardisation Agreement (STANAG), namely the STANAG level 1.<sup>112</sup> Besides the fact that this still was an insufficient level for senior officers, considering the goal of compatibility with NATO forces, it could also easily be lost. For this not to happen, these graduates had to be given the opportunity to use the language on the level of STANAG 2 and 3. But HAC GS was the highest and final course in the career education and additional language courses, although an option, were not required. Asked about whether or not it was considered a must that in the future foreign language knowledge would be required for students of the academic and specialised courses, members of the teaching staff in Liptovský Mikuláš responded affirmatively. Also, according to Colonel Pruzinsky, there really was only one way in this particular field.<sup>113</sup> A well-prepared officer in this respect was still an exception.

With regard to senior officers who already held functions in the defence establishment and had not studied in the higher courses at the Academy there was the possibility of foreign language courses. However, according to Dr. Margita Havliková, deputy director of the education division, officers that needed them often did not participate because of their workload.<sup>114</sup> Moreover there was not a selection system for this, although there were selection criteria. Usually officers had to be nominated for these courses by the MoD, the General Staff or the Academy. A co-ordinating element for all this was missing.<sup>115</sup> In general, recorded systematic rules for the language courses

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<sup>111</sup> E-mailed response from Colonel Pruzinsky. He did not give me the reason behind this.

<sup>112</sup> Interview with members of the teaching staff at the Military Academy in Liptovský Mikuláš, 9 February 1999.

<sup>113</sup> Michal Pruzinsky, *A case study on military education and research efforts, problems and options*, (unpublished written paper of a presentation given at the Third International Security Forum in Zurich, October, 1998), p. 12.

<sup>114</sup> Interview with Mrs Havliková.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid. The co-ordination was done by Mrs Havliková personally.

did not exist. Each year the minister had to decide how many courses would be given and on which levels.

The shortcomings in language skills surely had effects on other educational fields. For one thing they complicated the task of getting necessary information to the students at the Academy. Specifically in the context of the interoperability objective, this was detrimental. Useful military literature from the West was usually written in English. Neither the MoD nor the schools themselves had the capacity to have everything translated. In general, access to all the western sources was hampered. Another aspect was that a lot of Slovak officers missed out on the opportunity to attend necessary courses abroad, because they could not meet the language requirements. The deficiency also limited Slovakia's choice with regard to such courses. The country had to choose from the ones with lower requirements. That could have meant that courses which were more suitable to the country's needs had to be skipped.

Mrs Havlikova tried to focus the attention of the authorities on the problem of the language deficiency for three years. There was no response however.<sup>116</sup> According to her, improvement would have been possible despite the bad financial situation, if attention had been paid to her suggestions. These focus points included: the creation of a team with competent people that would analyse, steer and manage the situation of the language education; the strengthening of the language chairs at the academies; the creation of a language institute like those in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic; the more frequent use of civilian teachers; and a greater focus on STANAG 2 and 3. Mrs Havlikova also proposed that Slovakia should try to get some active foreign assistance in language education.

The new man in charge, Colonel Smida, was very disappointed with the accomplishments in the field of language education as well. According to him the initial expectation was that as of 1999 the curriculum at the Academy would, in terms of the language preparation, be completely compatible with military universities in the West.<sup>117</sup> By that year, every graduate should have had professional language skills. In international terms, they should have been professionally fully qualified for their task within the collective defence. But this did not happen. The political situation affected the process. Since the Colonel considered the language preparation to be a key problem, he announced that in the period from 1999 until 2001 some very radical steps would be taken to improve the situation. By 2001 most of the soldiers would need to prove their language skills.<sup>118</sup> The schools already had to prepare some basic measures for improvement in the new school year 1999/2000. Colonel Smida also talked about his intention to use the experience from the civilian universities.

In this whole context the Colonel focused on the younger and middle generation. A drastic re-qualification of these people was necessary since it was expected that they would function within NATO in the near future.<sup>119</sup> As for the older officers, there were some legislative reforms in 1998, which were intended to speed up the process of their retirement.<sup>120</sup> According to Smida the accurate conditions for this purpose were created,

<sup>116</sup> Interview with Mrs Havlikova.

<sup>117</sup> Interview with Colonel Smida.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> It is important to note that this intended policy did not apply only to language preparation, but to the education as a whole.

<sup>120</sup> Interview with Colonel Smida.

which did not involve any compulsion. He said it was important to try to avoid any social or even political pressures. The general idea was to provide language education to officers up to the age of forty plus to a number of selected people that, despite their higher age, would play a part in future developments which would require language skills. When an officer was around fifty or older he would not have to bother with compulsory language courses anymore. In connection with all of this Mrs Havlikova told us that the MoD was currently drafting a document which contained a new military career model.<sup>121</sup> This model would also state the specific requirements with regard to language skills.

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<sup>121</sup> Interview with Mrs Havlikova. This career plan was very similar to the Canadian model. It was designed after comparing various western models.

## VI. CONCLUSION

In Slovakia reform of the higher military education of senior officers became subordinated to the political situation. The political framework very much influenced all developments in this field. Although integration into the Euro-Atlantic security structures was the official policy, it was obvious that while Meciar's authoritarian coalition was in power, this goal would not be accomplished. That fact frustrated any effort of the military to meet the NATO standards. Moreover, the political reality meant that certain achievements could not be institutionalised. The political will was simply lacking. Of course the country took steps within the PfP programme to meet certain requirements so that it could join international military exercises. However, meeting these requirements did not influence the whole structure of the defence establishment. As Colonel Smida very strikingly put it: the more the prospect of ever becoming a part of NATO moved away from Slovakia, the more the military reverted to and fell back on traditional and nationally orientated ideas of defence.<sup>122</sup> In terms of military education this meant that the process of foreign language preparation got slowed down and that eventually the willingness to apply modern knowledge about military theory was lacking.

The political style of the Meciar period was reflected in defence management as well. It was the authoritarian style of over-centralisation and controlling all developments as much as possible. With regard to the structures of education this meant that everything had to be checked with and approved by the MoD. This practice slowed down the transformation process and thwarted new initiatives. Drastic changes were shunned, because such change could include loss of control and influence for the elite. Social tensions had to be avoided for the same reason. An aspect of this attitude was that within the military a part of the old guard was kept in place. This included elder senior officers in higher positions who probably had the right connections. What they did not have was the mind-set to change. But more importantly, a lot of them did not have to meet the educational requirements anymore and thus could preserve their old methods. This must have had its impact on the development of the Army as a whole in this crucial phase.

Another remarkable fact was that in the field of educational policymaking the General Staff played a permanent and very active role. It had a lot of input in this process and seemingly quite some influence too. It appeared as if drafts of concepts had to be negotiated with elements from the MoD and the General Staff until everyone was satisfied. Although the MoD of course officially had the final authority, it remained unclear to what extent the Ministry had to act upon the ideas and objections from the General Staff in practice. In a period when relations between the MoD and the General Staff were not yet well-defined and ministerial oversight proved to be difficult, this could have been problematic. Where in the practice of everyday life certain responsibilities and competencies actually lay was sometimes still only vaguely known. The influence of the General Staff went even further. It was active in drafting curricula as well. So, despite the fact that the MoD had the authority over education, the influence of the General Staff appeared to be quite considerable, which might very well have been detrimental to the process of change. Besides, although the issue under which authority of military

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<sup>122</sup> Interview with Colonel Smida.

education should fall was supposedly long settled at the expense of the General Staff, Mr. Krizan mentioned that in some places the discussions about this were still in progress.<sup>123</sup>

In these circumstances there could not be an optimum use of what was offered from abroad. Naturally, insufficient language skills were a part of the problem. International co-operation mainly consisted of gathering information. Of course, what was actually used and what was not is hard to assess. With regard to senior officers that attended courses abroad, the transfer and practical use of the acquired knowledge apparently left a lot to be desired. So, on top of the initial problems concerning starting from scratch and having virtually no experience in conducting further education, the Slovak system of higher defence education suffered from a political atmosphere that was not conducive to reform and innovation.

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<sup>123</sup> Interview with Jelenak and Krizan.



## EPILOGUE

Parts of this paper refer to certain changes after the new government took over in 1998. In the strategic field priorities were newly set. The country seemed determined to make a firm and unambiguous bid for full NATO membership in the very near future. The paragraph on National Defence in the government's policy programme stated the measures that were to be taken. One of them was the adaptation of the structure, organisation and number of management bodies of the defence sector to the new requirements.<sup>124</sup> In fact there was a reorganisation at the MoD. The new arrangements were implemented on 1 March 1999. As of that date all divisions that dealt with education, including PD, fell under the newly formed Personnel Management Section.<sup>125</sup> As mentioned, Colonel Milan Smida became its director. Some of his main ambitions in the field of (higher) education have already been stated, as well as certain processes of change. In general, the Colonel emphasised the educational re-qualification of the middle generation. Now that the political will existed, the MoD could put more energy and decisiveness into its reforms.<sup>126</sup> The government programme explicitly stated that the development and applications of new trends in military thinking would be stimulated.<sup>127</sup> For the highest education a National Defence Institute would be established as part of the Military Academy in Liptovsky Mikulas.<sup>128</sup> In terms of general policy, a critical analysis of the *Concept* of military education would be made in co-operation with the military schools in March 1999. Decisions on how to use its potential, changing it or even replacing it with a new concept should be taken afterwards.<sup>129</sup>

In the context of what was stated in the Conclusion above, the government would also 'arrange the relationships and competencies between the Defence Ministry and the General Staff'.<sup>130</sup> Finally it declared that it would preserve 'a non-partisan, politically neutral position' in defence issues.<sup>131</sup> If that was to become a reality, the break with the previous period would be complete, since under Meciar, politics frequently interfered with defence reforms.

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<sup>124</sup> *Slovak Republic Government Policy Programme*, paragraph IV.4.C (National Defence)

<sup>125</sup> Interview with Colonel Smida.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>127</sup> *Government Policy Programme*, paragraph IV.4.C.

<sup>128</sup> Interview with Jelenak and Krizan.

<sup>129</sup> Interview with Colonel Smida.

<sup>130</sup> *Government Policy Programme*, paragraph IV.4.C.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*



## LIST OF PRIMARY SOURCES

### Official documents on military education

Jelenak, Milan and Dusan Krizan, *Minulost, sucasny stav a perspektivy Slovenskeho vojenskeho skolstva* (Past, present state and perspectives of the Slovak military educational system) (unpublished; Bratislava: Slovak MoD, 1998).

*Koncepcia akademickych kurzov* (Concept of academic courses) (unpublished; Bratislava: Slovak MoD).

*Koncepcia vojenskeho vzdelavania a vychovy v rezorte ministerstva obrany* (Concept of military education) (unpublished; Bratislava: Slovak MoD, 1996).

### Interviews

At the MoD:

Interview with Dr. Milan Jelenak and Ing. Dusan Krizan of the science and education division (Section of the Development and Provision of Human Resources), 8 February 1999.

Interview with Dr. Margita Havlikova, deputy director of the science and education division (Section of the Development and Provision of Human Resources), 8 February 1999.

Interview with Colonel Dr. Milan Smida, director of the International Security and Law division (Section of Foreign Relations) and since 1 March 1999 director of the Section of Personnel Management, 10 February 1999.

At the Military Academy in Liptovsky Mikulas:

Interview with Colonel Prof. Ing. Miroslav Zak, vice-rector for Science and Pedagogical activities, and Lieutenant Colonel Marian Ac, chief of the Study department, 9 February 1999.

Interview with members of the teaching staff, 9 February 1999.

## APPENDIX A

### Systematic and basic measures for the improvement of the language education

- A. Renewal of the internal regulations of the MoD with regard to the learning of foreign languages in accordance with the norms of NATO STANAG 6001.<sup>132</sup>
- B. Practical implementation of the language education:
  - at military schools as part of the secondary and higher education;
  - at military schools, the Mod and the General Staff in the form of language courses (intensive and special internal courses, correspondence courses, evening courses, part-time courses and external courses);
  - at schools that belong to other central organs of the state administration or language courses at other educational institutions in Slovakia;
  - at military and civil schools abroad, by means of self-study.
- C. Organising the language education within the resort of the MoD with the objective that the experts of the Slovak Army will achieve a sufficient level of language skill, firstly in English or French and secondly in another western language or Russian.
- D. Achieving a level of language skill at the military universities in accordance with the norms of NATO STANAG 6001:
  - no. 1 (beginners); no. 2 (intermediate level); no. 3 (advanced).
- E. Achieving a level of language skill in the language education as a whole by means of language courses and schooling in accordance with the norms of NATO STANAG 6001:
  - no. 1 (beginners); no. 2 (intermediate level); no. 3 (advanced).

In accordance with the needs of the Army higher forms of language education will be realised at universities and language schools in Slovakia or abroad.

Source: Slovak MoD, *Koncepcia vojenskeho vzdelavania a vychovy v rezorte ministerstva obrany*.

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<sup>132</sup> NATO Standardisation Agreement on language proficiency levels.

## APPENDIX B

### **System of higher military education. Situation before the divorce from the Czech Republic and after the adoption of the *Concept* of Academic and Specialised courses**

#### Situation before Slovakia's independence:

- a) First level
  - academic course (11 months)
  - purposive course I (2-3 months)
- b) Second level
  - higher academic course (11 months)
  - purposive course II (3 months)
- c) Third level
  - Academy of the General Staff (11 months)
  - purposive course III (5 months)

#### Situation after the adoption of the *Concept* of Academic and Specialised courses:

##### Specialised courses:

- Purposive Course level I (up to 5 months)
- Purposive Course level II (5 months)

##### Academic courses:

- Academic Course (up to 11 months) (first level)
- Higher Academic Course of the General Staff (11 months) (second level)

Source: Jelenak and Krizan, *Minulost, súčasny stav a perspektivy Slovenskeho vojenskeho školstva*.

**APPENDIX C****Study Plan of Purposive Course II**

Topics	Amount
	Hours
<b>A. COMMON PART</b>	<b>380</b>
<b>I. SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY</b>	<b>26</b>
1. Security and defence policy of the Slovak Republic	8
2. Civil and international law	18
<b>II. MILITARY AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT</b>	<b>40</b>
3. Military art, its content and principles	4
4. Military management, military communication and information systems	26
5. Personnel management	10
<b>III. GENERAL PREPARATION</b>	<b>184/60</b>
6. Operational art	16/30
7. General Tactic	18/0
8. Command of troops and staff practice	10
9. Research and foreign armies Use of force in combat	6/4
10. –artillery	4/4
11. –antiaircraft defence ( <i>PVO</i> )	4/4
12. –infantry	4/4
13. – <i>RCHBO</i> units	2/2
14. –air force and <i>PVO</i>	8/4
15. Employment in combat of signal corps	4/2
16. Use of <i>EPs</i> and <i>REB</i> in combat	4/2
17. Logistical support	4/4
18. Mobilising deployment of troops, principles	8
19. Peace-time operations	4
20. Topographical interoperability	2
21. Physical preparation	80

Topics	Amount
	Hours
IV. LANGUAGE PREPARATION	<b>80</b>
22. English language	80
<b>B. PREPARATION FOR SPECIALISATIONS</b>	<b>160</b>
A/ Ground Forces	
B/ Air Forces and <i>PVO</i>	
C/ Logistics	
Total amount of weeks	<b>20</b>
Amount of hours per week	<b>30</b>
Total amount of hours	<b>550</b>

Source: Military Academy in Liptovsky Mikulas (February 1999).

**APPENDIX D****Study Plan of the Academic Course**

Topics	Amount
	Hours
<b>A. COMMON PART</b>	<b>610</b>
<b>I. SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY</b>	<b>38</b>
1. Security and defence policy	20
2. Civil and international law	18
<b>II. MILITARY AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT</b>	<b>64</b>
3. Military management	32
4. Personnel management	12
5. Military communication and information systems	20
<b>III. GENERAL PREPARATION</b>	<b>388</b>
6. Military art, its content and principles	6
7. Basic operational art	10
8. General Tactic	30
9. Command of troops and staff practice	40
10. Research and foreign armies Use of force in combat	14
11. –artillery	10
12. –antiaircraft defence ( <i>PVO</i> )	10
13. –infantry	10
14. – <i>RCHBO</i> units	4
15. –air force and <i>PVO</i>	14
16. Employment in combat of signal corps	6
17. Topographical preparation	4
18. Use of <i>EPs</i> and <i>REB</i> in combat	6
19. Logistical support	12
20. Mobilising deployment of troops	20
21. Peace-time operations	6
22. Methods of tactical preparation	20
23. Physical preparation	160
24. Examination	6



Topics	Amount
	Hours
IV. LANGUAGE PREPARATION	<b>120</b>
25. English language	120
<b>B. PREPARATION FOR SPECIALISATIONS</b>	<b>460</b>
A/ Ground Forces	
B/ Air Forces and <i>PVO</i>	
C/ Logistics	
<b>C. Concluding functional practice</b>	<b>30</b>
Total amount of weeks	<b>38</b>
Amount of hours per week	<b>30</b>
Total amount of hours	<b>1100</b>

Source: Military Academy in Liptovsky Mikulas (February 1999).

**APPENDIX E****Study plan of the Higher Academic Course of the General Staff**

Topics	Amount of hours		
	Total	Semester I	Semester II
<b>I. MILITARY-POLITICAL TOPICS AND TOPICS OF MANAGEMENT</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>68</b>
1. International and security policy of the Slovak Republic	16	16	
2. European security and the international security organisation	12	12	
3. The Army in a democratic society and the defence policy of the state	22	22	
4. Management and methodology	40		40
control and command on the strategic level	20	12	8
5. Communication and information systems in strategic-operational control	20		20
6. Management in crisis situations	12	12	
7. Economy of the defence of the state	14	14	
8. Current issues of international relations	12	12	
<b>II. TOPICS OF STRATEGIC-OPERATIONAL PREPARATION</b>	<b>528</b>	<b>336</b>	<b>192</b>
9. Strategic concept in the defence of the state and military strategy	90	90	
10. Operational art	100	30	70
11. Strategic operational use of army units and preparation for exercises	202	80	122
12. Forms and methods of operational preparation of commanders and staffs	28	28	
13. Command of troops in operations and the modelling of an operation	40	40	
14. Foreign armies	20	20	
15. Mobilising deployment of troops	30	30	
16. Military geography	18	18	

Topics	Amount of hours		
	Total	Semester I	Semester II
<b>III. HUMANITARIAN TOPICS</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>114</b>
17. Civil, international and humanitarian law. Basic military conventions	22		22
18. Military history and military art	20	20	
19. Diplomacy	12		12
20. Physical preparation	160	80	80
<b>IV. LANGUAGE PREPARATION</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>60</b>
21. English language	120	60	60
<b>V. PRACTICE AND TEMPORARY STUDY</b>	<b>84</b>		<b>84</b>
1. Position and task of army corpses in the strategic arrangement of the Slovak Army in defending the Slovak Republic	30		30
2. Resolving non-military threats with the use of armed forces	24		24
3. Information exchange with institutions which posses a strategic level of control abroad	30		30
Concluding functional practice	<b>30</b>		<b>30</b>
Final examination	<b>12</b>		<b>12</b>
Reserve time	<b>20</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Total amount of hours</b>	<b>1176</b>	<b>606</b>	<b>570</b>

Source: Military Academy in Liptovsky Mikulas (February 1999).



## HARMONIE PAPERS

1. Anatoliy S. Grytsenko, *Civil-Military Relations in Ukraine: a system emerging from chaos*, December 1997, NLG 15 (incl. postage).
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### Special Issue

Ivanka Nedeva and Joost Herman (eds), *Minorities and Foreign Policy*, November 1998, NLG 30 (incl. postage).

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