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ARMAMENTS COOPERATION IN EUROPE:
AN EXAMPLE OF EUROPEANIZATION?

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Abstract:
Armaments cooperation in Europe is a very complicated issue. The intergovernmental level and the subsequent intergovernmental procedures, through which these projects are negotiated and agreed, pose a major constraint in promoting further intra-European armaments cooperation. Moreover, the reluctance of the member states towards these projects add another constraining factor. Finally, it’s only the last decade that projects of intra-European armaments cooperation have made progress as a result of the R&D and production savings that member states have.

Keywords: Armaments cooperation, armaments policy, strategic culture, Europeanization, intergovernmental procedures.
1. INTRODUCTION.

Armaments procurement is a complex issue. Armaments cooperation is an even more complex one. Every country has a set of very specific rules and procedures that define in detail how the process of armaments production and acquisition works. Consequently, when a number of countries agree to cooperate in the field of armaments, this means that all these different sets of rules and procedures have to be brought together, in order to produce the desirable outcome. European states have cooperated in a number of armaments projects in the past 50 years. But why have the European states cooperated in this very sensitive field? Is this form of cooperation a result of pressures from the European level or is it simply a result of a combination of external and domestic factors such as the end of the Cold War, the declining defence budgets, the emergence of new types of threats, the huge R&D costs and the restructuring of the European defence industries that forced European states to cooperate on an intergovernmental basis? The answer is that armaments cooperation in Europe is a mirror of each state’s armaments policy, which reflects a very specific national approach. All these different national approaches, in turn, are reflected in armaments cooperation projects at the European level. Or to put it otherwise, armaments cooperation in Europe reflects each nation’s strategic culture.

Armaments cooperation in Europe is indeed a reflection of the different strategic cultures that exist among European states. For example, French strategic culture implies a global role for France and therefore power projection capabilities are essential. France, withdrawn from the EF-2000 (Eurofighter) project, developed its own aircraft, the Rafale, when it became clear that the aircraft under development would not have the ability to operate from aircraft carriers, something crucial for the French requirements for power projection. This is just one example of how national
approaches to the use of force, expressed through the strategic culture of each state, set the preconditions for European armaments cooperation. Consequently, the most successful armaments cooperation has been intergovernmental.

Therefore, this thesis will follow the intergovernmental approach, which emphasizes the role of the state. In parallel, it will use the concept of autonomy, as defined by Nordlinger. Nordlinger states that a “state is autonomous to the extent that it translates its preferences into authoritative actions”.\(^1\) These preferences that are translated into authoritative actions and determine the degree of autonomy of each state in the field of defence are only expressed through each nation’s strategic culture. Therefore this thesis will try to define firstly the nature of European armaments cooperation, whether it is an outcome of the European integration process or simply consists of intergovernmental arrangements and procedures. In the main part, it will examine the strategic cultures and the armaments policies of France, Germany and Britain, the countries that constitute the core of the European armaments cooperation. The last part will evaluate the level of armaments cooperation between the aforementioned countries and it will stress also the implications for the field of armaments cooperation.

2. EUROPEANIZATION OF ARMAMENTS COOPERATION?

Defence and Security was always a policy field that characterized nation’s states as independent and sovereign. Therefore, European states have been reluctant to cede sovereignty over this very sensitive field to the supranational level of the EU. Subsequently, this policy sector has not been considered as a core one for the process of European integration. This notion consolidated since the early stages of the

European integration process and Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome (Article 296 in the Treaty of Amsterdam) excluded armaments procurement from the jurisdiction of the European Community. Intergovernmentalism was the only way.

This intergovernmental dimension though was not the strongest possible in these early stages of European armaments cooperation because as Moravcsik argues “some collaborative projects particularly between France and Germany, were initiated in part for diplomatic reasons, ranging from the Franco—German desire to seal their reconciliation in the 1950s to Helmut Schmidt and Valery Giscard d’Estaing’s plan two decades later to strengthen security collaboration”². An outcome of the intergovernmental way was the remarkable and successful decision of France, Britain and Germany to establish OCCAR in 2001 and transfer a degree of their sovereignty over armaments procurement. We can, thus, speak of what Mawdsley calls “Europeanization outside of the EU institutions”³.

Consequently what Risse, Cowles and Caporaso define as ‘Europeanization’ that is, “the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules. Europeanization involves the evolution of new layers of politics that interact with older ones”⁴, best suits the purposes of this thesis.

Menon also argues that defence is a policy area that does not possess the complicated institutional framework which other policies have acquired at the EU.

level. Indeed at the European level ESDP is on an embryonic stage yet and it’s of pure intergovernmental nature. Furthermore, Moravcsik again writing back in 1990, clearly argues that European co-development – and consequently co production – on armaments consists generally of *ad hoc* intergovernmental arrangements, which are negotiated on a project–by–project basis. This means that projects of European armaments cooperation clearly reflect the different national preferences of the member states engaged.

Taylor verifies Moravcsik seven years later in 1997, by writing that “almost all European military collaborative projects have been *ad hoc*. Although similar practices are used in many cases, each project has its own precise arrangements and nuances...Intergovernmental arrangements dominate, with neither international management agencies nor multinational corporate arrangements developing much power or personality.” Consequently, the implications for possible integration and subsequently Europeanization of armaments production are very limited.

Rohde comes to strengthen this point, that the Europeanization of armaments development and production should be limited to a core of countries that employ the Defence Technological and Industrial Base required for such projects, by arguing that only a small group of EU member states should promote the deepening of armaments cooperation. Moreover, he goes one step further, by adding that “within this ‘core’ capability and force planning would have to be closely coordinated, if not, as a rule or

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concerning specific aspects, developed jointly. In addition, the members would have to establish their ‘own’ common market and develop common procurement rules”.

It is obvious that this is the case with OCCAR since it’s Article 7 states that “OCCAR shall coordinate control and implement those armaments programmes that are assigned to it by member states, and coordinate and promote joint activities for the future, thereby improving the effectiveness of project management in collaborative projects, in terms of cost, schedule and performance”. Furthermore, Article 8 states that one of the main tasks of OCCAR is the “preparation of common technical specifications for the development and procurement of jointly defined equipment”. OCCAR seems to be a forum, which brings into convergence the different national preferences over armaments development and production, a forum of intergovernmental cooperation for the formulation of common requirements.

From this point of view, any form of cooperation within intergovernmental structures is probably the solution to what Keith Hayward mentions: “Although European weapons collaboration is more than thirty years old and much has learnt about how to run such programmes, there are still fundamental problems in reconciling efficiency with political factors (my underlying)”. Efficiency has to do with the huge R&D costs, the declining defence budgets and the high costs linked with the maintenance of national industrial capabilities for the European states. The political factors are of course about national preferences and have to be negotiated on an intergovernmental basis. The end of the Cold War made more urgent than ever before the problems linked with efficiency and consequently, forced European

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10 All the above information about OCCAR are available at www.occar-ea.org/C1256B0E0052F1AC/vwContentFrame/N254SMVV967SLEREN - 4K - accessed on August 4 2006.
governments to strengthen further the intergovernmental cooperation on armaments development and production in order to minimize their economic consequences, thus forcing them to compromise over the sensitive political factors.12

Ultimately, the problem lies in the formation of common requirements for each armaments project and this process, as Hayward argues, starts from the national level: “Nationally, the requirement process will identify a broad need for a ‘tank’, ‘fighter aircraft’ and so on, but clearly the heart of the matter is the conceptual thinking that underpins national views of what that tank or aircraft should do and how it should do it ... The persistence and depth of national doctrinal preferences and historical bias born of experience have profound implications for the formulation of common requirements.”13

This conceptual thinking and national doctrinal preferences about what these armaments systems should do lies in each country’s strategic culture which identifies what each country must do in the international environment and what means needs in order to achieve these goals. Eventually, all lies in each country’s strategic culture so collaborative projects are nothing more than an attempt to attain, as De Vestel argues, “national objectives using international tools ”.14 Therefore, after a brief reference to the main frameworks of cooperation since the 1990s, in the main part of this thesis the strategic cultures and armaments policies of France, Germany and Britain will be examined.

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2.1 Cooperation since the 1990s.

The Western European Armaments Group (WEAG): is the former Independent European Program Group (IEPG).\textsuperscript{15} It includes all the European NATO and EU member states except for Ireland and Iceland. It is aiming in a more efficient use of resources through increased harmonization of requirements, opening up of national defence markets to cross-border competition, the strengthening of the European defence technological and industrial base and cooperation in research and development.\textsuperscript{16} In 1996, the Western European Armament Organization (WEAO) was founded as a research cell of the WEAG.\textsuperscript{17}

Organization for Joint Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR): Established in November 1996 between France, Germany, Britain and Italy became a legal entity in January 2001.\textsuperscript{18} OCCAR promotes the interests of a core group of countries that seeks progress through small multinational initiatives. OCCAR’s main function until now is to provide greater efficiency through the management of joint procurement programmes (A400M, Tiger HAP, Milan, Hot and Rolland missiles). European countries that participate in programmes managed by OCCAR can apply for membership in the organization. Thus Belgium joint OCCAR in 2003 due to its participation in the A400M program.

European Defence Agency (EDA): The European Defence Agency was established on the 12\textsuperscript{th} of July 2004 from the Council of Ministers of the EU. Its main tasks are a) defining and meeting the capability needs of ESDP, b) promoting the

\textsuperscript{15} For a detailed analysis of the IEPG see Harald Bauer “Institutional frameworks for integration of arms production in Western Europe ” pp. 40-42 in Michael Brzoska and Peter Lock (1992) (editors) “ Restructuring of Arms Production in Western Europe ” Oxford University Press for SIPRI.
\textsuperscript{17} Information available at http://www.weao.weu.int/site/index.php accessed on August 7 2006.
\textsuperscript{18} Information available at http://www.occar-ea.org/C1256B0E0052F1AC/vwContentFrame/N254SMV967SLEPEN accessed on August 7 2006. See also Burkard Schmidt (2005) “ Armaments Cooperation in Europe ” Institute for Security Studies WEU available at http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/07-bsarms.pdf accessed on August 7 2006. Information on this section was based on these sources.
equipment collaboration in order to enhance defence capabilities and further restructuring the European defence industries, c) promoting the collaborative use of national R&T funds within a European process that will define priorities and d) developing jointly with the Commission an internationally competitive market for defence equipment in Europe. While this is a considerable achievement bearing in mind, the member states attitudes on armaments issues, as Schmidt argues “it will take time for the Agency to become operational and make its weight felt”. Accordingly, we can assume that the Agency’s role so far can be best characterized as minimal.

3. ABOUT STRATEGIC CULTURE.

What is strategic culture? A definition here is useful and it will enable us to continue with the study of this feature of the three different states mentioned above. Colin Gray defined strategic culture a “referring to modes of thought and action with respect to force, which derive from perceptions of national historical experiences, from aspirations for responsible behaviour in national terms ...the civic culture and way of life ”. Johnston, in a similar way, defines strategic culture as “an integrated system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long – lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality, that the

strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious”. Longhurst finally defines strategic culture as a “distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, held by a collective and arising gradually over time through a unique protracted historical process. A strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its inception, although it is not a permanent or static feature ”. All the above definitions serve the purposes of this thesis.

3.1 FRENCH STRATEGIC CULTURE AND ARMAMENTS POLICY.

France has a long tradition in producing its own arms. This tradition goes back to 1670, when Jean Baptiste Colbert was Prime Minister and tried to create a domestic industrial capacity, which included a self – sufficient and protected defence industry as a source of state power. The policy remained known as Colbertism and was going to become a cornerstone of French public policy for the next centuries. This was verified almost one hundred years later when France surrounded by enemies gave rise to the first national army in history in the battle of Valmy and defended successfully it’s own existence.

Other historical experiences, such as the hesitation of Americans and British to deal with Germany after 1914, the dramatic withdrawal of the weak and never believed in victory British Force at Dunkirk in 1939, the sinking of the French fleet at Mers el – Kebir in order to prevent it from joining the Vichy regime to the defeat at Dien Bien Phu and Suez, had come to strengthen the point that France could not rely on it’s allies in a time of crisis. Francois Leotard in 1994 expressed this by stating that

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“at the moment of truth a nation has no friends.”  

As a consequence French strategic culture underlines the importance of independence in arms production for France’s independence, security and global role. Kolodziej comes to verify that in his masterful study by underlining that “French arms production and strategic military policy, including the raising, training and equipping of armed forces are inextricably entwined. However, much French regimes – royal, imperial or republican – may have differed in composition, claims to legitimacy, or objectives, they could agree that France’s independence, security, big-power role – grandeur no less – required an autonomous military strategy and national armed forces free from outside control.”

We can easily assume that the production of arms has allowed France to follow an independent defence and security policy for centuries as well as to perform its role as one of the great powers. But why this policy was solidified after the end of World War II when France was about to make a new start and change did not occur? The answer is that this happened thanks to General Charles De Gaulle, one of the most important figures in French and European history. As Gregory states “In terms of defence and security General Charles De Gaulle stands like a colossus at the mid-point of the French twentieth century and casts a long shadow over almost all that came after him.” De Gaulle’s defence policy set the framework and the preconditions for all its successors, things that were never challenged but followed heartfully. It is to the study of the General’s legacy that this thesis will now turn.

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26 In Shaun Gregory (2000) p. 11.
i. The Gaullist Legacy.

The term ‘Gaullist Legacy’ is used in order to describe a specific set of beliefs that came to characterize French defence policy since the 1960s. According to Gordon these principles were a) the maintenance of total autonomy of decision, b) the independence of the nuclear force, c) the avoidance of commitments to third country security, d) no participation in any sort of integrated military command structure, e) the claiming for France of a special global role, f) the denying the use of or access to French territory in time of peace or crisis, g) the rejection of participation to ‘bloc – to – bloc’ negotiations, h) the purchase of the overwhelming majority (95%) of French armaments in France and lastly i) the right and need to produce and export the whole range of armaments systems that other military powers produced.27

The fact that these principles have guide and, at the same time, constrained De Gaulle’s successors underlines the continuity of the policy envisaged by De Gaulle. Indeed as Gordon states “…the Gaullist model was maintained by all of De Gaulle’s successors”.28 In general the Gaullist legacy is summarized in three points a) the policy of grandeur, b) the statism and c) the corps system. Within the second lie the foundations of the French tradition to create national champions in each defence sector e.g tanks, aircrafts, which were in there majority under state control and invest on projects that would enhance national prestige such as the Rafale aircraft.29 Within the last lies the corps d’ armament which constitutes the core of the Délégation Générale por l’ Armement (DGA). DGA is the agency that is charged with the

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management of the French procurement process, otherwise with the development and
production of the 95% of French armaments in France and of course with the
programmes of national prestige. From the above what DGA accounts for in the
French procurement policy can be easily understood.

ii. The Délégation Générale pour l’Armement (DGA).

The Délégation Générale pour l’Armement (DGA)\textsuperscript{30} was established in 1961 and
was going to have a central role in arms procurement, production and in defence
industrial development. The establishment of DGA during the presidency of General
De Gaulle fulfilled one part of the Gaullist vision about France and at the same time
secured that the independence in the military sphere would be preserved. Politically,
the DGA is very powerful and it’s considered to be the ‘guardian angel’ of French
defence policy and defence industry. Eliassen proves this by claiming that “the DGA
is responsible for all French armaments programmes. It controls all research,
development, and production. It also conducts its own research and development for
all military services and monitors the activities of both nationalized and private firms
involved in the armament process”.\textsuperscript{31} This reveals an overall supervising role
combined with broad pertinences.

Mampaey gives in one phrase what DGA accounts for in the French procurement
process:“DGA is the ‘glue’ which has held the military industrial complex in France
together over the decades ”.\textsuperscript{32} Throughout the years though, it became obvious that
the effort to maintain an independent defence industry and producing your own

\textsuperscript{30} DGA was established in the beginning under the name Délégation Ministeriellé pour l’Armement
(DMA) and was renamed DGA in 1977.

\textsuperscript{31} In Kjell A. Eliassen (December 2002) “European Defence Procurement and Industrial Policy: The
Case of France ” p. 9 Centre for European and Asian Studies at Norwegian School of Management.

\textsuperscript{32} Luc Mampaey “Ownership and regulation of the defence industrial base: the French case” p. 129 in
Claude Serfati (2001) (editor) “COST Action A10 The restructuring of the European defence industry :
Dynamics of change” European Commission, Directorate General for Research.
armaments systems in certain sectors eg. The Rafale aircraft was extremely costly. In
the case of Rafale the costs per aircraft were estimated at about FFr600 million.
Combined with the decline in defence budgets in the 90s this meant that changes were
needed in order to ensure the viability of the French defence industry with its crucial
importance for the French state. Reforms were needed.

iii. Reforming the DGA.

The necessary reforms after some efforts that took place between 1990-1995 were
were pressing for the reforming of the French defence industry and procurement
process: a) the decline of national defence budget, b) the huge and constantly rising
R&D expenditures caused by the increasing complexity of armaments systems and c)
the growing competition from the American arms giants. Also, the lessons from the
second Gulf War in 1991 for the French Armed Forces, with the poor performance of
the army and its inadequate light armour equipment combined with interoperability
problems, were bitter and created the necessary conditions for reforms in the
military.\footnote{For the reforms in the military see Bastien Irondelle “ Europeanization without the European Union? French military reforms 1991-1996 ” Journal of European Public Policy 10:2 April 2003 pp. 208-226.} The role of the DGA as a link between the armed forces and the defence
industry was seriously questioned.

The reforms implemented had to do with the reorganization of the DGA and with
the effectiveness of the procurement process in financial terms. DGA was reorganized
and as a consequence three directorates are assigned with the preparation and
management of armament projects, two are assigned with the arms exports,
international co-operation and industrial policy and lastly two are assigned with
testing and evaluation activities.\textsuperscript{35} The role of the DGA was redetermined and its previous autonomy towards the government was restrained. There was also a turn towards European cooperation in armaments projects.

As a result European cooperation projects accounted for 34\% of the French weapons programmes in 2002 compared with the 15\% a few years ago.\textsuperscript{36} This turn indicates a major departure from the Gaullist tradition of independence in arms production but the French were forced to take that turn because of the huge R&D costs that were posing a time bomb to the viability of French defence industry. The huge R&D costs could no longer be met also due to increasing budgetary pressures as a result of the economic convergence criteria for the EMU.\textsuperscript{37} As Eliassen puts it “International collaboration offers opportunities for costs savings in R&D and production”.\textsuperscript{38}

This European collaboration takes place through the creation of large transnational consortia with the national governments playing a decisive role in the formation of such consortia by giving their consent and supervising the merger process among the defence industries. This process, as well as the joint venture through which cooperation is carried out in single programmes, are strictly intergovernmental. Moreover as Eliassen again points out “French generally regard international cooperation programmes as a version of offset...”.\textsuperscript{39} Therefore, we can easily understand that the French do not pay so much importance to European cooperation unless it serves their national purposes.


\textsuperscript{38} In Kjell A. Eliassen ( December 2002) p. 19.

\textsuperscript{39} In Kjell A. Eliassen (December 2002) p. 31.
iv. French Summation.

From all that was mentioned above, we can conclude that the French armament policy is still driven mainly by national procurement. The French are staying loyal to their Gaullist legacy of autonomy in arms development and production. They might have turned to European collaboration but they were forced to do so by a combination of domestic and external factors. Consequently, European cooperation was managed in a pure intergovernmental basis. And they did so to the degree that it served their national objectives and would not threat the core of the Gaullist legacy, the autonomy in arms production and the state control over the defence industry. Mawdsley argues that French defence industry after the reforms “was only quasi-autonomous and still seemed to be under the guardianship of an omnipresent state”.\textsuperscript{40} The Gaullist legacy fully preserved.

3.2 GERMAN\textsuperscript{41} STRATEGIC CULTURE AND ARMAMENTS POLICY.

German strategic culture with its present form is an outcome of the lessons drowned after the two World Wars and the German defeats. Particularly, it is the outcome from the lessons learned from the experiences of the Wilhelmian militarism first and National Socialism second. The weaknesses of the short-lived Weimar Republic were studied and also contributed to the shaping of modern German strategic culture. Especially, the unconditional surrender of Germany in 1945 and the notion that was created in the minds of the Germans that had fought for the objectives of a regime in the same way that National Socialism created the framework of Stunde

\textsuperscript{40} In Mawdsley (2000) p. 223.
\textsuperscript{41} The term ‘German’ refers to the Federal Republic of Germany that is West Germany before 1991 except if otherwise specified.
Null (Zero Hour in English). According to Longhurst Stunde Null, it “implies the total physical, moral and psychological devastation and trauma that prevailed in Germany at the close of Second World War; the term accurately conveys the clear break with the past that prevailed after the Second World War and on which new policies and practices were constructed”. 42

An outcome of the framework of Stunde Null was that German rearmament occurred within structures in which political ideas were of primary importance than military ones. Consequently, as Longhurst points out again West German strategic culture was an amalgam of two factors a) the allied preferences regarding the new role of the Federal Republic and b) the post-war domestic condition that prevailed in West Germany. 43 As a result, Hyde-Price will argue that “in the case of Germany, the war left an emotional overhang that shaped a strategic culture deeply colored by its foreign policy role conception as a civilian power. During the Cold War, this led to a strategic culture characterized by the belief that the purpose of the Bundeswehr was to deter another war, and that as soon as it had fired its first shot in anger it had failed in its mission ”. 44 Furthermore, Baumann and Helmann point out three factors that shaped modern German strategic culture and emanate from the legacy of German militarism and the subsequent attitude towards a German ‘special’ way (Sonderweg) that should be followed from now on. The three factors are a) multilateralism b) European integration and c) anti-militarism. 45 As a result the Germans evolved a mainly non-military strategic culture, which influenced their defence policy.

i. A Legacy of Constraints.  

The newborn Federal Republic was imposed huge restrictions regarding its rearmament. These restrictions aimed to ensure that Germany would not gain again the huge military power that led it to the two World Wars and that the army would not have any serious influence over politics. These restrictions though had the consent of the Germans and this is something that has to be mentioned.

The restrictions imposed had to do with a) the deployment of the German Armed Forces: German Armed Forces were initially earmarked only for territorial defence. However, as international pressures for German participation in UN and NATO operations increased, after reunification the solution was found to allow the participation of the German Armed Forces in international missions with the modification of the Constitution and the previous approval of the German Bundestag, b) Command and Control: Germany was not allowed to have a General Staff and all German Forces were under NATO command and did not have the ability to plan independent operations. This fact led the German Forces to be the most integrated among the Europeans.

This changed with the reunification and the ‘Two Plus Four’ Treaty of Moscow in 1990 which transferred responsibility for the eastern territories to the German Armed Forces together with the ability to execute independent operations, c) manpower limitations: The Bundeswehr’s strength was limited to 12 divisions and approximately 500,000 men at peacetime. After reunification plans were approved to cut overall strength at 370,000 men and d) equipment limitations: The Federal Republic agreed

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never to produce nuclear, biological and chemical weapons as well as guided missiles, warships over an agreed tonnage, tanks and military aircrafts. These restrictions were gradually lifted until 1984.

**ii The Bundeswehr Reforms.**

After the reunification in 1991, the need to reform Bundeswehr emerged. International pressures such as the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new types of missions and threats as well as domestic pressures, such as the declining defence budget created an urgent need for reforms. Dyson, develops an interesting point by arguing that strategic/political-military culture can be used as a tool by the politicians in order to promote or block change.\(^47\) Thus reform relies heavily on the perceptions that each defence minister has on this very specific policy sector. It is useful to mention here that the re-evaluation of the role and needs of the Bundeswehr had important implication for the Federal Republic’s armaments policy. New types of missions require new equipment, which has to be procured. Van Orden writing in 1991 foresees that the future Bundeswehr will be built around three types of units: a) units comprising the military infrastructure e.g academies, intelligence and security, b) reserve units dependent on mobilization and c) high deployment and mobility forces for crisis-management missions.\(^48\)

In the year 2000, three reports regarding Bundeswehr reform were at the government’s disposal: the Weizacker, the Kirchbach and the Defence Minister Scharping’s Reports. The Weizacker Commission Report states that “the structure of the armed forces should be oriented on the tasks they will most likely have to perform

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\(^{47}\) In Tom Dyson “German Military Reforms 1998-2004: Leadership and the Triumph of Domestic Constraint over International Opportunity” *European Security* 14:3 September 2005 pp. 361-386. See this very interesting article for an innovative analysis of the German military reforms in that period.

within the context of crisis prevention and crisis management; the armed forces should be reorganized to produce an operational force component of 140,000 troops that is functional and fit for employment in an alliance role".  

The Scharping Report states that Bundeswehr’s equipment will be modernized as well as that the reference points for the acquisition of armaments systems are the Defence Capabilities Initiative and the European Headline Goal. The Bunsdwher will be equipped also with space-borne reconnaissance capabilities and with capabilities, which will enhance its interoperability. However, it must be mentioned that until Defence Minister Peter Struck the Bundeswehr’s main mission was territorial defence with all the implications that this entailed for armaments procurement. The main implication of this is that as long as the main mission of the armed forces remains the same the pace of modernization has proven to be slow because weapons systems are produced according to that main mission. When priorities change, armaments procurement also changes.

iii. German Armaments Policy.

German rearmament and German armaments policy were aiming from the beginning in achieving a national objective that of sovereignty – autonomy in the longer term - for the Federal Republic. As Goeffrey Van Orden argues, “the nature of Germany’s military contribution was seen to be both an instrument for the achievement of sovereignty and equality, and a yardstick by which progress towards this might be measured. The Federal Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, recognized that the two went hand in hand”. On the other hand, the German industrialists were

reluctant to start producing weapons again and even some of them like Alfred Krupp had sworn never again to produce weapons.\textsuperscript{52}

The government tried to convince the industrialists through the Kircheim Resolutions proposed by the CSU Defence Minister Joseff Strauss. According to the Kircheim Resolutions, Germany should a) shape an armaments program which would meet German and Allied needs, b) the process of creating the Bundeswehr should produce a highly quality outcome and finally the most important, c) defence budget should be beneficial to the German economy and promote scientific and technical capabilities in areas in which Germany was still lacking.\textsuperscript{53} There is also a tendency through armaments projects to secure German jobs in the defence industry and all German governments have been particularly sensitive to this.\textsuperscript{54} This, according to Mawdsley, had as an outcome the necessary political – social – industrial consensus for rearmament to proceed and succeed and established Federal Republic’s consensual armaments policy.\textsuperscript{55}

Bearing in mind the restrictions regarding arms development and production that were imposed on Germany on the one hand, and Germany’s effort to regain sovereignty and equality through its initially carefully constrained and strictly controlled armaments production in order to catch up with the technological advances and to contribute militarily to the Western defence, only one way seemed to be the solution for both problems: intergovernmental cooperation in armaments development and production. And this was a tool that the German governments fully exploited.

As a result German armaments policy in order to acquire technological equality for the German defence industry has been a strong proponent of international

\textsuperscript{52} In Brzoska and Lock (1992) p. 118.
\textsuperscript{54} In Mawdsley (2000) p. 262.
\textsuperscript{55} In Mawdsley (2000) p. 249.
cooperation. Civilians carry out the procurement in Germany (Article 87 of the Fundamental Law), and regulation is strict. The Federal Office for Defence Technology and Procurement (BWB in German) is responsible for the overall management of armaments projects. As indicated by its official name, it is also responsible for military R&D. This office is as well responsible for projects of armaments cooperation. Consequently, Mawdsley points out that BWB is “the buyer of equipment for the armed force, therefore is the contact for all interested potential partners from industry and trade”. 56 We can thus support that BWB is the link between the armed forces and the defence industry and more or less performs the same functions with the French DGA.

Germans have long promoted armaments cooperation at the European level through intergovernmental procedures. The obvious outcome of this policy was the establishment of OCCAR in 2001 along with Britain, France and Italy. Germany participates in a number of projects managed by OCCAR. Germany has placed the largest order for the strategic transport aircraft A400M, including 73 pieces in total, which will solve the problems related with strategic mobility that Europeans face. However, bearing in mind that the German government had encouraged the merger of Daimler-Chrysler Aerospace (DASA) and Aerospatiale Matra, the outcome of which was the creation of EADS, the third largest defence company in the world, we can easily suppose that this order was motivated primarily from concerns to secure German jobs. Indeed, as Sarotte points out “the real objective was to secure construction jobs for Germany rather than a real German capability ”. 57

Germany also participates in the production of the Helios satellite intelligence system together with France in order to reduce dependency on the Americans for

intelligence collection. Finally, Germany participates in the multinational NH-90 transport helicopter project. German choosing of Rolls-Royce instead of General Electric turbo engines for their helicopters caused serious tensions between Berlin and Washington with the later to protest officially. Given though the huge restrictions that the U.S imposes on the transfer of technology\textsuperscript{58} and the German goal to enhance their technological base the choice seems fully justified. This is also the case with the EF-2000 Eurofighter aircraft and Meteor BVRAAM missile.\textsuperscript{59}

From all mentioned above we can easily conclude that German participation in multilateral armaments projects is driven mainly by national objectives which are the enhancement of technology and autonomy.

\textbf{iv. German Summation.}

Germany has proven to be a special case. The Germans found themselves in the post Second World War world in the middle of the West geopolitical spectrum, with the American on the one side, and the Europeans (particularly the French and British) on the other. Consequently, they tried to keep the balance and leave none of them disappointed. Thus, German interest was always influenced by the outcome of an equation, which on its one side had the aggregation of American and European (mostly French and British) interests. In the core of this effort was their aim for sovereignty and autonomy through the formation of German Armed Forces. With the end of the Cold war, the equation changed and the European interests moved to the other side together with the German ones.

Germany is still keeping the balance but is influenced more by the European side. Ultimately, the goal remained one, to enhance Germany’s autonomy in the field of

\textsuperscript{58} In John Deutch, Arnold Kanter and Brent Scowcroft “ Saving NATO’s Foundation ” pp. 54-56 Foreign Affairs 78:6 November/December 1999.
\textsuperscript{59} In Sarotte (2001) pp. 48-52.
defence. International cooperation in the field of armaments development and production served that goal and consequently, it was embraced by the Germans. Therefore, our conclusion should be what Van Orden wrote in 1991 that “Germany is reshaping its armed forces to express the achievement of sovereignty and that, while the current defence rhetoric emphasizes multinationalism, the tendency is towards a renationalization of defence ”. Renationalization of defence combined with intergovernmental arrangements and procedures at the European level we will add.

3.3 BRITISH STRATEGIC CULTURE AND ARMAMENTS POLICY.

Britain is a very special case: an island next to the European mainland, which used to be the center of an empire; an empire that had territories in almost every part of the world. This special geographical position subsequently influenced the formation of British strategic culture. Britain had troops deployed in every part of its former empire and still has troops deployed today in specific places of strategic importance to British interests. Consequently, as Miskimmon argues “ British strategic culture defines the boundaries and conditions within which the British Armed Forces may be used as part of an overall foreign policy strategy ”. United Kingdom holds a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, is one of the three ‘big’ of the EU, plays an important role in the Commonwealth and has a particular relationship with the United States. Therefore, United Kingdom is still a major player in world politics.

Moreover, UK is not still the economic power that it used to be but this is not the case with the British Armed Forces. As Mawdsley argues “the British decline in economic importance during the twentieth century has not been matched by a decline

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in the prestige of British military achievement”. 62 This British military achievement has helped Britain to fight two World Wars and manage according to Chuter “; to avoid the domination of the continent (Europe-my parenthesis) by any single power or ruler; a united Europe, in other words, always carries the risk of being a Europe united against Britain”. 63 Especially the Second World War and the central role that Britain played as one of the Allies in the defeat of the Third Reich left Britain according to Hyde Price “...with a much more positive view of their armed forces and a belief in the efficacy of military power that was largely absent from many other European countries, most notably Germany”. 64 Therefore, the British military might is still a reality.

Britain has also developed a special relationship with the United States after World War II. This transatlantic relationship is considered to be of key importance for the British interests. As a result, British strategic culture was connected with the United States and NATO. Hence, there is a high degree of interoperability between British and American forces and very close cooperation exists between the two country’s intelligence services. Consequently, Miskimmon will argue that “the UK’s commitment to the Atlantic Alliance and its ties with the United States formed the cornerstone of British strategic culture during the Cold War as a permanent member of the UN Security Council”. 65 Since then the British are trying to balance between Atlanticism and Europeanism with the former having the lead. As a result three tendencies can be identified in British strategic culture a) the former colonial power, b) the two World Wars and c) pressures related with the Cold War. 66

Consequently, every effort to integrate the defence sector in the EU level faces British reluctance. For example, EDSP as Howorth argues, “for the British was an Alliance project involving European instruments while for France was a European project embracing Alliance capabilities”.\(^{67}\) Therefore, the British have always believed that “...ad hoc co-operation can be carried out without fixed sets of rules, and is therefore safer”.\(^{68}\) Intergovernmental arrangements and procedures for armaments development and production seem to serve better British interests. Thus, British are in favor of international organizations for the management of armaments projects (OCCAR) but in these organizations “their structures, organization and working methods are generally imitated from national models, depending on who the founding nations are and what the power relationships are between them. Organizations have what in a computer is called an ‘operating system’, an agreed set of rules about ethos and procedure” according to Chuter.\(^{69}\) Bearing these in mind we turn to British armaments policy.

i. **British Armaments Policy.**

Until the Thatcher government defence procurement was handled exclusively by the Ministry of Defence, which enjoyed almost total autonomy in the management of armaments projects. Political oversight was to a large degree absent. A consequence of that situation was the *Chevaline* project regarding the modernization of the *Polaris* ballistic missiles of the British nuclear strategic submarines, which cost almost £1000 million without producing the desirable outcome. The modernization efforts were abandoned and the *Trident* missiles were purchased instead. British Parliament had

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\(^{69}\) Chuter in Howorth and Menon (1997) p. 113.
never been informed of the project neither had given its approval for it. This situation was the outcome to a large extent of the expertise related to armaments projects. The politicians had neither the time nor the knowledge to deal with or supervise these projects.  

Dunne and Macdonald derive the outcome for us: “Procurement policy was protectionist and acted as a form policy of disguised industrial policy, with high levels of defence expenditure maintaining demand in certain industries and the MoD maintaining preferred suppliers within the UK defence industry”.  

Consequently, in the early 80s the new conservative government under Margaret Thatcher, as Walker and Gummet point out “...looked with growing distaste on the manner in which the defence market operated – the lack of competition between defence contractors, the cozy relationship between industrial managers, civil servants and military personnel, the weakness of cost control, and the inefficiency of much defence research and development (R&D) and production”. One more thing that has to be mentioned here is that until the Thatcher government all British defence industries were under state owned and as Mawdsley points out “…the relationship between government and defence industry in the 1970s was similar to the relationship between the French Délégation Générale pour l’Armement and French defence industry”.  

The result was the same as in France and Germany; the state owned defence industries received the contracts for the armaments projects, and this mutual interdependence had as an outcome a totally inefficient procurement. Many projects did not worth all the money they were getting and the costs were steadily rising.

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Bearing in mind that the Thatcher government was a strong adherent of market liberalization and of a more rational use of the government’s budget, the message was that reforms would follow in many sectors of the economy. Defence was not going to be an exception. As Walker and Gummet point out “Reforming defence procurement thus became an important element in Mrs Thatcher’s efforts to apply the principles of the market economy and reduce the protection industry derived from the state.”  

ii. The Levene Reforms.

The reforms were initiated by the Thatcher government and implemented by Peter Levene (now Lord Levene of Portsoken) who was appointed Chief of Defence Procurement with the mandate to implement the reforms. Mr Levene was a businessman and therefore believed in the benefits of competition. The central motive of the reform process was ‘value for money’ which initiated an effort to control and maintain at acceptable levels the constantly rising equipment costs. British Ministry of Defence clarifies what ‘value for money’ stands for: “In all areas of acquisition the MoD seeks to achieve best value for money. This does not mean that it simply acquires the cheapest available item or accepts the lowest bid in a competition. Best value for money denotes the solution that meets the requirements at the lowest through-life cost.”

The three main principles of the reforms were a) competition among the suppliers for development and production contracts, b) from now on suppliers bear the risks of failure but they will be rewarded for efficiency and c) there would be a stricter

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74 In Walker and Gummet (1989) p. 420.
75 In Trevor Taylor “The British restructuring experience” p. 83 in Michael Brzoska and Peter Lock (1992) (editors) Restructuring of Arms Production in Western Europe Oxford University Press for SIPRI.
budgetary control.\textsuperscript{77} We can assume that the whole procurement process was entirely altered and new effective procedures were introduced for the first time. As Dunne and Macdonald point out “the privatization of nationalized industries, which had starter earlier, combined with a ‘value for money’ approach and competition policy introduced a new adversarialism into UK defence procurement ”.\textsuperscript{78} Consequently, the three main implications of the Levene reforms were competition, privatization and collaboration; its collaboration to which this thesis will now turn.

**iii. Collaboration and British Armaments.**

Lord Levene of Portsoken stated in the House of Commons in 2006: “European collaboration would help to make a balance and you would not be in the sort of position you describe, were you are dependent on one country ”. In another part he also stated “…if we cannot justify the cost of developing new equipment in this country on our own, we either join with the United States or we join with another partner. Almost without exception, the other partner will be one or more of the European countries ”.\textsuperscript{79} As these statements reveal British have cooperated both with the United States and the Europeans in the development and production of armaments. This was an outcome of the huge R&D costs and the UK government sought for partners to share the burden.

Consequently, UK participated in a number of collaborative projects such as the Future Large Aircraft (FLA) which became later known as the A400M strategic transport aircraft produced by the EADS consortium. The British order is for 25 pieces in total and according to Dunne and Macdonald it was placed in order to

\textsuperscript{77} In Walker and Gummet (1989) p. 421.
\textsuperscript{78} Dunne and Macdonald in Serfati (2001), (editor) p. 103.
maintain domestic industrial capabilities by securing Bae’s positions as leading wing technology supplier for the Airbus programme.\textsuperscript{80} Britain participates also in the Eurofighter project aiming to replace ageing aircrafts such as the Tornado, Harrier and Buccaneer, which are currently in service with RAF. It is the largest collaborative project in which the UK defence industry is involved. Eurofighter is also produced by the EADS consortium. But again as Willet, Clarke and Gummet point out this project is also of crucial importance for the British defence industry since it will keep the production lines open after the end of the Tornado project and at the same time it will secure almost 40,000 job places in the British aerospace industry.\textsuperscript{81}

But as we have said earlier British always keep the balance between the two sides of the Atlantic. This is illustrated in the British intention to buy attack helicopters for the British Army. The candidate’s were the McDonnel Douglas Apache (with Westland as a prime contractor), the Eurocopter Tiger (with Bae Systems as a prime contractor), the Bell Cobra Venom (with GEC Marconi as a prime contractor), the Agusta 129, the Boeing Sikorsky Comanche and the Atlas Aviation Rooivalk from South Africa. The final choice was between Apache and Tiger with the first been selected in the end. Bearing in mind that Westland had developed great expertise on helicopters, this order helped it maintain its privileged position as the only domestic supplier of military helicopters to the British Armed Forces.

Furthermore, the MoD officials took this decision having in mind industrial policy as well as financial and operational reasons. Industrial policy reasons because they encouraged a possible merger between Westland and Agusta, financial because Tiger

\textsuperscript{80} Dunne and Macdonald in Serfati (2001), (editor) p. 105.
was a lot more expensive and finally operational because Apache was already in service and had been tested in the Gulf War while Tiger was totally new.  

iv. British Summation.

As we have seen defence industry is a sensitive sector in Britain too. British governments always tried to keep the balance between the Americans and the Europeans. Despite their privileged relationship with the United States, British officials did not turn their back to their European partners and engaged in a number of collaborative projects. This cooperation has been carried out outside of the EU institutions through intergovernmental procedures and arrangements (A400M-EF2000, OCCAR). Domestic concerns and constraints related with the British defence industry always influence decisions related with collaborative projects, as it happens in France and Germany. British government took the risk and gained the lead in reforming defence procurement procedures in the 80s and as a result British defence industry is better placed today in the European armaments market.

4. A FINAL SUMMATION.

This thesis has explored the issue of armaments collaboration between European states. Defence is a very sensitive policy area and, despite that, states choose to cooperate in the development and production of armaments systems. Triggered by that paradox, this thesis examined the issue of armaments cooperation in three countries France, Germany and Britain, the three big of Europe and the three states with the largest defence industries of Europe, as well as three of the largest in the world. It tried to identify the incentives that make these countries cooperate in this

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very sensitive field. Also, it tried to identify the nature of that cooperation whether it is an outcome of pressures from the EU institutions or simply of intergovernmental arrangements. It found out that armaments collaboration in Europe reflects each country’s strategic culture and armaments policy. This occurs because strategic culture contains the beliefs and attitudes of each state towards the use of force. These beliefs and attitudes, in turn, guide the formation of the requirements that armaments systems should have. Domestic constraints, mainly financial, push further the collaboration option. Finally, it is the requirements that are negotiated between the states on an intergovernmental basis and through intergovernmental structures like OCCAR.

Consequently, France’s strategic culture is, to a large extent, an outcome of its Gaullist legacy, which emphasizes independence and autonomy in arms production in order for France to perform its global role. For these reasons, France possesses nuclear weapons; an aircraft carrier and armed forces of high readiness and mobility. In Germany strategic culture is an outcome of the negative consequences of the two World Wars, especially the Second, and emphasizes its role as a civilian power. As a result, Germany developed a non-military strategic culture and has never sought to acquire power projection capabilities like France. Finally, British strategic culture comprises of three characteristics, the special relationship with the U.S, the former colonial past and the constraints of the Cold War. British are a global military power. All these three countries choose to cooperate in armaments procurement but to the degree that this is not harmful to their autonomy in defence issues.

Of course, there is still a lot of research to be carried out in this particular field. The checks and balances that governments negotiate when they establish intergovernmental institutions for the management of armaments projects have to be
examined also. The fact that states prefer to cooperate outside of the EU institutions has to be examined also in order to reveal what is that on the EU level that discourages states to cooperate within the EU institutions. This will help in promoting further European integration in the defence sector and subsequently, strengthen further the EU as a global actor. Furthermore, it will contribute to the rational development and function of the newly established European Defence Agency with such a burden on its shoulders from its name already. In order to underline the importance of EDA this thesis will paraphrase John F. Kennedy by mentioning that while no European institution has ever faced such a challenge – to manage armaments procurement in the EU – no institution has ever been so ready to seize the burden and the glory of achieving this.  

Efforts of establishing institutions responsible for armaments procurement will continue both within and outside of the EU. This process of institutionalization will be full of obstacles and turnarounds as defence is a very sensitive policy area for the states. Thus, bearing in mind that this is traditionally a high politics area the final consignment of this thesis is what George Liska stated in 1990; that “in fact, institutionalization through the agency of rules-applying organization is little more than an unevenly moderating routinization of traditional modes of conflict and competition; ”.  


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INTERVIEWS

Interview with Geremy Greaves, Vice President Communications and PR, EADS UK Limited on 24th of June 2006.

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