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PfP, EAPC, and the PfP Consortium: Key Elements of the Euro-Atlantic Security Community

Jean-Jacques de Dardel *

PfP: An Idea Bigger Than Its Size

To many in the wider public, the Partnership for Peace, or PfP, is still more reminiscent of comic strip onomatopoeia than of a serious institution. Yet for anyone accustomed to military and international abbreviations, those three letters and their French equivalent, PPP, are worthy of an AAA rating. Since its inception about fifteen years ago, the Partnership for Peace has developed into a genuine success story, both in the quality and the quantity of its achievements. Although the necessities imposed by the sudden reshaping of the heretofore bipolar world with the end of the Cold War no doubt gave the new partnership a strong head start, it does seem that it quickly not only met all expectations, but even surpassed them. Indeed, the Partnership was widely seen, at first, as a transitional arrangement meant to enable a reorientation of many national security policies to allow nations time to adjust to the prerequisites of NATO membership. Yet the far-reaching concept of the Partnership for Peace, its à la carte principles, and its functional workings have not only allowed it to offer more than a mere stepping stone towards membership in the Atlantic Alliance, they have also ensured that the wider Partnership developed a life and a purpose of its own. In addition, some of its offshoots, such as the Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, thrived on the spirit of the Partnership in a groundbreaking manner. Why all of this was able to happen is the first question to which we should turn our attention.

The Partnership’s Main Aim

Upon completion of the necessary preparatory work, NATO launched the PfP in January 1994 and declared that its aim was to go “beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership—a Partnership for Peace. […] The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance.”¹ Key elements in the invitation were its extension to all non-allied countries that were members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the practical nature of the offer to cooperate on the basis of common values.

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¹ NATO Ministerial Communiqué M-1(94)2, “Partnership for Peace: Invitation issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council“ (10 January 1994).
On its face, that official description of the purpose of PfP can be said to have been both precise and prescient. But that foresight did not come immediately. It came rather as a solution to a dilemma that NATO was facing at the time as it pondered over its enlargement and its future. Indeed, in response to the demise of the Soviet empire and the scuttling of the Warsaw Pact, the Atlantic Alliance laid down in 1991 the first institutional basis for a new security structure by creating the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), designed “to promote both mutual reassurance and increasingly close ties.” The pressing issues emerging at the end of the Cold War called for immediate (but transitional) arrangements, hence the limited aim and the transience implied by the mere reassurance and the characterization of the growing new ties between former adversaries. The methods that were to give substance to the Council were mainly the exchange of regular diplomatic liaison in fields of interest to the Alliance and its new potential partners, as well as the intensification of military contacts at various levels. Soon, however, the limitations of the NACC came to the fore.

While the NACC was simply designed to bridge a gap and offer new paths to possible new fields of cooperation, it also seemed too modest for the ambitions of some members. It thus appeared to underline the reservations of certain parties and act as an impediment to, rather than an accelerator of, the rapid development of lasting bonds. Indeed, as a purely multilateral forum for dialogue that was not meant to facilitate self-differentiation nor take full account of national idiosyncrasies, and limited as it was in its opening solely to the regions of the former Warsaw Pact, the NACC was insufficient to respond to the needs of the 1990s—an era that was further disrupted by the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Some European countries were definitely looking for more. The NACC, notwithstanding its shortcomings, was instrumental in shaping the wider Partnership for Peace, as it revealed the larger needs of the hour and led the Alliance to conceive the Partnership for Peace as we know it.

PfP’s Inner Wisdom

If PfP was from the outset more than a gimmick, it was because it embodied a certain conceptual wisdom that allowed it to thrive. First of all, by establishing a wide and open-ended institution, NATO increased almost overnight the number of its partners. This opening did not only enable an eastward expansion; it also solidified the European security structures, inasmuch as it progressively engaged Western European neutral and non-allied countries. The latter thereafter initiated or became important contributors to a large number of PfP projects in favor of defense and broader security

2 The NACC initially comprised the sixteen Allied nations and nine Central and Eastern European countries. By June 1992, it included all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as Albania and Georgia.
3 NATO Ministerial Communiqué, “Partnership with Countries of Central and Eastern Europe” (6–7 June 1991).
sector reform in transition countries, thus contributing significantly to the stabilization and development of sizeable parts of the eastern half of the continent.

Second, PfP also allowed NATO to address some specific concerns of former Warsaw Pact members that were looking for closer ties to the West and required more practical, tailor-made cooperation. Beyond what NACC was able to provide, PfP usefully stepped up the level of rapprochement, inasmuch as “active participation in the Partnership for Peace [was to] play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO” at a time when it seemed necessary to postpone decisions on full accession to NATO by new members until after the presidential elections of 1996 in the United States and in Russia.5

Third, NATO gave itself the appropriate tools to respond to a set of new challenges. It is true that the risk that a situation would occur that required an Article V operation seemed rather remote at the time, but a wide range of security risks were nevertheless present in the region, and at least some of them warranted concerted action beyond the then sixteen-member North Atlantic Alliance. And so, through its very practical aspects, PfP quickly strengthened the Alliance’s outreach capacity and its relevance to all situations that would have involved its new partners.

PfP’s Outer Wisdom

Whereas NATO crafted the Partnership as a tool to help promote its own interests, it also met other countries’ aspirations—or neutralized some fears. Indeed, it extended a hand and opened doors not only to former Soviet bloc and newly independent countries, but it also brought in the Russian Federation itself, thus establishing a new operational avenue for cooperation (or at least a functional channel for multilayered dialogue). This willingness on the part of Moscow to engage in such a new form of cooperation exemplifies another virtue of the Partnership for Peace: because it was well thought through and offered the right mix of general openness and of particular attention to each partner’s needs, it was also met by a remarkable openness of mind on the part of the new partner nations. In other words, NATO’s own wisdom was met with commendable wisdom from its partners too. Partners were quick to accept the outstretched hand and to subscribe to new ideas that often entailed difficulties and hard work, and sometimes carried political risks on the home front. That was not self-evident for a number of partners, who had to accept a new game, which was being played according to new rules. Furthermore, the Partnership for Peace doubled other efforts to redraw and reinforce the common European security architecture, most notably at the CSCE.6 Striking a balance between the various fora was a delicate exercise, and it can be said that the rapid development of PfP is also to be attributed to those active and imaginative Partner nations that were willing to take some risks for the sake of what the Partnership purported to achieve.

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5 Partnership invitation issued at the ministerial meeting of the NAC, Brussels, 10–11 January 1994.
6 At a time when the CSCE was transformed into the OSCE, in 1994.
Thus PfP grew quickly and calmed any fears that it may have been a mere flight forward on the part of NATO, the opening of a Pandora’s Box, or even the beginning of the unraveling of the Alliance’s cohesion. To the contrary, it brought the Alliance a new dimension, a new functionality—indeed, it offered a new strength and new capabilities. It added real incremental value to transatlantic security, and carried hardly any unwarranted costs.

The Recipe for PfP’s Success

Wisdom by itself is not enough to ensure the success of a wide-ranging endeavor. However well meant, all new concepts need to be translated into working mechanisms that withstand the passage of time, the wearing of novelty, the emergence of new conflicting or competing ideas or needs. How, then, was PfP able to work so well? Because of one dominant characteristic, which is in fact rather rare in the realm of high-level intergovernmental relations: from the start, and however lofty the ideals and values at the core of the Partnership, what was privileged was a pragmatic, operational, non-ideological, and no-nonsense, down-to-earth approach.

Of course, such an approach is not the only recipe for success, and many an international body owes its strength to a top-down process of development and a robustly hierarchical structure, where the will of the highest-level decision makers, constantly expressed in the political arena, trickles down to the more technical strata. However, the Partnership’s pragmatism helped save time and effort among widely different partners with heterogeneous needs and interests. It conveyed immediate tangible results, thus convincing national militaries and other establishments of its worth. And it allowed for the flexibility needed to prompt a dynamic development of various new forms of cooperation.

Some of its key features are worth mentioning. PfP owes its flexibility in large part to the fact that it is based on a political declaration, not a full-fledged treaty entailing a set of obligations, some of which would have been difficult to subscribe to for some of its members. Secondly, PfP was focused from the start on highly substantive and central issues that were crucial to the reorientation of many a newly independent (or fully independent) country: strengthening the democratic control of the armed forces; enhancing transparency in military procurement and in the wider defense sector; and enhancing capability in crisis response management, peace support operations, and civil emergency planning, through cooperative and (where applicable) common planning, training, and education. Finally, PfP established interoperability as a long-term goal for all members, which made it relevant for all military and security establishments.7

In fact, that pragmatism was the single most effective trigger factor that enabled a country such as Switzerland to participate early on in PfP. Indeed, for a permanently neutral state which has never been in an alliance in the last several centuries, and which has no intention to change this fundamental characteristic of its security policy, joining forces with no less than NATO and former Soviet bloc countries meant a sea change

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7 For a full list of the Partnership’s goals, see “Partnership for Peace: Framework Document,” annex to the NATO Ministerial Communiqué M-1(94)2, 10 January 1994.
had taken place. Moving from a staunch reliance on its own forces to a new concept of “security through cooperation” meant a complete change of paradigm, even though that change did not imply abandoning neutrality.\(^8\) It can be argued that switching alliances, however momentous the change may be in the case of a political turnaround as profound as the one that occurred with the fall of the Berlin Wall, means no more than a divorce and a remarriage: the essentials of married life are known. In that case, in the security field, the instruments of the trade remain the same: cooperation, coordination, temporary or long term subordination, and consultation are simply pursued, albeit with different partners. But for Switzerland, this shift from a state of total self-reliance to habits of cooperation and cooperative attitudes meant a complete alteration of mental referents, a foray into worldly promiscuity away from monastic austerity. Had that institutional move been allowed only within a rigid framework of constraints and obligations, that evolution would simply not have been deemed possible in Switzerland—just as it would most likely have been rather controversial in other neutral countries.

Not surprisingly, some members of the Swiss Federal Assembly (Parliament) questioned at the time the compatibility of PfP with Swiss neutrality.\(^9\) PfP was seen by some as a step towards full NATO membership. Yet PfP’s open and non-constraining structures and philosophy were well taken by most. The Swiss Federal Council (government) and the majority of Parliament sensed or understood the potential of PfP within the framework of Swiss neutrality. As the head of the Swiss Defense Department, Federal Councilor Adolf Ogi—the father of Switzerland’s accession to PfP—said two years later at the first annual conference of the Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes: “neutrality does not preclude a country to participate actively in the search for peace and stability through international cooperation.”\(^10\)

What was most appreciated in Switzerland were the principles of self-differentiation and self-determination, as well as the non-contractual form of the process, which guaranteed to Switzerland total control over not only the scope and scale of Swiss participation, but over the ability to keep in tune with Swiss public opinion. Such à la carte principles ensured that Swiss conditio sine qua non were duly taken into account, just as other prevailing attitudes and characteristics in other countries could also be fully factored in. Thus, in 1996—the year in which it presided over the OSCE—Switzerland rose to the new security challenges which had been made starkly apparent by

\[^8\] Due to its mixed experience with the League of Nations, of which Switzerland was an active member before the world’s security structures collapsed in the face of mounting totalitarianism, Switzerland remained skeptical about the concepts of collective security.

\[^9\] Autumn session of the Swiss National Council, eleventh meeting, 1 October 1996.

the wars in former Yugoslavia, and accepted NATO’s offer to join the Partnership for Peace.\(^{11}\)

This major step forward was followed by substantive work on a new concept for Swiss security policy, which materialized in 2000 in the form of the “Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the Security Policy of Switzerland,” which remains the basis of Swiss security policy to this day. Through this process, PfP had a major impact on Switzerland’s policies. It has also provided proof that tailor-made solutions to cooperation—based on individual nations’ needs and circumstances—can encourage progress much more successfully (and more quickly) than political or moral pressures, which may well have an adverse effect.

**EAPC: The Essential Framework**

However well PfP developed and was put into practice, however efficient it has become since it was based on an operational approach, the Partnership would most probably not have been sustainable in the long run had it not been for the constant and renewed political support it received. Practical cooperation needed a political complement if it wanted to reach lasting objectives. The NACC structure was limited, as we have seen, and simply expanding its membership could have been seen as merely further experimenting under an unproved model. There definitely appeared to be a need for a new overarching political framework to allow PfP to fully develop its potential and to guarantee its continued functioning, despite the growing complexity, commitments, and even investments it demanded. Thus, the NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which started in December 1995 and featured meaningful non-NATO participation, triggered the creation of the EAPC, since that crisis necessitated full and close high-level political involvement and synchronization among all participating nations.\(^{12}\)

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council was established in 1997. The goal, as Robert Simmons put it, was to develop a forum for political consultation among all partners that would be aligned with the Partnership for Peace’s modes of more practical cooperation.\(^{13}\) Its objective was spelled out clearly in its basic document:

> The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, as the successor to NACC, will provide the overarching framework for consultations among its members on a broad range of political and security-related issues, as part of a process that will develop through practice. PfP in its enhanced form will be a clearly identifiable element within this flexible framework. Its basic elements will remain valid. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will build upon the existing framework of NATO’s outreach activities, pre-

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11 The two-year delay since the creation of PfP was due to the 1994 referendum in Switzerland that rejected the creation of a Swiss “blue helmet” contingent for the United Nations.

12 It was also a catalyst for PfP, since when they decided to launch the EAPC, the ministers meeting in Sintra in late May 1997 also decided to enhance the Partnership.

serving their advantages to promote cooperation in a transparent way. The expanded political dimension of consultation and cooperation which the Council will offer will allow Partners, if they wish, to develop a direct political relationship individually or in smaller groups with the Alliance. In addition, the Council will provide the framework to afford Partner countries, to the maximum extent possible, increased decision-making opportunities relating to activities in which they participate.\textsuperscript{14}

The EAPC was generally understood to be an essential new body at that time, for a number of reasons. First, it created a political counter-weight that extended the practical demands of operative cooperation, allowing a validation of the Partnership at the political and diplomatic levels—those at which consultations on political and security-related issues of common concern must be held if they are to feed any meaningful decision-making process. Second, it guaranteed the involvement in the PfP process of higher levels not only of the governmental sphere, but also of national parliaments. There is no doubt that, over the last decade, the involvement of members of all parliaments of the Euro-Atlantic community has helped assert the value-based nature of the Partnership. The close interactions of parliamentarians meeting at regular intervals within the NATO Parliamentary Assembly has also helped ensure that the security concerns voiced by governments will be promulgated in each national parliament, and that such concerns will be viewed in a broader perspective than that of purely national debates. Third, the EAPC also strengthened the notion of a basic level of equality in the Partnership, irrespective of each country’s level of functional integration. This equivalence in standing enables individual member nations to pursue a policy of self-differentiation, while also upholding the Partnership’s principles of inclusiveness without hampering its commitment to transparency. Since all partners are made to feel that they are on an equal footing at a certain political level, a feeling of cohesion can thrive, despite the material differences between countries and the respective worth of their contribution to international security commitments. The EAPC further provided an immediate response to the need to counterbalance the risk of the appearance of potential new dividing lines across Europe, as the first post-Cold War round of NATO enlargement was approved on the occasion of the EAPC’s coming into being. And finally, the flexibility built into the EAPC system echoed the flexibility that was at the heart of the PfP, a virtue that allowed the system to evolve and adapt to a changing environment.

\textit{Revalidating the EAPC}

Since its inception in 1997, the EAPC has proved its worth, but this is not necessarily to say that it has aged gracefully throughout its history. As NATO grows, and as more Partner nations are invited to join the Alliance, the EAPC and PfP’s roles as stepping-stones to NATO membership will tend to subside. The EAPC’s attractiveness for those whose main intent is to pursue NATO membership does not subside, but each successful Membership Action Plan (MAP) seems to lower the remaining content of the

EAPC framework. Undoubtedly, the numbers have changed: whereas Partner nations initially formed a majority clustered around a closely knit Atlantic Alliance minority (in country numbers), the number of NATO nations now outweighs that of the Partners, and that trend continues unabated. In addition, the importance of the issue of full membership in NATO is such that it often distracts from the other virtues of the EAPC/PfP institution. Consequently, a number of actors and observers have sensed that the EAPC, as a political body, has been waning somewhat in these last few years. Indeed, it is commonly admitted in various circles that the EAPC’s importance for NATO has diminished, and that this forum has been losing some of its dynamism as a result, especially at the ministerial level. This perception is reinforced by the fact that both defense and foreign affairs ministers will meet not twice a year, but only once a year going forward. In addition, the NATO-only summit in Riga in 2006 and the early uncertainties about the convening of an EAPC summit meeting in Bucharest added to the impression of a hollowing of the Council. This reading is also based on a positive assessment of the evolution of the security dialogue, a shift that is attributable in part precisely to the EAPC. As a result of the interaction fostered by the EAPC, a common understanding of security-related issues and threats has broadened, thus apparently lessening the need for a lively political forum to discuss these issues.

Viewed from still another angle, the EAPC/PfP construct has sometimes been narrowed down to an increasingly utilitarian perspective, whereby its main worth is to be counted in terms of capabilities provided in the context of demanding operations on the ground. And indeed, in times of heavy constraints on resources and growing needs for new capabilities in distant theatres of operations, it is perfectly legitimate that the EAPC be looked at through the prism of immediate needs to be met, rather than through the lenses of longer-term interests and purposes.

Yet it can also be argued that there is a risk that the potential supply of new capabilities may dwindle if the discussions at the political level at which they must be committed are not fair and sound. Force generation is not only a military problem, one that simply awaits a political go-ahead in a linear sequence. It is increasingly dependent on overall political—and, indeed, societal—views and approaches to international cooperation and involvement, in which an overall balance of interests and needs plays a functional role. And in cases where force generation as such is not in the cards, a general level of support for an international security effort (along with specific value-added contributions) will not be forthcoming if those countries that are solicited are not granted the status of full-fledged partners and made to feel that they are listened to.

In this sense, the EAPC’s worth and central role has not diminished. Those reasons that prompted the Alliance to establish it in the first place still remain largely valid today (if not for all EAPC members, then at least for a majority). It is thus encouraging to note that the EAPC has been revalidated in the run-up to the Bucharest meeting, and that new commitments to the Partnership have added to the substance of the April 2008

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15 Although this is not felt at lower levels, since the work pursued in technical sub-groups such as the PMSC remains quite intensive.
And, just as this support for the Partnership was being renewed by all who took the floor, the EAPC “turned fifty”—unquestionably a sign of maturity!  

Openness, in More Ways than One

A lively Partnership, steered by an interactive and participatory Partnership Council, fully corresponds to the interests and needs of a country such as Switzerland. The Swiss authorities thus view the PfP as being as important to its security policy now as it was in the first years of its institutional life. As was mentioned above, the Partnership for Peace had a significant impact on the development of Switzerland’s post-Cold War security policy. Switzerland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs developed new structures and teamed up with the Defense Department more closely than it had in the past; general thinking about the country’s international security policy evolved at a relatively fast pace; and the military, in the process of transforming the armed forces, let itself be influenced by the outer world in ways unknown in the past. From the start of its membership, Switzerland made good use of the Partnership. In 1997, the year the EAPC was founded, Swiss representatives participated in fifty-six PfP activities. Ten years later, this number had multiplied by four. In addition, Switzerland also participated during this period in NATO–led peace support operations under a UN mandate, contributing armed units and heavy equipment. The spectrum of activities the country takes part in also widened as the range of security challenges evolved; the fight against terrorism and the protection of critical infrastructure, to name but a few, were added to the more traditional avenues of military cooperation.  

This participation, of course, includes a number of activities that are of both direct and incremental benefit to Switzerland, as the country’s armed forces, government officials, and security experts gain knowledge, experience, and familiarity with international standards. But this participation is by no means a one-way street. Switzerland has from the start considered itself a net contributor to the transatlantic cooperative framework, and it has endeavored to provide training, expertise, and resources that would benefit the whole. The creation of three centers in Geneva—devoted to security policy training, humanitarian efforts to remove land mines, and the democratic control of the armed forces—no doubt represented a major contribution to PfP, since those centers considerably extended the Partnership’s ability to cater to the training needs of countries in transition.

Whereas putting the country’s resources at the disposal of Partner countries in need was nothing new for Switzerland, doing so in the security field at these new levels was

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16 With the accession of Malta as the fiftieth member state.
17 Most notably in South East Europe, where it is present in Kosovo with a contingent including staff officers and two companies (one infantry and one logistics company), and in Bosnia and Herzegovina with two Liaison and Observation Teams, as well as with helicopter units in both countries.
indeed a novelty. It is yet another positive effect of the Partnership that it has brought new thinking and new understanding of the fields of opportunity that are open for international cooperation between security providers. Thus the EAPC/PfP institution considerably expanded the international peacekeeping capabilities of countries that, like Switzerland, were until then not geared towards sustained military cooperation in the transatlantic sphere.

But this widening of scope, this enlargement of perspectives is itself a two-way street. It can be argued that the intermingling of Allied and Partner nations, particularly at the political and politico-military level, has also helped NATO to factor in other perspectives. Not only do Partner nations contribute certain expertise in a variety of fields that Allied nations and their militaries can also benefit from, they are also a welcome reminder of the wider complexities of the environment in which the Alliance develops its actions. It is through the constant rubbing of elbows of officials of different levels and different ministries, as well as the interactions between civil servants and high-ranking military personnel, that the EAPC offers all members involved a possibility to test all ideas against a diverse and variegated background (without, it must be stressed, falling into the traps of endless verbal tugs-of-war and posturing).

The Consortium: A Quintessence

Perhaps nothing better exemplifies the flourishing of modern-day international cooperation in the security field and the incremental value of the kind of pragmatic, tailor-made networking afforded by the spirit of EAPC/PfP than the PfP Consortium. The founding fathers of the Consortium are rightly said to be the United States and Germany. Switzerland, however, also considers itself as one of those nations involved in launching the institution. By the time the new concept of the Consortium was endorsed by the EAPC defense ministers at their June 1998 gathering, Switzerland had already prepared the ground for a quick convening of the new body. At that same EAPC ministerial meeting, the Switzerland’s then-Minister of Defense Adolf Ogi offered to host the Consortium’s first annual conference within the framework of the impending Swiss-sponsored third International Security Forum. This enabled the Consortium to hold its inaugural conference in October 1998 in Zurich, a mere four months after the ministerial endorsement. The Zurich conference in turn enabled the Consortium to clarify the road ahead, establish its internal operational structures, and lay the foundation for future work in the areas of security policy training and research. 19 Several months later, it was also Federal Councilor Ogi who reported on the successful first

steps of the Consortium at the EAPC ministerial meeting in the defense ministers’ session in December 1998.  

The Consortium has been able ever since to count on strong Swiss support for and involvement in its work. Two of the previously mentioned institutes, DCAF and GCSP, as well as another noteworthy body located in Switzerland, the International Security Network (ISN), were lead institutions that got heavily involved in the Consortium, supporting it with their resources and know-how. All three continue to be strongly committed to the Consortium, and two of them run an expert group in their respective field of expertise, namely the Advanced Distributed Learning and Security Sector Reform Working Groups. In addition, a number of Swiss government officials and experts have participated regularly in the work not only of the Steering Committee of the Consortium, but also of various working groups. The comments that will follow, for instance, are based on a number of years of regular personal involvement in one of the working groups devoted to Euro-Atlantic security matters. I have found my participation in this working group to be a rewarding experience indeed, which allows me to vouch for the excellence of the concept of the Consortium, its utility, and its continued usefulness.

**A Mind-opener**

In the course of its ten-year existence, the Consortium has brought together an expanding number of representatives from different countries, Allied and Partner alike, who share an academic interest in security matters. But most importantly, it has done so by crossing the ordinary professional and disciplinary lines that usually distinguish various communities of interest. The Consortium creates direct interactions between academics of various rank, military leaders, and civilian government officials from various ministries. All participants not only exchange information and experience, but also learn to interact, to listen to other views, to think a bit more freely, and depart from the beaten path of their own tried experience and professional biases. All of this takes place on an individual, freethinking basis that would more often than not be difficult or outright impossible in intergovernmental forums. It is true that the process of freeing one’s thoughts from familiar disciplinary or professional fetters takes time, and not every Consortium meeting will register novel views and instant cross-fertilization.

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22 Namely the European Security Study Group (ESSG)—then known as the Euro-Atlantic Security Study Group (EASSG)—headed by Major General Alain Faupin (France) and Professor Plamen Pantev (Bulgaria).
But in the long run, at meeting after meeting of the Consortium working groups, an osmosis does take place, as sparring partners who first came to the table with their own firmly-held opinions and backgrounds learn to listen, instead of only trying to convince others. And it is crucially important that these “others” are not only participants from other countries and regions, but are also individuals drawn from other professional backgrounds (and other generations, too).

Naturally, a number of other international organizations also have set up think-tanks and/or academic bodies that serve as intellectual resources for the organization as a whole. And outstanding think-tanks, university faculties, and consultants are not lacking in the realm of security studies. Within the Partnership itself, centers of excellence such as the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen and the NATO Defense College in Rome (to name but a few\(^\text{23}\)) are devoted to research, applied studies, training, and even counseling and institution building in some instances. But each such institution is only a single component of the wider network created by the Consortium.

Think-tanks and security studies institutes bring together participants for set periods of time. Training courses and months of internship imply a form of sabbatical leave from ordinary government and military positions. At the other end of the spectrum, one-, two-, or three-day seminars and conferences may serve to bring together groups of government representatives and academics a few times each year. The sporadic exchanges they enable contribute to the store of shared knowledge and foster a certain feeling of belonging to a wider security community. But it is the extended network created by the Consortium, and the form of constant work it implies, that really weaves a close-knit security community. Indeed, participating in a Consortium working group implies more than simply meeting a number of times throughout the year. It entails regular additional work and interaction, as there are papers to be written, presentations prepared, meetings chaired, and reports created. That constant preparatory work implies a deepening of subject matters, giving a truly academic slant to the government participant’s approach, and ensuring that the professional academics will have to pay particular attention to the practitioner’s points of view.

The breadth and depth of the Consortium’s network—and the demands it puts on its participants to adjust to each other’s views, even though they are continuously engaged on their home professional fronts—boosts lateral thinking and transverse considerations. These, in turn, help to broaden the understanding of international complexities on which governments are to base their decision-making processes. That is a welcome input at a time when multidisciplinary studies remain far from being the norm, and when specialization and entrenched thought patterns are not sufficiently questioned.

Of course, some may have thought at first—and others might well still think—that the Consortium was and is most useful for the “Eastern” sparring partners. It is this

\(^{23}\) The Consortium brings together more than 350 organizations from 42 countries of the Euro-Atlantic zone.
group, after all, that had the most catching up to do to come closer to the level of the Alliance—indeed, to that of the democratic West as a whole, after so many years of lopsided ideological indoctrination. But even though there is obviously a solid kernel of truth in this view, it does not give the full picture of what is needed to develop the wider transatlantic security community. In fact, NATO members would do well to remember that they are also constantly engaged in an aggiornamento of their concepts and of their framework references, just as are the other Western partners, who are also in the process of adapting to fast-changing circumstances. For both of these groups of countries, there is something to gain from understanding the thinking, the references and intricacies of those new Partner nations that are going through a momentous systemic transition. In this sense, the Consortium can also bring about new types of cross-fertilization, as it favors candid exchanges of views and promotes a better direct understanding of the thought processes current among different blocs and regional groupings.

A Long-term Investment

The operation of the Consortium is not particularly expensive, since it relies heavily on personal commitment and volunteer work. On the other hand, it does require some resources, and the Consortium could not survive without an assured yearly budget. It is hence very understandable that the major contributors regularly question its workings and ask what value it adds. What is the true return on investments made in the Consortium? Does it only confer benefits on the few, or does it have a sufficient spill-over effect to be a factor of positive influence more generally on other ongoing concerns of the security community, or on specific governments? In other words, is it an essential component of the machinery of international security, or is it merely a nifty gadget? From another (perhaps more cynical) point of view, can the Consortium be seen by some of the players in the Alliance and the EAPC as a tool for achieving better alignment on certain positions? Can it bring a perceptible, quantifiable change in the government policies of some nations? Can it influence decision makers in specific situations? And will it bring about an alignment of views on particular key needs or issues?

To be frank, this is most likely not the case. The Consortium’s advantages and promises do not lie in the realm of specific benefits and quantifiable results. As is the case with most mind-building, neuron-stimulating intellectual processes, and most knowledge-enhancing and university-level training, the Consortium serves long-term goals, and generally does not produce immediate returns. There are exceptions to this rule, since some work done on curricula and training methods may well be applied without delay, and some research can flow directly into position papers prepared by Consortium participants. But more generally, the stimulus it provides cannot be quantified as such and readily entered in a balance sheet.

On the other hand, some governments and institutions could well decide to use the networks already created by the Consortium to tap into intellectual resources that are currently available. They could, for instance, turn to specific working groups and suggest study themes, or ask that some issues be discussed and papers produced. Consortium participants would surely not back away from such challenges.
But the basic value of the Consortium more certainly lies at another level. It enables exchanges of views between and among different groups of participants, without the constraints of negotiations and national positioning, that serve to gradually change perceptions. In such a way, it contributes to the emergence of a wider Euro-Atlantic security community, where both security and community gain a more comprehensive meaning and scope of action. In so doing, it also furthers a better understanding of the virtues of global approaches, and promotes an increased appreciation for comprehensive action plans that rely on very different assets that often lie well beyond those that seem to be on top of most nations’ priority lists. Since a global approach is the indispensable, unavoidable path to appropriate, sustainable solutions in complex conflict areas and crisis situations, the Consortium’s contribution to lateral thinking and mutual understanding is, by all means, of the essence.
The PfP Consortium “Community of Experts” Approach to International Security Cooperation

Walter L. Christman *

Introduction

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes epitomizes a fundamental truth: “Long-term security and stability requires more than the transformation of our military forces in terms of new hardware. It also requires a mental transformation.” This assessment of the Consortium was provided by NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in his opening speech at its tenth anniversary celebration in Brussels on 18 June 2008, where he issued a call to reflect, take stock of what the Consortium had achieved, and look ahead.¹ Citing it as a model for the future as NATO enlarges its concept of “Partnership,” the Secretary-General situated the Consortium in the context of three phases of the Alliance’s own evolution. First was the Cold War, when NATO concentrated on territorial defense and had no formal relations with countries outside the Alliance. The end of the Cold War afforded the opportunity to build an undivided Europe and required an “open community” approach. In this second phase, the Partnership for Peace became NATO’s standard “for successful military cooperation between NATO and non-NATO countries, between big and small countries, and between countries with different geographical regions and with different security traditions.” De Hoop Scheffer added that, “PfP not only brought them together—it also brought out the best in them.”

In support of these goals, the PfP Consortium developed a wide network of institutions and individuals, including both academics and practitioners. The Secretary-General cited its continuing relevance as it had become “the flagship of Defense Institution Building and plays a major role in security sector reform.” The events of 11 September 2001, however, ushered in the third phase of the Alliance’s evolution, forcing it to find answers to challenges that are truly global in nature. This phase, Mr. de Hoop Scheffer argues, “may be the most challenging,” but optimism was apparent in his Consortium address:

But what about Partnership? Can we move this concept from the second phase of NATO, where it was created, into the third? Can we ensure that PfP retains its tremendous strategic value, even in this age of globalization? The answer is a clear ‘yes.’ Because, like NATO, PfP has evolved. Its potential has greatly expanded. And, like the Alliance, it has managed to remain both vibrant and relevant.

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¹ Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, “Secretary-General’s Opening Speech” at the PfP Consortium’s tenth anniversary conference at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, 18 June 2008. (Secretary General’s Private Office manuscript.)
In line with NATO’s more global outlook, the Consortium’s curriculum has increasingly stressed topics that are of global concern, such as combating international terrorism. Moreover, the Consortium has also championed new, innovative learning methods, and helped to foster a spirit of academic freedom that I consider a very precious asset. Because only if we put competing ideas to the test will we find the right answers to cope with an ever-changing security environment.

Working to strengthen defense education and research through institutional and national cooperation, the PfP Consortium is a model for capacity building anywhere in the world today where there is a need to help ensure democratic control of armed forces. Initiated in Zurich, Switzerland in 1998, and later formally endorsed by NATO heads of state and government in the Washington Summit Communiqué of April 1999, the PfP Consortium has since its inception organized over 2000 participants into multinational working groups and conferences, bringing together civilian and military representatives from more than 350 organizations from all fifty countries constituting the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) region. The Consortium’s journey has been one of almost continual evolution, adapting its organizational forms as the security community that it was established to support steadily matured and developed. While most of its original clientele has graduated from the status of NATO Partner to NATO Member, the PfP Consortium remains a vibrant and viable model in support of defense education reform, with NATO’s attention to the concepts of Partnership enlarging to include engagement with other regions of the world. Accordingly, this retrospective essay will explore not only the Consortium’s achievements, but will also highlight some of its major design features throughout its history in order to distill a general model of cooperation. As NATO prepares in 2009 to celebrate its sixtieth anniversary, the PfP Consortium is well positioned to support NATO’s global outreach.

**Genesis of the PfP Consortium**

The Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes was originally established in response to the fact that, despite nearly ten years of foreign assistance efforts after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, there had emerged little to no enduring civilian expertise on defense and security matters in the former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. While many Western institutions, such as the U.S.–German George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, had trained a substantial number of civilians from former Warsaw Pact nations on issues of defense management in a democracy, no mechanisms had yet emerged to assist nations to train their own civilians. A recurring phenomenon noted among Western defense planners at the time was how frequently individuals in Eastern Europe circulated from political life to national defense ministries and back to civilian life, never to be heard from again. This turnover of the civilian political leadership in Eastern defense establishments was bewildering and disconcerting to Western
defense planners.²

Dr. Rudolf Joo, a former deputy State Secretary of Defense in Hungary in the early 1990s, and then later a faculty member at the Marshall Center, provided some early insights to the problem. He noted in a 1996 article that, after the first five years of “systemic change,” the process of “civilianizing” defense ministries had fallen short of the initial hopes of those who sought a more dynamic transformation of defense management. While acknowledging that the reasons varied, and were often specific to each country, a common feature was an unstable domestic political landscape in which the new democracies experienced frequent governmental and personnel changes. For example, between 1990 and 1994, Poland had five ministers of defense, with Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia having an equally high turnover in sub-cabinet appointments. While short-lived governments and frequent personnel switches among politicians and civil servants had negative implications for establishing democratic political control, the larger problem identified by Dr. Joo was the scarcity of civilian experts and the manifold challenges in developing civilian expertise in democratic control of the armed forces:

Because of the previous excessive concern for military secrecy, these issues were simply excluded from public debate. As a consequence, especially at the outset, very few parliamentarians, civil servants, academic researchers, or journalists had any knowledge of these questions. This was true not only for the former opposition—the new parties which, as a general rule, constituted governments after the first free elections: the ex-Communists and their successor parties, with their political allies, have had no specific defense professional competence, or experience of policy-making in a democratic political setting either.³

Joo held that within Central Europe the problems were not everywhere the same, thus solutions could not be uniform either. For example, in some countries of the former Warsaw Pact, the civilian population harbored explicit anti-military feelings. In many, the intellectuals who had participated in opposition movements subsequently went into influential government positions, and often held anti-military views. The result was a shaky framework for developing a coherent dialogue within these nations concerning how best to co-develop models of democratic civil-military relations appropriate to each national situation.

Upon examination, it became apparent to strategic planners in the U.S. Defense Department and NATO that aspiring defense and security-sector professionals in the East, unlike their civilian colleagues in the West, were unable to sustain their connec-

tions with each other once outside of government. Neither were they able to share their talents, abilities, and knowledge with their counterparts in other nations. The initial concept behind the strategic planning of the PfP Consortium, therefore, was to cultivate and sustain civilian competence in defense affairs in the East by developing enduring ties with the defense education and security studies establishments of the West. The PfP Consortium was conceived to enlist Eastern Europeans in the creation of a multinational “community of practice” within the Euro-Atlantic defense community. It would address the post-Cold War needs within the civil societies of both mature and emerging democracies for new intellectual tools in support of democratic control of armed forces.

NATO and U.S. strategic planners thus sought to promote a new defense education system in the East, and sought better connections between Allied and Partner nations in two areas. For the military senior service schools in Eastern Europe, known in the West as National Defense Academies, a mechanism was needed to help shape a shared vision regarding defense and military educational curricula suitable for democratic states. For defense civilians trained outside the military educational system, more intensive linkages between think-tanks and security studies institutes (including civilian universities) could help to cross-fertilize the security sector elements of civil society.

This is easily said, but how is it best achieved? In reviewing ongoing efforts, NATO and U.S. planners concluded that there was much wasteful duplication and overlap that pointed to an urgent need for better coordination of Western assistance efforts. But these strategic planners had only a superficial understanding of the many varieties of Western models upon which to draw, and were neither interested nor qualified to identify which Western model best fit which Eastern need. For ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, countless technical visits from NATO countries had been politely received in the capitals of the former Warsaw Pact nations, promoting highly diverse expressions of the role of armed forces in a democracy. Eventually, it became clear that experts from the NATO nations and emerging civilian defense specialists from the former communist Partner nations needed a better mechanism in order to “find each other” and “just sort this stuff out among themselves.”

Furthermore, U.S. planners were uncomfortable with the degree to which U.S. expertise in the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) had been offered as a model for defense management. Differences in scale notwithstanding, U.S. DoD planners were skeptical that the model worked very well even in the United States. Sympathetic to these concerns, Dr. Chris Donnelly, a key advisor to the NATO Secretary-General, suggested that Britain’s model of a strong civilian-administrative component in the Ministry of Defense offered an alternative example. Others pointed to France’s legal and political experience in the sharing of tasks and authority between...
the main constitutional actors in security and defense policy. Germany’s concept of *Innere Führung*, with its focus on leadership and civic education in the armed forces, was perhaps the most rigorous model that relied upon the input of civilian educational institutions. Also worthy of mention were the Spanish and Portuguese transitions from military dictatorship to democracy, which offered additional insights to share. While Western models could not simply be copied by the new democracies, owing to unique historical and sociological realities, these experiences might be taken into consideration when developing new civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe. The task at hand was to identify some way to establish a learning environment in which a community of specialists might flourish.

**Launching the PfP Consortium: Mobilizing Knowledge Activists in the “Consortium of the Willing”**

The PfP Consortium was initiated with the intention of creating a “community of experts” willing and able to promote more effective defense reform, civil-military cooperation, and military interoperability, with priority given to organizing the civilian element. The Consortium’s initial concept paper prepared by the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense held that, among its objectives, the single most important principle was the notion that “it will be for the participating countries to fully define and develop both the scope for the Consortium and how it will operate.” The Consortium was initiated as an international cooperative arrangement “in the spirit of” the Partnership for Peace. While the U.S. and Germany offered to assist in the Consortium’s administration, employing the Marshall Center in support of these efforts, Switzerland took the lead role in soliciting international interest and participation, using the Third International Security Forum Conference held in Zurich in October 1998 as a vehicle to mobilize widespread interest. The Swiss greatly aided in the push for NATO-EAPC summit-level endorsement in April 1999. Bulgaria volunteered to host the first major Consortium event following the summit, and facilitated the development of its internal structures.

While a major element of change over the first decade of the Consortium’s life has been NATO’s adaptation to new security realities and the progressive improvement in its member states’ capabilities, the transformational imperatives of non-hierarchical Information Age cooperation have been the key drivers of its own success. Two Swiss theorists provide critical insight about this latter trend. The first, Andreas Wenger, director of the Center for Security Studies of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology...
in Zurich and a key observer-participant of the PfP Consortium, has argued that the advent of new information technologies has spread power and authority beyond their traditional owners, the nation-state. As Wenger notes, this diversification of actors due to the rise of the Internet has meant that “speed, capacity, and flexibility in collecting, producing, and disseminating information have increased. As a result of the fragmentation of authority and the altered quality of power, the traditional foundations of security have also been turned upside down.”

Another Swiss theorist, Etienne Wenger, who is famous for having coined the phrase “communities of practice,” provides the additional observation that a shared community naturally forms around the co-development of a shared body of knowledge, and that people working in large organizations learn the most from working in small groups of like-minded colleagues with whom they share a professional interest and can interact on a regular basis. In the case of the PfP Consortium, this has proven to be true for defense and military professionals from many nations whose common interest was to promote organizational change in institutions that are by nature highly conservative and structured around hierarchical notions of leadership and authority. Small working groups of the kind promoted by the Consortium—groups in which, in Etienne Wenger’s terms, “membership is based on participation rather than on official status,” and which “are not bound by organizational affiliations”—are able to “span institutional structures and hierarchies,” and thus allow participants to gain access to the most versatile and dynamic knowledge resources available.

The Consortium’s organizational components, processes, and interactions were expressly designed to create a “community of practice” composed of a loosely organized but robust network of scholars and experts in regional security and defense reform. One aim was to build a cadre of professionals and security specialists in government and the private sector in Partner nations with expertise in a wide variety of defense issues, including defense strategy, parliamentary oversight, public information policies, etc. Another aim was to facilitate greater information-sharing in Partner countries about Euro-Atlantic and European security institutions, particularly in the absence of NATO information offices in most Partner countries. An equally important goal was to provide a forum to assist private foundations, think-tanks, universities, and governmental and non-governmental agencies in offering practical assistance to enhance the quality of defense education in the nations of Central and Eastern Europe.

The challenge for strategic planners in developing the PfP Consortium was to cultivate a “capacity building” process that would help defense educational institutions focus on adaptation and change. Their beliefs about civil-military relations, technologies,

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7 Drawn from Dr. Wenger’s invitation letter to a 23–25 May 2005 international conference on the information revolution and the changing face of international relations and security in Lucerne, Switzerland. It was jointly hosted by the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute for Technology (ETH) Zurich and the Comparative Interdisciplinary Studies Section (CISS) of the International Studies Association (ISA).

the emerging nature of conflict, and the concept of a flexible and adaptive military force suggested the need to facilitate a vision of bottom-up knowledge creation that could emerge from within a community of experts formed in small “working groups” and “study groups.” The Consortium’s knowledge activists furthered the transfer of knowledge by energizing and connecting efforts throughout the Euro-Atlantic community. All were volunteers, operating largely in their private capacities as technical experts without any real reference to national agendas, the imperatives of the nation-state, or the international system. Their vision was firmly connected to building intellectual capacity and shaping a competent security sector within civil society that emphasized civilian performance as a measure of success. This occurred in three related domains: defense and military education and research; institutional and national cooperation; and contemporary security challenges.

The key to understanding the Consortium model and its potential for future replication is the study/working groups, projects, and boards and their support apparatus. The PfP Consortium supported participants in knowledge creation efforts through three functions: an operations staff headed by an executive director, the development of a journal and related publications, and the administration of a website. During the history of the Consortium, there have been six major and fully robust working groups, eight study groups, four projects, and two boards (in this accounting a couple of study groups have been renamed as working groups, or vice versa). New groups were formed because two or more participants or organizations were interested in working collaboratively on a specific issue, project, or idea. The only rule was that they adhere to the principle that participation be open to representatives of all Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) signatory nations. Each group was semi-autonomous, setting its goals, selecting its chairperson(s), and determining its work and meeting schedules in collaboration with the Consortium’s operations staff located at the Marshall Center. The operations staff supported the Consortium on a day-to-day basis by coordinating resources, including identifying potential members and experts, arranging for travel, assisting in finding meeting facilities, and advertising those activities and supporting virtual collaboration through communications technologies such as the Internet.

Study groups focused on intellectual exploration or development of an idea or issue; working groups usually had one or more projects, and were thus focused on the attainment of a definable goal or end state. Projects, in some cases, continued to function for a short time after the working group had completed its developmental work. Boards served to advise the Consortium Steering Committee and Senior Advisory Council on issues that affected the entire Consortium member population. The Steering Committee served as a forum for the working group chairs to discuss ideas and issues that affect the entire Consortium. It helped to ensure widespread distribution of information and coordination of all the Consortium’s activities. The Senior Advisory Council, on the other hand, was primarily a donor platform for allocating resources and coordinating inputs at the strategic level.

For the first half of its history, the study/working groups presented their work during the Consortium’s annual conferences. Between conferences, the study/working groups met as necessary to achieve the goals and aims that the groups had established;
between meetings, the individuals in the groups carried out their work via the Internet. Although the Consortium’s working group activities were eventually reduced in scope as the process matured from community building to being more project-oriented, the following is a list of the various study/working groups and projects that animated the Consortium during its most robust phase (around 2004).  

**Working Groups**
- Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) Working Group
- Curriculum Development Working Group
- Combating Terrorism Working Group
- Military History Working Group
- Security Sector Reform Working Group
- Archives Working Group

**Study Groups**
- Crisis Management in Central Asia Study Group
- Crisis Management in South East Europe Study Group
- Crisis Management in the Southern Caucasus Study Group
- European Security (ESDI/CESDP) Study Group
- Future of NATO Study Group
- Study Group on Nonproliferation and Export Controls
- Impact of Information Technology on National Security Study Group
- Economic and Legal Aspects of Security Study Group

**Projects**
- Information Technology (IT) Project
- Lessons Learned Project
- Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Project
- Digital Library Project

**Boards**
- Publications Board
- Research Board

Defined explicitly, the most valuable work of the PfP Consortium’s working groups and other activities consisted of creating a dialogue on multinational security cooperation. The simple existence of these dialogues—bringing together military staff, educators, and policy makers—is evidence of the emergence of new norms as a dependent

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variable of structure. These conversations either helped confirm the existence and content of knowledge relevant to defense and security cooperation within the Euro-Atlantic region, or aimed to create new knowledge. The most eloquent presentation of the Consortium’s contributions came from a Bulgarian officer – Colonel Valery Ratchev, Deputy Commandant of the G.S. Rakovski Defense and Staff College in Sofia, Bulgaria. Based upon his first-hand experiences participating in the Consortium, Col. Ratchev argued that:

Never before has military knowledge and practice been internationalized to the extent that it is today. Removing ideological differences—in particular in the rise of the new common threat perception—is opening a process of a scope and dimension previously unknown to us. None of our countries is able to deal independently with that problem. Internationalizing our efforts in education is not modernism, but is a vital necessity coming from the realities of the time we live in. Mutual opening of the military educational system means commonality of strategic cultures. In this process, everyone can be a beneficial contributor. Here there are not small and big, because there is not a monopoly on the knowledge. The Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes is one of the few brilliant ideas in this aspect. It is worth investing in it. It should be further developed as a model for relationships because it erases unnecessary borders between national and international, between military and civilian, between cultures and policies. … Everyone who knows the Consortium from the inside knows that one thing is obvious: the people participating in the working groups are closer together in terms of culture, mentality, ambitions, and capacity than the others, and there have been enough significant results that this is the answer to those asking, “What is the Consortium working for?”

At the same time, the process of managing dialogue was a critical element in the process of knowledge creation, as was ensuring that the dialogue took tangible form. Relevance in the Consortium was largely a function of building a trusting environment without any particular nation attempting to impose its point of view upon all. The PfP Consortium was especially effective in creating such an open and trusting environment, primarily through the early generous support and collaboration of key institutional leaders, such as Dr. Robert Kennedy, Director of the George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies; Ambassador Theodor Winkler, Director of the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces; General Raimund Schittenhelm, Commandant, Austrian National Defence Academy; and Mr. John Berry, Dean of the NATO Defense College. During the period 1999–2003, the operations staff of the Consortium, led by Lieutenant Colonel Kirk Murray and Kevin Morgan, coordinated an extraordinary array of meetings and activities for more than twenty groups (many of which were highly active, a couple of which barely existed on paper). They established a formidable array of publications, covering the full range of security studies to serve the military, civilian, and academic needs of the Consortium membership and the international

community, including the quarterly journal *Connections* and the occasional series of *Athena Papers*.\footnote{For a complete description of publications and access to their archived issues, see the publications section of the Consortium website at https://consortium.pims.org/publications.}

**The PfP Consortium in Support of NATO Training Transformation**

When Consortium members had established a trusting atmosphere, possibilities emerged for the generation of new concepts, born of a process of comparing national experiences, organizational differences, and the inherent civil-military dichotomy. By 2003, according to Major-General Federico Yaniz of the NATO Headquarters, International Military Staff, the results were impressive:

In the area of experimentation and training, the Consortium’s educational developments lead NATO’s transformation efforts. NATO is currently adopting the Consortium’s advanced distributed learning systems, in direct cooperation between the NATO staff and the PfP’s Advanced Distributed Learning Working Group. This working group is clearly the European focal point of international learning development, not only through its doctrinal expertise, but also through a number of very successful projects including both software and course development.\footnote{Plenary session remarks made during the PfP Consortium’s sixth annual conference in Berlin, 15 June 2003; available at https://consortium.pims.org/pfp-consortium-events/6th-annual-conference/6th-annual-conference-final-report.}

In turn, these new concepts had to be justified in terms of relevance to the organizational values, strategies, and distinctive experiences of diverse members. The Consortium’s Curriculum Development Working Group at its peak had regular participation from more than twenty countries in meetings held two to three times per year. In various groups and subgroups it promoted excellence in curriculum development and course accreditation. It worked on a multilateral basis in support of the development, accreditation, validation, and electronic distribution of curricula in defense management and security policy. It collected existing curricula from member institutions and sought to develop a consensus on curriculum content on cross-functional issues, which was felt to be the most strategic level. It established a database archive on curricula in order to create and sustain a cooperative network in security and defense education. The aim was to grant easy access to existing courses relating to security policy and international relations via an electronic collection of curricula that will provide information on the objects, target groups, outlines, and content of courses. The database had over three hundred individual curricula, collected from more than fifty institutions.

Given that the primary impetus of the PfP Consortium was to promote civilian competence in security affairs and avoid “military hegemony,” great emphasis was placed on producing an intellectual consensus. This was best represented by the efforts of the Curriculum Development Working Group to bring together scholars from Allied and Partner nations to produce consensus “reference” curricula on a number of strategic topics relevant to European security cooperation. The basic understanding was that
for a given topic, such as “peace support operations,” there exists a bounded body of knowledge that any practitioner should know. Yet individual, institutional, and national positions on this topic vary considerably. The working group sought to produce a general consensus on the main elements of a given topic in sufficient depth and breadth (supported by recommended references and literature) so they might be employed in a wide variety of classroom and other settings in order to promote a more broadly shared understanding of the topic. By the end of 2004, it had produced reference curricula on:

- National Security
- Civil-Military Cooperation
- Peace Support Operations
- International Humanitarian Law
- Security Challenges
- Revolution in Military Affairs
- European Security and Defense Policy and Trans-Atlantic Relations.

Dr. Alexey Victorovich Surin, Dean of the School of Public Administration of Moscow State University and a long-time participant in the PfP Consortium’s Curriculum Development Working Group, provided the following evaluation of the relevance of this work:13

The PfP Consortium is effective and useful because it helps us with three different tasks. First, it asks experts to explain what they are doing in their own way, in their schools and in their countries. It does this by helping us to combine together our experiences, so that we can see what each holds important and what is held in common. … Second, it allows for innovative approaches. We can ask what kinds of new approaches have been taken and what are the results. This allows us to observe the experience of others, perhaps enjoying the best and avoiding the worst. Third, we take upon ourselves the role of communicating to others in our countries outside of the Consortium what might be of use. … The PfP Consortium is a vibrant community of experts, both military and civilian, but the civilians are more likely to shape the process of change. … Military academies are conservative, and are not likely to transmit these concepts to the broader society.

As time, experience, and trust allowed, some working groups began to create prototypes or special projects to explore the possibility of codifying a “best practice” in terms of a demonstration for wider illustration. For example, the Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) Working Group, whose topic is more popularly known as “e-learning,” played a significant role in coordinating knowledge-creation initiatives. The ADL Working Group developed an open-source Partnership for Peace Learning Management System (PfP-LMS) and a web-based knowledge portal for use by the Consortium, which also became the foundation for NATO’s own ADL program. Through its Cooperative Development Teams, the ADL Working Group has supported numerous organizations wishing to convert selected existing courses into web-based interactive

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13 Interview with author in Reichenau, Austria, 13 September 2005.
courseware for inclusion in the PfP-LMS. In the process, it promotes cooperation with organizations from both Allied and Partner countries and, where possible, with private industry.

The ADL Working Group has been the Consortium’s primary engine for shared course development, and considerable emphasis has been placed on capacity building among member organizations to be able to produce online educational content. The ADL Working Group has spawned several prototype initiatives to cross-fertilize one another by communicating more extensively rather than duplicating work. As of 2006, the working group had completed forty-eight ADL courses to support NATO, PfP, and other international organizations.\textsuperscript{14} It had also trained more than a dozen teams from as many nations in the development of ADL course modules. The total usage of online courses developed under the auspices of the PfP Consortium skyrocketed, and resulted by 2007 in over 50,000 online course completions.\textsuperscript{15} It continues to support both classroom activities and PfP exercises, such as the Viking series of exercises hosted by Sweden. PfP-generated ADL courses are, at the time of this writing, also a mandatory part of the curriculum at both the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany and the NATO Defense College in Rome.

**Evaluating the PfP Consortium’s “Community of Experts” Approach**

Evaluating the effectiveness of the Consortium through quantitative measures has been from its inception a problematic issue. The primary benefits of the Consortium, such as trust between nations, are intangible and difficult to quantify. Furthermore, the process of measuring often changes that which is measured, or distorts otherwise good objectives in favor of goals that are of considerably less worth, but are more easily quantifiable. The Consortium’s focus on metrics and measurement has at times appeared to be a surrogate arena for disagreement among military and civilian officials about the utility of “conference diplomacy,” particularly since the topic under discussion is the participation of civilian academics.

The most difficult challenge the Consortium as a whole has had to confront is to identify and measure its effectiveness and output, when the real issue—questions concerning “whose identity” and “whose effectiveness”—might be more rhetorical weapons than units of measurement. Some senior military officers (both among Allies and Partners) who would have no difficulty recognizing the value of having military officers from different nations engaged in productive dialogue on topics of professional relevance nonetheless disparaged the Consortium’s gatherings of civilians to do the same. They tended to overlook the fact that their own professional careers had been groomed and controlled, with programmed rotational assignments and a mandatory progression of formal education, without questioning how civilians might also acquire

\textsuperscript{14} Courses may be accessed either through the PfP Consortium website or through the Allied Command for Transformation site, at www.act.nato.int/adl.

\textsuperscript{15} Statistic provided to author by ISN staff managing the PfP Consortium Learning Management System, December 2006.
sufficient education in the exercise of authority in the control of armed forces in a democratic society. The tensions inherent in *mutual obligation* within the Consortium have been found at almost every level of analysis: between Allies and Partners, between civilians and military, between scholars and technocrats. Nevertheless, the level of activities carried out in the name of the Consortium suggest that all sides valued the effort to move toward a shared body of knowledge, the value of which is found only in community, which ascribes its worth.

After a robust period of community development from 1998–2004, the Consortium made a turn toward greater accountability for products and output that could be measured as deliverables in support of donor objectives. This was partly due to the fact that the original security community that the Consortium was established to serve had largely matured, particularly as a result of NATO’s Prague Summit in 2002, by which time ten Partner nations had achieved NATO membership or an invitation to join the Alliance. At the Istanbul Summit in 2004, focus shifted to give greater attention to the Partner nations in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Accordingly, there was less demand for large numbers of working groups to support major community-wide conferences, and greater need for focused and targeted programs of assistance.

The Consortium’s transformation toward the project-oriented approach was guided by two successive executive directors, Bruce McLane and Henri Bigo, and the Consortium found new purpose in responding to the Education and Training for Defense Reform Initiative (EfR) in support of the Istanbul Summit’s Partnership Action Plan for Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB). The EfR commenced in 2006 and enabled the PAP-DIB to become more operationally focused. In support of these goals, it conducted in-depth peer reviews of Partner nations’ defense colleges to help raise standards of professional military education, conducted educator workshops to share innovative teaching methods, and developed a reference curriculum converting the Summit-approved PAB-DIB goals into academic courses. A regionally-oriented curriculum for the Greater Black Sea area was explored to promote a shared security vision for the region, seeking to harmonize views of common security challenges.

The Consortium, therefore, has undergone the full spectrum of development. The early stages were simply to explore its potential, allowing people in similar situations to begin meeting without the benefit of shared practice and discover commonalities. Over time, the members began to recognize the potential offered by the Consortium’s model, and started exploring methods of connectedness, defining joint enterprises, and negotiating roles within the community. Many individuals—such as Colonel Valery Ratchev in Bulgaria, who later became Bulgaria’s Ambassador to Iraq, and Dr. Surin in Russia, who fostered a wider acceptance of curriculum reform—found their voice and moved from the periphery to the center of the “community of experts,” thus making the Consortium one of the only entities that offered to help aspiring defense and security sector professionals in the East to sustain their connections with each other once outside of government. For over half of its existence, the PfP Consortium embodied a bottom-up model of international cooperation based on the notion that dedicated people will do what needs to be done, within the limits of their capacity to help. Through the efforts of these dedicated individuals, the Consortium provided a family of publi-
ations that covers the full range of security studies, to an international standard of excellence, serving the military, civilian, and academic needs of the Consortium membership. The Partnership for Peace Information Management System (PIMS) established the PfP Consortium website to facilitate the PfP Consortium’s ability to function as a virtual organization, which was ultimately the primary means by which the community it engendered has sustained itself as the effort matured in support of more project-oriented goals. As the Consortium began to focus on project-oriented tasks, it revealed that any vision of how knowledge is created and disseminated must remain firmly connected to the strategy of intellectual capacity building. In the case of the Consortium’s mission, this has meant promoting a competent security sector within civil society, emphasizing civilian participation as a measure of success, and preserving inviolate the concept of intellectual freedom.

Conclusion: The “Community of Experts” Approach and Social Networks of Security Cooperation as a Model for the Future

The history and development of the Partnership for Peace Consortium show that the Consortium successfully met the challenges it was created to address, greatly aiding in the development of a civilian community of practice in defense and security affairs throughout the Euro-Atlantic community. It successfully gathered together a wide array of institutions and activists engaged in a constructivist quest to co-develop a previously non-existent community of experts composed of both Allies and Partners. Binding them together was a shared commitment to transform the Partnership for Peace into a cooperative security network for the new millennium. While acknowledging the principle that education and training are ultimately national responsibilities, participants determined nevertheless to build upon these efforts by working to make multinational education and training a multinational responsibility. In so doing, they made great strides in building a cooperative network where participants could concentrate energy and resources by collecting and sharing educational materials and approaches.

The Consortium helped to align individual and organizational interests at a time of changing values and national interests among both Allies and Partners. Both the military and the civilian defense intellectual community need to confront the fact that insecurity in the postmodern world order arises from the disintegration and fragmentation of older forms of order and control. In response, there is a rising need to invest the informal authority for promoting change within civil society to a self-identifying “community of experts” who can engage in the mobilization of new forms of relevant knowledge.

As NATO prepares to celebrate its sixtieth anniversary in 2009, it is apparent that the entire Partnership concept, including the PfP Consortium, is ready for re-examination and refurbishment to support an agenda of expanding NATO’s outreach to other regions of the world. Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer’s encouraged the attendees of the Consortium’s tenth anniversary conference to press ahead, arguing that “the PfP Consortium deserves every possible support, because education is the best investment in our security.” He further reminded us that:
Partnership was a creation of the second phase of NATO. It was a means to consolidate Europe—to turn it into an undivided security space geared towards cooperative security. Today, we are in the third phase of NATO—in the era of global challenges. And Partnership has come along with us into this new era. This is true for its military-operational dimension, but certainly also for its educational dimension.\textsuperscript{16}

Established as part of the NATO-PfP Education and Training Enhancement Program (TEEP) at NATO’s fiftieth anniversary at the Washington Summit in 1999, the PfP Consortium is ready—along with all of the other elements of TEEP, including the PfP Simulation Network and the PfP Training Centers—to be reinvented to commence its journey for the next ten years. The Consortium’s first decade was marked by great achievements, and also by a process of maturity reaching toward becoming an artifact of community memory, as the original concept both fulfilled its primary mission and became refocused on smaller and more discrete tasks. The process of reinvention should concentrate on preparing all of the elements of TEEP, but particularly the Consortium, for new missions, mandates, and strategic purposes in support of NATO’s engagement with regions of the world that lie beyond the scope of the original geographic scope of the Partnership for Peace, which has progressively diminished with each round of NATO enlargement.

On a global basis, one finds that, wherever the development of civilian expertise in military affairs is either neglected or actively thwarted—especially in civil society, the media, and academia—the democratic experiment is in jeopardy. The trend line in the evolution of civil society also influences military organizations, and helps determine how military leaders react to that evolution. The modern military officer has to be adaptive with civilians in support of new socio-political circumstances. Throughout its history, NATO reports repeatedly endorsed the work of the PfP Consortium as being central to the Euro-Atlantic community’s transformation agenda.\textsuperscript{17} At the same time, the concept of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes appears to have a timeless relevance, and is a worthy model for adaptation and replication in the context of global partnerships. Its enduring relevance was reflected in its very first artifact: its logo.\textsuperscript{18} The image of Athena—the goddess of warriors and heroes, but also the goddess of civilization and wisdom—viewed through a mesh net, her hand holding her spear, while contemplating what might be imagined as the helmet of a fallen soldier, fittingly evokes the themes of the Consortium. While the boundaries of the Consortium are obscure, the enduring purpose of the “community of experts” model is clear: a deep contemplation of humanity’s ultimate state of affairs and the sacrifices that accompany them.

\textsuperscript{16} Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Opening Speech, 18 June 2008.
\textsuperscript{17} This was accomplished in Annual Reports on the Training and Education Enhancement program by the International Staff, and in Military Committee Memorandum MCM 064-03.
\textsuperscript{18} The Consortium’s logo was devised by Ulrich Gysel, formerly the Swiss chairman of the PfP Consortium’s Advanced Distributed Learning Working Group.
NATO and the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on Different Tracks

Martin Malek *

Introduction

In 2002, NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson stated that, “for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Caucasus is of no special relevance.”1 Up until now, this attitude has not changed fundamentally, even though the region obviously attracts the Alliance’s attention more than it did in the 1990s. NATO’s stance toward the South Caucasus has always provoked much more and stronger reactions in Russia than in the political, media, and public realms of the Alliance’s member states.

In 1999, within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), an Ad Hoc Working Group on Prospects for Regional Cooperation in the Caucasus was established, placing primary focus on defense and economics issues, civil and emergency planning, science and environmental cooperation, and information activities. However, to date there is no overall comprehensive format for NATO cooperation with the South Caucasus that would even come close to its “strategic partnership” with the EU, its concept of “special relations” with Russia and Ukraine, the Mediterranean Dialogue, or the South East European Initiative. Only in 2004—i.e., a full thirteen years after the dissolution of the USSR, which was closely followed by the independence of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—U.S. diplomat Robert Simmons was appointed as NATO’s first Special Envoy for the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

The prospects for joint initiatives with NATO are inevitably negatively influenced by the fact that the armies of all South Caucasian republics are far from meeting NATO standards and requirements, even though especially Georgia and Azerbaijan have been declaring that they hope to introduce and achieve these standards sooner rather than later. This applies to such issues as democratic control of the armed forces, soldiers’ human and civil rights, as well as their social status. At times in these nations, soldiers did not even receive victuals, and their low pay was disbursed with month-long delays or not at all. This not only led to low morale within the armed forces, massive conscientious objections, and desertions of considerable numbers of troops, but

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even to mutinies of some units, especially in Georgia. Corruption within the governmental agencies accountable for security and defense also has an influence on international military cooperation.²

This essay will review activities between NATO and South Caucasus, placing a special focus on the “Russian factor” within the region and the “frozen conflicts” in Azerbaijan and Georgia.

**Principal Positions Towards NATO**

**Armenia**

Armenia has not explicitly set for itself the goal of NATO membership. This would be totally incompatible with its tight military and political attachment to Russia. And Armenia is the only South Caucasian member republic of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization, or CSTO.³ Armenia’s membership in the CSTO, and its close relationship with Russia overall, is generally not opposed in Armenian domestic political discourse. Another obstacle to a push for NATO membership within Armenia is the nation’s decidedly friendly political and economic relationship with Iran.

President Robert Kocharyan declared that joining NATO would affect Armenia’s relations with neighboring countries and would barely improve its national security. His successor Serge Sarkisyan (who served as Minister of Defense from 1993–95 and 2000–07, then as Prime Minister) has made similar indications. Consequently, this course was documented in Armenia’s “National Security Strategy,” which was adopted in a meeting of the National Security Council of Armenia on 26 January 2007. This document clearly grants greater priority to cooperation with Russia (bilateral) and to cooperative efforts that take place within the framework of the CSTO (multilateral) than to interactions with other alliances, above all NATO.⁴ As was to be expected, this approach was continued in Armenia’s Defense Doctrine, which was signed by President Kocharyan on 25 December 2007. This document makes clear that the “strategic partnership” with Russia will remain the bedrock of Armenia’s security policy. Only a single paragraph of the document mentions

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² Peculation of foreign military aid took place to such an extent that the Georgian Ministry of Defense advised NATO to send only material goods in the future; see Dursun Dzlieradze, “Georgia: NATO Hopes on Hold,” *IWPR’s Caucasus Reporting Service*, No. 106 (20 November 2001).

³ This is a CIS military alliance with a provision for military assistance in case of attack (like in the North Atlantic Treaty), to which Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan currently belong. Azerbaijan and Georgia had left its predecessor body, the Collective Security Treaty, in 1999.

cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member partner states within the frameworks of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace program. To develop prospective and proper relations and developing interoperable capabilities with the NATO, the Republic of Armenia implements the Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO and participates in the NATO Planning and Review Process, and carries out bilateral military cooperation programs with the NATO members and partner states.⁵

Comments from Armenia on the rounds of NATO enlargement accomplished in 1999 and 2004 ranged from the skeptical to the outspokenly critical. Kocharyan repeatedly criticized Georgia’s NATO membership bid (see below), at the same time attesting to Russia’s “stabilizing role in the Caucasus.”⁶ Unmistakably, NATO is facing image problems in Armenia primarily for the reason that Turkey is a member state. In Armenia, Turkey is often blamed for obstructing Armenian cooperation with NATO. Yet at the same time, Yerevan has for a long time maintained very good relations—both political and security-related—with another NATO member, Greece. Among other areas, cooperation between Yerevan and Athens has included the training of Armenian officers in Greek military academies.

During the last fifteen years, supporters of Armenian accession to NATO have never even come close to a firm hold on leadership positions, neither in politics, media, nor within the broader public sphere. The Armenian executive branch (the president and the government) has always been convinced that cooperation with the Alliance is possible without membership ambitions, a view that Brussels has never contradicted. Parliament Speaker Artur Baghdasaryan tried to deviate from the Armenian mainstream in an interview with the German daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in April 2006. He stated that, since Armenia’s future would lie within NATO and EU, Russia should not “block our way to Europe.” Kocharyan immediately and vehemently disagreed, and many Armenian politicians and media outlets joined him. Baghdasaryan then rephrased his statement, claiming that NATO membership should be envisioned merely as the end point of a long process, but the damage to his public career had been done.⁷ He had to step down in May 2006, and proclaimed the withdrawal of his party, Orinats Yerkir, from the government.

Opinion polls in Armenia regarding NATO membership keep showing a wide deviation, depending on both the source of the study and the client who commissioned it. According to a survey conducted by the U.S. Agency for International Development and the International Republican Institute in 2007—if it is to be believed—the climate of public opinion towards NATO in Armenia is mellower than one might expect considering its internal and external political framework, as well as the enduring influence of Russian media in the country. According to this poll, 45 percent of Armenian citi-

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zens are “somewhat” or “strongly” opposed to accession to NATO, while 40 percent are “somewhat” or “strongly” in favor of it. Kocharyan declined any interest in EU membership, although it would meet with an 80 percent acceptance rate among the Armenian public.8

Azerbaijan

Vafa Guluzade, foreign policy advisor to Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev, has been very much in favor of NATO membership for Azerbaijan since the 1990s, which met with overwhelmingly negative or even harsh reactions in Russia, and silence in Brussels. Consequently, the leadership in Baku itself has avoided any clear statements, and has instead pursued forms of cooperation with the Alliance beneath the level of full membership. In February 2007, President Ilkham Aliev told Deutsche Welle that it is well known both in Brussels as well as in Baku that Azerbaijan is not yet ready for NATO membership, and that he would not want to “set any unrealistic goals.”9 A whole chapter in Azerbaijan’s “National Security Concept” (issued on 23 May 2007) is dedicated to the “Integration into European and Euro-Atlantic Structures,” which the document even labels a “strategic goal.”10 Furthermore, the “establishment of operational forces interoperable with those of NATO member states” is being mentioned. However, the goal of NATO membership is not mentioned in this document.11

It is highly probable that Baku’s political approach with respect to the Alliance is influenced by the position of its powerful neighbors. Elkhan Mekhtiev judged that Azerbaijan wants to avoid the kind of pressure that Russia currently is exerting on Georgia. The Baku-based foreign policy analyst further opined that nobody in Azerbaijan wants a conflict with Moscow simply over the issue of NATO membership: “Azerbaijan’s leaders understand that if they act like Georgia, the troubles that await them will be even worse.”12 Azerbaijan’s relations with Iran were strained due to several reasons, one of which is that Tehran perceives Azerbaijan’s foreign policy as being “pro-Western,” and therefore highly objectionable. In August 2007, Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad visited Baku for the first time. Ilkham Aliev declared on

8 “Armenia Says not Aiming for NATO, EU Membership,” RFE/RL Features Article (16 July 2007). However, official documents of the Armenian Defense Ministry contain the following phrase: “Consistent with its objective to integrate into European structures and institutions, Armenia intends to enhance its cooperation with the European Union and to seek closer institutional compatibility, with the ultimate aim of full membership” (Armenia’s Commitments Under Individual Partnership Action Plan With NATO, available at www.mil.am/eng/index.php?page=50 (accessed 10 April 2008).
10 Relations with Russia are dealt with in a small abstract (Chapter 4.1.5.1).
this occasion that “our positions are identical on all points.”\textsuperscript{13} This announcement was especially unexpected, since Iran’s refusal to accept rapprochement with NATO (not to mention membership) by any South Caucasian republic is beyond doubt, as is Tehran’s objection to any NATO and/or U.S. presence in the region.

\textit{Georgia}

President Eduard Shevardnadze’s position with respect to Georgia’s potential NATO membership was ambivalent. In 1999, he declared that the time “to knock on NATO’s door” would come in 2005. At the end of 2000, he stated at an international conference in Tbilisi that his country would be ready to join the Alliance by 2004. Nevertheless, this goal was beyond reach, and merely served to increase Moscow’s already strong concerns. At the same time, Shevardnadze announced—not coincidentally in interviews with Russian media—that Georgia could declare itself neutral by 2005.\textsuperscript{14} Sometimes, however, he referred to NATO membership as an unrealistic prospect in the near future.\textsuperscript{15}

On 13 September 2002, at a time when relations with Russia were very strained, Georgia’s parliament opted in favor of NATO membership, a step that was officially reconfirmed by Shevardnadze when he was invited as a guest to NATO’s Prague Summit in November 2002. Furthermore, he announced that, as the president of a Black Sea state, he was “particularly satisfied that the invitations have been extended to Romania and Bulgaria. This brings the Black Sea area into NATO’s sphere of interests and adds a new dimension to its security.”\textsuperscript{16} On 28 December 2002, Georgia’s National Security Council decided to set up a “State Program for Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic Integration.” This level of variability in Georgian policy definitely came to an end after the “Rose Revolution” took place in November 2003, ousting Shevardnadze and paving the way for Mikheil Saakashvili’s presidency, which started in 2004. Since then, the leadership in Tbilisi has set the clear goal of NATO membership. It is mentioned in all relevant documents, and—more importantly—is being actively pursued by Georgia’s de facto foreign and security policy.

The document “Georgia’s Commitments Under the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO: 2004–2006” openly stated: “Georgia is aware of the progress

\textsuperscript{13} Cited in \textit{RFE/RL} Newsline 11:155, Part I (22 August 2007).
\textsuperscript{15} Dzlieradze, “Georgia: NATO Hopes on Hold.”
\textsuperscript{16} Statement by President of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze at the EAPC Summit, Prague, 22 November 2002; available at www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021122h.htm (accessed 2 September 2007).
it needs to make prior to advancing its NATO membership aspirations.” The “Foreign Policy Strategy 2006–2009” underscored the goal of NATO membership, stating that relations with the EU should be “enhanced,” while membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is questioned. The “National Security Concept of Georgia,” adopted in 2005 by the Georgian parliament, outlines huge reforms in the defense sector with the aim of reaching NATO standards. Georgia, as further stated, welcomes the admission of new member states into NATO and EU. It regards the North Atlantic Pact “as an organization of collective defense that is the central mechanism for providing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Georgia’s cooperation with NATO contributes to the strengthening of democratic values in the country, the accomplishment of democratic reforms, especially in the field of defense, as well as the establishment of a secure and stable environment.” Also in 2005, the “National Security Concept,” which is regarded a core element of Georgia’s “National Military Strategy,” was adopted with the aim of providing guidelines for the nation’s defense policy until 2010. As a matter of fact, the entire document was influenced by the strong desire to join NATO: “The ultimate goal is a highly capable, NATO-interoperable Armed Force able to contribute to any NATO-led military operations.” NATO membership is also mentioned prominently in the foreign minister’s “Foreign Policy Directives 2007,” which state that a Membership Action Plan (MAP) should be achieved. Nevertheless, an MAP is no guarantee for rapid accession to membership; Albania and Macedonia have been taking part in the MAP since its initiation at NATO’s summit in Washington 1999, and Tirana was invited into the Alliance only in 2008.
ting aside their differences on many other issues—signed the document “On Membership of Georgia in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).” The parliament approved it unanimously the following day.

Opinion polls (which, however, cannot be conducted in the separatist regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia) revealed a generally high level of support for NATO. The positions of Georgia’s most significant ethnic minorities with respect to NATO are not surprising: while 72 percent of ethnic Azerbaijanis are in favor of NATO membership, a majority of Armenians opposes it. Georgia is so far the only South Caucasian republic where voters have been allowed to decide how to deal with NATO. A non-binding, advisory referendum on whether to join the Alliance was held on 5 January 2008, together with an early presidential election. According to the official results of the Central Election Commission, 68.37 percent of the total turnout was in favor of NATO membership.

The South Caucasus in NATO’s Basic Documents

The minor importance of the South Caucasus for NATO was made apparent by the fact that the region (or its particular states) was neither mentioned in the Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation of NATO’s Summit in July 1997 nor in NATO’s Strategic Concept of 1999, nor in the Communiqué of the Washington Summit from April 1999. In the declaration of the NATO Summit in Prague, which on 21 November 2002 invited seven post-communist countries to join the Alliance, the South Caucasus was mentioned once, being referred to—together with Central Asia—as a “strategically important region.” The Communiqué of the NATO Summit in June 2004 in Istanbul spoke of a “special focus on engaging with our Partners in the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia.” And, additionally:

Towards that end, NATO has agreed on improved liaison arrangements, including the assignment of two liaison officers, as well as a special representative for the two regions from within the International Staff. We welcome the decision by Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan to develop Individual Partnership Action Plans with NATO. This constitutes a significant step in these countries’ efforts to develop closer

Partnership relations with the Alliance. We welcome the commitment of the new government of Georgia to reform.\textsuperscript{26}

The declaration of the following NATO Summit taking place at the end of November 2006 in the Latvian capital Riga—the first NATO Summit to be held in a former Soviet republic—mentioned the South Caucasus (together with Moldova) in a single paragraph (no. 43), encompassing three sentences.\textsuperscript{27} Georgia and its very emphatic NATO ambitions received more attention. The document states that an “Intensified Dialogue” will be led with Georgia, “without prejudice to any eventual Alliance decision” (paragraph 37). Consequently, membership was not explicitly mentioned, much less a concrete invitation for opening membership negotiations—a step that is much desired in Georgia (and feared in Russia). More in the same vein follows in paragraph 39: “We welcome the commencement of an Intensified Dialogue with Georgia as well as Georgia’s contribution to international peacekeeping and security operations. We will continue to engage actively with Georgia in support of its reform process. We encourage Georgia to continue progress on political, economic and military reforms, including strengthening judicial reform.”\textsuperscript{28}

The Declaration of NATO’s Bucharest Summit (April 2008) expressed “concern” with the persistence of regional conflicts in the South Caucasus and support for the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: “We will continue to support efforts towards a peaceful settlement of these regional conflicts, taking into account these principles” (paragraph 43). Furthermore, the Alliance “welcomed” Georgia and Ukraine’s membership aspirations. “MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership,” the declaration stated. “Today we make clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP. Therefore we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications” (paragraph 23).\textsuperscript{29}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{27} NATO Press Release (2006) 150, Riga Summit Declaration, issued by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga on 29 November 2006 (29 November 2006); available at www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm (accessed 23 August 2007).
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{29} NATO Press Release (2008) 049, Bucharest Summit Declaration, issued by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008 (3 April 2008); available at www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html (accessed 7 April 2008).
\end{footnotesize}
Cooperation between NATO and Nations in the South Caucasus

General Provisions

Cooperation efforts between the Alliance on the one hand and Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on the other are being pursued at various levels. All three South Caucasian republics have their own missions to NATO and have established contacts with education and training facilities like the NATO School in Oberammergau, the NATO Defense College in Rome, and the PfP Training Center in Ankara. The PfP has become “NATO’s chief tool for deepening its military cooperation with the states of the South Caucasus.” Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are more or less intensively involved in numerous PfP activities that cannot be further elaborated upon (and definitely not assessed) in this essay. The area of scientific cooperation encompasses issues that would normally not be considered to belong to NATO’s competencies, like the South Caucasus River Monitoring project. The PfP Consortium (PfPC) has participants from all three South Caucasian states. The region is now being addressed by the PfP through the discussions of the Regional Stability in the Greater Black Sea Area Working Group. The Tbilisi-based Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS) was involved in its activities. GFSIS co-founder and Executive Vice-President Temur Iakobashvili was appointed State Minister on Reintegration Issues in January 2008; as such, he is in charge of conflict resolution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Generally, Georgia is very active in the PfP, even though expectations and hopes are not always met by outcomes.

The report of a delegation of NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly called Armenia an “enthusiastic participant in PfP activities.” At the beginning of 2006, the British Caucasus expert Elizabeth Fuller said with respect to Azerbaijan that its “IPAP does not give the impression that Baku considers cooperation with the Alliance a top priority.” Baku has nevertheless on many occasions emphasized that it wants to elevate its army to a NATO-level standard, especially by means of the IPAP. This is a primary goal of Azerbaijan’s military academies. The current estimates about the progress achieved so far in the armed forces with respect to achieving NATO standards differ

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widely even within Azerbaijan, although sources from the administration are generally more optimistic than others, especially from independent think-tanks and experts.

**NATO Exercises in the South Caucasus**

Nine NATO member states and six PfP countries, among them Azerbaijan and the host country, participated in the maneuver “Cooperative Partner 2001” in Poti, Georgia, in June 2001. In November 2001, the exercise “Cooperative Determination 2001” took place in Baku. But nine NATO members, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and seven other PfP countries did not move any military hardware; it was not a live drill, but rather a command post/computer-assisted exercise that aimed to improve military interoperability for crisis response operations. In June 2002, “Cooperative Best Effort 2002” united some 500 soldiers from NATO and PfP countries in Vaziani, Georgia, near Tbilisi. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey participated. Patrolling, organizing checkpoints, and dispersing crowds were some of the training subjects covered.

Russia had refused NATO’s invitation. A year later Armenia hosted a PfP maneuver for the first time—“Cooperative Best Effort 2003,” which brought together 400 soldiers from nineteen countries, including Georgia, Russia, and Turkey (the participation of its three soldiers provoked controversy in Armenia). Azerbaijan had refused to take part. “Cooperative Best Effort 2004” should have taken place in September 2004 in Azerbaijan. However, NATO abstained from undertaking the maneuver, since Baku had refused to grant visas to Armenian participants. Not surprisingly, Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanyan appreciated this step of the Alliance.

**Participation in NATO-led Operations**

The allocation of the South Caucasian contingents to the 15,900 soldier-strong peacekeeping force KFOR in Kosovo has made the political preferences of the contributing nations apparent. The Armenian platoon (34 soldiers) is under the command of a Greek battalion. The Azerbaijani motorized platoon (34 soldiers) and the Georgian contingent (182 soldiers) are under Turkish command within the framework of the Multi-National Task Force South (MNTFS), which was established in May 2006.

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35 One occasionally encounters the view that the primary reason behind Azerbaijan’s pursuit of NATO standards is that it expects to achieve military advantages in comparison with Armenia, in case of renewed conflict over Karabakh. See, for example, Andrew Monaghan, “Azerbaijan’s Key Role in the South Caucasus,” Research Paper No. 32 (Rome: NATO Defense College Rome, Academic Research Branch, March 2007), 5.


Table 1: Overview of NATO Activities Regarding the South Caucasus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Associated membership of parliaments in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly</th>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Azerbaijan</th>
<th>Georgia</th>
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<td>Opened in November 2004 (previously, Armenia’s Embassy in Brussels had represented the country at NATO)</td>
<td>Exists</td>
<td>Opened on 22 April 1998</td>
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<th>NATO Information Centers</th>
<th>NATO Information Center in Yerevan operational since November 2006; officially opened on 12 March 2007</th>
<th>Euro-Atlantic Center in Baku opened on 3 July 2006, and in Gandzha in July 2007</th>
<th>Active since 2005 in the following locations: Tbilisi (head office); bureaus in Batumi (Ajara), Kutaisi, Telavi, and Chkhalta (Kodori Valley)</th>
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<th>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), successor of NACC since 1997</th>
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<th>Planning and Review Process (PARP)</th>
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<td>Since 2002</td>
<td>Since 1997</td>
<td>Since March 1999</td>
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<tr>
<th>Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) endorsed by the NAC</th>
<th>16 December 2005</th>
<th>27 May 2005</th>
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<td>16 December 2005</td>
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38 This is the only part of Abkhazia controlled by the government in Tbilisi. The Abkhaz secessionist leadership in Sukhumi strictly opposed the opening of an office of the NATO Information Center on 26 July 2007. On 3 August 2007, the head of the center, Nanuka Zhorzholian, declared that another office could be established in Gali in Southern Abkhazia. This, too, was condemned in Sukhumi.
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<td>Participation in NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR)</td>
<td>Since February 2004</td>
<td>Since October 1999</td>
<td>Since May 2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Since November 2002</td>
<td>For a few months in 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T) as part of the EAPC (2002)</td>
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In August 2003, NATO took over command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. As of 1 April 2008, forty Azerbaijani soldiers and one Georgian representative had taken part in the 47,000-strong force (other figures of troop strength for comparison: U.S., 19,000; United Kingdom, 7,750). These contributions have to be considered to be primarily “political,” since in military terms they are merely symbolic. But Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine (one participant as of 1 April 2008) are the only CIS members among the forty states committing troops to Afghanistan.39

A Georgian contingent was deployed to Afghanistan for several months in 2004, when ISAF temporarily increased its troops during the presidential elections there; a platoon-size Georgian unit from the Sachkere battalion operated with a British battalion in Afghanistan at that time. Also worthy of mention is an agreement about host nation support for and transit of NATO forces and personnel through Georgia via air, road, and rail infrastructure signed by NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and Georgian Foreign Minister Salome Zourabichvili on 2 March 2005. This document provides important logistical support to NATO operations, in particular ISAF.

The United States has allocated resources to effect and guarantee the interoperability of South Caucasian armies with NATO forces. Washington sent field equipment for the Armenian 12th Peacekeeping Battalion to the MoD in Yerevan at the end of July 2007. This was part of a USD 8 million plan by the U.S. Foreign Military Financing

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program to help the Armenian government achieve its goal of developing a NATO-interoperable peacekeeping battalion by 2009.40

The “Russian Factor”

While NATO considers its engagement with the South Caucasus to be an integral part of its overall efforts to provide security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region, the overwhelming majority within Russia’s political, military, and academic elites as well as in the media holds exactly the opposite point of view. According to the Russian perspective, the Alliance plays a predominantly negative role in the world, is considered “aggressive,” and is seen as interfering in the internal affairs of the CIS, which should be none of NATO’s business. In Moscow, all NATO efforts toward the CIS—and therefore in the South Caucasus as well—are perceived as being principally directed against Russia and its influence in the region. All contacts between CIS republics and NATO are being observed and commented upon in Russia; in the best case, they are viewed with mere mistrust, but more often they meet with open and sharp rejection. For Russia, the accession of a CIS member state to NATO membership is totally out of the question.41

In Moscow it is a commonly held view that NATO and its leading power, the United States, are trying to diminish Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus, drive a wedge between Russia and Armenia, and achieve the closure of Russian military bases in the South Caucasus.42 And, from Moscow’s point of view, the association between Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova known as GUAM is a “Trojan Horse” of

40 “U.S. Provides $3 million of Field Equipment to Armenian Peacekeeping Battalion,” Armradio (1 August 2007); available at www.armradio.am/news/?part=soc&id=10355 (accessed 28 August 2007).
41 Those positions have been consolidated over the last few years, leading to serious doubts about the efficiency of various confidence building measures, consultations, and negotiations between Brussels and Moscow, especially within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (from 1997 to 2002 known as the Permanent Joint Council).
42 Russia had delayed its withdrawal from its Georgian military bases for a long time, worrying that NATO might “fill the vacuum” that its departure created, or that Georgia might join the Alliance more easily without the bases. But on 30 May 2005, Moscow and Tbilisi signed a preliminary agreement, according to which Russia has to vacate its two former bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki by the end of 2008. However, already in November 2007 it was officially announced that Russian forces have completed their withdrawal from their last remaining base in Georgia (Batumi). But a Russian base does remain in the city of Gudauta in breakaway Abkhazia.
NATO and/or the U.S. seeking to infiltrate the CIS and to constrain their effective “integration” (from the Russian perspective).43

Since the second half of the 1990s, various Russian politicians and media outlets have constantly claimed—with or without referring to relevant statements from Baku and Tbilisi—that the opening of NATO bases in Azerbaijan and Georgia would not only be a matter of time, but had practically been already decided, was a simple inevitability, etc. The Alliance, however, has never publicly shown any interest in setting up such facilities, and no statement by any NATO official is on the record stating that a continuation of cooperation with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia would depend upon or aim at “anti-Russian” measures. Neither this fact nor statements given by then-NATO Secretary-General Robertson—who “welcomed” the Russian military presence in the region44 (though not further elaborating on its positive role) and did not perceive any “competition”45 between NATO and the CSTO regarding security in the region—have so far helped to diminish Russia’s anxiety and opposition.

Georgia was a particular subject of Russian focus due to its emphatic pursuit of NATO membership. In July 2003, an unarmed NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) surveillance aircraft undertook a one-hour demonstration flight above Tbilisi. The Russian Foreign Ministry reacted immediately with overwrought statements, and senior Russian military officials publicly discussed the deployment of S-300 air defense systems in secessionist Abkhazia to be able to shoot down AWACS aircraft.46 The then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov (who was until December 2007 considered as one of the “crown-princes” of President Vladimir Putin) accused Eastern European NATO members of illegally supplying Soviet-made arms to Georgia, and spoke of “piracy.”47 Nevertheless, it remained unclear what the real core of the problem was, since no international arms embargo is in place against Georgia. Addi-

43 On 10 October 1997, the presidents of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, at a meeting in Strasbourg, signed a communiqué regarding closer cooperation between the four nations. Their informal association was named GUAM, according to the initial letters of the participant states. Russia went to considerable lengths to damage the GUAM association politically, diplomatically, and propagandistically. However, this expenditure was disproportionate to the group’s factual importance. It was (and is) neither a formal alliance nor an international organization, but merely—in the best case—a consulting board. An office of GUAM in Kiev only became operational in January 2007. It was never in any way in a position to act as a counterbalance for the CSTO, or even to confront Moscow’s hegemonic claims, even though Russian politicians, spin doctors, geopoliticians, senior officers of the armed forces, etc., being permanently anxious regarding GUAM’s influence, allege the contrary.

44 Cited in “Glava NATO posetil Azerbaydzhan; on vidit vozmozhnost ukreplenie svyazey” (translation of an AFP report), Kommersant (19 January 2001), 11.


tionally, other high-ranking Russian officials’ statements publicly raised doubts about their ability to accurately assess the actual state of affairs Georgia. Thus, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General Yuri Baluevsky, called the impoverished country a “world leader in the area of military development.”

In February 2007, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov pointed out in an interview with a Russian government newspaper that he did not want to let Georgian NATO membership happen. At that time, Moscow had already taken measures designed to underscore its firmness: in 2006, a boycott was imposed on important Georgian export products, especially wines and the mineral water brand “Borshomi,” which had been popular in Russia for decades. Furthermore, all air, postal, and bank links between Georgia and Russia were interrupted. Thousands of Georgian guest workers were expelled from Russia, and state-controlled Russian media portrayed Georgia in the darkest colors. Many Russian and foreign observers shared the opinion that Moscow aimed at antagonizing the Georgian population against Saakashvili and his pro-NATO course; the Russian political scientist Andrei Zagorski even identified the Russian goal of “regime change” in Tbilisi. At the same time the Kremlin seemed to have wanted to take the opportunity—once again—to make it clear to NATO that it had better stay out of the South Caucasus, since otherwise only trouble will result.

NATO and the “Frozen Conflicts”

NATO’s Positions

NATO representatives in general, and the Secretary-General in particular, have always deferred to the UN and OSCE when asked in Tbilisi and Baku about a possible role for the Alliance in the efforts to solve the “frozen conflicts” in Azerbaijan, namely the situation in the breakaway republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. NATO has therefore not participated in the thus far unsuc-

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49 Vladislav Vorobev, “Voina i MID. Sergey Lavrov otvergaet silovoe reshenie lyubogo krizisa,” Rossiyskaya gazeta (28 February 2007); available at http://www.rg.ru/2007/02/28/lavrov.html (accessed 28 February 2007). This amounts to the desire of one state to determine another state’s membership in an international organization. This in turn is a result of the traditional Russian perception that CIS member states (which, from the Russian viewpoint, constitute the “near abroad”) do not enjoy the same sovereignty in matters of domestic and foreign policy as countries of the “far abroad” (the rest of the world) do.

50 Tbilisi launched a “counterstrike” against the Russian wine boycott by hosting a “Day of Georgian Wine” at NATO Headquarters on 15 March 2007. For this reason, a huge Georgian delegation, led by Defense Minister David Kezerashvili, traveled to NATO HQ.

cessful negotiations over these conflicts, which have been going on for many years. Instead, NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson explained in an article appearing in the Azerbaijani press in mid-May 2003 that Russia should not be excluded from the efforts to mediate in the South Caucasian conflicts. However, such an “exclusion” cannot be considered realistic, neither now nor in the near future. And decisions about the format of the negotiations are certainly not a part of NATO’s competence.

In November 2006, NATO rejected the planned referendum on independence in South Ossetia, warning that it risked worsening regional unrest. Nevertheless, the voting took place, and produced the expected results: 99 percent of the votes were counted in favor of independence from Georgia. Thus it was demonstrated—not for the first time, and certainly not for the last—that the most powerful military alliance in the world is not capable of exerting influence on South Caucasian separatists.

In two paragraphs (39 and 43) of its Riga Summit Declaration issued in November 2006, NATO demanded a peaceful solution to the ethno-territorial conflicts in the South Caucasus and in Moldova: “Our nations support the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova.” The spokesman of the Armenian foreign ministry, Vladimir Karapetyan, appeared unimpressed by NATO’s rhetoric, proclaiming: “This can have no influence, since Nagorno-Karabakh has never belonged to the independent nation of Azerbaijan.”

NATO representatives have argued on many occasions in favor of “peaceful solutions” to the South Caucasian conflicts. Whether intended or unintended, this signifies a confirmation and strengthening of the status quo, which has persisted for many years, and serves as a key bolster to the de facto independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. But even this stance has not helped to improve NATO’s reputation in those areas; in fact, the effect has been quite to the contrary. Mirroring the EU (which is very close to NATO in this regard), NATO nowhere explicitly defines what is understood as a “solution” or is regarded as desirable: An indefinite continuation of the status quo? A (re)integration of the secessionist state-entities into Azerbaijan and Georgia? Or, to the contrary, their international recognition as sovereign states?

52 RFE/RL Newsline 7:89 (13 May 2003).
56 See, for example, de Hoop Scheffer’s speech at Tbilisi State University on 4 October 2007; available at www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s071004a.html (accessed 5 October 2007).
Since then, the situation has become even more complicated, as Russia wants to use Kosovo’s possible independence as a precedent for what “must” inevitably lead to the recognition of the several pro-Russian separatist proto-states in the CIS, namely Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and (on the territory of Moldova) Transnistria.\(^57\) NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer rejected this linkage in March 2007: “The eventual decision on Kosovo’s status cannot serve as a precedent […] Kosovo is a unique case.” At the same time, he reminded Russia that “NATO is not involved in the process of determining Kosovo’s status. This issue is for the UN Security Council, in which Russia, among others, plays a decisive role.”\(^58\) Nobody within NATO (at least officially) dared to refer to Russia’s own struggle against separatist forces in Chechnya, which has been raging since 1994.

**Consequences of NATO Membership Ambitions**

As a condition of membership, NATO accession candidates must not have any “territorial problems” or disputes with neighbor states. This does apparently not apply in the cases of Georgia and Azerbaijan, since the power of the state does not encompass the entire territory claimed by its government. In Baku, awareness about the consequences of this condition seems to be higher than in Tbilisi. Thus, Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov, referring to Nagorno-Karabakh, admitted that he does not see “any chance for a country engaged in such a territorial conflict” to become a member of NATO.\(^59\)

Georgia hopes that, “once it becomes part of the Alliance, it will be harder for Russia to influence the processes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.”\(^60\) Russia for its part is aware that the “frozen conflicts” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia severely affect Georgia’s NATO ambitions. Consequently, Moscow is trying to prevent at any cost a return of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to a position that places them under the authority of the Georgian state. The spokesperson of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Mikhail Kamynin, announced in April 2007 that Georgia’s intensive preparations for NATO membership are “undermining the negotiations on settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts and the very principle of territorial integrity.”\(^61\) Before that, the nationalist hardliner and pro-Kremlin spin doctor Konstantin Zatulin, director of the

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\(^57\) The sources of such an “automatism” in international law and politics remain unclear, as does the question of why Chechnya in turn would not “have” to be granted independence by Russia.


Moscow-based Institute of CIS Countries, even had more articulately formulated that Georgia’s accession to NATO equaled a “prologue to the country’s breakup.”

Russian politicians and observers critically commented on the plebiscite about NATO membership in Georgia mentioned above. Thus, Aleksei Ostrovsky, head of the Committee on CIS Affairs and Relations with Compatriots of the State Duma (Lower House of Parliament), called the official results “rather dubious in the light of assessments made by Russian observers.” Dmitri Rogozin, Russia’s permanent representative to NATO and a hard-core nationalist, said that “the very idea of holding a referendum on Georgia joining NATO was a big political mistake” on the part of Saakashvili. Rogozin pointed out that neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia had voted for Georgia to join NATO, and therefore they were freed from the responsibility of making the decision. According to this logic, by going ahead with the referendum despite knowing that the separatist regions would not take part, Saakashvili “thereby himself supported the separatist ambitions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.” Sergei Markov, the director of the Political Research Institute and a State Duma deputy from the pro-Kremlin-party “Unified Russia,” said that, despite the results of the referendum, Georgia has no chances to join the Alliance in the foreseeable future: “There are some NATO members that will not want to quarrel with Russia and will veto this accession.” Markov is a highly emotional figure with a controversial reputation, but this assessment turned out to be correct at NATO’s Bucharest Summit in April 2008. Already on 21 March 2008 the State Duma passed a resolution calling on the Kremlin to consider recognizing the “independence” of the Georgian breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia if Georgia joins NATO.

These Russian statements, and countless others like them, could suggest that a simple abandonment of ambitions to NATO membership may accelerate or make more likely Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s integration into the Georgian state. However, this is not the case, due to many reasons. One of them can be illustrated through the example of Azerbaijan: As discussed above, although it does not pursue NATO membership, it still does not seem to have any better chance of regaining control over Nagorno-Karabakh.

**NATO Assistance Against Secessionists?**

NATO has never discussed any military intervention in the South Caucasus, no matter where and on which side, and correlative scenarios—even when presented with great

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64 Ibid.
seriousness—seem only bizarre. Nevertheless, politicians made use of such specters, especially during the NATO intervention against rump Yugoslavia in early 1999 in response to the mass evictions of Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo. On the occasion of NATO’s fiftieth anniversary, a glossy brochure was published in Baku, including several positive statements by Azerbaijan’s President Heydar Aliyev concerning the Alliance. Therein it was made clear that he was expecting aid from NATO against Armenia. Additionally, he stated: “Independent organizations including NATO have yet to recognize Armenia as the aggressor and have taken no concrete steps to ensure that justice prevails, as they did in Kosovo.” Amayak Ovanesyan, member of the Armenian Parliament and chairman of an association of political scientists, saw NATO as posing a danger to the security of Karabakh. Obviously, he suspected the Alliance of providing assistance to Azerbaijan in a hypothetical military operation.

In 1999, speculations about NATO’s assistance for Georgia to recapture Abkhazia appeared persistently, above all in the Russian press, but also in Abkhazia. Later, several Russian and Abkhaz commentator suggested that the abovementioned NATO/PfP-exercise “Cooperative Partner 2001” was a rehearsal for a Georgian attack on Abkhazia. Additionally, the “CIS peacekeeping forces” (consisting of only Russian military units) in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict zone at the Inguri River believe that they must be prepared for a NATO invasion. Their commander, Major-General Nikolai Sidorovich, said on 14 June 2001 that, with 2,000 men, his force is strong enough to repulse any incursion by combined NATO and Georgian forces. Sanobar Shermatova, an insider on the southern periphery of the CIS, surmised that Abkhazia is seriously preparing to “avert a Georgian-American invasion by its own means.”

The AWACS flight over Tbilisi discussed above was seen by secessionist Abkhazia as a possible first signal of the “direct involvement of NATO forces in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.” The Abkhaz separatist leader Sergei Bagapsh stated in 2007: “We will increasingly arm ourselves as we know well what happens if Georgia joins

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67 Secretariat of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “NATO and Azerbaijan—Mutually Beneficial Cooperation” (Baku, 1999), 18, 20–21, 33.
69 Armenian observers contacted by the author could not name anybody who would be a member of this association besides Ovanesyan.
72 RFE/RL Newsline (15 June 2001).
NATO. And we understand who will appear in the conflict zone.”75 Russian officials expressed similar fears. Thus, the Russian Ambassador to Georgia, Vyacheslav Kovalenko, explained that Georgian NATO membership would strengthen the apprehensions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia concerning the measures that Tbilisi “wants to grasp.” They could be “assured in their feeling that Georgia is aiming at a military solution of the conflict.”76 Thus NATO was apparently judged to be willing to either tacitly favor or materially support a Georgian campaign in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It remains unclear how this attitude can plausibly be held in a country which itself has been fighting a bloody war that has caused tens of thousands of civilian casualties since 1994 against Chechen separatists that it only refers to as “terrorists,” and with whom it has rejected any overtures to negotiation.

Already, during the Shevardnadze era, Georgia wanted to see the “CIS peacekeepers” at the Inguri River, who lack any UN mandate, be replaced by contingents from other countries, such as Ukraine and/or Turkey, or even by a NATO or EU peacekeeping force. But Russia and Abkhazia always unconditionally rejected such proposals, and NATO did not display any further interest. Thus, in October 2006, the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, General Raymond Henault, made it clear that the Alliance has no intention to send peacekeeping forces to the Georgian breakaway regions. Concerning Nagorno-Karabakh, the question does not even appear theoretically: the Armenian-Azerbaijani ceasefire has been complied with (despite minor incidents) since May 1994 without the presence of any peacekeepers.

Summary and Conclusions

The more or less enthusiastic messages that have been spread to varying degrees by the administrations of all three South Caucasian republics—most intensely in Georgia, least enthusiastically in Armenia—regarding cooperation with NATO often do not permit judgment about the necessity for and effectiveness of such cooperation. It is difficult to ignore the significant incongruity between the optimistic statements of South Caucasian (especially Georgian) politicians concerning the realism of achieving NATO standards on the one hand and the actual condition of the region’s armies, as documented by several foreign and domestic observers, on the other hand.

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia pursue different aims regarding NATO, a state of affairs that will probably not change in the near future. The South Caucasian “climate of opinion” toward NATO is sunniest in Georgia, and gloomiest in Armenia.77

77 For different reasons, opinion polls in the region should be viewed with even greater caution than in Western Europe or North America. Thus it is legitimate to question their validity, when several competent (Caucasian and other) observers say that the persons interviewed have only limited (or no) knowledge of the matter concerned.
Even apart from this wide divergence in views of NATO within the region, the accession of the South Caucasian states to NATO membership is not an option for the immediate future. Thus it is rejected by Russia and Iran, and the Alliance is unlikely to strain the already tense relations with Moscow over a region that is not familiar to the Western European and American public, and which is not supposed to be of predominant importance.

In addition, it is hard to imagine how Georgia and Azerbaijan—whose governments exert only partial controlling over their territories—expect to join a military alliance. Tbilisi and Baku have obviously been mistaken if they hoped for NATO’s assistance to regain control over Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh respectively. The Alliance has until now not taken any steps in this direction, and has not even sought a role in the negotiation process. In fact, it has not even addressed the fact of occupation of Georgian and Azerbaijani soil.

Azerbaijan’s President Ilkham Aliev has stated time and again that a solution of the Karabakh conflict is not possible without the inclusion of EU and NATO. Nevertheless, a solution is also not likely to materialize within either of these organizations, since the root problem of the South Caucasian “frozen conflicts” does not lie in the format of the negotiations, but in the two sides’ apparently mutually exclusive claims: While Baku and Tbilisi assert the international law principle of territorial integrity (within the borders of the former Azerbaijani and Georgian Soviet republics), Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh insist that their territorial separation be allowed, and actually demand that their causes be covered by their specific interpretation of the principle of the self-determination of peoples.

Georgia felt affirmed in its ambitions toward NATO membership due to repeated violations of its airspace by Russian military aircraft (which were confirmed by international observers and commissions). Russia has always strictly rejected these Georgian allegations, and insinuated that Tbilisi is only searching for reasons that will help to draw NATO to its side. At present, this looks exactly like what Tbilisi is hoping will happen, but this naturally does not mean that it will work out as planned; NATO’s desire to protect Georgia and to prepare for a military clash with an increasingly self-confident Russia appears to be very small. Georgia was granted an “Intensified Dialogue on Membership Aspirations” by the North Atlantic Council in 2006, but at the same time NATO clarified this step: “This does not guarantee an invitation to join the Alli-

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79 According to Abid Sharifov, Deputy Prime Minister of Azerbaijan, NATO rejected two joint requests from Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey to deliver technology needed to provide security for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline; see RFE/RL Newsline, 11:204, Part I (2 November 2007). This, again, demonstrated the Alliance’s desire to stay out of any potential conflicts in the South Caucasian region.
ance, but it is a clear signal from the Allies that they support Georgia’s membership aspirations.”

Georgia’s accession to NATO membership in the near future is “very unlikely,” regardless of its desirability. This assessment gained even more significance in the light of Jaap de Hoop Scheffer’s statement at the occasion of the imposition of emergency rule during a political crisis in Georgia in November 2007, which he called “not in line with Euro-Atlantic values.” Emergency rule lasted only for a week, but nevertheless many observers agreed that Saakashvili has severely damaged Georgia’s chances of winning a promise of membership at NATO’s summit in April 2008 in Bucharest.

A number of statements from NATO and EU representatives suffer from the perception of the South Caucasus as a single, unified entity and the willingness to treat it as such, thereby leaving aside all differences and contrasts between the countries and peoples in the region. Bearing in mind this background, the danger of making poor decisions is naturally high. Already confronted with the expensive, complex, and unpopular engagements in the Western Balkans and Afghanistan, the resources and the willingness of NATO to deepen its activities in the South Caucasus are likewise small. Therefore the region will retain its comparatively minor importance for the Alliance in the foreseeable future.

The following disclaimer dates back to 2003: “NATO managed to address only peripherally the main security threats and challenges affecting countries in the region—i.e., unresolved conflicts, open borders, weak and corrupt state structures, inefficient armed forces, and arms and drug smuggling.” This is indeed the case, but the Alliance in its self-conception is not responsible for the solution of the bulk of these problems. Due to this and many other reasons, these threats will likely haunt the South Caucasus for a fairly long time to come.

Completed in April 2008

The Challenges of Being Ten: Reflections on the Uniqueness of the PfP Consortium

Sean Costigan, Ernst Felberbauer, and Peter Foot *

The PfP Consortium is “unique” in the security studies field. But might that uniqueness, embodied in the institution’s creation in 1998—the fiftieth anniversary year of NATO—explain its struggles to see a future for itself as NATO turns sixty?

The Sensorimotor Period: 1998 to 1999 ¹

From the start, as was articulated in William Cohen’s inaugurating speech at the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council meeting in June 1998, there was newness: “The establishment of a ‘Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes’ is a contribution to our enhanced Partnership for Peace and, in particular, a means of placing greater emphasis on defense and military education and training—a top priority within the Partnership.”²

There were two key elements of freshness here. The first was to emphasize military training as something that could be described as a priority at all. The second was to build on the assumption that military training and education could be improved by being placed in closer proximity to research and policy advice. To that date, defense

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Peter Foot is Academic Dean at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and Professor Emeritus at the Canadian Forces College Toronto. He has been associated with the work of the Consortium, especially the Editorial Board, for ten years.

Special thanks go to David Law, Senior Fellow at DCAF, who provided input to this paper.

¹ The Theory of Cognitive Development, one of the most influential theories in the field of psychology, was developed by Jean Piaget, a Swiss philosopher (1896–1980). The theory concerns the emergence and construction of schemata—schemes of how one perceives the world—in “developmental stages.” The theory is considered “constructivist,” meaning that, unlike nativist theories (which describe cognitive development as the unfolding of innate knowledge and abilities) or empiricist theories (which describe cognitive development as the gradual acquisition of knowledge through experience), it asserts that we construct our cognitive abilities through self-motivated action in the world. The theory sets four stages of development, here used as section titles—a mirror of the Consortium.

academies were largely ignored in the academy, regarded as backwaters enlivened by occasional eddies of research and individual writing brilliance.

With the inauguration of the PfP Consortium, for the first time, an opening was now afforded to defense training centers to look outward, to have the opportunity to internationalize their perspectives and, certainly for staff and war colleges, to harmonize their thinking about the teaching of doctrine for the post-Cold War era with two other groups of thinkers: the civilian worlds of research and diplomacy. One should never forget the earth-shaking moves in global policy that took place in 1989 and 1990—developments that were bound to have tremendous implications in the security and political realms of the entire EAPC region, which was the Consortium’s area of focus. Alongside the many other opportunities it offered—like education, travel, information connectivity, and possibilities for publication—this confluence of a critical mass of researchers, military staff, and diplomats was the truly unique concept of the Consortium. Concrete indications were given through the policy objectives articulated in the statement “Towards a Partnership for the 21st Century: The Enhanced and More Operational Partnership,” suggested by the NATO PMSC on PfP and endorsed at the NATO Prague Summit in 1999:

The Consortium's objectives, which might be further defined by its participants, could include: to foster greater academic and educational opportunities within the defense and security community; to encourage high standards for professional military education; to promote cost-effective education through collaborative distance learning and distributed training, such as via the Internet; to expand dialogue, understanding, and cooperation through security-related research in EAPC countries; and to explore complementary relationships with other institutions such as the NATO Defense College.

The striking feature of this departure from the norm was that very few national defense academies showed immediate interest in exploiting these opportunities for international openness. National interests were very rarely the point of representation or involvement. Which begs the question, was the Consortium operating above or parallel to the national interests of its members? While indirect government involvement was perceived to be a strength, this was a challenge for the enterprise from the start. The initial assumption had been that the rules that govern PfP membership would apply to the Consortium. Here is a section from early documentation:

For all concerned, including Allies, funding will operate on the principle of “costs lie where they fall.” This means that each nation or joining organization is responsible to pay its own expenses to participate in and benefit from the activities of the Consortium according to its own volition. This could include seconding personnel to form a Secretariat, providing venue and support for an annual conference, participating in the development of a journal, and so forth.\(^3\)

National institutions would, of course, wish to carry out national policy. A given government’s priorities would naturally be reflected in the priorities of that govern-

\(^3\) Ibid.
ment’s participating organizations. It reflected the prevailing official U.S. attitude that academia exists to further national interests, one of the notions characteristic of the nineteenth-century German educational system that still surprise Europeans when they encounter it in twenty-first century U.S. practice. Eastern European military institutions were struggling to survive, much less conform to some Western-inspired notion of norms. Those colleges that existed (or had been created) in newly independent states were far more interested in the traditional security agendas followed by supposedly sovereign states, and they took as models those examples that were closest at hand historically. Expectations were raised about transparency that more settled states such as France and the United Kingdom could not possibly accept; yet former Warsaw Pact nations were struggling to conform to even these standards.

Moreover, commandants of national military training and education facilities were naturally protective of the institutions they commanded. Networking was a form of communication that offered greater challenges than anticipated. For a Partner nation, if participation in the Consortium improved its chances of getting U.S. gifts of computers and access to the PfP Information Management System (PIMS), then institutional participation would happen, albeit at a level well below that of the commandant of a training facility. For countries that aspired to NATO membership, the demands of the Membership Action Plan were far more pressing than the more gentle, exploratory, and open-ended work being done within the Consortium. As an incentive to the participation of Partner or candidate countries, money for travel was invariably provided through the Consortium offices. But, even with such inducements, defense academies were much more likely to participate in the annual Conference of Commandants, held under the auspices of the NATO Defense College in Rome and now fully open to PfP countries.

Concerns of this type were brought forward as early as 1998 in the status report concerning the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes presented by Swiss Federal Councilor Adolf Ogi in the defense ministers’ session at the meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council:

> Along the lines of this concept it should be possible to establish a meaningful and unique dialogue of institutes, academies, and alumni in support of an evolving Euro-Atlantic security community. The difficulty of this piece is to try and identify how we can convert the current mission of improving training and education into a framework for a policy development organization.\(^5\)

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4 Actually, as an example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the *Führungsakademie* in Hamburg existed to serve the separate interests of the German Army, Air Force, and Navy, more or less in that order. “Germany” was a much more distant priority.

The Preoperational Stage: 2000–2004

In reality, the Consortium offered much more in the way of opportunities for interaction and exchange, but this was insufficiently appreciated by the countries and their security, political, research, and educational institutions. To that extent, the Consortium’s uniqueness did not generate its own reward.

In an entirely unintended expression of uniqueness, only four countries provided financial support. To be sure, countries that have hosted annual conferences for the Consortium have had a sponsorship role for their respective year. But the operating expenses of the Consortium have been borne mostly by the United States and Germany as co-hosts of the Consortium’s executive offices at the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen. Switzerland and Austria have also been steady providers of resources, in the form of money, facilities, personnel, expertise, or technology. In the case of each of these four countries, representation and resources came directly from and through government officials or serving military officers. Despite rather intense bureaucratic difficulties in funding Eastern Europeans, the U.S. funded quite a number of participants from the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe for travel and accommodation. It was clear, however, that for most of these participants, jealously excluding colleagues from enjoying the same benefits was a higher priority than advertising the advantages to their country now offered by the Consortium. For many NATO and Partner countries, representation was usually one stage removed from departments of state.6

In sum, this kind of representational mixture was not designed to produce a gradually increasing level of direct national sponsorship for the Consortium. Although money was spent on similar ventures by governments, it simply never made its way to the Consortium. Wealthy countries spent money and appointed officers on a variety of defense and security issues in cases where an individual government could exert direct influence and claim the credit. The Consortium’s very uniqueness precluded this kind of support. Curiously, right at the start of its life, as it emerged from the ISF Zurich conference in 1998—at the same time the first annual conference of the Consortium—a proposal was made for a fully staffed Consortium Secretariat of thirty international officers on secondment, all working for a “secretary-general.” Had this been accepted, one might have seen the kind of cost-sharing arrangement that has been used for decades to support the operation of NATO headquarters and facilities. But the political climate at the time would not support this model, and so the Consortium became a largely U.S.-led affair, based in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, very much dependent on the energy and commitment of its executive director and his ability to sustain support from the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the Pentagon.

Participation levels and management structures were, at times, at odds with the in-

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6 France was represented by a retired general already seconded to the Marshall Center; British representation was sponsored by the Swiss; Moscow State University represented Russia; Swedish interests were channeled through an air force general responsible for the annual joint U.S.-Swedish Viking exercises in computer simulations.
ternationalizing vision of the Consortium. And yet the Consortium showed itself to be a remarkable organization. In the cliché of the day, it most certainly added value: it became a structurally and philosophically unique institution that contributed to multilateral communications and fostered both understanding and concrete opportunities to professionalize the armed forces associated with the PfP and NATO. In a new Europe, where national security think-tanks were proliferating, it was more than simply another security studies institute with a logo, publications, a phone number, and a website. As its series of annual conferences sought to demonstrate, the Consortium was about participation in a revolution of strategic education linked to security research. The ending of the Cold War, the recent years of bloody conflict in the Western Balkans, the development of emerging technologies for distance learning and communication, the wish to integrate militaries fully in newly-emergent, independent states, the (transitory) doctrinal enthusiasm for the Revolution in Military Affairs, the recognition that national training institutions, NATO, or the universities needed to lead in this area—all contributed to the sense that the Consortium had a unique and important role to play on behalf of the Euro-Atlantic community.

Despite the structural impediments discussed above, the Consortium offered a dynamic mix of official and unofficial representation across the EAPC. In its annual meetings, and in small working and study groups, people from uniformed militaries, government, academic institutions, and the security community discussed issues in a context of freedom and openness that rarely exists in policy communities. As one small but pertinent example of the Consortium’s early uniqueness, nowhere else could Azeris and Armenians meet in a strictly Chatham House-governed, non-governmental atmosphere that encouraged mutual cooperation and respect.

While not everything was rosy, friendships across any number of recently-fallen borders were quick to develop that gave the Consortium even more strength and vitality. Those friendships provided core strength and heartfelt humor that would later prove to be crucial to the maturation and survival of the Consortium. The bottom-up organizational structure, can-do attitude, and creative thinking endowed the Consortium with potential and originality. No one else had actively recruited security researchers from Eastern Europe and Central Asia. New scholars were welcomed and became completely equal participants in any group. Historians were as welcome as political scientists and technologists. There was no compartmentalizing of disciplines; innovation and quality were the intended results. At the beginning, there was neither a political hierarchy nor a hierarchy of ideas—an individual or group who wanted Consortium sponsorship for a new area of study had only to convince the Secretariat Working Group of its intellectual and policy viability. Money, the Consortium governing bodies were repeatedly told, was not a constraint.

The result was that, by the fourth annual conference, held in Moscow in 2001, a

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7 Indeed, to insert a touch of humor to a serious article, from a 2000 meeting in Rome onwards, members of the Consortium Secretariat Working Group (today the Consortium Steering Committee) fittingly began calling their hard-core dedicated group the “Partnership for Pizza Consortium.”
vast range of cross-disciplinary subjects were being addressed both at the annual conferences and in more focused gatherings of individual working group meetings in a variety of settings (meetings that were frequently held in Partner countries in order to maximize their inclusion in the security dialogue).

All of this was faithfully representative of the Consortium’s mission. But there were also marked limitations, particularly when measured against published output. Publications had been seen from the outset as a vital area for the Consortium to prove its worth. Virtually no academic journal concentrated on the security concerns of Partner nations; NATO enlargement was the theme that was assumed to subsume the range of concerns that confronted these states. The Connections series of publications was designed to meet that evident need. If Europe was again to be whole and secure, the interests of all Europeans had to be understood, not just those of either the NATO family or the bigger powers of Russia and Ukraine to the east. Two weaknesses became apparent almost immediately that severely limited the Consortium’s capacity to succeed in this vacant publishing niche. The first was that the standards of writing, research, and information in former Communist countries were low. There were obvious individual exceptions, and they appear regularly in past volumes of the quarterly journal, Connections.

The second limitation was that the working groups—the intellectual engine of Consortium activities—actually produced publishable material in only a minority of cases. This is not at all to say that no work was done; rather, the point is that the working groups preferred informal discourse and networking to the more stringent requirements of academic publishing. Indeed, this same networking and multilateral, informal outreach remains key to the success of the Consortium.

While networking remains a valued effort, the case persists that tangible products of the discussions of the working groups continue to be in short supply. From the standpoint of generating ideas that lead to publications—a standard measure of success in academia—the Western-based academics who were most heavily involved used the working groups as opportunities to test support for research agendas that were then written up in individually authored, peer-reviewed, Western-oriented journals with established reputations in Western Europe or North America. Thus, the Consortium might have done a better job at exploiting the unique openings in information exchange and dissemination offered by the working groups.

The Concrete Operational Stage: 2005 to Today

Where the Consortium has been genuinely successful is in serving as host for a variety of activities that, perhaps ironically, did not expressly need the Consortium in order to take place, but have chosen to use it as a vehicle for achieving wider participation, acceptance, and support. This is most obvious in what, ten years on, remains of the working groups:

8 The most notable exceptions were the Western-supported working groups, like the Austrian-run Regional Stability for South East Europe Study Group, or the Swiss-run Security Sector Reform Working Group.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working Group</th>
<th>Prime Movers</th>
<th>Publishing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Distributed Learning</td>
<td>U.S. &amp; Switzerland</td>
<td>Web-based, limited (proceedings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Development</td>
<td>U.S. and Canada</td>
<td>Web-based, limited (proceedings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combating Terrorism</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Prolific, U.S.-sponsored or in Connections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Prolific, DCAF Geneva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Stability–Southeast Europe</td>
<td>Austria(^9)</td>
<td>Prolific and sustained, Austrian Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Stability–Greater Black Sea Area</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Little so far</td>
</tr>
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In every case, the work being done is clearly being sponsored for national reasons: the U.S. Joint Forces Command has a global responsibility to the services of the U.S. military to provide distance education; the Austrian Ministry of Defense follows its national interests in helping to clarify the situation in the Balkans, and is especially generous with publishing; the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces still finds it convenient to do SSR work within the framework of the Consortium; and the events of 9/11 imposed terror as an issue for the Consortium to confront, with encouragement from the Bush Administration.\(^{10}\) It is not unreasonable to suggest that, in every case identified in the table above, the lead institution involved would be doing exactly what they are doing now, even if the Consortium did not exist.

Clearly, this internal dichotomy both rewards and subverts the Consortium. On the one hand, it provides continuity and purpose, but at a minimal cost to the U.S. exchequer or policy community. On the other hand, it is hardly a ringing endorsement of what is—and still could be—unique about the Consortium. Still, that internal, tensile strength of self-interest is what carried the Consortium through its more troubled second half-decade. It allowed the participants to sustain their commitment to the unique opportunities to further professionalize and prepare the armed forces throughout the Alliance and beyond, and to do so under radically altered and rapidly changing strategic conditions.

That same inner strength also helped Consortium insiders to cope with the internal disappointments that occurred within the organization. The first of these was evident at

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\(^{10}\) Few in the Consortium resisted the idea, but they wanted terrorism to be examined *across* the working groups, not isolated from other security concerns or debates.
the 2001 conference in Moscow. This was a huge event—the biggest in the Consortium’s history—and the stakes were high. But it was, by almost any standard, a failure. Inspired by good intentions about bringing the new Russia into the Euro-Atlantic family, it was bedeviled by the nomenklatura members who ran the Moscow State University, by Russian determination to make information security (or, rather, counter-espionage through the Internet) the theme of the conference, and by the need of former client states to make much of their newly-found independence. In effect, it became two parallel conferences at loggerheads with each other and, overall, represented a blow to the Consortium, the defining purpose of which had been apparently lost in the melee.

In retrospect, the 2001 conference in Moscow and the 2002 conference in Paris were pivotal events. Both at and after the 2003 conference, which was held in Berlin, nothing was quite the same. A new Director at the Marshall Center faithfully conveyed the Bush Administration’s skepticism with vigor and clarity. Met by European incredulity, hostility, or misunderstanding, there was no singularly coherent response from the Consortium in defense of its mission and uniqueness. Used to a more responsive style of U.S. leadership, Europeans within the governing elements of the Consortium were forced back into focusing on their narrow national priorities and/or into sustaining that momentum of activities represented by the institutionally secure working groups and reflected at annual conferences. Numerically, participation by individuals declined, not least through the impact of canceling the 2006 annual conference, which called into question the purpose of the Consortium as an agent of change and security networking.\(^{11}\)

In parallel, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan were exacting their inevitable price in terms of what was deemed “relevant.” In addition, in relative economic and security terms, Central and Eastern Europe were doing fairly well, and history was on the move. A combination of NATO and EU expansion could surely be relied upon to solidify the infrastructure for security and prosperity. Even those who were suspicious about the long-term sustainability of these developments had to concede that things could certainly have been a lot worse. Even in the Balkans, the post-Dayton arrangements were holding. It might have been skin deep; it might have been an illusion, skillfully presented. But it could be offered in government circles as a positive development.

If that most intractable European problem of the Balkans was on its way to a solution, just how much emphasis and resources did the integration of Central and Eastern European states into the Euro-Atlantic family actually now require? It is very hard, given the pressures on military budgets everywhere, to blame politicians and officials for answering that with, “Not as much as we had thought.” Unsurprisingly, the Consortium’s own answer has been to help provide NATO itself with training assistance in its Partnership Action Plan—Defense Institution Building (PAP–DIB) and Education for Reform programs. This is an institutional survival strategy that appeals particularly to the Consortium’s U.S. and German sponsors, and brings to NATO much-needed

\(^{11}\) Originally, the annual conference was the centrepiece of the Consortium’s activities, and served as its main operating body.
training and education expertise. It is a natural evolution in that it reflects the Partnership for Peace as it now is, not as it was at its inception. NATO enlargement has emphasized the special needs of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. In strict constructionist terms, this approach falls within the original mandate of the Consortium. A looser construction would see it as a narrowing and limiting initiative that leaves the Consortium with few attractive options for the long term.

**The Formal Operational Stage: Will it be Implemented?**

In the scope of human history, ten years is very little time at all. While Central and Eastern Europe have benefited and, in many cases, thrived, efforts there should be strengthened. The Consortium should be looking to branch out once again, with lessons learned from the past and newly developed abilities retained. While Central Asian nations have suffered setbacks, the Consortium should be ready to work in close concert with them. Indeed, time may show that the Consortium will yet have another unique opportunity.

The agenda of the Consortium needs to be restructured to ensure that the working groups focus on the key issues facing the EAPC region and beyond. Currently this would mean that there would be working groups dedicated to such themes as PAP-DIB, regional stability in crisis regions, cooperation with countries of the greater Middle East, relations with the EU and Russia, comprehensive approaches to peace making and conflict management, emerging threats, and others.

The Consortium also needs to rethink its overall objectives. It currently concentrates on networking, training, and outreach, and all these aspects will doubtless remain important to its work. But the Consortium needs an overarching concept to orient its activities. One suggestion would be that it frame itself as a community for policy development, where the emphasis would be on generating workable ideas that can strengthen Euro-Atlantic cooperation and overall effectiveness. This function is chronically underdeveloped at both the governmental and non-governmental levels in many Euro-Atlantic countries, and needs the kind of transnational framework the Consortium could provide. Training and education would remain key dimensions of the Consortium’s activities, but would have capacity building for policy development as their core purpose. The Consortium needs to see itself as a results-oriented body that generates ideas and policy proposals for the consideration of a broader audience, both public and governmental.

Henri Matisse once noted in his old age that it had bothered him all his life that he didn’t paint like everyone else, and so too it might be for those who have painted this picture of the Consortium. Perhaps the brushstrokes weren’t made just right, or the subject matter isn’t quite what we had intended. But the picture, on the whole, serves to show what makes the Consortium unique. Openness, dynamism, and vibrancy also have corollaries. Yet, uniqueness, no doubt, has been retained, and is the key to the Consortium’s continuing success.
The PfP Consortium as a Change Management and Integration Tool: Ten Years of Experience

*Velizar Shalamanov*

**Introduction: Development of the Consortium in the Spirit of PfP**

The PfP Consortium was born in 1999 at NATO’s Fiftieth Anniversary at the Washington Summit, although the idea of the Consortium was first tested in 1998 at ISF in Zurich.¹ Bulgaria had the privilege of hosting the Second PfP Consortium Annual Conference in Sofia—the first gathering dedicated to the new initiative to define the road-map for the future “troika council” that had been established to provide continuity between the annual conferences.

The objectives defined in Washington were “fostering greater academic and educational opportunities within the defense and security community; encouraging high standards for professional military education; promoting cost-effective education through collaborative distance learning and distributed training; expanding dialogue, understanding, and cooperation through security-related research in EAPC countries; and, exploring complementary relationships with institutions such as the NATO Defense College.” About ten years later it is time to see how these goals were pursued, and to assess to what extent they have been achieved in EAPC area.

The Statement of the Principles of the Consortium and the Statement of Operation and Administration were approved at the conference in Sofia. This marked the formal start of the new initiative, which was prepared by a team led by Dr. Kennedy and Dr. Winkler at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany.² The following year, in 2000, Dr. Winkler took over the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), an organization that played a key role in moving the Consortium forward.

From the very beginning, the Consortium—having been established in the spirit of PfP—was an effective change management instrument that provided the opportunity for defense academies to work with civilian universities and security studies institutes, many of them NGOs from PfP countries. The development of the Consortium was facilitated by annual conferences, and through its relationships with other forums such as the International Security Forum (ISF), the George Marshall Center Alumni Association, the NATO Defense College Alumni Association, and the Conference of the

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Commandants of the Defense Staff Colleges activities.

Now, a decade later, I propose to look at the Consortium’s work and assess its role in the research and education community at large, and in every country and region. This endeavor could help shape the future of this initiative that is dedicated to supporting the formation of a stronger Euro-Atlantic community of security experts. This paper aims to analyze the development of the Consortium from a practitioner’s perspective; it identifies problems, looks at different levels of community integration, and examines the Consortium’s use as a change management tool. In my view, after ten successful years the future of the Consortium lies in facilitating an international and multidisciplinary operational analysis process by providing research infrastructure support (mostly computer assisted technologies) for study teams. The Consortium could become the base for the integration of the efforts of many research programs in the security area, programs supported by NATO, the EU and other organizations or individual countries for the common benefit of the strategic community established by the Consortium.

The Consortium Viewed from Different Angles

As a former deputy defense minister in Bulgaria, I had first-hand experience with the Washington Summit and the second annual Consortium conference in Sofia, as well the next two conferences in Tallinn (2000) and Moscow (2001). As a chairman of the George C. Marshall Association, a think tank in Bulgaria, I also took part in the annual PfP conferences in Paris (2002), Berlin (2003), and Bucharest (2004). Later I was able to evaluate the PfP Consortium through experiences gained from roles I held in a variety of settings: at the NATO Science Committee Human and Societal Dynamics of Security (HSD) Advisory Panel, at DCAF, and as a practitioner organizing security-related research projects in Bulgaria as well as security-related educational courses in various universities. Currently, as a participant in ESRIF, I have had the opportunity to experience the EU perspective on the PfP Consortium’s areas of activity.

My work in preparation for the second annual conference in Sofia paved the way for my participation in DCAF (representing Bulgaria as a co-founder in 2000), the NATO Science Committee Advisory Panel on HSD (2004), and ESRIF (2007). My personal experience has shown that one of the key accomplishments of the Consortium is bringing people together and facilitating the development of a strategic community in the area of security-related research and education.

The agenda of the Consortium is an excellent example of the capacity to identify key security problems and to organize a focused approach to study them in a multinational environment. In practical terms, the framework of the Consortium was effectively used to internally define research topics for study, or to test and promote topics coming from different research organizations participating in the forum. For the first several years an important task of the Consortium was to develop its research and educational agenda and to explore some key tools that could be used to support cooperative projects in the security area. At the same time, one of the key results of these activities has been the development and strengthening of the strategic research community in the security domain. The three most important areas of the consortium’s work are:
• Identification of key research and educational priorities in security and defense
• Development of the critical instruments that can help support research and education or build a general infrastructure for cooperation
• Building a strategic community through Education and Research.

Considering the PfP Consortium as a security institution, we could define four main pillars of its development:

• Documental (conceptual and normative) base: from the initial concept paper (1998) through the statement of principles (1999) to the subsequent conceptual documents
• Organizational base: starting from the structures defined by the statement for operation and administration (1999) and proceeding to all subsequent arrangements for a secretariat, a senior advisory council, and a steering committee
• Capabilities base: mostly connected with the working groups, publications, website, and other capabilities
• Resource base: provided by nations and key participating organizations.

The Consortium is a security institution that should be based on effective international cooperation with well-established democratic control (including guidance provided through the participation of many NGOs). The key aspect of the Consortium’s continuing success is its capability for change management in the security and institutional environment. PfP itself has changed a great deal, and NATO’s new partnerships will continue to have added impact on the Consortium.

Since its inception the Consortium has played an integration role on several levels:

• Integration between research and education that was not a practice in Warsaw Pact countries
• Integration between “hard” and “soft” security studies by inviting defense academies to work with research and educational bodies dealing with civil security, public order, crisis management, civil protection, and human security
• Integration on a regional level under the common umbrella of the PfP
• Integration between classical research and educational methods and modern IT-based tools
• Integration between studies under different programs, including NATO and EU programs
• Integration between technology-oriented disciplines and the social sciences and humanities.

The development of the Consortium could be assessed in correlation with other initiatives in the area of security research and education. SWOT (Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats) analysis by professional teams could provide an objective picture of the competitive advantages of this initiative, but even from a general review it is easy to see the uniqueness of the Consortium’s scope and flexibility. These characteristics could be seen as limitations to taking an institutional approach to the forum’s work. Step by step, working groups were established around existing institu-
tions; their agenda and vision, and even their very presence within the framework of the Consortium, were subject to strong institutional influences exerted by the host organizations. In my view, the Consortium is a valuable and effective change management tool in the security area through knowledge sharing and integration facilitation, which is an area where future efforts should be consolidated.

**The Consortium as a Change Management Tool**

The Partnership for Peace initiative was at its core a change management instrument for the defense and security sectors of the former Warsaw Pact countries. Four years after the start of the PfP, the Consortium addressed the foundation of any successful security transformation efforts by putting its emphasis on research and education. It essentially differed from NATO’s Science Program, which was established in 1958 and operated under NATO’s Science Committee, and which in its later years focused mostly on the integration of scientists from Partner countries. The Consortium is also different from the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Societies, which was founded in 1969. Established in the spirit of PfP, the Consortium is a flexible organization with a mandate (set forth in its original concept paper) focused on building common understanding of security and security policy. In this respect—serving as a change management instrument and developing a network for security research and improvement of education—the progress made by the Consortium is tremendous. On the other side, as will be discussed below, the power of integration is still limited. Many of the groups are clustered around the “engines”—such as DCAF, the Austrian Defence Academy, and other institutions—and many have received particular support and leadership from the United States, but visible ownership on the part of non-NATO former Warsaw Pact countries has proved elusive. Sub-regional networks again are inspired and powered by Western institutions; there is still no other example of the caliber of the Baltic Defense College in Estonia anywhere in South East Europe, the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, or Central Asia. There are not even any such research institutes active in these regions on a virtual basis. One of the problems is that, even though the Consortium was by design established to be open to civil universities and NGOs, the primary focus on institution building and funding is still directed toward defense academies. These institutions are more conservative when it comes to participating in regional cooperation mechanisms, and are also more vulnerable to political influence and changes in government.

Looking at the most successful role of the Consortium, there are at least four levels of change to be considered:

- NATO’s activities in the area of research and education
- PfP-related research and educational activities
- Internally for the countries (an illustration based on the case of Bulgaria is considered)

3 Stamey, “The Way Ahead.”
• In defined sub-regions such as SEE, the wider Black Sea Area, Caucasus, and Central Asia through building regional working groups on specific topics and the development of regional identity on security matters.

Functionally, the change was visible in the areas of:

• Technology: promoting Advanced Distance Learning (ADL), modeling and simulation (M&S), knowledge portals
• Curriculum development, education, and training: the introduction of new programs, courses, and techniques for education and training
• Research activity and publications: the development of new periodicals and a book series.

The development of working groups proved that, without the support of a strong institution (as the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces’ link with the working groups on Security Sector Reform and Crisis Management, for example), it is difficult to expect effective results. Another example was the history of the group initiated in Sofia (1999) on ESDI/CESDP, later transformed to become the Euro-Atlantic Security Working Group, which was cancelled due to a lack of institutional support. Having strong support behind the Partnership Information Management System (PIMS), Modeling and Simulation, and Advanced Distance Learning Working Groups was another good example of the critical role of leadership and resource management in introducing change.

The Consortium’s integration with other NATO programs, especially under the division of public diplomacy—including NATO’s Science Committee programs under the aegis of the Advisory Panel on Human and Societal Dynamics of Security (established in 2004)—and with the different instruments of Science for Peace (SfP), including SfP projects, Advanced Research Workshops (ARW), Advanced Study Institutes (ASI), and Advanced Training Courses (ATC) proved to play an important role in building synergy among different initiatives of NATO and NATO countries for mutual support of the projects. The Education for Reform Initiative and the Partnership Action Plans (PAP)—and especially the Institution Building Initiative—showed the integral role of the PfP Consortium as an environment that supports security research and education-related initiatives.

The PfP Consortium is large and wide-ranging, which makes it hard to expect to find easily measurable results for the whole organization. Its environment is suited for concept development and experimentation, to serving as a “test bed” for more specific initiatives in certain subject areas, regions, or even separate countries. The Consortium is designed to motivate visionary and strategic thinking. Implementation follows in the concrete projects initiated by specific stakeholder organizations or countries. The most

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important role the Consortium can play in change management is at the national level, where the real capabilities are maintained: national defense academies, research institutes, universities, NGOs, national security research, education policy, and strategy development and implementation.

**Influence of the Consortium on Security Research and Education in Bulgaria, South East Europe, and the Black Sea Region**

During its 2001 annual meeting in Moscow, the Consortium was used as a venue to discuss the idea of the SEE Defense College as a virtual distributed network of existing defense colleges using the modern technologies that have developed within the framework of the PfP, such as ADL and SIMNET. A subsequent idea, for a Black Sea Virtual Distributed Defense & Security University, has been under discussion since 2004, including the prospect of situating it within the framework of the newly established Black Sea Working Group in the PfP Consortium. As with the SEE Defense College, however, there have been no visible developments.

At the same time, ADL and SIMNET as well as PIMS are providing a prime opportunity for cooperation between defense colleges; even without a formal regional institution, such as SEE or the Black Sea defense college, these new technologies are exerting a significant influence on the development of shared curricula and joint exercises. So it may well be the case that this form of technology-enabled cooperation is the best way to work in the Consortium environment, rather than creating new institutions from scratch that are wedded to a specific location. In this sense, the computer-assisted exercise (CAX) environment for regional civil security/crisis management cooperation in SEE⁵ and WBSA⁶ was largely discussed within NATO forums and was related to PfP Consortium activities. This linkage again created a positive situation for the use of new technologies (PIMS in particular) as a tool for the next level of cooperation.

The presence of networking activities between both people and organizations as a precondition for creating synergies in security research and education provided visible results in South East Europe and in the wider Black Sea region.⁷ The effectiveness of this approach could be attributed to the various regional initiatives rooted in PfP Consortium working groups. A specific aspect is the development of security research and education programs on the national level that are cultivated in the spirit of the PfP

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Consortium. In the case of Bulgaria, we could consider a process started by a group of NGOs that was focused on:

1. Establishing the SSR Coalition in Bulgaria in 2002 in support of the integration of Bulgaria in NATO and the EU
2. Commencing the SSR program at the University of Sofia, as well as establishing new programs on crisis management and Euro-Atlantic security; these programs “proliferated” in some other universities as a new area of teaching or as an instrument for the improvement of existing programs (this was the case in the Defense and Staff College, the Academy of the Ministry of Interior, the University of National and World Economy, and the New Bulgarian University) and was linked to the establishment of new Master’s degree programs
3. Establishing the Center for National Security and Defense Research within the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in 2002)
4. Initiating NATO SfP Project’s (SfP 981149) Center of Operational Analyses (COA) in the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
5. Creating several new research NGOs to support regional studies, such as the Center for SEE Studies (CSEES), the Center for Black Sea Security Studies (CBSSS), and others
6. Launching the Center for Security Studies at the Sofia University in 2008
7. Developing a new security research program in Bulgaria, which was started in the above context and with the support of NATO Science Committee as well as the European Security Research and Innovation Forum.

One of the problems identified as a result of the study on research projects for the period 1999–2008 was the issue of the governance and coordination of security studies. More than one hundred projects were analyzed, from the following points of view:

- Area of study
- Financing
- Use of results
- Implementing organization

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10 The SECRES study was initiated in Bulgaria to support the nation’s participation in the ESRIF and FORESEC projects under Framework Program 7 of the EU.
• Used research infrastructure.

As a result, the proposal for the EU-funded Operational Program “Administrative Capacity” is under development to provide financing for the development of modern governance, management, and assessment capabilities for security-related research in the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and partner organizations from universities and NGOs.

**Conclusion: The Consortium as an Integration Tool**

In the last ten years, the Consortium passed through several labor-intensive steps, including identification of topics for research and education, differentiating between working groups by topics and sub-regions, and integrating the research and education community through annual conferences, the journal *Connections* and other publications, and development of the Consortium website and the network of web pages of the various working groups. We could claim that main goals of the Consortium have been addressed successfully, and it is true that these efforts over the past decade have been beneficial in many respects. But the future development of the Consortium will only be possible through the continued integration of solid national capabilities for research and education in the security area. States have to review their own research and education strategies, organizations, infrastructure, capabilities, and resources to strengthen national governance and coordination in order to be valuable partners in the integration process within the Consortium.

In my view, the Consortium is a tool for both change management and integration, but its effectiveness and success depends on the capabilities of the countries participating in the process, as well as the capabilities of the involved institutions. In 1999, during the presentation of the Bulgarian MoD book produced for the Partners, titled *Vision, Will, and Faith*, Dr. Bob Kennedy (then-director of the George C. Marshall Center) noted very clearly that “Capabilities” would also be necessary in order to succeed. This is still the main challenge for the participants in the Consortium, because its strength is based on the integration of the capabilities of the participating nations and institutions.

The consortium can serve as an integration tool not only for nations and participating institutions, but also for the research and education related programs within NATO and the EU. This will provide genuine added value to the efforts in these formally structured organizations, which need better cooperation in the security area.

After playing a successful role as a tool of change management, it may be that the time has come to consolidate the most effective tools for strengthening the community. My personal experience is that curriculum development, operational analysis, and computer-assisted exercises are three interrelated and very powerful tools for community building. Using these tools, the PfP Consortium could focus its integration agenda on the support of institution building and cooperative projects among nations at the sub-regional level. In this sense, the Consortium could come to represent the over-reaching architecture for supporting common standards in education and research, es-
Especially in the areas of operational analysis and CAX in support of institution building and transformation.

The future challenges for the PfP Consortium are related to the challenge facing the PfP itself, as well as that facing the Public Diplomacy program within NATO. First, the Consortium and Public Diplomacy cannot be seen as the only outreach programs from NATO to its partner nations. Second, the partners are not only those nations that are members of PfP. PfP was regionalized as a result of the integration into NATO of key countries from Central and Eastern Europe to groups of countries in the Western Balkans, Caucasus, and Central Asia, as well as some affluent Western countries. There are new partner nations in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and other areas of the world where research and education could be important tools for strengthening security, providing legitimacy for NATO, and extending the strategic community for change. Third, the diversity of studies is contrasted with the standardization of tools: ADL, CAX, virtual distributed networks for knowledge management, etc. Fourth, in addition to the process of institution building in security research is the development of research infrastructure itself, and the development of a culture of using operational analysis in decision-making support for higher quality and transparency of security policy.

The PfP Consortium was established ten years ago as a tool to identify research areas of common interest, to differentiate the activities of various working groups, and to deepen studies divided by topics and regions. Networking, research infrastructure, shared research in high technology, and educational tools are critical integration instruments for scientists. The continued process of institution building in security research and education for NATO partners is essential, and should be focused on developing the research infrastructure that is needed to support the institutions. One of the most important tasks could be the development of strong national operational analysis (OA) capabilities in order to be able to exploit the results of different studies in the decision support process of the security institutions. In addition to ADL, the Consortium could be a leader in introducing of the methodologies of OA and CAX as key instruments in the area of security research and institution building. Practically all the studies of the working groups provide excellent input for focused OA projects. CAX could be used to facilitate the introduction of new concepts and ideas as well as to build team spirit in the international decision-making environment. It means that a special group at the Consortium Secretariat at the Marshall Center in Garmisch could provide training in the use of OA/CAX methodologies for specific problem-solving purposes in the EAPC community as well as to facilitate introduction of OA/CAX-related education in defense academies and universities dealing with security research and training. This aspect of the Consortium’s activity would serve as a powerful instrument for integrating other idea/concept/data generation projects created by the working groups.
Whence and Whither the PfP Consortium?

Frederic Labarre *

The PfP Consortium is already a full ten years old. The time has come to look back on the road it has traveled, and to anticipate what lies on the road ahead. This essay will dwell upon the most significant achievements of the Consortium (in my eyes), as well as upon some shortcomings.

In doing so, it is useful to reflect on the notion of “PfP.” This shorthand method of referring to both partnership and peace obscures the meaning of these two very powerful words. As a “Partnership,” the Consortium requires the input of a variety of actors, and in this regard the support staff at the Marshall Center deserves most of the credit, as do the countries that have been generous with both their funding and logistical support over the years. Clearly, the United States, Switzerland, Germany, and Austria deserve most of the credit here.

But the notion of “Peace” brings into focus the actions of those countries, institutions, and individuals for whom the Consortium was intended. The PfP nations of ten years ago—many of whom are now members of NATO and/or the EU—have been indirectly led into the larger process of integration through the willingness of their institutions to interact with partner institutions in other countries. For the directors and project managers in these academies, institutes, and ministries, this has required an inordinate amount of faith and moral courage. Discovering and displaying the moral courage necessary to shed the established views and the momentum of habits of fifty (if not (seventy) years of Cold War has been difficult indeed, even on the “Western” side of the equation.

In this respect, the successes that have been achieved are partial, but still significant. In the case of the South East Europe, the catastrophe brought on in the Balkans by the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia had to be stopped by UN and allied intervention on two occasions since the end of the Cold War, in Bosnia and Kosovo. But this did not keep representatives from various factions from meeting in the halls of Reichenau Castle every spring (at the workshops held by the PfP Study Group on “Regional Stability in South East Europe”) to discuss, mostly constructively, the challenges of peace. Although the actors present at these meetings rarely had the power or authority to enforce any decisions that might have arisen from the spring discussions in Austria, an indirect influence was achieved by demonstrating what decades of peace could achieve, with the right mix of civic responsibility, tolerance, and accountability.

Looking at the success of the Regional Stability in South East Europe Study Group, I do believe that we can identify certain elements of success. The first element is the commitment of a nation to host such an event in a recurring, predictable manner, championed by an expert team of organizers, and also supported by actors from the re-

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The supervision and attention to detail on the part of the event organizers ensures that participants will be able to focus freely on the issues at stake. Most importantly, however, the presence of actors from the region ensures the legitimacy of the process. This sort of legitimacy, buttressed by genuine academic support, is a cornerstone of success. Too often, “Westerners” have been accused of lecturing when they should be listening. This charge of proselytism is harder to level against individuals who are from the region under discussion, however. Integration into a community of diverse and challenging views is that much more readily accomplished when “one of your own” (if we must use these terms) is seen as being fully “integrated.”

Another element of success has to do with the understanding that human beings and institutions—especially those that are operating under the stress of being forced to define a new identity because of the emergence of new states, and the disintegration of old ones—are fundamentally proud, and thus are reluctant to publicly discuss the sensitive core of the issue. The Study Group has attempted to compensate for this human character flaw by offering as many opportunities for face-to-face discussions that take place away from the scrutiny of the editor of the conference proceedings.

North Americans are normally impatient, and I am no different. Many of us may have chafed at the thought that no “project” or deliverable seemed to emerge from certain working groups. Unfortunately for North Americans, we can rarely assume that we have the luxury of pursuing a program that takes the long view. The Austrian National Defence Academy has provided support for nearly the last ten years to ensure that the RSSEE conferences can take place every spring in Reichenau, Austria. Because of this long-term support, one can evaluate (through the published conference proceedings) the ways in which the topic of the conferences has evolved through the years. If 2001 was dominated by the question of the Presevo Valley and Kosovar Albanian incursions into Macedonia, the 2003 meetings held in Dubrovnik, Croatia, were focused on the link between crime and economic development. The fact that the topics of the discussions at these meetings moved away from contentious matters of sovereignty and boundaries and toward narrow social issues with more long-term influence on peace in the Balkans is a sign of the maturity emerging in the region, which is felt but also indirectly fed by the organizers of the conferences in Austria, Croatia, and Bulgaria. This evolution is a deliverable that demonstrates the regional success of the Study Group and the broader impact of the PfP Consortium.

Austria and Switzerland, through the Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in Geneva, have attempted to provide a similar long-term schedule of meetings and workshops focused on the issue of civil control of security services for actors from the Black Sea area and the Caucasus. While the achievements in this regard were less tangible that in the case of South East Europe, I fondly remember a meeting in 2003, where I was privileged to the reaction of Georgian participants to the Rose Revolution taking place in their country at the same time that Austria was hosting a working group on the Caucasus. The effect here was to bring into perspective the very reason for the PfP Consortium’s existence: it was designed to help those who were in charge of managing situations of great change. It has been five years since the Rose Revolution, and now it is Armenia that is in the throes of fundamental change. To
those who may have doubted the validity of such a forum, the lessons of Georgia in 2003 and Armenia at the moment I write these lines are potent reminders that change is best handled by talking, and not fighting, and that therefore, the PfP Consortium’s job is not over.

The Caucasus Working Group found itself fused with a working group devoted to the emergent Black Sea area, and the combined body was soon incorporated into the Romanian defense university. Its inaugural conference, held in Bucharest in January–February 2006, demonstrated to all doubters that the organizers had a precise plan for how they wanted to manage this working group. As a result of this clarity, the organizers were able to elevate the number of participants, as well as to increase the range of the participants in terms of specialization. The fact that Russian admirals, Turkish diplomats, Georgian ambassadors, and Romanian parliamentarians were at the same table discussing issues related to the future use of the Black Sea and the potential creation of a Black Sea defense college with academics from Germany and the U.S. and officials from NATO (among many others) leaves no doubt that the PfP Consortium is capable of attracting attention in the highest decision-making circles, and that officials of high stature can have confidence in the discussion of matters with important stakes that take place within a context of relative informality. To the creators of the PfP Consortium, the fact that Romania was taking ownership of such an important strategic forum demonstrated the depth of the success of the Consortium’s integration processes and the commitment of its participants.

Other working groups, such as the Military History Working Group, may have been treated less fairly. Due to budgetary pressures, the Military History Working Group—which has by far the highest “entertainment” value, or ability to generate broader interest—had to be cut, but its value was such that it continued to attract the interest of various participants. The last meeting, held in Kingston, Ontario in March 2007, took place outside the rubric of the PfP Consortium, but reunited participants from Austria, Canada, France, Romania, Slovakia, and the United States, to name just a few. The contribution of the Military History Working Group to the parallel history of the Cold War should also be understood as an essential milestone in the process of great power reconciliation, and I can testify that the example of this contribution was often put forward as a practical measure of confidence building in the Balkans. What the Balkans need, among many other important things, is a common understanding of history. Lest we forget, it is difficult for many of us to make sense of where we are going by forgetting where we came from. The Regional Stability in South East Europe Study Group, piloted by our Austrian colleagues, continues to promote this shared understanding.

When we speak of tangible deliverables, none rivals (in the North American mind, at least) those of the Advanced Distributed Learning Working Group. Here, the contributions of Germany, Switzerland, the Ukraine, and the United States shine particularly brightly. The aim of the ADL Working Group is to bring together technicians and practitioners (some from as far away as Australia) to set up processes and tools for developing and hosting online courses for the benefit of the other working groups, academics, and institutions. Here, the discussions have been decidedly less political and more technical in nature. No one can discount the impact that the ADL Working Group
has had in stimulating work and exploration of novel training and education delivery techniques and tools in the NATO world. Today, the NATO Defense College in Rome and the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany both use courses designed through the interaction of the various working groups to bring greater efficiency to the delivery of their onsite curricula. Hungary, Poland, and Romania now all embrace the benefits of ADL in the development of their armed forces, following the examples of Canada, Sweden, and the United States.

The impact of the ADL Working Group’s achievements is testimony to the group’s commitment to excellence and to the continued refinement of the product (an improvement process that has taken place perhaps to the chagrin of those of us who are less technologically inclined). This has led some to believe that perhaps most (if not all) military training and education could be replaced by ADL. This is clearly not the case, and those of us who deal with such issues have to constantly engage those who believe it to be true on the one hand, and those who fear that it will come true, on the other hand. Clearly, the working group should perhaps communicate better to the non-initiated what the potential for ADL is. ADL is a medium that, when misused, can stifle academic freedom rather than stimulate it. This is why I believe that future meetings of the ADL Working Group should deal less with the technicalities of the instrument, and focus more on how to bring it to bear in a responsible manner. Perhaps the creation of a peer-review panel to vet new courses would be in order, but I will leave that issue to the chair of the ADL Working Group.

But so much for the past. Where are we going now? I must observe with much regret that the country (and the attendant institutions) that was most in need of engagement—Russia—is not as present within our working groups and study groups as would be hoped. In my eight years of involvement with the PfP Consortium, I have met only six Russian nationals. Lately, the family of publications has dropped Russian as a language of translation, which I believe is a real tragedy, if only for those citizens in other countries who are more comfortable with this language than they are with English. Again, budgetary pressures are to blame, but the paucity of interest emanating from Russian institutions is also a cause.

At a moment when Russia is emerging once again as a global player, forums such as the PfP Consortium, where discussions deal with significant issues in an informal manner, are needed more than ever. There is a feeling that the general trend in foreign policy-making in the U.S.—more concerned with the Middle East than with Central and Eastern Europe—has clearly been detrimental to the PfP Consortium. But, as an officer working for the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense has confided, regardless of who holds the key to the White House in November 2008, one can be assured of a greater spirit of cooperation with Europe in the wake of the travails of the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. Coming from the most generous funding agent of the PfP Consortium, this bodes rather well for the future.

But resources are not the only issue. Much needs to be done to help make the Euro-Atlantic arena fully peaceful and functional; the work in Kosovo is clearly not complete, and the developments there could have a reverse effect in Bosnia, now that SFOR has yielded to EUFOR, which is conducting mostly police activities that are less...
coercive in nature. Reforms in Georgia are under pressure by secessionist impulses and by the influence of neighboring states. Ukraine and Croatia may be standing ready to join NATO, but in some cases in may be true that the message that the Alliance intends to convey is being misconceived in the potential member states (just as it is being misperceived in Russia). Clearly, more integration is needed.

Armenia’s domestic situation is also tense. The situations in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Transnistria remain frozen because policy attention has been drawn away by the spectacular actions by millionaire terrorist miscreants. At a moment when energy policy has had so powerful an adverse impact on years of work on “good-neighborly relations,” shouldn’t the PfP Consortium seek to consolidate the successes of the past decade in a way to effect constructive policy-making in the region for all involved (indirectly, if need be)? Shouldn’t there be an Energy Security Working Group under the PfP umbrella? All these matters remain for the next ten, twenty, or perhaps thirty years. These subjects should clearly be the focus of more than the occasional paper in Connections.

And certainly, special overtures should be made to Russia. More has to be done within the PfP Consortium to promote cordial relations with this great country, perhaps including re-issuing Connections in Russian. At a moment when Russia’s representatives will be invited to attend the NATO Summit in Bucharest, the least that the PfP Consortium can do to welcome with open arms those who, in my estimation at least, have the greatest interest in sharing their concerns and priorities in the spirit of cooperation should define the twenty-first century, rather than the realpolitik habits of the nineteenth century, to which our countries are always at risk of returning.
ADDENDA
Vision of PFP in the 21st Century

Our ultimate goal for the 21st century should be a cooperative security network of Allies and Partners, with PFP as the cornerstone. Therefore, we must remain steadfast in our commitment to PFP's evolution as an independent framework for European security, worthy of membership in its own right, as well as its preparatory role for Alliance membership for those who desire it. While PFP will remain a primary vehicle for preparing aspiring NATO members for the military obligations that Alliance membership entails, it is not just a stepping stone and should not be portrayed simply in these terms. In other words, PFP is not a means to an end. It is an end in itself. As we continue the process begun in 1991 of recognizing that new challenges mean new missions for the Alliance, we should always look for opportunities for Partner participation in those missions. Thus the increasing role of Partners should be reflected in the updated Strategic Concept.

Continue Enhancements

We've already taken a major step toward creating this 21st Century cooperative security network of Allies and Partners by agreeing to and implementing PFP enhancements. A year ago at Madrid, our governments agreed to a substantial package of enhancements that, when fully implemented, will create a fundamentally different Partnership – one in which Partners have a greater voice in the management of PFP and numerous new opportunities to build interoperability with NATO and learn NATO procedures. In the Consolidated Report on PFP Enhancement, we said we would give Partners a greater voice in PFP affairs and regularize Alliance consultations with them. We've since established the EAPC, and it had a successful first year: More than a dozen EAPC bodies met at levels ranging from ministers and ambassadors to subject experts. A week does not go by at NATO without some type of EAPC discussion. For example, EAPC ambassadors and military representatives meet monthly, the EAPC Political-Military Steering Committee meets twice a week and the EAPC in SFOR format meets once a week. In the same report, we said we would create PFP Staff Elements (PSEs). We've now chosen the 38 Partner officers to fill the eight PSEs that will be up and running in just a matter of weeks. We promised to open to Partners permanent military posts in the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC). Seven Partner officers are now serving in those PCC posts, including one in a leadership position in which
Allied and Partner officers alike report to him. We pledged to make the Planning and Review Process (PARP) more like NATO's defense planning process. With today's endorsement of the report on expanding and adapting the PARP, we'll have a more operationally-focused PARP nearly indistinguishable from NATO defense planning, complete with Ministerial Guidance and its own version of force goals. We agreed to allow Partners to open full-fledged Missions to NATO; 26 of 27 PFP partners have either done so or have announced their intention to do so. We sought to expand the scope of NATO infrastructure funding to PFP projects. We now have agreement on the first two projects. These projects will allow for ease of communications in Partner staff elements and better connectivity between PSEs and Partner capitals. Finally, we agreed to open up the range of NATO's senior committees to partner participation. Partners are now well integrated into nearly all of NATO's committees and are making daily contributions in diverse areas such as armaments cooperation, airspace management, and civil emergency planning. Of course, the job is not complete. For example, we've only begun to tackle the remit to create a Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PFP operations. Allies and Partners should continue our work toward fulfilling these PFP enhancements so that we may complete the task of PFP enhancement by the April 1999 Washington Summit.

Taking PFP to the Next Level

As we begin to focus on next year's Summit, we need to start now to develop initiatives to make PFP even more visible and central to the Summit. The United States encourages all Allies and Partners to make proposals for doing so. Today, let me outline U.S. thoughts on improving the PFP training and education system. There is no doubt that PFP exercises—especially as they have been made more complex and qualitative over the past year—provide valuable training to partners. However, we believe there is further room for improvement, with more focused training geared to specific operational and security objectives. For example, there is currently no regular system of feedback on Partner performance in exercises. Specifically, PFP needs to refine its education and training to better incorporate the lessons learned from the wide scope of exercises and other activities that we're carrying out. We need a framework for assessment and measurement of Partner performance against specific standards. Also, we need a way to help Partners tailor their PFP participation to achieve specific interoperability objectives. Widespread interest among Partners to establish their own PFP training centers underscores that PFP is ready to move to the next phase. Partners and Allies alike recognize the need to graduate to higher levels of sophistication in the conduct of military exercises, as well as securing meaningful feedback from participation in these exercises. Within the scope of PFP, both Allies and Partners need to concentrate energy and resources, while collecting and sharing lessons learned. One way to accomplish this is to strengthen existing defense educational institutions by linking them together. The United States has a three-part proposal for building among nations this enhanced education and training framework: 1. A Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes; 2. An exercise simulation network focused on
peace support operation scenarios; and 3. A cooperative network of nationally-sponsored PFP training centers. These proposals are mutually reinforcing and designed to facilitate the evolution of PFP into a robust security institution.

**PFP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes**

The goal of the proposed “Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes”—sponsored jointly by the United States and Germany—is to strengthen defense and military education through enhanced national, institutional cooperation. As cosponsors, the U.S. and Germany hope to increase the number of individuals in Government and private sectors with defense and security policy expertise, further promote professional military education in participating nations, and encourage collaborative approaches to defense education. In addition to our Governmental Defense Academic Institutions and Security Studies Institutes, we believe non-governmental institutes, universities and other similar bodies will also have a valuable potential part to play in this work. All of these bodies can participate in the projected activities of the Consortium, which include:

- an annual conference, which would provide the venue for expert level planning workshops for the activities of ad hoc groups which would be “commissioned” during the conference;

- these ad hoc groups would meet at expert level more frequently and provide for more effective exchanges of information and ideas on PFP-related topics such as training and education.

- a scholarly journal as a mechanism to promote and stimulate leading ideas, with distribution to participants and interested parties' libraries and colleges.

- a Consortium world wide web home page for sharing information.

The Consortium will be a cooperative arrangement of national institutions in the spirit of PFP. It will be for the participating countries to fully define and develop both the scope for the Consortium and how it will operate. To help get started, I and my colleague from the Federal Republic of Germany, Minister Volker Ruehe, are offering the Marshall Center to serve as the interim secretariat for the Consortium, until longer-term arrangements are determined by Consortium. Several Ministers in our group have expressed a willingness to support the Consortium by hosting conferences and providing supporting staff. I look forward to hearing their remarks about this initiative and how best to get started.

**PFP Simulation Network for Peace Support Operations**

In an era of increased operational deployments and diminishing resources, all military forces must take advantage of more cost-effective training resources. Simulation is such a resource. We have seen computer simulations used to great effect as part of the second Combined Joint Task Force implementation trial. SACEUR and SACLANT cooperation in the implementation of two recent NATO exercises with Partner partici-
pation provides a model for the future. SACLANT's exercise, Unified Endeavor, prepared commanders and staffs from Allied and Partner countries for successful participation in the follow-on CJTF field trial, Strong Resolve. Unified Endeavor demonstrated the importance of computer simulation in helping to collect and share lessons learned, provide feedback, and measure performance against stated objectives. We are examining proposals to expand on this success through distributed training employing satellite and computer technology. We hope to bring forward our proposals for wider consideration at December's Ministerial meetings.

Looking to the Future: PFP Training Centers

I welcome the many proposals that Partners have made for PFP training centers -- from Romania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Sweden, and Ukraine. This represents a strong willingness by more Partners to become more closely integrated into NATO's day-to-day work. These centers, however, should not be billed as “regional” centers. Partners and Allies from all areas should plan to use them, not just those closest geographically. Instead, these centers should be “functional” centers, each with a specialization in a particular training area. For example, one center could focus on training for peace support operations, another on defense resource management, while yet another could be dedicated to maneuver and field exercise training. I propose that the Alliance close on the issue of which of these proposals to designate as “PFP training centers” by the time of the next Ministerial in December, with a goal of having these centers open and functioning by the time of the April 1999 summit. This will give concrete substance to what the U.S. hopes will truly be a Partner Summit.
During the EAPC Meeting of Defence Ministers of 12 June 1998, US Secretary of Defence Cohen proposed the creation of a PfP Consortium of defence academies and civilian institutes of security studies. This Consortium should serve to strengthen defence civilian and military professionalism through enhanced institutional cooperation among the forty-four EAPC member states in defence education and training. Its activities should include an annual conference, a dedicated Internet website, a secretariat, and a journal or other appropriate publication to further its goals.

The Federal Republic of Germany cosponsored this proposal and agreed to the establishment of an Interim Secretariat at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen. The group of forty-four Defence Ministers at the EAPC meeting welcomed the initiative.

In support of this initiative, Switzerland proposed that the Consortium’s first conference be conducted in conjunction with the already planned ‘Third International Security Forum,’ to be held on 19-21 October 1998 in Zürich as part of the Swiss-sponsored PfP activities. This proposal was welcomed. The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies and the NATO Defence College were subsequently invited to serve as co-sponsors and co-organisers.

The combined Third International Security Forum and First Conference of PfP Consortium had a participation of 330 representatives from 45 countries, with representatives from over 150 institutions engaged in European security affairs. 125 persons took part in the PfP Consortium’s dedicated workshop, including 85 representatives from 42 EAPC countries designated by their government.

There was strong support for the future development of the Consortium. The participants considered the way ahead for the Consortium, in particular its tasks, procedures and activities. This resulted in the definition of practical objectives in keeping with the original aims outlined for the Consortium. Expert groups were commissioned to meet and develop further options for implementation. The future work will concentrate on three issues: process building, the achievement of practical progress, and networking.

- In the area of process building, virtually all participants viewed the Consortium as a promising co-operative arrangement of national institutions that perfectly matches the spirit of PfP, offering a unique opportunity to foster meaningful cooperation be-

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* This status report concerning the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes was presented by Federal Councillor Adolf Ogi, Head of the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports (Switzerland), at the Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in Defence Ministers Session, Brussels, 18 December 1998.
between academies, institutes, and experts in security and defence affairs. The Consortium shall develop its own distinct character, and its activities should complement, though not duplicate already existing ones. Agreement was reached on having an annual conference, allowing for personal contacts, dedicated exclusively to Consortium issues. This annual conference shall be held on a rotating basis in interested countries and be conducted in four languages: English, French, German, and Russian. The group of designated attendees from each nation served as an initial co-ordinating committee. Two interim sub-committees were established. The first shall develop ideas for establishing ‘membership’ or participation in the Consortium through affiliate relationships. The second interim sub-committee shall refine options concerning the tasks (e.g., maintaining contact to members, distributing information and supporting countries or institutions hosting conferences and workshops), location, and staffing of the Consortium’s permanent secretariat.

- In the area of practical progress, consensus was reached in support of cooperative, coordinated and joint efforts to share curricula and teaching materials, guest speakers, and faculty members. Prospects for a professional Consortium scholarly journal, issue papers, and/or occasional papers were deemed to be options to be taken up at the next annual conference. Pending a decision on the structure and locations of the Consortium’s secretariat, the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies was requested to elaborate a proposal to further define the tasks, structure, legal and financial basis of the Consortium. At the Zurich conference, it was felt that it might be useful to establish working groups on security, defence, educational, and other related matters. The introduction of these working groups’ results to the plenary of the Consortium would be an important element of the annual conference.

- The employment of modern information technology is very important for maintaining the network character of the Consortium. A dedicated website allowing on-line work, and, possibly later, an electronic journal can play an important role in supporting the connection between institutes, academies, and alumni. The largest potential for future synergy and economy of resources to emerge in this area was an agreement between the Swiss-sponsored, Internet-based International Relations and Security Network (ISN) and the US Defense Department’s Partnership for Peace Information Management System (PIMS). ISN is one of Switzerland’s contributions to the Partnership for Peace. Its focus is primarily on developing Internet support tools for civilian organisations, both non-governmental and quasi-governmental, engaged in the study and practice of security policy. During the conference, a prototype website for the Consortium was demonstrated on PIMS. This work will be refined by a conference-commissioned working group to be conducted under joint Swiss-US leadership. The users, in collaboration with an information technology working group of the Consortium, should further develop character and content of these electronic tools. It was the view of many of the participants that exploitation of technology as part of the Consortium effort was clearly secondary to the im-
importance of interaction at the personal level between researchers, Defence Academies, and Security Studies Institutes.

The Consortium’s unique and distinct character derives from the new approach of bringing defence academies and security studies institutes of all EAPC member countries together for enhanced exchange and co-operation. Within individual nations, cooperation between national security studies institutes and academies is well established, and internationally there is co-operation between academies on one hand and between security studies institutes on the other, but international exchange between these two groups appears to be limited. The Consortium is meant to bridge this gap and establish contacts between academies and institutes throughout the Euro-Atlantic region.

- Academies will improve the efficiency of education and training based on increased availability of accurate information from different sources in their own country, in the region of interest, and from external countries, thus helping to find a neutral and professional appreciation of a given security situation.

- Security studies institutes will be able to funnel their results directly into the education and training systems and can maintain mutually beneficial contacts with decision-makers. In addition, they will, similar to the academies, profit from the international exchange.

- Students in participating institutions will have the same broad scope of information available. They will also be able to share the results of their own studies and to discuss them via the Consortium network. Equally important, they will maintain access to the information sources as alumni and can utilize them in their later work.

Along the lines of this concept it should be possible to establish a meaningful and unique dialogue of institutes, academies, and alumni in support of an evolving Euro-Atlantic security community.
Endorsement of the Consortium in the Summit Communiqué, which was issued at the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Summit in Washington, D.C. on 24th April 1999.

Washington Summit Communiqué
Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 24th April 1999

An Alliance for the 21st Century

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Washington to celebrate the 50th anniversary of NATO and to set forth our vision of the Alliance of the 21st century. The North Atlantic Alliance, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, remains the basis of our collective defence; it embodies the transatlantic link that binds North America and Europe in a unique defence and security partnership.

2. Fifty years ago, the North Atlantic Alliance was founded in troubled and uncertain times. It has withstood the test of five decades and allowed the citizens of Allied countries to enjoy an unprecedented period of peace, freedom and prosperity. Here in Washington, we have paid tribute to the achievements of the past and we have shaped a new Alliance to meet the challenges of the future. This new Alliance will be larger, more capable and more flexible, committed to collective defence and able to undertake new missions including contributing to effective conflict prevention and engaging actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations. The Alliance will work with other nations and organisations to advance security, prosperity and democracy throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. The presence today of three new Allies—the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland—demonstrates that we have overcome the division of Europe.

3. The Alliance takes the opportunity of this 50th anniversary to recognise and express its heartfelt appreciation for the commitment, sacrifice, resolve and loyalty of the servicemen and women of all Allies to the cause of freedom. The Alliance salutes these active and reserve forces' essential contributions, which for 50 years have guaranteed freedom and safeguarded trans-Atlantic security. Our nations and our Alliance are in their debt and offer them profound thanks.
4. The NATO of the 21st century starts today – a NATO which retains the strengths of the past and has new missions, new members and new partnerships. To this end, we have:

- approved an updated Strategic Concept;
- reaffirmed our commitment to the enlargement process of the Alliance and approved a Membership Action Plan for countries wishing to join;
- completed the work on key elements of the Berlin Decisions on building the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance and decided to further enhance its effectiveness;
- launched the Defence Capabilities Initiative;
- intensified our relations with Partners through an enhanced and more operational Partnership for Peace and strengthened our consultations and cooperation within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;
- enhanced the Mediterranean Dialogue; and
- decided to increase Alliance efforts against weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

5. As part of the Alliance's adaptation to the new security challenges, we have updated our Strategic Concept to make it fully consistent with the Alliance's new security environment. The updated Concept reaffirms our commitment to collective defence and the transatlantic link; takes account of the challenges the Alliance now faces; presents an Alliance ready and with a full range of capabilities to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area; reaffirms our commitment to building the ESDI within the Alliance; highlights the enhanced role of partnership and dialogue; underlines the need to develop defence capabilities to their full potential to meet the spectrum of Alliance missions, including forces which are more deployable, sustainable, survivable and able to engage effectively; and provides guidance to the NATO Military Authorities to this end.

6. To achieve its essential purpose, as an Alliance of nations committed to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

**Security**: To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.

**Consultation**: To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.
Deterrence and Defence: To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:

- **Crisis Management**: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.

- **Partnership**: To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.

7. We warmly welcome the participation of the three new Allies—the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland—in their first Alliance Summit meeting. Their accession to the North Atlantic Treaty opens a new chapter in the history of the Atlantic Alliance.

We reaffirm today our commitment to the openness of the Alliance under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and in accordance with Paragraph 8 of the Madrid Summit Declaration. We pledge that NATO will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. This is part of an evolutionary process that takes into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe. Our commitment to enlargement is part of a broader strategy of projecting stability and working together with our Partners to build a Europe whole and free. The ongoing enlargement process strengthens the Alliance and enhances the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. The three new members will not be the last.

At the Summit in Madrid we recognised the progress made by a number of countries aspiring to join the Alliance in meeting the responsibilities and obligations for possible membership.

Today we recognise and welcome the continuing efforts and progress in both Romania and Slovenia. We also recognise and welcome continuing efforts and progress in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Since the Madrid Summit, we note and welcome positive developments in Bulgaria. We also note and welcome recent positive developments in Slovakia. We are grateful for the co-operation of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with NATO in the present crisis and welcome its progress on reforms. We welcome Albania's co-operation with the Alliance in the present crisis and encourage its reform efforts.

We welcome the efforts and progress aspiring members have made, since we last met, to advance political, military and economic reforms. We appreciate the results achieved, and look forward to further progress by these countries in strengthening

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1 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
their democratic institutions and in restructuring their economies and militaries. We take account of the efforts of these aspiring members, together with a number of other Partner countries, to improve relations with neighbours and contribute to security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. We look forward to further deepening our cooperation with aspiring countries and to increasing their political and military involvement in the work of the Alliance.

The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and that the inclusion would enhance overall European security and stability. To give substance to this commitment, NATO will maintain an active relationship with those nations that have expressed an interest in NATO membership as well as those who may wish to seek membership in the future. Those nations that have expressed an interest in becoming NATO members will remain under active consideration for future membership. No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration, regardless of its geographic location, each being considered on its own merits. All states have the inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security. Furthermore, in order to enhance overall security and stability in Europe, further steps in the ongoing enlargement process of the Alliance should balance the security concerns of all Allies.

We welcome the aspirations of the nine countries currently interested in joining the Alliance. Accordingly, we are ready to provide advice, assistance and practical support. To this end, we approve today a Membership Action Plan which includes the following elements:

- the submission by aspiring members of individual annual national programmes on their preparations for possible future membership, covering political, economic, defence, resource, security and legal aspects;
- a focused and candid feedback mechanism on aspirant countries' progress on their programmes that includes both political and technical advice, as well as annual 19+1 meetings at Council level to assess progress;
- a clearinghouse to help co-ordinate assistance by NATO and by member states to aspirant countries in the defence/military field;
- a defence planning approach for aspirants which includes elaboration and review of agreed planning targets.

We direct that NATO Foreign Ministers keep the enlargement process, including the implementation of the Membership Action Plan, under continual review and report to us. We will review the process at our next Summit meeting which will be held no later than 2002.

8. We reaffirm our commitment to preserve the transatlantic link, including our readiness to pursue common security objectives through the Alliance wherever possible.
We are pleased with the progress achieved in implementing the Berlin decisions and reaffirm our strong commitment to pursue the process of reinforcing the European pillar of the Alliance on the basis of our Brussels Declaration of 1994 and of the principles agreed at Berlin in 1996. We note with satisfaction that the key elements of the Berlin decisions are being put in place. These include flexible options for the selection of a European NATO Commander and NATO Headquarters for WEU-led operations, as well as specific terms of reference for DSACEUR and an adapted CJTF concept. Close linkages between the two organisations have been established, including planning, exercises (in particular a joint crisis management exercise in 2000) and consultation, as well as a framework for the release and return of Alliance assets and capabilities.

9. We welcome the new impetus given to the strengthening of a common European policy in security and defence by the Amsterdam Treaty and the reflections launched since then in the WEU and—following the St. Malo Declaration—in the EU, including the Vienna European Council Conclusions. This is a process which has implications for all Allies. We confirm that a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of our Alliance for the 21st century, which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members. In this regard:

a. We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged;

b. As this process goes forward, NATO and the EU should ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, co-operation and transparency, building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU;

c. We applaud the determination of both EU members and other European Allies to take the necessary steps to strengthen their defence capabilities, especially for new missions, avoiding unnecessary duplication;

d. We attach the utmost importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, building on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU. We also note Canada's interest in participating in such operations under appropriate modalities.

e. We are determined that the decisions taken in Berlin in 1996, including the concept of using separable but not separate NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations, should be further developed.

10. On the basis of the above principles and building on the Berlin decisions, we therefore stand ready to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance. The Council in Permanent Session will approve these arrangements, which will respect the requirements of NATO operations and the coherence of its command structure, and should address:
a. Assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations;

b. The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations;

c. Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities;

d. The further adaptation of NATO’s defence planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations.

We task the Council in Permanent Session to address these measures on an ongoing basis, taking into account the evolution of relevant arrangements in the EU. The Council will make recommendations to the next Ministerial meeting for its consideration.

11. We have launched a Defence Capabilities Initiative to improve the defence capabilities of the Alliance to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions in the present and foreseeable security environment with a special focus on improving interoperability among Alliance forces (and where applicable also between Alliance and Partner forces). Defence capabilities will be increased through improvements in the deployability and mobility of Alliance forces, their sustainability and logistics, their survivability and effective engagement capability, and command and control and information systems. In this connection, we endorse the Council decision to begin implementing the Multinational Joint Logistics Centre concept by the end of 1999, and to develop the C3 system architecture by 2002 to form a basis for an integrated Alliance core capability allowing interoperability with national systems. We have established a temporary High-Level Steering Group to oversee the implementation of the Defence Capabilities Initiative and to meet the requirement of co-ordination and harmonisation among relevant planning disciplines, including for Allies concerned force planning, with the aim of achieving lasting effects on improvements in capabilities and interoperability. Improvements in interoperability and critical capabilities should also strengthen the European pillar in NATO.

12. We reaffirm our commitment to the 1995 Peace Agreement, negotiated in Dayton and signed in Paris, which established Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single, democratic and multi-ethnic state, and to the full implementation of the Peace Agreement. We reiterate our readiness to work constructively with all Parties that support the Peace Agreement and seek to implement it.

13. The Madrid Peace Implementation Council meeting in December 1998 confirmed that the next two years would be vital in strengthening the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina and recognised that SFOR's presence remains essential, both to keep the peace and to provide the secure environment and support for civilian implementation. Return of refugees to areas in which they are a minority will remain
vital for political stability and reconciliation. We will support efforts to take this
process forward.
14. SFOR will continue to work closely and effectively with the High Representative,
whose role we support, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslav-
ia, the OSCE and other major international organisations, the UN International
Police Task Force and other agencies implementing the civilian aspects of the
Peace Agreement. We commend the crucial contribution of men and women of
both NATO and Partner countries serving in SFOR, who are helping to bring peace
to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
15. SFOR's presence cannot, however, be maintained indefinitely. SFOR is being
streamlined through efficiency measures. We note that the Council in Permanent
Session is examining options on the future size and structure of SFOR.
16. The continuing crisis in and around Kosovo threatens to further destabilise areas
beyond the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The potential for wider insta-
bility underscores the need for a comprehensive approach to the stabilisation of
the crisis region in South-Eastern Europe. We recognise and endorse the crucial im-
portance of making South-Eastern Europe a region free from violence and instabil-
ity. A new level of international engagement is thus needed to build security, pros-
perity and democratic civil society, leading in time to full integration into the wider
European family.
17. NATO is determined to play its full part in this process by contributing to the build-
ing of a more secure and co-operative relationship with and between the countries
of the region. Given the differences in economic development and the diversity and
complexity of the problems of each country in the region, international efforts to
develop and stabilise the region must be comprehensive, coherent and well coordi-
nated. To achieve these ends, NATO, the WEU, the EU, the OSCE and the UN
must work closely together. The international financial institutions also have a cru-
cial role to play. The Alliance's efforts to enhance regional security and stability in
South-Eastern Europe and to help resolve humanitarian problems, and the efforts
by other international organisations, as well as those by the countries of the region,
should be mutually reinforcing.
18. We will be meeting with colleagues from the countries of South-Eastern Europe to-
morrow. We intend to build on that meeting by maintaining NATO's consultations
with the countries of the region. Accordingly, we will propose to them a consulta-
tive forum on security matters which brings together all NATO members and
countries of the region at an appropriate level.
19. We direct the Council in Permanent Session, building on, as appropriate, the exist-
ing EAPC and PfP framework, to give substance to this proposal, inter alia, in the
following areas:
• 19+1 consultations where appropriate;
• the promotion of regional co-operation in the framework of an EAPC cooperative mechanism, taking into account other regional initiatives;
• targeted NATO security co-operation programmes for the countries in the region, as appropriate;
• regionally focused PfP activities and exercises;
• better targeting and co-ordination of Allies' and Partners' bilateral assistance to the region.

20. The Alliance's efforts to enhance regional security in South-Eastern Europe complement those by other international organisations, as well as those by the countries of the region. We welcome the forthcoming European Union conference on a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe on 27th May 1999, and the South-Eastern Europe Co-operation process, as well as other regional efforts. Coherence and co-ordination between the various initiatives will be of great importance.

21. The security of the Balkan region is essential to achieving lasting stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Our goal is to see the integration of the countries of the region into the Euro-Atlantic community. We want all the countries and peoples of South-Eastern Europe to enjoy peace and security and establish normal relations with one another, based on respect of human rights, democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

22. We reaffirm our commitment to consultation, partnership and practical co-operation through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace. We commit ourselves today to build an enhanced and more operational relationship with Partners for the 21st century that strengthens stability, mutual confidence, and security throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. The EAPC and the PfP have transformed political-military relations across the continent and have become the instruments of choice when the Alliance and its Partners consult and act together in the pursuit of peace and security. We look forward to consulting with our Partners at tomorrow's EAPC Summit meeting.

23. The EAPC, founded in 1997, contributes substantially to stronger political consultation and practical co-operation between the Alliance and its Partners, for solutions to security issues. We applaud this expanded dimension of political consultations, which has enhanced transparency and confidence among all EAPC members. The Alliance and its Partners have consulted regularly on regional security issues, such as on Bosnia and Herzegovina and on Kosovo. We have also developed new areas of co-operation such as peacekeeping, humanitarian de-mining, control over transfer of small arms, and the co-ordination of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.

24. We welcome the successful fulfilment by the Alliance and its Partners of five years of Partnership for Peace and the full implementation of PfP enhancements launched in 1997. Enhanced PfP has ensured that NATO-Partner co-operation contributes concretely to Euro-Atlantic stability and security. The participation of 15 PfP Part-
ners in IFOR/SFOR demonstrates the real-life benefits of PfP's focus on interoperability and provides valuable lessons for future Alliance-Partner co-operation. The presence of Partner officers in an international capacity in NATO military headquarters enables Partners to participate in planning for NATO-PfP exercises and NATO-led PfP operations. Enhanced PfP has also permitted NATO to take action to assist Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with their unique security concerns.

25. We welcome and take special note of the initiatives designed to make the Partnership more operational and ensure greater Partner involvement in appropriate decisionmaking and planning, as we had envisioned in our Madrid Declaration. These steps will ensure that the Partnership will be better able to address its objectives, and will provide a solid foundation for its continuing evolution as the core of a cooperative security network between NATO and its Partners for the 21st century. To further this goal, we have today approved the following comprehensive package. We have:

- approved a Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP operations, which will enhance Partners' roles in political guidance and oversight, planning, and command arrangements for such operations;
- endorsed the expanded and adapted Planning and Review Process, which will further enhance interoperability of Partner forces declared available for PfP activities, and will allow for more focused and increased Partner contributions of valuable forces and capabilities for future NATO-led PfP operations;
- endorsed the outline Operational Capabilities Concept for NATO-led PfP operations, which will provide for deeper military co-operation between the Alliance and Partners with the goal of improving the ability of Partner forces and capabilities to operate with the Alliance in NATO-led PfP operations and directed the Council in Permanent Session to pursue its further development;
- endorsed the outline programme on enhancing PfP training and education to optimise and harmonise NATO and national PfP activities in order to meet the current and future demands of an enhanced and more operational PfP. The outline programme includes the role of three new PfP tools – a PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, a PfP Exercise Simulation Network and PfP Training Centres. We directed the Council in Permanent Session to develop a PfP Training and Education Enhancement Programme.

26. We remain firmly committed to our partnership with Russia under the NATO-Russia Founding Act. NATO and Russia have a common objective in strengthening security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Throughout the Kosovo crisis, NATO and Russia have shared the common goals of the international community: to halt the violence, to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, and to create the conditions for a political solution. These goals remain valid. Consultation and dialogue are even more important in times of crisis. NATO and its member countries are determined to build on the areas of common ground with Russia concerning the international
response to the crisis in Kosovo and remain ready to resume consultations and co-operation in the framework of the Founding Act.

27. Close relations between NATO and Russia are of great importance to stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Since the conclusion of the Founding Act in May 1997, considerable and encouraging progress has been made in intensifying consultation and co-operation with Russia. The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council has developed into an important venue to consult, to promote transparency and confidence-building, and to foster co-operation. Russia's participation in the implementation of the peace agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina was a significant step towards a new co-operative relationship. We have developed an extensive dialogue on such matters as disarmament and arms control, including the adaptation of the CFE Treaty; peacekeeping and nuclear weapons issues. Strategy, defence policy and doctrines, budgets and infrastructure development programmes, and nonproliferation, are further examples of this increasing co-operation.

28. We attach great importance to a strong, enduring and distinctive partnership between NATO and Ukraine. Ukraine has an important role to play in enhancing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and in particular in Central and Eastern Europe. We are pleased with the progress reached since the signing of the NATO-Ukraine Charter in Madrid, and will continue to strengthen our distinctive partnership. We continue to support Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and Ukraine's status as a non-nuclear weapons state as key factors of stability and security in Europe. We encourage Ukraine to carry forward its democratic and economic transformation, including its defence reform, and reaffirm NATO's support for Ukraine's efforts to this end. We applaud the progress made in the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform. We welcome the establishment of a NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv to further enhance Ukraine's role as a distinctive Partner. We also look forward to today's inaugural Summit meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission.

29. The Mediterranean Dialogue is an integral part of the Alliance's co-operative approach to security since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. We are pleased with the development of our Mediterranean Dialogue. The Dialogue is progressive in nature and we welcome the progress towards developing broader and deeper co-operation and dialogue with the countries in the Mediterranean region. We endorse the enhancements to the political and practical co-operation of the Mediterranean Dialogue agreed by the Council in Permanent Session and direct it to pursue their early implementation. We encourage Allied nations and Mediterranean Dialogue countries to organise events such as the Rome Conference in 1997 and the Valencia Conference in 1999 as positive steps to strengthen mutual regional understanding. We look forward to further opportunities to strengthen co-operation in areas where NATO can add value, particularly in the military field, and where Dialogue countries have expressed interest. The Dialogue and other international efforts, including the EU
Barcelona process, are complementary and mutually reinforcing and thus contribute to transparency and building confidence in the region.

30. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery can pose a direct military threat to Allies' populations, territory, and forces and therefore continues to be a matter of serious concern for the Alliance. The principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferation from occurring, or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. We reiterate our full support for the international non-proliferation regimes and their strengthening. We recognise progress made in this regard. In order to respond to the risks to Alliance security posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means, we have launched an Initiative that builds upon work since the Brussels Summit to improve overall Alliance political and military efforts in this area.

31. The WMD Initiative will: ensure a more vigorous, structured debate at NATO leading to strengthened common understanding among Allies on WMD issues and how to respond to them; improve the quality and quantity of intelligence and information-sharing among Allies on proliferation issues; support the development of a public information strategy by Allies to increase awareness of proliferation issues and Allies' efforts to support non-proliferation efforts; enhance existing Allied programmes which increase military readiness to operate in a WMD environment and to counter WMD threats; strengthen the process of information exchange about Allies' national programmes of bilateral WMD destruction and assistance; enhance the possibilities for Allies to assist one another in the protection of their civil populations against WMD risks; and create a WMD Centre within the International Staff at NATO to support these efforts. The WMD initiative will integrate political and military aspects of Alliance work in responding to proliferation.

32. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. NATO has a long-standing commitment in this area. Allied forces, both conventional and nuclear, have been significantly reduced since the end of the Cold War as part of the changed security environment. All Allies are States Parties to the central treaties related to disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and are committed to the full implementation of these treaties. NATO is a defensive Alliance seeking to enhance security and stability at the minimum level of forces consistent with the requirements for the full range of Alliance missions. As part of its broad approach to security, NATO actively supports arms control and disarmament, both conventional and nuclear, and pursues its approach against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means. In the light of overall strategic developments and the reduced salience of nuclear weapons, the Alliance will consider options for confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament. The Council in Permanent Session will propose a process to Ministers in De-
ember for considering such options. The responsible NATO bodies would accomplish this. We support deepening consultations with Russia in these and other areas in the Permanent Joint Council as well as with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine Commission and with other Partners in the EAPC.

33. The CFE Treaty is a cornerstone of European security. We reaffirm our commitment to the successful adaptation of the Treaty reflecting the new security environment and paving the way to greater conventional security and stability in Europe. In the course of the negotiations so far, Members of the Alliance have already declared their intention to undertake reductions in their equipment entitlements or holdings, and we strongly encourage others to follow suit with similar substantial reductions. In this context, we are pleased that agreement has been reached by CFE States Parties in Vienna in March 1999 on the key outstanding issues, permitting drafting work to proceed without delay. Allies will do their utmost to complete an adapted Treaty for signature by the time of the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 1999. Until the adaptation process is completed, the continued full implementation of the existing Treaty and its associated documents will remain crucial.

34. We call on Russia to ratify the START II Treaty without delay. This would pave the way for considerable reductions of nuclear arsenals and would allow negotiations on a START III Treaty aiming at further far-reaching reductions. We remain committed to an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and call upon all countries to accede to and implement the Treaty in due course. We support the early commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

35. We are determined to achieve progress on a legally binding protocol including effective verification measures to enhance compliance and promote transparency that strengthens the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. We re-emphasise the importance of universal adherence to, and effective implementation of, the Chemical Weapons Convention. We support de-mining efforts in Bosnia, the development of practical initiatives under the auspices of the EAPC, and—for signatories—activities to meet obligations under the Ottawa Convention.

36. We call on Belarus, Russia and Ukraine to ratify the Open Skies Treaty without delay.

37. We will seek to intensify on a mutually reinforcing basis the Alliance's contacts and cooperation with other international organisations with a role to play in consolidating democracy and preserving peace in the Euro-Atlantic area.

38. As stated in the Washington Treaty, we recognise the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Alliance and the UN have worked together effectively in implementing the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We look forward to developing further contact and exchanges of information with the United Nations, in the context of cooperation in conflict prevention, crisis management, crisis response operations, including peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance. In the crisis in Kos-
ovo, the Alliance is using its civil and military capabilities to work with the UNHCR, the lead agency in the field of refugee relief, and other relevant international organisations, in providing humanitarian assistance and refugee relief. The Alliance will consider on a case-by-case basis future co-operation of this kind.

39. Co-operation and co-ordination between the Alliance and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe has expanded considerably in the light of the support we have provided to the OSCE-led Kosovo Verification Missions. We hope to make use of these important bridges between our two organisations to work together in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, in the spirit of the OSCE's Common Concept for the Development of Co-operation between Mutually Reinforcing Institutions. We continue to support the efforts of the OSCE to develop a Document-Charter on European Security, worthy of adoption at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 1999.

40. The Alliance and the European Union share common strategic interests. Our respective efforts in building peace in the former Yugoslavia are complementary. Both organisations make decisive contributions to peace and stability on the European continent. Co-operation between the two organisations on topics of common concern, to be decided on a case-by-case basis, could be developed when it enhances the effectiveness of action by NATO and the EU.

41. The Alliance, in order to adapt its structures to better prepare it to meet future challenges, launched a comprehensive programme including the continuing adaptation of NATO's command structure. Accordingly, Allies welcome the activation decision of the implementation phase of the Alliance's new command structure. This will ensure NATO's ability to carry out the whole range of its missions more effectively and flexibly; support an enlarged Alliance and our more operational relationship with Partners; and provide, as part of the development of the ESDI within NATO, for European command arrangements able to prepare, support, command and conduct WEU-led operations. After successful trials, we have embarked on the full implementation of the CJTF concept, giving us an important new tool for crisis management in the next century. Allies also welcome the full integration of Spain into NATO's military structure from January this year, another significant milestone for the Alliance.

42. Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability that can threaten the territorial integrity of States. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorism and reaffirm our determination to combat it in accordance with our international commitments and national legislation. The terrorist threat against deployed NATO forces and NATO installations requires the consideration and development of appropriate measures for their continued protection, taking full account of host nation responsibilities.

43. NATO Heads of State and Government believe that a key to the future success of the North Atlantic Alliance is the efficient production and availability of advanced weapons and technology in support of security for all its members. We also believe
that viable defence industries on both sides of the Atlantic are critical to the efficient functioning of NATO military forces. To that end, we welcome continued transatlantic defence industrial co-operation to help ensure interoperability, economies of scale, competition and innovation. We will seek to ensure that NATO's armament activities meet the Alliance's evolving military needs.

44. We welcome the presence in Washington of the President and other representatives of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NPA). The NPA plays a significant role in complementing NATO's efforts to project stability throughout Europe. We therefore attach great importance to enhancing our relations with the NPA in areas of common concern. We also appreciate the contribution made by the Atlantic Treaty Association in promoting better understanding of the Alliance and its objectives among our publics.

45. We express our deep appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by the Government of the United States on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Chairman's summary
of the Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
at Summit Level, Washington D.C.

1. Heads of State and Government, or their representatives, of the member countries of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), met today in Washington. The Secretary-General of the Western European Union also attended the meeting. This was the second gathering of EAPC Heads of State and Government.

2. Discussion at the meeting focused on the theme of Euro-Atlantic Partnership in the twenty-first century. Heads of State and Government concentrated on the key security challenges that face the EAPC area today, in particular the situation in Kosovo; enhancements to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme to make it more operational and capable; and ways in which the EAPC can best help to deal with security challenges in the EAPC area.

3. The discussion underlined the importance of the EAPC as a forum for consultation on political and security-related issues and on practical cooperation measures to address those.

4. EAPC Heads of State and Government discussed the situation in Kosovo and expressed support for the demands of the international community. They underlined their sympathy for the refugees and their support for humanitarian relief efforts and for unhindered access by humanitarian aid organizations. They emphasized their abhorrence of the policies of violence, repression and ethnic cleansing being carried out by the FRY authorities in Kosovo.

5. EAPC Heads of State and Government welcomed the work that has been carried out on the further enhancement of the Partnership for Peace since the 1997 Madrid Summit. They noted that these initiatives will serve to increase EAPC capacity to contribute to crisis management endeavours. They endorsed the document on a “Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP Operations” and emphasized its importance to the growing operational role of the Partnership. The Political-Military Framework sets out the principles, modalities and other necessary guidance for Partner involvement in political consultations and decision-making, in operational planning, and in command arrangements for future NATO-led operations in which they participate. It is a fundamental document for the future Partnership.
6. Heads of State and Government also welcomed and endorsed the report “Towards a Partnership for the 21st Century – The Enhanced and more Operational Partnership.” This report sets out the main elements of the more operational PfP, including the Political-Military Framework, the expanded and adapted Planning and Review Process, and enhanced defence-related and military cooperation. In endorsing the overall report, EAPC members also endorsed an Operational Capabilities Concept for NATO-led PfP Operations, which will be further developed to reinforce PfP's operational capabilities, thereby improving the ability of the Alliance and Partner forces to operate together in the future. Furthermore, in recognition of the key role of training and education, EAPC members endorsed a strategy to develop a comprehensive enhancement programme in this area, with the aim of making best use of the human capital invested in PfP. Heads of State and Government agreed that this package of measures will considerably improve the effectiveness of the Partnership. They also took note of a compendium of views and experiences on humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping.

7. EAPC Heads of State and Government welcomed the contribution that both EAPC and PfP have made towards enhancing security for all, based on shared values. They discussed how the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council can further increase its effectiveness in enhancing transparency, confidence and cooperation throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. They took note of the various initiatives that have been undertaken by the EAPC in this field. They welcomed work already begun on global humanitarian mine action aimed at complementing and adding value to other international and national efforts in this field. They welcomed the creation of an open-ended ad hoc working group to examine how EAPC might contribute to controlling the transfer of small arms, recognizing the high number of innocent civilian casualties caused by the use of mines and small arms. They also expressed their strong support for efforts to promote greater regional cooperation for security within the wider EAPC context, notably through seminars to this end held and planned in a number of Partner countries. They took note of the Alliance's initiative to promote further regional cooperation in South-East Europe.

8. Heads of State and Government reaffirmed their commitment to a vigorous and dynamic Euro-Atlantic Partnership into the 21st century and looked forward to continuing to strengthen multi-faceted cooperation within the EAPC and Partnership for Peace.
Appendix E

Improving Training and Education in Partnership for Peace

This Appendix develops an outline for a programme to improve and optimise training and education in the Partnership. It takes account of initial military advice.

Outline Programme

Introduction

1. The December 1998 Ministerial meetings tasked the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to identify and put together initiatives underway in PfP, including education and training activities such as the PfP Training Centres, the PfP Simulation Network and the Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, to form a coherent package of measures to reinforce PfP's operational capabilities.

Aim

2. The PfP Training and Education Enhancement Programme (TEEP) will provide a structured approach to optimise and improve training and education in the Partnership. Its principal aim is to increase the ability of training and education efforts to meet current and future demands of an enhanced and more operational Partnership, focussing specifically on the achievement of interoperability. It also seeks to promote greater cooperation and dialogue among the wider defence and security communities in NATO and Partner nations.

Importance of Training and Education in the Partnership

3. As underscored in recent Ministerial meetings there is an awareness that training and education of individuals capable of responding to the challenges of the enhanced and more operational Partnership will be vital for the continued success of the Partnership. In line with the overarching aims of the 1997 SLG Report and subsequent taskings, PfP is assuming a more operational character with greater requirement for interoperability. As PfP cooperation deepens and contains more operational elements, including more robust and sophisticated exercises, demands on qualified human resources have been increasing. This is further complicated by the
growing challenge of multinationality at lower levels of command and force structures.

**Current Experience**

4. Presently, there is a wealth of training and education opportunities throughout the Partnership based on NATO-sponsored activities, including exercises and NATO Schools, and nationally sponsored activities. Notwithstanding these opportunities, exchanges of national experiences and views at NATO fora, including on the IFOR/SFOR and lessons learned from NATO/PfP exercises, have highlighted a number of continuing shortfalls within the area of interoperability. Experience also shows that there are varying levels of interoperability within Partner nations and different needs to be addressed. If not addressed, these challenges will likely impact on the ability to meet the demands of an enhanced and more operational PfP, including the ability of Partner forces to operate together with those of the Allies in NATO-led PfP operations. Training and education will play a key role in addressing such challenges.

**Overall Approach**

5. To take full advantage of the education and training contributions by NATO and Nations to the Partnership, the TEEP seeks to optimise and harmonise NATO and national PfP activities as appropriate and to increase transparency of activities “in the spirit of PfP,” and bring them closer to the PfP NATO process.

6. There is a need to consolidate existing and emerging tools, deepening and improving them where necessary and reinforcing the effectiveness of their contribution to the overall enhanced and more operational Partnership. Without prejudicing the principle that education and training are ultimately national responsibilities, this effort also entails acknowledging multinational cooperation “in the spirit of PfP” as an essential component in taking Partnership to a higher level of cooperation. A basic assumption for this effort is that within the scope of PfP, both Allies and Partners need to concentrate energy and resources, while collecting and sharing lessons learned. One way to accomplish this is to establish PfP Training Centres, where enhanced training and education activities are available to all Allies and Partners. Another is to strengthen existing defence educational institutions by linking them together. A third is to improve training efficiencies by conducting training on a distributed basis, reaching a wider audience at less cost. These and the optimisation of the already existing NATO-sponsored activities are complementary paths that should be taken up in parallel.

**Improving NATO's Contribution**

7. Training and education provided by NATO are a central feature of the Partnership Work Programme (PWP). These activities take many forms: individual education at various NATO Schools, NATO-sponsored conferences and workshops, as well as military activities and exercises. Over time, considerable effort has been made to
develop and improve these training and education activities. The establishment of the NATO Training Group (NTG) within the International Military Staff, the increasing role of the Military Agency for Standardisation (MAS), the newly established NATO Simulation Policy Group (NSPG), and the Education and Training Branch in the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) offer new opportunities for continuing this effort which should be explored. In addition, the PWP feedback system, which has recently been made operational, offers promise for assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of training and education activities. Moreover, programme tailoring to ensure activities offered continue to match evolving requirements would be an important result of ongoing work, and in the context of Individual Partnership Programmes, the possibility to assist Partners to develop a national concept for education and training, including through PARP Ministerial Guidance, should be pursued.

Optimising the Contribution of National and “In the Spirit of” PfP Activities

8. The important contribution of national and “in the spirit of” PfP activities to the overall Partnership has been recognised and fostered from the early days of PfP. This is particularly true in the training and education field where NATO's capabilities are limited. Just as NATO tools can be improved, national efforts could also be enhanced. Better feedback and assessment mechanisms to assist setting priorities, measuring impact of training on the trained personnel, and designing customised activities, as well as bringing the national PfP training and education activities closer to the NATO process, including by increasing transparency, would complement the endeavours of nations to optimise their offerings. Therefore, a major effort to make more effective use of national contributions should be a part of the TEEP.

Capitalising on Recent Initiatives

9. Recent initiatives such as the Concept for PfP Training Centres, PfP Simulation Network and the Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies illustrate the usefulness of multinational cooperation as essential and complementary components in underwriting a collaborative approach to education in PfP.

10. PfP Training Centres are national facilities made available to all PfP countries to enhance training and education activities. Through the Concept for PfP Training Centres the Allies and Partners took a significant step to foster a greater role for national training facilities within the Partnership. The Concept allows for a range of NATO involvement in these Centres, including by providing expert advice and assistance. In accordance with the terms set out in the Concept, several PfP Training Centres have already been designated, while others are being considered. As more

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1 The PfP Training Centre in Ankara, Turkey; Yavoriv training area, Ukraine; Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland; PfP Training Centre in Bucharest, Romania; PfP Training Centre in Almnas, Sweden.
facilities join the family of PfP Training Centres, a network of national facilities should emerge as part of a collaborative approach to training and education.

11. The TEEP should seek to realise the full potential of the relationship between designated national training centres and PfP established through the Concept for PfP Training Centres. It should explore, inter alia, possible networking of these Centres including through the utilisation of simulation networks and the consortium model. It should also consider their geographical and functional spread, as appropriate, to avoid duplication of efforts and resources and to attain complementarity and wider reach. In facilitating the way ahead, interaction among these Centres would be developed initially through the Clearing House mechanism.

12. The PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes focuses on civil-military education in national security and strategic-level military planning, and aims at enhancing multinational education through collaborative approaches linking defence practitioners, scholars, and experts into activity-based networks that facilitate information sharing. It may also extend participation in PfP to include universities and non-governmental institutes. The first annual conference in 1998 on “Networking Security Institutions in the Information Age and the Way Ahead for the PfP Consortium” illustrates the important role the Consortium can play in the overall education and training effort.

13. The Consortium's objectives, which might be further defined by its participants, could include: to foster greater academic and educational opportunities within the defence and security community; to encourage high standards for professional military education; to promote cost-effective education through collaborative distance learning and distributed training, such as via the Internet; to expand dialogue, understanding, and cooperation through security-related research in EAPC countries; and to explore complementary relationships with other institutions such as the NATO Defence College.

14. Possibilities that offer Allies and Partners greater involvement in the Consortium include: participating in the staffing of an interim secretariat whose work will be coordinated by the US-German George C. Marshall Center and shared among institutions in the Partnership; hosting of an annual conference with work supported by workshops and sub-committees and augmented by joint security studies research projects; disseminating lessons learned through a journal or other appropriate publication; and periodic reports to the PMSC on Consortium activities.

15. The PfP Simulation Network (SIMNET) focuses on military command and staff training for NATO-led PfP operations. It will be based on the latest developments of the Combined Joint Task Force Concept and should aim to support related concepts. Its approach is to enhance such training through computer assisted technologies and communications that can link national or multinational staffs and remote-site command posts.

16. Allies and Partners can contribute to the SIMNET's further development by participating as "remote sites" in which the Headquarters leadership role could rotate
among nations as part of PfP command post exercises to improve command and staff procedures employed in NATO-led PfP operations. Ways should be explored to take advantage of the PfP SIMNET initiative's ability to maximise the impact of advanced technology on the development of the enhanced and more operational Partnership. This could include, inter alia, exploring relationships and mutual support among the PfP SIMNET, the NATO Simulation Policy Group (NSPG) and the ACE Command and Staff Training Programme (ACSTP). Extending the reach of NATO's own efforts in this area to Partner nations for joint and combined training for NATO-led PfP operations should also be considered. Finally, PfP SIMNET participants could volunteer, on a rotational basis, to host conferences to further develop these concepts and to provide periodic reports on PfP SIMNET activities to NATO's Political-Military Steering Committee meeting in EAPC format.

**Main Aspects of the Work Ahead**

17. The work ahead will address the following areas:

   a. *Stocktaking:*
      
      In consultation with Partners an accurate assessment should be made of the training and education opportunities available to Partners, including activities “in the spirit of PfP,” with a view to identifying more precisely the shortcomings and requirements.

   b. *Exercises:*
      
      Exercises are a key element in assessing standards and overall interoperability. Possibilities for further expanding the scope and complexity of exercises should be explored. The study could also investigate the prospects for regular and appropriately sequenced exercises, including Computer-Assisted Exercises (CAX), Command Post Exercises (CPX) and Field Training Exercises (FTX), in relevant PfP Training Centres.

   c. *Feedback and assessment mechanisms:*
      
      It is imperative to have adequate transparency, feedback and lessons-learned mechanisms to accurately determine the continuing benefit of training and education activities. These mechanisms are necessary to tailor future activities to the evolving needs of the Partnership, taking into account Partners' absorption capabilities.

   d. *Interoperability:*
      
      Further work in the field of training and education could be explored with a view to developing common knowledge of concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs to achieve and maintain the most effective level of interoperability.

   e. *Linkages and collaboration:*
      
      Collaboration among training and education institutions, while respecting their national and NATO character, could help improve the quality of the activities offered and promote harmonisation of programmes. At the same time, collaboration could increase regional co-operation, as well as habits and structures of
mutual assistance. The full potential of the PfP Training Centres, including their possible networking and the development of the Consortium model, will be explored.

f. **Distributed training:**
   The potential of information and remote communication technologies will be brought to bear extensively on the distributed training and education effort. In this regard, existing and other possibilities will be explored with regard to establishing EAPC-wide simulation networks and training programmes in a cost-effective way.

g. **National Training and Education Strategies:**
   The need for and possibilities to provide more direct advice to Partner nations in assisting them to develop national strategies for PfP-related education and training will be studied. It should be recognised that PfP countries have different starting points, resources, capabilities, approaches and priorities.

h. **Resources:**
   The study should take account of possible resource implications for steps to be agreed to further improve and optimise training and education in PfP.

**Recommendations**

18. Council is invited to agree the following recommendations:

a. *task the PMSC* to develop political-military advice for the development of specific recommendations on the above issues as needed and report to the NAC by 1 June 1999;

b. *task the NMA's and other appropriate NATO bodies* based on political-military advice to be developed in accordance with the above tasking, to provide specific recommendations based on a full stocktaking and assessment of the existing opportunities by 1 September 1999;

c. *task the PMSC* to provide an interim report to the NAC by mid-September 1999;

d. *task the PMSC* to develop the PfP Training and Education Enhancement Programme, including specific recommendations, as part of the comprehensive report on the overall implementation of the enhanced and more operational PfP, taking into account military advice, in time for the Autumn 1999 Ministerial meetings;

e. *task the Senior Resource Board*, in consultation with the NMAs, and the Civil Budget Committee—as part of the tasking in paragraph 19.d. of the main body of this report—to provide an affordability assessment of this Programme by the time of the Autumn 1999 Ministerial meetings.
Memorandum of understanding between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sports of Switzerland Concerning Cooperation in the Development of an Internet-Based Website, to Support the Work of the Partnership For Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes

(Official version signed in Washington in April)

This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Department of Defense of the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as “the United States”) and the Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sports of Switzerland (hereinafter referred to as “Switzerland”) is in furtherance of the principles established in the Partnership for Peace (PFP) Framework Document adopted by the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels on 10 January 1994.

The United States and Switzerland (hereinafter referred to as “the participants”) have determined that the establishment of an Internet-based website under the auspices of a PFP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes (hereinafter referred to as the “PFP Defense and Security Studies Consortium”) would enhance the peaceful purposes of their respective defense interests.

The purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding is to further these objectives and seek to establish an orderly framework, policies, procedures and the respective responsibilities of the participants regarding mutual support in the development of an Internet-based website to support the work of the PFP Defense and Security Studies Consortium.

The participants intend to conduct joint activities to demonstrate how a PFP Defense and Security Studies Consortium website can enhance security cooperation among many nations and relevant institutions by linking defense and security studies practitioners, scholars and experts through networks that facilitate sharing of knowledge.

To this end, a PFP Defense and Security Studies Consortium website will facilitate the use of advanced distributed learning through the development of internet-accessible information sharing. This should include developing a digital library of individual education and training courses. It could also include conferences, workshops, and publications.

Priority attention should be given to the cross-assignment of personnel between the participants to support the work of the consortium in engaging a wide variety of institutions and content matter experts in the development of the digital library of courses.

All costs incurred as a result of conferences, workshops, personnel assignments and the Internet-based operation of a Defense and Security Studies Consortium are to be borne by each participant for its respective facility, personnel expenses and ancillary
support. Subject to these conditions, expenses for common operations and requirements are to be borne by the participants as mutually agreed. Respective activities under this MOU are to be subject to the laws and regulations of the respective participant, and are subject to the availability of funds.

To establish an orderly framework, the respective responsibilities of the participants are to be carried out through a hierarchy of designated agents, implementing agents, academic advisory support elements whose work will be coordinated through a joint planning committee and documented through joint planning documents.

The United States Atlantic Command is designated as the agent responsible for implementation of this MOU on behalf of the United States. The Office of Security and Defense Policy of the General Secretariat of the Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sports is designated as the agent responsible for implementation of this MOU on behalf of Switzerland. Such agents are referred to hereinafter as “designated agents.”

The designated agents have identified counterpart implementing agents and academic advisory support elements to assist in carrying out the purposes of this memorandum. For the United States Atlantic Command, the Partnership for Peace Information Management System (PIMS) will serve as the implementing agent and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies will serve as the academic advisory support element. For the Swiss Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sports, the International Relations and Security Network (ISN) will serve as the implementing agent and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy will serve as the academic advisory support element.

The designated agents will co-chair a joint planning committee, which will include each participant’s implementing agent and academic advisory support element in order to facilitate cooperation by identifying areas of mutual interest and benefit to be further developed in the form of concrete plans. The implementing agents in close coordination with the academic advisory support elements will develop joint planning documents to implement this MOU for the joint approval of the designated agents. The joint planning documents will identify the participants’ priorities for developing the website’s educational content for advanced distributed learning. They will establish the terms of reference for mutual support, outline plans concerning the academic advisory support elements, and promote conferences and workshops that will help facilitate among other nations and institutions the most effective usage of the Internet-based component of a PFP Defense and Security Studies Consortium. Joint planning documents will be administered as annexes to this MOU.

No classified military information is to be communicated directly or indirectly between the participants pursuant to this MOU. It is understood that unclassified but sensitive or commercially proprietary information shared as a result of this MOU is to be handled as follows:

A. The recipient government is not to release the information to a third government or any other party without the approval of the releasing government;
B. The recipient government will afford the information a degree of protection equivalent to that afforded it by the releasing government;

C. The recipient government will not use the information for other than the purposes of this MOU; and

D. The recipient will respect private rights, such as patents, copyrights or trade secrets that are involved in the process of information exchange.

Any disputes that may arise between the designated agents under or relating to this MOU are to be resolved by negotiation between representatives of the participants, and not be referred to an individual, national or international tribunal, or to any other forum for arbitration or settlement.

Duration of this MOU is five years extendable for an additional five years. Activities under this MOU will commence at the time of signature and continue until one of the participants notifies the other in writing at least three months prior to the end of the initial five-year period, of its intent to terminate, or of its desire to renegotiate, this MOU.

Signed in Washington, DC this 25th day of April, 1999.

For the Department of Defense of the United States of America: William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense

For the Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sports of Switzerland: Adolf Ogi, Federal Councillor for Defence, Civil Protection and Sports
A U.S. Vision of Europe

Lisa Bronson

Thank you very much for this kind introduction and welcome.

I want to begin by thanking the conference organizers for what has truly been a splendid effort. I’d like to thank the Ministry of Defense and the Government of Estonia for agreeing to host the Third Conference of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Consortium.

It has been a privilege to spend the last two days in your beautiful capital city. As I reflect upon the history of Tallinn, and Estonia as a whole, I am struck by how appropriate this site is for this conference. I think of the history of trade, invasion, and education. In the 15th and 16th centuries, Tallinn was a center of trade, salt and wine moving en route to Russia; bear hides, leather and linen moving from Russia to the west. This week Tallinn has reconnected with its rich history as a center of trade, but it has been a trade of ideas and techniques of teaching as seen in the working groups on Advanced Distributed Learning and Curriculum Development.

Estonia, like many other European countries, shares a history of invasion. This week representatives of Sweden, Denmark, Poland and Russia have returned to Estonia, but the invasion has not been an unwelcome one of force. Instead, it has been an invasion of shared values and a shared vision. A vision of a Europe that is whole and free. A vision of a “strategic community” built through education and research. As the working groups on Crisis Management in Southeastern Europe and European Security Defense Initiative (ESDI) wrestle with the creation of a more stable and integrated Europe, Estonia and the Baltic/Nordic region stand as shining examples that history does not have to repeat itself, if we are wise enough to accept its lessons and its counsel. Yesterday the European Union (EU) completed its summit in Feirra. The US welcomes Europe’s commitment to create, as has been described by the French Minister of Defense Richard, “the capability to develop the ability to put out fires in its own backyard.” The Headline Goal, and now the new commitment to create a police force of over 5,000 officers for a range of international missions, will provide the capabilities Europe needs to secure a peaceful, stable, and prosperous future. The Consortium working group on this issue can provide an important forum for discussing how NATO and the EU can forge a co-operative partnership, in which NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative and the EU’s Headline Goal may reinforce one another, in pursuit of one single pool of more capable European forces.

In addition to a history of trade and invasion, Estonia has a historical commitment to education. I am reminded that Tartu University was founded in 1632 and included a teachers’ seminar that helped to establish a national commitment to universal literacy.

that became a standard for this region. Tomorrow that historical commitment to
education will be renewed as the first class of the Baltic Defense College graduates.

I cannot think of a more fitting place than Tallinn, Estonia for the Third Conference
of the Consortium. Last night as I watched the Estonian folk dancers and I was literally
swept off my feet by my gallant and charming dance partner, I felt exhilarated and I
felt a sense of celebration. Part of it is no doubt the power of the summer solstice. But
there is a spiritual counterpart to the ever-present sunlight that we have experienced
this week. The Consortium has evolved into a beacon of light that has the potential to
illuminate the path to better understanding and cooperation between military and civil
security experts in over 40 countries throughout the Euro-Atlantic Region.

You know the history of the Consortium. You’ve gone through it in the past few
days here. In June 1998, a vision, a joint vision by my Secretary of Defense William
Cohen and the German Defense Minister Volke Rühe, launched the idea of a three-part
vision. It included: the Consortium; a PfP network of training centers; and a simulation
network.

A number of countries have come together to make this a reality. Switzerland
jumped right in, in October of 1998, and agreed with an enormous amount of
flexibility and team spirit to modify its existing conference so that we could hold the
first conference of the Consortium.

In April of 1999 at the Washington Summit, Sweden joined with Hungary and the
Netherlands to create the first demonstration of a simulation network. It underscored
the value of the ability to go ahead and train a large number of officers and staff,
procedures at a distance, without having to leave their home stations.

In April of last year, the EAPC Ministers approved the PfP education and training
program that includes the three initiatives that you see in blue: Consortium; PfP
training; simulation (see illustration on the next page).

Last year, Bulgaria carried on the tradition by hosting the Second Conference, and I
am pleased, as my Russian colleague has just announced, that Moscow will pick up the
standard and carry on the tradition next year.

But you know the Consortium. You know what it has done. You’ve been an
integral part of its working groups, of its web page, of its bulletin. But it’s important to
have a sense of the larger whole. And what I’d like to try to do in the next couple of
moments is give you a sense of a vision for the larger whole, where the Consortium
might fit in to a larger network of training and education institutions.

So how are the other pieces doing that were laid out in Volker Rühe and William
Cohen’s vision of two years ago? There are lots of different ways to describe what we
do as we educate and train our military officers and our civilian defense officials. One
way to look at it is to think in terms of three specific areas as laid out in this slide:
strategic education; operational education; and operational training. There’s overlap
between the categories, but for the sake of developing categories this is a useful way,
perhaps, to divide the areas of education and training. The Consortium has a
counterpart in NATO, the NATO Defense College, which has recently become part of
the creation of an online defense university, an online defense university that some day
can come together and unite both the PfP Consortium and the NATO Defense College.
Each organization should continue in its individuality, but each can also contribute to what you see in the center as a larger Euro-Atlantic Defense University. Again the idea is one of integration, not the absorption of the various pieces, but the integration of the pieces to create a larger and more integrated co-operative whole.

In the area of operational education, the PfP training centers have simply flourished with partners like Sweden and allies like Turkey, countries like Bulgaria, the Ukraine, and many others, hosting PfP centers. These centers have helped to develop important skills in peace keeping, humanitarian assistance, and civil emergency planning. There is a NATO counterpart, as depicted in the middle of the slide, for operational education, and that is the NATO School at Oberammergau, where NATO staff procedures and multi-national joint logistics have most recently been taught, along with a whole range of other important staff skills. Recently the NATO military committee has called for the creation of an annual conference of PfP training centers. And we envision that this conference of training centers could be a way, for the training that takes place at the PfP training centers and the training that takes place at the NATO School at Oberammergau, to share experiences and to become a force multiplier for one another as they share their experiences and integrate their collective ways of approaching operational education.

Operational training is probably best illustrated by the PfP simulation network. NATO has its own work that has been done in parallel, the Allied Command Europe, Command and Staff Training Program, also organized along the principles of using
computer simulation and distributed learning as a way to go ahead and improve overall staff skills. One day we can envision the combination of these two efforts, so that you could have a high band width network to support the education, training and exercise needs of the Euro-Atlantic region. And a common thread for this effort would be the concept of Advanced Distributed Learning, which ties together lots of different forms of education and is the subject of one of your working groups here today.

Why the integration? And why the need to have a combination of integration but yet a preservation of some of the separateness? This is to allow the umbrella that covers a great variety of countries, to continue to be an all-encompassing umbrella. One of the benefits of Partnership for Peace, and one of the benefits of the Consortium, has been that you can accommodate many different nations with many different security needs. This includes: nations who are in the alliance; nations who want to come into the alliance; nations who have no desire to ever come into the alliance but, nonetheless, want to work together in a co-operative security network. Because while there are important differences, the umbrella under which they work, covers a common set of values, covers a common set of goals, a goal of a Europe that is free, that is prosperous and that is stable. These different pieces can come together to reinforce that goal.

Why integration? Why not leave them as separate entities? There are some very pragmatic reasons. First, for military effectiveness. This is good for academic learning, but it is also very effective when we have to work together in an operation like Kosovo Force (KFOR). Our shared values, and shared military understanding, combined with an ability to do simple things like speak English together, and use the same staff procedures at company and battalion levels, have allowed us to undertake KFOR, one of the best examples of co-operation between allies and partners. In fact, I will go so far as to say I cannot imagine another operation in the future, in Europe, that does not involve partners and that is not a combination of allies and partners. Because I believe that this is the way in the future that we will come to deal with crises and crises management, this network becomes even more important. Because this network becomes, and my Russian colleague used a very apt term, “the capillaries” or “the veins,” through which the blood of a common collective view of security and a common collective way of doing business, can flow, and thereby be shared.

In closing, this is a time of celebration. This is a time of reflection. But this is also a time to, once again, lift our eyes up towards the horizon, and on the longest day of the year, when we can see most clearly, begin to see a vision of an integrated education and network which can secure the peace, stability and prosperity of the entire Euro-Atlantic Region.

Thank you very much.
List of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes Annual Conferences

First Annual Conference:
*Networking Security Institutions in the Information Age and the Way Ahead for the PfP Consortium*
19-21 October 1998, Zurich, Switzerland

Second Annual Conference:
*Enhancing Cooperation in Education and Research in the 21st Century*
8-10 December 1999, Sofia, Bulgaria

Third Annual Conference:
*Building a Strategic Community through Education and Research*
19-21 June 2000, Tallin, Estonia

Fourth Annual Conference:
*Building a Strategic Community through Education and Research*
25-27 June 2001, Moscow, Russia

Fifth Annual Conference:
*Building a Strategic Community through Education and Research*
17-19 June 2002, Paris, France

Sixth Annual Conference:
*Building a Strategic Community through Education and Research*
15-17 June 2003, Berlin, Germany

Seventh Annual Conference:
*Transformation: Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century*
13-15 June 2004, Bucharest, Romania

Eight Annual Conference:
*Expanding and Enhancing the Partnerships: Further Steps after Istanbul*
12-14 June 2005, Vienna, Austria

Ninth Annual Conference:
*Strengthening NATO’s Partnerships: The Role of Education in Security Sector Reform and Defense Institution Building*
13-14 June 2006, Zagreb, Croatia

Tenth Annual Conference:
*The Next Ten Years: Leveraging Consortium Capabilities for Defense Institution Building and Regional Stability*
18-19 June 2008, Brussels, Belgium
First Conference
Zurich, Switzerland, 19-21 October, 1998
In conjunction with the Third International Security Forum

125 Participants from 42 Countries

Focus on Advanced Distributive Learning and planning a Future for the Consortium

During the 3rd International Security Forum in Zurich, Switzerland on October 19-21, 1998 (which also counts as the 1st Annual Partnership for Peace Consortium Conference) the interest to create a Consortium was confirmed.

The first annual conference in 1998 on “Networking Security Institutions in the Information Age and the Way Ahead for the PfP Consortium” illustrates the important role the Consortium can play in the overall education and training effort.

More information is available at:
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/3isf/publist.htm
185 Participants from 41 Countries

Keynote speakers:
- Mr. Petar Stoyanov, President of Bulgaria
- Mr. Georgi Ananiev, Bulgarian Minister of Defense
- Lt. General Paul J. Cerjan, President of Regent University
220 attendees from 42 Countries

Keynote speakers:
- Mr. Mart Laar, Prime Minister of Estonia
- Mr. Walter Kolbow, German Deputy Minister of Defense
- Dr. Velizar Shalamonov, Deputy Minister of Defense and Bulgarian representative of the Troika
- LTG Harmut Olboeter, Commandant of NATO Defense College
450 attendees from 47 countries

**Plenary Session I**

1. Welcome Address by Viktor A. Sadovnichii
2. Opening Address by Sergei B. Ivanov
3. Address by Jüri Luik
4. Keynote Address – Ambassador James Collins
5. Remarks by Kirk E. Murray
6. Presentation by Viktor A. Sadovnichii
Parallel Study/Working Group Meetings
7. Track I: Crisis Management in Central Asia
8. Track II: Democratic Control of Armed Forces
9. Track III: Information Technology
10. Track IV.1: Promoting Electronic Business: New Opportunities, Expansion
    Difficulties and Problems of Security
11. Track IV.2: New Challenges for a Global Community: Increase of Crime in the
    Information Technology Field
12. Track V: Military History

Parallel Study/Working Group Meetings
13. Track I: Crisis Management in South East Europe
14. Track II: Economic and Legal Aspects of Security
15. Track III: Curriculum Development
16. Track IV.3: Maintaining Individual Freedom and Privacy in an Internet
    Environment
17. Track IV.4: Influence of Internet Technology on Civilian and Military
    Education
18. Track V: Digital Library

Parallel Study/Working Group Meetings
19. Track I: Non-proliferation and Export Control
20. Track II: European Security and Defense Identity
21. Track III: Advanced Distributed Learning
22. Track IV.5: Exploring the Influence of a Free and Open Mass Media on Military
    Planing and Operations, and During Emergency Situations
23. Track IV.6: Exploring the Impact of Information Technology on National
    Security
24. Track V: Archives

Parallel Study/Working Group Meetings
25. Track I: Lessons Learned
26. Track II: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security
27. Track III: Modeling & Simulation
28. Track IV.7: Training Specialists to Combat Computer Crime – A Complex Inter-
    disciplinary Problem Research
29. Track V: Research
30. Track VI: Meeting of New Groups

Plenary Session II
31. Review of the Conference Results of the Study/Working Groups
32. Addresses by the Troika Representatives
   a. Russia: Viktor A. Sadovnichii
   b. France: Representative from the Ministry of Defense
33. Closing Comments by Kirk E. Murray
350 attendees from 47 countries

Keynote speakers:
• Jean-Pierre Kelche, Chief of the General Staff, France
• Dr. Josef Joffe, Editor of *Die Zeit*, *The changing face of global security*
• Ms. Nicole Gnessoto, Director of the Institute for Security Studies, European Union, “*Defense of Europe after September 11*”

Subthemes:
Track 1: Crisis Management
Track 2: European Identity and NATO
Track 3: Education and Defense
Track 4: Military History and Archives
Track 5: Counter Terrorism and Global Security
241 attendees from 43 countries

Subthemes:

1. Implications and Perspectives of EU/NATO Enlargement
2. Reflection on Regional Stability in Europe and on its periphery
3. PFP Consortium and the Way ahead
320 attendees from 41 countries

**Keynote speakers:**
- Mr. George Christian Maior, State Secretary, Romanian Ministry of National Defense
- Mr. Ioan Mircea Pascu, Romanian Minister of Defense
- Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, Supreme Allied Commander, Allied Command transformation and Commander, US Joint Forces Command

**Subthemes:**
1. International Military Organization
2. Knowledge Management
3. Euro-Atlantic Security
4. WMD Proliferation
200 attendees from 38 countries

**Keynote speakers:**
- General Roland Ertl, Chief of Defence Staff of the Federal Ministry of Defence of Austria
- General Raimond Schittenhelm, Commandant of the National Defence Academy of Austria

**Subthemes:**
1. Reforming the Security Sector in an Age of Terrorism
2. Transforming NATO and its Partnerships
3. Preparing Tomorrow’s Leaders: Responding to New challenges of Education
4. Regional Co-operation as a Partnership Goal
5. Preparing Tomorrow’s Leaders: Promises and Pitfalls of Collaborative Education Networks
119 attendees from 47 Partner nations

Keynote speakers:
• Mr. Powell Moore, Secretary of Defense Representative to the OSCE
• Mr. Pjer Siumunovic, Croatian Assistant Foreign Minister

Subthemes:
1. Getting the right results from defense education
2. Development and sustainment of civilian defense professionals
3. The role of the Consortium in security sector reform and defense institution building
139 attendees from 40 countries

Keynote speakers:
- Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General
- Greg Gross, OSD, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Partnership Strategy

Subthemes:
1. The role of defense education in defense institution building: case studies in defense education reform, Moderator – Dr. David Emelifeonwu
2. The Consortium role in fostering regional stability, Moderator – Mr. Frederic Labarre
3. Advanced educational methodologies – resident and e-learning, Moderator – Mr. Timo Staub