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**A Review of Russian
Foreign Policy**

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Key Points

- * Russia's intensified anti-US tone is due to her greater self-confidence, which stems from her role as an energy producer.
- * Russia feels that she can now play a greater role in shaping the international system.
- * Disillusionment with US foreign policy means that Moscow is no longer interested in being part of a western community of states.
- * Moscow is instead seeking to enhance her position in parts of the post-Soviet space and elsewhere. These moves have anti-US undertones.
- * The role of energy as a tool of foreign policy is increasing. Russia is now also enhancing her military capability.
- * Russia may seek to play a role as a citadel of anti-NATO forces, thus echoing the bipolar competition of the Cold War.

Contents

Disillusionment with the USA	1
The development of the post Soviet space	5
The rest of the world	6
The role of energy in Russian foreign policy	8
Conclusion	9

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A more assertive tone regarding Russia's role in the world has been pronounced by the Russian leadership in recent months. A striking feature of this assertiveness is a greater willingness to criticise the USA. This shift coincides with the publication of a Review of Russian foreign policy by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 27 March 2007.¹ The review is notable for its emphasis on Russia's newly acquired self-confidence. The review comments that "the main achievement in recent years has been the newly found foreign policy independence of Russia". It also notes that: "Russia's international position has become significantly firmer. A strong more self-confident Russia has become an important constituent part of positive changes in the world."

The review also sees Russia as being able to play a major role in shaping and managing the international system. It states that we have now come to a "defining moment, when it is necessary to think about a new architecture of global security, based on a rational balance of the interests of all the subjects of the international community. In these conditions Russia's role and responsibility have qualitatively risen."

Disillusionment with the USA

The decision to carry out this review was made in June 2006 by Vladimir Putin.² His state of the nation address to the Federal Assembly in May 2006³ was notable for its criticism of the USA as "a wolf which knows who to eat and is not about to listen to anyone, it seems". In contrast to the 1990s and the early Putin years, the May 2006 State of the Nation address did not talk about the desirability of a close US-Russian partnership. Putin in fact made no distinction between the USA, China or India, which were the only individual countries he mentioned in this address:

Of great importance for us and for the entire international system are our relations with the United States of America, with the People's Republic of China, with India, and also with the fast-growing countries of the Asia-Pacific Region, Latin America and Africa. We are willing to take new steps to expand the areas and framework of our cooperation with these countries, increase cooperation in ensuring global and regional security, develop mutual trade and investment and expand cultural and educational ties.

The 2006 speech drew attention to the development of various military programmes. It seemed that after years of neglect and half-hearted reform, some progress might at last be being made in creating viable and credible armed forces. The enhancement of Russia's military power and her importance as an energy exporter gives her reason to feel more self-confident. This explains the greater willingness to criticise the USA, as in Putin's speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, where he made the sharpest criticism of Washington

that has been made by a Russian leader since the end of the Soviet Union. Putin criticised the notion of a unipolar (i.e. US dominated) international system. He saw it as leading to lawlessness:

Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems. Moreover, they have caused new human tragedies and created new centres of tension. Judge for yourselves: wars as well as local and regional conflicts have not diminished...

Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force – military force – in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. As a result we do not have sufficient strength to find a comprehensive solution to any one of these conflicts. Finding a political settlement also becomes impossible.

We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law. And independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming increasingly closer to one state's legal system. One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?

...And of course this is extremely dangerous. It results in the fact that no one feels safe. I want to emphasise this – no one feels safe! Because no one can feel that international law is like a stone wall that will protect them. Of course such a policy stimulates an arms race.⁴

In May 2007, Putin accused the USA of pursuing a policy of diktat and imperialism.

The world has changed and an attempt has been made to make it unipolar. Some international players have had a desire to dictate their will to each and everyone, without making their actions conform to standards of international communication and law...In our view, this is pure diktat and imperialism.⁵

He went on to accuse the USA of “stuffing Eastern Europe with new weapons,” and stated that that Russia would continue to develop its military resources, noting its recent tests of ballistic and cruise missiles.

Although this sharp tone only developed in 2006, it is of interest to note that Putin commented in September 2004 that “if the Soviet Union had not changed politically and had not disintegrated,” then the USA would not have invaded Iraq.⁶ The inability of Russia to constrain the ability of the US to use military force is presumably one reason why Putin in April 2005, in his state of the nation address, stated that the collapse of the USSR was a major geopolitical catastrophe.⁷

In June 2007, on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the establishment of relations between the USA and Tsarist Russia, Sergey Lavrov accused the USA of pursuing a policy of containment towards Russia, and lamented the fact that Moscow and Washington understood and respected each other's interests more during the Cold War than they do now.⁸

In July 2007 Vladimir Putin issued a decree suspending Russia's participation in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. This follows on from the moratorium on the CFE treaty he declared in his state of the nation address in April

2007. This means that Russia no longer considers herself obliged to observe the restrictions on the numbers of armed forces that can be deployed in western Russia, to inform other signatories of movements of troops, or to permit observers from other signatories to carry out inspections to confirm that the treaty is being adhered to. This constitutes a significant shift away from the military cooperation with the West that existed during the late Gorbachev and Yel'tsin periods.

The significance of all these remarks and actions lies in the fact that Russia, as it consolidates itself after the chaos of the 1990s, is no longer interested in the close partnership that was envisaged by the Yel'tsin leadership in the early 1990s. As Dmitry Trenin terms it, Russia is leaving the West. In *Foreign Affairs* in summer 2006, he wrote:

Until recently, Russia saw itself as Pluto in the Western solar system, very far from the centre but still fundamentally a part of it. Now it has left that orbit entirely: Russia's leaders have given up on becoming part of the West and have started creating their own Moscow-centred system.

The Kremlin's new approach to foreign policy assumes that as a big country, Russia is essentially friendless; no great power wants a strong Russia, which would be a formidable competitor, and many want a weak Russia that they could exploit and manipulate. Accordingly, Russia has a choice between accepting subservience and reasserting its status as a great power, thereby claiming its rightful place in the world alongside the United States and China rather than settling for the company of Brazil and India.⁹

The early Putin period of 2000-2001 appeared to envisage Russia as a close partner of the West. The essay written by Putin and published on the internet on 31 December 1999, the day he became acting president, implied as much, by its emphasis on Russia's need to be integrated into the global economic system.¹⁰ There was also concern in early 2001 about the incoming Bush Administration's tendency to downplay Russia as a priority. This was temporarily allayed after 9-11, when some circles in Washington even used the term 'ally' in relation to the Russian Federation in the immediate aftermath of the attack on the USA.

However, Moscow has become disillusioned with Washington since then, due to what it sees as the USA's tendency to see Russia as no more than a junior partner. Russia feels resentment for several reasons:¹¹

- Russia believes that it was deceived over NATO widening. In February 1990, James Baker, the Secretary of State in the Bush Senior Administration told Gorbachev that apart from the incorporation of East Germany into the Federal Republic of Germany, NATO would not extend any further east.¹² This was an informal verbal promise which was disregarded by the Clinton Administration. NATO is now extending into the former Soviet Union, with Ukraine and Georgia as possible candidates for membership.
- NATO took military action against Yugoslavia over Kosovo in 1999 without a UN Security Council resolution and also without consulting Russia even though the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council had been set up as a consultation mechanism in 1997.
- The USA gave notice that it would withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty in December 2001, just three months after 9-11, when Washington was

emphasising the importance of the partnership with Russia in the war on terrorism.

- The USA is planning to deploy a missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic, in order to defend against any possible missile threat that may emerge from Iran. However Moscow fears that in the long term it could be used to undermine Russia's strategic nuclear capability, and is sceptical about any nuclear threat from Iran against Europe.
- The USA has not lifted the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment to the US-USSR Trade Agreement which made the granting of most favoured nation trade status to Moscow conditional on permitting Jewish emigration. Although the practical effects are limited, its continued imposition is seen as symbolic, and gives Moscow the impression that Washington is still seeking to wage the Cold War.
- The USA is encouraging the development of oil and gas transport routes that bypass Russia and provide an alternative to Russian pipelines.

These and other reasons give Russia reason to believe that close partnership with the USA is no longer possible. The March 2007 review notes that the US foreign policy often operates on the principle that it is the leader and that others must be led, and that not all in the American political establishment are psychologically prepared to accept that Russia has re-established her foreign policy independence. It also notes that although the Bush Administration says it has made a principled choice in favour of cooperation with Russia, and US-Russian relations do have a positive dynamic, there still remains a long way to go before Russian interests are properly taken into account by the US.

The review also expresses concern about the wisdom of attempting to impose democracy and intervening in other states in order to prevent proliferation; these are implicit criticisms of US policy and of its increased willingness to use force in international relations. It also notes that international relations have been unbalanced since the end of the Cold War, which means that there has been no "systemic counteraction" to US unilateral actions. Furthermore, the review believes that what it calls unilateral reactions in international relations (i.e. current US foreign policy) are based on a "Cold War Victory" syndrome. This approach, argues the review, is linked to the preservation of dividing lines in international relations on account of the step-by-step widening - by co-opting new members - of spheres of western influence. This leads to the re-ideologisation and militarization of international relations.

The Putin leadership is now no longer willing to tolerate the humiliation that it believes was inflicted on Russia in the 1990s. Since 2000, Putin has attempted, with a considerable degree of success, to rebuild the Russian state. He has re-established the control of the state over society, and curbed the regional centrifugalism of the Yel'tsin era. Such control is an essential prerequisite to pursuing a more independent foreign policy. Ambitious plans for the further development of the Russian armed forces were outlined by then defence minister Sergey Ivanov to the Duma in February 2007.¹³ A new military doctrine is likely to be adopted in 2008, which may well reflect the leadership's approach to what it sees as a growing challenge from the USA to Russia's security interests.

The Development of the post Soviet space

It is clear that the Russian leadership is once again focusing on the former Soviet space as a sphere of Russian influence. In April 2006 in a speech to the CIS Arts and Science Communities Forum, Putin noted that:

We've long since lost the Soviet Union, it would seem, and so one could ask, what's the point now in worrying about our common humanitarian space and in lamenting the common foundation we had built in this area? But the thing is that this common humanitarian foundation never did disappear. It is still with us today and it is more relevant than ever.

We feel a pull towards each other today. Why is this? What is happening? We all know, of course, that we live in independent countries and we all feel pride in even the most modest achievements of our peoples. But we have also become acutely aware that, though our peoples now live in the independent states that make up this vast Eurasian area and enjoy all the benefits that independence brings, we nonetheless have a common socio-cultural heritage. It is here, in this socio-cultural heritage, that lie our considerable competitive advantages in the modern, global world, and it would be foolish not to make use of them. ¹⁴

Whilst Russia has seen herself as the core and leader of integration in the CIS since the Yel'tsin period,¹⁵ it is only since Putin came to power that Russia has managed to make substantial progress in enhancing its influence and it is not simply the attractive power of a common heritage that has caused this. The raising of the cost of energy to former Soviet states and the Russian stranglehold over other trade and economic infrastructure has made clear Russia's economic power vis-à-vis her neighbours.

The institutions of the CIS had not proved very effective in integrating the member states of this organisation. In the first decade of the 21st century, other organisations have taken over the task of boosting integration in the post-Soviet space. These are the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC), which was formed in October 2000,¹⁶ and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) which developed out of the CIS Collective Security Treaty. EURASEC endeavours to build on the plans for a CIS Customs Union, and to promote the formation of a single economic space. It comprises Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The CSTO comprises Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In addition the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was formed in June 2001 and comprises Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It is both an economic and security organisation, and thus overlaps with the CSTO and EURASEC.¹⁷

It remains to be seen whether these organisations will be any more effective than the CIS in promoting integration. However, given that Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova are not members of these organisations, the grouping of states with a broadly common geopolitical orientation may make real collaboration easier.

It may well be the security cooperation within both the CSTO and SCO that will play the major role in promoting closer relations not only between Russia and the former Soviet states in these organisations, but also with China and other potential members of the SCO. Arms sales at favourable prices also play a part in this. The CSTO has three military groupings: Central Asia, Eastern Europe, Transcaucasia.

Considerable effort has been put into developing a credible force. In January 2005 CSTO Secretary-General Nikolay Bordyuzha said that:

The coalition group of the CSTO troops in Central Asia, which is being set up at present, is being supported by a set of practical measures...we are using the experience of the East European group which is part of the armed forces of Belarus and Russia, as well of the Caucasus group - which is part of the armed forces of Russia and Armenia...On the basis of the long-term plan of the coalition's military development for the period until 2010, unified military systems - air defence, communications, information and reconnaissance support - will be set up in Central Asia.¹⁸

The SCO has become an important framework for managing the Russo-Chinese relationship.¹⁹ The Russo-Chinese military exercises that took place in August 2005, the first since the Sino-Soviet split, are due to be repeated in August 2007, and mark the development of a much closer security relationship. Although the SCO has rejected the idea of becoming a military bloc, it is nonetheless developing a security dimension. In April 2006 SCO defence ministers met in Beijing. Three anti-terrorism exercises have been held to date, and a SCO command-staff exercise will be held in August 2007.

In addition, at the SCO Shanghai summit in June 2006, Vladimir Putin proposed that an SCO energy club be formed.²⁰ This appears to be an attempt to coordinate the energy policies of the member states, which comprise both producers and consumers. It was announced by Putin in Shanghai that Gazprom was willing to take part in the construction of the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. Iran attended the Shanghai summit as an observer, and as Russia and Iran have the largest and second largest gas reserves in the world, their energy relationship is of major significance.

Russia is unlikely to be able to develop the sort of domination over her neighbours that the USSR exercised over Eastern Europe in the Cold War. It is more likely that she will have a loose sphere of influence including the states of Central Asia, Armenia and Belarus. Even then, she will have to contend with dissent. One of the most interesting developments of 2007 has been the attempts by Belarus, hitherto one of Moscow's most loyal partners, to reduce its energy dependence on Russia after successive price rises.

The rest of the world

Another aspect of Russia's increased confidence is her desire to assert a presence in areas in which she had little involvement during the Yel'tsin or late Soviet period. The Putin leadership has in the last two years displayed interest in the Persian Gulf, Africa and Latin America. Putin's visit to the Persian Gulf (i.e. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan) in February 2007 was the first visit by a Russian/Soviet leader to that region, and it is clear that he sees it as important for Russia to develop wide-ranging economic and political relationships with these countries. Similarly his visits to Algeria (March 2006) and Morocco (September 2006) indicate a broadening of Russia's interest in North Africa. Algeria is important as an energy partner to Russia.²¹

The March 2007 foreign policy review noted the increased interest being displayed in Africa by major western powers, China, India and ASEAN states, and saw this region as an area in which Russia should play a larger role. Putin's visit to the

Republic of South Africa (RSA) in September 2006 was the first by a Russian leader. During this visit several inter-governmental agreements were signed, including a friendship and cooperation treaty. An agreement on uranium extraction was signed in February 2007, and prime minister Mikhail Fradkov visited the RSA in March 2007. During Putin's visit it was announced that the Russian company Renova would sign an agreement with South Africa to build a manganese alloy plant. Another company is planning to take part in developing the electricity sector, while building an aluminium plant in parallel. Russia will supply nuclear fuel for South African reactors until 2010. Russia is also interested in military-technical cooperation with the RSA and other African states. The trade level between Russia and the RSA is currently low (about \$200 million annually), but there is a clear interest on both sides to expand it. In May 2007 Sergey Lavrov said that Russia would wipe off \$500 million of the debt owed to it by the poorest African countries. This is in addition to the \$11.3 billion of African debt already forgiven by Moscow.

There has been a similar heightening of interest in Latin America. Putin visited Mexico, Chile and Brazil in 2004, and Guatemala in 2007. This is again the first visit by a Russian/Soviet leader to Latin America (with the exception of visits by Soviet leaders to Cuba). During Putin's visit to Brazil in November 2004 it was agreed to expand Russo-Brazilian space cooperation. The Russian national oil agency and the University of Sao Paulo are also engaged in a project on the transfer of Russian technologies to Brazil in the sphere of airborne geophysical research for the creation of geological maps and for geological intelligence aimed at discovering possible locations of natural resources in Brazil. Putin spoke of creating a "technological alliance" between the two countries, and of doubling or tripling the level of trade (in 2004 the Russo-Brazilian trade turnover was about \$2 billion). During his visit to Mexico in June 2004 Putin stated that Russia would start supplying Mexico with Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from 2007. Russian companies may help develop the LNG infrastructure in Mexico. Putin also expressed interest in developing Russo-Mexican military-technological cooperation.

Russia's relationship with Venezuela has also become significant, in view of the Venezuelan leadership's poor relationship with the USA. US-Venezuelan relations have been strained since President Hugo Chavez came to power in 1999. The Bush Administration is suspected by many of being behind a failed coup attempt against Chavez in April 2002. Chavez has cultivated relations with Cuba and Iran, and he also seems to see Moscow as a useful counterweight to any pressure he may face from Washington. He has visited Moscow four times since he became president (May 2001, November 2004, July 2006 and June 2007). Venezuela has become a purchaser of Russian military aircraft and helicopters, and is interested in purchasing Russian pipelines for a project to build a major gas pipeline, which will run from Venezuela to Rio de la Plata in southern Latin America. Lukoil intends to enter into a joint venture with Petroleos de Venezuela in 2008.

The Russian leadership has defended its right to sell military equipment to Venezuela in the face of US criticism. Moscow sees Venezuela as a useful partner in that she is a customer for Russian military hardware, and there is the potential for useful cooperation in the energy sector. The development of good relations with Venezuela is also another way in which Russia can demonstrate to the USA her determination to pursue an independent foreign policy. It is unlikely, however, that Moscow would be willing to allow herself to be pulled into a confrontation with Washington in the event of a drastic deterioration in US-Venezuelan relations. Russia's value as a counterweight to the USA is therefore of limited value to Venezuela.

The role of energy in Russian foreign policy

Russian policy appears to aim at creating a Eurasian bloc to counter the USA. Energy is increasingly being used as a tool of this foreign policy.²² Russia seeks to ensure control over oil and gas pipeline routes both across her territory and elsewhere in order to gain leverage in relationships with both potential allies and adversaries. The Russian state is also increasing its control over its own energy resources. In December 2006 Shell was forced to relinquish its controlling share in the \$20 billion Sakhalin-2 project to Gazprom. Russia energy companies are interested in acquiring ownership of parts of other countries' energy infrastructure. This is particularly true of Gazprom, which is essentially a state owned corporation. One reason why Gazprom initially rejected the involvement of western companies in the Shtokman project was because of their unwillingness to transfer some of their assets to Gazprom's control.²³

In May 2007 Russia reached agreement to modernise the old Soviet Central Asia-Centre gas pipeline and those along the Caspian Sea, which pipe gas to Russia. Construction work will begin in mid-2008. Gazprom will control the all phases of the process: field development, gas acquisition, pipeline construction, and transit operation. An increasing quantity of Kazakh gas will also be piped via Russian pipelines.²⁴

In addition, Kazakhstan in 2006 exported most of its oil (42 million tons of a total of 52.3 million tons exported) via Russia. Russia also signed an agreement with Kazakhstan in May 2007 on setting up an international uranium enrichment centre in Angarsk, in Russia. Kazakhstan is the world's second-largest uranium producer. Kazatomprom and Rosatom intend to set up a joint venture to prospect and drill for uranium. These developments will strengthen Russia's position as a supplier of uranium to world markets.²⁵

Gazprom has also sought to acquire part of the British energy infrastructure. It now "owns 10% of the interconnector pipeline between Belgium and Britain, ensuring it can get gas into the UK. In 2006, Gazprom bought a UK energy retailer, Pennine Natural Gas, and it is now targeting NHS hospitals. Gazprom's expansion in mainland Europe is moving far faster than the UK. The company has done asset swaps in Italy, Hungary, and Germany with the likes of Eni and E.on. Similar asset swaps are expected in the UK."²⁶

In July 2007 it was announced that Gazprom was buying Natural Gas Shipping Services, a small, Cheshire-based gas-distribution business that is the sister company of Pennine Natural Gas. Pennine and NGSS are Gazprom's vehicles for a push into the British retail market. Gazprom now accounts for 4% of that market, and Gazprom has set a target of 10% "within five to seven years". Gazprom also desires to become a one-stop energy shop for commercial users in Britain, selling electricity, heating and even carbon credits. The company is also interested in acquiring power stations.²⁷ Gazprom is also negotiating to purchase 50 per cent of the Hungarian gas company Emfesz.

Russia envisages energy cooperation with Germany as a means of enhancing her influence and importance as an energy supplier to Europe. In October 2006, when he visited Germany, Putin stated:

I would like to single out collaboration between Russian and German companies in the energy sector. Judging by everything, this sphere of our

cooperation could be much greater, as a result of which the Federal Republic of Germany would turn from a consumer of Russian gas and oil into a large centre for European distribution of these products. This is our serious and weighty contribution to the cause of ensuring Europe's energy security.

He went on to comment that the development of the Shtokman gas field and North European gas pipeline would make it possible for Germany to play this role. The development of such a partnership would obviously increase Russia's importance as a partner to the European Union and its overall importance as a European power. Moscow would presumably use this to argue in favour of the notion that she is in the long-term a better partner for the EU than the USA. Putin himself came close to making such a comment in his speech to the German Bundestag in September 2001, not long after 9/11.²⁸

Conclusions

In the longterm, the Russian desire would appear to be to develop a quasi-bloc with the Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union, Belarus, plus an alliance-type relationship with China, and develop a closer relationship with a Europe which is less Atlanticist in its foreign policy orientation. In the Middle East, Moscow is now more determined to raise its profile and play a role independent of Washington, and to develop closer ties with Iran. Increased attention to Africa and Latin America, along with her longer standing interest in the Asia-Pacific region, is indicative of Russia's capacity and willingness to play a more assertive role in the international system, and both directly and indirectly challenge the USA's post-Cold War pre-eminence. Her importance as an energy producer enables her to pursue a more active foreign policy, and the overseas activities and acquisitions of Russian energy companies give Russia an increased presence abroad. In 2006 Russia was third among developing economies in volume of direct foreign investment. However her overall role as a trading power is limited compared to other G8 members, and failure to expand her position as a trading power will constrain Russia's ability to expand her international presence. Russia thus sees admission to the World Trade Organisation as an important objective.

Although Russia's official foreign policy doctrine of June 2000 advocates a multipolar international system, the increasingly harsh criticisms of US foreign policy give the impression of a desire to re-create a form of the bipolar competition that existed during the Cold War. Putin's nostalgia for the Soviet Union appears to be based on the fact that its existence constrained the USA's ability to use force in the international arena. The 2007 review's reference to the loss of balance in the post-Cold War international system can also be seen as a form of nostalgia, along with its criticism of Cold War triumphalism in certain western circles. It may also be seen as a desire to revive bipolar competition. Russia feels she is now more capable of engaging in this competition than she was in the 1990s.

It has been argued that there is a faction in the Russian leadership that desires to see Russia as a citadel of all the anti-NATO forces in the international system.²⁹ The increasingly sharp criticisms of the USA indicate that this is quite possible. Presidential succession in the US and the Russian Federation in 2008 coincide. In the interim, and the immediate aftermath, Russia is likely to be on the lookout for opportunities to further strengthen her position internationally in the debates over missile defence, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Kosovo, the Middle East and other issues. The offer made by Putin to the USA at the G8 to use the Qabala radar station in

Azerbaijan to monitor any possible launch of missiles by Iran indicates a new found deftness and flexibility in Russian foreign policy that may pose a significant challenge for the USA. The decision to withdraw from observance of the CFE Treaty indicates that Russia is indeed shifting away from the West, and concentrating on developing herself as a Eurasian power.

Endnotes

¹ The Review can be found here:

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¹⁸ ITAR-TASS news agency, Moscow, in Russian 0948 gmt 20 January 2005. BBC Mon *FS1* FsuPol tm/iu

¹⁹ Interview with Nikolay Bordyuzha in *Rossiskie Vesti*, 25 January 2006. See also Ariel Cohen, 'After the G-8 Summit: China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,' *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Volume 4, No. 3 (2006) p. 51-64

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