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THE CIVIL-MILITARY AGENDA



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THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

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Executive Summary

A review of post-Cold War peacekeeping and peacebuilding actions shows that these operations have experienced significant problems with coherence and coordination, and that this has contributed to the poor rate of sustainability of these operations to date. These challenges need to be understood in the context of an increasingly complex and interdependent international conflict-management system where the scope of the crisis faced by the international community is often of such a scale that no single agency, government or international organization can manage it on its own. In order to address this challenge, various agencies, governments and organizations have started exploring, independently of each other, a range of models and mechanisms aimed at improving the overall coherence, cooperation and coordination of their conflict-management systems. This effort to pursue greater synergy, harmonization and complementarity in the international peacebuilding system has become known as the Comprehensive Approach. In the United Nations (UN) context, it has generated the Integrated Approach and a specific structural arrangement in the context of UN peacekeeping operations, the Integrated Mission.

Integrated Missions refer to a type of UN mission in which there are processes, mechanisms and structures in place that generate and sustain a common strategic objective and a comprehensive operational approach among the political, security, development, human rights, and where appropriate, humanitarian UN actors at country level. The assumption of the Comprehensive Approach in general, and the UN's Integrated Approach in particular, is that a more coherent system-wide (security, governance and development) effort, will have a more relevant, effective, efficient and sustainable impact on the peace process.

One of the implications of the Integrated Approach on UN peacekeeping operations is that the old bi-polar concept of civil-military coordination no longer adequately captures the new multi-polar coordination challenges facing complex UN peacekeeping operations. In the UN Integrated Missions context, the focus has shifted instead to system-wide coordination across the political, security, development, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian dimensions.

As with any new innovation, the UN's Integrated Approach has not been without its detractors. Although it is a recent innovation that is still being refined, its application to date has highlighted various technical, administrative, organizational and budget-

ary challenges that will need to be addressed before the new Integrated Approach can be judged to have made an impact on the coherence and coordination dilemma it is meant to address. One of the most serious and persistent concerns relates to the perceived loss of humanitarian independence and neutrality when the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) becomes one of the Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (DSRSG).

Many other concerns and dilemmas have been identified, however, and taken together they represent significant feedback from the field that challenges the policy-level assumption that there is a sufficient level of shared values, principles, goals and objectives among the different agents and dimensions that make up the international peacebuilding system to facilitate system-wide coherence. This does not imply that it is impossible to achieve meaningful coherence and coordination among the different agents and across the various dimensions under a comprehensive approach umbrella, but rather that there may be times and situations where it may not be possible to achieve a common approach. Thus, instead of assuming that there will always be room for a common approach, reality dictates that complex peacebuilding coordination models need to provide room for trade-offs, second-best solutions, compromises and coexistence, as well as recognize that there are certain conditions under which a common approach is not attainable.

The two most critical areas for coherence in the context of the comprehensive approach in general, and in the UN Integrated Approach in particular, are the needs to devise an overall strategic framework and to ensure local ownership.

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Introduction

A large number of evaluation studies¹ and research reports² that have analyzed the record of post-Cold War peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations have found that these operations have experienced significant problems with coherence and coordination, and that this has contributed to the poor rate of sustainability of these operations to date. It is estimated that approximately a quarter of all peace processes fail within the first five years.³ For example, the Joint *Utstein* Study of peacebuilding, which analyzed 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway over the last decade, has identified a lack of coherence at the strategic level, what it terms a “strategic deficit”, as the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding (Smith 2003: 16). The *Utstein* study found that more than 55% of the programs it evaluated did not show any link to a larger country strategy.

The United Nations (UN) system has responded to this challenge by commissioning a series of high-level panels and working groups⁴ that considered various aspects of this dilemma and experimented with a number of strategic and operational coordination models.⁵ These efforts culminated, over the last half-decade, in the Integrated Missions approach (UN 2005b). The term “UN Integrated Mission” refers to a specific type of operational process and design, in which the planning and coordination processes of the different elements of the UN family are integrated into a single country-level UN system to undertake complex peacekeeping operations (UN 2008b).

The need for, and benefits of, improved coherence are widely accepted today in the international multilateral governance context. There is now a broad consensus that inconsistent policies and fragmented programs entail a higher risk of duplication, inefficient spending, a lower quality of service, difficulty in meeting goals and, ulti-

¹ Amongst others, Cutillo, 2006; Dahrendorf, 2003; Donini, 2002; Porter, 2002; Stockton, 2002; Sommers, 2000; Reindorp and Wiles, 2001; Duffield, Lautze and Jones, 1998 and Eriksson, 1996.

² For instance, Dobbins, 2005; Paris, 2004; Collier, 2003; and Stedman, Cousens and Rothchild, 2002.

³ See Collier *et al.*, 2003, but note that the approximately 50% figure cited generally has been questioned by Suhrke and Samset (2007). They argue that a more correct finding of the Collier *et al.* study is approximately 25%.

⁴ Amongst others, the Panel on Peace Operations (UN 2000b); the Working Group on Transition Issues (UN 2004a); the Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (UN 2004b); the Secretary-General's *In Larger Freedom* report (UN 2005a); and the Panel on System-Wide Coherence (UN 2006a).

⁵ For example, the Integrated Mission Task Force concept for mission planning, the Strategic Framework concept in Afghanistan and the Results Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF) in Sierra Leone. These and other initiatives will be discussed later in this report.

mately, a reduced capacity for delivery, and thus also impact (OECD 2003). In this paper, 'coherence' is understood as the effort to direct the wide range of activities undertaken in the political, development, human rights, humanitarian, rule of law and security dimensions of a comprehensive approach system towards common strategic objectives.⁶ 'Coordination' is understood to incorporate developing strategies, determining objectives, planning, sharing information, agreeing on the division of roles, responsibilities and tasks, and mobilizing resources.⁷

This paper will distinguish between four elements of coherence⁸ in the comprehensive approach context, namely: (1) agency coherence, i.e. consistency among the policies and actions of an individual agency, including the internal consistency of a specific policy or programme; (2) whole-of-government coherence, i.e. consistency among the policies and actions of the different government agencies of a country;⁹ (3) external coherence, i.e. consistency among the policies pursued by the various international actors in a given country context (harmonization¹⁰); and (4) internal/external coherence, i.e. consistency between the policies of the local and international actors in a given country context (alignment¹¹). The degree to which a specific comprehensive approach mission can be assessed as more or less coherent will be a factor in all four elements of coherence (de Coning 2007: 6).

It is important to recognize, however, that the dynamic and non-linear nature of complex systems means that coherence can never be fully attained (Cilliers 2002: 83). It is nonetheless possible to distinguish between systems where there is less or more coherence, and coherence is thus understood to be about degree, not end states. Coherence also needs to be understood in the context of the natural tensions, and therefore trade-offs, between the four elements of coherence. In the real world, the agencies that are responsible for programs and campaigns more often than not have

⁶ For alternative definitions, see for instance 'Policy Coherence: Vital for Global Development', *OECD Observer*, 2003, available on www.oecd.org and accessed on 10 May 2007, which defines policy coherence as "...the systematic promotion of mutual reinforcing policy actions across government departments and agencies creating synergies towards achieving the agreed objectives."

⁷ Based on Minear and Chellia's (1992: 3) definition of humanitarian coordination.

⁸ Derived from Robert Picciotto (2005: 13-14), who identifies: (1) internal coherence, (2) whole of government coherence, (3) donor coherence and (4) country-level coherence.

⁹ Note, for instance, the Canadian approach aimed at combining Diplomacy, Defence and Development, the so-called '3D' approach.

¹⁰ Note the 'Rome Declaration on Harmonization' of 25 February 2003. See www.aidharmonization.org, accessed on 12 May 2007.

¹¹ Note in this context the 'Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness' of 2 March 2005. See www.oecd.org, accessed on 12 May 2007.

to settle for 'second best' or 'partially coherent' solutions in order to establish a workable foundation for cooperation (Picciotto 2005, Paris and Sisk 2007).

This paper will analyze the UN's Integrated Approach, and its application to date, in the context of the international trend towards more comprehensive, coherent and coordinated civil-military relations.

The UN's Integrated Approach

A UN Integrated Mission is a type of mission with processes, mechanisms and structures in place that generate and sustain a common strategic objective, as well as a comprehensive operational approach, among the political, security, development, human rights, and where appropriate, humanitarian UN actors at country level (UN 2006c: 3). The Note of the Secretary-General on Integrated Missions establishes the Integrated Missions concept as the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations, and for linking the different dimensions into a coherent support strategy (UN 2006b:4). UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan first described the concept as follows:

An Integrated Mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner.¹²

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has reaffirmed the concept, but refined it by re-naming it the Integrated Approach, which signifies that this is a process approach, not a structural approach. He confirmed the Integrated Approach as the guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations in which the UN has a Country Team and a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, or a political or peacebuilding office, regardless of whether these missions are structurally integrated or not (UN 2008b). The 2008 Secretary-General's decision on integration thus differs from the original Integrated Missions concept in that it does not imply structural integration, although it provides for it where appropriate. Instead, the Integrated Approach refers to a strategic partnership between the UN peacekeeping operation and the UN Country Team that ensures that all components of the UN system operate in a coherent and mutually supportive manner in close collaboration with other partners.

¹² See *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions*, Issued by the Secretary-General on 9 December 2005, paragraph 4, and the Revised *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions*, dated 17 January 2006, and released under a Note from the Secretary-General on 9 February 2006, paragraph 4.

An Integrated Approach requires:

- 1) “a shared vision of the UN’s strategic objectives,
- 2) closely aligned or integrated planning,
- 3) a set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace, and
- 4) agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation” (UN 2008b).

The core features of the UN’s Integrated Approach can be summarized as follows:

- *Context:* Multidimensional and system-wide UN family support to the stabilization of a conflict or the implementation of a comprehensive peace process in a post-conflict setting, i.e. actions to establish a meaningful peace process, or where such a peace process is in place, support to the parties in implementing this process (UN 2008b);
- *Purpose:* “The main purpose of the integrated approach is to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN’s response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace” (UN 2008b). The assumption of the Integrated Approach is thus that a more coherent approach, that manages to produce a comprehensive and coordinated UN system-wide effort, will have a more relevant,¹³ effective,¹⁴ efficient¹⁵ and sustainable¹⁶ impact¹⁷ on the peace process;
- *Dimensions:* Recognition that an Integrated Approach requires a system-wide process that covers the political, security, development, human rights, rule of law and, where appropriate, humanitarian dimensions (UN 2005b, 2006b);
- *Participating UN Agents:* Understanding that in order for all these dimensions to be brought into play in a synchronized, appropriately sequenced and coherent fashion, the UN family, which consist of a diverse range of

¹³ Relevance refers to the extent to which the objectives of an intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies (OECD, 2002: 32).

¹⁴ Effectiveness refers to the extent to which an intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance (OECD, 2002: 20).

¹⁵ *Efficiency* is a measure of how economically resources and inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results (OECD, 2002: 21). ‘Economy’ in this context refers to the absence of waste for a given output, i.e. an activity is economical when the costs of the scarce resources used approximate to the minimum needed to achieve planned objectives (OECD, 2002: 20).

¹⁶ Sustainability refers to the continuation of benefits from an intervention after major assistance has been completed – the probability of continued long-term benefits, and the resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time (OECD, 2002:36).

¹⁷ Impact refers to the positive and negative, primary and secondary short, intermediate and long-term effects produced by an intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended (OECD, 2002: 24).

departments in the Secretariat,¹⁸ independently constituted funds, agencies and programs,¹⁹ and the Bretton Woods institutions²⁰ need to operate as one integrated UN system at country level;

- *Operational Coordination*: Establishment of a range of processes, mechanisms and structures that will generate common assessments, integrated plans, operational coordination mechanisms, common monitoring tools and an ability to evaluate the overall effect and impact of the integrated approach that has been brought about among all the relevant elements of the UN system (UN 2005b, 2006b, 2008b).

Within the UN system, there are various semi-autonomous agencies, funds, offices and programs that have a humanitarian and development mandate, as well as departments of the UN Secretariat that has the responsibility for peace operations. Although the core of the UN integration effort will be aimed at achieving system-wide coherence among these members of the UN system, a comprehensive approach is not meant to be limited to the members of the UN family. The members of the UN system that participate in the UN Integrated Approach should also facilitate and participate in various other coordination initiatives aimed at promoting overall harmonization among the external actors, and alignment between the internal²¹ and external²² actors in any given country or regional conflict system.

The Integrated Approach should thus be understood in a wider international context where coherence is being pursued at national level among government departments, and internationally among donors (harmonization), between donors and recipients (alignment), within the UN development, humanitarian and environment dimensions (system-wide coherence), and between the peace, security, human rights, humanitarian and development dimensions of the UN system at country level (Integrated Approach).

Integrated Missions have now been officially accepted (see appendix) in the UN System as the mission structure of choice, where appropriate (UN 2006b and 2008b).

¹⁸ In the peacekeeping and peacebuilding contexts, these are the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Field Support (DFS), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

¹⁹ Such as the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), etc.

²⁰ The International Monitoring Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

²¹ Internal actors are all the local actors in the country or conflict system in which peacebuilding activities are taking place.

²² External actors are all the international actors engaged in undertaking humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities in a given country or conflict system.

It will be the dominant management structure for UN peacekeeping operations in the near- to medium-term, and it may influence the way the European Union (EU), NATO and the African Union (AU) manage their own respective integration and comprehensive approach initiatives.

However, one needs to be mindful that integration in a non-UN context refers to multidimensional integration rather than system-wide integration. For instance, the AU's Integrated Planning Task Force (IPTF) refers to a mechanism in which the military, police and civilian planning functions are integrated (AU 2006b), as opposed to the UN's Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF), which refers to the coming together of planners from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), UN Department of Field Support (DFS), UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), UN Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and others in the UN system. The former remains a peace- and security-focused process, although it is now multi-dimensional, whereas the latter refers to the integration of the political, peacekeeping, humanitarian and development dimensions, thus working towards system-wide integration.

UN Peacekeeping Operations

The UN's Integrated Approach is closely linked to UN peacekeeping operations in that it comes into play whenever a UN multidimensional peacekeeping mission is deployed in a given country, and it remains in place once the peacekeeping mission changes into an integrated or peacebuilding role. In other words, when a UN peacekeeping mission or peacebuilding office is combined with a UN Country Team, the Integrated Approach is utilized to pursue coherence between the UN developmental and humanitarian actors on the one hand and the military, police and civilian peacekeepers on the other. As the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) acts as the lead agency for UN peacekeeping operations, it is thus also *de facto* the lead agency responsible for implementing and managing the Integrated Approach.

In 2008 DPKO released a capstone doctrine that provides a contemporary understanding of UN peacekeeping operations (UN 2008a). The new doctrine recognizes that, whilst UN peacekeeping operations are meant to support a peace process, they cannot deliver peace on their own. The capstone doctrine thus understands and accepts that UN peacekeeping operations are part of a larger Comprehensive Approach process. Within this larger context, it argues that the core business of UN peacekeeping is to

create a secure and stable environment, including strengthening the capacity of the state to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights. UN peacekeeping operations should facilitate the political process by promoting and facilitating dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and efficient governance institutions. UN peacekeeping operations, by virtue of the authority and role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), should also provide a framework for ensuring that the UN family as a whole, like other international actors, pursues its activities at the country level in a coherent and coordinated manner.

The 2008 UN peacekeeping doctrine thus understands UN peacekeeping operations as essentially political and security-focused, but with an important role to facilitate also overall coherence and coordination (de Coning *et al.* 2008: 4). From a UN perspective, a UN peacekeeping operation will thus typically have an important role in facilitating not just the UN's internal Integrated Approach, but also the overall Comprehensive Approach. This may be especially relevant for situations in which the UN is co-deployed with other major regional players, such as the EU in Chad, NATO in Afghanistan and the Balkans, and the AU in Darfur.

Civil-Military Coordination in UN Peacekeeping Operations

UN peacekeeping operations were initially conceptualized as the interpositioning of a third-party military force to monitor inter-state ceasefire agreements. Over time, and especially in the post-Cold War period, more and more civilian and police roles were added to peacekeeping mandates, and today UN peacekeeping missions are truly multidimensional in scope and composition. When civilians first started playing a more prominent role in, and alongside, UN peacekeeping operations in the early 1990s, there was naturally a focus on civil-military coordination. Over time, however, the old bi-polar civil-military coordination approach to UN operations has ceased to capture adequately the new multi-polar, multidimensional, comprehensive and integrated coordination challenges facing complex UN peacekeeping operations.

In the UN Integrated Approach context, the coordination focus has shifted instead to country-level system-wide coordination across the political, security, development, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian dimensions (de Coning 2007c: 2). Whilst 'civil-military coordination' may still be a meaningful term to describe the relationship between a NATO-type military operation and its civilian counterparts at the strategic level, the term is no longer meaningfully applied at that level to UN peacekeeping

operations because in these missions the military component is embedded in a new multi-dimensional reality, where the emphasis has shifted from civil-military coordination to mission-wide coordination in the Integrated Approach context.

At the operational and tactical levels, civil-military coordination can still be meaningfully used to refer to the specific policies, modalities, structures and tactics that are used to manage the relationship between the military component of a UN peacekeeping operation and its civilian counterparts (de Coning 2007a: 26). There is, however a range of mechanisms and processes to deal with these issues at various levels and in various specialized fields. The work of the Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) branch of the military component in UN peacekeeping operations is limited to facilitating operational and tactical liaison in the areas of mission support and community support (de Coning 2007a: 28). DPKO has developed a UN Civil-Military Coordination policy (UN 2002) to address this aspect of civil-military relations in the UN context. This policy is currently under review, and DPKO intends to revise and update the 2002 policy to reflect better the Integrated Approach and the new capstone doctrine that has since been developed.

From a UN military perspective, the structural aspects of the civil-military relationship between the military component and the other components of a UN peacekeeping operation, as well as between the military component and the rest of the UN system, will already be pre-determined by existing UN policies,²³ and by the mandate and organizational structure of the specific UN peacekeeping operation. There is thus no need, in the UN context, to promote the establishment of mission-specific civil-military coordination mechanisms at the strategic level in order to manage this relationship, as there would already be several mission-wide coordination mechanisms built into the mission design,²⁴ as well as an expectation that further mechanisms will be established as the need arises.

NATO, EUFOR, AU and coalition operations, in contrast, are deployed as essentially military operations that exist as a separate legal and organizational entity from the

²³ See, for instance, the UN Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) Guidelines on the Functioning of the Resident Coordinator System, 24 September 1999; the UN Secretary-General's Note of Guidance on Relations between Representatives of the Secretary General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators, dated 11 December 2000; the UN Secretary-General's Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, dated 17 January 2006; and DPKO's Policy Directive on Joint Operations Centers and Joint Mission Analysis Centers, dated 31 May 2006.

²⁴ Such as the Senior Mission Leadership Group, Security Management Team (SMT), Joint Operations Centre (JOC), the Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC), the Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT), etc.

UN or other international or regional groupings that may be active in the conflict prevention, peacemaking or peacebuilding spheres in what, from a military perspective, is the same 'battle space'. There is thus a need for these operations to establish liaison and cooperation arrangements between themselves and their civilian counterparts, including with the UN mission and agencies that share the same theatre of operations. In this strategic context, therefore, civil-military coordination has a substantively different meaning for these independent military organizations than for the military component within a UN Integrated Approach context.

Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord)

In the UN context, it is also important to note that there is a distinct set of humanitarian civil-military coordination policies. For instance, in June 2004 the Inter-Agency Steering Committee adopted a reference paper on *Civil-Military Relations in Complex Emergencies (UN 2004c)* that complements and expands the principles and guidelines previously developed by the UN on the use of military and civil defense assets and armed escorts. It also provides guidance of a more general nature for civil-military coordination in humanitarian emergencies. The complex emergency guidelines and the reference paper also introduced a new concept into our vocabulary, namely UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN CMCoord), which is defined as: The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training. (UN 2004c)

The UN guidelines for humanitarian-military coordination can be summarized in the following six operating principles for the use of military assets in humanitarian operations:

- 1) "Decisions to accept military assets must be made by humanitarian organizations, not political authorities, and based solely on humanitarian criteria;
- 2) Military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only if the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset must therefore be unique in nature or timeliness of deployment, and its use should be as a last resort;
- 3) A humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. The operation must remain under the overall authority and control of the humanitarian organization responsible for that operation, whatever the

- specific command arrangements for the military asset itself. As much as possible, the military asset should operate unarmed and be civilian in appearance;
- 4) Countries providing military personnel to support humanitarian operations should ensure that they respect the code of conduct and principles of the humanitarian organization responsible for that deployment;
 - 5) The large-scale involvement of military personnel in the direct delivery of humanitarian assistance should be avoided; and
 - 6) Any use of military assets should ensure that the humanitarian operation retains its international and multilateral character”²⁵

From the perspective of UN peacekeeping operations, it is important to note that these UN humanitarian policies and guidelines for civil-military coordination are focused on, and limited to, humanitarian-military coordination. Civil-military coordination guidance beyond the humanitarian-military relationship – for instance in the context of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR), Rule of Law (RoL) and electoral support – has not yet been adequately developed (de Coning 2007b). In this vacuum, the policies developed for the very specific needs of the humanitarian-military relationship, where the independence of the civilian partners is emphasized and safeguarded, is often misapplied to peacebuilding dimensions, such as DDR, SSR and RoL. For example, NGOs that are engaged in civic and/or voter education or conflict-management training for the resolution of local land disputes may apply the UN humanitarian-military guidelines to their relationship under the mistaken understanding that they apply to all NGO-military relationships, when in fact they have been crafted for the establishment and maintenance of humanitarian space. The confusion is compounded when the same NGO is active in both the humanitarian and peacebuilding fields.

²⁵ These six general operating principles for the use of military assets in support of humanitarian operations was adopted when the ‘Report of the Task Force on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations’ was approved by the XIXth Meeting of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group on 27 September 1995 in Geneva.

Integrated Missions

The Integrated Approach is about process, but it does provide for a structural manifestation, namely the Integrated Mission. The Integrated Approach emphasizes that a specific structure is not required in order to achieve integration. Whilst the Integrated Approach applies to all conflict and post-conflict situations in which the UN has a UN Country Team and multidimensional peacekeeping, or a political or peacebuilding office, the Integrated Mission label only applies when there is structural integration. Integration, in this structural context, refers to the degree to which the humanitarian coordination function has been integrated into the peacekeeping operation or the political or peacebuilding role.

Through UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 1991, the UN has been given the role of coordinating humanitarian assistance through the Emergency Relief Coordinator internationally and the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) system at country level. The UN plays a similar role in development coordination through the UN Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO) and the Resident Coordinator (RC) system at country level. The UN is present in almost all developing countries, and the various UN humanitarian, development, environmental and other specialized agencies, funds and programs in these countries are typically collocated as the UN Country Team (UNCT) and are coordinated by the RC/HC. Following the recommendations of the High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence (UN 2006a), there is currently an initiative underway under the banner of ‘Delivering as One’, which is aimed at further improving coherence among the humanitarian, development and environmental agencies of the UN system, including especially even closer cooperation and coordination at the country level.

In the Integrated Approach context, as in this paper, the term “UN system-wide integration” refers to the integration of the peace and security dimension, typically represented by UN peacekeeping operations or UN political or peacebuilding roles, with the humanitarian and development dimension, represented at the country level by the various agencies, funds and programs that make up the UN Country Team. Structurally, a UN peacekeeping mission becomes an Integrated Mission when the RC/HC function is integrated with the peacekeeping operation through the appointment of a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) RC/HC, or, in the UN political or peacebuilding roles, where the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG) is also the RC/HC. The

2006 Secretary-General's Note on Integrated Missions applies to all missions that fall into this category.²⁶

It should be noted, however, that the various agencies, funds and programs that make up the UNCT remain structurally independent from the mission. In other words, they retain their normal operational independence. It is just the coordinator of the UNCT who becomes structurally part of the UN peacekeeping operation so as to be in a better position to represent the humanitarian and development dimensions in the assessments, planning, coordination, management, monitoring and evaluation of the Integrated Mission. In many cases, the DSRSG RC/HC actually has two offices and two sets of staff, one with the UN peacekeeping mission and one with the UN Country Team. The DSRSG RC/HC reports to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), but also has a secondary reporting line to the head of the UN Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO) for the RC function, and the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) for the HC function.

A few variations of the Integrated Missions model have emerged to date. The 2005 Barth Eide *et al.* Report on Integrated Missions coined the phrase *form follows function*, and this concept has been incorporated into almost all official UN policy directives on Integrated Missions. It implies that there is no single form, meaning structural template, that all Integrated Missions have to follow, and that the exact structural arrangements of each mission should depend on the specific context of that mission. In reality, however, as indicated in the previous paragraph, all Integrated Missions have a structural commonality, namely a DSRSG RC/HC. There are, however, differences within this model, and these reflect the degree to which association with the peacekeeping mission, and especially its military component, can impact negatively on the perceived neutrality and impartiality of the humanitarian actors, and the degree to which such an association might increase the risk for the aid workers and populations they serve.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is the department within the UN Secretariat that is mandated under UN General Assembly Resolution 146/82 with the coordination of the humanitarian community. Amongst others, it is responsible for supporting the HC function. The main structural variation in the Integrated Mission approach, other than the integration or not of the

²⁶ "This updated Note of Guidance applies to all Integrated Missions in which the SRSG is supported by a RC and HC serving as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG/RC/HC)." *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions* (UN 2006b), paragraph 3.

RC/HC, depends on the position of OCHA in relation to the UN Peacekeeping Mission. OCHA refers to this as the two-feet model,²⁷ and envisages three options: one foot in – one foot out, both feet in, and both feet out.

The *one foot in, one foot out* option refers to the UN's default model, where one foot, the HC, is part of the Integrated Mission in the form of the DSRSG RC/HC, but where the humanitarian coordination function is provided by OCHA outside the peacekeeping mission. This provides the UN, in the form of OCHA, with the opportunity to serve all the humanitarian actors with a coordination function that is independent of the UN peacekeeping operation, while still being closely connected with the peacekeeping mission through the HC function. It is a kind of best of both worlds model. In this situation, OCHA will support the HC function from within the UNCT. Current examples are the DRC (MONUC) and southern Sudan (UNMIS).

The *two feet out* model implies no integration, i.e. the coexistence of a UN peacekeeping mission and a UNCT with no formal integration. This does not imply that there would be no coordination, but in this model neither the RC/HC nor OCHA are integrated into the UN peacekeeping mission. This is the preferred model in two contexts. The first is situations in which the UN peacekeeping operation has a stabilization type of mandate or is otherwise expected to be engaged by, or to engage, some armed groups that are not (yet) part of the peace process. For example, if the UN were to be given a mandate under the current (September 2008) conditions to deploy a peacekeeping operation to Somalia, OCHA would advocate a *two feet out* model. The second context that warrants the *two feet out* model is when there are incompatible geographical mandates between the peacekeeping operation and the UNCT. The UNCT system is country-bound, but UN peacekeeping operations can span more than one country, as with the UN Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT), or there may be more than one UN peacekeeping operation in the same country, e.g. the UN missions in Darfur (UNAMID) and Sudan (UNMIS).

The *two feet in* model is when both the HC and humanitarian coordination function are integrated into the UN peacekeeping mission. This typically occurs when the security situation is very stable and the local authorities are able to coordinate the humanitarian response, if any is still necessary, so that OCHA is no longer present

²⁷ *OCHA's Structural Relationship with Integrated Missions*, draft OCHA Policy Instruction, version 3.2 of 2008.

in a given country. This model is more likely to occur in stable peacebuilding-type contexts during the consolidation phase of the mission. A current example is the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

It is also necessary to consider Integrated Missions in the context of UN political missions or offices, or UN peacebuilding offices. A current example of a UN political mission is Afghanistan (UNAMA), which has a *one foot in, one foot out* integration model. An example of a political office is Burundi (BINUB), whilst Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) is the first peacebuilding office. Both have an Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG) that is also the RC/HC. In Sierra Leone OCHA no longer has a presence, so one could say that here there is a *two feet in model*, whilst in Burundi, where OCHA is still present, one can say there is a *one foot in, one foot out* integration model.

Regardless of the structural variation, it is important to note that a UN Integrated Mission is not intended to imply the incorporation of one entity into another, or subsuming one entity under the management control or command and control of another. Each UN department, programme, fund, office, etc. maintains its own identity, management system, funding lines and financial responsibility. Instead, it refers to the processes, mechanisms and structures that are applied to connect these various UN entities and the peacebuilding dimensions within which they carry out their work into a single interlinked, mutually supportive comprehensive UN country-level system. The objectives of this kind of integration are harmonization, alignment and coherence with a view to greater overall efficiency and effectiveness. The different structural forms that the Integrated Missions approach may take thus need to be understood as mechanisms or processes that facilitate the Integrated Approach, not as ends in and of themselves.

In this context, the role of the SRSG is very important. Whilst the UN Secretary-General's Note on Integrated Missions (UN 2006b) and related UN policy documents states that the SRSG is the most senior representative of the UN system and has overall authority over the UN in a given country, the reality is that the SRSG, like the UN Secretary General, does not have the actual legal, financial or administrative authority to direct the resources at the disposal of the various UN agencies, funds and programs. The SRSG's authority over the peacekeeping operation is also constrained by the fact that financial authority normally resides with the most senior accounting officer, typically the Director of Mission Support. The real role of the SRSG is to foster coherence among the different dimensions of the UN system and the wider

community of internal and external actors. In this role, the SRSG has the authority to coordinate the UN system in accordance with the Integrated Approach guidelines and to act as a catalyst and facilitator for a wider Comprehensive Approach.

The UN's Integrated Approach and the roles of its principal agents, the SRSG and the DSRSG RC/HC, should thus be understood as process tools intended to facilitate coherence and coordination in the UN system and the wider community of internal and external actors. It is important, however, to recognize that not even in its structural or Integrated Mission form does the mission or its agents wield any authority to direct the operations or resources of any of the other agents that make up the UN Integrated Approach system or the overall Comprehensive Approach system. It is a system that relies on the voluntary cooperation of its constituent parts, and the structural coordination arrangements of such a loose network or open system should not be confused with the management authority that exists within structurally closed hierarchal organizations.

Analysis

As with any new innovation, the Integrated Approach has not been without its detractors, and they have highlighted various technical, administrative, organizational and budgetary challenges that need to be overcome before all aspects of the model can be fully implemented. The most serious concerns raised to date relate to the perceived loss of humanitarian independence when the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) becomes one of the Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (DSRSG). While most humanitarian UN agencies seem to feel that by becoming part of the UN Integrated Mission structure they have more opportunities to influence the direction of the mission and to protect the humanitarian space, more independent-minded humanitarian NGOs have opted to create their own humanitarian coordination mechanisms, which are more loosely connected to the HC function than before. This seems to be more acute in situations where OCHA has withdrawn or where the humanitarian coordination function has been incorporated into the UN mission, e.g. in UNMIL/Liberia. The UN itself takes the view that an Integrated Approach can yield significant benefits for humanitarian operations, provided that integration arrangements take full account of humanitarian principles, allow for the protection of humanitarian space and facilitate effective humanitarian coordination (UN 2008b).

There is also a more generally held view, however, that the Integrated Approach will make it more difficult for individual agencies to be associated with their products and therefore to raise funds on the basis of their perceived visibility in a particular crisis. For instance, while a multitude of UN and non-UN agencies have worked together in the DDR campaign in Liberia and are still working together in Sudan, the overall effects are generally reported as, and perceived to be, UN mission achievements.

While the UN Integrated Mission has been accepted as the mission structure of choice at the highest levels within member states, the UN secretariat and UN agencies, these problems at the country level still bedevil its acceptance at the operational level. The degree of resistance to and frustration with the Integrated Mission model at the country or field level itself causes dysfunction and has resulted in the implementation of the approach generating a range of unintended consequences, which will be analyzed further below.

The Policy–Reality Gap

All comprehensive approach initiatives, including the UN Integrated Approach, share a number of broad policy assumptions that are not always explicitly stated, such as:

- a) Following a comprehensive approach will result in more efficient and more effective interventions, with a more sustainable outcome;
- b) It is possible to combine the political, security, human rights, developmental and humanitarian dimensions under a comprehensive approach because there are sufficient shared values, principles, goals and objectives among them;
- c) There is sufficient willingness among the different agencies to work together to achieve a comprehensive approach; and
- d) There is sufficient structural flexibility to allow the different agencies to work together, and where obstacles are identified, there is a willingness to address any such impediments.

Although most of these comprehensive approach initiatives are fairly recent, initial indications from the field and past experiences with coordination both indicate that, at the operational and tactical levels, many of these assumptions are at best challenged, and at the worst flawed. The lack of coherence among field activities in the humanitarian relief, development, political and security spheres have been well documented in a number of evaluation reports and studies²⁸ and is acknowledged in a various recent UN reports.²⁹ The main challenges are discussed below.

Conflicting Values and Principles

The practical application of the comprehensive approach concept differs widely depending on the actual context, but one can conclude that one of the most important indicators of the degree to which meaningful coherence can be achieved is the degree of hostility that is present in the conflict system. The organizational values and operating principles that guide the human rights and humanitarian actors, for instance, are more likely to be in conflict with each other and with the values and principles of the political and security actors in contexts where some of the international and local actors are hostile to each other. These tensions will be especially acute in situations in which an international intervention has to deal with a hostile host government, as is the case in Darfur in Sudan, or with an insurgency, as in Afghanistan, or is engaged

²⁸ See footnotes 1 and 2.

²⁹ See footnote 4.

in forcefully disarming rebel or militia groups, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Such fundamental differences in values and principles are not, however, limited to hostile environments: there are also other situations in which the values, principles and mandates of the various actors could be in conflict. The different actors may have different views with regard to what aspects to prioritize. Political and security actors may typically prefer to focus on stabilizing a situation before addressing human rights violations, or before dealing with issues such as corruption, black market trading, racketeering or narcotics, especially if the actors they perceive to be the key to stabilizing the situation are also suspected of being responsible for human rights atrocities or criminal behavior.

In some cases, the timetable of one actor or dimension may be in conflict with the principles of another. A case in point is the election timetable in Liberia, which motivated those responsible for the election to encourage the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Monrovia to return to their original communities so that they could be registered there to vote. The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) pressurized those agencies responsible for reintegration to persuade the IDPs to return and to start offering them reintegration support. However, these agencies disagreed with the return timetable suggested by UNMIL because their assessments were that the conditions in the original communities were not yet conducive to sustainable returns. This situation caused tensions between the political and developmental/humanitarian actors because their respective goals, short term vs. long term, and operating values and principles brought them into direct opposition with one another.

Another example would be situations in which political and security actors may wish to reward certain political or military actors for their cooperation with humanitarian assistance or developmental projects. In some contexts, for instance in counter-insurgency doctrine, communities that cooperate with the Government and international forces are rewarded with aid to show them that cooperation with the Government and international forces brings them greater benefits than cooperation with the insurgents. This “hearts and minds” approach could result in the political and military actors placing undue pressure on the development and humanitarian actors either to provide or to deny services in selected areas. Alternatively the political and security actors could use their own means to provide services that appear to be developmental and humanitarian.

All these variations may result in a blurring of the distinction between political/military and humanitarian action, thus undermining the independence, neutrality and impartiality of the humanitarian actors in the eyes of the local communities and the insurgents, and it may result in tensions within a comprehensive approach community, or in an inability to achieve a comprehensive approach.

The assumption that there is, or should be, a sufficient level of shared values, principles, goals and objectives is thus not supported by the feedback from the field. This does not imply that it is impossible to achieve meaningful coherence and coordination across the various dimensions under a comprehensive approach umbrella, but rather that there will be times and situations in which it is not possible to achieve a common approach. Thus, instead of assuming that there will always be room for a common approach, reality dictates that there will have to be trade-offs, second-best solutions, compromises and even sometimes an inability to come to any kind of agreement. In all of these circumstances, however, it is preferable to have pre-agreed mechanisms for dialogue and coordination – even if only aimed at de-confliction – where the different viewpoints can be raised and where the different actors can inform each other of their respective principles, goals, objectives and approaches, so that when these tensions do occur, they can be discounted in a transparent and well-informed manner.

Conflicting Rules, Regulations and Resource Management Processes

There are also structural impediments to coherence and cooperation that, although technical, are significant obstacles at the field-level, as they are:

- a) typically imposed by higher order processes and thus not changeable in the field,
- b) require considerable political will and institutional effort to change,
- c) typically take a long time to change, as they are subject to negotiation among various stakeholders, and the decision-making processes required to change them usually takes place only once a year, or even less.

These structural impediments fall into two broad categories, namely administrative rules and regulations, and resource-management processes. In the rules and regulations category, we find organizational procedures that discourage cooperation. These are typically instances that, for instance, prohibit UN peacekeeping personnel from

allowing any non-UN peacekeeping personnel into UN vehicles because of insurance coverage and indemnity issues, or prohibit personnel from a military force from moving around without arms, which impedes the ability of liaison personnel to attend civilian meetings, etc. In other words, they are often tactical-level practical arrangements that have a high impact on the ability of people to work together in the field, but the rules or regulations themselves have been established at a higher level, typically at the different headquarters of each organization, and for different reasons, e.g. insurance or security of personnel, making it very difficult to change them in the short term.

Another example in the UN context is the lack of flexibility that agencies have to share resources. For good operational reasons, most UN agencies will have their own telecommunications, information technology, transport and other resources. However, each of these agencies has developed these over the years independently from the others, and the interoperability of these various systems is a problem in the field. Often, especially in the early stages of a crisis, some agencies have resources in the field while others are still waiting for theirs to arrive. In these circumstances, better cooperation among the agencies to share the resources available would seem logical, but organizational rules and regulations and complicated reimbursement processes have resulted in a sub-optimal sharing of resources.

Very often the underlying cause in these cases relates to financial management issues. For good and sound financial reasons, organizations have to budget for resources, and once allocated, have to use their resources as planned. Where deviations occur, they have to pre-clear and report. Although these systems make for good financial management and need to be especially rigorous as public funds are at stake, they do not make it any easier for field-level managers to operate in highly dynamic situations. Each agency has its own budgetary and financial rules and regulations, which typically do not easily provide for a pooling of funds or resources, sharing resources, or other forms of cooperation. Those organizations that rely on voluntary funding also often need to be able to show the funding agency, or the general public, how their specific contributions have had an impact, and as this becomes very difficult in cooperative ventures, such organizations are often under pressure to act independently. In some cases, there has been pooling of funds and common delivery pipelines, i.e. where a number of agencies use a common process to move and distribute aid, which may result in one agency actually delivering the goods provided by another or a batch of goods made up from various contributing sources, but these examples are few, and the transaction costs, under present constraints, are high.

One area that is particularly sensitive relates to the remuneration of personnel. People from all kinds of agencies and background work closely together, but are rewarded at different scales and have different benefits. In some cases, these differences are significant, especially among local and international staff. This causes tension, resentment and mobility among people working together, but it is very difficult to harmonize, as these benefits are determined at headquarters level, and as the people involved fall into so many different categories. It is, for instance, very difficult to compare the remuneration and benefits of a military officer – who is employed and rewarded nationally through a range of long-term benefits, including pension and family health care, and thus only receives an additional field allowance – with that of a civilian UN staff member who is employed on a short-term contract, and whose field-level salary represents their total income and benefit package.

There are thus a range of structural issues that discourage coherence and cooperation among agencies in the field. Some can be changed, but this requires high transaction costs and may take a long time. Others may be impossible to change, and one just has to accept them as part of the environment and develop coping mechanisms to deal with them. Many personnel in the field are on short-term contracts and have been hired specifically for field-level positions without prior service at the headquarters level, and they feel disempowered to influence these higher-level decision-making processes. This is one of the reasons why personality, or individual leadership, plays such an important role in these contexts. Some managers, especially those with long-term career ambitions in a specific organization, choose to follow the organizational rules and regulations, regardless of their side-effects, and are afraid to alert their headquarters of negative side-effects, in case this affects their future career prospects. Others choose to fight the system and may make short-term gains, but generally seem to become frustrated with the system and leave. The most successful group seems to strike a balance between these extremes, as well as to develop coping mechanisms to find ways around some rules and regulations while at the same time maximizing the leverage they can get out of others. These managers learn how to use the system to their advantage and are capable of coping – or even of thriving – in these highly challenging environments. Campbell and Kaspersen (2008: 470) point out that “cases of successful integration are largely attributable to ad hoc initiatives, with high transaction costs, undertaken by individual staff voluntarily circumventing barriers.”

Inappropriate Management Philosophies, Processes and Tools

Such personalities are, however, in short supply, and we cannot rely on them to overcome the shortcomings of the system. We need to recognize the inadequacies of the current dominant management philosophies, policies and processes to deal with the highly dynamic, complex and interdependent comprehensive approach context, as well as develop new management models designed to cope with the particular management needs in this environment. The current model is based on independent inward-looking closed-loop project cycles and budget-based systems. Managers are meant to ensure that projects are managed against goals and objectives, and according to pre-approved budgets and inputs, to produce pre-determined outputs. Any deviations from the project plan are frowned upon, will draw unwanted scrutiny and will require thorough motivation. The model ensures that the project is carried out according to plan and within budget. It makes little or no provision for coordination with other projects, or adaptation to a highly dynamic environment.

However, a comprehensive approach context requires that each program understands not only its independent reality, but also its interdependent reality. Each program is independent in the sense that it is executed under the auspices of a certain bureaucratic organization that exists as a legal entity and that has its own budget and both the authority and responsibility to manage the program. The traditional project-management model has been designed to serve this independent reality. However, each program is also interdependent in that its meaning is derived from its part in, and contribution to, the larger system, i.e. it contributes to achieving a specific effect that only makes sense if one takes into account the fact that others are contributing towards other effects, and the total combined effect is necessary to achieve momentum towards peace. For instance, a specific developmental program may provide vocational training as part of a larger disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme in a post-conflict context, but that program only makes sense (have meaning) if it is understood in its overall context as being part of a larger peace process that includes a DDR program in which several organizations are taking part, and the vocational training program can only be considered to be a success if others identify, register and disarm combatants and work towards creating the sustained livelihoods and economic recovery which will create the environment within which the vocation can be applied.

In such a context, the program manager needs to be able to establish and maintain a network that ensures that the particular program is connected with other programs that may have an influence on its outcome, and that will result in it being able to

adjust to changes elsewhere in the system. In other words, it is not just managing the independent reality, but also managing the interdependent reality of being part of a highly dynamic complex system, that requires that the individual program needs to be coherent with at least some aspects of the larger system, and that coordination with others, and adaptation to changes elsewhere in the system, become additional requirements. In this context, changes to the plan should not be frowned upon but expected, and managers should be expected to plan for and report on their efforts to ensure coherence, coordination and adaptation.

Conclusion

The UN recognizes that, although it has a particular role and mandate in the international system, it cannot achieve the overall peacebuilding objective on its own. This requires the concerted and sustained efforts of the broadest possible alignment of international capacity, including the political support of its multilateral bodies and interested states; the financial support of its multilateral bodies, banks and individual donor nations; and the coordinated and ultimately coherent action overall of its various multilateral bodies and the multitude of non-governmental agencies (NGOs) that, taken together, represent the external actors in the international system. The most important coherent thing the external actors can do to improve coherence is to make an effort to arrive at a common understanding of the strategic objectives. An overall strategic framework, even if just agreed among a core group of external and internal actors, provides the guiding context within which, and around which, the various actors can organize themselves. Such a framework will allow all the agencies, including those on the periphery that are too small or specialized to participate in coordination processes at all levels, or those that wish to remain independent, with an object against whom they can measure their own coherence, and in so doing, provide momentum towards a common direction.

Lastly, but most importantly, is the need to ensure the primacy of the internal actors. The purpose of the external actors only derives meaning to the extent that they support the efforts of the internal actors. It is only the internal actors that can make peace and ensure sustainable development. They own the problem, and must also own the solution. No amount of international will, capacity and goodwill can replace the primacy of the internal actors. Alignment between the internal and external actors, with the aim of achieving the appropriate balance between internally led efforts supported by the international community, is thus the last, but most critical ingredient of the overall effort to pursue coherence.

The UN's Integrated Approach is an effort to achieve whole-of-government coherence among the members of the UN family. It serves as a catalyst for agency coherence among the individual members of the UN system, and it can provide a central point for the facilitation of external coherence among the various agencies that make up the international community. The UN can also serve as a credible representative of the external community in overall framework discussions among the external and internal actors.

The UN's Integrated Approach in general, and the UN's Integrated Missions model in particular, represents the most advanced form of the Comprehensive Approach to emerge so far. In comparison with its peers, the Integrated Approach has developed more sophisticated systems, has achieved a higher degree of civil-military and multidimensional integration, and has tested and refined these developments in more missions, and in missions of greater variety, than any of its peers. However, this does not imply that it has managed to escape its own set of contradictions, complications and dilemmas. Firstly, it has the potential to become so self-engrossing that it blinds the UN to the need to encourage and participate in the Comprehensive Approach. There is a danger that the Integrated Approach may end up serving the UN instead of the host system. Secondly, the feedback from the field discussed in detail in the main body of the paper suggests that the Integrated Approach exists at present more in policy desire than in field reality. Urgent work needs to be done to address the various administrative, financial, and logistical constraints on better coordination among the different members of the UN family. And significant work remains to be done to improve harmonization between the various policy and mandate imperatives and to remove the conflicts that set some parts of the UN system against others. Many of these tensions cannot be resolved at the field level, although that is where they manifest themselves most clearly, and where they have the most negative effects on the lack of sustainability of peace processes.

The UN's Integrated Approach is an attempt to manage the inconsistencies of the UN system, and it will have to rely on the combined effort of all four elements of coherence identified in this paper, namely agency coherence, whole-of-government coherence, external coherence and internal/external coherence. We are able, however, to distinguish between systems in which there is more or less coherence, and the UN's Integrated Approach does represent a system in which there are mechanisms and processes in place that strive towards greater coherence.

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
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
Appendix

UN Integrated Mission Structure in Burundi



Source: The United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB).

Relation of the UN Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) to other Planning Frameworks



Source: The United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB).

