

# CONNECTIONS

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## THE DEBATE ON NATO EXPANSION

*Eunika Katarzyna Frydrych*



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# The Debate on NATO Expansion

Eunika Katarzyna Frydrych \*

## The Nature of NATO Enlargement: Alliance Theory

This essay addresses the general rationale for creating and enlarging alliances. It presents a definition of alliance; explores the reasons for forming alliances; and examines the value that this type of arrangement adds. In particular, this paper will attempt a deeper analysis of the question why alliances choose to enlarge.

NATO is a classic example of an alliance. The organization was launched by Western countries to ensure the security of its member states, which in practice meant deterring the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the states affiliated with it in the Warsaw Pact. It is a multilateral alliance based on a formal agreement—the Washington Treaty (1949)—that provides security guarantees for every member state. In addition, it has been a defensive alliance that aims at maintaining the sovereignty and freedom of its members. However, what distinguishes NATO from alliances of the past is its subordination to the United Nations Charter.<sup>1</sup>

One of the widely-accepted of an alliance is the one developed by Stephen M. Walt. He characterizes an alliance as “a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.”<sup>2</sup> There is another definition of an alliance that characterizes the institution “as a treaty-bound group of states that applies military means to security problems.”<sup>3</sup> Taken together, these descriptions offer quite a narrow definition, as they perceive alliances as purely military phenomena, and do not take into account the existence of political alliances. With reference to the discourse on NATO, however, this definition seems to be suitable.

The question of the formation of alliances is one of the principal areas of exploration of the neorealist school of thought in international relations. According to scholars representing this school, “the systemic structure, structural polarity and systemic anarchy, determine the formation of alliances. In particular, the anarchy characteristic of

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\* The author is a Senior Expert in the International Security Policy Department in the Polish Ministry of National Defense in Warsaw.

<sup>1</sup> Richard H. Heindel, Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, and Francis O. Wilcox, “The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate,” *The American Journal of International Law* 43 (1949): 663.

<sup>2</sup> Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 12.

<sup>3</sup> Mark Smith, *NATO Enlargement during the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance* (Houndmills, U.K.: Palgrave, 2000), 3.

the international system leads states to accord primacy to their security.”<sup>4</sup> After the Second World War, the question of ensuring security was of utmost importance for Western countries. The growing politico-military confrontation with the Eastern Bloc and the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its satellite states prompted the formation of the Alliance in 1949. Western nations were afraid that they would not be able to guarantee themselves a level of safety sufficient to allow them to function in such a demanding security environment and rebuild their economies after the Second World War. Thus, we can perceive the creation of NATO as a natural response to the security concerns and security environment in existence immediately following World War II.

Some of the key questions to address are what, exactly, are the functions of alliances? What are the most important factors prompting the creation of this kind of arrangement? And what kind of benefits can be gained by individual states from participating in alliances? As Martin Wight argues, “The function of an alliance is to reinforce the security of the allies or to promote their interests in the external world. States incapable of facing unilaterally a stronger enemy decide to cooperate with other states in the same situation in order to increase their security by massing their capabilities against a common enemy.”<sup>5</sup> George Liska argues in the same vein that “alliances help to direct the military, technological, economic, and sociocultural capabilities and attributes of a particular state to the purposes of a larger collective body.” However, he identifies one very important argument. According to him, “alliances may also be formed in an effort to prevent states from conflicting amongst themselves and thus to channel the respective energies and interest of states toward positive collective goals. Alliances can thus provide stability and protection, ameliorate intra-alliance disputes and tensions, seek to reduce collective costs, and provide predictability for investment, if not serve to open markets.”<sup>6</sup>

From the above paragraph one can conclude that there are two main reasons why alliances are launched:

1. *External*, to ensure safety from common enemies by gathering a group of states together in a way that enables them to combine their potential and strength
2. *Internal*, to help mitigate tensions and resolve disputes that exist between countries within an alliance.

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<sup>4</sup> Wolfango Piccoli, “Alliance Theory: The Case of Turkey and Israel,” *CIAO Working Papers* (August 1999); available at [www.ciaonet.org/wps/pic01/](http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/pic01/). It is the view of neorealists that “anarchy” means a lack of hierarchy in international relations, because states—as the main actors in the international system—do not recognize any authority above them. Filippo Andreatta, “Theory and the European Union’s International Relations,” in *International Relations and the European Union*, eds. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 23.

<sup>5</sup> Quoted in Piccoli, “Alliance Theory.”

<sup>6</sup> Quoted in Carl C. Hodge, *NATO for a New Century: Atlanticism and European Security* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 25.

The first reason is of primary importance. The basic motivation is to create an alliance in order to pool the military capacities of all its member states, and in consequence to strengthen the collective possibilities of self-defense. In the case of NATO, the alliance was created in response to a robust threat posed by the Soviet Union. Whereas the second, internal motivation can be seen as being of secondary importance, it obviously reinforces the strength and effectiveness of an alliance's arrangements (this is also the case when we analyze the formation of NATO). This institution has aimed at preventing aggression from a third party, but the member states have also sought to integrate themselves within the organization and ensure good relations and peace between one another, e.g., between the Federal Republic of Germany and its former adversaries from the Second World War, especially France. Nevertheless, the practice occasionally met with less success, as in the case of the interactions between Turkey and Greece.

The issue of alliances is directly connected with the theory of the balance of power, which is also known as "balance of threat theory." According to this theory, "states form alliances in order to prevent stronger powers from dominating them."<sup>7</sup> As Stephen M. Walt writes, "states form alliances primarily to balance against threats. Threats, in turn, are functions of power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions."<sup>8</sup>

The creation of NATO can be seen as an effort to influence the balance of power. The aim was to launch an organization that would be able to counterbalance and deter the threat posed by the Eastern Bloc. The Alliance enabled its members to combine at its inception the military capabilities of twelve states (and then of other members) around the dominant power, the United States. It has been a special kind of arrangement, providing security guarantees via Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.<sup>9</sup> It obviously increased the perceived and real sense of security on the part of all of its member states. Not without importance was the additional aim to reinforce transatlantic relations, political dialogue, and military cooperation between two North American nations and ten European ones.

There is one crucial question, however: What happens when a threat—the very threat that brought about the creation of an alliance and strengthened the coherence between partners—disappears? Some theorists of international relations, especially representatives of the neorealist school of thought, argue that the original threat's disappearance undermines the rationale for the existence of the alliance.<sup>10</sup> At the beginning of the 1990s, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, two representatives of the neorealist school of thought, Kenneth N. Waltz and John J. Mearsheimer,

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<sup>7</sup> Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, x, 18.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, vi.

<sup>9</sup> To get more information on collective security arrangements, see Charles L. Glaser, "Why NATO Is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe," *International Security* 18:1 (1993): 26–29.

<sup>10</sup> Compare with James M. Goldgeier, *Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 1999), 3.

expressed their opinion that, “without an external enemy (i.e., the Soviet Union) the Alliance would lose its reason for existence.”<sup>11</sup> Waltz further stated “it is the Soviet threat that provides the glue that holds NATO together. Take away that offensive threat and the United States is likely to abandon the Continent.”<sup>12</sup> This is why many expected the organization to “wither away or, at best, to stagnate and decline in importance.”<sup>13</sup>

Neorealists would commend the analysis of Bruno Tertrais, who scrutinized a few cases of multilateral formal alliances. He observed that “permanent multilateral alliances appear increasingly to belong to the past,” noting that many of them collapsed. Tertrais continues by pointing out that “permanent multilateral alliances have ... proven difficult to maintain because their members have chosen to opt out when disagreeing ... and because diminished threats have made their cohesion harder to maintain.”<sup>14</sup>

So, how one can apply the predictions and conclusions described above to the case of NATO’s development after the end of the Cold War? It is apparent that these neore-

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<sup>11</sup> Both authors cited in Ryan C. Hendrickson, “The Miscalculation of NATO’s Death,” *Parameters* 37:1 (2007): 100.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. For more, see John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” *International Security* 15:1 (1990): 5–56; Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” *International Security* 18:2 (1993): 44–79; and Robert W. Rauchhaus, “Marching NATO Eastward: Can International Relations Theory Keep Pace?” in *Explaining NATO Enlargement*, ed. Robert W. Rauchhaus (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 11–13. The neorealist view of the development of NATO is pessimistic. Neoliberal institutionalists (such as Robert O. Keohane) represent another understanding. They are more optimistic about the Alliance than the neorealists. They maintain that “NATO does and will continue to perform valuable functions” (Paul Papayoanou, “Intra-Alliance Bargaining and U.S. Bosnia Policy,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41:1 (1997): 93). They argue that “first, unlike most military alliances, NATO is highly institutionalized. It provides members with well-defined rules and joint decision-making procedure, and requires them to participate in a unified military command structure. Second, NATO is about much more than just coordinating military policy to deter and defend against a common enemy. From its inception, NATO has had the broader goal of enhancing its members’ security, which includes promoting stable civil-military relations within member states as well as preventing security competition between them” (Rauchhaus, “Marching NATO Eastward,” 13–14). To compare these analyses, see Rauchhaus’ description of the views of representatives of organization theory and constructivism (Rauchhaus, 15–19).

<sup>13</sup> Rauchhaus, “Marching NATO Eastward,” 3.

<sup>14</sup> Bruno Tertrais, “The Changing Nature of Military Alliances,” *The Washington Quarterly* 27:2 (2004): 135–50; quoted at 139. Tertrais refers, for example, to such formal multilateral alliances as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) between the U.S., the UK and the countries of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific which existed from 1954 to 1977; the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) between Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and the U.K., which lasted from 1955 to 1979; the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) established in 1951, which in 1986 “became *de facto* a bilateral alliance as Washington decided to suspend its obligations toward Wellington after New Zealand refused to allow nuclear-armed or nuclear-propelled U.S. ships to call on its ports” (Tertrais, 139).

alist predictions have not become a reality, and the Alliance has not collapsed. Additionally, many analysts have assessed NATO as a thriving institution. The simple explanation of this phenomenon is also provided by neorealist scholars, who argue simply that “NATO is still a better arrangement than any other alternative.”<sup>15</sup> The second element of the answer to the question of why NATO still exists and performs its functions is the fact that the Alliance has undergone a process of transformation after the end of the Cold War. NATO, “created as an organization dedicated to the collective defense of its members, ... transformed itself in the 1990s, expanding its mission to include conflict prevention and conflict management throughout Europe, including beyond the boundaries of the NATO treaty area.”<sup>16</sup> As Tertrais argues, “unlike other multinational alliances, NATO was able to evolve after the threat against which it was created disappeared, therefore allowing it to maintain its position as the dominant security arrangement on the continent.”<sup>17</sup> This view represents very well the statement made by then-Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs in the U.S. State Department, Richard Holbrooke, who asserted in 1995: “The threat is gone. ... I believe if we left NATO unchanged in its present configuration, it would become irrelevant.”<sup>18</sup>

In this regard, the enlargement of the Alliance can be seen as one of the elements of its transformation after the end of the Cold War. It was the Alliance’s response to the new security environment and its contribution to the stabilization of the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole. It has been an attempt to define its own identity afresh.

If NATO’s enlargement is one of the key elements of its transformation, one should examine the question of why the organization expanded. This part of this article will try to account for this process from the perspective of the theory of international relations. In general,

NATO enlargement is difficult to explain on the basis of system-level, rationalist alliance theory which starts from the assumption of states instrumentally pursuing their egoistic security and power interests in the international system. By contrast, a sociological institutionalist theory, which conceives international organizations as agencies of international communities of values and norms, accounts for enlargement in general, and the selection of candidates in particular: NATO admitted states that have come to share

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<sup>15</sup> Marco Cesa, “From Hegemony to Ambivalence: NATO’s Transformation and European Stability,” fellowship report submitted to the NATO Office of Information and the Press (30 June 1999), 17; available at [www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/cesa.pdf](http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/cesa.pdf).

<sup>16</sup> Thomas Szayna, *NATO Enlargement 2000–2015* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), xiii.

<sup>17</sup> Tertrais, “The Changing Nature of Military Alliances,” 144.

<sup>18</sup> Quoted in Jonathan Haslam, “Russia’s Seat at the Table: A Place Denied or a Place Delayed?” *International Affairs* 74:1 (1998): 122.



the collective identity, the values and norms of the liberal, Euro-Atlantic community it represents.<sup>19</sup>

Neorealists have difficulties in explaining why NATO has grown. From the perspective of neorealists, “enlargement is puzzling because, as a result of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the Russian threat has so strongly diminished and the position of NATO in the international power structure has so vastly improved that enlargement is unnecessary as a balancing strategy.” Moreover, it does not implement the neorealist strategy of maximizing power. With enlargement, NATO increases its territory and population, but it does not strengthen its military capabilities.<sup>20</sup>

Nonetheless, in the view of Kenneth Waltz, the enlargement of the Alliance constitutes “an American policy designed to maintain and extend America’s grip on European foreign and military policies. Instead of demonstrating the resilience and strength of international institutions, NATO’s expansion shows how institutions are shaped to serve what strong countries believe to be their interests.”<sup>21</sup>

In general, neorealists look at the process of NATO enlargement in a critical manner. They base their analysis mainly on the exploration of the risks and threats connected with this process. Neorealists have argued that “NATO’s enlargement may have far-reaching negative consequences for European stability.”<sup>22</sup> They have opposed the process of enlargement because “it draws new lines of division in Europe, [and] alienates those left out,” especially Russia.<sup>23</sup> Thus, neorealists see NATO enlargement mainly through the lens of relations with the Russian Federation and the risk of damaging Western relations with this country.

Moreover, neorealists also highlight the lack of enthusiasm on the side of NATO members about the trend toward eastward expansion because of the costs connected with the project.<sup>24</sup> Waltz states further that “the expansion of NATO extends its military interests, enlarges its responsibilities and increases its burdens. Not only do new members require NATO’s protection, they also heighten its concern over destabilizing events near their borders.”<sup>25</sup> Thus he views the process of NATO enlargement mainly through the lens of potential liabilities and threats. Inviting new nations into the Alliance will bring extended obligations and expenses (because of the limited military capabilities and investments on the part of new members), and will also expose the Alliance to new crises that it will have to cope with (in such hot spots as the Western Balkans).

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<sup>19</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, “NATO’s Enlargement to the East: An Analysis of Collective Decision-making,” EAPC-NATO Individual Fellowship Report 1998-2000 (2000), 2; available at [www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/schimmelfennig.pdf](http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/schimmelfennig.pdf).

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 5–6.

<sup>21</sup> Rauchhaus, “Marching NATO Eastward,” 209.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>23</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, “NATO Expansion: A Realist’s View,” in *Explaining NATO Enlargement*, ed. Robert W. Rauchhaus (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 30.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 26–27.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

Waltz also decries the role played by NATO expansion in the democratization process in Eastern and Central Europe: “One may wonder, however, why this should be an American rather than a European task and why a military rather than a political-economic organization should be seen as the appropriate means for carrying it out. The task of building democracy is not a military one. The military security of new NATO members is not in jeopardy; their political development and economic well-being are.”<sup>26</sup>

Sociological institutionalist theory sees a different rationale for NATO’s enlargement after the end of the Cold War. From a sociological point of view, NATO was launched as a military alliance, but over a long period of time it evolved into a transatlantic community based on shared values.<sup>27</sup> Thus, NATO is not “simply a military alliance but [is] the military organization of an international community of values and norms. ... This community is most fundamentally based on the liberal values and norms shared by its members. Liberal human rights, i.e., individual freedoms, civil liberties, and political rights are at the centre of the community’s collective identity.” Consequently, one can expect that NATO would invite countries that respect those norms.<sup>28</sup> As Daniel Fried, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, asserted: “NATO is not just a military alliance. It is an alliance of values, and NATO’s success in the past and promise for the future reflect its fusion of strength and democratic values.”<sup>29</sup>

Therefore, in the view of sociological institutionalist theory, the adherence to common values is the most important reason why NATO has admitted nations from Central and South East Europe. Reform of a nation’s entire state system was the basic condition for an invitation to join NATO. The very existence of the Alliance expresses the importance of common values. These shared values are reflected in the founding act of the Alliance—the North Atlantic Treaty—as well as the *Study on NATO Enlargement*, which presents guidelines for aspiring countries on how to become a member of the organization. In consequence, the sociological interpretation—unlike that of the neorealists—does not emphasize the Alliance’s role in strengthening military security. Consequently, it does not look at the expansion process through the issue of the pooling of military capabilities.

As Rauchhaus argues, “NATO enlargement may help the domestic reform efforts of Eastern European post-communist countries. It ... will create strong incentives for Eastern European countries to improve their civil-military relations, resolve ongoing border disputes, and guarantee the fair treatment of national minorities.”<sup>30</sup> In this inter-

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 34.

<sup>27</sup> Rauchhaus, “Marching NATO Eastward,” 7.

<sup>28</sup> Schimmelfennig, “NATO’s Enlargement to the East,” 8; quoted passage at 9.

<sup>29</sup> Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, “NATO: Enlargement and Effectiveness,” testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (11 March 2008), 1; available at [www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/102134.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/102134.htm).

<sup>30</sup> Rauchhaus, “Marching NATO Eastward,” 4.

pretation, the prospect of membership has been a great incentive for the countries of the former Communist bloc to transform their systems in the direction of democracy.

## Framework of NATO Enlargement

This section aims to present a framework of NATO enlargement. It examines two main documents that constitute the basis of the accession process of the Alliance: the North Atlantic Treaty and the *Study on NATO Enlargement*. This section proposes to address the question of admitting new nations from a theoretical point of view. It concentrates on analyzing the conditions that have to be met by an aspiring nation to become a NATO member. Moreover, this section will depict the stages of integration within NATO.

### *North Atlantic Treaty*

NATO was created by the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949 in Washington, D.C.<sup>31</sup> This treaty constitutes the most important document in defining the goals and generic functioning mechanisms of the Alliance. Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty creates the formal framework for the admission of states to the organization.<sup>32</sup> This clause explicitly expresses that NATO can invite any “European state in a position to further the principles of ... [the] Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.” This is the only fragment within the founding act of NATO that explicitly addresses the criteria for gaining member status.

One can draw a general conclusion from this fragment of Article 10 that a member state of NATO cannot be a nation from beyond Europe, e.g., from Asia or Africa. Furthermore, a European state aspiring to NATO membership must be able to strengthen the security of the current member states of the Alliance. There are two general problems stemming from this statement. The first deals with how the geographical boundaries of Europe are defined (although one has to bear in mind that an amendment of the records of the Washington Treaty is technically possible).<sup>33</sup> The second problem with regard to Article 10 refers to an assessment of the contribution of prospective member states to the security of the North Atlantic area. It seems to be purely a question of an interpretation whether a specific country will reinforce the security of the Alliance and to what extent. The evaluation of a state’s potential contribution to collective security can vary among member states, which can be a consequence not only of objective arguments, but also of national interests, historical experience, or even of

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<sup>31</sup> The official text of the North Atlantic Treaty, which will be quoted extensively in this section, is available at [www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm).

<sup>32</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty does not take into account the possibility of other forms of status than “member.” Nevertheless, Greece and Turkey “enjoyed ‘observer’ status in NATO prior to their full admission in 1952”; Gerald B. Solomon, *The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990–1997: Blessings of Liberty* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 20.

<sup>33</sup> Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, talking about the area of collective defense ensured by NATO, was modified by the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951.

tactical motivations (e.g., a government's view on enlargement may be an issue in domestic politics).<sup>34</sup> In this regard, coherence in how a membership candidate is assessed is of the utmost importance, because—as is stipulated in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty—a country is invited to join NATO only “by unanimous agreement.”

Within Article 10, one can find a second procedural element of enlargement. Any invited state “may become a Party to the [North Atlantic] Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America.” This means that every member state has to ratify the Accession Protocols according to its own national procedures. Accession Protocols constitute amendments to the North Atlantic Treaty as well as formal invitations of a specific country to accede to the Treaty.<sup>35</sup>

Moreover, “the implicit requirements for membership could be deduced from the short preamble and Articles 1, 2 and 3, which state ... very general goals of justice, democracy, stability, economic collaboration and well-being.”<sup>36</sup> One would add two other implicit responsibilities to this list. The first, which can be found in the preamble to the Treaty, refers to the need to respect the “purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”<sup>37</sup> It obviously imposes on a nation a vast range of general obligations, such as seeking the resolution of disputes by peaceful means. The second relates to the military capacities of a potential member state. In Article 3 one can find the extract declaring that a member state “will maintain and develop [its] individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” Thus, it imposes further obligation on the ally to create adequate military capabilities in order to be able to effectively contribute to the defense of NATO.

The North Atlantic Treaty also raises the question of a member state's political system. In the preamble one can find reference to “the principle of democracy,” which implies that a member of the Alliance should be a democratic state. Nonetheless, NATO's practice during the Cold War era showed that those provisions did not exclude a nation from membership that was not considered to be entirely democratic.

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<sup>34</sup> Reference to such a concern can be found in Point 30 of the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement; available at [www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/enl-9502.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/enl-9502.htm).

<sup>35</sup> See Gebhardt Von Moltke, “Accession of New Members to the Alliance: What are the Next Steps?” *NATO Review* 4:45 (1997); available at [www.nato.int/docu/review/1997/9704-2.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1997/9704-2.htm). The requirement of ratification may constitute a kind of constraint with regard to a possible invitation to join the Alliance. The Clinton Administration, for example, claimed that the ratification of admission of more than three countries in 1999 (referring to the potential membership of Slovenia, in addition to Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic) would be a big challenge for the U.S. Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 148–49.

<sup>36</sup> Anton A. Bebler, *The Challenge of NATO Enlargement* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 49.

<sup>37</sup> This is not the only reference to the Charter of the United Nations within the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 5 explicitly invokes Article 51 of the UN Charter, which recognizes the right of individual or collective self-defense.

This is confirmed in the case of Portugal, one of the twelve original signatories of the Washington Treaty, which possessed “an authoritarian form of government” until the 1970s.<sup>38</sup> The same situation characterized the admission of Turkey and Greece, which were also not democracies at the time of their accession.<sup>39</sup>

What is also interesting is that “there is no legal basis for the ejection of a state from NATO, within the North Atlantic Treaty or elsewhere. By ejection, I mean revocation of a state’s status as a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty, and thereby of the benefits of the security commitment in Article 5. The only mention of exit from the treaty is in Article 13, which allows for voluntary exit with a year’s notice.”<sup>40</sup> However, there was a time when NATO “dealt with members whose governments have not always supported democratic values. When such situations arose—for example, with Greek and Turkish military regimes in the late 1960s and early 1970s—other Allies effectively isolated or excluded them from sensitive discussions. In those instances, suspending either or both would have risked sparking a nationalist backlash against the Allies—or possibly a war between the two long-time adversaries.”<sup>41</sup>

### *Study on NATO Enlargement*

Another crucial document relating to the question of NATO enlargement was developed in the mid-1990s. During that time one could observe the rising hopes and expectations of the countries of the former Eastern Bloc who were seeking possibilities to deepen their relationships with NATO. One of the developments in this vein was the NATO’s publication of a document titled the *Study on NATO Enlargement* in September 1995. This document “considered the merits of admitting new members and how they should be brought in.”<sup>42</sup> As Bebler notes,

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<sup>38</sup> Heindel, Kalijarvi, and Wilcox, “The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate,” 656.

<sup>39</sup> Solomon, *The NATO Enlargement Debate*, 20.

<sup>40</sup> Dan Reiter, “Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy,” *International Security* 25:4 (2001): 52–53. In this regard, Celeste A. Wallander’s views are particularly interesting. She argues that “NATO members must agree to amend the North Atlantic Treaty to allow for sanction, suspension, or even expulsion of backsliding members”; Celeste A. Wallander, “NATO’s Price,” *Foreign Affairs* 81:6 (2002): 2. In this article she referred critically to performance of (among others) Hungary and the Czech Republic. A similar view, but not so radical, was expressed by Ronald D. Asmus. He stated that “we should also consider establishing clearer benchmarks for new members to continue to meet after they joined the Alliance. We need to understand that these countries joining NATO does not actually mean they are ready to be full members. We are asking them to meet a set of very minimal standards—with the expectation that the lion’s share of reform and work will still take place after they join”; Ronald D. Asmus, “NATO Enlargement and Effectiveness,” testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (11 March 2008), 8.

<sup>41</sup> Leo Michel, “NATO Decisionmaking: How the ‘Consensus Rule’ Works,” National Defense University paper (December 2006), 9; available at [www.ndu.edu/inss/research/croatia.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/research/croatia.pdf).

<sup>42</sup> NATO Public Diplomacy Division, *Enhancing Security and Extending Stability Through NATO Enlargement* (Brussels: NATO, 2004), 4; available at [http://www.nato.int/docu/enlargement/enlargement\\_eng.pdf](http://www.nato.int/docu/enlargement/enlargement_eng.pdf).

The Study ... spelled out, albeit still too generally, the political conditions for being seriously considered as a candidate. These conditions came close to but still clearly fell short of the explicit criteria of admission. They could be characterized as informal considerations or expectations. But since the Study was issued officially by NATO, in spite of its ambivalent title, it was taken (mistakenly) by many in the candidate countries as the definitive list of official criteria of admission.<sup>43</sup>

Therefore, it should be stressed that the *Study on NATO Enlargement* is not an act that establishes and defines the benchmarks for membership in the Alliance. Rather, the document simply seeks to offer detailed guidance for aspiring countries on how to get closer to NATO and to be finally recognized as candidates for membership.

This view confirms a passage in Chapter 1 of the *Study* that states "there is no fixed or rigid list of criteria for inviting new member states to join the Alliance. Enlargement will be decided on a case-by-case basis and some nations may attain membership before others."<sup>44</sup> This is one of the key elements of the document. It shows the nature of the process of NATO enlargement, which is flexible, and depends on results of assessments of individual states. It also points out that one cannot predict which state will become a member of NATO, or when it will occur.

However, one can also find in the almost thirty pages of the *Study* critical information with regard to the potential enlargement of the Alliance. The paper indicates that the prospective process of enlargement will be based on Article 10.<sup>45</sup> Thus, it confirms that the bedrock of enlargement constitutes the conditions included in this particular segment of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The essence of the *Study on NATO Enlargement*, however, constitutes the passages that present a number of guidelines that prospective members are to meet prior to accession. These include:

- A functioning democratic political system (including free and fair elections and respect for individual liberty and the rule of law)
- A market economy
- Democratic-style civil-military relations
- Treatment of minority populations in accordance with Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) guidelines
- Resolution of disputes with neighboring countries and a commitment to solving international disputes peacefully
- A military contribution to the Alliance, including a willingness to take steps to achieve interoperability with other Alliance members.

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<sup>43</sup> Bebler, *The Challenge of NATO Enlargement*, 50.

<sup>44</sup> Full text of the Study on NATO Enlargement is available at [www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/enl-9501.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/enl-9501.htm).

<sup>45</sup> The *Study on NATO Enlargement* quotes Article 10 of the Washington Treaty on pages 2 and 10.

In addition, NATO requires new members to commit themselves to keeping the door open to further enlargement.<sup>46</sup>

### *Stages of Integration Within NATO*

The Alliance created several mechanisms to help aspiring member nations meet the above described criteria and the requirements included in the North Atlantic Treaty and the *Study on NATO Enlargement*. The first mechanism is the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which was launched in 1994. It is the main forum of politico-military cooperation of the Partner nations with NATO.<sup>47</sup> Currently, there are twenty-four nations participating in the PfP,<sup>48</sup> and many of them are seeking to join NATO. Thus, should these nations become successful in acceding to NATO membership, it will affect the modes of cooperation that have developed within the framework of the PfP, *inter alia*, because of the resulting decrease in the number of Partner nations.

Within the PfP framework, one can list a network of mechanisms that aim at facilitating integration within the Alliance. The principal tool is the Membership Action Plan (MAP). Undertaking the MAP process constitutes an important step on the way to Alliance membership, and indicates that a nation is at a higher stage of cooperation aiming at accession. Thus, a country that implements this mechanism is viewed as a candidate state.

However, before an invitation to initiate the MAP is issued, a nation usually develops other mechanisms within the framework of the PfP. Those are the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) and the Intensified Dialogue (ID). One could say that a classic path to membership in NATO consists of the following steps of integration: joining the PfP; followed by implementation of the IPAP, the ID, and finally the MAP. The concluding and the most important step is obviously the invitation to join the Alliance.

As experience shows, the classic path of integration outlined above today only applies to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Montenegro. After joining the PfP, these nations began to develop first their specific IPAPs, and have now moved on to the ID phase. The small number of states that follow the “classic path” is due to a vari-

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<sup>46</sup> Thomas Szayna, “NATO Enlargement: Assessing the Candidates for Prague,” *Bulletin of the Atlantic Council of the United States* 13:2 (2002): 2.

<sup>47</sup> For more information on the PfP see NATO, “The Partnership for Peace,” 21 April 2008; available at [www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html).

<sup>48</sup> There are other two institutions of partnership cooperation within NATO: the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). MD was established in 1995. The forum gathers seven nations from North Africa and the Middle East: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. For more information, see NATO, “NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue” (8 April 2008); available at [www.nato.int/med-dial/home.htm](http://www.nato.int/med-dial/home.htm). ICI was launched at the NATO Istanbul Summit in June 2004 and is aimed at developing cooperation with nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Nowadays, there are four participating countries in ICI: Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. See NATO, “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI): Reaching out to the broader Middle East” (31 August 2007); available at [www.nato.int/issues/ici/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/ici/index.html).

ety of causes. For example, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia did not develop Individual Partnership Action Plans, because when this mechanism was launched, during the NATO Prague Summit in November 2002, those nations were already developing their Membership Action Plans. Since the latter expresses a higher level of cooperation, there was no reason to revert to the IPAP. Table 1 below presents the level of integration with NATO for eight states. It lists specific NATO mechanisms and the time that their implementation began.

Table 1: The State of Integration of the Group of Eight States with NATO

<b>Country</b>	<b>PfP</b>	<b>IPAP</b>	<b>ID</b>	<b>MAP</b>	<b>Invitation</b>
Albania	February 1994	-	-	1999	April 2008
Croatia	May 2000	-	-	2002	April 2008
Macedonia	November 1995	-	-	1999	-
Georgia	March 1994	October 2004	December 2006	-	-
Ukraine	February 1994	-	April 2004	-	-
Bosnia and Herzegovina	December 2006	February 2008	April 2008	-	-
Montenegro	December 2006	March 2008	April 2008	-	-
Serbia	December 2006	-	-	-	-

As was discussed above, the MAP constitutes a crucial step on the path to NATO membership. The MAP was launched during the NATO Washington Summit in April 1999. It is “a program of advice, assistance, and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance. The MAP is not simply a checklist for aspiring countries to fulfill, but instead is a process which helps these nations focus their preparations on meeting the goals and priorities set out within it and provides a range of activities designed to strengthen each country’s candidacy.”<sup>49</sup>

The establishment of the MAP mechanism was based on the experience of the first wave of NATO enlargement after the Cold War. As Donnelly and Simon note, “The MAP is an excellent way to measure the capacities of each country and to structure the enlargement process. Experience with the first three new NATO countries (the Czech

<sup>49</sup> Sverre Myrli (rapporteur), “The Three Adriatic Aspirants: Capabilities and Preparations,” Committee Report to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (6 October 2007), 3.



Republic, Hungary and Poland) since admission in 1999 has demonstrated that there has been a large divergence between what a country says it can do and what the country can actually deliver.”<sup>50</sup>

What is most important about the MAP process is that it supports meeting the guidelines introduced by the *Study on NATO Enlargement* and also allows a thorough assessment of the performance of every aspiring state. As Jiri Šedivý notes, “The general areas covered by MAP’s activities are identical to those outlined in the *Study on NATO Enlargement* (political and military, defense/military, resources, security and legal) which guided the first enlargement process. Yet the current aspirants are, through a sophisticated structure of MAP instruments, subjected to more profound scrutiny and in-depth evaluation. The feedback from NATO on their progress is more critical and discriminatory than was the case for their predecessors.”<sup>51</sup>

Thus, the MAP can be perceived as a reflection, as Ronald Asmus put it, of “tough love” on the part of the Allies toward aspiring nations.<sup>52</sup> By establishing the MAP, NATO wanted to show that there are criteria for membership, and to outline the mechanism for verifying whether or not these criteria had been met.

However, it should be emphasized—especially in the context of current discussions on Georgia and Ukraine—that implementation of the MAP “does not prejudice any decision by the Alliance on future membership.”<sup>53</sup> According to the framework of NATO enlargement, first, a country should meet all benchmarks defined by the Alliance; second, that country’s accession must be agreed to by all members of the Alliance. This also means that there is no defined timeframe for the implementation of the MAP in order to be invited to join NATO. Experience shows that specific countries need different amounts of time—e.g., Albania spent nine years developing the MAP before being invited to sign membership accords in July 2008, whereas Croatia spent only six years in the MAP phase.

The Intensified Dialogue phase is an earlier step in the process of integration within NATO. It is viewed as the stage of cooperation preceding implementation of the MAP, but following on from participation in the Partnership for Peace. The ID gives a prospective member state “access to a more intense political exchange with NATO Allies on its membership aspirations and relevant reforms, without prejudice to any eventual

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<sup>50</sup> Chris Donnelly and Jeffrey Simon, “Roadmaps to NATO Accession: Preparing for Membership,” East European Studies Meeting Report no. 242 (January 2002); available at [www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?event\\_id=5976&fuseaction=events.event\\_summary](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?event_id=5976&fuseaction=events.event_summary). Compare with Paul Belkin, Carl Ek, Julie Kim, Jim Nichol, and Steven Woehrel, *Enlargement Issues at NATO’s Bucharest Summit*, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 12 March 2008), 3.

<sup>51</sup> Jiri Šedivý, “The Puzzle of NATO Enlargement,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 22:2 (2001): 3. Šedivý, in his statement, referred to the countries that were admitted to NATO during the first round of enlargement after the Cold War (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). They were not implementing the MAP.

<sup>52</sup> Ronald D. Asmus, “NATO Enlargement and Effectiveness,” testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (11 March 2008), 4.

<sup>53</sup> NATO, “Membership Action Plan (MAP),” available at [www.nato.int/issues/map/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/map/index.html).

Alliance decision on further membership.”<sup>54</sup> Nowadays, there are four nations in the Intensified Dialogue phase: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, and Ukraine.

The Individual Partnership Action Plan is an even earlier phase in the integration process, coming before the initiation of the Intensified Dialogue. It serves as yet another mechanism of developing cooperation between NATO and a partner nation. It is a tool designed to deepen politico-military relations with the Alliance. Within this mechanism countries implement activities in the following areas: political and security issues; defense, security and military issues; public information; science and environment; civil emergency planning; and administrative, protective security, and resource issues. The IPAP, launched at the NATO Prague Summit in 2002, was created mainly for the Partner nations from the South Caucasus (e.g. Georgia) and Central Asia (e.g. Kazakhstan), but today is also implemented by countries aiming at joining the Alliance, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro.<sup>55</sup>

To summarize, one can draw a general conclusion that the process of NATO enlargement is based on a formal framework. The basis of this system constitutes the records of the North Atlantic Treaty, especially Article 10, and the *Study on NATO Enlargement*. However, expansion of the Alliance is a flexible process based on political evaluations made by NATO members. Those acts define requirements that must be met in order for a state to be recognized as a qualified country and finally to be invited to join NATO. However, what should be underlined is that the fulfillment of all these criteria does not guarantee accession to the Alliance. On the other hand, paradoxically, the lack of implementation of all required reforms does not exclude an invitation to join NATO either.

### *History of NATO Enlargement*

This section aims at outlining the previous rounds of NATO enlargement. It looks at the three distinct waves of NATO expansion that took place: one during the Cold War period, and two after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. The Cold War rounds of enlargement were as follows: Greece and Turkey in 1952; the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955; and Spain in 1982. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been two additional waves of expansion, which embraced countries from Eastern and Central Europe that were previously members of the Warsaw Pact. Thus the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO in 1999, whereas Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined in 2004. A third post-Cold War enlargement round has been launched with the invitation of Albania and Croatia during the 2008 Bucharest Summit.

Turkey and Greece were admitted to NATO in 1952, which was justified mainly on strategic and security grounds. It was connected with the “difficulties faced by Greece after World War II in quelling a communist rebellion and demands by the Soviet Un-

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<sup>54</sup> NATO, “NATO Offers Intensified Dialogue to Georgia,” *NATO Update* (21 September 2006); available at [www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/09-september/e0921c.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/09-september/e0921c.htm).

<sup>55</sup> NATO, “Individual Partnership Action Plans,” 15 April 2008; available at [www.nato.int/issues/ipap/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/ipap/index.html).

ion for military bases in the Turkish Straits.”<sup>56</sup> This situation arose from the so-called Truman Doctrine, which was first articulated in 1947. “The doctrine enunciated American intentions to guarantee the security of Turkey and Greece and resulted in large scale U.S. military and economic aid.”<sup>57</sup> The accession of those two countries enabled the Alliance to “shore up its southern flank to forestall Communist military action in Europe at the height of the Korean War.”<sup>58</sup> Turkey’s location in particular has been of great importance from NATO’s point of view. It “serves as the organization’s vital eastern anchor, controlling the straits leading from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and sharing a border with Syria, Iraq, and Iran.”<sup>59</sup> Turkey’s military potential was also a significant consideration; indeed, “among NATO countries, its military establishment has ranked second in size to that of the United States.”<sup>60</sup>

The Federal Republic of Germany became a member of NATO in 1955. This fact meant that the primary adversary of the Second World War was invited to join the Alliance of the Western world, “despite initial protests by both France and the Soviet Union.”<sup>61</sup> For the Federal Republic of Germany, this was an important step in its “post-war rehabilitation and paved the way ... to play a substantial role in the defense of Western Europe during the Cold War.”<sup>62</sup> In addition, accession to NATO returned to Germany much of its sovereignty, which had been in abeyance during the post-World War Two occupation period. One should bear in mind that, after the unification of Germany in October 1990, the area of NATO was broadened to include the territory of the former German Democratic Republic, though understandably it did not mean the increase of the number of member states.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, *Background Note: Turkey* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2007); available at [www.state.gov/t/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm](http://www.state.gov/t/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm).

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> United States General Accounting Office, *NATO Enlargement*, Report to Congressional Committees (Washington, D.C.: GAO, November 2002); available at [www.gao.gov/new.items/d03255.pdf](http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03255.pdf).

<sup>59</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Background Note: Turkey*.

<sup>60</sup> Isaiah Frank, “A Place for Turkey,” *Washington Post* (28 September 1999): A25.

<sup>61</sup> Charly Salonijs-Pasternak, *From Protecting Some to Securing Many: NATO’s Journey from a Military Alliance to a Security Manager*, FIIA Report 17 (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2007), 21. France did not want to agree to a rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany in the recent aftermath of the Second World War; see Helga Haftendorn, “Germany’s Accession to NATO: 50 Years On,” *NATO Review* (Summer 2005): 2.

<sup>62</sup> Haftendorn, Ibid., 1.

<sup>63</sup> August Pradetto and Fouzieh Melani Alamir, eds., *Die Debatte über die Kosten der NATO-Osterweiterung* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998), 261.

Spain became a member of NATO in 1982, following three decades of special defense arrangements with the U.S. on hosting sea and air bases.<sup>64</sup> Spain's strategic location at the southern end of Europe at the Mediterranean Sea, Atlantic Ocean, and Straits of Gibraltar was long appreciated within the Alliance.<sup>65</sup> However, Spain's application to join the Alliance generated "heated domestic discussion when the conservative government applied for membership in contradiction to a previous consensus to not seek membership."<sup>66</sup> Spain was very close to withdrawing from the Alliance when, shortly after the application was made, "the Socialist Party, officially hostile to the Alliance, took power and Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez promised a national referendum on NATO membership."<sup>67</sup> In the referendum held in 1986, Spaniards voted to stay in NATO.<sup>68</sup> What is interesting, however, is that Spain joined the integrated military structure of the Alliance only in 1998.<sup>69</sup>

There were two waves of enlargement that embraced former members of the Warsaw Pact in Eastern and Central Europe. First, the so-called Visegrad Three—the

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<sup>64</sup> The American presence had been causing tensions in Spain. "The sensitivity over NATO and the American bases comes largely from a Spanish perception that the 1953 treaty establishing the bases broke [Francisco] Franco's international isolation and saved his regime from falling. In February [1985], the expulsion of two American diplomats here accused of spying and the disclosure of contingency plans to store nuclear weapons in Spain added salt to the historical wounds." Edward Schumacher, "Issues in Madrid Awaiting Reagan," *New York Times* (5 May 1985): A19.

<sup>65</sup> During the Cold War era, Spain was part of NATO's "defense in depth" strategy. In the event of war in Central Europe, Spain was seen as a key rear base for shuttling troops and supplies to the front and as a vital point to help control the Straits of Gibraltar, the Western Mediterranean, and the Atlantic around the Canary Islands, all important passages for convoys. Edward Schumacher, "If Spain Leaves NATO Both Could Be the Poorer," *New York Times* (9 March 1986): A2.

<sup>66</sup> Salonius-Pasternak, *From Protecting Some to Securing Many*, 22.

<sup>67</sup> Edward Schumacher, "The Cloudy Outlook for Gibraltar's Commanding View," *New York Times* (10 February 1985): A5.

<sup>68</sup> "In return for approval by Spaniards of continued NATO membership, Gonzalez promised his leftist electorate that Spain would not host nuclear weapons or fully integrate into NATO militarily. The third condition was that there would be a significant reduction in American military presence." Jim Hoagland, "Spain's Move Stirs NATO Concern. Allies Fear Spillover Problems If U.S. Warplanes Are Ousted," *Washington Post* (29 December 1987): A9.

<sup>69</sup> NATO, *Summit Guide* (March 2008); available at [www.nato.int/docu/comm/2008/0804-bucharest/guide.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2008/0804-bucharest/guide.html).

Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—joined NATO in 1999.<sup>70</sup> The second wave saw seven other countries—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—follow suit in 2004.

The rounds of expansion that took place in 1999 and 2004 were distinct from those that occurred during the Cold War. The “enlargements were qualitatively and quantitatively different from the previous enlargements. Quantitatively, in the space of five years, the number of NATO members rose from 16 to 26. The enlargements significantly extended the ‘Alliance border areas’ adjoining Russia, and increased the size of the area under the collective security umbrella in Europe by nearly 30 percent.”<sup>71</sup>

What was the rationale for the two post-Cold War waves of enlargement? As Ronald D. Asmus argues, there were three main goals of the expansion of NATO to ten post-communist countries: to build a post-Cold War Europe “whole, free, and at peace”; to renew the transatlantic alliance; and to reposition the United States and Europe to address global challenges.<sup>72</sup> This view confirms the words of Bill Clinton, who in a June 2001 speech at Warsaw University said that the rationale for enlargement was to create a “Europe whole and free.”<sup>73</sup>

With regard to the expansion of NATO which took place in 2004, one can say that the events of 11 September 2001 in the U.S. played an important role in the inclusion of the nations from not only Eastern and Central Europe, but also the Western Balkans. The strategic location of Bulgaria and Romania has been of great importance for the U.S. in the war against terrorism. In this respect, the Bush Administration has believed

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<sup>70</sup> The first wave of enlargement of NATO was limited only to three countries from East-central Europe. However “France and Italy in particular had pressed strongly to include Romania and Slovenia in the group of membership candidates – in opposition to many other Allies, particularly the U.S.” (Karl-Heinz Kamp, “NATO Entrapped: Debating the Next Enlargement Round,” *Survival* 40:3 (1998): 170.) “Paris raised the stakes by linking its possible return to the integrated military structure of NATO to the extension of membership to Romania and Slovenia plus the appointment of a European, rather than an American, commander of Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH). Other south European states supported Slovenia’s and Romania’s case along with the French, but opposed Paris over the AFSOUTH command.” (Stuart Croft, “Guaranteeing Europe’s Security? Enlarging NATO Again,” *International Affairs* 78:1 (2002): 104.)

<sup>71</sup> Saloniuk-Pasternak, *From Protecting Some to Securing Many*, 22.

<sup>72</sup> Ronald D. Asmus, “Europe’s Eastern Promise: Rethinking NATO and EU Enlargement,” *Foreign Affairs* 87:1 (2008): 95.

<sup>73</sup> During that speech President Clinton said: “I believe in NATO membership for all of Europe’s democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibilities that NATO brings. The question of ‘when’ may still be up for debate within NATO; the question of ‘whether’ should not be. As we plan to enlarge NATO, no nation should be used as a pawn in the agendas of others. We will not trade away the fate of free European peoples. No more Munichs. No more Yaltas. Let us tell all those who have struggled to build democracy and free markets what we have told the Poles: from now on, what you build, you keep. No one can take away your freedom or your country.” The White House, “Remarks by the President in an address to faculty and students of Warsaw University,” Warsaw, Poland, 15 June 2001; available at [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010615-1.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010615-1.html).

that “an enlarged Alliance that conducts joint defense and operational planning, promotes interoperability, and encourages realistic training exercises will be a more effective partner in answering global security challenges.”<sup>74</sup> Without question, “Bulgaria and Romania became beneficiaries of the September 2001 crisis. Admission of these two could give NATO a coherent and geostrategically significant ‘southern dimension,’ connecting Hungary through the Balkans to Greece and Turkey.”<sup>75</sup>

## The Debate on NATO Enlargement

The aim of this section is to analyze the debate on the future of NATO enlargement, in order to gain a better understanding of the character of discussions on the expansion of the Alliance. Here I will examine a few chosen important questions that influence the decisions made with regard to the expansion of the Alliance. The section begins with a presentation of the main decisions made during two last NATO summits in Riga (November 2006) and Bucharest (April 2008). It provides background for the exploration of other issues later in this essay, such as: the strategic dimension of expansion; responsibilities stemming from Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; the military contribution expected from new member states; support for NATO enlargement; the Russian factor; and the decision-making process around enlargement.

### *Enlargement on the Agenda of NATO*

There are currently nine countries that are viewed as prospective NATO members. They are located in the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, and the South Caucasus. Albania and Croatia were already invited during the Bucharest Summit to begin accession talks, and signed membership accords in July 2008. The third country from the Western Balkans, Macedonia, is a formal aspirant for NATO membership and is currently implementing its Membership Action Plan. One can also list several other countries that are part of the enlargement debate: Georgia and Ukraine, which are developing the Intensified Dialogue with NATO; and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro which joined the PfP program in December 2006. One can also look at Kosovo—a newly independent state in the Western Balkans—as a potential future member of NATO.

Enlargement is an important matter on the NATO agenda. However, one can certainly say that primary attention is given nowadays to other issues, such as the operations in Afghanistan, and the military transformation of the Alliance itself. This fragmented attention results in a less vibrant and vivid debate in Europe and North America as it did in the case of the first (or even second) round of NATO enlargement after the end of the Cold War. The process of Euro-Atlantic integration concentrates mainly

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<sup>74</sup> Rebecca R. Moore, *NATO's New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 79.

<sup>75</sup> Michael Clarke and Paul Cornish “The European Defence Project and the Prague Summit,” *International Affairs* 78:4 (2002): 779–80.

on the question of meeting membership criteria. Nonetheless, NATO today faces a few complicated cases of integration, particularly Macedonia, Georgia, and Ukraine.

The issue of enlargement was not the central topic of the NATO Summit held in Riga in November 2006. During that meeting, the Allies focused on the question of military missions, mainly in Afghanistan (ISAF) and Kosovo (KFOR), as well as the transformation of NATO.<sup>76</sup> The Alliance did not make any important decision in Latvia with regard to aspiring member countries. Nevertheless, representatives of twenty-six member states habitually reaffirmed that “NATO remains open to new European members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty.” There was another crucial message that came from the heads of state gathered in Riga: “At our next summit in 2008, the Alliance intends to extend further invitations to those countries that meet NATO’s performance-based standards and are able to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security and stability.”<sup>77</sup> Obviously, the Allies had in mind three Balkan states—Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia—which were closest to NATO membership.

A few weeks before the April 2008 NATO Summit held in Bucharest, Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced that the question of enlargement would be the second-most important issue on the agenda of the Bucharest Summit, after the operational engagement of the Alliance. However, he also underscored that the decision with regard to three MAP countries had not yet been made, and it would depend upon the fulfillment of membership criteria. Thus, he emphasized that the possible invitations to negotiations with the Alliance would depend on the performance of the candidate countries.<sup>78</sup>

Nonetheless, it is unquestionable that, during the last summit in Bucharest, one of the key issues on the agenda was NATO’s “open door policy.”<sup>79</sup> What is noteworthy is that the Bucharest Summit Declaration issued after the meeting began with the statement “[we] met today to enlarge our Alliance,” highlighting the significance of the decisions made on NATO expansion.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, “Opening Statement by NATO Secretary General at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Level of Heads of States and Government,” 29 November 2006; available at [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061129b.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061129b.htm).

<sup>77</sup> NATO, “Riga Summit Declaration,” 29 November 2006; available at [www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm).

<sup>78</sup> Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, “Looking ahead to NATO’s Bucharest Summit,” Speech by NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at Bucharest University, Romania (11 January 2008); available at [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080111a.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080111a.html).

<sup>79</sup> Other important topics touched upon during the Bucharest Summit were military operations (especially ISAF in Afghanistan and KFOR in Kosovo), military transformation of the Alliance, partnership policy, missile defense, energy security, and the relationship between NATO and the EU. See NATO, “Bucharest Summit Takes NATO Agenda Forward,” (3 April 2008); available at [www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/04-april/e0403f.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/04-april/e0403f.html).

<sup>80</sup> NATO, “Bucharest Summit Declaration,” issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest (3 April 2008); available at [www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html).

The discussions before and during the meeting were very intense. Since there was a consensus to invite Albania and Croatia to initiate accession talks, the debate concentrated mainly around two questions: the bilateral dispute between Greece and Macedonia, and the invitation of Ukraine and Georgia to initiate the MAP process. Ultimately, NATO made two crucial decisions with regard to enlargement policy. The member states invited Albania and Croatia to begin accession talks, and granted BiH and Montenegro Intensified Dialogue status. NATO underscored that Albania and Croatia will soon become members thanks to “years of hard work and a demonstrated commitment to ... common security and NATO’s shared values.” NATO stressed that “the accession of these new members will strengthen security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area, and bring us closer to our goal of a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace.”<sup>81</sup>

With regard to the procedural aspects of joining NATO, the invited countries began accession talks after the summit meeting. After this, the Protocols of Accession will be ratified by the NATO member states. Finally, one can expect that Albania and Croatia will become full-fledged members in the following year, in summer or fall 2009.<sup>82</sup>

During the Bucharest Summit, Macedonia’s performance in the larger processes of Euro-Atlantic integration was welcomed and praised, but the country was not invited to join the Alliance because of their bilateral dispute with Greece. The latter state used its veto power in the organization to block the invitation. However, Macedonia was ensured by the Alliance that an invitation “will be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached.”<sup>83</sup>

The invitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro to the ID was not a surprise. Those countries are interested in deepening their relations with the Alliance, and hope to eventually accede to membership. The third country from the Western Balkans, Serbia, was also offered this mechanism, but did not express any interest in it. Nevertheless, NATO member states wanted to send a signal that they would welcome strengthening relations with Serbia. This is why in the Bucharest Summit Declaration one can find a provision that NATO is ready to deepen its cooperation with Serbia and “will consider an Intensified Dialogue following a request by Serbia.”<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> In the past, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were invited to join the Alliance during the Madrid Summit in July 1997, and became members in March 1999. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia were invited during the Prague Summit in November 2002, and gained member status in March 2004. Thus, Albania and Croatia should become members of the Alliance in 2009.

<sup>83</sup> NATO, “Bucharest Summit Declaration.” According to Henri Bohnet, director of the Skopje office of the Germany-based political think tank the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, “the main reason why neither party came to an agreement was due to the fact that negotiations started far too late—only two or three months in advance—when really it all should have been concluded a year ago.” Seeurope, “Region: Mixed Fortunes for Southeast Europe at Bucharest’s NATO Summit,” (14 April 2008); available at [www.seeurope.net/?q=node/15321](http://www.seeurope.net/?q=node/15321) (accessed 10 June 2008; URL is now disabled).

<sup>84</sup> NATO, “Bucharest Summit Declaration.”



MAP status was not granted to Georgia and Ukraine during the Bucharest summit. However, the Allies stated that “MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership.” Furthermore, in the Bucharest Summit Declaration one can find the following direct statement of intention: “these countries ... will become members of NATO.” This stipulation allows one to infer that the decision about granting MAP status (and an eventual invitation to the Alliance) has been postponed, but that Georgia and Ukraine will certainly become members.<sup>85</sup>

All in all, this statement constitutes quite an unusual commitment on the part of the Alliance. The organization has always avoided declarations entailing any future decisions directed at any specific state. It is clear that Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko welcomed this statement. During the meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) held in Bucharest (4 April 2008), he stated *that the decision “gave a clear signal on future relations of Ukraine with NATO.”*<sup>86</sup> He added, “Here we got a 100 percent guarantee, at least formally, for membership,” and his overall assessment of the summit’s decisions was straightforward: “This is our victory.”<sup>87</sup> Georgian Foreign Minister David Bakradze had a similar assessment of the summit, describing it as a “historic breakthrough” for the nation.<sup>88</sup> Overall, the Allies introduced some new statements in the Bucharest Summit Declaration. Further assessment of Georgia and Ukraine’s MAP applications will be carried out during the Foreign Ministers meeting in December 2008.

During the Bucharest Summit, the Allies devoted much time to discussing the question of Kosovo. However, the debate concentrated on NATO’s operational commitments to help to stabilize the security situation in that country. The Alliance again reiterated that KFOR will remain in Kosovo to “ensure a safe and secure environment.”<sup>89</sup> Member states did not take up the question of the broader Euro-Atlantic inte-

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<sup>85</sup> Ibid. During the discussions in Bucharest, the Allies “argued over the exact wording of the final communiqué, in particular how to frame the rejection of Ukraine and Georgia. In the end, they only offered rhetorical support for these countries’ aspirations, saying only that they would be members of NATO one day.” Steven Lee Myers and Graham Bowley, “Bush Wins NATO Backing on Shield, but not on Ukraine and Georgia,” *International Herald Tribune* (3 April 2008); available at [www.iht.com/articles/2008/04/03/europe/3shield.php](http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/04/03/europe/3shield.php).

<sup>86</sup> NATO, “NATO-Ukraine Commission Discusses a New Phase of Relations” (4 April 2008); available at [www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/04-april/e0404a.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/04-april/e0404a.html).

<sup>87</sup> RFERL, “NATO: No MAP for Georgia or Ukraine, but Alliance Vows Membership,” (3 April 2008); available at [www.rferl.org/content/Article/1079726.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1079726.html); David Brunnstrom and Susan Cornwell, “NATO Agrees Former Soviet Republics Will One Day Enter,” *International Herald Tribune* (3 April 2008); available at [www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2008/04/03/europe/OUKWD-UK-NATO.php](http://www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2008/04/03/europe/OUKWD-UK-NATO.php).

<sup>88</sup> Brunnstrom and Cornwell, “NATO Agrees Former Soviet Republics Will One Day Enter.”

<sup>89</sup> NATO, “Bucharest Summit Declaration,” 2008.

gration of Kosovo. It is a clear sign that NATO sees embarking on the debate of possible future membership for the country as premature.<sup>90</sup>

### *Strategic Dimension*

The continuing enlargement of NATO generally aims at strengthening the level of security and stabilization in the entire Euro-Atlantic area as well as consolidating the democratization process in the post-communist countries. This applies to the Western Balkans as well. NATO recognizes the importance of that region and has stressed that “Euro-Atlantic integration, based on solidarity and democratic values, remains necessary for long-term stability.”<sup>91</sup> The strategy of NATO towards the Western Balkans “aims to consolidate stability in Southeast Europe and facilitate the integration of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, and ... Macedonia into Euro-Atlantic structures.”<sup>92</sup> NATO has been engaged in the process of stabilization of the Western Balkans for a long time by conducting peacekeeping operations (e.g., IFOR/SFOR, KFOR) and developing politico-military cooperation, by assisting with the process of security and defense sector reform.<sup>93</sup>

The invitation of Albania and Croatia—as well as the plausibility of future membership for Macedonia, BiH, Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo—will therefore be one of the crucial elements of the stabilization process in the Western Balkans. NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated just one day before the Bucharest Summit that he hopes that enlargement will “give the Balkans region the boost of stability and confidence that it needs.”<sup>94</sup> Additionally, it will be a continuation of the process of NATO expansion to the region after having admitted Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Slovenia to the organization. Furthermore, the location of those states close to the Mediterranean and the Middle East is not insignificant for the Alliance. NATO has been broadly involved in those geographic areas by conducting operations (Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean and the NATO Training Mission in Iraq) and developing ties with partner nations from MD and ICI.

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<sup>90</sup> James Appathurai, NATO Spokesman, made a very interesting statement on Kosovo: “With regard to Kosovo, ... I think again we shouldn’t be getting ahead of ourselves. There are a number of very important issues that we’re dealing with right now as an international community with regard to Kosovo and NATO playing a very important role backstopping the security environment. So, I have not heard any discussion or any decision within NATO of looking forward beyond addressing now what are the immediate challenges related to Kosovo.” Press briefing by NATO Spokesman James Appathurai, 2 April 2008; available at [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080402e.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080402e.html).

<sup>91</sup> NATO, “Riga Summit Declaration,” 2006.

<sup>92</sup> NATO, “NATO in the Balkans,” 24 January 2008; available at [www.nato.int/issues/balkans/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/balkans/index.html).

<sup>93</sup> NATO, “Bringing Peace and Stability to the Balkans,” February 2005; available at [www.nato.int/docu/briefing/balkans/balkans-e.pdf](http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/balkans/balkans-e.pdf).

<sup>94</sup> NATO, Keynote speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and Panel intervention at the Bucharest Conference (GMF), 2 April 2008; available at [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080402b.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080402b.html).

The geographical reach of the Alliance in the Balkans will be expanded. Albania and Croatia have been already invited to NATO, and it seems that Macedonia will join this group soon. If this scenario is implemented, Greece will gain two new neighbors that are the part of the Alliance (Albania and Macedonia). In the northern part of the Western Balkans, Croatia—which borders two member states, Hungary and Slovenia—will expand NATO’s reach with an extensive coastline along the Adriatic Sea.

There is no doubt that the location of Ukraine is of particular strategic importance. The country is situated on the Black Sea and borders four NATO member states (Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland) as well as the Russian Federation. Ukraine, which is the second largest country in Europe (603 thousand km<sup>2</sup>), creates a kind of buffer zone between the members of the Alliance and Russia. NATO recognized the strategic importance and military potential of Ukraine by signing the “Charter on a Distinctive Partnership” in July 1997. This is the only country, beside the Russian Federation, which has developed special relations with NATO. Ukraine is also very important from the perspective of some individual NATO member countries. Ukraine’s accession to the organization would be especially important for Allies along the Eastern flank of NATO that share a border with Ukraine, such as Poland and Slovakia. The strategic importance of Ukraine is also recognized by the Russian Federation. It is one of the reasons why this state opposes eastward NATO enlargement.

Georgia’s location is seen as strategic, but at the same time can be perceived as problematic.<sup>95</sup> The state shares a border with one NATO member state (Turkey) and also adjoins the Russian Federation. The Alliance views Georgia “as a key buffer state in the Caucasus, one whose mere existence holds Russia in check.” However, this location, bordering the Russian Federation and on the Eastern shore of the Black Sea, means that this state is also seen as “too dysfunctional and isolated for NATO to ever be able to adequately defend it.”<sup>96</sup> Furthermore, the South Caucasus region is perceived as unstable, because of (among other reasons) the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and the general political situation in the countries of this area.

Georgia’s situation is even more complex, however. According to the provisions of Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, enlargement to new countries should strengthen the security of NATO member states. From a strategic point of view, the current situation in Georgia indicates that NATO’s security will not be strengthened by Georgia’s accession. The main reason is the lack of territorial integrity of Georgia because of the existence of two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia – a situation that erupted into armed conflict in August 2008, with Russian troops occupying both breakaway provinces (where they had previously stationed “peacekeeper” troops) and invading border sections of Georgia itself. In consequence, this state of affairs complicates Georgia’s security situation, and exposes other member states to risk as well. This is one of the main reasons why a few countries of the Alliance are reluctant to in-

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<sup>95</sup> Editorial Board comment: This paper was written before the crisis of August 2008, but the argument remains of interest.

<sup>96</sup> Stratfor, “Georgia: A NATO Move to Calm Tensions,” 4 October 2007; available at [www.stratfor.com/analysis/georgia\\_nato\\_move\\_calm\\_tensions](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/georgia_nato_move_calm_tensions) (membership required).

vite Georgia even to begin the MAP phase, which constitutes the next step on the path to membership after developing the ID. Those states are also afraid of the possible political consequences, as this move would strongly strain NATO's relations with the Russian Federation.

When examining the strategic dimensions of NATO expansion, it can also be viewed as a parallel and reinforcing process of stabilization along with the expansion of the EU. Both organizations are based on common values: respect for democracy, fundamental freedoms, and a market economy. Both institutions are in the process of enlargement. However, while "the EU is said to be suffering from enlargement fatigue, NATO does not send a signal that it is also losing heart in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration."<sup>97</sup>

There is no formal link between the membership processes for NATO and the EU; each institution has established its own unique arrangements for how to become a member.<sup>98</sup> However, there is no doubt that both organizations have influence on each other. Twenty-one nations are members of both NATO and the EU. It is also important that those institutions develop strategic partnership and politico-military cooperation, in both the ideological and the operational realms. Furthermore, "the EU and NATO have increasingly come to cover the same tasks in the same geographical area. For the newcomers, in particular, the overlapping membership is expected to facilitate both cooperation and convergence."<sup>99</sup> Therefore, overlapping membership can be seen as highly beneficial.

Ten countries in Eastern and Central Europe that had been admitted to NATO (1999 and 2004) later became members of the EU (in 2004 and 2007). One can draw the conclusion that accession to NATO helps in becoming an EU member, since it traditionally precedes EU membership. It is true, however, that one cannot treat becoming a NATO member as a condition for being admitted to the EU. Those two processes of integration are interlinked (e.g., meeting democracy benchmarks), but very distinct and without any direct correlations and dependencies.

Nowadays, three Western Balkans countries also intend to join the EU. Croatia and Macedonia have the status of official candidates for membership. Croatia started its negotiations with the EU in 2005, whereas Macedonia has not yet begun formal talks. Albania signed Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in 2003, as did Serbia in 2008. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Kosovo are seen as

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<sup>97</sup> Jamie Shea, "Reflections on NATO's Political and Military Transformation Since 9/11," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 5:3 (2006).

<sup>98</sup> A very interesting but at the same time humorous and sarcastic comparison of the processes of integration within the EU and NATO and requirements connected with it was made by former German defense minister Volker R  he, who stated, "You can join the Atlantic Alliance with old tanks, but joining the EU with old farm tractors causes problems." Quoted in Zoltan Barany, "NATO Expansion, Round Two: Making Matters Worse," *Security Studies* 11:3 (2002): 69.

<sup>99</sup> Antonio Missiroli, "Central Europe Between the EU and NATO," *Survival* 46:4 (2004): 131-32.

potential future members of the EU. With regard to Ukraine and Georgia, those countries have signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with the EU.<sup>100</sup> It is very important that membership in NATO, just as the process of integration itself, is widely perceived to have a positive impact on the process of stabilization of these nations' internal situation.

### *Responsibilities under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty*

One of the facets of the discussion on enlargement relates to responsibilities stemming from Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.<sup>101</sup> There is no doubt that the character of security threats and challenges has changed, and nowadays the possibility of an armed conflict is decreasing.<sup>102</sup> Subsequently, the Alliance has been transforming "from a defense body to an institution dealing primarily with out-of-area problems."<sup>103</sup> Nonetheless, collective defense remains the core function of the Alliance. Therefore, the member states as well as aspiring countries must meet the challenges of contributing to collective defense.

Prospective NATO members attach great importance to the security guarantees resulting from Article 5. This is still one of key motivations why they seek to join the Alliance. For the aspiring countries, NATO membership is mainly seen as a guarantee to ensure their territorial integrity. This is particularly important due to the complicated history of many of these countries, their newly established statehood, their relatively limited military capabilities, and the fact that many of them are located in regions where the security situation still has not stabilized. Therefore, for prospective members the security guarantees stemming from Article 5 of the Washington Treaty are extremely important. Membership in NATO is seen as significantly increasing the level of security of those countries.

Moreover, if NATO enlarges, there will be other implications for the Allies. The size of the area that will have to be secured will change significantly, especially after the invitation of Ukraine, which is the second-largest country in Europe. This will have operational implications for the Allies, who would have to explore how to effectively ensure security and provide security guarantees across suddenly much larger distances. It will certainly influence the process of defense planning, and will alter the resources required to carry out an action under Article 5. Furthermore, a possible intervention to

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<sup>100</sup> To find more information on EU enlargement, see the European Commission's website, at [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/index_en.htm).

<sup>101</sup> In the history of NATO, Article 5 has been invoked only once, immediately after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. in September 2001.

<sup>102</sup> According to Michael Clarke and Paul Cornish, "collective self-defense may have seemed a logical imperative during the Cold War, but seems far less relevant in facing the more complex challenges of collective security in a Europe characterized by internal disorder and domestic dislocation rather than external threat." Michael Clarke and Paul Cornish, "The European Defence Project and the Prague Summit," 780.

<sup>103</sup> Helmut Hubel, "The Baltic Sea Subregion after Dual Enlargement," *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association* 39:3 (2004): 283.

defend one of the new members might entail engagement in conflicts that the Allies would hope to avoid, such as the situation in the South Caucasus.

The likelihood of the necessity to take up a self-defense action will be higher if NATO offers membership to countries from unstable regions—e.g. the Western Balkans and the South Caucasus. The biggest problem obviously pertains to Georgia, which still has pending conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, along with the significant recent complication of Russian incursions. This is why some hold the view that, despite the great strides that have been made in the reform process, Georgia should not be invited to join NATO. Sir Malcolm Rifkind, member of the British Parliament and the former Foreign Secretary (1995–97), argues that the invocation of Article 5 “cannot be considered a hypothetical concern. ... Would it really be wise for NATO member states to accept a legal obligation, not just an option, to come to the aid of Georgia if either or both of these secessionist regimes, with or without the support of Moscow, continued to use armed force against the Georgian government?”<sup>104</sup> The same opinion was expressed by other Allied representatives, among them German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who said “countries that are entangled in regional and internal conflicts cannot become NATO members,” a statement that clearly referred to Georgia.<sup>105</sup>

A less problematic case is Ukraine, which enjoys relatively secure territorial integrity. However, its relations with the Russian Federation remain tense. Russia has expressed its displeasure about Ukraine’s ambitions to join NATO.<sup>106</sup> When we add the facts that “Ukraine has a large Russian-speaking minority, ... Crimea is an ethnic Russian territory that was only joined to Ukraine in the 1950s ... and [the fact that] the question of Ukraine’s orientation towards the West is the seminal issue of Ukrainian politics, with the population almost equally divided,” concerns about the obligations coming from Article 5 are inevitably raised.<sup>107</sup>

### *Military Contribution*

When discussing NATO enlargement, one of the elements the Allies must take into account is the potential military contribution of prospective members. As noted by Leo Michel, “the so-called ‘burdensharing’ debate was as old as NATO itself.”<sup>108</sup> It relates not only to capacities, but also to readiness to meet commitments as prospective members of a politico-military alliance. This debate was also reflected during the Bucharest

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<sup>104</sup> Malcolm Rifkind, “NATO Shouldn’t Advance too Far East,” *Daily Telegraph* (London) (2 April 2008); available at [www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2008/04/02/do0204.xml](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2008/04/02/do0204.xml).

<sup>105</sup> Bill Van Auken, “US, Germany Clash over NATO Expansion Plan,” *World Socialist Web Site* (2 April 2008); available at [www.wsws.org/articles/2008/apr2008/nato-a02.shtml](http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/apr2008/nato-a02.shtml).

<sup>106</sup> See “Russia Attacks NATO on Enlargement,” *International Herald Tribune* (23 January 2008); available at [www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/23/europe/russia.php](http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/23/europe/russia.php).

<sup>107</sup> Rifkind, “NATO Shouldn’t Advance too Far East.”

<sup>108</sup> Michel, “NATO Decisionmaking: How the ‘Consensus Rule’ Works,” 7.

Summit, when the members discussed the question of NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan.<sup>109</sup>

When looking at the military capabilities of possible future member states, the conclusion is that they are limited. Most of these states’ armed forces are quite small and are still undergoing modernization. The only exception in terms of potential is the Ukrainian military, which has 150,000 troops, in spite of the fact that the country is still conducting a vast security and defense sector reform.<sup>110</sup> The humble military capacities in these nations stem from the fact that the states of the Western Balkans and the South Caucasus represent small territories and populations, which in consequence brings about relatively modest defense spending and troop levels. The data of eight states currently in the process of integrating with NATO is presented in Table 2 below. These data confirm that the military potential offered by these states is limited.

Table 2: Economic and Military Data for Eight States Currently Integrating with NATO (2007)<sup>111</sup>

<b>Country</b>	<b>Territory (km<sup>2</sup>)</b>	<b>Population (million)</b>	<b>Armed Forces</b>	<b>Defense spending (% of GDP)</b>	<b>Defense budget</b>
Albania	28,748	3.6	16,000	2.00	USD 208m
Croatia	56,542	4.5	16,000	1.69	USD 875m
Macedonia	25,333	2.0	7,900	2.30	USD 161m
Georgia	69,700	4.6	26,900	0.59	USD 583m
Ukraine	603,700	46.3	152,000	1.33	USD 1.81bn
Bosnia and Herzegovina	51,129	4.5	10,000	4.50	USD 142m
Montenegro	14,026	0.7	1,600	2.04	EUR 40m
Serbia	77,474	8	30,000	2.50	USD 1bn

<sup>109</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, “NATO Offers Equal Alliance, Unequal Roles,” *Der Spiegel Online* (27 March 2008); available at [www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,543681,00.html](http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,543681,00.html).

<sup>110</sup> Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, *White Book 2007, Defense Policy of Ukraine* (Kiev, 2008), 110; available at [www.mil.gov.ua/files/white\\_book/white\\_book\\_en2007.pdf](http://www.mil.gov.ua/files/white_book/white_book_en2007.pdf).

<sup>111</sup> Data compiled from the respective countries’ MoD publications, and the *CIA World Fact Book*, available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>.

Similarly, the ten countries that joined NATO in 1999 and 2004 also brought relatively small military contributions to the table, in terms of strengthening NATO's operational capability.<sup>112</sup> As noted by Jiri Šedivý, "the first wave [of NATO expansion] was driven by the political ambitions of the central Europeans and the political interests of some of NATO core countries (namely the U.S. and Germany). Questions concerning future members' military capacities and capabilities were secondary."<sup>113</sup> Moreover, the previous rounds of enlargement showed that the military adaptation of new members to NATO standards was very problematic.<sup>114</sup> This led to criticism of the invitation of those countries, both because of their limited military strength and because of problems encountered in the process of modernization of their military after accession (e.g. modernization of equipment, reduction of personnel in the armed forces or low defense spending).<sup>115</sup>

The second dimension of the military contribution to the tasks of NATO is engagement in international operations. Nowadays, the Alliance is extensively involved in missions in different parts of the world, and anticipates significant engagement on the part of aspiring countries in these efforts.<sup>116</sup> NATO is presently conducting missions in Kosovo (KFOR), Afghanistan (ISAF), Iraq (NTM-I), and the Mediterranean (Active Endeavour). The priority operation for NATO is ISAF. At the same time, this mission is the most difficult in the history of the Alliance. Consequently, this is one of the reasons why NATO faces so many difficulties in generating forces for the needs of ISAF. Having said that, in the process of enlargement NATO expects that newcomers will actively engage in operational tasks. This was explicitly stated during the Riga

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<sup>112</sup> The limited contribution of new members has been criticized. See, e.g., Hendrickson, "The Miscalculation of NATO's Death," 100.

<sup>113</sup> Šedivý, "The Puzzle of NATO Enlargement," 3.

<sup>114</sup> Karl-Heinz Kamp, "NATO-Enlargement After the Riga Summit," *Analysen und Argumente aus der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung* 32 (2006): 2.

<sup>115</sup> Zoltan Barany, "NATO Expansion, Round Two: Making Matters Worse," 127–28. In 2002, Jeffrey Simon conducted a very interesting study of new NATO members (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). He observed that "the performance of the three newest member states has not been good, and this relatively poor performance has created a problem of credibility that will work to the detriment of the aspirant states." Moreover, Simon listed "seven specific areas of deficiencies within these states, including: force planning inadequacies; budgetary constraints; restructuring of military personnel; constitutional and legal system inadequacies; national security concepts, defense concepts, and military doctrines; defense planning complications; and declining public support for the military." Chris Donnelly and Jeffrey Simon, "Roadmaps to NATO Accession: Preparing for Membership," 2002.

<sup>116</sup> The operational burden of the Alliance is supported by Partner nations. As of summer 2007, thirteen of the eighteen non-NATO contributing nations (NNCNs) participating in NATO operations were PfP nations. Nine countries were contributing respectively 2,300 troops to KFOR and 780 to ISAF. Partner nations were also engaged at that time in the operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean. See Robert F. Simmons, Jr., "Ten Years of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council: A Personal Reflection," *NATO Review* (Summer 2007); available at [www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue2/english/art5.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue2/english/art5.html).



Summit in 2006. The Allies committed to increase “contributions to international peacekeeping and security operations.”<sup>117</sup> However, if one assesses the possibility of those countries to contribute to NATO operations with expeditionary forces, it is clear that they do not have much to offer. The armed forces of prospective NATO members are small (except for Ukraine), and their militaries face other major problems that require heavy investment, like defense reform. When one looks at the current engagement of nine countries in supporting NATO’s priority mission in Afghanistan, currently only three out of eight aspirant nations have contingents within ISAF. All of them constitute contributions from MAP countries, which are quite limited: there are 210 Croatian, 140 Albanian, and 120 Macedonian troops deployed within the ISAF operation.<sup>118</sup>

However, one cannot rule out the possibility that after its accession a specific state will increase its contribution to NATO-led operations.<sup>119</sup> Nonetheless, NATO’s experience shows rather that the reality is less optimistic. Paradoxically, the Alliance has less influence on the decisions of its members with regard to their operational involvement than it does in the case of aspiring countries. The latter, if they want to join NATO, always try to boost their engagement in missions to prove that they will be reliable partners within the Alliance.<sup>120</sup>

However, the examples of the nations from Eastern, Central, and South East Europe have shown that, despite their limited military and financial potential, they can be viable contributors to NATO operations. This can best be achieved through role specialization. As Missiroli notes, “The Czechs, for example, have focused on developing nuclear, biological and chemical decontamination units; the Hungarians on engineering squads; and the Romanians on mountain light infantry.”<sup>121</sup> Aspiring nations are applying the same approach. Small states from the Western Balkans are trying to develop niche capabilities. One of the examples is Albania, which hopes to create “a deployable Rapid Reaction Brigade, ... Special Operations forces, Military Police, explosive ordnance disposal experts, engineers, as well as medical support.”<sup>122</sup>

### *Support for NATO Enlargement*

There is a general recognition among the member states that NATO will continue to expand. The enlargement of the Alliance is still strongly supported by the United

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<sup>117</sup> NATO, “Riga Summit Declaration,” 2006.

<sup>118</sup> NATO, “International Security Assistance Force,” 1 April 2008; available at [www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf\\_placemat.pdf](http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf).

<sup>119</sup> A good example of this view is Poland, which boosted its engagement in the ISAF operation. Poland “has twice sent in more troops to eastern Afghanistan—first in Fall 2006 when it added 1,000 and then again in this winter with a pledge for 400 more troops and eight vital helicopters.” Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, “NATO: Enlargement and Effectiveness,” 8.

<sup>120</sup> For example, Croatia, as an aspiring country, substantially increased its contribution to the ISAF operation in Afghanistan.

<sup>121</sup> Antonio Missiroli, “Central Europe Between the EU and NATO,” 123–24.

<sup>122</sup> Sverre Myrli (rapporteur), “The Three Adriatic Aspirants,” 5.

States; in April 2007, President George W. Bush signed the “NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2007,” which reaffirms backing for continued enlargement for such nations as Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, and Ukraine.

There has been general support by other NATO members for a round of enlargement that would include the three Western Balkans countries—Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia. However, there are still difficulties in the relationship between Greece as a member state of NATO and Macedonia as an aspirant country over the name of the state of Macedonia. This disagreement brought about a decision at the Bucharest Summit that caused Greece to block the invitation of Macedonia to join NATO. However, it should be underlined that the Greek government is not opposed to the accession of Macedonia to the Alliance as such; from the Greek perspective, the only problem is the name.<sup>123</sup>

The issue over the potential membership of Ukraine and Georgia seems to be more complicated. The membership of those nations in NATO is supported especially by the U.S. and the nine new members of NATO (except for Hungary). On the other hand, there is significant opposition from such nations as Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Hungary. They are not only against the membership of Georgia and Ukraine in NATO, but are also opposed to granting them MAP status. The listed group of nations is concerned that, by enhancing relations with Georgia and Ukraine, the Alliance may cause further disputes between NATO members and Russia. The ongoing dispute over U.S. plans to deploy elements of a missile defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland exacerbates the Russia problem. Moreover, it may worsen Moscow’s already strained relations with Ukraine and Georgia (as mentioned above, Russian relations with Georgia have very recently worsened to the point of armed conflict). This group of NATO members also points to limited support within Ukrainian society for Euro-Atlantic integration. An additional fear pertains to the lack of territorial integrity of Georgia.<sup>124</sup>

Nonetheless, as mentioned above, Ukraine and Georgia can count on backing from NATO members in Eastern and Central Europe. This was apparent in the run-up to the Bucharest Summit, especially in the case of Ukraine. As one observer wrote at the time, “These nations firmly believe that Ukraine is strategically important for European security, and a MAP would promote needed military reform and accelerate European integration. Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Baltic States argue that a negative response to Ukraine’s ambitions would reverse NATO’s ‘open door’ policy for new members.”<sup>125</sup> To show its support, in March 2008 nine Eastern/Central European states and Canada sent a letter to the NATO Secretary-General expressing sup-

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<sup>123</sup> Press briefing by NATO Spokesman James Appathurai, 3 April 2008; available at [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080403e.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080403e.html).

<sup>124</sup> “Open Door to Ukraine, Georgia, Say Eastern NATO States,” *Agence France-Presse* (20 March 2008); available at <http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jdZbjHcFjlr6c0andD6wKyp408dUw>.

<sup>125</sup> Adrian J. Erlinger, “Ukraine’s NATO Dilemma,” *ISN Security Watch* (2 April 2008); available at [www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=18810](http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=18810).

port for granting Georgia and Ukraine the MAP.<sup>126</sup> In the view of those nations, such move would increase stability and security on the continent.<sup>127</sup>

### *The Russian Factor*

Russia does not feel comfortable with the process of enlargement.<sup>128</sup> It has opposed every round so far and is still trying to influence decisions in this regard. The Alliance has been for a long time, starting with the first round of expansion after the end of Cold War, moving towards the borders of the Russian Federation. Earlier, during the preparation to the rounds of enlargement in 1999 and 2004, the question was very broadly discussed with the Russian Federation.

At present, the question of NATO enlargement still constitutes a major point of disagreement between the Russian Federation and the Western countries. In addition, there are other issues that complicate relations between the Kremlin and the West. The two primary points of friction are the recognition of the independence of Kosovo by a majority of NATO members, and U.S. plans to deploy missile defense facilities on the territory of the Czech Republic and Poland.

Moscow is not opposed to NATO's expansion to the Western Balkans. But expansion to its two neighbors, Georgia and Ukraine, represents a different matter entirely. The Russian Federation is still opposed to "any further eastward expansion of NATO, particularly into Georgia," and consequently has expressed its objection with regard to the admission of those two states to NATO, even with regard to the possibility of MAP status.<sup>129</sup> The Russian Federation perceives such an expansion of NATO's reach to its borders as a threat to its security. During the Munich Conference on Security Policy in February 2007, President Vladimir Putin said that "NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernization of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe."<sup>130</sup> Since then, the Russian President has continued with statements opposing NATO enlargement. In February 2008, he stated "Moscow would regrettably be forced

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<sup>126</sup> Those nine nations were Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania. The only one from this region that did not sign the letter was Hungary, due to that state's close relations with the Russian Federation (e.g., Hungary recently "signed a draft agreement to join Gazprom's South Stream project in late February"). *Ibid.*

<sup>127</sup> See "10 NATO Countries Back Georgian, Ukrainian Aspirations for Alliance Entry," *Voice of America News* (20 March 2008); available at [www.voanews.com/english/2008-03-20-voa56.cfm](http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-03-20-voa56.cfm).

<sup>128</sup> In the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (2000) NATO's eastward expansion was defined as one of the fundamental threats (NSC 2000, 4-5).

<sup>129</sup> Peter Finn, "Putin Names Nationalist to NATO," *Washington Post* (11 January 2008): A13.

<sup>130</sup> Vladimir Putin, Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2 October 2007; available at [www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?sprache=en&id=179](http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?sprache=en&id=179).

to redirect its missiles at its post-Soviet neighbor, if Ukraine went ahead with its plan to join NATO and allowed U.S. infrastructure on its territory.”<sup>131</sup>

Furthermore, in January 2008 President Putin appointed Dmitry Rogozin, “a prominent nationalist and political gadfly” who “has harshly criticized NATO and U.S. policies, including the alliance’s eastward expansion,” as Russia’s new permanent representative to NATO.<sup>132</sup> The decision was a signal of Russia’s determination to stop the process of enlargement. Rogozin himself has expressed his opposition to NATO expansion; in advance of the Bucharest Summit, he stated “Russia ‘will not move a millimeter’ on the question of opening up for Ukraine and Georgia the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to join NATO.”<sup>133</sup>

The Russian Federation tries to influence the decision-making process within NATO by “using special relations with individual member countries to frustrate collective decisions.”<sup>134</sup> During the Bucharest Summit, Russia succeeded in applying this tactic. The Allies did not invite Georgia and Ukraine to begin the MAP process, thanks to strong opposition from France and Germany in particular, who feared the damage that a decision in favor of Georgia and Ukraine would have done to their respective bilateral relations with the Russian Federation. Shortly after the Bucharest Summit, German Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier stated, “Russia deserved some compensation at the expense of Ukraine and Georgia, in return for Moscow’s presumed ‘loss’ in Kosovo.”<sup>135</sup> Additionally, France’s foreign minister “suggested that NATO must ‘take into account Russia’s sensitivity and the important role it plays’ when expanding the alliance.”<sup>136</sup>

NATO itself needs support from the Russian Federation to carry out its tasks. The West needs “Russian cooperation on Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iran, missile defense, arms control, and energy supplies,” according to Charles Kupchan.<sup>137</sup> This reliance was also reflected during the Bucharest Summit, which saw NATO and Russia sign “a land transit pact allowing the Alliance to deliver non-lethal supplies to troops in Afghanistan

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<sup>131</sup> Luke Harding, “Putin Issues Nuclear Threat to Ukraine over Plan to Host US Shield,” *The Guardian* (U.K.) (13 February 2008); available at [www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/13/russia.putin](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/13/russia.putin).

<sup>132</sup> Finn, “Putin Names Nationalist to NATO.”

<sup>133</sup> “Russia’s Envoy to NATO Slams Ukraine’s Membership Bid,” *Red Orbit* (1 April 2008), originally published by Ekho Moskvyy radio station (in Russian); available at [www.redorbit.com/news/general/1321313/russias\\_envoy\\_to\\_nato\\_slams\\_ukraines\\_members\\_hip\\_bid/index.html?source=r\\_general](http://www.redorbit.com/news/general/1321313/russias_envoy_to_nato_slams_ukraines_members_hip_bid/index.html?source=r_general).

<sup>134</sup> A prime example of this tactic was a situation near the time of the Bucharest Summit when “Russian President Vladimir Putin telephoned French President Nicolas Sarkozy to say, ‘I don’t have a veto, but I have an opinion’ on the Ukraine and Georgia decisions.” Vladimir Socor, “The Pro-MAP Faction Succeeds at NATO Summit,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor* (8 April 2008); available at [www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article\\_id=2372952](http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372952).

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>136</sup> Erlinger, “Ukraine’s NATO Dilemma.”

<sup>137</sup> Charles Kupchan, “NATO Divided,” *International Herald Tribune* (9 April 2008); available at [www.iht.com/articles/2008/04/09/opinion/edkupchan.php](http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/04/09/opinion/edkupchan.php).

across Russian territory, but it did not cover troop transport or air transit arrangements as initially sought by NATO.”<sup>138</sup>

Despite the view of the Russian Federation, Moscow does not hold a veto within the Alliance, a fact that has been emphasized by both member states and NATO officials.<sup>139</sup> NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer constantly repeats the mantra that “the enlargement of NATO’s membership is not directed against any country [and] ... that no country which is not a member of NATO has a veto or ‘*droit de regard*’ over NATO enlargement decisions.”<sup>140</sup> This statement underscores the message that NATO members will always be the ones to make final decisions on enlargement, and that the Russian Federation cannot have a decisive influence on this process.

### *Decision-making Process*

Decisions in NATO are made by unanimous agreement by all member states. The consensus rule reflects NATO’s character as “an alliance of independent and sovereign countries rather than a supranational body. The rule also exemplifies for many the ‘one for all, all for one’ ethos of the organization’s collective defense commitment.”<sup>141</sup> The question of the decision-making process has always been taken into account when discussing potential invitations to the organization.<sup>142</sup> However, it seems that the admission of new members will not significantly complicate the decision-making process.

As Karl-Heinz Kamp argues,

the enlargement opponents’ fear that admitting new members would complicate the decision-making process within the Alliance and thus cripple the ability of NATO to act decisively proved to be unfounded. The Alliance reached its most difficult decision to date—air strikes against Belgrade as part of the response to the Kosovo crisis—despite the fact that three countries (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) had joined the Alliance just days earlier. Problems in reaching consensus in the years since then have primarily arisen from the ‘old’ NATO member states, and only rarely from the new ones.<sup>143</sup>

In practice, the strongest influence on shaping decisions within NATO has been the prerogative of the largest countries—in terms of wealth, military strength, and population. There is no doubt that the difference in impact upon decisions of the Alliance

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<sup>138</sup> Oleg Shchedrov and Mark John, “Putin Tells NATO to ‘Be friends’,” *International Herald Tribune* (4 April 2008); available at [www.ihf.com/articles/reuters/2008/04/04/europe/OUKWD-UK-NATO.php](http://www.ihf.com/articles/reuters/2008/04/04/europe/OUKWD-UK-NATO.php).

<sup>139</sup> See, e.g., Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, “NATO: Enlargement and Effectiveness,” 11.

<sup>140</sup> Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Speech at Tbilisi State University, Tbilisi, Georgia, 4 October 2007; available at [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s071004a.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s071004a.html).

<sup>141</sup> Michel, “NATO Decisionmaking: How the ‘Consensus Rule’ Works,” 3.

<sup>142</sup> The question of the effectiveness of the decision-making process in NATO after the next possible round of enlargement, however, does not stimulate nearly as vivid a discussion as it does in the case of the EU.

<sup>143</sup> Kamp, “NATO-Enlargement After the Riga Summit,” 2.

between small countries (Luxembourg or Estonia) and the leaders of the organization (the U.S., the U.K., Germany, or France) is extremely wide. Thus, in case of a stalemate, these dominant states are able to prevail over other members of NATO.

It seems that the accession of new nations will not significantly complicate the decision-making processes within the Alliance, and will not undermine their coherence. New members will adapt to NATO's cooperative approach, or they will likely not reach full membership status. Additionally, the capacities of prospective members to challenge decisions made by the largest member states are limited.

## Conclusion

There is no doubt that the process of NATO enlargement has been a success. It has helped to strengthen security and stability in the entire Euro-Atlantic area. Moreover, as NATO officials often emphasize, the process of expansion has helped to reinforce liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and shared values throughout Europe and beyond.<sup>144</sup>

These concepts highlight the character of NATO enlargement nowadays. It is aimed largely at expanding a community of like-minded countries that is willing to pool their military capacities to guarantee their security. Moreover, since the security environment has changed since the end of the Cold War, and the threat of Soviet aggression disappeared (at least for the most part), NATO's expansion is not being directed against any nation. Rather, the rationale for enlargement is to build a security community in the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore, expansion of NATO can be seen as a political process, instead of a military project.

The process of NATO enlargement will certainly continue. The last Bucharest Summit showed that there will be two additional member states soon (Albania and Croatia), and there are other nations from the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, and the South Caucasus waiting in line. It seems to be unavoidable that the Alliance will soon be an institution comprising over thirty nations from Europe and North America. One can expect that the next decisions on enlargement will be made during the upcoming NATO Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl in April 2009. However, these decisions will be confined to Macedonia. The greater challenge confronting NATO is how to deal with the two most difficult cases of Georgia and Ukraine. These states currently are seeking to join the MAP process, but their ultimate goal is obviously membership in NATO. Further down the road, the Alliance will have to decide if it is really interested in beginning the debate on possible expansion to new regions in order to embrace a few select contact countries, such as Australia and South Korea. From discussion presented above in this article, one can draw several specific conclusions. They are briefly outlined in the sections below.

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<sup>144</sup> Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Opening Remarks at the North Atlantic Council Summit Meeting, 3 April 2008; available at [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080403b.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080403b.html).

### *Continuation of Enlargement*

The basic conclusion to be drawn—significant, if obvious—is that NATO will continue enlarging. The Alliance will follow the logic of expansion that began in the 1990s, and which has been embodied by two waves of enlargement to the nations of Eastern and Central Europe and the Balkans in 1999 and 2004. Therefore, the rhetorical question posed almost fifteen years ago by U.S. President Bill Clinton, and nowadays asked by Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, remains valid: not the question of “if”, but only of “when.”<sup>145</sup>

One can expect that NATO will grow in the future to a size of over thirty member states. It is quite difficult to precisely predict how many members there will be definitively, but it is expected that there will be twenty-eight nations (including Albania and Croatia) in NATO in 2009. Subsequently, the Alliance will invite other countries from the Western Balkans: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Georgia and Ukraine will continue to be problematic cases. It seems that those countries will become members of the organization, although their path to membership may be quite bumpy and long.

Kosovo will probably be admitted to the Alliance as well. However, in this case it is an absolute requirement that the internal security situation is stabilized and the state functions well. Last but not least, there is also the question of Serbia. NATO showed its interest in significantly enhancing cooperation with that country. In this case, however, everything depends on the climate of Serbian society and the political establishment itself. They will have to decide on the future of their country’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.

### *Enlargement Directed by Political Reasons*

The accession of additional countries to NATO can be perceived as a continuation of the political process of strengthening stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area, as well as the consolidation of democracy and community based on shared values. Therefore, the driving force behind NATO expansion is still predominantly political. This is something of a paradox, because enlargement of alliances is generally directed at strengthening their military potential. However, this anomaly results from the changed security environment after the end of the Cold War and NATO’s adaptation to conduct diverse tasks, such as conducting stabilization operations.

The question of common values and strengthening the community of like-minded states constitutes the basis of the debate on NATO enlargement. As stated by former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in 2004, “For most of its existence, NATO has been concerned mainly with the defense of common territory. NATO is now transformed, as only a league of democracies can be, into an alliance concerned mainly with

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<sup>145</sup> Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Speech at the Albanian Parliament, 6 July 2006; available at [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060706a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060706a.htm).

the defense of common values and common ideas.”<sup>146</sup> However, one has to keep in mind that the military potential and military preparedness of prospective members, which is objectively limited, will be taken into consideration during any future discussions on enlargement.

### *Formal Framework of Enlargement*

The formal framework of enlargement still rests on the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty, mainly Article 10, as well as the *Study on NATO Enlargement*. Those acts define the guidelines for prospective members of NATO.

Expansion of the Alliance will continue to be a performance-based process. Additionally, the extension of invitations to join NATO will be still a political and case-by-case decision. Nonetheless, as the experience of the two previous rounds of enlargement in 1999 and 2004 showed, NATO does not rigidly stick to those benchmarks. But it should be noted that in the cases of Albania and Croatia—the states that were invited to join the organization during the 2008 Bucharest Summit—both nations met the established standards for membership.

Through various mechanisms of the Partnership for Peace program, NATO helps aspiring nations in their process of integration within the Euro-Atlantic security community. The most important step in this process is the Membership Action Plan. This tool not only helps a nation to conduct a broad process of reforms, but also verifies if a respective country is ready to be admitted to the organization.

### *No Further “Big Bang”*

One cannot expect any further round of enlargement that will integrate a large number of nations, as was the case in 2004, when seven nations acceded to NATO. In fact, at present we are witnessing the smallest round of NATO enlargement since the end of the Cold War. The Alliance invited only two nations to join in 2008, after two larger waves of expansions which embraced three (1999) and later seven states (2004) respectively.

It seems that another so-called “big bang” is virtually impossible. The Alliance will extend an invitation to one or up to a maximum of three countries during every forthcoming round of enlargement. This is first a product of simple geography: there are a limited number of states that can be taken into account as prospective NATO members, all of which are located in the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, and the South Caucasus. The second reason for the limitation is that many of these countries face acute problems—including a lack of territorial integrity or strong public opposition—that consequently hamper the pace of integration or can even stop it cold. Subsequently, this fact brings a third reason for the likelihood that future rounds of NATO expansion will take place on a smaller scale: the limited support of the Allies for further expansion.

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<sup>146</sup> Colin L. Powell, Remarks at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Accession Lunch, Washington, D.C., 29 March 2004, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/30893.htm>.



sion, due to the challenges presented by integrating the current prospective member states.

### *Limited Military Contribution*

The military reinforcement brought to NATO after the accession of further nations will be modest at best. The military capabilities of the current aspiring countries are limited. In the future, if Ukraine is admitted to NATO, it will be the only exception to this rule, as it possesses robust armed forces with several capabilities (such as airlift) that other prospective member nations simply lack.

However, this will simply represent a continuation of the trend that started with the accession of post-communist nations in 1999 and 2004. The military capacities of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe remain relatively limited, although they are certainly more significant than those represented by the Western Balkans nations. Nonetheless, the small military contributions to be made by current prospective members may have an advantage, in that it will be less problematic to integrate the armed forces of those countries with the Alliance.

With regard to the issue of military contribution, the involvement of new nations in NATO-led operations will be particularly important. Today's data show that these states' contribution is limited in terms of the number of troops and provided capabilities, which will not change significantly over time. The main reason is the obviously limited potential of those nations. This is why they will instead try to provide niche capabilities.

It is also interesting to notice that countries that want to be admitted to NATO often boost their involvement in NATO-led operations (like Croatia) to show that they would be committed and staunch members. However, one should bear in mind that limited military capacities do not disqualify nations from membership. The most important criteria for admission to the Alliance are a nation's contribution to the overall enhanced security of the Euro-Atlantic region and its commitment to democracy and the protection of fundamental freedoms. These dual criteria also show that NATO is not a primarily military organization that is simply aimed at pooling as many as possible military capabilities. In the history of NATO, the organization has undertaken only one purely military action (in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999).

### *Historical Importance*

The enlargements of NATO that took place in 1999 and 2004 had prominent symbolic importance. At the time, NATO stressed that its expansion to the countries of the former Warsaw Pact and to states that had constituted part of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War and of collective divisions within Europe. A further round of enlargement to the Adriatic Three will not carry such symbolic weight. Nevertheless, this development will be important, because the expansion of the Alliance will contribute to the process of the consolidation of democracy and the zone of stability in the Western Balkans, which is particularly important in light of the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

In the long run, however, the accession of Georgia and Ukraine will have the greatest historic importance. In welcoming these two states, NATO would embrace countries that used to be part of the Soviet Union, and that still hold significant strategic and even psychological value for the Russian Federation.

### *Process of Democratization*

The prospect of NATO membership (alongside that of membership in the EU) is still one of the main incentives (and also levers) for transition states to conduct the far-reaching and often painful process of thoroughly reforming its state structures and civil society. These nations are simultaneously attempting to build a democratic political culture and the institutions of a market economy, as well as to normalize relations with their neighbors and address their internal problems. Democratization and modernization of state structures are some of the basic criteria for admission to the Alliance.

Additionally, it should be noted that—as the experience of the past decade shows—the leverage that the Alliance possesses is most effectively applied *before* a country joins the organization. This is why NATO presses very hard on certain nations in their reform process before they are invited to join the organization.<sup>147</sup>

### *No Other Real Option of Security Guarantees*

Although the character of NATO and its tasks have changed since the end of the Cold War, the organization remains the institution that is able to provide the most reliable security guarantees to its member states, given the far-reaching provisions of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This is a major reason why European states still seek to obtain membership in the Alliance, especially nations from unstable regions or those ones that have difficult or complex relations with their neighbors. This is a major motivation for the aspiring states from the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, and the South Caucasus.

### *Role of the United States*

The United States still plays very influential role in the Alliance, and is without any doubt a driving force behind the process of NATO enlargement; in fact, the U.S. is consistently one of the biggest proponents of extending the number of member states. Moreover, the current Bush Administration has advocated for a broad expansion of the Alliance that would embrace not only nations of the Western Balkans, but also former Soviet republics, i.e. Ukraine and Georgia. Those states constitute the two most controversial candidates for NATO membership at present.

For the U.S., the process of NATO enlargement is still aimed at strengthening stability and security in Europe. As President George W. Bush said at the last Bucharest Summit, “NATO’s door must remain open to other nations in Europe that share our

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<sup>147</sup> Ronald D. Asmus, “A Better Way to Grow NATO,” *Washington Post* (28 January 2008): A21, [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/27/AR2008012701611.html?referrer=emailarticlep](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/27/AR2008012701611.html?referrer=emailarticlep).

love for liberty.”<sup>148</sup> The U.S also places significant importance on the engagement of new members in the operational tasks of NATO, especially involvement in military operations, and support in dealing with new threats and challenges, such as terrorism or international narcotics trafficking.

### *NATO's Effectiveness*

As has been discussed above, the number of member states in the Alliance will continue to increase; at some point in the future there will be over thirty nations in NATO. This is why the Alliance takes into account the influence of enlargement on its effectiveness as it makes decisions about expansion. Enlargement will certainly influence the pace and effectiveness of NATO's decision-making process, especially if the consensus rule will still hold sway. However, it seems that the increase in the number of members will not significantly hamper the efficiency of the Alliance, nor will it undermine its cohesion. The main argument is that newcomers will try to support the implementation of NATO tasks in a constructive way. They will also attempt to prove that they deserve to be members of the Alliance, which will reinforce their constructive attitude within NATO. The only remaining question concerns how significant a role new members can actually play within the Alliance, and how much they are able to influence the collective decision-making process to pursue their own goals.

### *Role of the Russian Federation*

Russia will still attempt to influence the process of NATO enlargement, even though it is not a member of the organization and holds no veto over the decisions of the Alliance. Additionally, the Russian Federation will try to capitalize on (and at times aggravate) differences between member states for its own purposes. In the same way, Moscow will also exploit problematic issues in its bilateral relations with specific NATO members to gain certain benefits or exert international leverage, as in the recent case concerning the U.S. deployment of a missile defense system in Eastern Europe.

The Russian Federation has expressed its most vocal opposition to eastward NATO enlargement, specifically concerning Ukraine and Georgia. These nations' possible accession to NATO membership, and even steps that represent a strengthening of their cooperation with NATO, will certainly affect Western relations with the Russian Federation. Nonetheless, the final decision on admitting a particular state remains in the hands of the Alliance itself.

### *NATO's Partnership Policy*

NATO enlargement will influence the Alliance's partnership policy, particularly cooperation within the framework of the Partnership for Peace. First, the growing number of NATO members will obviously result in a decrease in the number of nations participating in the PfP. Second, the number of Partner nations that are genuinely motivated to strengthen the level of their politico-military cooperation with NATO will decline. Subsequently, the enlargement process will have an increasingly strong impact on the

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<sup>148</sup> Brunnstrom and Cornwell, "NATO Agrees Former Soviet Republics Will One Day Enter."

quality of relations between the Alliance and Partner nations. Those two effects will represent a continuation of the process that began in 1999 when the first wave of post-Cold War NATO expansion occurred.

The diminishing importance and quality of cooperation in the PfP program will encourage NATO to devote more time and means to cooperation with its partner nations in other mechanisms, such as contact countries and members of MD and ICI. This tendency will be reinforced by the fact that NATO will increasingly be engaging in operations in different and remote areas of the world. In this light, relations with the contact countries will be of particular importance, since these nations share the same values and strongly support the Alliance in its operations. The strengthening of these forms of partnership will potentially rekindle the discussion on global partnership within NATO.

The concept of the creation of a Europe whole and free, united in peace, democracy, and common values is still of crucial importance. One of the key elements of the implementation of this vision is the process of NATO enlargement. The Alliance will continue to expand in the coming years, taking on board countries that began their process of democratization in the 1990s. The process of integration with NATO in itself will continue to be valuable, and will bring greater stability and predictability on the international scene. Aspiring member countries will continue their process of politico-military transformation in order to meet the benchmarks established by NATO. From their perspective, joining the Alliance is still viewed primarily through the lens of the reliable security guarantees set forth in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, the character and tasks of NATO have evolved since the end of the Cold War, and the Alliance is currently deeply engaged in stabilization tasks as its main effort to enhance global security.

The vision of free and peaceful world has always been important for NATO, and the process of expanding the membership of the Alliance supports the implementation of this concept. In the future, members of the organization will have to address the question of the limits of enlargement. Observers will watch with great interest to see if expansion to the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, and the South Caucasus ends the chapter of NATO expansion, or if the organization will enlarge still further, perhaps even beyond the Euro-Atlantic region. In this context, there will be also a need to gauge whether enlargement strengthens the Alliance and stabilizes the Euro-Atlantic area, or if it brings about more challenges and risks. The answer to those questions will without question shape the future of NATO.



# Energy Security and NATO: Any Role for the Alliance?

*Zurab Khamashuridze* \*

## Introduction

This paper is meant to address issues related to energy security in the twenty-first century, and to identify areas where NATO could add value to the world's overall energy security environment, and in particular how it can improve the security of critical energy infrastructures. Increased demand on energy resources, driven mainly by economic growth and demographic developments in Asian countries, particularly China and India, has removed spare capacity from the energy market, which has translated into price hikes for energy resources, thus causing immense economic damage to nations that are heavily dependent on energy imports.

Energy scarcity and the inability of energy producing countries to increase exploration and extraction capacities creates additional tensions on the energy market and even causes friction between states in their efforts to secure energy resources. Aging energy infrastructures in some producer countries, combined with political instability and the increasing tendency of energy producing states to use their export potential for political leverage are additional sources of concern for European consumers.

Terrorist organizations have recognized the vulnerabilities of Western economies, and have adopted the policy of "petroterrorism," which aims to cause interruptions in energy flow and inflict economic damage on the United States and other Western nations. Threats of terrorist attacks on the energy infrastructure have become an issue of increased attention and discussion in Western societies and institutions, such as the European Union and NATO.

Concerns about energy insecurity have prompted NATO to raise the issues for discussion within the Alliance. As early as the organization's Strategic Concept of 1991, and then later in 1999, Allied nations recognized the disruption of the flow of vital natural resources as a potential threat and challenge to the organization in the coming century.

Though energy security and the security of critical energy infrastructure elements are not new topics for NATO, the Alliance has still not defined a clear role it might play in securing energy flows to its member states. However, there are certainly areas where the Alliance could add value. By patrolling the world's strategic energy choke-points, conducting monitoring and threat assessments on maritime shipping lanes, and providing training and support to domestic security services, NATO could play a significant role in securing the flow of the world's energy resources. Protecting critical energy infrastructure, providing Allied solidarity in cases of the disruption of energy flows to one of the Allied nations, and even carrying out interdiction operations are the issues NATO has to address in the immediate future.

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\* Mr. Khamashuridze is Head of the Department for Relations with International Organizations in the Office of the State Minister for Reintegration in Tbilisi, Georgia.

## Energy Security in the Twenty-first Century

The failure to agree on a new price formula for Russian gas shipped to Ukraine, and the resulting cutoff of the nation's gas supply by the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom on 1 January 2006, prompted many European experts and government representatives to think about the reliability of their own countries' energy supply. Some experts talked about a "gas crisis," and even raised the specter of a new "Cold War" era.

While the legitimacy of demanding higher prices for energy is virtually impossible to contest, what made the experts so worried were political motivations for the price increases, and the inability to resolve such disputes in the absence of viable regulatory mechanisms. Another issue these problems raised (and not for the first time) was that of single-supplier dependence in an era of rising energy nationalism. Whereas the 1 January events were hyped as the turning point in Europe's perception of its energy vulnerability, many experts failed to react to the increasingly assertive energy politics of the Russian Federation vis-à-vis its neighbors. The explosion of two main gas lines supplying Georgia with Russian gas was not met with an adequate reaction from the West.

Increasing demand for energy resources, especially in countries such as China and India, and rising prices for gas and oil have put energy supply and energy security issues once again at the top of the world's energy agenda. Recent developments showed that energy issues are assuming increasing geostrategic importance, and have become an integral part of the foreign policy of some producer countries.

European fears of energy insecurity have been made more acute by the aggressive politics of the renationalization of energy resources in producing countries such as the Russian Federation, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia, as well as by the anxieties caused by Iran's nuclear ambitions and its threats to block the flow of natural resources through the Straits of Hormuz. Debates about setting up a "Gas OPEC" and shifting deliveries from the European market to Asian consumers further increased European fears.

What is energy security? This is one of the most frequently asked questions of the last few years. Is it the uninterrupted flow of energy from one point to another? Or is it a diversified array of energy supplies, thus securing the flow if one source fails? For the purposes of this essay, energy security is taken to mean reliable access to energy in sufficient volume at affordable prices under the framework of a viable regulatory regime. This concept of energy security has also been recognized by the European Union, which set up a comprehensive system for settling disputes on matters covered by the Energy Charter Treaty. The Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2006 once again highlighted the need for a regulatory mechanism. Protection of energy infrastructure is also an integral part of energy security.

When considering energy security, one of the primary questions to be answered is whether there are enough resources to cover the growing world demand for energy. European concerns about energy security are linked to developments on the Russian energy market, the exploration and development (upstream) capacities of Central Asian

producing countries, and of course to the investment climate in energy infrastructure in Russia and the littoral states of the Caspian Sea.<sup>1</sup>

Recent estimates by the International Energy Agency provide a rather pessimistic picture of the world energy market. Total world consumption of energy is projected to increase by 57 percent by 2030.<sup>2</sup> European demand for energy resources will increase for the next twenty-five years. Gas consumption in particular is projected to increase from the current 520 billion cubic meters (bcm) a year to approximately 800 bcm in 2030.<sup>3</sup> Oil consumption will also rise dramatically, from the current rate of 16 million barrels per day (mbd) to 20 mbd in 2030. Gas consumption by European Union members will increase from the current level of 57 percent of the EU's total energy consumption to 80 percent in 2030. The Russian share of Europe's gas consumption is currently about 30 percent, and is projected to increase to 60 percent by 2030. Today Russian gas accounts for 70 percent of European gas imports (the rest comes from Algeria).

Europe's increasing dependence on Russian energy and the Kremlin's strategy of monopolization of the energy market—with Gazprom at the forefront<sup>4</sup>—is an issue of security concern in most European capitals and institutions. Concerns about dependence on a single supplier are being further aggravated by proposals to create a “Gas OPEC”—an idea floated by President Ahmadinejad of Iran, another energy-rich country, which was picked up by President Putin of Russia. The creation of a gas cartel, which would also include Central Asian producer countries such as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and other major energy producers like Algeria and Iran, would expose net importer (consumer) countries to the potential of energy being wielded as a weapon for political purposes. Though many experts since then have questioned the rationale behind the idea of setting up a “Gas Cartel,” pointing to the divergent political agendas of the possible members, several developments indicate the logic behind the prospect.

First, if a Gas Cartel were created, the dominant role would fall to Russia as the richest nation in terms of gas reserves. Russia is also the biggest gas producer and exporter in the world, which would effectively make Russia the “new Saudi Arabia of gas.”<sup>5</sup> Second, having a preferred position, the Russian gas sector would guarantee itself the greatest benefits by preventing projects that might compete with its own

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<sup>1</sup> Andreas Goldthau and Oliver Geden, “Europas Energieversorgungssicherheit—Ein Plädoyer für einen pragmatischen Ansatz,” *IPG* 4 (2007).

<sup>2</sup> International Energy Agency, *International Energy Outlook 2007*, available at [www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/](http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/).

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Enno Harks, “The Conundrum of Energy Security: Gas in Eastern and Western Europe,” *The International Spectator* 41:3 (2006).

<sup>5</sup> Vladimir Socor, “Gas Supplier's Cartel: Not an ‘OPEC,’ but a Cartel all the Same,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 4:62 (29 March 2007); available at [http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume\\_id=420&issue\\_id=4052&article\\_id=2372055](http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume_id=420&issue_id=4052&article_id=2372055).



agenda.<sup>6</sup> This is important especially when looking at recent instances where Russia has used political and economic leverage to conclude energy deals with Central Asian countries under preferred conditions, thus positioning itself as a virtual monopolist in bringing Central Asian gas and oil to the European markets.

Russian energy policy is not the only issue of concern for European consumers. They are also concerned about underinvestment in the energy infrastructure in Russia. Stagnation in the upstream sector raises many questions as well. Steadily increasing Russian domestic gas demand, which accounts for 67 percent of Russia's entire production, is also an important factor to be taken into account. Russia's annual increase in demand of 4–6 percent is mostly driven by the need to produce more electricity to support the growing economy.<sup>7</sup>

It is worth mentioning that Russian gas production has currently peaked; in fact, production in the three giant gas fields at Yamburg, Urengoy, and Medvezhye is decreasing. In the newly developed fields, gas production has already reached its maximum as well. In order to offset the gap between gas production and gas consumption, new gas fields have to be developed. Such developments are very important for meeting contractual commitments to European consumers. However, the vast majority of new gas fields are located in areas with severe arctic conditions that are very difficult to access. There are overwhelming technical challenges that are likely to translate into high exploration and production costs. According to the OCDE assessments, there is a need to invest more than USD 25 billion in exploration and production for the Yamal Peninsula and Ob-Taz Region. In addition, USD 40 billion is needed to invest in the construction of pipeline systems.<sup>8</sup>

According to a survey conducted by the United Bank of Switzerland, in order to fulfill all export commitments through 2010 and cover domestic demand—to which Gazprom is legally bound—there is a need to achieve a total projected production of 560 bcm. Additionally, the whole of Central Asia's export capacity and contribution from the independent Russian producers is necessary to meet this need.<sup>9</sup> Restrictions on the participation of independent foreign investors in exploration and production processes makes foreign companies and a few Russian independent producers reluctant to increase their extraction capacities, which poses a serious risk to energy security.

Many experts believe that issues related to energy supply and energy security are of an economic nature, and that only the markets can dictate the policies that will need to be adopted in this arena. However, it is highly unlikely that markets alone will be able to ensure the necessary level of energy security.<sup>10</sup> According to Susanne Peters, of

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<sup>6</sup> Matteo Fachinotti, "Will Russia Create a Gas Cartel?" *Russian Analytical Digest* 18 (Zürich: Centre for Security Studies, ETH Zürich), 3 April 2007.

<sup>7</sup> Daniel Simmons and Isabel Murray, "Russian Gas: Will There Be Enough Investment?" *Daily Estimate* (25 September 2007); available at [www.dailystemate.com/article.asp?id=11200](http://www.dailystemate.com/article.asp?id=11200).

<sup>8</sup> Andreas Goldthau and Oliver Geden, "Europas Energieversorgungssicherheit."

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Dr. Ariel Cohen, "Target: Energy, IAGS Energy Security," available at <http://www.iags.org/n111104c.htm>.

Kent State University's Geneva Semester Faculty, liberalized energy markets and self-regulatory policies alone cannot provide energy security by simply dictating when and to what extent to increase energy production. Peters writes:

Firstly, world energy markets are not liberalized. Rather, there is a trend toward energy-renationalization. Western oil companies only have full access to 6 percent of the world's known reserves. They can invest in an additional 11 percent of reserves through joint ventures and production sharing arrangements. But the rest of the world is closed to them. Currently 72 percent of the world's oil reserves are held by national oil companies. That is no global liberalized market.<sup>11</sup>

The latest trends show that Russian, Chinese, and other foreign, mostly state-owned/controlled energy companies do not really focus on achieving commercial profits and being cost-efficient, but are rather conducting their energy policy based on security and foreign policy considerations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, in an article submitted to the journal *Foreign Affairs* but later withdrawn, stated that: "Russia does consider energy to be a strategic sector that helps safeguard independence in its foreign relations. ... The Russian government's energy policy reflects a global trend toward state control over natural resources."<sup>12</sup>

The fact that Soviet-era pipeline systems are mostly outdated and generally in poor condition amplifies concerns about the reliability of energy deliveries to European consumers. Frequent leaks not only affect energy prices, but also pose a serious threat to the environment. In 2006, the Russian General Accounting Office estimated that 57 percent of the pipelines in Russia are already worn out. Furthermore, Russian security arrangements do not provide sufficient protection for thousands of kilometers of pipelines, not to mention hundreds of refineries and oil/gas terminals.<sup>13</sup>

Since Europe is already the second-largest energy consumer and importer of natural resources after the United States, it also relies to a great extent on the stability of world energy markets. The Middle East and Persian Gulf regions play a very important role in Europe's energy security and diversification policy. The global war on terrorism, military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and instability in Africa will also play a significant, if not decisive role in shaping European energy policy. Moreover, there is significant potential for future conflicts in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region, which could lead to shortages and interruptions of energy supplies to European and

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<sup>11</sup> Susanne Peters, "The Future Energy Security Environment: No Alternative to a Radical Shift," Kent State University, Geneva. Published in *Energy Security and Security Policy: NATO and the Role of International Security Actors in Achieving Energy Security*, ed. Phillip Cornell (Oberammergau: NATO School, November 2007).

<sup>12</sup> Sergey Lavrov, Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, "Containing Russia: Back to the Future?"; available at [www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=6373](http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=6373).

<sup>13</sup> Adrian Kendry, "NATO and Energy Security," in *Energy Security and Security Policy: NATO and the Role of International Security Actors in Achieving Energy Security*, ed. Phillip Cornell (Oberammergau: NATO School, November 2007); available at [www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?v21=106904&lng=en&ord61=alphaNavi&ord60=PublicationDate&id=56272](http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?v21=106904&lng=en&ord61=alphaNavi&ord60=PublicationDate&id=56272).

Western markets. Any interruption of energy flow would translate into increased energy prices, with dramatic consequences for national, regional, and transnational economies, especially in the era of globalization.

Only six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council control 45 percent of proven oil reserves and 15 percent of proven global gas reserves. Adding Iran and Iraq to this mix, this group's holdings account for respectively 65 percent and 35 percent of world oil and gas reserves. Based on these figures, one could easily understand the importance of the region for global energy security. OPEC's reluctance to increase oil production could also challenge the world's energy security in the future. Unlike the oil crisis of 1973, when OPEC could enforce a price rise increase for the short term, today it would be quite easy for OPEC to change the power balance in favor of producer countries. It is foreseen that in 2020 OPEC will cover more than 50 percent of Europe's oil consumption, and this number will increase as the rate of oil extraction and production in the North Sea declines. A critical look at oil reserves of Saudi Arabia gives one pause, especially in view of the fact that for the last couple of years the government of Saudi Arabia has rejected all proposals to conduct verification of its proven strategic reserves.<sup>14</sup> Some experts believe that the oil reserves in Saudi Arabia are significantly lower than officially represented.

Not only do the assertively nationalistic energy policies of producing countries, declining energy production, and poor infrastructure conditions threaten world energy security, but terrorist attacks on pipelines and refineries also pose a very serious challenge to the uninterrupted flow of energy. Gal Luft, writing in the *Washington Post*, raised the specter of an "energy Pearl Harbor" that could have had devastating effects on the world's economy if the terrorist attack on Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq oil terminal had succeeded. In his words, today's energy market looks like a car without shock absorbers: "the tiniest bump on the road could send consumers and prices bouncing off the ceiling."<sup>15</sup> Unlike the early 2000s, when some oil producers (mainly Saudi Arabia) could produce spare capacity, thus bringing the energy market into equilibrium, today it is virtually impossible to produce enough spare oil to stabilize the energy market. Increasing demand for energy recurses in the world and a near-desperate quest for any additional oil took spare capacity off the upstream sector. Whereas in the early 2000s there were about 7 mbd (10 percent of annual world consumption) of spare capacity, today it is unlikely that oil producing countries could absorb shocks caused by terrorist attacks or natural disasters. Any attack on energy infrastructure could cause price hikes in oil and gas and leave hundreds of thousands of people jobless. As Neal Adams put it at the Energy Symposium organized by the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security and Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, "Oil is an effective weapon. The weapon is a sudden disruption in oil supply. This immediately translates into a shock of the global energy economy."<sup>16</sup> The attempted attack on the world's biggest oil refin-

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<sup>14</sup> André Salem, "Wundersame Ölvermehrung," *Internationale Politik* 62:2 (February 2006).

<sup>15</sup> Gal Luft, "An Energy Pearl Harbor?" *The Washington Post* (5 March 2006).

<sup>16</sup> Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, "Target: Energy, IAGS Energy Security"; available at [www.iags.org/n111104c.htm](http://www.iags.org/n111104c.htm).

ery Abqaiq was not the only terrorist act aimed at collapsing the world's energy supply. In 2002 Saudi security services arrested a group of terrorists targeting the world's largest offshore oil facility, Ras Tanura.

The potentially devastating effects caused by the possible interruption of energy flows therefore put energy infrastructure in the crosshairs of terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. According to information provided by the European Commission's Global Monitoring for Environment and Security Program (GMES), in recent years terrorist attacks on energy infrastructure, particularly oil stations, have increased significantly and have taken on a global character. Attempts by terrorist groups to interrupt the flow of energy resources have taken place in Algeria, Columbia, Ecuador, the Philippines, Russia, Pakistan, Iraq, and Turkey. In the period from 2003 to 2006, more than 300 incidents and attacks were registered. The numbers demonstrated by the GMES, however, do not provide a complete picture of the problem.

Terrorist organizations have put "energy jihad" at the top of their political agenda. They pursue a policy of bleeding Western countries and the United States to bankruptcy by targeting critical energy infrastructure.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, their tactics and methods aim at having broad media coverage when explosions and trails of flames on oil fields are immediately broadcast, thus causing panic on the energy markets.

Al Qaeda has adopted a policy of "petroterrorism" aimed at causing interruptions in energy flows and inflicting economic damage on the West. Iraq, for example, is used as a training ground for terrorists in attacking energy infrastructure. Taking Iraq as an example, one can calculate that attacks against energy infrastructure carried out by terrorists remove approximately one million barrels per day from the global energy supply. Many experts claim that if this capacity were in the energy market, it would have had a direct impact on oil prices reducing it by USD 10 to 15 per barrel.

A "Map of Future Al-Qaeda Operations" posted on the Internet on 12 February 2005 listed the organization's priorities. Among others was listed: "targeting the American points of interest in all the countries, mainly oil facilities in the Persian Gulf that represent the main artery of the American economy. Cause harm to the American economy as a result of the rise in the price of oil, cause an embarrassment to America before all the countries in the world, which will be certain of America's inability to provide oil supply contrary to what it claims...."<sup>18</sup>

Nigeria, the country with the largest oil and gas reserves in Africa, is yet another unstable region Western consumers are dependent on. The country supplies 19 percent of European crude oil consumption, and 42 percent of the country's crude oil exports are shipped to the U.S. In the Niger Delta region, local armed groups competing for a bigger share of oil revenues are fighting against each other using subversive tactics and

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<sup>17</sup> Pavel K. Baev, "Reevaluating the Risks of Terrorist Attacks Against Energy Infrastructure in Eurasia," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 4:2 (2006); published by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, and available at [www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/May\\_2006/Baev.pdf](http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/May_2006/Baev.pdf).

<sup>18</sup> Al Qalah website, "Map of Future Al-Qaeda Operations"; available at <http://www.mail-archive.com/osint@yahooogroups.com/msg04935.html>.

targeting pipeline infrastructure, refineries, and foreign oil workers. Militant groups attacking oil stations in 2006 forced Royal Dutch Shell to shut down four oil facilities in Nigeria. The bomb attack on the pipeline took 106,000 barrels a day—about 10 percent of Shell’s total production in Nigeria—off the market, and raised fears that international companies would withdraw from doing business in the country.<sup>19</sup>

Turmoil caused by disputed presidential elections in Nigeria in 2007 left three pipelines blown up, several supply vessels attacked, and many oil workers kidnapped by militant groups. The unstable political and security situation in the Niger Delta forced Chevron to evacuate its personnel, and militants captured some staff members of the Italian oil company Agip.<sup>20</sup> As a result of the unrest, about 20 percent of the country’s export capacities were taken off the energy market.

The most recent incidents that occurred earlier this year involving three U.S. warships and five Iranian fast boats once again demonstrated the fragility and vulnerability of world’s energy security. U.S. Navy ships were conducting routine patrols in the Straits of Hormuz when they encountered Iranian boats threatening to inflict damage on them. With about 30 percent of the world’s oil supply passing through it, the Straits of Hormuz is one of the world’s most critical strategic chokepoints. In 2006, some 17 bbd passed through the straits, supplying the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and other Asian states with oil from Persian Gulf nations, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE.<sup>21</sup>

With 3 km-wide inbound and outbound lanes, if the Strait is blocked, only a small amount of oil can be diverted to alternate routes, thus taking millions of barrels per day off the global energy market. According to the International Energy Agency about 17 mbd, or 21 percent of the world’s total oil supply, crossed through this route in 2006.<sup>22</sup> It is projected that oil flow through the Straits of Hormuz will grow from 17 mbd today to 32 mbd in 2030—that is, about 28 percent of world’s oil and 4 percent of its gas supply could be delivered to consumers in the U.S., Western Europe, and Asia through the strait by 2030. In 2007, about 176 mbd, or 11 percent of Japan’s oil imports, came from Iran via the Straits of Hormuz. Oil imports from countries of the Persian Gulf accounted for 90 percent of Japan’s total imports in 2006.

China is another major consumer of energy resources from the Persian Gulf, with Iran becoming a major supplier of natural resources for both China and India. In 2005 more than 16 percent of Chinese oil imports came from Iran. This trend is projected to grow dramatically, as China is currently experiencing steady and robust economic growth. Iran’s share in China’s imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) is also expected

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<sup>19</sup> Simon Freeman, “Shell Quits Nigeria Oil Stations as Violence Flares,” *TimesOnline* (London) (16 January 2006).

<sup>20</sup> Jad Mouawad, “Renewed Violence in Nigeria Strains Oil Production,” *International Herald Tribune* (14 May 2007).

<sup>21</sup> Energy Information Administration, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” available at [www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World\\_Oil\\_Transit\\_Chokepoints/Background.html](http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Background.html).

<sup>22</sup> International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2005*; available at [www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/weo2005.pdf](http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/weo2005.pdf).

to grow significantly, while the Middle Eastern share of China's overall oil imports is expected to grow from the current 60 percent of total imports to 75 percent by 2015.

Considering the immense significance of Middle Eastern natural resources for Chinese energy security, and hence for its economic growth, it is likely that in the future China will be competing with the United States over the issue of controlling the Straits of Hormuz. China has been concerned for some time about the strong U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf. Many analysts believe that Beijing's ambitious policy of naval build-up is driven by the need to secure sea routes for energy supplies. Some experts predict that in the future frictions and incidents in the Persian Gulf region involving the U.S. and Chinese navies are unavoidable.

The European Union as the world's largest energy market is heavily dependent on imports of natural resources from politically unstable regions. It has been observing the trends developing in the world's energy security sector with growing concern. Today, the group of nations represented by members of the EU is already the world's largest energy importer. A Green Paper on European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive, and Secure Energy (2006) was developed in order to take measures to reduce dependence on energy from unstable regions by promoting more transparency, competitiveness, and diversity. It also states that there is an urgent need for investment in order to avoid energy shortfalls caused by ageing infrastructure.<sup>23</sup> It estimates that a EUR one trillion investment in the energy infrastructure will be necessary over the next twenty years in order to meet projected energy demands.

Already today it is predicted that the EU's dependence on imported oil and gas from unstable regions will rise from the current level of 50 percent of total energy imports to 70 percent over the next twenty to thirty years. In the next twenty-five years, the EU's gas imports, mainly from three countries—the Russian Federation, Norway, and Algeria—will increase from today's level of 35 percent of total energy imports to 80 percent. It is also worth mentioning that fossil fuel sources like oil and gas will account for 90 percent of the world's growing energy demand.

The EU's green paper suggests developing fully competitive internal energy markets which, when created, would ensure the security of energy flows and lower prices. A competitive, transparent, and secure European energy market is being considered as a basic pillar of Europeans' daily lives.<sup>24</sup> Abandoning protectionism and promoting open markets that guarantee foreign private companies access to the European energy market could improve energy security and promote competitiveness. However, practice does not always conform to theory. In many European countries energy policy still falls under the domain of national security and foreign policy. In other countries, however, oil and gas are seen as purely economic goods, and not strategic ones. Hence, they are left to market regulatory rules.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Commission of the European Community, *Green Paper on European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy* (December 2006); available at [http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green-paper-energy/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green-paper-energy/index_en.htm).

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Frank Umbach, "Europe's Next Cold War," *Internationale Politik* 62:2 (February 2006).

The European green paper on energy security pays significant attention to the security of supply, in cases where threats posed by political instability, natural disasters, and terrorist attacks could lead to the collapse of Western economic systems. Increased investments in security measures by private companies, intelligence sharing and analytical assessments, as well as cooperation between governments and industry in information sharing could represent a step forward. The paper also suggests creating a mechanism to provide rapid solidarity and assistance in case one country or a group of countries is affected by energy shortfalls. It also recommends taking steps toward standardizing measures that ensure infrastructure protection.<sup>26</sup>

As part of a coherent external energy policy, the green paper envisions a clear policy on energy diversification and energy security. According to the paper this is to be guaranteed by upgrading existing and building new energy infrastructure, including oil and gas pipelines as well as liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals.<sup>27</sup> Independent gas supplies should come from the Caspian Region, the Middle East and North Africa, and cross through Georgia, Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria.<sup>28</sup> The EU demonstrates its readiness to support the private sector in realizing such projects by concrete political, financial, and regulatory measures. The new EU-Africa Strategy that is aimed at interconnecting the energy systems of the two continents was granted priority status, and is seen as a possibility to support Europe's diversification policy.<sup>29</sup>

Dialogue with the major energy suppliers of the EU, such as OPEC, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and Russia (Europe's single largest supplier) is the declared aim of the paper.<sup>30</sup> The EU seeks to establish a partnership with Russia where both parties are equal, and that is based on predictability and security. Such a partnership could be conducive to long-term broad investments, and hence increase capacities both in upstream and downstream production. The paper once again underlines the need to intensify efforts leading to subsequent ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and the appropriate Transit Protocol by the Russian Federation that guarantees non-discriminatory access for the EU and third countries to the Russian pipeline system.

As described above, growing energy demand and consumption in the world, mainly driven by economic growth and demographic developments in the world's most populous countries such as China and India, along with rising energy prices, political instability in oil and gas rich countries, international terrorism, and attacks on energy infrastructure pose serious threats to the world's energy security. Declines in energy production and stagnation in exploration and extraction sectors and the inability of producers to provide spare capacity further aggravates the already tense situation on the global energy market. High competition between states for securing long-term energy contracts will in the future be the main source of friction, as recent developments in the

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<sup>26</sup> Commission of the European Communities, *Green Paper on European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy*.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

East China Sea demonstrate. Energy scarcity and decreasing extraction capacities due to a lack of modern technologies in producer countries could further boost energy prices.

The “nervous system” of the global energy distribution network and the oil tankers passing the strategic energy chokepoints such as the Straits of Hormuz, the Straits of Malacca, and Bab el Mandab will continue to remain the main targets of terrorist organizations aiming to destabilize energy markets and thus cause the collapse of the world’s economy. Single nation-states, having limited capabilities to prevent such attacks, will not be able to cope with these tasks alone. Joint efforts and an institutionalized approach are needed to address the challenges threatening energy security in the twenty-first century. In today’s world, where energy markets have ceased to be regional, and are now global in nature, security does not mean providing protection to a certain single energy infrastructure anymore. Energy security has become an issue of common responsibility and concern. Not only does the physical security of infrastructure need to be guaranteed; the strengthening of institutional capacities could also play a vital role. Promoting energy efficiency, pursuing diversification policies, and creating a favorable investment climate in the countries producing energy would all be steps toward providing more security. Market liberalization, transparency, competitiveness, and ensuring foreign private energy companies access to domestic energy markets would bring benefits to consumers and producers equally.

## **NATO and Energy Security**

As seen above, energy security has become an issue of immense importance to the United States and its European allies. Although there is a general perception in many European countries that market regulatory rules alone would be sufficient to ensure the security of energy supplies, concerns about energy insecurity have prompted NATO to discuss the issue within the Alliance. Energy security is not a new concern for NATO and its member states. Since NATO’s inception, ensuring the uninterrupted flow of energy resources has been a priority for the Alliance, as it has always been directly linked to the organization’s operability and the security of its member states. For the Alliance, energy security has always meant first and foremost ensuring a steady supply of fuel to its military forces. Separate and distinct military storage and distribution systems were set up, and are an integral part of the NATO pipeline system.

The Alliance has regularly dealt with this issue in different fora and formats. NATO’s Strategic Concept from 1991, and then later the Strategic Concept from 1999 identify the disruption of flows of vital resources as a security challenge and risk to the Alliance: “Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources.”<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> NATO’s Strategic Concept, adopted on 23–24 April 1999; available at [www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm).



There are also references to energy supplies in the Comprehensive Political Guidance that provides the framework and political direction for NATO's continuing transformation over the next ten to fifteen years. Aside from these official mentions, discussion on this topic takes place within the Alliance, and NATO member states support workshops and forums addressing this issue. Several workshops held in several capitals such as London, Prague, and others discussed potential threats to energy infrastructure and the free flow of energy. Additionally, NATO ships regularly conduct preparatory route surveys at chokepoints throughout the Mediterranean. Scientists from NATO and partner countries work together to address issues relating to energy security and identify possible roles for the Alliance. NATO also maintains close relationships with private energy companies, such as Royal Dutch Shell, BP, E.On, and Ruhrgas.

Though energy issues had been discussed in different formats, before NATO's Riga Summit, energy and energy security were never a consistent part of NATO's policy statements, and the Alliance had never before developed a systematic approach to these issues. In the Riga Summit declaration, NATO for the first time in its history put energy security on its political agenda, and paved the way for internal debates in order to determine what NATO's role should be and where it can add value to the world's overall energy security:

As underscored in NATO's Strategic Concept, Alliance security interests can also be affected by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. We support a coordinated, international effort to assess risks to energy infrastructures and to promote energy infrastructure security. With this in mind, we direct the Council in Permanent Session to consult on the most immediate risks in the field of energy security, in order to define those areas where NATO may add value to safeguard the security interests of the Allies and, upon request, assist national and international efforts.<sup>32</sup>

The Riga Summit Communiqué once again underscored the Alliance's increasing interest in securing energy flows and protecting energy infrastructure. International terrorism—primarily through threats posed by terrorist attacks on oil tankers, prime shipping lanes, and strategic chokepoints—as well as instability in the Middle East region and natural disasters highlight the need for a systematic approach to the issue.

Though there is no direct mandate for NATO to deal with energy security issues, in the contemporary debates in the capitals of member states many experts and government representatives are focusing on the task of setting up a system of collective energy security and energy solidarity. In 2006 the Polish government developed an idea of creating an "Energy NATO," under the rubric of which the European Union and NATO states would provide mutual support in energy matters, in any form, but without the use of force. Though some EU governments believe that NATO's attempts to play a role in energy security could be premature at this stage, it is commonly accepted that there certainly are some fields where NATO could add value to overall energy security. There should be a multifaceted approach to the question of NATO's potential role

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<sup>32</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Riga Summit Declaration," Riga, Latvia, 9 November 2006; available at [www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm).

in energy security. It could range from initiating political dialogue with all partners and stakeholders involved, monitoring and assessment of energy security and threats, to intelligence sharing and direct involvement in protecting critical energy infrastructure.

Since NATO has already developed formats such as the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and the Mediterranean Dialogue, where it already closely cooperates with partner countries, including the world's leading oil suppliers, using these frameworks for consultation on energy issues would make an important contribution to contemporary debates related to energy security. Conducting joint exercises, civil emergency rescue missions, and providing training to the representatives of these countries would be an additional step in this direction. However, many experts believe that NATO's involvement in energy security issues could be misinterpreted in some countries as NATO forging an energy alliance against them. Opponents of the Alliance's involvement in energy issues believe that the liberalization of European energy markets, further integration of national energy grids, and the diversification policies of European nations lie beyond the organization's aims and mandate. They also believe that the "militarization" of issues that are of a completely economic nature will have negative effects, and could create tensions with producer countries, especially Russia.

In order to define the areas where NATO could add value, we have to identify fields of critical importance for NATO and its member states. Another aspect would be to determine whether NATO has the capabilities to address threats that have already been identified, and whether consensus could be reached on the Alliance's involvement in protecting energy infrastructure and ensuring energy security. It is commonly recognized that securing its own domestic energy needs is each nation's responsibility; however, a political assessment has to be done to identify to what extent the energy vulnerability of a particular Allied nation could be translated into a broader concern for the Alliance as a whole. Dr. Cezary Lusinski, Director of the Department of International Security Policy in the Polish Defense Ministry, suggests providing Allied solidarity in case one member state were exposed to energy imbalances and vulnerabilities. In his words, "nurturing solidarity would be the best response to the endangerment of interests of an Allied nation. We can see the value of such solidarity in response to non-conventional threats in such examples as the recent cyber-attack on Estonia."<sup>33</sup>

Andrew Monaghan, from the Research Department of the NATO Defense College, in a speech on 20 July 2007 at the NATO School in Oberammergau, outlined the benefits of NATO's involvement in energy security. First, it explicitly involves the U.S. and Turkey, which are Europe's major energy partners. Turkey's involvement provides additional value, as the country is setting itself up as the "fourth major energy artery to

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<sup>33</sup> Dr. Cezary Lusinski, Director, Department of International Security Policy, Polish Ministry of Defense, "Energy Security: Any Role for NATO?" in *Energy Security and Security Policy: NATO and the Role of International Security Actors in Achieving Energy Security*, ed. Phillip Cornell (Oberammergau: NATO School, November 2007).

Europe.”<sup>34</sup> Second, uninterrupted energy flows are directly linked to the Alliance’s capabilities to carry out its missions and operations. The success of NATO’s military operations are very much dependent on large quantities of secure fuel.<sup>35</sup> Having different partnership formats with many countries, NATO is the best avenue to discuss issues related to energy security and the security of energy infrastructure. NATO conducts dialogue with Russia within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council; within the framework of the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), the Alliance maintains partnerships with relevant energy producers and transit countries. Central Asian and Persian Gulf countries also have dialogue with NATO in different formats and enjoy specific partnerships with the Alliance.

Given NATO’s direct interest in ensuring a secure flow of energy resources and in minimizing the threats posed to its member states, a threat-based approach to the issue has been developed by NATO experts, and some “niche areas” have been identified where NATO can add value to international efforts to improve energy security. Monitoring and assessing the energy security situation is the field where, according to Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning at NATO, the Alliance can play the most meaningful role. He suggests setting up a permanent monitoring and assessment mechanisms to closely monitor developments related to energy security. Such cooperation should be implemented in close consultation with NATO members and partner countries. Joint international military staffs should prepare analysis and intelligence reports that would be provided to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) for further decisions and actions. Cooperation with other international institutions such as the European Union and the International Energy Agency and the involvement of major oil companies will certainly play an important role as well.<sup>36</sup> NATO and the EU are already involved in close cooperation in the Science and Technology (S&T) programs for energy infrastructure security. Discussions and activities within these programs directly address the issues related to energy and infrastructure security.

Jamie Shea also recommends that the North Atlantic Council (NAC) establish an Energy Security and Intelligence Analysis Cell. A similar cell already exists that deals with issues related to international terrorism. Intelligence could be gathered by member states and partner countries, and a mechanism for intelligence sharing on energy security could be developed in close consultation with all parties involved. NATO could play a significant role in assessing threats posed to key elements of the global energy infrastructure based on the intelligence provided by the partner countries.

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<sup>34</sup> Andrew Monaghan, Research Department, NATO Defense College, “The Euro-Atlantic Area, Russia and Energy Interdependence,” paper presented at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, on 20 July 2007. Published in *Energy Security and Security Policy: NATO and the Role of International Security Actors in Achieving Energy Security*, ed. Phillip Cornell (Oberammergau: NATO School, November 2007).

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Jamie Shea, “Energy Security: NATO’s Potential Role,” *NATO Review* (Autumn 2006); available at [www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue3/english/special1.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue3/english/special1.html).

NATO could also add value to the monitoring of important maritime shipping lanes and the world's strategic energy chokepoints. These are areas of significant importance not only to NATO and its member states, but to partner countries as well. NATO's capabilities in monitoring and assessing the threats—threats that are often too large or diffuse for individual states to cope with on their own—would be very important for ensuring the secure transfer of vital resources through the places that are vulnerable to disruption and attack by terrorists.

Africa is the region where both organizations—NATO and the European Union—could most productively combine their efforts. For the last couple of years Africa has become a high priority issue for Europe. The development of an EU-Africa Partnership on Infrastructure and plans to develop an Africa-Europe Energy Partnership underline the importance of the region to the EU. On the other hand, NATO is also very much interested in developing close partnerships in Africa. For example, NATO has provided support to African Union (AU) operations in Darfur. Given Africa's rich energy resources and the threats posed to the energy infrastructure there, it should be in the interests of NATO and the EU to bolster cooperation in the region on issues related to energy security.

Many Allied nations are very much involved in developing policies for protecting what they call critical energy infrastructure. This is of the utmost importance, since terrorist attacks and damage to the energy infrastructure would have severe negative effects, not only for the world's energy market but for each individual national economy as well. In various cases, Allied nations cooperate with producer and transit countries bilaterally, offering recommendations and training for security personnel assigned to energy infrastructure. Joint groups of experts conduct surveys and assessments of energy facilities and infrastructure and compile reports identifying gaps and the most vulnerable sectors of the energy infrastructure. Some Allied nations have a very positive track record in this field, and if their efforts were combined under a NATO umbrella, other small member states could benefit from it.

NATO could use its maritime surveillance capabilities for patrolling and, in cases of necessity, defending energy infrastructure critical to the organization and its member states. As an immediate response to the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, NATO started Operation Active Endeavor, in which NATO ships patrol the Mediterranean, monitoring shipping and providing escorts to non-military vessels through the Straits of Gibraltar to help detect, deter, and protect against terrorist activity. The same model could be applied to the missions aimed at protecting energy infrastructure and oil tankers passing through maritime shipping lanes. Such missions could also have a deterrent effect, sending clear signals to terrorists that the Alliance is willing to ensure an uninterrupted flow of natural resources to its member states. By patrolling the main energy chokepoints, NATO ships could also assist private oil companies in providing threat assessments and information about threats to the energy infrastructure. Providing training and support to security services in producer and transit countries is another field where NATO could enhance overall energy security.

Many experts believe that NATO could also provide direct security assistance to a single nation or group of nations experiencing difficulties in protecting their energy infrastructure and ensuring a free flow of energy. In such cases, NATO could even conduct interdiction military operations aimed at securing vulnerable energy infrastructure during a time of need. It could include assistance to maritime services and aerial patrolling and assistance in intelligence sharing. NATO could also help nations to develop emergency plans and (in the most extreme cases) deploy Rapid Reaction Forces to protect energy assets.

## **Conclusion**

Though energy security and protecting energy infrastructure have always been on NATO's political and military radar, NATO still has to define what the Alliance's role in ensuring better energy security will be. Increasing demand for energy resources and tense energy markets, coupled with threats posed to energy infrastructure by terrorist attacks and natural disasters could lead to an energy crisis in which the free flow of energy resources will be interrupted. Recognizing those risks, NATO has been regularly addressing these issues in a variety of different venues. There are certainly areas where NATO can add value to overall energy security—for example, by providing assistance to its member states and partner nations in threat assessment, monitoring and assessing the energy security situation, providing assistance and training to domestic security services, and intelligence sharing with partner countries and private oil companies. There is a need for further discussions and dialogue within the Alliance and with partner nations to define what could be the best contribution a military-political alliance such as NATO can provide.

# The Future of Russia: Outlook from the Center and the Regions

*Denis S. Alexeev* \*

## Introduction

The issue of the transformations in Russia's internal and foreign policy that occurred during the years of Vladimir Putin's presidency has been repeatedly discussed among scholars and politicians inside and outside of the country, especially in the light of the Russian presidential elections held in early 2008. The internal factors that affected the processes of transformation are rather obvious, and are presented by the Russian ruling elite as including a campaign against the oligarchs who have taken control over significant portions of the Russian economy; the necessary improvement of the mechanisms of governance; the protection of Russia's national interests; and the implementation of the model of "Sovereign Democracy." At the same time, some elements of Russian policy remain strongly dependent upon the activity of other players in the international arena. Many analysts identify the causes of the recent striking turns in former and contemporary Russian policy as being directly connected with external factors and international realities.

In 2007, a group of experts and scholars representing the State Universities of Voronezh, Kaliningrad, Saratov, Yekaterinburg, and Vladivostok, along with the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), embarked on an attempt to analyze some of the tendencies of Russian political and economic change, based on potential transformations within the international environment. This ambitious research project, which was named "The Future of Russia," was sponsored by Russian INO-Center and its contributors—the Russian Ministry of Education, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation—and brought together specialists in such fields as history, sociology, political science, and international relations. This paper does not address the project as a whole, but rather examines the findings that have been made during the work on one of the project's subsections, entitled "Relations between Center and Regions in the Context of Development of the International Environment," in which the author was involved as the head of the team of scholars from Saratov State University.

The hypothesis for the research presented here rests on the premise that Russia's internal transformation will depend on potential changes in the entire international system, making external influence one of the crucial factors in the development of relations between the regions of Russia and the nation's federal administration. To better illustrate these trends, it was decided to categorize research into separate scenarios. Based on the hypothesis given above, four scenarios were elaborated as a starting point

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\* Dr. Denis S. Alexeev is an associate professor of history and international relations at Saratov State University in Russia. This paper is adapted from a presentation given by the author at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies on 27 September 2007.

for regional scholars to examine how each particular scenario might bring about changes in regional development trends as well as in pending relations between Moscow (in its role as the federal center) and the Russian regions.

Empirical data extracted from a series of surveys—spread across representatives of regional political elites, the business community, and academia—were analyzed by the experts and converted into actual scenario sketches for each of the five regions in accordance with the four “ground scenarios”: “Fortress-Russia,” “Kremlin’s Gambit,” “Dispersal of Russia,” and “The New Liberal Dream.” Obviously, the final reports, which constitute a collection of volumetric articles, describe each of the regions as unique, with many regional peculiarities. However, I have tried to isolate similarities and draw them together into a single picture. Based on their geographic locations, I divided all the regions described in the final reports into two groups: Inner Regions (Saratov Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, and Sverdlovskaya Oblast) and Outer Regions (Kaliningrad Oblast and Primorsky Krai, with the capital Vladivostok). The limited boundaries of this paper do not allow me to make further generalizations; instead, my aim is to present some inferences extracted from the empirical data collected and processed by the experts. Hence, the ambitious goal of this paper is to analyze and summarize the main conclusions drawn by each of the regional scholars’ teams and to some extent put it into a systematic structure that may provide food for further thought and analysis.

### **Scenario 1: Fortress Russia**

Within the scenario “Fortress Russia,” the collected experts foresaw the unprecedented growth of political and economic pressure being placed on Russia from several major centers of power. Geographically and politically these “major” centers represent the following:

- *The United States* and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region
- *The European Union*, competing with Russia for influence over strategic transport corridors as well as oil and gas supplies in the post-Soviet space
- *China*, which is actively seeking to extend its economic and political influence in Central Asia along the eastern borders of Russian Federation
- *Arab countries* that constitute the region of the Near and Middle East, which not only see Russia as a strong competitor, but also identify it with “Northern” threats to traditional Islamic values
- *India*, which has grown into a significant economic power, and is also trying to acquire more influential positions to confront Chinese and Russian economic and political interests.

Developing international controversies do not allow several of these major powers to apply consolidated or coordinated pressure on Russia, due to serious disagreements among them on wide range of issues. Globalization as a coherent process has gradually faded away; as a result of the myriad changes grouped together under the rubric of

“globalization,” many international ties became corrupted, particularly in the worlds of trade, the exchange of goods and service, transference of labor force, and information and technology. These factors have presented negative consequences for the stable economic growth of national economies. Under these conditions, the elements of a liberal market economy cannot survive, and instead give way to a policy of protectionism, bilateralism, trade war, and hard-edged competition. Anti-globalization tendencies like isolationism and active competition result in imbalances of power in the world. As a result, the expectation of oncoming global instability leads all countries to prepare themselves for the worst possible outcome.

The mechanisms in place for maintaining confidence within the realm of international security are also gradually losing their effectiveness. Many of the world’s primary security-related questions have been removed from the United Nations’ area of responsibility after the series of modernizations that occurred within the organization. NATO’s attempts to attain some of the functions of the guarantor of global security proved to place a heavy burden on all of the allies’ shoulders. The involvement of NATO nations in several missions in different parts of Eurasia has required the mobilization of more than 300,000 troops in rapid-response forces just to maintain the normal process of rotation of military personal. The problem of significant financial assets has become acute, threatening the flow of funds essential in allowing NATO to complete the missions it has taken on. Political declarations in Brussels that called upon the allies to increase their military spending encountered resistance on the national level.

Some of the factors that have posed obstacles to the Alliance’s transformation are growing contradictions between European members and the U.S. in their strategic views on global development. Arguments on a wide range of problems—from the question of the restrictive character of the distribution of U.S. military-related advanced technologies among the allies, to the issue of placement of the elements of the U.S. “missile shield” in Europe, as well as the United States’ attempts to protect its individual national interests using NATO assets—have become destabilizing factors. At present, there exists a diversity of opinions on the issue of how NATO should be transformed to meet the future, which dramatically slows down the process of transformation. All this does nothing to add certainty to NATO’s future, especially given the increasing strength of other players and regional organizations on the international arena.

In such circumstances, Russia is forced to erect artificial barriers and lines of protection against dangerous and unpredictable surroundings. A series of armed conflicts close to Russian borders and the expectation of global chaos makes “Fortress Russia” to be the option that is perceived within Russia as offering an island of stability and security in an ocean of hostility.

### *Internal Changes and the Transformation of the State’s Developmental Path*

Within this scenario, Fortress Russia is plagued by insecurity, and is focusing on preparing to fight for its survival. This shapes a defining character of Russia’s current policy. There are two main objects within any nation that may become targets of external interest: natural resources and territory. The concept of national security has developed around the need to keep and protect these national assets. The issues of securing



sovereignty and territorial integrity against unfriendly infringement translate into Russian society not just as a hypothetical threat the nation should be aware of, but rather as real possibilities that may be expected in the nearest future.

However, Russia's status as a significant nuclear power, and the constant improvement of its national missile defense system, results in the risk of open armed conflict between Russia and one of the other poles of power being essentially negligible. At the same time, speculations about the possibility of such a scenario are supported by the ruling elite, and are strongly amplified within Russian society. This exaggeration is necessary for sustaining exclusive, unprecedented, and functionally dictatorial power for the Russian president, and for continuing the drive for national consolidation in the face of numerous internal conflicts. The idea of a credible deadly threat from an external nation is spread widely within the country by the state-controlled mass media. Russia is represented as a country isolated in the midst of developing conflict, a milieu that is shifting from the state of "aggressive and unfriendly environment" to one of uncontrolled chaos. Under this view, the high probability that all nations will become embroiled in these high-tension conflicts requires a joint effort on the part of the entire Russian people to ensure Russia's survival as a nation.

All power is concentrated in the hands of a dictator unchecked by the other branches of power. The political elite consists of former and current military or security service officers. It is consolidated around the dictator, stable and monolithic in character, operating in a strictly hierarchical subordinated system. The mechanisms by which the political elite is formed and assignments to governmental positions within the state hierarchy are made are nontransparent, and depend mostly on personal relationships with and loyalty to the leader. Thus, the electoral process and the public dimensions of policy have been *de facto* eliminated. All sensitive and strategic political decisions are made by the dictator and the closed inner circle of his confidants.

The concept of national development is based on the idea of "Russia's own way" in the world. New international situations provide the impetus for the elaboration of a new ideological doctrine, which is constituted by an original combination of statism, patriotism, and nationalism. At the same time, the paradigm of the revival of Russia as a strong imperial power has been rejected, due to the lack of resources. The vertical organization of bureaucratic executive power is finally attaining its perfect form and achieving long-term sustainability. Unchecked executive powers now rest not only on the desires of political elite to take over all the levers of public management—that is, to completely detach political power from Russian society—but also on external instability, which renders this detachment justifiable and, to a certain extent, even necessary in the eyes of much of the Russian public.

Establishing these conditions allows the regime to return to the methods of governance used during the Soviet period. Economic policy is characterized by *dirigisme*, protectionism, and state control over the production, trade, consumption, and distribution of national resources. The state maintains a monopoly on the management of oil and energy companies and other sensitive sectors of economy. A significant array of Russian goods and services are noncompetitive on the international market and require protectionist policy; thus, these industries either largely depend on the state for their

continued operation, or are entirely state-controlled. The defense sector of the national economy is undergoing serious modernization, which is reflected in increased defense budgets.

Social policy is a mixture of populism and paternalism. Patriotism and nationalism, which are championed by the elite, leave no public space for political pluralism. Political opposition elements are accused as being powers working to destroy the fragile balance of the nation's internal stability and weaken Russia. The multi-party system has been eliminated not only *de facto*, but also *de jure*. Only two parties survived a long struggle for power. Both of them have close ties with competing groups within the dictator's administration, and are controlled by the executive power. Such a bipartisan system allows the Kremlin to manipulate politically active citizens and regional elites. The traditionally weak legislature will finally lose its official governmental role, and be transformed into a silent conductor of the initiatives and decisions made by the executive branch. Society has disintegrated, and is heavily influenced by state propaganda. National history passes through the procedures of "correction" and the creation of a pantheon of national heroes.

It is worth mentioning that a pessimistic prognosis about the forthcoming collapse of international stability, transmitted to society through political leaders, is not solely an attempt to strike fear into the citizenry and project anxiety about fictitious situations. The world has indeed transformed and become more insecure and less predictable. Russian society (with few exceptions) has been largely insulated from international processes, and the citizenry watches world developments through the lens of state propaganda. The main claim the government makes is that it offers protection against external threats. It is creating a stable social basis for Fortress Russia, and justifies the people giving up most of their civil liberties in exchange for security and stability. The idea of civil society is being discarded, due to the loss of any urgent interest in its survival on the part of both average citizens and the state elite, as well as to its lack of correspondence to the state's development strategy.

### *Regional Reaction*

The given scenario creates a unique situation for many regions of Russia. Under this scenario, the federal government announces the creation of an "Interregional Network for Security Insurance," which includes elements of social, economic, and military infrastructure. The main aim of the "Network" is to transform the entire state in order to prepare against future threats and get ready to ward off a possible external attack. On one hand, some regions see in the current situation new possibilities for development, and are trying to make a place for themselves in the forming Network. Some other regions, however, interpret this process as an attempt to put restrictions on them, and to slow down or even stop their development.

*Inner Regions.* The regions of Saratov, Voronezh, and Yekaterinburg, according to experts' reports, demonstrate a calm and at times even positive reaction to the policy transformation. This positive reaction is primarily connected to the traditional specialization of the regions during the Soviet times. Some sectors of the regional economy that have passed through decades of degradation expect to be revived according to new

conditions formulated by the logic of the Fortress Russia scenario. First of all, this process will primarily influence military-industrial establishments left over from the Soviet era. Government contracts and investment are supposed to offset disadvantages brought about by the loss of foreign investment and the departure of international firms, which will be squeezed out from the regions. For example, one of the largest Russian heavy industry complexes is located in Sverdlovsk Oblast, and it is expected to lead the region in becoming one of the most prosperous parts of Russia. Foreign businesses in these regions hence face two possibilities. The first one consists of selling controlling interests in the company's shares to Russian state or private owners, and in return keeping certain privileges on the internal market. This option, suggested by the backbone network companies, will grow into the regional economy. The other possibility is to leave the market due to unfavorable conditions in the regional tax and legal systems that are created by local governments.

Alongside military-industrial establishments, the inner regions have critical defense-related assets, and they expect some investments to be made in the regional infrastructure—e.g., strategic forces that include modern ballistic missile complexes and strategic aviation located in Saratov Oblast may give privileged status to the region, and therefore can require Moscow to increase its financial support for infrastructural projects. Voronezh Oblast traditionally is a significant agricultural region, so this fact will require Moscow to invest in agricultural infrastructure projects, and will also encourage merging the regions of Voronezh, Lipetsk, and Belgorod Oblasts into one, which will strengthen their economic importance and position within the Federation. Positive expectations are also connected with the revival of the old Soviet principle of the regional division of labor and specialization of regions. In accordance with this principle, the inner regions expect to be given their own prominent place in a renovated state hierarchy and economy. Strengthening of inter-regional ties is also supposed to contribute to the regions' economic growth. Furthermore, the inner regions perceive mobilization of their social energy and economic power in the face of inevitable external threats as the only option for national survival.

*Outer Regions.* The outer regions of Kaliningrad and Vladivostok have a rather different vision of their prospects within the "Fortress Russia" scenario. In general, these regions expect a loss of their development potential, which primarily rests on active trans-boundary cooperation. There are several reasons for the given pessimism. First, these outer regions are anxious about their position on the front line of confrontation. The federal government is not trying to search for possible ways of lowering tensions with Russia's neighbors, and is instead choosing an isolationist path. Second, the outer regions are wary of their potential transformation into a "double periphery," both for Russia and the rest of the world. During the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's boundary regions have lived through a severe period of neglect. Moscow was overburdened by dozens of problems, and the outer regions had learned how to survive without continuous federal support. This resulted in the majority of strategic plans for regional development in one way or another depending on cooperation with neighboring states. Consequently, the termination of traditional contacts and the milita-

rization of the outer regions is damaging not only for local business, but also for the overall socio-economic climate there.

The remote situation of the outer regions constrained their ability to be included in inter-regional cooperation efforts. High transport expenses make most of the goods produced in the outer regions uncompetitive on the internal Russian market. Small businesses and even some big companies turned out to be unprofitable and were forced to shrink their volume of production or change their product profile. All this resulted in high unemployment rates, social tensions, and a growing wave of immigration. Despite all the attempts of local governments to overcome the discrepancies between federal and regional development strategies, businesses looking for the means to break through this environment of isolation (even illegally) are outside of the state's control. Latent resistance to state policy is taking form of conflict between business and governmental agencies in the region.

## **Scenario 2: Kremlin's Gambit**

Within the framework of the "Kremlin's Gambit" scenario, the world system is relatively stable and sustainable. All major players conduct a predictable and balanced foreign policy. The circle of major powers remains unchanged, and includes the U.S., core EU countries, and Japan. These entities have the most innovative and competitive economies, and produce over 50 percent of the world's GDP. Alongside these traditional leaders, there are several powers that demonstrate prominent growth and constitute the BRIC four: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The integration of growing states into the international division of labor is proceeding without any hiccups. The growth of the economies of the traditional power centers is based on high technology and knowledge industries. The BRIC states are growing due to the development of the industrial sectors of their economies: extracting (Russia) and manufacturing (China, India, and Brazil) industries. The economic potential of key players on the international arena is proportionally converted into their political influence in the world. All the above-mentioned actors are trying to maintain the moderate and institutionalized level of competition among them. Remaining disagreements on a wide range of issues do not undermine the preservation of the *status quo* in the world order, which is desired by both "old" and "new" leader-countries.

In this multi-polar world, Russia is represented as an independent center of power. Oil and natural gas remain major drivers of the world's economic growth. Russia maintains a significant place among major exporters of these resources on the world market. Combined with its modernized armed forces, this helps ensure that Russia will maintain strong position in the international arena. Russia remains fully integrated within international forums and organizations. However, the process of integration was difficult, and connected with the need for the protection of Russia's national interests and the necessity to avoid discrimination against Russia on the international stage.

Despite a consensus on the main issues of international security and development, Russia feels some pressure from other strong players. This pressure is a result of attempts by other countries to increase their shares within Russian markets, as well as

attempts to reduce Russia's influence as exporter of energy resources. Other concerns include efforts to prevent Russia from strengthening its positions within the post-Soviet space, and to make Russian policy more favorable to others actors' national priorities. Russia, on the other hand, to a certain extent depends on other states, because the modernization of Russian industry and infrastructure is impossible without the import of foreign technologies. A search for a decent balance between the preservation of its national interests and Russian dependence on foreign countries constitutes the general political course of the Russian Federation within this scenario.

### *Internal Changes and the Transformation of the State's Developmental Path*

The essence of the "Kremlin's Gambit" scenario consists of the following: control over major economic resources transfers to the state. The reason for gaining such control is explained by the necessity of the *centralized and coordinated* redistribution of financial resources for the rapid modernization of Russia's economy, social sphere, and army to place the country in line with the most developed countries of the world. Political power inside the state *de facto* is concentrated within the hands of the executive branch (president, presidential administration, and government). There are two "chess-pieces" that are supposed to be sacrificed for the success of the overall gambit of effective modernization. The first one is international recognition of Russia as Western-style consolidated liberal democracy. The second is liberalization of political and economic competition inside the country.

The sacrifice of the first chess-piece is justified by the confidence among the political elite that only a strong Russia will be recognized by other centers of power as an equal partner. Hence, the Russian regime will ignore accusations of authoritarianism and use all the administrative instruments at its disposal in order to make Russia stronger, both economically and militarily, even at the cost of democratic freedoms. This will inevitably result in Russia's eventual recognition as a major power, and even more favorable conditions for the country. Justification of sacrificing the second chess-piece is based on the elite's premise that effective political competition can only be possible within a sustainable state system. Historical experience has proved that Russia does not precisely suit the models of state-building suggested by the Western democracies. Genuine political competition has to be grown inside the "incubator" of controlled or "managed" democracy, which will allow the accumulation of necessary experience of modern political culture.

The competition in the key sectors of national economy is harmful from a short-term perspective because it leads to inefficient disposition of resources and investments, as well as a lack of coordination. As a result of such inefficiency, Russia loses standing on the international markets. That is why Russia will gain significant economic advantages by taking heavy industry, military-industrial establishments, and research and development efforts under state control. However, the competition among small businesses inside the country should remain, and must be encouraged by governmental regulations. Nonetheless, the above-mentioned sacrifices are worthwhile only under conditions of high oil prices on the international market, which allows the accumulation of the financial resources necessary for modernization to occur. Uncer-

tain oil prices and the difficulty of forecasting how long prices will remain favorable to the Russian economy will force the Russian government to speed up modernization and reforms.

Russia's political elite involved in the implementation of the "Gambit" is heterogeneous and complex in character. It represents a combination of several groups of interests: the president and his administration, who are playing the role of main political agents; military and security officers, who are called upon to ensure the stability of the entire political system; the high-ranking management of the natural monopolies controlled by the state (extraction industries, transport, etc.), and owners of private businesses affiliated with these monopolies; and representatives of the federal bureaucracy, who control the implementation of federal policy in the regions. Important attributes of the political elite are its superficial monolithic character, which is embodied in the elite's adherence to a single political party. Nevertheless, the political elite represents a conglomeration of different clans with a diversity of interests, corporate affiliations, as well as personal and informal relations.

Decision-making processes in the Russian political system under this scenario are non-transparent. This lack of transparency, accompanied by weak judicial authority, leaves enough space for manipulations favorable to the interests of the ruling elite. Mass media and other public institutions influenced by the state-run corporations help to construct a positive image of the political system within society. In general, Russia's political processes are imitational in character. Personal factors acquire significant value in Russian political and electoral processes. The personalization of political life gives the president and his informal circle of confidants the instruments necessary for exercising control over the smooth succession of power and preserving its existing political path.

The state acquires a leading role in working out the nation's economic development strategy and investment policy. An emphasis on big, vertically-integrated corporations is an integral part of this economic policy. Many such corporations in key sectors of national economy are either created or managed by the state. The economic goals declared by the government consist of two main directions:

- Modernization of infrastructure and major sectors of industry via rapid upgrades sponsored by the profitable state corporations, with the usage of the latest foreign technologies
- Diversification of the economy to weaken the state's dependence on exports of oil and natural gas.

In pursuit of these aims, the Russian government partly revives the Soviet system of economic planning. This planning does not take the form and shape of Soviet-style directive methods of management, but holds some of their features and peculiarities.

The main ideological imperative suggested within the sphere of social policy and public diplomacy is that of Russia as a consolidated and strong state, which is related not only at the revival of its power and influence among other nations, but also to the amelioration of social problems among its citizens. Certain efforts are undertaken by

the state in order to bring this message to society, and attempts are made to reinforce it by the initiation of several social programs and starting the process of optimization of a national system of social security. The main social programs are structured by the fields of their implementation: demography, housing, reforms in family medicine, and the educational system. However, these measures and projects to some extent have a populist character, and lack any strict criteria for evaluating their efficiency; they are oriented more toward the demonstration of active efforts than toward achieving well-defined results.

Despite the attempts undertaken by the political elite to make social life full of patriotic and other sorts of political campaigns—which are often converted into public movements, organizations, institutions and so on—an overwhelming majority of citizens are politically indifferent and passive. Russian society is atomized, and the growing gap between rich and poor only serves to increase this level of atomization. The issues of democracy and the building of civil society have been moved to the back burner of social discourse. The society's main concern is to ensure stability, order, personal security, and material wealth.

Revival of Russia's status as a global power appears to be the main goal of Russian foreign policy under the "Kremlin's Gambit" scenario. In pursuit of this goal, the federal government relies on the military reforms that it has initiated to modernize Russia's army and increase its defensive capacity. This activity, first of all, grows from the state's evaluation of its status based on realistic ideas and attitudes toward international relations. The increasing strength of players and alliances—e.g., NATO enlargement, and the development of military infrastructure in Eastern Europe—is perceived by the Russian elite as unjustifiable or suspicious. This is the basis of Russia's adherence to the practice of increasing its defense budget and maintaining military readiness, with a primary goal of preserving flexibility in how Russia chooses to meet its international obligations. Possible withdrawal from security treaties and agreements that may threaten the existing balance of power or run counter to the national interest remain as an option in Russian foreign policy.

The ministry of foreign affairs also proclaimed a growing emphasis on "soft power" in Russian efforts to deal with pressing security threats—such as terrorism, proliferation of WMD, etc.—and in Moscow's policy toward former Soviet republics. The elaborated doctrine of Russian foreign policy is free from strict ideology, and is instead based on pragmatism in dealing with partners and allies to achieve equal rights and status.

### *Regional Reaction*

State policy toward the regions consists of strict control over implementation of the decisions made by Moscow. The monitoring of regional policy is declared as a necessary attribute of successful modernization conducted by the government. Moscow has plenty of different levers and instruments in order to intervene in regional matters and governors' activities. Regional elites generally consist of loyal bureaucrats who have passed through a multi-stage process of selection prior to coming into power, and they do not pose any resistance to the decisions made in the Kremlin.

*Inner Regions.* Many of the inner regions perceive “Kremlin’s Gambit” as representing their lucky chance for quick modernization. The belief in the state’s competent redistribution of oil revenues and their reinvestment into the regional economies is still widespread in Russia. The legacy of Soviet-era industrialization, characterized by hundreds of plants and scientific institutions under state control and oriented to the defense sector, largely became defunct after the collapse of Soviet Union. Reorganizing and rebuilding these assets in accordance with present-day needs, and incorporating them back into the regional economy requires a robust investment policy. This process, known as “reindustrialization” in the regions, is considered to be possible only under state patronage under the rubric of the given scenario. In other words, the strong need for the modernization and reindustrialization of different sectors of the economy lends this scenario a high degree of credibility. However, strong inner regions (e.g. Sverdlovskaya Oblast) feel anxiety about growing influence and control from the center. The strong authority possessed by the executive branch and the president is perceived as an opening for corruption and the possible neglect of regional interests. That is why some regions are expecting a progressive, but rather inertial character of development, without any significant breakthroughs.

The regional elites, created and controlled by Kremlin, will end the destructive struggles for power and competition between different interest groups in the regions. On one hand, the lack of any diversity of interests within the regional elite could positively affect the efficiency of government and the implementation of decisions made by the center. On the other hand, the close-knit and static character of the elite may contribute to the spread of corruption, misapplication of funds, and abuses of power.

Nonetheless, under the “Kremlin’s Gambit” scenario, the inner regions foresee the state playing an active role in the realization of the program of the regions’ economic revival and in the improvement of living standards for a wider group of Russian citizens. Society is largely indifferent to the political process; democratic freedoms become less valuable than stability and economic growth. While the visible effects of ongoing reforms and international economic conditions allow the government to maintain budget surpluses, it also demonstrates efficient management inside the country. As a model of maintaining Russia’s political sphere free from destructive conflicts and entrenching internal stability, the “Kremlin’s Gambit” scenario remains attractive for the public.

*Outer Regions.* The outer regions are expected to convert themselves into efficient and successful bridges between Russia and the rest of the world. The “Kremlin’s Gambit” scenario, representing a peculiar variety of state-controlled capitalism, proposes active trans-border cooperation and economic activity. Economic realities allow the outer regions to occupy unique niches and enjoy their economic opportunities, such as being included in the investment projects initiated by Moscow aimed at renovating and building the nation’s infrastructure; ensuring the exchange of goods and resources with other countries (e.g., pipelines and transport infrastructure); and being used by Moscow as test areas in the search for mutually beneficial schemes and mechanisms of cooperation with neighboring states (especially the case of Kaliningrad). Similar situations are developing in the area of foreign investment. Favorable conditions for capital



inflows into the regional economies contribute to increases in regional budgets and the creation of new joint enterprises. This scenario gives the outer regions the most practicable opportunity to implement complex programs for socio-economic development within the regions. Ongoing changes are helping Kaliningrad and Vladivostok to make a leap forward from the status of recipients regions to donor regions to the federal budget, thus improving their status within the Russian Federation. The political and social climate in these outer regions does not differ dramatically from its character in the rest of the country and, with minor exclusions, fits into the overall tendencies suggested by the scenario.

The Kremlin's policy, with its accent on a certain degree of protection of the national economy and pragmatism in foreign affairs, allows actors to find a balance between foreign and regional interests and not to let foreign capital intervene too deeply in sensitive sectors of regional economies. The outer regions also receive the status of special economic zones, which carries a number of privileges. Combined with their favorable geographic situation, special economic zone status makes the pace of the outer regions' development faster than in some inner regions.

### **Scenario 3: Dispersal of Russia**

This scenario suggests the further intensification of the processes of globalization around the world, under which the international economy demonstrates moderate but continuous growth. Political stabilization in the Middle East and improvements in the process of East-West dialogue positively affect oil prices on the international markets. The price level decreases dramatically in comparison to the first decade of the twenty-first century. The global environment is characterized by active competition among states, but general tendencies confirm the lowering of conflict potential in the world. International organizations like the UN, NATO, OSCE, and others are gaining more influence and authority due to the increasing prominence of the ideology of multilateralism in the international arena.

These international political and economic developments, however, seriously weaken Russia's position in the world. Decreased oil prices have a negative impact on the process of Russian economic modernization as well as the process of embedding the nation into the international division of labor. Foreign actors intervene in Russian political and economic life and try to impose their will. International organizations like WTO, PACE, and OSCE have strong levers of influence on Russia's policy and economy. Russia is steadily weakened by outside forces and global pressures, and gradually loses its role as an independent actor. Russia's level of involvement in the resolution of wide range of international issues is insignificant, and becomes a subject of external manipulation. Russia's integration into the world's community of nations proceeds on a basis of inequality—what can be called the “younger brother” model. Russia's territory is informally split into separate spheres of influence. A major vector of influence is Western (EU and the United States) and is widespread mostly over regions situated in the European part of the Russian Federation and the Urals; however, there is some

Chinese and Muslim impact in the Caucasus, Upper Volga, Siberia, and Far East as well.

### *Internal Changes and the Transformation of the State's Developmental Path*

Unfavorable international conditions and the serious deterioration of the economic climate inside the country affect social support for the president and government. The levers of political power gradually slip out of the hands of the federal government. The president's approval rating begins to sink, and regional leaders start occupying increasingly prominent positions on the national political scene. Instability and frequent rearrangements of political figures also deprive the government of its authority and public trust. Parliament also does not represent a strong pole of political influence, due to its division into multiple unstable factions and parties. Real authority and control over the efficient mechanisms of political and economic power transfers to the groups that were unsatisfied with the previously proclaimed project of "state-guided modernization": businessmen, liberal technocrats, and strong regional leaders.

In spite of the image of the new political elite as a wide and sustainable coalition of different kinds of political forces, it is heterogeneous and fragmentary. The ruling class is divided into multiple interest groups, alliances, and coalitions. Different groups compete with each other for control over financial streams and leading sectors of the economy. There are no long-term winners in such a competition; all the alliances are fragile and situational in character. The overall style of governance is eclectic, characterized by the lack of well-defined strategy and an absence of clear long-term priorities.

The main ideological paradigm suggested by the elite is liberalism and "pure federalism," including maximal openness to the rest of the world and integration into international institutions at all costs. For independent individuals, prosperity and wealth are the main concerns within the suggested paradigm. Moscow guarantees the real division of authority between the federal center and various regions, such as representation on the federal level, participation in the decision-making process, regional political and economic autonomy, and the growing authority of the institutions of local government.

The state's regulatory functions are gradually diminished. Economic policy is characterized by anti-protectionism, and has spawned a new wave of privatization of state-controlled assets in the industry. Russia has proclaimed itself to be entirely open to foreign investment, and international capital acquires wider privileges. Federal intervention in the regional economies is abolished completely, and the redistribution of financial resources necessary for reducing the gap between depressed and prosperous regions is abolished.

The challenge of ensuring a strong social security protection program for all citizens is gradually moved off of the government's agenda of pressing items. In practical terms, Moscow initiates the transfer of major federal obligations of social security to the regional authorities. Fragmentation and decentralization accelerate within the judicial, economic, political, and social security systems of the state. Stronger regions force the Kremlin to build relationships with them on the basis of bilateral agreements, taking into account the specific needs of each region.

All the regions are given the opportunity to develop their internal economic potential. In their attempts to fit themselves into transforming Russian political conditions, they are experimenting with different styles of governance by using a variety of tools: protectionist policy, liberal reforms, isolationism, and so forth. Regions are also elaborating and applying different strategies of development: some maintain their close relationships with Moscow, while others are trying to find their own semi-independent course, keeping only the “formal” spirit of subordination to the center.

The ongoing changes inevitably affect public life. However, social reaction does not follow a single pattern. Russian society is unable to formulate a joint claim to the central government. There are divergent and mutually contradictory interests among active groups of citizens: those desiring a strong hand versus those hoping for even more liberal freedom. There is no common ideological paradigm or idea that can unify the Russian people. Dispersal of Russia is reflected in growing divisions within society and between the regions of the country.

### *Regional Reaction*

*Inner Regions.* Dispersal of Russia affects the inner regions in a variety of ways. One of the mostly pronounced tendencies is the process of regional enlargement. This process is a result of the absorption of weaker regions by the stronger ones. A clear example is the creation of a Greater Ural region, using the EU model, with the center in Yekaterinburg; the rise of the macro-region of Greater Volga, without an obvious leader; and the development of a loosely confederated Greater Siberia region, with its center in Novosibirsk but that acts as a conglomerate of powerful sub-regions extending as far west as the Volga River, unified by a series of multilateral treaties of cooperation in a number of spheres. Regional enlargement in a conditions of a weak center is predetermined by two main preconditions: the historical and geographical commonality of some neighboring regions and the existence of traditional centers (Yekaterinburg and Tumen’ in the Urals, Samara, Nizhny Novgorod, and Kazan on the Volga River etc.), and political and economic necessity, under which strict competition among regions dictates the necessity for weak regions to unify with stronger and successful neighbors to meet future challenges and avoid economic crisis. Bigger regions get the opportunity to advance their own foreign economic and political ties independent of Moscow’s control, elaborate their own priorities of development, and even develop their own security policies—for example, Yekaterinburg, in cooperation with the U.K., Germany, and the Netherlands, works out its vision of these issues and publishes Regional Security Concept 2015, which reflects regional threats and ways to counter them that rely on regional assets.

The growing extent of regional independence leads to the formation of new groups of regional elites. Redistribution of political and economic influence in the regions opens the way for conflicts between different interest groups inside the regional elite; the renewed squabbling between clans, political parties, and other groups holds the potential for a possible revival of oligarchy. Governors acquire stronger authority and have to play a role of balancer or pacifier between different interest groups. Realignment in regional policies leads to liberalization of governance in some regions and au-

thoritarian drift in others. Differences in the political situation and provincial economies promote growing levels of migration inside the country to the most successful regions, as well as emmigration abroad.

Social tensions become a constant attribute of regional life. The difference in living standards and profit between rural areas and regional centers remains very dramatic. The outflow of labor forces to other regions combines with the intensification of migration to some inner regions from former soviet republics of the Caucasus, Central Asia, and China. The augmentation of national diaspora populations in the regions increases potential for conflict and organized crime. Social fragmentation becomes more and more obvious. Some groups feel uncertainty about their future and express nostalgia for the era of autocratic central power; others pin their hopes to the independent development of their regions free from federal influence and intervention.

*Outer Regions.* The outer regions simultaneously become targets for competition between their neighbor states for influence or even annexation. Primorsky Krai has become an object of Chinese economic, political, and territorial interest. Officially, Beijing suggests a variety of programs aimed at strengthening the region's economic, cultural, and social ties with China. Unofficially, China perceives semi-independent Primorsky Krai as one of the crucially important geopolitical points in this part of Eurasia, and Chinese strategic plans include the incorporation of this region into the Chinese zone of influence as another northern province. For their part, the United States and Japan are undertaking some efforts to intervene in the region. Their goal is to constrain Chinese influence on Vladivostok and curtail its aspirations for reinforcement of China's strategic positions in Asia-Pacific. Kaliningrad Oblast is also the object of political and economic struggle among Lithuania, Germany, and Poland over influence in the region. Situations when outer regions become a field of explicit competition lead to their gradual loss of economic independence and an inability to work out and apply a long-term development strategy. Regional vectors of development are thus sporadic and fragmentary in character in these outer areas. The most profitable sector of the economy remains the export of raw materials and goods with low added costs. However, principles of distribution of profit among citizens are in most cases unequal, and assets accumulate mostly in the hands of the ruling elites and local businesses.

The transformations that occur in the political arena of the outer regions bring to power a specific combination of representatives of local bureaucracy and business interests. The peculiar political environment of the Far Eastern region has become a fertile field for growing authoritarian tendencies in governance. The governor of Primorsky Krai is concentrating within his apparatus all major mechanisms of control over economic and political life in the region. Kaliningrad, on the contrary, adheres to the idea of liberalism, and attempts to follow the Western model of governance. The EU actively supports the adoption of this model through a variety of social, economic, and educational programs. The transformation of political systems in the outer regions goes hand-in-hand with transformations within the society. The average people prefer to identify their citizenship with the region rather than with the state. Consequently, the Vladivostok region transforms itself into an authoritarian semi-independent province, with interests oriented toward the Asia-Pacific rather than toward the European part of

Russia. Kaliningrad Oblast, prior to determination of its final status (and potential complete inclusion in the community of Central or Western European nations) may possibly become a protectorate of the EU or group of neighboring state that are helping to reform the region's economic and political institutions.

The loss of the regions' ties with the Kremlin is seen as containing more risks than opportunities. Regions are unable to find adequate responses to internal security threats. All the experts underline growing criminalization of border regions, including black market transactions, trans-border smuggling, illegal migration; the spreading criminalization of society becomes a permanent problem for regional administrations.

#### **Scenario 4: The New Liberal Dream**

The postindustrial era and the first two decades of the twenty-first century have brought steady growth to major segments of the international economy. The rate of economic growth for developed countries remains moderate and sustainable (particular figures depend on field and industry sector). Rapidly developing countries like India, China, Brazil, Russia, and a few others have shown even better indexes of growth. Economic development has increased demands for raw materials and fossil fuels. Even though countries of the European Union and North America have found some means to ease the level of dependence on foreign oil in their economies, at the same time growing appetites for oil and gas in such countries as China and India keep market prices for these goods relatively high (the level of prices is lower than it was at the beginning of the century, but it is still sufficient to maintain budget surpluses in oil and gas exporting countries like Russia).

There is no significant change in the distribution of power and influence on the international stage; all powers are balanced, and try to avoid hegemonic aspirations. The competition among the major centers of power remains moderate, and does not go beyond conventional economic and political mechanisms. The rising powers prefer to adhere to this "play by the rules" policy, and concentrate mostly on issues of internal development, taking advantage of the opportunities brought by globalization. Cooperation is the dominant type of interrelationship among a majority of states. The UN transforms into a solid base for the development of a new system of global management, set to eliminate inequality and development disparities between countries, and to preserve sustainable development peace among and within member states.

Russia is fully integrated into all the major international economic institutions. Continuing economic development and political stability inside the country makes Russia an attractive partner for cooperation. Russia's responsible and cooperative policies, accompanied by internal political transformation, accelerate the process of Russia's integration into the community of Western democracies as an equal partner. Russia takes part in the decision-making process on all sensitive international issues, and is involved in the resolution of conflicts alongside other key players. The implications of *realpolitik* in international relations gradually fade away; instead, international relations become institutionalized, and external security threats are softened and minimized. The main accent of Russian foreign policy makes it necessary to integrate the

country into the “institutions of globalization,” and to pursue the “synchronization” of Russian policy with other players. Russia tries to keep the balance between playing by the rules of Western liberal democracies and protecting its own vital national interests. In the context of increasing consensus among nations on a wide range of international issues, the instruments of “soft power” become more useful and efficient in foreign policy.

### *Internal Changes and the Transformation of the State’s Developmental Path*

Russia’s political elite consists of a new generation of leaders including businessmen, industrialists, young political activists, and former top managers of private companies. These groups are diverse in the character of their interests and professional experiences, but unified in a common aversion to the mode of Russian political and economic development between 1996 and 2012, as well as in their desire to change existing trends in Russian policy.

The coalition of political elites suggests a program for Russia’s development called “Rational Reforms and Good Governance.” The program consists of a combination of liberal priorities such as human rights, individual initiatives, and political and economic freedoms along with the responsibility of businesses and the state to maintain a strong system of social security. The ways and means of implementation of this proclaimed program are realistic and pragmatic. The overall character of governance of the “new generation” of Russia’s political elite fits into the philosophy of the above-mentioned “program for Russia”: pragmatic and realistic assessment of opportunities, without any strict ideological adherence, but with a well-defined accent on the basic liberal principles, including the rule of law, respect for human rights, freedom of the press, etc. The actions undertaken by the government are not based on abstract ideas or populist ideology, but rather on clear aims like the removal of obstacles to economic growth, improvement of conditions for the development of small business and private initiative, and the elimination of poverty.

The economic sphere of the federal government’s activity combines the stimulation of free competition and the implications of preventive measures against monopolization along with the creation of favorable conditions for investment, which contributes to the modernization of industry and infrastructure. The government sells the state’s shares in firms involved in mining and extraction industries. Selling off these valuable shares allows the government to accumulate significant financial assets and redirect the money to expensive projects of socio-economic modernization connected with the development of the knowledge economy. In general, the national economy is free from protectionism and economic nationalism, but some restrictions remain for the allowance of foreign capital in the core sectors of the Russian economy. The state takes on the role of guarantor of the unified economic rules for all actors.

Social security regulations remain the state’s responsibility, but the general course for the rationalization of budget expenditures and social support reorganizes itself in accordance with national categorizations of the recipients. Private companies are also involved in the social security sphere, but their activity is regulated by governmental agencies. NGOs, professional associations, and other forms of social activity contrib-

ute to the formation of civil society in Russia. Civil rights and freedoms acquire greater value for Russian citizens, and become indispensable attributes of their life. Social clashes and conflicts are softening due to growing wealth and competent policy. The government successfully implements measures to reduce the gap between rich and poor. Social priorities are defined by the interests of the dominant groups of society, and generally include claims for stability in living conditions and protection of civil rights.

The Kremlin's regional policy is aimed at the strengthening and democratization of federal relations. The federal center proclaims the realization of the policy of "Cooperative Federalism," in which Moscow introduces itself as a partner, a "guide" for the implementation of innovations in all spheres of regional life. The main aim of this policy is to avoid widening the gap between developed and depressed regions. The Kremlin is not afraid to transfer part of its authority to other regions, and at the same time does not try to promote the "regionalization" of Russia (characterized by self-sufficient regions and a weak center). However, Moscow is trying to keep close ties with regions and sustain moderate mechanisms of subordination (e.g., the institution of "President's Plenipotentiaries" in the regions), because regions that are stronger both economically and politically are perceived by Kremlin as crucial parts of the strategy of national liberalization.

### *Regional Reaction*

*Inner Regions.* The "new liberal dream" scenario creates very specific conditions for the interior regions. On the one hand, liberal economic reforms, stimulation of fair competition, and increased political stability are seen as having a positive impact on regional industry and business, and viewed as helping raise standards of living. On the other hand, the experts' reaction to the scenario and their views on regional development also contain a large number of issues the regions will face under conditions of a liberalized market and loosened state control over the political process and social relations.

The given scenario is distinguished by its promotion of knowledge and innovation in the regions. All the experts pointed to the importance of speeding the process of development of the system of higher education, including promoting different kinds of educational programs, and building a strong nexus between business and science in the inner regions. Technological innovations and their application in manufacturing become an indispensable attribute of a competitive business environment. Nevertheless, the deteriorated state of the infrastructure in these regions does not allow them to fully capitalize on their economic opportunities. In a liberalized economy, some previously successful enterprises become moribund, and are forced to re-orient their activity or re-profile their production for new markets. Non-uniform tendencies of development in some sectors of regional economy stimulate interregional economic cooperation in similar fields of industry. This process results in the clustering of regional industry into interregional segments.

Transformations in the Russian political climate and reforms in economic legislation attract foreign business and capital. Investment in the growing Russian economy

becomes more profitable in the long term. Along with growing shares of international business, the competition between Russian and foreign producers (EU and China) in analogous sectors of the economy is tightening, and Russian business is forced to pursue a “catch-up” strategy of development. The regions expect a temporary lowering of regional budget income, and a consequent decline of living standards, which feeds increasing poverty and social tensions. However, the benefits of the painful process of integration into the international economic system exceed its costs, which forces the regions to continue reforms and transformations.

Regional elites, freed from strict Kremlin control, are trying to adopt new forms of governance, but are not always successful in these aspirations. The interest groups that constitute the elites remain heterogeneous and unstable. All the attempts of regional governors to avoid conflicts of interests among influential business groups merged with regional administration and different political parties have no real effect. Regional political systems transform into a specific mixture of liberal and patriarchal features. Lobbying, corruption, abuses of power, and client-patron relations continue to be a regional reality. After all, regional political systems represent a wide spectrum of varieties: authoritarianism with imitation of democratic institutions, regional paternalism, liberal democracy with a stronger executive branch, and parliamentary republic (for some regions in central parts of Russia and Siberia).

*Outer Regions.* In accordance with the experts’ evaluation, the outer regions derive the most significant benefits from the “new liberal dream” scenario. Active Russian participation and involvement in a number of different international programs and projects creates a unique opportunity for the outer regions to stay on the front line of modernization and to serve as so-called “agents” for the translation of innovations, goods, and services between Russia and other countries. Such a fortunate situation makes these regional economies very attractive for both international and Russian companies and investors. It is worth mentioning that the Kremlin, understanding the importance of these regions in promoting smooth cooperation between Russia and its foreign partners, offers its assistance and help in arranging proper mechanisms of cooperation between the regions and their neighboring countries.

The basis for economic growth, foreign investment, and intensified modernization of the outer regions rests on three major sources: transport corridors and infrastructure elements that go through the region; transportation of energy resources assigned for export, including the oil and natural gas pipelines; raw materials processing and food industries. The growth of these economies, and the consequent strengthening of their regional status, allows these outer regions to acquire a stronger voice in dealing with their neighbor states, and to interact with them on a more equal basis. For example, Kaliningrad Oblast becomes deeply involved in the process of political and economic decision making in sub-regions of Eastern and Northern Europe. In the same manner, Primorsky Krai becomes involved in international economic and environmental projects with China, Korea, and Japan. The main specialization of the regions is connected to the functions of so-called “switches” in transfers of material assets, products, and non-material streams between East and West, capitalizing on their unique geographical situation.



Remaining among the fastest developing areas of Russia, the outer regions gain certain political advantages within the “new liberal dream” scenario. Moscow views the regions as the test case for cooperation between Russia and other countries. This approach results in the creation of special economic zones, the adaptation of Russia’s economic legislation, and the initiation of the modernization of its political institutions. These ongoing changes positively affect the social situation in the regions. A growing middle class and the overall increase of public wealth reduces the gap between rich and poor, and makes the structure of the society more uniform. This easing of social tensions creates favorable conditions for the formation of civil society and the promotion of regional identity.

## Conclusion

Aside from their schematic character, all the scenarios represented in this article reveal some of the important peculiarities that already exist in Russia’s internal and external policy, or are likely to shape it in the future. As was mentioned at the beginning of the essay, the ideas expressed here and the research carried out by the scholars from different universities could not, of course, address all the areas of social life that might be touched during the course of Russian transformation. The international environment remains, of course, only one of many other factors that will shape Russia’s future, but it is a particularly serious factor. This adds some value to conclusions that may be drawn after the analysis of the presented scenarios and a consideration of the influence they have on Russia itself and the Russian regions.

The majority of scholars stress that a strong executive branch, with elements of vertical subordination, generates more positive expectations in the minds of contemporary Russian political elites in the regions of the country than does a weaker, less centralized executive. The scenarios that represent this model of governance (“Fortress Russia” and “Kremlin’s Gambit”) are welcomed by the most of the regions. Some circumstances when this idea may be rejected appear only under the scenarios of “Fortress Russia” and “Dispersal of Russia.” However, the idea of a strong central state, which is repeatedly and emphatically transmitted to society by the state-controlled mass media, and which also has deep historical roots, is widely accepted in today’s Russian society, and in all likelihood will remain as a major trend in the future. Russia’s currently favorable economic situation, which is linked to high oil prices, makes the idea extremely attractive for average people.

Despite the revival of Russia as more substantive player on the world stage, the given scenarios show that there is high probability that Russia will remain more an object than a subject in the process of international relations, and its policy will be strongly dependent on external conditions. A wider understanding of the abnormality of this situation is growing within the Russian ruling elite. Perhaps this is the reason why the “Kremlin’s Gambit,” the only scenario in which Russia is able to preserve a policy that is more or less independent from external influence, is so openly welcomed by the majority of the regions in Russia.

External threats and rivals (or speculations on their existence) remain the most efficient (if not the only possible) mechanism for the consolidation of Russian society. Today's world—with all its insecurity, and its growing number of threats and challenges—gives the Russian elite a wide range of situations in which to play this “external threat” card. Practically, the idea of adopting Western-style liberal democracy in a context in which Russia is threatened or may be threatened is perceived in Russian regions as totally destructive. Therefore, democratic reforms and the consolidation of civil society (or its possible formation in the near future, having in mind the ongoing tendencies in Russian development) are considered by the majority of experts to be more myth than reality.

The negative experience and consequences of democratic reforms in the end of the last century are etched in the memory of most members of Russian society, especially its patriotic wing, represented by the military and security officers—the so-called *siloviki*—which has been brought to power during Vladimir Putin's presidency. Hence, for those people the most efficient way of strengthening the political system and the state itself, as well as of bringing about the consolidation of Russian society, is to do it in a “restricted” environment. This explains the Russian government's passage of the infamous “NGO's Act,” its promotion of the concept of “Sovereign Democracy,” and its continued ironclad control over the political process.

After all, regardless of their geographic location, the Russian regions prefer to connect their future development with the strict federal structure of the state and the leading role of Moscow as a power that unifies Russia. This preference reflects the overall strategy of Russian development. The “Dispersal of Russia” scenario, despite all the attempts to make it attractive for the regions—emphasizing their freedom to rely on their own resources, and offering many options to elaborate their own development strategies that most effectively fit the needs of each region—was viewed by the regional scholars, policy makers, and businessmen as a pessimistic scenario. Even the “New Liberal Dream” scenario, aside from its labored and artificial character, is in one way or another associated in the regions with relatively strong state power (at least on the regional level). Nevertheless, even given the obvious adherence of the majority of Russian regions to maintain their loyalty to the Kremlin under a wide range of different circumstances, Moscow is expected to conduct a highly flexible policy toward different parts of Russia, one that takes their specific preferences and needs into account. Failure to do so may cause profound dissatisfaction, and could lead to the rejection of the current trend of loyalty to the center.



# The U.S.–Russian Dispute Over Missile Defense

*Vladimir Rukavishnikov* \*

## Introduction

The current Bush Administration is considering a crash effort to put into place the European components of a U.S.-built national missile defense system (NMD) before the end of President Bush's second term. While the debates in the United States are focused primarily on the failure and success of various flight tests, and on the cost of missile defense, the European general public wants to see a concrete plan of its deployment, to understand the design of the entire system, and have a clearer sense of a timetable.

The European part of the U.S. anti-missile shield consists of interceptor missiles in Poland and radar installations in the Czech Republic linked with them. Initially, President George W. Bush's missile defense plan had met with muted support at best in Central Europe, but the situation changed dramatically in short order, because the U.S. offered its partners a tremendous carrot—namely, significant help in modernizing the Polish armed forces, investments in the Czech Republic—along with the stick of exact obedience from these new NATO members.

There is no doubt that the new U.S. bases in Poland and the Czech Republic will become a reality sooner rather than later. The ruling elites of these nations think that, as in the Cold War era, the Americans are playing a paramount role in guaranteeing Europe's security from what they view as "a common enemy."<sup>1</sup>

Some Americans may feel pride or even a bit of condescension in this dependency on the part of Poland and the Czech Republic. Indeed, it costs the United States less to defend its interests in Europe if these two Central European countries are more closely tied to the U.S.<sup>2</sup>

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\* Prof. Dr. Vladimir Rukavishnikov currently is an independent expert-consultant, based in Russia. He was the Head of the Department of Social Dynamics in the Institute of Socio-Political Research at the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow, and a professor in the Department of Global Politics in the Higher School of Economics at the State University of Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> I do not agree entirely with the opinion of some colleagues of mine that "Central Europeans lost self-confidence through two world wars and self-reliance in the Cold War, and now they find it easier to defer to the United States in the issue of missile defense (private communication). This arrogant opinion does not constitute a correct explanation for current policy decisions. Yet we do agree that the mixed reaction of public opinion to the Bush proposal reflects a fear of the Russian bear which is still widespread among parts of certain Central European elites.

<sup>2</sup> In the United States, the public's attitude toward particular foreign policy issues depends primarily on the degree to which the policy advances the American national interest, whether such a policy involves the use of military force, and how much it costs, among other factors.

Political changes in both Russia and the United States in 2008 are raising questions about the continuation of the missile defense dispute, since the outcome of these elections is not clear at this time. However, we do not think that the next U.S. administration will abandon Bush's effort to station interceptors' bases in Europe. Russian experts are certain that the announced limited number of interceptors with a radar station to guide them represent only a small part of what the U.S. military envisions as an end state. The consequences of this "provocative action" must not be underestimated (or so these Russian experts say), but nobody knows exactly what is really implied by these threatening words.

## The Beginning of the Story

This story began in May 2001, when the U.S. President George W. Bush announced plans to pursue a stepped-up national missile defense program (NMD). Mr. Bush said that small rogue nations were developing nuclear bombs and chemical weapons, and therefore posed a greater threat to the West than Russia and China.<sup>3</sup> He also said that the National Missile Defense system should protect U.S. citizens from missiles launched by *any* country, and that his administration hoped to develop such a system.<sup>4</sup>

According to a widespread view, the NMD project is a logical continuation of the Reagan-era Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars" program, as the missile defense program announced in the early 1980s was called. It should be noted that in September 2000, before leaving the White House, then-President Bill Clinton announced that he would not go ahead with the development of national missile defense system, deferring any decision to his successor, George W. Bush. The truth is that, at that time, if an attack had been launched against the United States, the U.S. military would not have been able to protect their national territory from incoming ballistic missiles, especially those with multiple warheads.

Clinton's decision was welcomed by President Putin, who said that it was seen in Russia as "a well-thought and responsible step."<sup>5</sup> The Russian military were more skeptical concerning postponing of the development of NMD. The defense ministry's official spokesman, three-star General Valery Manilov, the first deputy chief of staff of the Russian armed forces, told reporters in an interview with Russian television that Clinton's NMD postponement was "a false-bottomed suitcase."

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<sup>3</sup> According to U.S. sources, by the end of the previous century there were some 20–25 countries other than Russia and China that were suspected of developing or acquiring ballistic missiles that could be used in an attack either on U.S. or allied troops overseas or on United States territory. The list of so-called rogue states at that time was much shorter (the "nations of concern" were North Korea, Iraq, Libya, and Iran).

<sup>4</sup> President G.W. Bush made this hope clear in a speech on 1 May 2001; see "Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University," available at [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/text/20010501-10.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/text/20010501-10.html).

<sup>5</sup> This quotation is from the official statement of the Kremlin, and is available at [www.mid.ru](http://www.mid.ru); it can be found in the data archive.

For the Russian generals, the NMD proposal, its “Star Wars” predecessor, the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Program, which was developing in parallel, and other similar projects were all equally dangerous. The Russian military analysts viewed them as efforts aimed at reinforcing U.S. missile and high-tech arsenals, in order to build a modern umbrella to shield U.S. conventional and nuclear forces.<sup>6</sup>

On 13 June 2002, the United States withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia, which banned the deployment of missile defense systems outside the national territory. The U.S. withdrew from the treaty because, in order to be effective, missile defense systems should be deployed as close to the trouble spot as possible, not because the treaty was simply a Cold War relic.

Today, the 1972 ABM Treaty limitations are invalid.<sup>7</sup> That is why the U.S. can deploy elements of the missile defense system in Central Europe, where the so-called third positioning area of the U.S. ABM system is currently located. For a long time the Russians resisted changing the 1972 ABM Treaty, although they agreed that after the demise of the USSR it was rendered archaic. Although the Soviet Union—the United States’ partner in the 1972 ABM Treaty—no longer existed, as its successor state Russia kept all treaty commitments until the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002. The ABM treaty was critical to Russia as a confirmation of its status in the international arena, despite its loss of superpower status following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Russian Federation readily raised its voice against the unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the treaty, but that was all its leaders could do, along with making promises to upgrade the country’s strategic forces.<sup>8</sup> The U.S. president and his advisers tried to justify their decision, but all attempts to persuade the Russians failed, given their strong opposition to the idea of deployment of components of U.S. anti-ballistic missile system outside of U.S. territory. The United States was not ready to forgo building an interceptor site in Europe, while Russians insisted on such a site’s unacceptable nature. The Russians offered to use their radar installations in Azerbaijan as a joint early-

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<sup>6</sup> This point of view has still not changed significantly, even today. It matches that of Richard N. Perle, who had responsibility for the Strategic Defense Initiative as assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan Administration. This famous proselytizer for missile defense wrote recently: “Without any missile defense—our current situation—we are vulnerable to any country or movement that manages to obtain even a single missile capable of reaching the United States. Our allies and troops abroad are in greater jeopardy because shorter-range missiles, which are already available, can reach them.” (Richard N. Perle, “The Arms Race Myth, Again,” *The Washington Post*, 3 March 2008; A17; the citation has been taken from the version of the article posted on washingtonpost.com).

<sup>7</sup> The US Congress had not ratified the 1997 additional protocol, which bound the START II Treaty to the 1972 ABM Treaty.

<sup>8</sup> Moscow’s response, delivered in a statement by President Vladimir Putin, expressed disagreement with the U.S. decision but simultaneously emphasized the Russian official diplomatic position that the United States is not a threat to Russia. Putin also talked about speeding up the reform of Russia’s strategic forces. See S. Kortunov, “Washington Withdraws from the ABM Treaty,” *International Affairs* (Moscow) 48:4 (2002): 77–83.

warning center; the U.S. considered the radar system to be out-of-date; and so it went. In short, at every turn U.S.–Russian cooperation on this sensitive issue has been deflected or rejected by one side or the other.

We do not think that the then-Russian leadership feared that the U.S. missile umbrella would make United States forces invulnerable to missile attack, and thus would allow their “strategic partner” to strike Russia without fear of retaliation. Most likely they thought that, by holding to the treaty, they had a *legal* barrier to prevent the United States from developing something more dangerous than just the “limited” shield Bush claimed to want.

In our view, the juridical background of Putin and his closest advisers should be taken into account in any retrospective policy analysis. The Russian leadership under Putin always emphasized warm personal relationships with Western leaders and its respect for existing treaties and international laws—at least in public. But the idea that a handshake between Putin and Bush could stop the U.S. NMD program seems to us ludicrous.

## Rhetoric For and Against Missile Defense

On 1 May 2001, President Bush said, “This is an important opportunity for the world to rethink the unthinkable and to find new ways to keep peace,” alluding to days when the United States and the former Soviet Union threatened each other with massive nuclear arsenals. And then he added: “We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defense to counter the different threats to today’s world.” But we believe that this is not a new strategy to help “safeguard the U.S. from small but militant states,” to use President Bush’s words.<sup>9</sup>

There should be no illusion – the deployment of interceptors in Europe is simply a new version of the practice of extended defense. We are using the term *extended defense* consciously. The tired debate over missile defense brings us back to the strategy of the Cold War. Some older people may remember the concept concerning nuclear weapons as military instruments providing a way to deterrence that was *extended geographically*. Although the likelihood of nuclear war was rarely particularly high, throughout most of the Cold War this concept was attractive enough to justify the costs of defense systems positioned far from the American mainland. And, as we can see, the old-fashioned concept of extended deterrence remains viable; it has not been replaced with “new concepts of deterrence,” as Mr. Bush said. To those observers—including Russians or European—who might have had any doubts about the fundamental reason for the Bush Administration’s decision to deploy components of the ABM system, we will provide the following historical parallel that will address their questions.

To put it simply, today’s usage of the old concept of extended deterrence shows that the U.S. national security establishment to a large degree remains captive to a Cold War mentality. Cold War habits of thinking die hard. In this case we will not discuss missiles that might be launched from North Korea against the U.S. This scenario is not

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<sup>9</sup> Washingtonpost.com (online version of the *Washington Post* for 1 May 2001).

nearly as interesting for Russian analysts compared with a scenario involving the same missile being launched from a site located in the Middle East, because of such sites' geographical proximity to the main population centers in Russia. If they were intercepted, the North Korean missiles would likely fall into nearby seas or the Pacific Ocean with few if any immediate casualties.<sup>10</sup>

As for a possible attack from the Middle East, Russian military intelligence experts are sure that Iran has no intercontinental missiles capable of reaching Washington, D.C.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, Russian President Putin strongly opposed the U.S. decision to move a missile defense site close to the western borders of the Russian Federation, because for him there is no need to station interceptors in Europe "in advance." For pragmatic-thinking Russians, until Iranian long-range missiles are tested and proven to be operational, they pose no real threat to U.S. security.<sup>12</sup>

Another argument in support of this position comes from estimates for trajectories of missiles originating in Iran. If missiles launched from the Middle East were successfully intercepted by a boost-phase missile defense, it would be very likely that their warheads and/or pieces of incoming rockets and interceptors could kill thousands of innocent people in countries close to the launch site. It would be very unlikely that an intercepted missile with a nuclear warhead would fall within the borders of the country launching a missile, because of the time it would take for both the missile to climb out of the denser part of the atmosphere and for an interceptor to reach it.

To state the case clearly, if the above projections are valid, then it is almost certain that in the event of an attack launched from the Middle East, thousands of people who happen to live along the flight of an incoming missile would be killed. And if anyone believes that the United States really intends to deploy only a limited set of anti-ballistic missiles close to the launch sites to defend their citizens against Iranian attack, then he or she must answer the question: Why it should be done at the expense of Europeans and Russians?

For a long time, President Bush's advisers referred to this project as a national missile system, which implied that it was designed to protect only the United States, rather

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<sup>10</sup> Needless to say, the consequences of any successful interceptions can be estimated only in terms of possible outcomes. We will not speculate about what would happen to a warhead after a successful boost-phase missile defense engagement: would it detonate or not after the interceptor strikes a target? This issue is beyond the scope of this essay. According to technical experts, the probability of preventing the detonation of the nuclear warhead of an incoming rocket could vary due to a set of factors that will not be discussed here.

<sup>11</sup> Russia strongly stands against any "ultimate solution" of the so-called Iranian problem – e.g., a preemptive attack before missiles are launched, or a strike against Iran's nuclear facilities, etc. Such a defense policy could in theory be effective but is unacceptable in practice.

<sup>12</sup> The Russian military experts agree that both North Korea and Iran are building ballistic missiles with a range of 3,500–4,000 kilometers or even more, but say the total amount of these long-range missiles will be measured maybe in tens, not hundreds, by 2020–25. They also do not exclude a chance that in the future, a nation's (say, Pakistan) nuclear weapons and missiles might be stolen by Islamic extremists of Al-Qaeda, but doubt that the U.S. missile defenses would help to quell this kind of threat.



than Europe as well. As I said before, it seems that the U.S. is now seeking its own security at the expense of others. Of course, Bush Administration officials denied this interpretation from the very beginning of this story. On 3 February 2001, at the Munich Conference on European Security Policy, Donald Rumsfeld, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense, said to the European audience: “The United States has no interest in deploying defenses that would separate us from our friends and allies.”<sup>13</sup>

These words were spoken seven years ago. Regrettably, the very idea of deploying such a system has served to separate the Americans from the Russians, who, generally speaking, face the same risk of a potential attack from the Middle East. As we know, the proposal of collaborative missile defense against an attack from the Middle East made by Mr. Putin—which was actually the best variant, politically as well as technologically—was rejected by the U.S.<sup>14</sup> Perhaps, seven years ago in Munich, Mr. Rumsfeld was addressing his remarks only to Europeans, not to the Russians, who for him were neither friends nor allies. And it is likely that this attitude toward Russia, which was and is widespread among the Bush Administration and the U.S. elite at large, explains a great deal in the entire story: the rhetoric of friendship has been followed by a series of decisions calculated to alienate Russia.<sup>15</sup> One of these decisions is the construction of a NATO missile defense system, which will be discussed below.

Some Western colleagues may believe that a limited number of U.S.-built land-based interceptors in Europe do not constitute sufficient reason for Russia’s concern, but Russia believes that the United States’ friends, as well as its enemies, know that devil likes to lie in details.

The U.S. media emphasized the point that the ABM program is “limited,” and the number of interceptors is “modest”—e.g., dozens at first, and maybe near two or three hundred after that. About one hundred of these missiles would be located in Alaska, and a “limited” number in Central Europe and Turkey. In addition to these sites are those interceptors that are or will be stationed on sea-based launching platforms. All in all, it looks like a chain of anti-ballistic missiles along the perimeter of the Russian Federation and the borders of the People’s Republic of China. It is a striking reminder of the strategic outlook of the Cold War.

The Russians do not believe that such a configuration of launch sites is designed to defend the U.S. and its allies from North Korean and Iranian ballistic missiles, and that

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<sup>13</sup> Available at [www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2001/s20010203-secdef.htm](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2001/s20010203-secdef.htm).

<sup>14</sup> Yet there is little agreement in Moscow as to whether Russia really needs this collaboration, and what it will gain.

<sup>15</sup> Concerning this attitude, there is no great difference between Donald Rumsfeld and two other powerful decision makers in the Bush Administration, Dick Cheney and Condoleezza Rice, or even between him and Gen. Colin Powell, who served in the administration only during the first Bush term. In March 2001, Colin Powell, then-U.S. Secretary of State, told a congressional hearing: “In some ways, the approach to Russia, it seems to me, shouldn’t be terribly different than the very realistic approach we had to the old Soviet Union in the late 1980s”; see *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (May/June 2001): 30.

such a “modest defense is a prudent first step toward countering a known threat.”<sup>16</sup> For the Russians, the additional two to three hundred of the newest U.S.-built interceptors deployed near their borders constitute sufficient reason for serious anxiety.

### A Parade of Mistrust

According to Russian experts, there are strong reasons to believe that the U.S.-built AMD system is oriented basically against Russia and China as the newly emerged missile power of the twenty-first century, not against missiles from Iran or North Korea. U.S. GBI-type interceptors launched from Poland may reach Moscow in eleven minutes. These interceptors have a unique opportunity to eliminate Russian long-range (intercontinental) missiles during the boost phase of flight, just after launch—a capability that the U.S. military had never before possessed.<sup>17</sup> (The interceptors based in Alaska cannot reach Moscow quickly enough.) And it is absolutely impossible to imagine that the Russian national missile defense system would not react to an interceptor launch from Poland by treating it as an attack from an enemy target, because it could not simply ignore this event as if nothing had happened. Even a limited U.S. missile defense presence in Europe would result in Russia heightening the alert status of its missile arsenal, deploying new multiple warheads, etc.

As for the powerful radar installation in the Czech Republic—the most important element of the In-Flight Interceptor Communications System (IFICS) for controlling U.S. missiles, which, according to Russian experts, might be aimed at Russian strategic missiles—it is also considered to be an instrument that can be used for monitoring military activities in the eastern part of the Russian Federation, including missile launches for various purposes.<sup>18</sup>

Now for a brief aside: a short review of the range of viewpoints on the missile defense issue dominant in present-day Russia gives us a clear understanding that Russian military experts do not believe in the officially declared aims of the European components of the U.S. AMD system. The Russian political elite holds a similar attitude. This suspicious attitude toward U.S. attempts to persuade the Russians in a prolonged dispute over missile defense seems to be a mirror reflection of the traditional U.S. mistrust of the Russians that revealed itself in Mr. Rumsfeld’s speech in Munich mentioned above.

In our view, few in Moscow today believe that the mentioned “limited” elements of the AMD system represent an immediate threat to Russian national security. But while these elements were being positioned in Poland and the Czech Republic, despite Russian objections, the Russian authorities resumed talking about the “appropriate responses” to what they consider to be a newly emergent challenge to Russia. This dis-

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<sup>16</sup> Richard Perle, “The Arms Race Myth, Again.”

<sup>17</sup> Vladimir Vasiliev, “Zachem Amerikantsam basi PRO v Evrope? (Why do Americans have Anti-Missile Defense bases in Europe?)” *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (27 February 2008); available at [www.ng.ru/nvo/2008-02-27/9\\_pro.html](http://www.ng.ru/nvo/2008-02-27/9_pro.html).

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

cussion was sparked because only very few Russians believe in the idea of collaborative defense against a missile attack from the Middle East.

The political discourse regarding the positioning of the U.S.-built anti-ballistic missile system in Europe has followed the same pattern as the discussion of the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty in 2002, and earlier in the 1980s regarding the Star Wars program. In all three cases, the Russian responses first fell under the rubric of an argument about *asymmetry*, and the rationale for bringing up this term was to prepare the nation for a new, moderate (by definition), increase of military expenses. The second step in the pattern—at least partly in the last case—is to mobilize public opinion in Poland and the Czech Republic to oppose their national governments on this sensitive issue. The third step is to dissuade the United States and its European allies from pursuing the selected course of action.

The idea behind missile defense has always been to save the U.S. people from the disastrous consequences of nuclear attack. How ironic it is, then, that today there are sound reasons to believe that Russia would be most likely to retarget some of its missiles to Europe as a part of its asymmetric response to this deployment. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that the Bush Administration and the U.S. Congress are concerned about this prospect, or are even aware of it. On the contrary, President Bush is galloping in exactly the wrong direction with his advocacy of the European elements of the AMD system.

The defense ministers of NATO countries at the recent (2008) meeting in Northwick discussed an idea of comprehensive missile defense that can protect all NATO members. Naturally, the Russian observers could not ignore these debates, yet it was simply a conversation about the potential architecture of the entire project. Because again, while thinking about the future, one should answer several basic questions: First, is there a real danger of an offensive missile attack against Europe? Where is such an attack expected to come from? Second, are all member states equally engaged in the project, or do the decisions emanate from just a few countries? And, if this is a case, who in particular, and why?

The conclusions drawn by Russian commentators concerning the perception of threats exposed at that meeting could best be described as original. They argued that, for NATO leaders, the danger to the Alliance does not come from the East, but rather it lies in the East—that is, the threat is not encroaching on Europe, but rather Europe is advancing into dangerous territory.

There is a long historical tradition of Western perceptions of the threat from the East. That conception played an important role in the assessment of Soviet policy and in the planning of Western strategists. As we see, these hoary old threat-perceptions are alive. The deeply rooted prejudice against the Russians or a latent Russo-phobia produced an appeal explicitly to an already-existing traditional threat-perception. Simply put, what determines the actions of the NATO defense ministers is what they think a potential threat looks like, not what it actually is.

We doubt that Russian opposition will slow NATO's planned missile defense implementation. The Alliance is studying the hows, not the whys of this plan. It seems that nobody among the NATO member states ever took seriously the statement made

by Vladimir Putin, after he was elected as President of Russia in March 2000, that if the West views Russia as an equitable partner, then Russia might, with the passage of time, join NATO.

I will not speculate here about whether Russia is still perceived as the primary threat to NATO, despite numerous declarations about partnership and collaboration and a change in the global geopolitical landscape. Nor will I discuss Russia's deeply rooted mistrust regarding the truthfulness of Western/U.S. policy, which is the foundation of much of the anti-missile defense rhetoric in Russia. Such speculations are fun, but what good are they?

If the U.S. had a completely operational Star Wars missile shield on September 11, would it have saved the Twin Towers? The principal answer is that designing a missile defense system that is sufficient for the purposes of dealing with accidental or unintended launches is merely a technical problem, while dealing with rogue states or fighting international terrorism is a political problem, and this difference is not yet well understood. Therefore, we would agree that the real issue is how to deal with real threats as they emerge, how to develop a true and comprehensive non-proliferation strategy, and how to ensure that global security overall is enhanced rather than diminished by whatever efforts are undertaken.<sup>19</sup>

### **Non-Collateral Consequences**

The use of sea-based anti-missile weapons against the disabled U.S. intelligence satellite in February 2008—an event that actually looked more like a test of the interceptor's ability—might serve to provoke accelerated development of anti-satellite weapons in Russia and China, and thus an arms race in space.<sup>20</sup> Looking back in time, we can remember that, shortly before Mr. Rumsfeld became President Bush's defense secretary and delivered his speech in Munich, he chaired a commission that concluded that "space warfare was virtually inevitable." To "negate the hostile use of space against us," the commission said, "America would need to be able to project power in, from, and through space"—a challenge neither Russia nor China is likely to ignore.<sup>21</sup> And today, unfortunately, there is a good reason to believe that the likelihood of a new, perhaps even more costly, arms race will keep increasing.

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<sup>19</sup> Here we are slightly rephrasing the words of Robert Hunter, the former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, from his Ernest Bevin Memorial lecture at the Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom on 10 February 2001.

<sup>20</sup> In fact, Russia/the USSR is a pioneer in this area (a set of successful tests of anti-satellite weapons was conducted in the 1970s and 1980s), but according to sources the Soviets stopped work in this area at the beginning of the 1990s. As for China, this nation has accelerated its anti-satellite weaponry and missile programs in the early 2000s. In 2006, China demonstrated its ability to destroy an object in space, although not with the same skill as the leading space nations. In response to the U.S. plan of TMD deployment in Taiwan, China continues to build up its conventional missile forces. If China is indeed to become "the superpower of the twenty-first century," as some experts argue, the next few years may be vital in its transformation into a great space nation.

<sup>21</sup> Cited in *The Economist* (5 May 2001): 21.

Russian defense officials are not afraid of U.S. missile defense modernization; they know that a completely “watertight” missile defense system is technically unfeasible. If the development of a supersonic missile with the ability to penetrate any missile shield, and thus to fully negate the most robust NMD the United States might muster, is an inseparable part of Russia’s asymmetric policy response, then defense strategists must remember that the domestic consequences of the Cold War-era arms race for the USSR were catastrophic.<sup>22</sup> The Russian authorities swear that they will not repeat the mistakes of their Soviet forebears, and it is a pity if these declarations are just words. It is worth remembering that the rest of the world may not see us the way we see ourselves.

It should also be noted that some students of international relations maintain a view that the AMD deployment would not lead to another world-wide arms race because the Cold War doctrine of mutual assured destruction has been dissipated, as both the United States and Russia seek to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons and address more conventional twenty-first-century threats. Despite the reliance on nuclear deterrence proclaimed in the military doctrines of both the Russian Federation and the United States, nuclear weapons are not the weapons of the twenty-first century. This is due first to the fact that they are weapons of last resort, and, second, to the rapid development of new powerful and precise non-nuclear weapons that can successfully replace nuclear weaponry in certain applications, missile defense systems, and other state-of-the-art military technologies.

As a result, an arms race defined by the old rules will not materialize in the new century, and therefore the U.S. ABM defense deployments near Russia or China’s borders will have little or no effect on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) around the world. Instead, great powers will continue to retool their conventional forces. There is a certain rationale in such a view, yet only the future will show for certain whether the nuclear competition and/or the proliferation of long-range missiles have truly come to a halt. It is true that the threats are different, but the global fear of Iran’s military nuclear program confirms that a national nuclear power is still the most valid argument in international affairs that will ensure anyone respectable status on the world stage.

Now for another brief aside: I have referred above to the theory of “mutually assured destruction,” or MAD. And we believe that readers have recognized that the deterrence strategies of the Cold War—the concepts of mutually assured destruction and massive retaliation—are not working today. Unfortunately, the logic of MAD has not gone away.

In the Russian view, one serious concern is also a possible (though unlikely) decision by the U.S. to return to a limited nuclear testing regime, because the U.S. has not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The famous 2002 U.S.–Russia agreement about reductions of nuclear arsenals must be mentioned in this line as well.

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<sup>22</sup> These weapons have a unique capability. To be completely correct, the above mentioned project was launched long before the issue of missile defense in Europe became a hot topic. As a rule, it takes several years or even more to develop a new warhead, carrier rocket, or launcher.

As we know, soon after the U.S. withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty, Russia agreed to make major reductions in its strategic offensive missile forces. Today many experts are concerned with questions concerning the future of bilateral arms agreements between the U.S. and Russia: Will the deployment of the small land-based component of the U.S. missile defense system in Europe hinder future arms-reduction deals? To what extent can future reductions in nuclear weapons be negotiated between the United States and the Russian Federation given the dangers posed by an atmosphere of growing mutual mistrust?

## Conclusions

The full content of the Russian asymmetric response to the United States' withdrawal from the AMD Treaty and the deployment of elements of the missile defense system in two Eastern European countries remains unresolved. The efforts by the United States to build missile defenses lead to reactions from Russia, and today there is no question of whether the Russian government could come up with enough money to implement "adequate" responses. The flood of oil money enables Russia to afford a response on the technical level. Indeed, on 18 June 2001, the first time that President Putin announced his reaction after the U.S. missile defense plan was initially revealed to the public, he spoke about upgrading Russia's nuclear arsenal. In particular, Mr. Putin discussed the prospect that Russia would mount multiple warheads on its strategic missiles, and said that Russia would be likely to stop reducing its long-range missile and bomber forces as part of Russia's "asymmetric response." He has repeated his words about an "asymmetric" answer several times during the last seven years, but it seems that Russia's threats were not heard in the West.

In February 2008, Vladimir Putin—at that time on his way out of office (if not out of power)—once again vowed to field new weapons "in response" to the deployment of interceptors in Central Europe. The U.S. media simply laughed at his statement that, with U.S. plans to deploy a limited defense against ballistic missiles, "a new arms race has been unleashed in the world." As Richard Perle wrote in *The Washington Post* on 3 March 2008, "We should greet Russian threats to race with amusement and a big yawn: They would be competing against themselves. If Putin wishes to pour petro-rubles into building more missiles, our response should be limited to sympathy for the ordinary Russians whose taxes will be squandered, much as they were with catastrophic consequences during the Cold War." The conclusion was that, "with his rhetoric, Putin hopes to excite the opponents of a limited U.S. missile defense system and those politicians here and abroad who will be unnerved by Russian threats of a new 'arms race'," but that he "should relax."<sup>23</sup>

This is a characteristic depiction in the Western media of Russia's reaction to the deployment of U.S.-built interceptors in Central Europe. Meanwhile, Putin's threats should not be completely dismissed as rhetoric, as he has been very shrewd in managing Russia's nuclear policy. He supported the ratification of START II by the Russian

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<sup>23</sup> Richard Perle, "The Arms Race Myth, Again."

parliament, and then challenged the United States to agree to deeper strategic nuclear force cuts in a new treaty.

In dealing with this topic, we often find ourselves confronted with a conflict: either we talk and speculate generally about the entire issue, or we examine very concretely, perhaps too concretely, certain detailed aspects of perceptions of Russia's behavior in this particular case. In this paper I have attempted to discuss both the big picture and the more specific evidence with the necessary concentration and brevity.

Most Western observers of the U.S.–Russian dispute about missile defense are concerned with the question of how the growth of Russia's resistance to missile defense systems is linked with Russia's transformation into an "energy superpower." No one should be surprised by such a connection. Western observers often proffer an explanation of Russia's behavior that is couched in economic terms: today, Russia's threats are actually about oil contracts; earlier, they were actually about the repayment of Soviet-era debt. However, in my view, such a simplistic analysis fails to account for Russia's essential motives. Russia's political use of oil and gas exports to Europe is depicted by the Western media as a means for the realization of Russia's ambition to regain its great power status. Meanwhile, in reality the Western countries that consume Russian gas and oil and the Russia that produces and sells these commodities are mutually dependent. Russia always fulfills its energy contracts with the West. As one wise person said, the Russians wouldn't drink their petrol, if the West did not buy it.

We think that the question the media are pursuing concerns not the essence of present Russian foreign and energy policy, but rather an image of Russia that is conveyed by the press in the West. As was mentioned above, the image of Russia as a re-emerging threat to European security is a result of a complex process of image-building, one that is more dependent on historical traditions than on present-day facts and prospects. Nevertheless, this specific image that many in the Western political elite have of Russia forms part of the foundation on which media comments and political decisions are based. It seems that even the concessions to the U.S. made by Mr. Putin in the early 2000s appear not to have created any fundamental change in perceptions.

The political problem can be best framed as, How much of President Putin's post-September 11 policy is Russia ready to abandon in response to the deployment of interceptors in Central Europe? I will not discuss this question here, although the reader might try to answer this question him- or herself.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> It seems that in the early 2000s Putin held illusions regarding the consistency of missile defense policy, and maybe even thought that Bush's intentions could be changed by a combination of Russian objections and concessions. After the U.S. withdrew from the ABM treaty in 2001, Moscow's response, delivered in a statement by Putin, expressed disagreement with the U.S. decision but diplomatically emphasized the official position that U.S. is not a threat to Russia. After the events of 9/11, Putin allowed the U.S. to construct airbases in former Soviet republics in Central Asia, and did not actively hinder the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Then, in 2002, Russia agreed to sign a new treaty on the reduction of U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals.

The course of a nation's foreign policy is said to be the sum of that country's geography, history, and resources. Such a policy course includes a foreign policy geared to a nation's interests, memories, and values. The dilemma of Russia's size and the current dynamism of its economy are crucial for the years to come. As a matter of fact, the Russian Federation—much like the Soviet Union in the days of the Cold War—relies upon nuclear weapons as risk-minimizing military instruments. The possession of a significant nuclear arsenal gives the Russians a chance to compete with the West economically and to be treated as equals politically; this is a popular position of those who prefer thinking in terms of security that is guaranteed through the ability of assured destruction of any potential rival by nuclear missiles. But isn't this way of thinking simply *realpolitik* all over again?

On Russia's political agenda, the debate around the ABM issue is mixed with a discussion of steps aimed at modernizing the Russian armed forces and creating renewed components for the Russian missile program. It is really an unfinished discussion, yet it has been poorly reported in the West, where it has too often been caricatured and misinterpreted.<sup>25</sup>

The recent debate in the Russian media concerning the coming deployment of the missile defense system components in Central Europe has been driven by a tiny group of military commentators, while the public has played a negligible role. As Russian objections have been ignored once again, many ordinary Russians, following Putin's anti-Western rhetoric, believe the U.S. is still pushing its old security agenda, and that the Bush Administration is pursuing a methodical anti-Russian policy. In fact, the U.S. NMD plan served as a powerful impulse to frighten the Russian public into sacrificing more for the nation's defense. The bulk of Russian policy-makers and observers have been almost universally hostile to the new U.S. and/or NATO bases near the Russian borders (in Bulgaria, etc.); their attitude toward the deployment of U.S. interceptors in Poland, along with the radar station in the Czech Republic, was predictably negative. Meanwhile, it seems that Russian military analysts have realized that Russia cannot do much about it. This follows the same pattern of behavior that was revealed during lengthy debates in Russia on NATO enlargement eastward in 1990s, the Kosovo crisis in 1999, and after President Bush's announcement of the NMD plan in 2001.

The Russians felt humiliated yet again, but could do nothing to prevent the deployment. Would they finally let the problem drop quietly? It is an open question, although one can foresee no profound actions coming from the Russian side. Perhaps this is because the missile issue does not concern Russia's vital interests.

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<sup>25</sup> See, for instance, Robert Joseph and J.D. Crouch II, "Moscow's Missile Gambit," *The Washington Post* (13 March 2008): A17. The authors attempted to analyze the U.S. and Russian stands in the dispute on missile issue, praised the U.S. position, and finally came to the very trivial conclusion: "Moscow is eager to regain its great-power status and thinks the path to success requires painting the United States as the threat. ... On missile defense, the United States must move forward, just as Russia does when its vital interests are at stake. We should continue to be respectful and transparent about the need for our deployments but make clear that the United States will proceed without Moscow's cooperation."



This kind of behavior matches the course of Russian foreign policy course since Vladimir Putin came to power. Only after the United States withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty (continued adherence to which was a condition specified in the Russian START II ratification law) did Russia announce that it considered itself no longer bound by the provisions of START II. Due to the ABM project—at least in part—U.S.–Russian relations have been deteriorating for some time, and Russia has been drifting away from the West in general, as demonstrated by its unilateral withdrawal from the Conventional Forces in Europe (CPE) Treaty. There also have been predictable differences over the issue of Kosovo’s independence at the UN Security Council meetings. Alas, nothing of all that has been mentioned has been anything new.

To conclude, the Bush team came to office obsessed with building a ballistic missile shield. The temptation of missile defense became a harsh lesson for Russia’s president. However, let us not forget that the issue of missile defense is just a part of the broader context of international relations. And let us hope that responsible Russian leadership—in particular the newly elected Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev,<sup>26</sup> as well as Russian society at large—will seek to avoid “freezing” Russian cooperation with Europe, and will not push the country toward a new military and political confrontation with the United States. We think that a new national leader cannot craft policy on the assumption that the future will largely resemble the past, because then any changes will come as a shock for which Russia is not prepared.

The old appeals to understand the other side—i.e., the motivations and interests as they apply to the missile defense issue—and to offer a mutually acceptable solution are vital today as never before. Otherwise, we believe that missile defense systems, while redefining deterrence, are nevertheless part of discredited security paradigm, and will lead to greater global instability, and not to the abolition of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems through diplomacy.

*Postscript: This article was written in March 2008. Six months later, its predictions are becoming a reality. It is still too early to speak of what the Russian counter-actions against the deployment of the U.S. missile defense bases in Poland and the Czech Republic might be. Therefore, it is impossible to discuss what measures will be taken by the Russian Federation. Appropriate decisions will be made by the Medvedev Administration depending on information obtained. But, whatever they may be, these actions cannot solve the missile defense problem in the long term.*

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<sup>26</sup> This text was written soon after the 2008 presidential elections in Russia.

# The Military Profession, Public Trust, and Public Interest

Giuseppe Caforio \*

## Public Opinion and the Institution of the Military

Trust in and prestige of the military profession are strongly influenced by the general public attitude towards the armed forces, in relation to the perception of threat by the public and the prestige that the military has overall in each country.<sup>1</sup> It thus seems opportune to begin this essay with a few elements of knowledge on these aspects of more general interest before moving on to a survey centered on the military profession in the more specific sense.

The profound geopolitical transformations that began in 1989 led, for a certain number of years, to a decreased perception of threat by European populations (and others as well) that was shortly followed by a sizeable decrease in armed forces and military budgets. But the illusion of the “end of history” and of a “peace dividend” soon had to give way to an international reality that was much more turbulent than in the past but which, up until the events of 11 September 2001, did not make a strong impression on European public opinion.<sup>2</sup> Threat perception was a datum of so little interest after 1989 that the Eurobarometer surveys of the 1990s and up to 2002 did not include this item in their questionnaires. The attacks of 11 September 2001 represented a turning point in a crescendo of preoccupations now registered by opinion polls that reveal, for the countries of the European Community, a sensitivity to individual threats and the trend described graphically in Figure 1.

After 2001, the citizens of the European countries examined in these surveys thus appear to be concerned by what have been termed the “new security threats,” namely international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime,

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\* Dr. Giuseppe Caforio is a retired general in the Italian Army, and is currently president of the Research Committee 01 “Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution” of the International Sociological Association. He has written widely on the sociology of the armed forces.

<sup>1</sup> The term “military profession” is here understood chiefly as the officer’s profession, both because, according to the prevalent opinion among scholars, only officers are attributed the full connotation of a professional position: see Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York, Free Press, 1960); Gian Paolo Prandstraller, *La professione militare in Italia* (Milan, Franco Angeli, 1985); and Giuseppe Caforio, “The Military Profession: Theories of Change,” *Armed Forces & Society* 15:1 (Fall 1988): 55–70. This is because non-commissioned officers are normally considered semi-professionals, and because the most significant studies and researches to date have been conducted on officers; see Amitai Etzioni, ed., *The Semiprofessions and their Organization: Teachers, Nurses, Social Workers* (New York: Free Press, 1969).

<sup>2</sup> See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History* (New York: Free Press, 1992). For a discussion of the putative “peace dividend,” see John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” *International Security* 15:4 (Summer 1990): 5–56.




Figure 1: The Fears of EU Citizens (EU15)

Source: Eurobarometer surveys 57 and 59 (author’s elaboration); available at [www.gesis.org/en/data\\_service/eurobarometer/](http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eurobarometer/).

an accident in a nuclear power station, ethnic conflicts, and a world war. These are all threats that, with the exception of only two—organized crime and nuclear accidents—appear to be issues that lie in the realm of military competence, and that also, at least in the short-term analysis (2002–03), prove to be on the rise.

The overarching security problem therefore no longer centers, post-1989, on the necessity of maintaining a balance of forces with an opposing armed bloc, but rather on the need to maintain a peaceful situation in the world, at least in the early part of this period. In the years since 2001, another security challenge has arisen alongside the need to maintain global stability: countering the new menace of Islamic fundamentalism in its more aggressive forms. This is also the framework of the exponential growth in the number of peacekeeping missions from the 1980s to 2000 and beyond, missions that have become an important part (at times preponderant) of the operational commitment of the armed forces in the European countries.

Public trust and interest in the armed forces follow the same trend—that is, an overall rise from the early 1990s to the present. Particularly interesting in this regard are the data of the European Values Study, which examined trust in the armed forces in thirty-four European countries over the 1990s. These surveys showed an overall average growth in trust in the armed forces, from 46 percent in 1990 to 55 percent in 2000.<sup>3</sup> To give a view that adheres more closely to the reality of the phenomenon, in

<sup>3</sup> The thirty-four countries are: Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany (East/West), Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey (2001), and Ukraine. The European Value Study was not conducted after 2000.

Figure 2 below I have reported the data of five key European countries for the entire period 1990–2003, which better illustrates the growth trend.<sup>4</sup>




Figure 2: Trust in the Army: Trends from 1990–2003; A sample of five countries  
*Source:* ZA3811: EVS—European Values Study 1990/2000 (release 2 May 2006)—Integrated Dataset, and Eurobarometer 61 for the year 2003. Available at <http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/velocity?mode=treeview#> and [www.gesis.org/en/data\\_service/eurobarometer/](http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eurobarometer/), respectively.

Except for Poland, where public trust in the military nevertheless still remains at high levels, the trend is positive for all of the remaining four nations examined.

It is also interesting to observe the relative positions between the institutions in which European citizens place the most trust and their variations in the period. Figure 3 clearly shows how, during the post-Cold War era in Europe, the increase of trust in the armed forces has been matched by a decrease of trust in other institutions, such as the church, the police, and supranational institutions.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> A confirmation of the trend had already come from the research of Jan van der Meulen for the period 1990–97 in four countries: the U.K., France, Germany, and the Netherlands. See Jan van der Meulen, “Public Opinion, Mass Media, and the Military: A Programmatic Sketch of Perspectives,” in *The European Military in Transition*, ed. Maria Vlachova (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998), 148–57.

<sup>5</sup> The position of the church in the ranking of the institutions is strongly influenced by the data from the countries in the Orthodox Christian region, where the church still is the most trusted institution for most people, even today. (See, for example, the data of the SEE Public Agenda Survey, organized by the International Idea and SEEDS Network in 2002; data available at [www.idea.int/europe\\_cis/balkans/](http://www.idea.int/europe_cis/balkans/).) In the fifteen-member European Union, on the contrary, is the armed forces and the police in the early twenty-first century that are vying for the top spot in citizens’ trust, followed by voluntary organizations; the church does not appear in the top five spots in the ranking (data from Eurobarometer surveys).




Figure 3: Trust in Institutions: Trends from 1990–2000: Thirty-four countries of the European Values Study  
 Source: ZA3811: EVS–European Values Study 1990/2000 (release 2, May 2006)–Integrated Dataset.

### Public Opinion and the Military Profession

As mentioned above, favorable attitudes toward the military profession have followed the same positive trend as displayed by the increasing trust shown by public opinion in the European countries in the military as a whole. This is attested not only by various opinion polls conducted in nearly all of the countries, but also—and perhaps even more convincingly—by the trend of the number of applications per opening in the various military academies. To briefly illustrate this trend with some available data, I have shown in Figure 4 below the trend of applicants per place in the military academies of four European countries in the period. As can be seen in the graph, the trend is rising everywhere.

In the same years examined in Figure 4, the military profession in the developed countries (and especially in Europe) also underwent far-reaching internal transformations that were not without substantial repercussions in its perception by civil society.

As I have written elsewhere, the changing face of the military profession in the 1990s appears to have been determined essentially by three causes.<sup>6</sup> The first is that in everyday practice the European officer is called on to operate in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and, among them, increasingly often in Peace Support Operations (PSOs). The second is that the contingents deployed in these types of missions are more and more often multinational in character, with the result that officers have to cope with not inconsiderable problems of interoperability with the units of other

<sup>6</sup> Giuseppe Caforio, ed., *The European Officer: A Comparative View on Selection and Education* (Pisa: ETS, 2000).




Figure 4: Number of Applicants per Place at Military Academies

Source: Giuseppe Caforio, ed., *The European Officer: A Comparative View on Selection and Education* (Pisa: ETS, 2000).

countries.<sup>7</sup> The third cause is that, particularly in PSOs, military officers have taken on roles of an increasingly diplomatic nature for which they were not previously responsible, including maintaining relations with the local communities, with the local churches, with the international bodies, and with non-governmental organizations.

To prepare the new military professionals for these new aspects of their profession, substantial changes have taken place in both the substance and emphasis of the training processes at the military academies of most European countries which have, among other things, led to their programs drawing closer to those of sectors of the civilian universities (especially those of political science faculties).<sup>8</sup> All this has led to phenomena of convergence of the institution of the military with civil society, a convergence that has, almost everywhere in Europe, made the work of military professionals more comprehensible (and better appreciated) than it was in the Cold War period, where the primary function of the armed forces was the rather cryptic one of deterrence.

## Opinions and Attitudes of Young People Today Toward the Military Profession

### *Foreword on the Sample and the Research*

Today's situation regarding the trust and interest of young people in the military profession is described here on the basis of data from an empirical survey that was conducted in eleven democratic countries on a broader theme, but which offers significant

<sup>7</sup> The term *interoperability* is here taken to mean the necessity of coordinating the use of units with different armaments, different munitions, different military training, different legal and disciplinary rules, etc.

<sup>8</sup> See Caforio, *The European Officer*.

insights for the subject under review.<sup>9</sup> The particular significance of the research stems from the fact that it is not a generic opinion poll of a sampling of citizens from each selected country according to the common characteristics of representativeness of ordinary surveys, but a study focused on samples of students at both civilian universities and military academies. These “future elites” of the participating countries were surveyed in depth by means of a questionnaire consisting of forty-five questions administered during the year 2004–05. A total of 2,751 young people born between 1974 and 1986 were surveyed. The sample composition is shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Composition of the Sample

	Q20. What are you studying?				
	Military Academies	Various	Economics	Law	Political Science
Number of useful questionnaires	1230	212	519	452	338
Percentages	44.7	7.7	18.9	16.4	12.3
Male %	87.0	46.7	53.6	54.2	50.7
Female %	13.0	53.3	46.4	45.8	49.3
Class year: %					
1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup>	59.7	42.6	41.5	51.9	46.9
3 <sup>rd</sup> and higher	40.3	57.4	58.5	48.1	53.1

As can be seen from these data, the sample seems sufficiently representative, both in its subdivision by gender (which, however skewed in certain cases, accurately reflects the gender composition of the individual universes surveyed) and in the distribution by class year. A more detailed description of the sample and of the research methodologies can be found in the volume devoted to a complete report on the research.<sup>10</sup>

The survey has particular interest both for its attempt to get a fix on some of the value attitudes of the youths in the examined countries at a given historical moment (thereby also permitting a diachronic comparison in a later analogous investigation) and for comparing these attitudes among the youths of different geopolitical areas. One aspect that might be considered a limit of this research must be borne in mind, however: it was conducted among those that we have called the “future elites” of the ex-

<sup>9</sup> The countries where the survey was conducted are Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. The general theme of the research was the cultural gap that exists between the civilian sector and the military sector. The research report was published in spring 2007; see Giuseppe Caforio, ed., *Cultural Differences between the Military and Parent Society in Democratic Countries* (London and Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007).

<sup>10</sup> See Caforio, ed., *Ibid.*

amed countries—that is, only among young people attending university-level programs of study, with the exclusion of those already employed in other occupations. Our point of view hinges on the hypothesis that it is the elites who dictate the tendencies that are sooner or later followed by their peers.

### *The Results of the Research*

The interest of young people in security issues in general is rather high, seeing that the sum of the “very much” and “somewhat interested” responses is 81.5 percent of the sample. The situation differs from country to country, naturally, as shown in Figure 5.




Figure 5: Interest in Security Issues by Country

(reflecting a combination of responses in the categories “very much” and “somewhat”)

Source: All of the data shown in this figure, as well as in the figures and tables that follow, are taken from Giuseppe Caforio, ed., *Cultural Differences between the Military and Parent Society in Democratic Countries* (London and Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007).

This interest is of course more extensive among the youths who attend the military academies, but it also remains high among their peers at the civilian universities (71 percent).

In comparison with the view of other national institutions, the trust that the interviewed young people place in the military is high. Indeed, it occupies second place overall (outstripped only by universities): it is first for the French, German, Dutch, Romanian, and Swedish interviewees; second for the Bulgarians and Poles; third for the Italians; and fourth for the Slovenes. A separate case is represented by the Swiss respondents, for which the military is only ranked the fifth most-trusted institution in Switzerland, and the Spanish ones, who put it as low as eighth. We shall talk about the particular situations of these two countries later on. In general, the average responses indicate that the military is ranked among those institutions in which the interviewees have most trust, with the mentioned exceptions. In a subdivision according to gender it is males, as might be expected, who place more trust in the military than females.



A confirmation of the trust that the interviewed elites have in the military comes from analyzing their responses to the statement: “The military should be abolished.” Only 10 percent of the respondents answered affirmatively to this item, with the remainder responding negatively. If we break down this response according to the other variables present, we see that those most in favor of the abolition of the military are, in order, the Swiss (28 percent) and the Spanish (20 percent); women more than men (15 percent versus 9 percent); young Muslims (16 percent), who expressed this sentiment more often than those of other religions; and those who place themselves at the extreme left of the political spectrum (32 percent).

To the more specific question on the public image of the military profession in the respondent’s own country, the overall average of the respondents judges this image to be positive (56.3 percent), as illustrated in Figure 6 below.




Figure 6: Perceived Public Image of the Military Profession

But here, too, it is a deeper analysis that breaks down the responses and examines their intersections with other variables that give the most meaningful results. Starting with a breakdown by country (illustrated in Figure 7), we see that it is in the former communist countries that the military profession seems to have a better public image, while in the countries of Western Europe one records values quite close to the general average for the sample, with the significant negative exceptions of the Spanish and German respondents.

In a breakdown according to gender, it is the women who feel that the military profession has a more positive public image (3 percentage points more than the men): is the fascination of the uniform perhaps at work here?

More significant is the correlation with the respondents’ declared political positions, where, perhaps unexpectedly, it is those on the left who feel the image of the military profession is better in their respective country’s public opinion. Figure 8 below clearly illustrates this trend.




Figure 7: Perceived Positive Public Image of the Military Profession by Country




Figure 8: Perceived Positive Public Image of the Military Profession by Political Affiliation

It is possible that, especially among the members of the political right, who might be expected to traditionally hold a more favorable opinion of the military, an unsatisfied desire for increased public esteem for the military profession is at work here.

Public perception of the military profession according to respondents' declared religious faith is quite interesting. Orthodox Christians diverge significantly from the sample average by their much higher esteem (over 80 percent) for the military, a perception that remains high also for Muslim respondents (over 60 percent), albeit with less enthusiastic judgments than the preceding ones (see Figure 9). Decidedly more modest is the view held by Protestants and, even more so, by Catholics, whose trends also appear very similar, as shown in Figure 9. The lowest evaluation of the military is expressed by those who describe themselves as atheists (not included in the figure).

It would seem, therefore, that religious affiliation is not an indifferent data point in relation to people's views of the military profession and, in particular, it is linked to religious fervor. Indeed, responding to another question on church attendance, those who declare themselves Orthodox Christians also report higher rates of church atten-

dance than the sample average; at the other extreme, as we have seen, it is the declared atheists who offer the lowest assessment of the military profession’s public image. From these data one should infer, therefore, albeit with due caution, that religious observance and a pro-military mindset go hand-in-hand for the future elites of the European countries examined here.




Figure 9: Perceived Positive Public Image of the Military Profession by Religious Affiliation

Extending the analysis to the level of *prestige* that the respondents accord to the military profession, we see that it is ranked sixth among sixteen professions proposed for evaluation by the interviewees, after those of medical doctor, diplomat, university professor, lawyer, and manager. An excellent ranking overall, therefore, seeing as how it precedes prestigious professions like that of engineer, entrepreneur, pharmacist, journalist, and police inspector. The ranking varies significantly from country to country, however, as is show in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Perceived Prestige of a Professional Military Position by Country

Country	Bulgaria	France	Germany	Italy	Netherlands	Poland	Romania	Slovenia	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland
Prestige of officer profession (ranking)	5	3	7	3	3	4	2	9	8	5	9

Perceived prestige according to gender varies by one position—the officer position comes in sixth place for men, seventh for women, who place engineers ahead of military officers in the sample average.

This positive assessment of the military profession is also confirmed by another item of the questionnaire, which reads “I am proud of women and men who serve in the military,” a statement that received 74 percent favorable responses from those surveyed. The national differences, reported in Table 3, are significant and interesting here in this respect as well.

Table 3: Pride in Respondents’ Countries’ Military Personnel, by Country

Country	Bulgaria	France	Germany	Italy	Netherlands	Poland	Romania	Slovenia	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland
% of respondents who are proud of their country’s military men and women	81.5	84.4	70.0	80.9	78.1	59.5	74.4	70.2	59.3	79.1	45.6

In all the surveyed countries, however, this item elicits agreement from a majority of the interviewees with the exception of Switzerland.

In a breakdown according to religious faith, greater appreciation for military personnel is shown here too by Orthodox Christians (78.3 percent) than by the combined group of members of other religious faiths and respondents declaring themselves atheists (63.9 percent).

Finally, a respondent’s declared political stance appears to be a strong indicator of opinion on this point, as graphically represented in Figure 10 below.




Figure 10: Positive Consideration of Military Personnel According to Respondents’ Political Position

The rating, finally, of the professional training provided to officers at military academies is positive on the whole for 71 percent of the sample, but with sizeable differences between the cadets and the university students, as the latter appear more tepid in their esteem of this preparation, as is illustrated in Figure 11 below. Among university students it is especially women who give more negative assessments (33.4 percent) than both the sample average (29 percent) and their male peers (26.4 percent).




Figure 11: Military Officer Education Rating

Breaking this category of response down by religious faith, once again it is the Orthodox Christian respondents who stand out, having views of the quality of officer education that are much more positive than the sample average, as do those on the political right with respect to respondents who embrace other political positions.<sup>11</sup>

**Discussion**

The presentation of the data above makes it possible first of all to confirm that public trust and interest in the military profession in Europe have grown in parallel with the manifestation of a different perception of the threat environment and an increasing confidence in the military institution overall. Analyzing the shifts in threat perception is particularly interesting. It substantially declined in quantitative terms in the period 1990–2001, but turned toward a wider range of threats and ones of a type more easily perceived by a public opinion that is not always particularly well informed on security issues. After 2001, public perception of the threats posed in the current security environment went back to increasing quantitatively, with obvious implications for people’s views of the military profession.

<sup>11</sup> But the two positions do not coincide: the favorable views held by those on the political right are particularly strong among young Catholics (41.5 percent) and Protestants (41.2 percent), while Orthodox Christians are at 19.3 percent.

At the same time, the positive performances turned in by most of the various national armed forces in different functions and theatres of operation in MOOTW and PSOs have produced growing trust in the institution and in the assessment of the image of the military professional. This has occurred at different levels and with different nuances in the various countries. Glancing the data reported in the previous section, one immediately notes that public trust and interest, in the responses of the interviewees, are much lower in some countries than in others, particularly in Spain and Switzerland, and to a lesser degree in Slovenia.

The Spanish respondents display the lowest level of interest in security issues, as well as of trust in the military in general. They show sizeable percentages in favor of abolishing the military (20 percent), and feel that the image of the military profession in the country is much lower than the sample averages. In a ranking of the professions according to prestige, they rate that of military officer eighth, against an average ranking putting the military profession in sixth place. And they are considerably less proud than the sample average of the men and women who serve in their nation's armed forces (59 percent in Spain, versus 74 percent overall).

This seems to be paralleled by the view that emerges from the Swiss respondents. Their level of trust in the institution of the military is low; they display a strong percentage in favor of abolishing the military (28 percent); in the classification of professions according to prestige they relegate that of military officer to ninth place; and they display the lowest level of pride in their fellow citizens in uniform (45 percent versus the sample average of 74 percent).

Despite the similarities in responses, the causes of this attitude are substantially different in the two countries. To attempt an explanation of them I must here make recourse to a different methodological tool than the one used so far. This instrument is a qualitative research study that we conducted by means of an expert survey in the examined countries, in parallel to the quantitative survey referred to above.<sup>12</sup> The responses given by the experts in the semi-structured interviews conducted provide important clues to the causes of the individual national situations in the two countries under consideration.

For Spain, according to the opinions of most of the interviewed experts, it is the heavy legacy of Francoism and the difficulties of the transition to democracy that have weighed on the public image of the military profession, contributing to the larger uncertainties around the process of change that, as mentioned, is influencing the military profession and its contents everywhere. In this context the stimuli provided by the new types of military missions characteristic of the post-Cold War era are often interpreted in the sense of casting doubt on the relevance of the military to the types of threats perceived today. In Spain, other institutions, such as the police, are the preferred actors to respond to these new types of threats.

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<sup>12</sup> See Caforio, ed., *Cultural Differences between the Military and Parent Society in Democratic Countries*.

In fact, voices among the current elites question the military's suitability for the country's current needs, such as a university teacher who says:

Everyone goes on about peace missions and making militaries more human. But people don't believe in that, because they see that this doesn't avoid wars.

The armed forces can only survive thanks to the peace missions.

Another field of action is helping civil society. But the "Prestige affair" has shown us that they're always late and they're very slow and they couldn't resolve the problem. They took on a problem that is not theirs to solve.

The position of the Swiss interviewees stands completely apart: the country appears to suffer from something of an identity crisis that has repercussions on the use of the military in particular. Here, too, the words of one of the interviewees reflect a more generally shared attitude:

Switzerland has a very long tradition of neutrality. However, for the last twelve years Switzerland has been in an identity crisis. The main reason is that neutrality has lost its meaning: the cold war is over, Europe is united, there are no real security threats, and the UN charter has outlawed war. Nevertheless, people can't adapt their mindset so fast to the new situation—they need time to understand and realize that the solutions which worked for the last couple of hundred years will be useless for the future. Although political and military leaders are very much aware of the new situation of international politics, they must display a certain degree of awareness of the condition and the opinions of the citizens. As a consequence, they do a balancing act between talking about the important role of national defense and neutrality on the one hand and international cooperation and peacekeeping on the other.

A breakdown according to respondents' religious faith is interesting as well. Indeed, as already mentioned in reporting the individual data, a strong link is manifested between belief and religious practice on one hand and appreciation for the military profession on the other. As stated earlier, Orthodox Christians have particular esteem for the military profession, in all items examined here, with Protestants and Catholics placing themselves at the opposite end of the scale, and the Muslim respondents in an intermediate position. This breakdown does not correspond to the particular political positions of the interviewees: the correlation between declared religious faith and political affiliation does not follow the trend of the degree of appreciation harbored for the military profession.

Respondents' political views, then, seem to influence attitudes toward the military profession in a contradictory way. On the one hand it is the right-wing youths who judge the officer's public image less positively than the sample average; on the other hand, these are the ones who display the most appreciation for members of the military. Probably a partially unsatisfied desire for increased public esteem for the armed forces and their members is at work here.

The cadets at the military academies obviously exhibit more appreciation for their profession than the university students, but what is interesting to note here is that the gap remains moderate. Examining the data according to respondents' gender, lastly, one notes a general attitude that is more pacifist among women which makes them

have less positive views toward everything that is military, but with some contradictory attitudes in regard to appreciation of the officer's profession.

To conclude, one can say that the military profession in general, and that of the officer in particular, is today subject to a process of change that is swifter and farther reaching than the normal revision that has always gone on, and that public appreciation of it is on the rise in all of the examined European countries. This is also borne out in practical terms by the growing number of applications for openings at academies. The general shift now in progress from conscripted armed forces to professional armies<sup>13</sup> poses the problem of examining not only officers and non-commissioned officers from the standpoint of professionalism, but also the rank and file, however incomplete such a study might be.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> For more on the shift from conscripted armies to professional armed forces, see Karl Haltiner, "The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western Europe?" *Armed Forces & Society* 25:1 (1998): 7–36.

<sup>14</sup> Perhaps the rank and file could be analyzed from the standpoint of semi-professions: for examples, see Etzioni, *The Semiprofessions and their Organization*; and N. Toren, *Social Work: The Case of a Semiprofession* (London: Sage, 1969). On non-commissioned officers, moreover, there are still very few studies: see Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., "Comments on the Non-commissioned Officer," in *Soldiers and Civilians: The U.S. Army and the American People*, ed. Garry D. Ryan and Timothy K. Nenninger (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian, 1987), 57–60; Arnold G. Fisch, Jr. and Robert K. Wright, Jr., eds., *The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps: The Backbone of the Army* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1989); Michele Marotta, *La condizione militare in Italia, Vol. II, Ufficiali e Sottufficiali* (Rome: Cemiss, 1994); and J.D. Pendry, *The Three Meter Zone: Common Sense Leadership for NCOs* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2001).





# The Divide Over European Security

C. D. Van Aller \*

## Introduction

The war in Iraq continues to divide the Western democracies, nations once optimistic that the post-Cold War environment might lead to a more secure world. Even if solutions proved difficult to achieve, many hoped that these societies would share common viewpoints on threats to peace. Yet there have been contrasting security perspectives that have been highlighted by the conflict in Iraq, such as that of former European Union High Commissioner for Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, who stated in 2003 that “Europe is not at war.” One of the main cleavages is between Europe and the United States generally, with the former considering that the U.S. has increasingly been too dedicated to the unilateral use of force, views held by both elites and the general public in Europe. Even before the Bush Administration, Samuel Huntington described U.S. foreign policy as one of “world unilateralism,” with a single-minded devotion to its own interests while minimizing those of other countries.<sup>1</sup> Since the Iraq war, Harold Pinter has stated, the U.S. “has become a fully-fledged, award-winning, gold-plated monster. It has effectively declared war on the world....” Many people in Western Europe have some sympathy with this view, if not its hyperbolic quality, and the war in Iraq appears to have amplified long-held convictions about the world’s sole remaining superpower.<sup>2</sup>

However another great cleavage is within Europe itself, mainly between those countries once dominated by the former Soviet Union and others more willing to object to U.S. security proposals. The major Central European states have long been part of the operations in Iraq, despite opposition and even outright threats by their new European Union neighbors. French President Chirac, for instance, publicly chided Poland for its quick support of the war, and as EU negotiations loomed implied that only major powers should decide questions of war and peace.<sup>3</sup> Poland and the Czech Republic are presently being courted by the United States as sites for future missile defense bases, part of a system called “Son of Star Wars” by their media.

As of March 2007, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mark Pelaka was consulting with Europeans on plans to erect a partial shield against ballistic missiles launched

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\* Christopher D. Van Aller is professor of political science at Winthrop University in Rock Hill, SC, where he specializes in international relations, security policy, European politics, and post-Soviet politics.

<sup>1</sup> Samuel Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” *Foreign Affairs* 78:2 (March-April 1999): 35–49.

<sup>2</sup> Cited in Steven Brooks, *As Others See Us* (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2006), 107. Brooks documents abundant evidence of anti-American attitudes in Europe, even in those countries in the “Coalition of the Willing,” such as the United Kingdom.

<sup>3</sup> Transcript of interview with Jacques Chirac, *New York Times Online* (22 September 2003).

from Iran or North Korea, or perhaps an unauthorized launch from Russia. The plan would include up to ten ground-launched ballistic missiles in Poland, and the Czech Republic would have a large radar array to track incoming missiles, costing about USD 1.6 billion. Just as in earlier disagreements on Iraq, Western European governments (and their citizens) are objecting to these plans. Thus, German Foreign Minister Steinmeier has warned of a new Cold War because of strident Russian objections, and has called on all NATO partners to agree on the bases before implementation.<sup>4</sup> Another European diplomat echoed Chirac's remarks on Iraq when he stated that the Central Europeans failed to see that their agreement "was a national decision with European implications."<sup>5</sup>

Once again, the current U.S. administration appears to be pitting the "New Europe" against the old, revealing a strategy to "cherry pick" allies for missions that some consider destabilizing and destructive of a common approach to security. This Central European anti-missile deployment could potentially have more consequential ramifications for the United States' standing in Europe than the conflict in Iraq. While Russia rejected calls for preemptive war, and threatened to veto the final UN resolution authorizing the use of military force in Iraq, its reaction to the limited ballistic missile defense emplacements has been quite extreme. In a strident speech before key local elections in March 2007, President Putin stated that such measures "could provoke nothing less than the beginning of a [new] nuclear era," and that the United States had "overstepped its national borders in every way."<sup>6</sup> While the contributions to the effort in Iraq have been far from easy for Eastern European states, despite very low casualties, this current controversy has the potential to inflame European relations from the Atlantic to the Urals. As of 2001, before anti-American sentiments were exacerbated by the war in Iraq, a majority of the populations of Germany (90 percent), France (86 percent), Italy (76 percent), and Great Britain (80 percent) were opposed to the prospect of such bases, echoing the fears caused by Reagan-era nuclear policies in the early 1980s.<sup>7</sup>

There are essential questions that require exploration to begin to understand this apparently small-scale proposal, as it has wide-ranging political dimensions. For one, is there a legitimate need for such arrangements? Does it make sense to counter the weapons of new nuclear powers (NNP) or terrorists in this way? Related to this is the idea that some Europeans are reflexively opposed to active security measures, for reasons other than objective strategic criteria. Conversely, missile defense proponents seem to place a form of technological faith in these theoretical measures.

Next, are Russian fears indicative of a genuine anxiety about an overly assertive United States, or are they perhaps a smoke screen for Russia's forcible reassertion of

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<sup>4</sup> William Kole, "U.S.: Defense Shield No Threat to Russia," *Associated Press* (23 March 2007).

<sup>5</sup> "Russia Raises Stakes Over U.S. Plan for Missile Shield," *The Independent Online* (U.K.) (20 February 2007).

<sup>6</sup> "Putin Lashes Out at U.S. Foreign Policy," *St. Petersburg Times Online* (13 February 2007).

<sup>7</sup> Pew Global Attitudes Survey Report, 8 August 2001; available at <http://pewglobal.org/reports/print.php?ReportID=5>.

control in its sphere of influence? Then again, Russian pronouncements may be primarily intended for domestic consumption, drawing on old fears of Western encirclement. Why are the Eastern Europeans so willing to differ with their wealthy EU trading partners in the West, but also with a more powerful Russia that has (among other considerations) control over essential energy supplies? Lastly, is this development one more indication that plans for a common European policy on security are overly optimistic, destroyed either by a cynical United States or by the fundamentally different viewpoints of its diverse members?

## **Ballistic Missile Defense**

Ever since the controversial proposals in the 1980s for a large-scale system to simultaneously destroy several thousand Soviet ICBMs, the idea of stopping at least some missile attacks has been retained by Americans resistant to the depressing realities of the doctrine of “mutually assured destruction” (MAD). For example, Republican conservatives in Congress promoted the Defend America Act in 1996 that called for a “heavy” Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system by 2003, which was resisted by the Clinton Administration due to considerations of Russian, Chinese, and European reactions. Even the use of the word “heavy” harks back to memories of the deterrence-challenging “Star Wars” system originally proposed by President Reagan, and the legislation refers to the system’s eventual expansion to protect all of the United States. Once in charge, the second Bush Administration made missile defense its major strategic emphasis, with Donald Rumsfeld, the prominent former chairman of a pro-BMD commission installed as Secretary of Defense, as its chief proponent.

The pros and cons of the original Strategic Defense Initiative cannot be discussed here, but questions of the system’s cost, practicality, and counter-measures were never sufficiently answered before the end of the Cold War. Other considerations concerning the fate of long accepted arms treaties and assumptions about deterrence were also unclear and potentially alarming to both friends and foes alike. In terms of the current controversy, the idea is that since technology—particularly the ability to better target the slower boost phase of missiles, or the initial portion of their flight—has improved so much since the 1980s, the feasibility of stopping weapons in flight has increased greatly. In actuality there has not been a successful test of a missile intercept since 2002, and even then under questionable test scenarios, yet proponents consider even an imperfect system better than no alternative at all. Just as Western Europeans have an unwavering faith in non-military solutions, BMD advocates seem willing to suspend disbelief as well. Perhaps a future system could shoot down several missiles, but in

turn why would a potential opponent rely on the one technology for which there is a defense?<sup>8</sup>

Most importantly, the threat from non-traditional sources has become more severe in the view of anti-missile system advocates. Brian Kennedy asks, “What if Osama Bin Laden were to obtain a nuclear ballistic missile from Pakistan (which, after all, helped to install the Taliban regime), [and] placed it on a ship somewhere off our coast...?”<sup>9</sup> The question of how to address the simpler, alternative delivery systems possible for such weapons remains unanswered, so the administration’s most likely opponents remain Iran and North Korea, both of whom have evidenced capabilities in both ballistic missile technology and more ominously, in nuclear capabilities. President Ahmadinejad’s frequent calls for the destruction of Israel and his vows to continue Iran’s nuclear programs are examples of this willingness to risk conflict.<sup>10</sup>

The Bush Administration’s view is that these regimes are untrustworthy, and both may be less predictable in terms of their assumptions about deterrence than was the Soviet Union. Moreover, they could use third parties—such as terrorist groups—to deploy their weapons in unconventional means, which would render the threatened retaliation necessary to make MAD work much more problematic. The question of responsibility would be unclear. It should also be mentioned, however, that proponents of this “limited” system imply that it should be expanded at some point, to approximate the Strategic Defense Initiative of a generation ago. For example, former CIA analyst William Lee and others consider that Russia still deploys such a system around Moscow, exploiting a provision in the ABM Treaty, with the capability of protecting 75 percent of the Russian population. The United States and its allies therefore have a right to deploy such systems.<sup>11</sup> Thus, arguments about the benefits and liabilities of a large-scale missile defense capability are not over, and underlie some of the suspicions about the current system. Any mention of limited ballistic missile defense implies a possibility of an eventual return to SDI, with its challenge to standard interpretations of deterrence.

Western European governments are alarmed over statements such as that of Lieutenant General Trey Obering, the Pentagon’s current Missile Agency head, when he uses phrases such as “technology has caught up with the vision,” literally using words

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<sup>8</sup> David Duma, the Pentagon’s chief weapons tester, said in 2006 that, “there is insufficient evidence to support a confident assessment of [even] limited defensive operations.” “Director Operational Test and Evaluation FY 2005 Report” (January 2006), cited in Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, *The Illusion of Operational Readiness of National Missile Defense* (7 July 2006), 2.

<sup>9</sup> 1 January 2002; the speaker is head of the influential Claremont Institute; text of the cited speech is available at [www.missilethreat.com/publications/id.653/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.missilethreat.com/publications/id.653/pub_detail.asp).

<sup>10</sup> As of this writing, the Iranian seizure of British sailors enforcing United Nations mandates continues, a further indication of the regime’s irresponsibility. According to former Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, the EU has revealed yet again its weakness on security policy.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. Lee has written a book that is influential with missile defense proponents, titled *The ABM Treaty Charade: A Study in Elite Illusion and Delusion* (Washington, D.C.: Council for Social and Economic Studies, 1997).

from a Reagan speech justifying SDI in 1983.<sup>12</sup> With the notable exception of Great Britain, major Western European governments reject missile defense if selectively imposed by the United States, echoing their earlier sentiments when it was the main issue before the Atlantic Alliance before the events of 11 September 2001. While an exploration of such a system is not unpalatable to these governments, in contrast to the Iraq operation, the unilateral method of implementation is at least as offensive to them. At one meeting of EU foreign ministers, the Luxembourg delegate called the Bush BMD proposal “incomprehensible,” and went on to state, “We’ll have no stability in Europe if we force Russia into a corner.”<sup>13</sup> In this sense, there is concern that the heavy-handed manner of implementation is seen as alarming to the Russians, as well as about the system’s long-term strategic implications. Of course, the capability to knock down up to a dozen or so missiles, however imperfectly, should not objectively change the strategic balance in Europe to any degree, so the argument may be more deeply philosophical in nature on the part of the “Venusian” Europeans.

In his controversial book *Of Paradise and Power*, Robert Kagan notes a philosophical “security divide” between much of Europe and the United States. He thinks the former is unwilling to contemplate war, is reluctant to fund defense, and is reliant on international laws and treaties for security. Even small uses of force, such as the intervention in Kosovo, revealed a huge gap in capabilities and a lack of coordination between the United States and its European allies. In an ironic reversal of the isolationist 1930s years, it is now the U.S. that is willing to confront threats, who rejects much of normative international law, and feels empowered to radically alter long-term arrangements, such as the ABM Treaty.<sup>14</sup>

Other commentators, such as Wayne Merry, feel that longtime superpower security guarantees have made the Europeans all too confident that problems can be solved without at least the possibility of force. He goes as far as to say that a dissolution of NATO might teach Europe that active measures, particularly in the “second tier” of less-developed countries, are necessary to protect the West and convince all to share the expense of security burdens with the United States. The “Martian” superpower has erred as well, in that treating its allies like a “toolbox” reduces alliance cohesion; weaker members in particular resent being treated primarily as a means to an end.<sup>15</sup> As Strobe Talbott has written, this administration has surpassed its predecessors in its willingness to pursue unilateral options that use diplomacy as a means to single ends rather than as a series of limiting compromises.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> “Intercept or Interfere,” *The Financial Times Limited Online* (7 March 2007), 2.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 1–8.

<sup>15</sup> E. Wayne Merry, “Therapy’s End: Thinking Beyond NATO,” *The National Interest* (Winter 2003): 1–7.

<sup>16</sup> Strobe Talbott, “Memo to America: Join the World,” [www.theinterdependent.org](http://www.theinterdependent.org) (Spring 2007).

## The East-West Divide in Europe

There are some European leaders who feel that missile defense is worthwhile, and hope that arguments about it do not further split the Alliance after the agony of Iraq. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has pointed out the need to be objective on the question, and in particular to resist the temptation to appeal to short-term domestic constituencies. In his words, “Let’s not use false arguments. Let’s use real arguments” in response to pronouncements from the German Social Democratic Party that no such system should ever be deployed.<sup>17</sup> He points out that NATO has agreed to explore missile defense (in an exhaustive 10,000-page study), and accepts that the threats are indeed real and growing. Iran and North Korea have repeatedly demonstrated alarming capabilities in his view, and the choice of Eastern Europe is a cost-effective one, given that radar capabilities located there will easily cover most of the Continent.<sup>18</sup> Nonetheless, Western European constituencies see NATO as a vehicle to subsume their interests before those of a unilateralist superpower, and these feelings have increased support for an EU defense and foreign policy independent of U.S. direction.<sup>19</sup> Exacerbated by events in Iraq and scandals like the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo, European citizens increasingly reject any sort of U.S. leadership.

In a significant departure, Javier Solana, now head of the European Defense Agency, has cautioned that such systems must only be installed if, first, they do not negatively affect the organization’s “relations with third countries, namely Russia” and second, that such a decision—if made unilaterally by Central European nations—would weaken the solidarity of the Union. He feels that sovereignty cannot be used to transcend community interests in continental security.<sup>20</sup> The contrast between his notions of security with that of the head of NATO is instructive, as it reveals that the two organizations have different agendas and contrasting interpretations of security. Certainly the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty, calling for a common security policy, seems in doubt. Leftist members of the European Parliament have been much more outspoken against the bases, and have been countered by conservative members from Eastern Europe, with one stating, “the missile defense shield is not the danger; the danger is a number of member states adopting the Russian view.”<sup>21</sup> Poland and the Czech Republic are now full and established EU members, in contrast to their status during the earlier debate over Iraq in 2003, and so their willingness to depart from EU admonitions is a further blow to common policy.

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<sup>17</sup> “NATO Chief Defends U.S. Missile Plan,” *The Telegraph Online* (U.K.), (20 March 2007).

<sup>18</sup> “NATO Chief Warns of Division over U.S. Missile Shield Plans,” *EU Observer.com* (12 March 2007).

<sup>19</sup> Leonard Ray and Gregory Johnson, “European Anti-Americanism and Choices for a European Defense Policy,” *Political Science* (January 2007): 89.

<sup>20</sup> “EU’s Solana: Participation in U.S. Missile Defense Shield Must not Harm EU Security,” *Pravda Online* (29 March 2007).

<sup>21</sup> “European Parliament Debates Missile Plan,” *International Herald Tribune Online* (29 March 2007).

While the leadership of Germany in particular is now more centrist, and is attempting to heal the Alliance after the anger over Iraq, it must pay attention to its alarmed constituents and fellow EU member nations. Even German Chancellor Angela Merkel's own party supporters are questioning the missile deployments and are close to the Social Democrats on this issue. Christian Democratic Union legislator Ruprecht Polenz has advised Merkel "to insist that the Europeans unite on a common position ... bilateral arrangements of individual member states make such agreement increasingly difficult.... Everything [should be] in favor of being very transparent towards the Russians."<sup>22</sup> Other legislators from the SPD and the Greens have been predictably more outspoken, with the latter insisting that the system is actually designed to eventually marginalize the Russian deterrent.

The new chancellor is determined to heal the rift caused by the Iraq war, and in particular by her predecessor's willingness to criticize the U.S., but the pressures on her are substantial. Germany's new position as head of the EU Council demands that it take a leadership position in resolving this controversial issue, and it must not appear as being either pro-U.S. or anti-Russian. To this end, Merkel has called for full NATO agreement before implementation. To add another complication, Germany looks to Moscow for ongoing energy supplies, and may even build a pipeline that avoids troublesome Poland.<sup>23</sup> The Bush Administration does not seem interested in exhaustive consultation with those European nations that are not involved in hosting the new bases. According to U.S. Ambassador to NATO Victoria Nuland, the Allies would be informed of "important decisions" but a "public announcement" of the plans is not foreseen.<sup>24</sup>

For his part, President Chirac, in his final months in office, was nevertheless very critical about the chance that the new bases would weaken European security cohesion. His main concern was that relations with Russia would be damaged, starting a new Cold War and creating "a new dividing line in Europe."<sup>25</sup> These considerations must be added to ongoing French objections to U.S. attempts to restructure the NATO Alliance by partnering with new non-European states like Japan and Australia, countries that have contributed to the Iraq war effort.<sup>26</sup> Neo-conservatives like Paul Wolfowitz have written of the importance of "demonstrating that your friends will be protected ... and those who refuse to support you will live to regret doing so..."<sup>27</sup> Again, as in the earlier Iraq debate, France is wary that the U.S. is continuing to divide the Alliance by

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<sup>22</sup> "Missile Defense Puts Merkel on Defensive," *Der Spiegel Online* (6 March 2007), 5.

<sup>23</sup> Martin Zaborowski, "A Feud Berlin and Warsaw Must End," *The Financial Times.com* (19 January 2007), 1.

<sup>24</sup> Nuland's statement on 23 January 2007; "Blair Seeks British Role in US Missile Defence," *Financial Times.com* (24 February 2007).

<sup>25</sup> "Chirac Hits at U.S. Missile Plans," *Financial Times.com* (10 March 2007).

<sup>26</sup> "France Accused of 'Provocation' at NATO Summit amid 'Bitter Fight' with Washington," *Le Figaro* (cited in *Open Europe*, 29 November 2007).

<sup>27</sup> Thomas Ricks, "Planning for War," *The Washington Post* (National Weekly Edition) (12 January 2003), 8.



utilizing newer members, and is thereby diluting Western European influence in security deliberations. Poland, the Czech Republic, and others of course were lauded as the “new Europe” by an undiplomatic Secretary Rumsfeld. Chirac publicly chided the Eastern Europeans for damaging Europe in the famous Vilnius letter, and despite his harshness still considers that the “European spirit demanded [consultation] with other members before making such an important decision that engages all of Europe.”<sup>28</sup>

There is also a European alternative to BMD that is less destabilizing because it relies on deterrence. France has promised nuclear retaliation against attacks from countries like Iran, and there is some support from European publics on a firm stand against this outspoken and unpredictable country.<sup>29</sup> Chirac’s defense minister stated, after some criticism of this idea, that such weapons had to have some possibility of use to mean anything, especially against powers with relatively few weapons. More importantly, deterrence is the main conventional alternative to ballistic missile defense, as even the small nuclear forces in Europe dwarf that of any future threat from the Middle East.<sup>30</sup> While Chirac’s successor Nicolas Sarkozy appears less stridently anti-American, even he will have to pay attention to the fact that the EU is worried about Russian relations and energy supplies. Moscow’s willingness to both raise prices and turn off the spigot on its natural gas pipelines, even to relative brethren like Belarus in 2006, cannot be lost on an energy-dependent Europe. These harsh methods not only substantially increased revenue to Moscow, but also deepened its long-term control of gas supplies to the Continent.<sup>31</sup>

## The Central European Perspective

As was the case in the controversy over involvement in Iraq, Poland in particular is very much at the geographical and political center of a key security debate. This historically vulnerable nation has been massively damaged, and at times destroyed as a country, in the competition between its larger neighbors. In the twentieth century alone, it has felt abandoned in times of impending danger or domination. It therefore is wary of relying on those countries that eschew war as a possibility in foreign relations. The Czechs have had a similar interwar experience, as well as having suffered postwar domination by the Soviet Union. The war in Iraq became the first major case for conflicting interpretations of security by Western democracies since the end of the Cold War. If a finally independent Poland sided with defiant Western Europeans in this conflict, it would have placed its faith in long-term and heretofore unrealized plans for a unified European defense policy. Conversely, its decision to side with its new EU neighbors would perhaps grant it new political and economic influence, as linkages

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<sup>28</sup> “French President Admits Failure on Constitution,” *Financial Times.com* (9 March 2007).

<sup>29</sup> According to a poll released on 4 April 2007, 52 percent of EU citizens agreed that military action was justifiable to stop states like Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. A majority agreed in eighteen states, while a majority in nine disagreed; see [openeurope.org](http://openeurope.org).

<sup>30</sup> “French Defense Minister Calls Chirac’s Warning of Nuclear Response to Attack Necessary,” *Associated Press Worldstream* (4 July 2006).

<sup>31</sup> “Loveless Brothers,” *The Economist.com* (11 January 2007).

would deepen over time. In both the Iraq war and in the current divide over BMD, supporting the U.S. view would imply choosing a security approach similar to the shifting *realpolitik* coalitions of the past, but would also place Poland in alliance with the world's strongest power and its willingness to use force.<sup>32</sup>

On another level, the basic debate is whether the older collective security arrangement, NATO, still has value, given its transatlantic entanglements, or whether an independent European foreign and defense policy can work, particularly when there are radically different perspectives between members. Whether Iraq or BMD are truly the imperatives the United States portrays them as being is not the only issue. For Poland and the Czech Republic, the problem is that both sides of the Atlantic are now more overtly considering the relevance of an organization, NATO, that both hoped would bring these fledgling democracies unprecedented protection and prestige. Former Polish President Kwasniewski admitted in 2004 that the EU was less popular than NATO in his country, because memories of foreign domination are still fresh. As recently as the mid-1990s, policymakers and experts alike had grave reservations about the prospects of these former Warsaw Pact countries joining such an alliance, so its potential obsolescence is therefore a most painful prospect after the intense debate about admission.

Not only is NATO being called into question compared with rival EU alternatives, neo-conservatives in the Bush Administration are resistant to any impediments to U.S. action, and are even more wary of the rise of an eventual EU common security policy.<sup>33</sup> Poland, the Czech Republic, and potential NATO members think that unless they cooperate with U.S. security measures, even if mistaken or wasteful in terms of the specific policy, then the protective superpower could withdraw substantially from European affairs, leaving their territories once more subject to interference by outside powers (Russia being the main threat, but not the only one).<sup>34</sup> As a country that has suffered as a result of previous periods of U.S. isolationism, as was the case between the world wars, Poland for one is wary of anything that will lessen transatlantic commitments. As former President Kwasniewski stated, "We know the meaning of indifference at a time of threat, like the indifference Poland experienced in 1939."<sup>35</sup>

At the same time, Poland must consider the impact of its actions on its European neighbors, as a different sort of security, mainly economic in nature, is vital as well. For centuries, this strategically vulnerable country has had to weigh multiple considerations concerning its allies and enemies. Joshua Spero points out how complex Po-

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<sup>32</sup> See Elizabeth Pond's account of President Bush's visit to Krakow in 2002, in which he conspicuously never mentioned the EU and talked of traditional Polish ties to the United States. Pond, *Friendly Fire: The Near Death of the Transatlantic Alliance* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2003), 85–6.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 8–9.

<sup>34</sup> Radek Sikorski, "NATO Has not Perished Yet while We Are Still Alive," American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (2 March 2004), 1–3.

<sup>35</sup> "President of Poland Signs a Decision to use Polish Troops outside of Poland," [polandembassy.org](http://polandembassy.org); dated 17 March 2003, posted 26 February 2004.

land's situation has been since 2000. It has served the "difficult role as bridge builder between east and west ... [in Europe] while fissures within the Alliance continue to deepen."<sup>36</sup> On the Continent alone it must reconcile differences between itself and the East, namely Ukraine and Russia, while maintaining good relations with its new EU partners. After initial Iraqi operations, Poland worked to heal the rift between the U.S. and its now more independent allies by reaching out after its involvement to both France and Germany, admitting that the latter nations' reservations about Iraq had merit, and calling for more UN supervision in the operation. However, by its plans to introduce the missile bases, the Bush Administration is again placing its interests over those of a united Europe, and is keeping its allies fragmented in order to dilute opposition to its policies. Whether this is a long-term trend, as some scholars suggest, or just a manifestation of a uniquely independent Washington administration, the nations of Central Europe must make some difficult choices.

Compared with the previous Kwasniewski administration, the current one has tilted more in the direction of the United States and away from the Western Europeans. Just as in the case of Iraq, the Polish people are not in support of missile bases, but nonetheless the new government is showing its independence from its larger European neighbors. From BMD to environmental policy to ongoing commitments in Iraq, Poland is showing its willingness to take its own unique path, something not unknown in its history.<sup>37</sup> Despite the fact that the Iraq operation is now extending long beyond U.S. predictions, and other longtime allies like the United Kingdom and Hungary are withdrawing their troops, Poland kept its troops deployed in Iraq for a longer period, along with those from other Eastern brethren like the Czech Republic and Lithuania. In short, even when there is substantial political cover to end their involvement, these countries are choosing not to do so, and Poland moreover has increased its contribution to Afghanistan by five times, to one thousand soldiers. This deployment is also in contrast to those of most Western European NATO members, who have refused to contribute troops in an increasingly dangerous environment.

Somewhat surprisingly, Poland has not received much in the way of political or economic benefit from Washington for its sacrifices, which have been substantial for a poor country still recovering from Communist rule. For example, Warsaw now desires to purchase both F-22 and F-18 fighters, but is not deemed a close enough ally by the Pentagon to deserve these systems, despite providing lasting support for an unpopular war.<sup>38</sup> In the view of some, Central Europe is being used as a means to an end by a distracted and overwhelmed Bush Administration, but the Poles are realistic that their alliance is a pragmatic if thankless one. The Czechs also feel a lack of gratitude by the U.S. for their contributions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo, particularly in areas like

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<sup>36</sup> Joshua B. Spero, "Beyond Old and New Europe," *Current History* (March 2004): 135.

<sup>37</sup> "Poland Boosts U.S. Ties, Differs from EU," *Associated Press* (7 March 2007).

<sup>38</sup> "Key to Efficient Polish-American Partnership: No Sentiments, Only Pragmatism," *Rzeczpospolita* (23–24 September 2006), A7; *Polish News Bulletin* (28 September 2006).

visa requirements, but nevertheless hope that the missile bases will bring eventual concessions.<sup>39</sup>

The Kaczynski Administration is less experienced in foreign policy and “looks out and tends to see the old Germany and the old expansionist Russia; it has not taken part mentally in the long process of [European] integration.”<sup>40</sup> More importantly, old memories remain of the United States being far more interested in the “rollback” of communism than the Western Europeans, with the result that Adam Michnik, the Polish writer, considers that his countrymen “tend to be more pro-American than Americans.”<sup>41</sup> Added to the longstanding historical ties between the two nations since the American Revolution, the current government is a more nationalist one that is suspicious of EU weakness on security matters, and is much more willing to confront Russia. While pushing the Western Europeans on ideas like a meaningful EU army, the fact remains that President Kaczynski is very skeptical of theoretical ideas on transnational security and the obsolescence of the nation-state. He is no doubt aware that EU citizens are unwilling, at a rate of about 75 percent, to spend any more on defense, in contrast to Poland, which has steadily increased its defense expenditures and obligations.<sup>42</sup> The president has therefore stated: “I think the nation-state has still not ended its mission ... and I know that it is very uncomfortable in the Union to be alone, but that does not mean we are afraid of that.” In particular, he is worried that the EU will not be firm enough in dealing with an assertive Russia, on issues ranging from energy supply to trade relations to Moscow’s “continuing powerful military.”<sup>43</sup> For these many reasons, Poland has until recently vetoed EU negotiations with Russia on trade.

## The Threat from Russia

Compared to the days of Boris Yeltsin, the actions and statements of President Putin are increasingly threatening to the Central Europeans, and are also more credible, because Moscow is now substantially stronger due to its full national coffers thanks to energy revenues. Russia has demonstrated that it wishes to reassert control in both the near abroad, as witnessed by its interference in the Ukrainian elections, as well as to defend the rights of ethnic kinsmen in places like Kosovo. More alarmingly for regional security, the Russians are starting to expand their nuclear abilities, with former Defense Minister Ivanov calling the START treaty a “Cold War relic,” ostensibly because of threats from the new nuclear powers, but signaling as well a rejection of arms control instruments and negotiations with the United States. He also stated that it was

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<sup>39</sup> “New Foreign Minister Wants Predictable, Realistic Foreign Policy,” *Czech News Agency* (6 September 2007).

<sup>40</sup> Roger Cohen, “For Europe, a Moment to Ponder,” *International Herald Tribune* (27 March 2007), 4.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> A European poll found that only 23 percent of citizens were willing to accept higher levels of defense spending; TNS-Sofres survey data are available at [www.openeurope.org.uk/media-centre/pressrelease.aspx?pressreleaseid=36](http://www.openeurope.org.uk/media-centre/pressrelease.aspx?pressreleaseid=36).

<sup>43</sup> “Poland Moots EU Army Tied to NATO,” *The Financial Times.com* (6 November 2006), 8.

wrong to fail to share missile defense between NATO powers and Russia, although later he stated that the technology was a waste of money.<sup>44</sup> Moreover, Moscow is embarking on a new series of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear submarines, the former at a rate of seventeen per year, a substantial increase from the usual number of four. The missiles in question, the Topol-M class, are pointedly described by Putin as able to penetrate any missile defense system. Ivanov also stated that the “combat readiness of the army and navy is currently the highest in the post-Soviet history,” and he wanted to “exceed Soviet era levels.”<sup>45</sup> Given current tendencies in Russian politics, his statements appeared even more dangerous to countries like Poland.

From Putin on down, Russian reactions to the proposed missile defense system have grown steadily less diplomatic. It is vital to note that the Russians are particularly upset that the eastern NATO members—those that made promises to station no offensive weapons after joining NATO—are the location for these new bases. These countries seem to be containing Russia, as “the process of NATO expansion has nothing to do with the modernization of the Alliance. We have the right to ask, against whom is this expansion directed?”<sup>46</sup> As Georgy Bovt notes, the problem is that the Kremlin is convinced that the U.S. has a long-term plan to subjugate Russia through measures like missile defense and interference in areas like Georgia, and this reaction is deeply felt by most politicians in Russia, most of whom have roots in the old Soviet government. The original Reagan-era SDI program was very alarming to Soviet elites, for despite its technical limitations, it was a system that they could never hope to match; in short, it was an unanswerable challenge to a backward economic system. These same people therefore retain strong feelings today on this issue, despite many statements from the United States pointing out how such a small system could not possibly change the strategic balance.<sup>47</sup> President Bush, for example, has recently attempted to convince President Putin directly that the BMD system has limited ends that are not directed at his country, as has Secretary of State Rice in several visits to Moscow. Yet such reassurances will probably not work. According to Russian political scientist Vladimir Shlapentokh, anti-Americanism serves a psychological role in justifying the failures of the post-Soviet years, even if there is no objective reason for fear. It serves as a rallying cry to unify the upper classes against a common enemy, and has now become embedded in the national culture.<sup>48</sup>

Essentially, the Russians do not believe the system is as benign as the U.S. portrays it to be, echoing their original fears of the 1980s SDI program. In their view, agreements made at the end of the Cold War were methods used to encourage Moscow to

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<sup>44</sup> “Russian Defense Minister Calls START Treaty ‘Cold War relic’,” *BBC.com* (11 February 2007).

<sup>45</sup> “Russia Plans New ICBMs, Nuclear Subs,” *Associated Press* (7 February 2007).

<sup>46</sup> “Putin Says U.S. is Undermining Global Stability,” *New York Times Online* (11 February 2007).

<sup>47</sup> Georgy Bovt, “Three Scary Words: SDI,” *St. Petersburg Times Online* (9 March 2007).

<sup>48</sup> Vladimir Shlapentokh, “Russian Attitudes Toward America: A Split Between the Ruling Class and the Masses,” *World Affairs* 164:1 (Summer 2001).

lower its guard, and now Russia has the strength to react. For example, the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe has now been broken in spirit by the West, as former Warsaw Pact countries not under its jurisdiction are being armed in opposition to Moscow. Now, a ballistic missile defense system based in Central Europe is an economical way to begin to lessen the power of the Russian deterrent in a region that is next door to their vital installations. Such tactics are ironically reminiscent of Khrushchev's attempts to install missiles in Cuba by using friendly allies to contain a nearby superpower.

In the view of the Russian military, anti-ballistic missiles can easily be turned into more threatening platforms for launching attacks because the high-speed weapons involved can be used instead for a decapitating nuclear strike. To quote Lieutenant-General Yevgeny Burzhinsky of the Russian military, such a system will support U.S. rather than greater European interests, and "may pose a direct threat to Russian deterrent forces." In a sense the system is a technological way to trump the collective aspects of NATO by forcing it to confront Russia.<sup>49</sup> Over time, the Americans will expand the system to the point where the forces of Russia and China will be much less credible as a deterrent because, as nuclear stockpiles diminish due to age and arms control agreements, a U.S. first strike combined with BMD could mean victory in a nuclear war.<sup>50</sup>

These fears have been reflected in Russian pronouncements. Army Chief of Staff Yury Baluyevsky has stated that his country may withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and specifically mentioned the new BMD bases as a reason for doing so. He echoed Putin's remarks that this agreement was no longer in the Russian national interest, and threatened that a new arms race looms if the bases are built in Central Europe. This threat is especially important in the European context, as these weapons were once targeted at European assets, with German towns for example described as being "one kiloton apart." Putin even stated that missiles launched from North Korea could not be shot down from Poland, stating, "This [approach] clearly contradicts the principles of ballistics. Or as we say in Russia, it's like trying to reach your left ear with your right hand."<sup>51</sup> Finally, the bases are seen as a way to pressure Russia generally, on issues ranging from energy supplies to stopping its influence in former Soviet republics like Georgia.

Even though up to two-thirds of Polish citizens are opposed to the bases, with similar reactions in the Czech Republic, both governments still believe that hosting them is in their national interest.<sup>52</sup> The bases will be run by U.S. forces and will be extra-territorial, which is also unpopular with the citizenry. Yet the reaction to the most overt threats of all—the decision to target both Poland and the Czech Republic by the

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<sup>49</sup> Lieutenant-General Yevgeny Burzhinsky, "Ballistic Missile Defense and European Security," Press Release by the Russian Ministry of Defense (6 October 2006).

<sup>50</sup> "A Military Technological Alliance," *Agency WPS* (13 February 2007).

<sup>51</sup> "Russia May Unilaterally Quit INF Treaty—General Staff," *RIA Novosti* (15 February 2007).

<sup>52</sup> "Czechs Give Go-ahead for U.S. 'Son of Star Wars' Base," *The Guardian Online* (22 January 2007).

head of Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces—is consistent with the long-term geopolitical views held in both nations. Central Europeans consider that Putin and his generals have greatly overreached themselves by their abrasive statements, which serves to confirm the wisdom of their alliance with the United States. As one Warsaw spokesperson put it, “The reason is that Putin’s true colors were revealed ... everyone could sense his arrogance which is why he provoked little sympathy.” For their part, the Czechs also dismissed Russian threats, stating “they make us more adamant to continue in that direction. We are a sovereign nation....”<sup>53</sup>

Whether or not the proposed BMD system is technologically sound or economically feasible, the Central Europeans feel that Russia is emerging once again as a threat, and they must ally themselves with the power most likely to do something about it. It is also pertinent to note that prominent Western European politicians, such as the previously mentioned German Foreign Minister Steinmeier, did not criticize Putin’s speech, thus confirming Polish suspicions that their EU partners may be more interested in a new Russian gas pipeline than in Moscow’s attempts to reassert its sphere of influence.<sup>54</sup> The impact of history is also ever present, as Russian and Soviet tactics are long remembered by the Central Europeans; as the Czech Foreign Minister stated, “We have quite an experience with the Russians. You have to make it clear to them you won’t succumb to blackmail. Once you give in, there is no going back.”<sup>55</sup> It is also true that both countries now use their longstanding support for the United States as a source of power in Europe; they are no longer small countries in thrall to the Russians. They have proven themselves willing to make difficult decisions amid criticism from more powerful neighbors, and the United States now turns to them, transcending Old Europe. By embracing both the operation in Iraq and the new BMD bases, their stature has been significantly elevated.<sup>56</sup> This new status is useful, particularly in confronting a powerful Germany, who has territorial disputes with Poland and may bypass the country with its pipeline to Russia.<sup>57</sup>

## Common European Security

The question of BMD bases is perhaps more profound for the future of common security policy in Europe than is the divide over the conflict in Iraq. This painful war has proven to Western Europeans that their refusal to participate was a wise decision, but now the question at hand concerns security in their own neighborhood. It is also crucial

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<sup>53</sup> “Putin’s Harsh Speech Is Seen Falling Flat in Europe,” *International Herald Tribune* (15 February 2007).

<sup>54</sup> “Putin Fails to Rally Europe with Critique of U.S.; Despite Rift, Leaders Unswayed by Speech,” *International Herald Tribune* (16 February 2007), 2.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> “Germany Is Slightly Jealous,” *Agency WPS* (7 March 2007).

<sup>57</sup> President Kaczynski has strong feelings about the territorial claims of some German citizens. He states that the complaints against his country “may have a devastating effect on relations between the two states.” See “Polish-German Relations: Claims, Complaints & Controversy,” *The Warsaw Voice* (3 January 2007).

to note that the expansion of Europe via NATO and the EU is making achieving a concerted European defense policy ever more difficult. As Robert Kagan notes, under U.S. protection during the Cold War, Europeans increasingly rejected the concept of force in international relations despite their growing economic power. It may also be true that the Europeans understand the cost of war more than the United States does. However, they must make a choice whether to become a world power or accept U.S. leadership and its ideas. Central Europe is unwilling to accept the EU's heretofore unrealized commitments to common security, and have become frustrated with the lack of concrete action.<sup>58</sup> For example, the organization has of late failed to agree on a common policy on Iran's nuclear programs, and was unable to arrive at an effort to pressure Iran to release British sailors who were seized while enforcing United Nations mandates. Poland also considers its own opinions of and experience with Russia much better informed to those of the Western Europeans, who have in any case demonstrated their willingness to abandon Central Europe on several bitter occasions in the past.<sup>59</sup>

Again, as in the case of Iraq, both Poland and the Czech Republic think they can differ with their Western counterparts on the BMD question but still reach out to them to arrive at a significant consensus on other concerns. Both countries have disagreed with the United States on issues such as the International Criminal Court, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Kyoto Protocol—all issues of central concern to nations in Western Europe. In short, on vital matters important to European civilization and attitudes on the world, the split in Europe is not so wide. At the same time, these states' willingness to host the bases also anchors the U.S. to the defense of Central Europe, and puts pressure on NATO to move on the new measures. It is also true that, compared with the grandiose plans of the original SDI system, the much smaller BMD proposals have some support in all European governments, as the ability to knock down even a few missiles could save millions of lives. Again, it is more a matter of the way the U.S. is going about this program rather than its intrinsic merits.<sup>60</sup> Moreover, the Polish and Czech decision to host the bases places pressure on the EU to go beyond vague pronouncements on security. After all, what substantive alternative has this organization implemented concerning Iran and nuclear terrorism?

Has the United States learned from its experience in Iraq that choosing between its allies damages the Alliance, and perhaps long-term Atlantic security as well? At this point, the answer appears negative. This administration seems to be installing these

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<sup>58</sup> See "EU Pessimistic over Teheran's Nuclear Potential," which basically states that the organization considers it impossible to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, and has failed to come to an agreement on stricter sanctions. *The Telegraph Online* (U.K.) (14 February 2007).

<sup>59</sup> Robin Shepard, "Romania, Bulgaria, and the EU's future," *Current History* (March 2007): 117–22.


<sup>58</sup> "Europe Warms to U.S. Missile Shield," *Christian Science Monitor* (26 February 2007), 1.

<sup>59</sup> Jonathan Rauch, "Coalition of the Waiting," *The Atlantic Monthly* (December 2006), 29–30.

<sup>60</sup> "Russia's response is totally political," says one Russian analyst, quoted in Rauch, "Coalition of the Waiting."



bases without thoughtfully considering their impact on the United States' longtime allies. However, the difference between this situation and the operation in Iraq is that there seems to be genuine fear of a frequently bellicose Iran, as both European and American citizens are alarmed at the prospect of this nation acquiring weapons of mass destruction, leading to a greater degree of consensus than on Saddam's Iraq. So, while Europeans debate the undiplomatic way the U.S. wants to install the missile bases, and may be angered that their Eastern cousins agreed so quickly, they are still aware of the need for action. Iran's actions and belligerent statements show no real sign of abatement. Hopefully a new, more diplomatic U.S. administration can fully discuss with Europe the best options for dealing with potential new members of the nuclear club, which might well involve relatively small missile defense systems. However, other options might be attempted as well, such as a renewed commitment to the principles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with the United States participating in verifiable build-downs of its deterrent force and renewed commitments against first strikes. Working with the United Nations in non-proliferation efforts would also be popular with the Europeans, on both ends of the continent. In addition, these efforts would be more fruitful in moderating Russian actions, which at present seem to echo the Cold War. There are some who claim that politicians there are merely using fear about the anti-missile bases to mobilize domestic support, even though they know the system is miniscule. Yet, even if this claim is true, a more sensitive U.S. policy might moderate internal Russian politics, another goal that the West should pursue.



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The Operations Staff of the PFP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes is located at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies:

Gernackerstrasse 2  
Bldg. 102, Room 306B  
82467 Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany  
Phone: +49 8821 750-2880  
Fax: +49 8821 750-2852  
E-mail: [pfpcconsortium@marshallcenter.org](mailto:pfpcconsortium@marshallcenter.org)  
<http://consortium.pims.org>  
Attn: Captain Lothar Loth

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