

Peace Support Operations: The past and the future

Papers of the Ankara Seminar

Contributions to the PSO Conference in
Ankara (12-13 November) 2007

Ritske Bloemendaal and Kars de Bruijne, editors

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Peace support operations: The past and the future. Papers of the Ankara Seminar.

Editors: Ritske Bloemendaal and Kars de Bruijne

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The Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) is an independent institute for research, consultancy, education and training, based in the Netherlands. Its aim is to promote transparent, accountable and effective governance of the security sector, broadly defined. It seeks to advance democracy and the rule of law, help governments and civil society face their security challenges, and further the civilized and lawful resolution of conflict.

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Preface

It is our great pleasure to introduce the contributions and conclusions of the Joint Bilkent–Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) Conference entitled ‘Peace Support Operations: The past and the future’, which was held on 12 and 13 November 2007 at the Bilkent Hotel in Ankara. The aim of the conference, organized in cooperation with the Bilkent Department of International Relations, (Turkey) was to create a better understanding of the complex phenomena of peace support operations (PSO). We think this goal was met through the conference programme and the in-depth discussions which took place.

During the first session the formal framework of the international organisations was laid out; the speakers gave the perspectives of the United Nations, NATO and the European Union. During session two the reality on the ground was explained by generals with PSO experience. On the second day of the conference an attempt was made to identify and explore the relationship between security and development. On the basis of the two sessions from the first day, and the new input of experts from the development world, this became a very rewarding experience. The main conclusions were that the international organisations could cooperate more effectively and that the experiences of the past required more attention in order to implement the lessons learned — although in recent years much progress has been made especially in the development arena. The world has learned from serious mistakes such as those made in Somalia and has become more aware of the need for integrated policy making. The creation of the Department of Peace Keeping Operations at the United Nations is an important step in this regard. The overall conclusion is that the international community has strengthened its capability to act in PSOs, but there is still a lot of room for improvement.

The support of the Rector of Bilkent University, Professor Ali Dođramacı, in hosting this conference, is highly appreciated. CESS also thanks Ambassador Hasan Gōđūs, Director General for Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, for his introductory remarks.

CESS especially thanks LGen. Hilmi Akin Zorlu, Chief of General Planning and Principals of the General Staff, former ISAF-II Commander, for delivering the keynote speech during which he explained “the Turkish approach”: that peace support operations can only be successful if the leadership on the ground realises from the outset that good relations with civil populations are paramount.

The contributions of H.E. Johan van der Werff and of the speakers of Session II — General Bir, TUA (ret.) and Brigadier-General Vleugels, RNLA — were compiled by Kars de Bruijne with the final consent of the speakers.

Ritske Bloemendaal
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Notes on contributors

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Maj. Gen Anis A. Bajwa joined the Pakistan Army in 1965 and retired in 2003. He holds a Bachelors degree in Economics from the University of the Punjab, and a Masters in War Studies from Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad. He is a graduate of various defence colleges. Maj. Gen. Bajwa was Chief of Staff at UNOSOM-II Force Headquarters. In 2000 he was appointed Chief Military Observer in Georgia. In mid-2003 he joined the UN at New York as DPKO's first Director of Change Management. In August 2005, the Secretary General appointed him as his Deputy Special Representative in East Timor. Maj. Gen. Bajwa became the Director of Change Management, actively engaged in the realignment and reorganisation effort of DPKO. As a result of his efforts, the Policy, Evaluation and Training division was created and he was appointed its Director on 1 July 2007.

Johan van der Werff has a degree in History from Leiden University, the Netherlands. In 1981, he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands and served as a diplomat at the Embassies of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Senegal, Liberia and Paris. From 1995 to 2003 he worked for the Permanent Representation of the EU in Brussels, where he became head of the EU enlargement section. From 2003 until May 2005 he was a Director of the EU presidency project team commissioned to prepare the Netherlands EU presidency in 2004. Since 1 June 2005 he has been Deputy Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to NATO.

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Gen. (ret.) Cevik Bir was born in Izmir, and graduated from the Army War Academy as engineer officer in 1958. He studied at the Army Staff College in 1970 and the Armed Forces College in 1971; in 1972 he graduated from NATO defence college (Rome), and served three years at NATO's supreme headquarters as staff officer. In 1983 he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General and commanded an armed brigade and division in Turkey. He served as Major General in the years 1987–1991, was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General and commanded the UN forces in Somalia. Thereafter, he became a four star general; he served three years as the vice chairman of the Turkish armed forces and became the commander of the Turkish first army. Gen. Bir retired from the army in 1999. He has been awarded various national and international medals.

BGen. Theo Vleugels entered the Royal Netherlands Military Academy in 1976 and attended several military colleges during his career. In 1981 he was deployed in Lebanon as part of the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In 1992 he was deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina as the G3 planner within the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). BGen. Theo Vleugels is former commander of the Task Force Uruzgan I, part of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Afghanistan. In April 2007 Gen Vleugels became Commander of the Royal Netherlands Army Training Command in Utrecht, and was promoted to Brigadier General.

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Wolf-Christian Paes studied Political Science, Economics and Law at the Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms University in Bonn from 1995 until 1998, obtained a Masters degree in 1999 from the University of Stellenbosch (South Africa) and a Masters in Public Administration in 2000 from the German University of Administrative Science Speyer. Wolf-Christian Paes has worked in a number of conflict and post-conflict countries and was seconded to the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development to work on peace building in West Africa. He has worked for a number of international government and non-governmental organisations. He has published widely on issues related to resources, conflict, Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and small and light weapons control. Currently Dr. Paes is senior researcher at Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) and an international consultant on DDR.

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Peace support operations: the past and the future

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The global security situation has changed fundamentally since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. A global war between superpowers has become less likely and new security concerns have appeared on the agenda. Smaller high- and low-intensity conflicts have erupted, largely with ethnic and religious origins, and occurring overwhelmingly within, rather than between, countries. *Intrastate* conflict accounts for 95% of current conflicts worldwide. As a result, mechanisms to cope with these new challenges have emerged. Methods of conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict programmes like Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Security System Reform (SSR) have gained importance.

One of the mechanisms that attracted particular attention in the 1990s was the use of peace support operations (PSOs). It is true that the international community had used such operations during the Cold War — recall the peacekeeping contributions in Cyprus and Lebanon based on Chapter VI of the UN charter. However, since the 1990s the use of Peacekeeping, Peace Building, Peace Enforcement and hybrid second generation operations ('robust' peacekeeping) has significantly increased. While in the period 1947–1987 on average one PSO was undertaken per two year this number rose to more than seven per two-year in the period 1988–2004. More than 108,000 peace workers are currently deployed and this number will rise to nearly 150,000 in the near future, when PSOs are established in Darfur and Chad/Central African Republic. As a consequence, major international organisations have undergone a number of significant changes at all levels.

The increased use of peace support operations as a response instrument is, however, no proof of its success. There is, for example, no common understanding of peace support operations, and no common language: the UN term for PSOs is peace operations, while NATO embraces the concept of crisis response operations. In addition, the lack of success of past PSOs leads to hesitations and scepticism about the use of PSOs. At the same time, practitioners and academics believe that inadequate integration in the field and

* This article is the author's compilation and interpretation of the contributions and the discussions at the conference and reflects a personal perspective rather than an agreed conference report.

poor cooperation between the various actors are causing problems for PSOs. Against this background, PSOs are clearly worthy of further study.

In November 2007 the Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) based in the Netherlands and the Department of International Relations of Bilkent University in Turkey organised a conference on this important and timely topic: 'Peace Support Operations: The Past and the Future'. Both countries have contributed significantly to peace support operations. Turkey has twice led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and has participated in all PSOs to which it has been invited by the international community. Bilkent University has also contributed with the training of teachers and doctors. The Netherlands has a long tradition of involvement in all sorts of peace support operations and is currently deployed in Afghanistan.

The goal of the conference — expressed in the subtitle, 'the past and the future' — was to identify current problems and to accommodate the search for new policy directions and approaches. Consequently, in the conference methodology the organisers made a distinction between current doctrines and experiences (sessions one and two) and future approaches (session three). The participants to the conference came from several nations, represented different professions, and brought together a wide variety of views. This article is a compilation and interpretation of the contributions and the discussions at the conference; it reflects a personal perspective rather than an agreed conference report. It is divided into three sections: the first part focuses on past PSOs, and specifically on the experiences of the UN in Somalia, and explains the difficulties that have arisen from multidimensional peace operations. The second section presents the current institutional approaches and practices, and signals the serious problems that exist in PSOs at the executive level, focussing on the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan and civilian performance in PSOs. Finally, new policy directions, approaches and good practices put forward by the speakers and participants of the conference are addressed in the third section.

Past problems

The involvement of the international community in peace support operations in Somalia in the early 1990s led to a widespread realisation of the problematic nature of PSOs. Following the Somali peace agreements of 3 March 1992, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorized UNOSOM-I, a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation, and the intermediate US-led mission Restore Hope (UNTAF). Both missions aimed to provide the security essential for humanitarian relief. The successor of both missions (UNOSOM-II) began in May 1993. UNOSOM-II was a Chapter VII Peace Enforcement operation with the additional aim of providing a secure environment for humanitarian assistance.

During this mission, the difficulties of PSOs became abundantly clear, and major problems were revealed at three levels: political, strategic and operational.

The mandate of UNOSOM-II, agreed upon by resolution 814 of the Security Council, led to serious problems for the PSO in Somalia. According to the Turkish UNOSOM-II commander, the mandate was neither clear nor attainable. The tasks allocated to the mission in the mandate were multidimensional, including political, military and humanitarian goals. By the time the Turkish commander assumed responsibility, fewer than 30% of the UN personnel were in place to achieve these goals. At the same time, the mandate was in some sense too restrictive. The military was well aware of the importance of criminal activities which were taking place for the (re-)armament of Somali clans. However, the commanders of UNOSOM-II lacked the mandate to combat these criminal activities and were not allowed to fight organised crime.

In order to provide security for humanitarian assistance, the main tasks of UNOSOM-II were to monitor the existing agreements and prevent any resumption of violence. The constraints facing the operation became clear when one faction, headed by General Farah Aidid, failed to cooperate with the peace agreements. A series of brutal and deadly attacks was launched by Aidid's clan on UN personnel. How was UNOSOM-II to deal with this 'spoiler'? Was it, for instance, allowed to use force against Aidid's faction? The truth was that there was no strategy available for responding to the threats posed to the process by spoilers. Furthermore, there was no integrated, guiding vision of the multiple goals of the mission on which the commanders could rely. How were they supposed to integrate the three aims of preserving peace, providing security and engaging in humanitarian efforts? At the strategic level there were no answers to these basic questions.

The political and strategic issues caused enormous difficulties at the operational level. The PSOs were manifestly hampered by lack of coordination; military commanders complained that they were not able to contact New York in case of emergencies; most of the participating forces bypassed the command of UNOSOM-II by giving direct orders, with regard to duties and tasks, to their national contingents. When the commander of UNOSOM-II launched an attack on the 'centre of gravity' (south Mogadishu) some countries refused to allow their troops to be deployed. Consequently, UNOSOM-II, supposedly endowed with 30,000 personnel, was not able to bring sufficient forces into the centre of gravity.

To what extent are the dilemmas and complications that arose in Somalia still a reality in today's peace support operations? Some of the issues have been resolved. UNOSOM-II experienced different (national) procedures, understandings and equipment that rendered the interoperability of the mission problematic. As a result, the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UNDPKO) has implemented operational standards that are acceptable to all

states and peoples involved. Moreover, UN headquarters in New York can now be reached 24/7 in order to provide essential guidance during operations.

It is important to understand that UNOSOM-II was the first UN-led Peace Enforcement mission; as a result, it faced many new and unanticipated challenges. What is striking, however, is that the problems of unclear and unachievable mandates, the failure to match ends with means, and the need for integration of civilian and military efforts, were only addressed in the Brahimi report, a UN report published in the year 2000 — more than seven years after the experiences in Somalia.

Current experiences

The UN is currently running 17 missions throughout the world; there are also peace support operations being conducted by other organisations such as NATO (e.g. Afghanistan), the EU (e.g. Congo) and the African Union (e.g. Darfur). Have these new missions taken into account the lessons learned in Somalia? Or in a broader sense, how are they being carried out? What problems do the actors face? To answer these questions, this section focuses on the current experiences of all players. It looks in turn at institutional approaches and problems; military executive problems and achievements; and civilian backlashes in PSOs.

Institutional approaches

Of the organisations currently involved in PSOs, one might expect the UN to have taken into account the lessons of Somalia and to have formulated new and better approaches to peace support operations. NATO, a predominantly military player, has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War: has it responded to the new security challenges? And the EU, a newcomer in the field of international security, established a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) only after the Cold War. Can this organisation contribute to PSOs? We will examine each in turn.

The United Nations

Although the UN has decades of experience in PSOs and can draw on the know-how of many professionals involved in such operations, it has not yet developed a doctrine. However, a strong shared view on the core principles of PSOs does exist among UN peacekeepers and the relevant bodies. Thus, although there is no common doctrine, a common approach can be identified. This approach is apparent in public speeches of UN officials, reports of the Secretary General (e.g. the Agenda for Peace and the Supplement to the Agenda for Peace) and other UN documents such as the Brahimi report and the Capstone doctrine.

The UN prefers to perform peacekeeping missions rather than peace enforcement operations. This focus on peacekeeping is demonstrated by the famous quote 'we can keep peace only if there is a peace to keep'. The UN will only engage in a PSO if the basic conditions for a successful operation are present. These basic conditions include: 1) the hostile parties must give their consent to the UN presence; 2) a commitment to peace must exist among the parties; 3) a viable peace process must be in place. One might feel some discomfort with this common UN approach. Sometimes political or humanitarian reasons will exist that require the UN to act militarily at an earlier stage. So why has the UN taken this position?

There are a number of factors behind the UN position. Firstly, it has learned lessons from the past. These experiences, including Somalia, have shown that the UN will not be successful when basic conditions, such as a commitment to peace and a peace process, are not in place. Furthermore, the UN has a profound deficiency in war-fighting capabilities. It has no military forces at its disposal, no command and control structure, no re-supply system and — very important in modern wars — no intelligence capabilities. For these reasons, the bureaucracies of the UN assert that UN peacekeeping is not a tool to enforce peace.

However, the clear distinction between peace enforcement and peacekeeping has been blurred to some extent by the introduction of the murky term 'robust peacekeeping' in the Brahimi report. The term is used to describe efforts that need to be undertaken *vis-à-vis* 'spoilers'. Spoilers are groups that have signed the peace agreement but are nevertheless not in favour of peace. The UN has shown a preparedness to deal with these spoilers through the use of 'robust' peacekeeping missions which involve military operations against them. These have often been successful. When necessary, the UN is willing to deploy additional 'robust' military force to counter the threat that spoilers pose to the peace process.

While the conditions mentioned above primarily stipulate *when* a UN PSO may be carried out, some attention should also be paid to the question of *how* a UN PSO is to be pursued. UN missions in the post Cold War environment are multidimensional in nature, comprising security, humanitarian and development instruments. Many UN institutions work closely with the peacekeepers, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). A Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) may be appointed to coordinate all these different initiatives. This shows the existence now of the kind of integrated vision on multidimensional peacekeeping which was so profoundly lacking during the Somali campaign.

NATO

NATO is a security organisation. It considers the challenges arising from terrorism and from instability in failed and failing states, among others, as a threat to the security of the members of the alliance. One of NATO's responses to such threats is so-called Non-article V Operations or, to be more specific, Peace Support Operations. The organisation has launched PSOs in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Afghanistan and, in a support role, Iraq.

Of the organisations under consideration in this article, only NATO has formulated a doctrine on PSOs: 'PSOs [...] involve military forces, diplomatic and humanitarian agencies [...] and may include Peace Enforcement and Peacekeeping as well as Conflict Prevention, Peacemaking, Peace Building and Humanitarian Relief'.¹ When NATO's approach is compared to that of the UN, a number of differences can be noted. Most importantly, NATO tries to define its role through the principles of impartiality, consent and restraint in the use of force, an approach more or less comparable to the UN approach. However, the transatlantic alliance does not limit itself completely to these peacekeeping principles. According to NATO, PSOs may also include peace enforcement missions that 'aim to re-establish peace'.² While the UN will only deploy a PSO when there is 'a peace to keep', NATO instead may actively engage in creating favourable conditions for peace.

Furthermore, NATO's doctrine is more technical and detailed than the UN approach. It stipulates, for instance, the main operational requirements for PSOs related to command and control, and intelligence. A final crucial difference is that the alliance is primarily dependent on military capabilities. Of course, NATO is first and foremost a military organisation and one might therefore expect it to have detailed doctrines and stipulations on command, control and intelligence. However, this comes at a cost. The organisation's main resource is its military capacity; when performing humanitarian tasks, NATO believes itself to be capable only of providing security, and requests other civilian actors to perform reconstruction and assistance tasks.

European Union

The EU is a relatively new player in the field of international security and Peace Support Operations. In 1991, the organisation announced a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Developments in this area have speeded up since the start of the new millennium and the contours of a security culture have emerged, illustrated for example by the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Not surprisingly for a newcomer, the EU does not have a doctrine on Peace Support Operations in the sense of a written and fixed body of precepts. However, it has undertaken almost twenty ESDP

¹ *Peace support operations* (2001), Brussels: NATO, AJP 3.4.1 0001.

² *Non-article V crisis response operations* (2005), Brussels : NATO, AJP 3.4, 0304.

missions over recent years and the distinctive features of a European approach have begun to materialise. Most important, the EU approach displays a primarily civilian mindset, as evidenced by the aims of the Civilian Headline Goal to improve civilian capabilities such as police forces, judges and civilian administrators. At the same time, the EU has tried to expand its military capabilities. The establishment of battle groups and the updated Military Headline Goal 2010 are important steps, but have not yet yielded very concrete results.

One reason for this is that members of the EU see no reason to duplicate the efforts of their transatlantic neighbour in Brussels, NATO, by drawing on the same set of forces. This political reality, in combination with ideological impetus from the Nordic countries, makes military action the least favoured option in the EU. As a result, PSOs undertaken by the EU have been — and will probably continue to be — focussed on the lower end of the so-called Petersburg tasks; humanitarian and rescue tasks and some crisis management tasks. In this context the EU has thus far focussed on the maintenance of secure environments and the stabilisation of precarious security situations (e.g. in Macedonia and Congo), although the military capabilities to support these operations were not always readily available.

Communication, Cooperation and Coordination

To sum up so far: there is no common understanding on PSOs because the organisations involved endorse different conceptions of PSOs. The UN has limited itself to carrying out peacekeeping operations, occasionally complemented by robust responses against spoilers. NATO has adopted peace enforcement as a part of its PSOs; it endorses an approach primarily dependent on military capabilities, while civilian actors are required to carry out reconstruction and assistance tasks. The EU, in contrast, has adopted a civilian approach, while its military capabilities are generally inadequate.

Although one might criticize these players for the lack of a common understanding or a common vision, the current situation does present significant opportunities in the field of PSOs. In very simple terms, the UN is best placed to provide legitimacy and authority for the authorisation of PSOs. At the same time, the UN agencies enable the UN to mount and sustain a multidimensional response focussing on human rights, security and development simultaneously. However, the UN lacks proper command and control capabilities, and adequate military powers. The military character and institutional set-up of NATO means that this organisation is very well placed to carry out the much-needed military tasks in PSOs, but is unable to carry out necessary civilian tasks. The EU, newcomer in the field, has posted some successes in recent years and has gained much experience in civilian missions, which enhances the organisation's ability to perform civilian tasks in PSOs. Given these diverging approaches it seems fruitful to focus on the comparative advantages of the organisations.

Of course, the division of labour presented here is too simplistic and too clear-cut. Even with such a division of labour, however, a focus on the comparative advantages is at the same time a call for a culture of communication, cooperation and coordination between the three organisations. NATO endorses such a view, as expressed in the Comprehensive Political Guidance: 'the role of the UN and EU, and other organisations, including as appropriate non-governmental organisations, in ongoing operations and future crises will put a premium on practical close cooperation and coordination among all elements of the international response'.³ Is this going well? One of the contributors to the conference clearly believes that it is not.

NATO is involved in a UN-mandated mission in Afghanistan but while the circumstances call for close cooperation, relations between NATO and UN staff are very weak. NATO ambassadors were kept in Brussels in the summer of 2006 to draft a NATO–UN declaration that spelled out the role of NATO in PSOs. An illustration of the weak relations between the organisations is the fact that NATO did not consult the UN about this, and did not ask whether this declaration was appropriate at that time. To date, the UN has not responded. NATO–EU relations are seriously strained due to problems between Cyprus, Greece and NATO's second largest member in terms of troops, Turkey. Formal contacts between officials of the three organisations are rare. The only sign of improvements in relations is between the UN and EU; in November 2007, officials of the UN visited EU institutions to talk about education at the tactical and operational level for EU PSO staff. Still, much uncertainty and incomprehension remains on the side of the UN with regard to the intentions and potentials of the EUs. The UN expects the EU to address conflicts within Europe, but there seems to be little political will in Europe to take care of European conflicts.

At the same time, the expectations which each organisation has of the others have grown considerably. NATO would like the UN to take up an overall coordination role in Afghanistan, rather than shying away until a stable situation has emerged in the country and the region. The UN's expectations of regional organisations have also increased: the Capstone doctrine mentioned the development of regional organisations such as the EU, NATO and the African Union (AU) as first-responders and stressed their importance. According to the UN: 'this is a welcome development in so far as the global demand for peace operations currently outstrips the capacity of any single actor, including the UN. Efforts by regional actors to develop their own ability to plan, manage and sustain peace operations give a greater depth to response options'.⁴ The need for communication, cooperation and coordination between the organisations,

³ *Comprehensive Political Guidance* §6, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b061129e.htm>>.

⁴ *Capstone doctrine*, §18, <<http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/Capstone%20Doctrine%20-%20Consultation%20Draft.pdf>>.

combined with the failure to achieve them, and the increased expectations of the organisations *vis-à-vis* one another, all play a role in the problems encountered in PSOs.

Military achievements and executive problems

In focussing on the serious communication problems, it is all too easy to overlook not only other problems, but also to the achievements which are happening in practice. In this context, the experiences of NATO in Afghanistan are very telling; this section will examine these experiences in order to reveal new problems on the military executive level and point to important PSO achievements in practice.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is an ambitious, multidimensional NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. It simultaneously aims to assist the development of the Afghan National Security Forces, to provide stability and security in coordination with the Afghan National Security Forces, to assist the country's reconstruction, and to develop the authority of the Afghan government. We will look first at the problems which have emerged in this NATO operation.

One of the first problems to arise was one which had already existed in the Somali operation: the ratio between combat troops and the task at hand was out of balance. In 2002, ISAF consisted of approximately 4,800 personnel, only 850 of whom were combat forces. As was the case in Somalia, countries participating in the operation preferred to assign support troops than to provide combat forces. Back in Somalia, when the UNOSOM-II commander launched an attack in the 'centre of gravity', the countries involved tried all sorts of measures to prevent the deployment of their national troops.

A second problem, also present in Somalia, was related to the approach of the military towards civilians. The operation in Afghanistan was primarily directed at the populations, aiming to win the 'hearts and minds' of the population. A very significant threat to this ambition was posed by insurgents aiming to destabilise Afghanistan and discredit the international troops. Consequently, the commanders in ISAF Headquarters felt the need to engage in counter-insurgency activities. However, the mandate agreed for the operation did not give them the freedom to deal with these terrorists: the military commanders were deprived of essential political directives from the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to counter the threat posed by insurgents. Again, this situation can be compared to the lack of international direction in Somalia.

Finally, a much-needed trust fund which the UN Security Council had called for in order to cover common expenses, could not be established. The lead nations had to meet the cost for the ISAF while other countries did not contribute.

Despite these three 'familiar' problems, one should not lose sight of some very promising achievements and developments of ISAF in Afghanistan.

In order to fulfil the mandated tasks in the Afghan context, NATO tried to win the confidence of the Afghan authorities and the Afghan people. ISAF troops were trained to display polite behaviour to the population and show respect for Afghan customs and cultural values. Many initiatives were undertaken in order to secure this goal. First, Afghan Security Forces and ISAF patrols were conducted jointly to underline the mutual trust and support between the international community and the Afghan government. Second, the physical appearance of the military changed. Military personnel were not allowed to wear sunglasses; they had to point their weapons towards the ground; they tried to walk instead of driving in vehicles; and only women were allowed to touch local women (for men to touch them would violate local customs). Third, ISAF commanders tried not to undertake action without taking into consideration the effects of the action on the local population. According to the former commander of ISAF-II, the relative stability and security in Afghanistan in 2002 could be attributed to this behaviour and respect shown by the peacekeepers.

While communication, cooperation and coordination are important at the institutional level, their importance in the actual conduct of a PSO cannot be overestimated. One of the major achievements of the NATO operation in Afghanistan has been the encouraging examples of policy integration and harmonization of efforts by different national departments. Such an achievement is especially telling in multidimensional operations.

The Taskforce Uruzgan, a Dutch–Australian force under Regional Command South (ISAF-III), was responsible for conducting a PSO in the province of Uruzgan on the basis of the UN mandate. The planners of the Dutch government divided the tasks conferred to the Taskforce by the UN mandate into three distinct activities: defence, focussed on security and stability; diplomacy, on the integration of efforts; and development, on the socio-economic recovery of Uruzgan. These three activities are known collectively as the ‘Three-D-approach’. In order to harmonize the three Ds, the taskforce was ‘governed’ by representatives of three different ministries involved; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Directorate for Development Cooperation. The military commander, the representative from the Ministry of Defence, was in charge of the operation and was advised by the two other representatives. These three had to coordinate and integrate the actual conduct of the PSO in Afghanistan.

The Taskforce Uruzgan provides one of the encouraging examples of policy integration and harmonization of effort. Moreover, the integrative approach of the Taskforce is not limited to the Dutch contingent: Canadian and British troops also provide encouraging examples.

Civilian problems of development assistance

The experiences of those involved in PSOs reveal problems not only on the military side, but also on the ‘civilian side’. In the first place, effective

cooperation between development and security actors was often hampered by a lack of trust between the two, beginning with their understanding of each other's roles (see below). Development actors frequently criticised the military for not engaging in in-depth analysis of the causes of the conflict, for example. This led to *ad hoc* activities being undertaken, with no real consideration for their sustainability. In general, development actors believed that the military was not best placed to perform 'civilian' tasks in peace support operations. The military, for their part, could not understand the way the development actors operated. For example, development actors faced long lead times before they were actually deployed, largely as a result of the way they were financed, whereas military actors which could be deployed relatively quickly.

Another problem can be illustrated by post-conflict programmes such as Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). The disarmament phase is often financed through the military budget while the reintegration phase is more dependent on donor contributions through development actors. However, donor interest tends to peak in the direct aftermath of a particular conflict and then decrease over time. As a result, the financial resources needed for expensive reintegration trajectories have often tailed off by the time development actors are in place and the beneficiary country is ready to start the programme.

Development actors have earned a role in multidimensional peace support operations. NGOs constitute an important part of the set of development actors, but since they are independent, it can be difficult for other organisations to exercise control over them and to regulate their activities. This lack of control over development actors often resulted in duplication of efforts and in disproportionate amounts of attention being focussed on certain aspects of PSOs, while others were neglected.

Future directions

Practitioners, officials and analysts in the field have developed the understanding that PSOs have a multifaceted character, comprising simultaneous goals including security, development, human rights, gender mainstreaming, rehabilitation, etc. The need to link security and development has been frequently stressed. In addition, many state and non-state actors, both military and civilian, are involved in trying to achieve these multiple goals. The need to integrate the different goals and actors — sometimes referred to as the comprehensive approach — has been more clearly recognised in recent years. In the Brahimi report, the UN called for the integration of civilian expertise on good governance, human rights and the rule of law within peacekeeping missions. NATO stressed the importance of the comprehensive approach in Riga: 'experience in Afghanistan and Kosovo demonstrates that today's

challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments'.⁵ Many participants to the conference also underlined the need for a comprehensive approach.

It may thus be argued that there is international agreement on the overall direction of PSOs: the need for a comprehensive approach. Nevertheless, the question of how to achieve this remains a complex and challenging one. The remaining part of this article will be devoted to this question.

Coordination

The comprehensive approach stresses the need to coordinate PSOs at all levels. Indeed, the lack of coordination has proven to be the most problematic aspect of PSOs; many of the problems outlined in this paper demonstrate the need for greater coordination. So what can be done? How can international efforts be coordinated?

Communication, cooperation and coordination are fundamental prerequisites for an integrated effort and it is shocking that cooperation between the main actors (UN, NATO and EU) remains so bad. There are, however, many opportunities for improved relationships between the organisations. It would be fruitful to start by taking confidence-building measures to encourage trust and confidence between the major players, before the organisations move on in PSOs. A joint strategic planning process for both the military and the civilian sphere would offer another opportunity. The key donors should agree on strict parameters, including a joint definition of the goals, a benchmarking process to define indicators by which to measure success and failure of a PSO, and an exit strategy for the military and for the development community to switch from post-conflict assistance to normal development assistance. Such a joint strategic planning process may force the organisations to search for comparative advantages and find a way to cooperate with one another.

At the same time, the issue of who takes on the role of overall coordinator needs to be resolved. It seems natural to give this responsibility to the UN, which is the most inclusive of the organisations and consequently best suited to play this coordinator role. More important, the UN has the legitimacy to issue PSOs on the basis of the UN charter; even the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan is based on a mandate of the UN Security Council. It is true that failed PSOs have done nothing to raise the profile or improve the image of the UN worldwide, and some hesitation on the part of UN officials is understandable. However, if one examines the options, the UN seems to be the only body able to carry out this coordination role.

Coordination is vital not only for the planning phase at the institutional level, but also during activities in the beneficiary countries. In today's PSOs, a

⁵ *Riga summit declaration*, §10, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm>>.

UN representative may coordinate some of the development activities that are conducted by NGOs, governments and international actors. While the UN is the most likely organisation to coordinate these activities, the quality of UN officials varies significantly. More importantly, the UN lacks essential financial powers since it is dependent on donors. UN officials may not have the capacity and authority to work with all actors and coordinate all efforts at the same time.

A possible solution to this apparent lack of capacity and authority is the increased use of multi-donor trust funds. These trust funds have not performed very well in the past: due to corruption and acute mismanagement, individual governments have sometimes taken an informal decision not to contribute if the fund was being run by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It is important that the running of these trust funds should be reformed in order to rebuild the confidence of the donors. The UN would then have more means at its disposal and could more forcefully claim authority to coordinate activities in the beneficiary countries.

At the same time, it should be noted that UN coordination of PSO activities may raise questions of local ownership and local governance. Rather than the UN, a local person or a local organisation may be given responsibility for coordinating development efforts within a country: the UN tried such a construction in East-Timor, with success. The importance of coordinating development within a beneficiary country is undeniable, but the question of who should undertake that coordination is not always straightforward.

We have already mentioned, as one of the encouraging features of peace support operations, the cross-departmental coordination of the so-called Three-D concept. This approach, originally from Canada, aims to coordinate the efforts of the various departments in the actual conduct of a PSO. The experiences with the Three-D approach are valuable and promising, but one should not lose sight of the pitfalls of the concept. Three-D is not the final solution to cross-departmental competition and is not all-encompassing; for example, the Ministry of Interior is not represented. Furthermore, all three fields — defence, diplomacy and development — have their own procedures, structures and goals in a PSO, which not infrequently interfere with one another. These tensions boil down to the simple question: who can do what?

Who can do what?

The security situation in a specific country generally requires a PSO to have a military focus. At the same time, the multidimensional problems of that country oblige the international actors to undertake development endeavours. When the security situation does not permit development actors to enter a certain area, soldiers will have to perform development tasks. Recall, for instance, the Provincial Reconstruction Team of the Task Force Uruzgan that was made up of a former tank battalion.

However, military personnel are not specifically trained to perform projects within the development sphere, such as the rebuilding of political institutions; development workers may also criticise the military for embracing a top-down approach. Together with the diplomats they tend to distribute funds and aid through the (remaining) governmental bodies and ruling authorities. From a developmental point of view, the most important thing to do is to build up the capacity of the local population instead of the state. If the security situation would permit the development workers to enter, they would primarily take this bottom-up approach.

From a professional stance, it is clear that the development workers and agencies are much better suited to undertake developmental and civilian endeavours. But where the security situation prevents them from doing so, the military is more or less obliged to take on roles it 'normally' cannot and would not perform. Perhaps the best way to conduct multidimensional PSOs in the face of such realities is to be as civilian as possible and as military as necessary. It is an important challenge to find ways to combine the best of both worlds.

Conclusion

The daily engagement in peace support operations by international institutions, governments, the military and civil society since the beginning of the 1990s has had undeniable positive effects on the practice of PSOs. The world has learned to avoid some of the serious mistakes made in Somalia and is now consciously aware of the need to integrate policy and the need to employ 'robust' forces to counter the threat posed to peace processes by spoilers. Moreover, the United Nations has assumed responsibility in the field, attracting qualified personnel to the office of UNDPKO and adopting operational military standards which are acceptable to all nations. To some extent the organisation has also assumed responsibility for coordinating civilian and military efforts within beneficiary countries. It can be concluded that the overall performance of the international community in the business of PSOs has improved.

However, these improvements cannot hide some very problematic aspects of PSOs and constant and critical review of the nature of PSOs is still essential. After all, the experience of Somalia was so negative that current practices are almost bound to register an improvement. More important, PSOs remain very complex. Too often, practitioners and officials run into difficulties when performing their tasks. It is abundantly clear that coordination of PSOs in both planning and execution phases remains inadequate, even with the UN assuming responsibility. Moreover, the balance between civilian and military impetus — or, in other words, between security and development — is still problematic and the interrelationship of the two remains unclear.

Looking to the future, some encouraging practices, largely related to integration of national government policies, have cleared the way for further integration and an aligning of national departmental roles. However, this 'comprehensive approach' is prone to criticism. It focuses primarily on the means of the missions and may in the process overlook the ends, ignoring deeper questions related to the overall goals. How should the international community value local governance? To what extent are the goals of PSOs tenable? And how can the international community bring democracy to far-flung places without a democratic tradition? If our PSO past has taught us anything, it is that we have to look beyond the actual and foreseeable problems of PSOs and aspire to answer tomorrow's questions.

Introductory remarks

Hasan Göğüş

Ambassador Hasan Göğüş is General Director for Multilateral Affairs, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkey.

Professor Dođramacı, Professor Volten, Esteemed guests,

On behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, let me start by welcoming our foreign guests to Turkey for this important conference jointly organised by Bilkent University and the Centre for European Security Studies. I am grateful for the opportunity to address this gathering of eminent academicians and senior officials. The subject matter of the deliberations over the next two days is a critical issue for the international community as a whole; how to conduct effective peace support operations in the 21st century, at a time of growing demands for international action in the face of instability and conflict in many parts of the world. I am especially pleased that the conference will have the benefit of the presence and active contribution of our friends from Groningen; an ancient city with a university dating back to the beginning of the 17th century.

There has been a substantial amount of academic and policy activity over the past decade to identify the best means for conducting an increased amount of peace support activity with essentially limited military and financial capabilities. Peacekeeping is a delicate and expensive undertaking, requiring a robust mandate, adequate force protection, deployment of scarce military capabilities and sustained political engagement. The major international organisations with specific responsibilities in this area, such as the United Nations, NATO, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, have all invested a considerable effort to review and revamp their procedures for executing their respective, and often complementary, field activities.

Naturally, Turkey fully supports these efforts. As Director General, in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for international organisations, I have daily oversight of all UN activities in this respect. We are confident that the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the restructuring of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the formation of a separate Department of Field Support will serve to provide the international community with a higher-quality service. It has been 61 years since Winston Churchill called for equipping the United Nations with an international armed force, in the famous Iron Curtain speech. The world organisation certainly has some military clout now; it is conducting 17 operations with more than 100,000 personnel.

Turkey is keen to sustain and enhance her contributions in this respect. The UN's own data, as of September 2007, indicate that Turkey is the 25th largest contributor to UN operations, with nearly 1,000 troops on active duty, while, in terms of police contributions, we are ranked 14th among UN member states. We are, of course, also taking part in all NATO operations, with some 2,500 troops, and a further 2,750 troops on call in the NATO Response Force. We have commanded ISAF twice, and still have some 1,200 troops in Afghanistan, as well as a Provincial Reconstruction Team. Furthermore, we have supported the development of the European Security and Defence Policy from the outset and have taken part in every EU operation to which we were invited. In fact, we are the leading non-EU European ally in terms of contributions to ESDP missions.

There is an impressive congregation of experts here to deliberate the important topics on the agenda of the conference. Perhaps I should briefly touch upon one of those topics, namely national approaches to peace support operations, as Turkey has gathered a considerable amount of experience in this field. As I said, we led ISAF twice; once as a UN operation and again as a NATO-led force. We also currently have nearly 1,000 troops in UNIFIL in Lebanon. This body of experience makes it possible for me to make certain observations, especially with regard to political engagement between the peacekeeping force and the host country. This is a critical relationship for the success of any mission, in terms of ensuring force protection for our men and women on active duty in foreign lands, allowing timely exit from the host country and preventing a subsequent recurrence of hostilities.

The first of these observations is that the task of securing and maintaining the trust of our hosts is the most crucial aspect of peacekeeping work. Naturally, military planners will insist on the right mix of combat and support elements and the availability of critical enablers, but without this mutual trust, the endeavour will almost certainly fail to attain its objectives. Experience has shown that remaining equidistant to the various ethnic and religious groups in the host country is essential. The Turkish military commanders and personnel also avoid any involvement in the domestic affairs of the country. Transparency in dealings with all local leaders, whether in government or not, helps to sustain a constructive two-way dialogue. Full respect for the customs, cultural values and religious beliefs of the local population is also essential.

We would probably all agree that local ownership of the responsibility for peace and stability is highly desirable. However, this will not be possible if local officials, community leaders and military commanders do not have a culture of working together, as is often the case. This may well be due to a lack of trust among those players because of past behaviour. The commanding officers of a peacekeeping force will find it easier to persuade their local counterparts to cooperate with each other and thus facilitate the establishment

of a broad-based national consensus in the host country, if they have already won their confidence and respect.

Friendly patrols on foot, rather than an excessive use of armoured vehicles driven at high speed, are likely to win the hearts and minds of the population. Sensitive treatment at control posts, for example by ensuring that women are only searched by female officers, is also essential. Joint patrols with local forces or police officers may remove any grounds for suspicion by the population and government officials as to the activities of what is essentially a sizeable and well-armed group of foreigners. Conspicuous display of arms and weapons should be discouraged. Where such simple practices are not followed, the peacekeeping force may quickly resemble an army of occupation.

Regarding the composition of peacekeeping forces, I note that roughly 10 percent of uniformed personnel in current UN peacekeeping forces is made up of police officers. This trend should be encouraged further, as the evolving nature of peacekeeping tasks requires a greater amount of conventional police work in post-conflict societies. We should also endeavour to get the right ratio of combat troops and support personnel, as many countries prefer not to provide combat forces or critical enablers like transport assets or intelligence units, which are all in short supply.

As a final remark, I would like to emphasise the need to integrate the political and socio-economic dimension of peacebuilding into our peace support operations, in order to create societies that can sustain peace on their own long after peacekeeping forces depart their country.

Distinguished colleagues, may I once again express my gratitude for the opportunity to share with you some of the experiences collected over the years through Turkish peacekeeping activity. Your deliberations will no doubt make a substantial contribution to the ongoing debate in this field. I look forward to refining my own understanding of this critical subject with the help of your observations and conclusions. Last but not least, let me extend our thanks and congratulations to Bilkent University and the Centre for European Security Studies for organising this conference.

The United Nations' approach to peace support operations

Anis Bajwa

Anis Bajwa is Director Policy, Evaluation and Training at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

This conference provides us with a valuable opportunity to take stock of the current state and realities of peace operations and to exchange views on how to maximise the impact of our collective efforts for managing and resolving conflicts which threaten global peace and security on the one hand and thwart human development on the other. I am honoured to provide a UN perspective in this regard.

Since its invention almost sixty years ago, United Nations peacekeeping has undergone some profound transformations. Following a period of retrenchment in the mid 1990s, UN peacekeeping today is at its highest ever level of deployment. The surge in UN peacekeeping over the past decade, particularly in the past five years, has been dramatic. From a low point of around 11,000–12,000 peacekeepers in the late 1990s, the UN peacekeeping force has grown to more than 103,000 men and women serving in 19 missions. With the deployment of two new multi-dimensional missions to Chad/CAR and Darfur over the coming year, that number is set to rise to nearly 150,000. This unprecedented growth over the past five years can be seen as a vote of confidence by member states for UN peacekeeping. Indeed, it is widely recognised that the UN is the only multilateral organisation with the capability to mount and sustain a multidimensional response — a response that simultaneously carries political, security, humanitarian, human rights and development instruments to address the complex problems inherent in a post-conflict situation. This capability, together with decades of experience and lessons learned, the legality provided by Security Council resolutions, and the legitimacy derived from its multinational character and the possibility it offers for universal burden and cost-sharing, are among the UN's key comparative advantages.

Yet, despite the successes achieved in places like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, and the DRC, experience shows that not all situations are amenable to the UN peacekeeping treatment and that there are limits to what it can achieve. As the demands for peacekeeping grow larger and ever more complex, we need to ensure that UN peacekeeping remains the successful venture that it now is. Today, more than ever, there is an urgent need to clarify the limits of UN peacekeeping in order to avoid repeating the mistakes of the early 1990s, when UN peacekeeping operations were deployed into situations where the basic

conditions for successful peacekeeping were absent. We must avoid the pitfalls of the past that were so costly in terms of lives and the reputation of United Nations peacekeeping.

It is essential that we respect the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, or fighting, operations. The UN is not a fighting organization. It simply does not have the homogeneous forces, the necessary command authority, the command and control structures, the intelligence capabilities, the means of communication and the integral logistics and re-supply systems required to sustain high-intensity combat operations. This is why we assert that UN peacekeeping is not an enforcement tool. However, as the Brahimi report recommended, our missions must be willing and able to meet situations in which some actors in a peace process reduce or withdraw their involvement or consent, and we must be able to meet the challenges posed by “the lingering forces of war and violence”.

The lessons of Sierra Leone strongly underscore this key recommendation of the Brahimi Review. The UN must not engage in peace operations that do not have the consent of the main parties to the conflict. Experience shows that UN peacekeeping is simply not an effective response when a genuine commitment to peace is lacking, and where there is no viable peace process between the major actors: “We can keep peace only if there is peace to keep”. Where such a peace process does not exist, the international community must work with the parties to put a process in place. The deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation into an environment it is not equipped to handle, can result in the mission being unable to provide the security that the population so desperately needs. Furthermore, it can lead to a collapse in international support, both to the country in need, and the enterprise of UN peacekeeping.

We also need to identify our limits when it comes to creating and consolidating a sustainable peace. We must ask to what extent a peacekeeping operation should engage in building national capacity for the security services, the police and militaries of war-ravaged countries. How do we design transition strategies that are based on careful assessments of risk? How do we balance mandates to support change in a post-conflict setting against the need to build a genuine sense of ownership among the local actors who must take this process forward once the peacekeeping mission has withdrawn? In addition to better defining the limits of UN peacekeeping as a conflict management tool, it is equally important to provide the military, police and civilian personnel serving in the field and at headquarters with the conceptual tools needed to navigate the complexities of contemporary peacekeeping environment.

Unlike peacekeeping in its early decades, more and more missions today operate in failing or failed states emerging from civil strife, where there is a need to help create the conditions to promote reconciliation while simultaneously rebuilding institutions of governance, security and rule of law. A

rudimentary analysis of Security Council mandates shows that most new operations now contain a large spread of activities that range from traditional security tasks through to Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and electoral programmes and support for security sector, rule of law and governance reforms. At the same time, the Security Council has continued to mandate thematic responsibilities, such as human rights promotion in post-conflict environments. This growth in civilian mandates has been matched by growth of civilian personnel in missions to help us focus on comprehensive solutions to conflict.

Maintaining unity of effort between the military, police, political, human rights, humanitarian, development and administration and logistics components of today's multi-dimensional operations is a major task requiring the sustained commitment of a mission's leadership and staff alike. All pillars of a mission must learn how to work with one another in an integrated manner. This is done by realising that it takes all of these actors working in concert to achieve strategies that both keep the peace and build the early structures for a self-sustaining peace. The remarkable growth of UN peacekeeping has served to compound the challenge of bringing together and sequencing the many moving parts required to deploy and sustain our operations. In the absence of a common vision of UN peacekeeping, diplomats, logisticians, police officers, administrators and budget officers, contingent commanders and Special representatives of the Secretary General (SRSGs) may all have radically differing views, which can cause friction and misunderstanding.

In addition to the multidimensional aspects of modern peacekeeping, there are other new complexities too. One, in particular, is the emergence of what the Brahimi report described as "robust" peacekeeping, that is, operations which lie in a "grey area" between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. In the jungles of Ituri and in the poor urban centres of Port-au-Prince in Haiti, UN peacekeepers are engaged in high tempo military operations against militias and gangs that prey on the local population and undermine the stability of the peace process. In 2004 in Bukavu, on the other hand, where "spoiler" aggression was not met with firm resolve by the United Nations, the mission suffered enormous damage to its credibility in the eyes of the Congolese and the international community. While these robust operations have often proven successful, they also have consequences. The UN is taking casualties, and inflicting casualties. As a result, we are asked "how does this tally with the traditional peacekeeping principles of impartiality, consent and non-use of force except in self-defence?". Others ask "if you are fighting opponents, then aren't you actually enforcing peace and not keeping it?".

As we consider the future of peace operations we must recognise that although the UN remains the centrepiece of our international peace and security architecture, it is not the only actor conducting, or able to conduct, peace operations. Over the past decade, the African Union (AU), EU and NATO have

become major players in the peace and security arena. This is a welcome development since the global demand for peace operations clearly outstrips the capacity of any single actor, including the UN. With the expansion of peacekeeping, the role of regional organisations in the maintenance of global peace and security, under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, has also grown. Indeed, the vast majority of peace operations deployed by the UN in the past decade have involved some form of cooperation with regional and other inter-governmental organisations.

In a number of situations, regional organisations have acted as “first responders” and have helped prepare the ground for the subsequent deployment of a multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operation, such as in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Burundi where troops originally deployed by ECOWAS and the AU were absorbed into the UN mission when the UN took over. Regional organisations have also provided enhanced military support to an existing or newly deploying UN operation. The EU played a critical role in bolstering the UN Mission in the DRC through Operation Artemis 2003, which enabled the expansion of MONUC, and more recently, the deployment of EUFOR during the run-up to the 2006 presidential elections. The new UN mission in Chad/CAR, called MINURCAT, will also be deployed alongside an EU-led force, operating under separate command.

There have also been instances of joint deployments involving a civilian–military division of labour, as is the case in Kosovo and Afghanistan. In Kosovo the UN, along with the EU and OSCE, provides the civilian and police dimensions of the operation, while NATO provides the military arm, under separate but coordinated command. In Afghanistan, UNAMA, which is limited to a civilian presence, is deployed alongside the NATO-commanded International Assistance Force (ISAF). Another mode of collaborative operation has involved the deployment of linked peacekeeping–observer missions where the UN and another operation provide a combination of peacekeeping and observer capacities in separate but, hopefully, coordinated commands. The two clear examples of this are UNOMIG, where the UN provides an observer presence alongside a CIS peacekeeping force; and UNMEE, where the AU provides observers alongside the UN peacekeeping force.

We are now entering into uncharted territory with the deployment of a new kind of “Hybrid” operation with the AU in Darfur, where the AU component will not be re-designated, but will retain its AU identity. UNAMID, as the mission is called, will be simultaneously a UN and an AU mission, operating under joint command, deriving authority from the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council. Quite how this operation will function in practice remains to be seen.

Until now, the UN’s cooperation with regional organisations in the area of peace and security has been largely *ad hoc*. However, our interaction with regional partners has become so intense, diverse and complex that traditional

cooperation arrangements are becoming increasingly outdated. While joint operations provide an opportunity to share the burden and to develop knowledge and best practices, they inherently bring complexity, and at times require compromise. A key challenge for us in the coming years will be to establish predictable and efficient frameworks for joint or collaborative ventures, enhanced interoperability, better coordination and enhanced impact and effectiveness of joint measures. When political demands and expediency, or the need to reinforce the capacity of one organisation lead to the mandating of joint operations, it is important to choose the right partners, and to ensure that such operational partnerships are based on complementarity and comparative advantage.

The strengthening of partnerships with regional organizations is a major priority for UN peacekeeping and is one of the central pillars of the *Peace Operations 2010* reform effort launched by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping in 2005. The achievement of this critical strategic objective is closely linked to another key pillar of the 2010 reform effort: the development of a comprehensive doctrine for UN peacekeeping operations. For DPKO and the newly created Department of Field Support (DFS), doctrine simply means the body of guidance that supports our staff serving in, and preparing to deploy to, UN peacekeeping operations. We see doctrine as a written body of guiding principles, lessons, past experience and “know-how” that will define the parameters of peacekeeping and support the preparation of future peacekeepers. Unlike training, doctrine is quite new to the UN System. We have always had “a way of doing things” but this has never been well codified in writing. There is a strong shared view among UN peacekeepers about the core values and approaches of UN peacekeeping. It is time for us to organise around these commonly held beliefs and practices of our peacekeepers.

In this regard, we are committed to ensuring that in developing a UN peacekeeping doctrine we take on board input and advice from member states, but do not simply adapt the relevant doctrines of NATO, EU, AU and individual member states. We need to develop our own doctrine by drawing on the experiences of those who actually *do* UN peacekeeping, and build upon the long and proud tradition of UN peace operations and guiding principles. The lessons of our top troop and police contributors and the lessons of our senior political figures such as SRSGs must be at the heart of our efforts to develop and update UN doctrine for the future. At the same time, these efforts to clarify how the business of UN peacekeeping is conducted are a key step towards achieving the interoperability required to combine our respective capacities effectively with our partners, including regional organisations.

While we seek to improve our interoperability at the operational and tactical levels, it is equally important to develop a common understanding of key terms and concepts such as “robust peacekeeping”, “peace enforcement” and “integrated missions”, and to clearly define the similarities and differences

between peacekeeping and crisis management. In order to work together more effectively, a mutual understanding of each other's governance mechanisms, decision-making processes and internal cultures is essential.

This conference will, I am sure, help to foster a better understanding among us — participants from the UN, EU and NATO — of our capabilities, limitations, and comparative advantages in addressing crises of peace. The UN has a strong commitment to such an understanding, as illustrated, for example, by the debate on the 'Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Organisations in Peace Operations' that was held on 6 November (2007) in the UN Security Council. A similar debate was also held in the Council last March. These, and similar earlier discourses have, generally, underpinned the possibilities of our organisations working together in peace operations. This is not to suggest that we have overcome all the challenges that we face in working together — far from it. But it does indicate that together we will overcome those challenges.

NATO in peace support operations: capabilities and challenges

Summary

Johan van der Werff

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has undergone a profound transformation since the end of the Cold War. From a somewhat static organisation concentrating on Article V, NATO became a more dynamic organisation that started to make use of non-Article V operations. These Peace Support Operations (PSOs) are also being called Crisis Response Operations (CROs), which adds to the confusion.

The transformation of NATO has had consequences for its security perception. The second paragraph of the Riga Communiqué states: 'In today's evolving security environment, we confront complex, sometimes inter-related threats such as terrorism, increasingly global in scale and lethal in results, and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery, as well as challenges from instability due to failed or failing states'. As a consequence the organisation agreed that this altered security situation 'puts a premium on the vital role NATO plays as the essential forum for security consultation between North American and European Allies. It highlights the importance of common action against those threats, including in UN-mandated crisis response operations'.⁶

During the Riga summit, NATO endorsed the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG). This important policy document emphasised cooperation between the different actors in Peace Support Operations. Paragraph 3 of the CPG states: 'Of particular importance because of their wide range of means and responsibilities are the United Nations and the European Union. The United Nations Security Council will continue to have the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The European Union, which is able to mobilize a wide range of military and civilian instruments, is assuming a growing role in support of international stability'.⁷

⁶ *Riga Communiqué* §2, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm>>.

⁷ *Comprehensive Political Guidance* §3, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b061129e.htm>>.

A Comprehensive Approach

The Riga Communiqué, Paragraph 10, highlights the importance of a Comprehensive Approach by the international community, 'involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments'.⁸ The heads of state and governments have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to develop pragmatic proposals to this end. In general one can say that NATO has tried to enhance its own crisis management instruments and that it has shown willingness to engage in cooperation at all levels with other actors. One could wonder to what extent these aspirations have become practice. Cooperation between NATO and other actors boils down, in the end, to whether NATO works well with the UN and the EU. At the moment, it does not.

The relations between the organisations are far from perfect and a lot needs to be done. It is a strange phenomenon that, while NATO plays a key role in the UN-mandated mission in Afghanistan, the interaction between the UN and NATO remains weak. Throughout the summer of 2006, NATO's Senior Political Committee was kept busy by NATO's Secretary General, working on a draft NATO–UN declaration to spell out how NATO could assist the UN in undertaking Crisis Response Operations. However, it has become obvious that within UN headquarters, many still regard NATO as a US-dominated, Western military alliance. There were, and still are, many sensitivities about the UN working together with NATO. Today, NATO is still waiting for a reaction to its outstretched hand.

At the same time, the level of cooperation between NATO and the EU is deplorable. Although the organisations have overlapping memberships, there are certain factors that make cooperation extremely difficult. I do not need to elaborate in great detail before this distinguished audience. But let me be frank; In NATO, it is often due to the intransigence of the Turkish delegation that NATO–EU cooperation remains so weak. At the same time, on the other side of Brussels, Greece and Cyprus are continuously putting spanners in the wheel of EU–NATO cooperation.

The need to complement the military efforts by reconstruction conducted by civilian actors is at the forefront of NATO's concerns. NATO is exasperated by the slowness of the reconstruction effort. The military cannot do it alone, and needs more help from civilian partners. The UN should take a more prominent role and the EU, which has a lot more clout on development issues, should jump in and start working. The military cannot do it alone and NATO is acutely aware of that.

⁸ *Riga Communiqué* §10, < <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm>>.

The European Union and peace support operations: Gaining credibility in the field of international security

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The European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) are all faced with the same security challenges. This has a levelling influence on their doctrines, concepts and practices. All organisations are under pressure to pursue comprehensive approaches, to modernise their instruments and tactics, and to seek seamless cooperation with each other.

Put somewhat crudely, the UN has plenty of (non-Western) troops at its disposal, but it labours under self-imposed limitations in the business of crisis management. NATO, on the other hand, has the military know-how and clout conferred by American membership in the organisation, but seems to have developed a latent identity problem. The EU is a newcomer to the international security scene, is universally liked, has a vast array of civilian resources and instruments at its disposal, but has a military credibility problem. In short, the three organisations each have their respective comparative advantages which they must seek to dovetail in order to tackle the multifaceted nature of modern-day crises.

One aspect of current security challenges pertains to Peace Support Operations (PSOs). Some question the EU's contribution in this field, asking whether the EU has a PSO doctrine. If one accepts the notion of doctrine as a fixed body of precepts which are applied mechanically to given situations, then the answer is no, the EU does not have a PSO doctrine. A more fruitful approach would be to avoid the term 'doctrine' and try instead to elucidate the distinctive features of the EU view of PSOs and contrast these with the approaches taken by the UN and NATO.

The EU approach

The EU is a relative newcomer to the field of international security and crisis management. The long process by which the EU sought to establish itself as a credible player in this field began in 1991 with the Maastricht treaty, which

included the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Ten years later, the EU introduced a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In their St. Malo Declaration (December 1998) France and the UK put their full weight behind the building of an ESDP. The NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo (1999) starkly highlighted the military weaknesses of the European allies. Conceptually, the EU equipped itself with its European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003. This may be called a doctrine to the extent that the ESS spells out a global approach: it is a catalogue of wishes and precepts which the EU tries to apply in practice. Through a succession of productive European Councils in 1999 to 2001 (the Cologne, Helsinki, Feira and Nice Councils), the EU managed in a relatively short period of time to model its structures for political-military decision-making.

The EU now has a Military Committee supported by Military Staff, a Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Political Military Group and the Committee on the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. Next to institutional achievements, the EU has made undeniable operational progress. To date, it has launched almost 20 civilian and military ESDP missions. The ESDP budget has grown substantially, although not enough to accommodate all ambitions. Last but not least, the EU has been working hard at creating a security culture at the *Rond Point Schuman*. However, it takes more than the presence of military uniforms in the EU corridors to create a real security culture, and the EU still has some way to go.

Civilian crisis management

The EU has at its disposal a broad array of civilian instruments: economic, social and diplomatic (preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention). Not surprisingly, therefore, EU crisis management often displays a very civilian mindset, as evidenced by the importance which the EU — and most notably Sweden — attaches to conflict prevention. Military action is seen as the reluctant option: the EU will engage militarily if all else has failed. Furthermore, the military action is subjected to a number of somewhat legalistic checks: have all diplomatic avenues been explored? Do we have a mandate? Do we have an invitation from the host state? Do we have legitimacy? What are the UN and/or NATO doing/not doing?

Many of these instruments have found their way into the Civilian Headline Goal, which is the civilian counterpart of the Military Headline Goal. Its main aim is to build up EU crisis management capacities in the field of police, rule-of-law, civilian administration and civil protection. The EU wants to have at its disposal 6,000 policemen, as well as thousands of judges, civilian administrators and other civilian experts, who can staff the missions.

Building up civilian crisis management capabilities brings its own problems. The vast array of CFSP and ESDP components across the three pillars of the Maastricht treaty tends to create coordination problems that can, at times, prove quite intractable. Different civilian missions enjoy different levels of support, depending on the member states which have pushed hardest for specific missions. There is also a temptation, on the part of some member states, to enlist ESDP missions in what is basically the settlement of post-colonial legacies. Finally, there is reluctance on the part of both civilian and military actors to fully engage with one another in the pursuit of the necessary synergies between civilian and military ESDP missions.

This brings us to military capability development, embodied in the Helsinki Headline Goal (1999) and the Military Headline Goal 2010 (2004). After nine years military capability development does start to make a difference. But the process is hampered by ideological, economic and technological problems. First, many member states do not want the build-up of EU military capabilities to take place at the expense of NATO: to a large extent, the two organisations are drawing on a single set of forces, which does not allow much room for duplication of efforts. Second, the development of new weapons systems entails long and costly lead times, while many member states are simultaneously grappling with defence cuts by their governments. Moreover, as technological developments forge ahead, new weapons risk being outmoded by the time they enter the units. The EU must take care not to develop yesterday's instruments to face tomorrow's challenges.

In sum, the EU has been very much engaged in the search for capabilities in order to prove itself, especially *vis-à-vis* its big transatlantic neighbour in Brussels. This 'capability quest' is a necessary way of building up credibility, since the EU started with no assets or capabilities of its own in this area, and given that nearly everything is being provided by the member states themselves.

Missions, missions, missions...

Taking part in missions has been another major preoccupation — and another way for the EU to prove itself in the field of international security. In purely quantitative terms, the EU has been more active than NATO, for instance, with almost 20 ESDP missions over the past years. While most of these missions were of a civilian nature, this still constitutes a remarkable achievement for an organisation which, until 2000, was almost completely absent from the crisis management field. (The now defunct European Community/European Union Monitoring Mission, ECMM/EUMM, in the Western Balkans, 1991–2007, can be considered a precursor to the later ESDP missions.) The EU is gaining invaluable experience from these missions, which are showing the EU flag in far

flung parts of the world such as Atjeh province in Indonesia. The only continent which has not been visited so far is Latin America, although Haiti and Colombia are sometimes mentioned as possible future recipients of an ESDP mission.

The expansion of ESDP missions has inevitably caused some problems. Mission proliferation makes heavy demands on the relatively scarce budgetary resources which the EU has set aside for civilian crisis management. There is also the distinct danger of dispersing attention and energies. Furthermore, as civilian missions are financed by the European Community budget (CFSP budget), the Commission will of course want to make its influence felt in the way missions are planned and run. The present institutional fragmentation in Brussels between the Council and the Commission will not be improved by the steady expansion of ESDP missions.

Peace Support Operations in the context of ESDP

What does this all mean in terms of the EU's approach to PSOs? If one understands PSOs in the widest sense of the term, including civilian missions, it could be argued that ESDP is in fact one big PSO. After all, ESDP is in the daily business of engaging with the world, at many levels and across a wide spectrum of problems, and of interacting with many different actors in support of peace, security, development and associated noble causes. But assuming that such a conclusion is a little too easily drawn, let us focus on PSOs in the more restrictive sense of military operations. As noted above, the military option remains the last resort, undertaken only reluctantly: EU member states will try all other means at their disposal before dispatching their soldiers. So far, the EU has sent military forces only to the Balkans and Africa.

PSOs have focused on the lower end of the so-called Petersberg tasks. These are the tasks which the now almost defunct Western European Union (WEU) assigned itself back in 1992. They include: (1) humanitarian and rescue tasks; (2) crisis management; (3) the tasks of combat forces in peacekeeping, including combat peacemaking. In the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the EU member states decided to import the WEU Petersberg tasks into the treaty text (Article 17/2). "Petersberg" includes a wide array of tasks, but within the EU there is consensus only on the lower-end tasks as collective undertakings. As soon as the discussion moves to the middle or the higher end of the spectrum, member states tend to follow their diverging national instincts. EU military operations have therefore concentrated on these lower-end tasks, such as maintaining a secure environment (Operation CONCORDIA in FYROM, 2003), stabilising north-eastern Congo (Operation ARTEMIS, 2003) or taking over from NATO/IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Operation ALTHEA, as of 2004). These are supported by military capabilities which are considerable on paper, but are not always readily available. The expeditionary mindset has not yet become

commonplace among EU political and military decision-makers. The counter-insurgency mindset is even harder to find.

Yet the modesty which characterises EU military operations in practice contrasts sharply with its stated ambitions. The EU's own Strategic Concept, the ESS, is all about greater coordination and coherence of policies and policy instruments across a wide spectrum of issues and actors. For instance, the ESS aspires to create the ability to sustain several operations simultaneously, to develop operations with civilian and military components, and to undertake more preventive engagements. It expresses a commitment to reinforce operational cooperation with the UN. The ESS calls for stronger diplomatic capabilities and a wider spectrum of missions, including support for security sector reform (SSR) as well as for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR).

There are some explanations for the manifest discrepancy between the EU's ambitions and its actual conduct of PSOs. For all the stated ambitions of the ESS, EU PSOs remain constrained by a number of factors. First, they are heavily dependent on the goodwill, the interests and the engagement of major EU member states. If the UK, France or Germany do not concur, an EU PSO generally will not get off the ground. Very often these major EU member states, especially Britain and France, have national interests which they continue to pursue on their own, using their national means and capabilities (the French in Ivory Coast, the British in Sierra Leone). Furthermore, the new member states ('New Europe') tend to have an instinctive preference for NATO as a framework for military action. Finally, the more complex the operation, the more important and relevant the option of NATO support becomes. But what began as a technical matter over the use of NATO assets and capabilities, has over the years developed into an ideological issue pitting EU and NATO/Greece and Turkey against each other. This state of affairs has not helped to popularise EU-led military operations.

Conclusion

To sum up, the EU has undeniably become a player in the field of international security, mainly by contributing its unique range of civilian crisis management instruments. In the more specific field of military action/PSOs, the EU's record so far has been more modest. The EU will tend to field PSOs at the lower end of the conflict spectrum and to rely on NATO for more demanding types of operations. At the same time the EU is able, thanks to the vast civilian resources at its disposal, to make unique, integrated contributions to the stabilisation and reconstruction of crisis areas, thereby conferring to the ESDP its own, distinctive strategic significance. The EU will most probably not be tested across the full scale of Petersberg tasks in the near future. Rather, the

organisation is likely to limit itself to the lower end of the conflict spectrum, occasionally venturing into the middle section of the spectrum with a little help from its NATO friends.

There seems little reason to expect major changes in this scenario in the near future. If it seeks improvements, it will have to find them at the operational level. The Lisbon treaty will bring about some organisational improvements within the EU machinery in Brussels, which in turn should generate more synergy, more coordination and, therefore, more effectiveness on the ground. The EU has to cultivate pragmatic solutions with its main counterparts, UN and NATO, and seek comparative advantages. In fact, at the working level a lot of good work is being done. The EU has, for instance, adopted a joint declaration with the UN on cooperating in peacekeeping, buttressed by concrete proposals for cooperative action in the field. With NATO much remains to be done, not only in the area of capability-building but also at the level of operational cooperation. Concerning the latter, Afghanistan seems to offer the ideal proving ground for the EU to demonstrate itself as an effective security partner for NATO. However, the EU still has some way to go, as evidenced by the laborious start to its police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan, 2007). The EU will have to work hard to raise its security profile in Afghanistan, where it should be seen to pull its full weight.

The United Nations in Somalia: a commander's perspective

Summary

Cevik Bir

Gen. (ret.) Cevik Bir, is the
Former Force Commander of UNOSOM-II

Introduction

Gen. (ret.) Cevik Bir was commander of the Somalia Operation UNOSOM-II, the first UN peace enforcement operation whose command and control were performed by the United Nations. In this summary, we will first focus on existing UN Peace Support Operations (PSOs). In the second part we turn to the general principles that should guide UN PSOs. Finally, the principles and nature of UN PSOs will be evaluated in the light of the UNOSOM-II experiences.

United Nations Peacekeeping

Ultimately, two sorts of fundamental Peace Support Operations exist in the context of the United Nations: peacekeeping missions, based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and Peace Enforcement or Peace Making operations, based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Peacekeeping missions are traditional diplomatic operations; the use of force is only allowed in case of self defence. Such operations were also undertaken during the Cold War; from 1948 to 1989 all missions except for the Korean War were peacekeeping operations. Peace enforcement missions, on the other hand, are military operations and include warlike conditions. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) are approved by the UNSC and determine when, where and how force should be used.

In the post Cold War era the international community has increasingly made use of peace enforcement missions or Chapter VII missions. Between 1990 and 1995, the world experienced more than 90 wars resulting in 5.5 million casualties. Traditional peacekeeping missions became much more challenging and the risks increased. Consequently, the use of force in UN missions became inevitable, necessary and legitimate, and peace enforcement missions gained in importance. These missions are different from war in the sense that the actors and partners involved are multinational and have multiple functions. In addition, nations which contribute troops have to face the fact that the lives of the peacemakers are in danger when the UN undertakes a peace enforcement mission.

New challenges, different rules and principles

As a result of the new challenges the world faced in the 1990s, the goals and strategies — the ends and the means — have had to be updated. Successful peace enforcement operations now have to conform to a number of new rules. First, the nations should agree on a clear mandate, a clarification of authority and a coherent strategy in order to harmonize political, humanitarian and military elements of the mission. Second, since the missions are performed in warlike conditions, the UN has to develop and man combat forces and to establish the command and control of the operations. Troop-contributing nations must comply with UN principles and agree on the desired direction of the mission. Finally, other operational requirements come into play: the deployed forces need an adequate level of multinational training for these specific warlike conditions and they also need considerable force multipliers at their disposal to operate within similar Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

The UNOSOM-II mission in Somalia

The mission in Somalia provides an extraordinary example of a peace enforcement operation that was not conducted on the basis of the stipulations outlined above. In the first place, the UN was too strict with the mandate. Military commanders faced difficulties since, according to them, the mandate was not open enough to allow them to carry out their tasks effectively. Furthermore, the political objective was neither clear nor attainable. Equally importantly, there was no integrated strategy for the multiple tasks involved: the various political, humanitarian and military objectives had not been reconciled into a clear strategy. One could argue that these problems were a result of an ambiguous decision making process in the Security Council, which puts the political decision and the mandate into the same resolution. A further problem, and one of the gravest in the case of Somalia, was the political anarchy in the country. In the absence of state institutions, the peace enforcers were not able to identify a legitimate authority. This meant that UNOSOM-II could not acquire the support of the population, since handing over authority to one faction would provoke opposition from another.

Furthermore, operational problems were very severe in Somalia. The military command noted that the contributing countries lacked a common outlook and consequently there was no unity of effort. Contributing nations tried to dictate to their own contingents, and stipulated the tasks and duties their contingents were to perform. Operations in the so-called centre of gravity, in particular, were not accepted by the contributing nations, with the result that UNOSOM-II ran out of forces that were allowed to be deployed in the most important battlefields. In addition, force multipliers (appropriate

command/control assets, communication intelligence, and aviation) were inadequate and some of them, such as communication and aviation, were based on contracts. As soon as a single shot was fired in the centre of gravity, contracted aviation assets were withdrawn from the area. A second operational problem was the lack of interoperability of the troops. Forces from different contributing countries had their own national operational procedures, equipment and understanding, which hampered effective command and control of the troops overall. UN missions need interoperable procedures and compatible equipment.

Somalia was the first UN mission undertaken in warlike conditions, in which the UN conducted command and control itself. The mission made it abundantly clear that the UN, at that time, was not ready for such tasks in peace enforcement missions. The political objectives were unattainable; the multiple strategic goals were not harmonized; and the military commanders faced grave operational problems, particularly related to command and control. The UN, in short, was not the proper organisation to manage the large, complex and ambitious military operation in Somalia. It did not have the capacity to deploy, direct and oversee command and control in this PSO. Only if the UN acquires the necessary structures might it may be able to carry out peace enforcement operations. Otherwise, peace enforcement missions should be delegated to a capable nation or an international organisation like NATO, while the UN restricts itself to less ambitious peacekeeping operations.

NATO's lessons learned in Afghanistan

Hilmi Akin Zorlu

Lieutenant General Hilmi Akin Zorlu is Chief of Plans and Policy Division of the TGS and Former Commander of ISAF II

I would like to thank Bilkent University and the Centre for European Security Studies for giving me this opportunity to address you today. I would like to touch upon some important aspects and lessons learned during ISAF-II operations.

1. Introduction

The United Nations authorised the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, by the UN Security Council Resolution 1386, dated 20 December 2001. Resolution 1386 tasked ISAF 'to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas'. The type of mission was Peace Enforcement.

Following the initial phase, Turkey took over the second term command of ISAF from the United Kingdom on 20 June 2002, as required by the UN Security Council Resolution 1413, dated 23 May 2002. In addition to its core mission, the Military Technical Agreement stipulated that ISAF had the following tasks:

- To aid the Interim Government in developing national security structures,
- To assist the country's reconstruction,
- To assist in developing and training future Afghan Security Forces.

At the end of our extended period of the mission, we handed over the leadership to a Germany–Dutch Corps on 10 February 2003.

2. Operational Principles

Now, I would like to explain the fundamental operational principles of the Turkish leadership of ISAF. These principles were identified before coming to the mission area.

- a) I think that the most important thing we did was to issue strict orders to all ISAF personnel to be polite and kind to Afghan citizens at all times.
- b) At the same time, we took great care to remain equally distant to all ethnic groups of the Afghan people.
- c) Furthermore, we were very careful not to become involved in

- Afghan domestic politics.
- d) In addition, we, and all ISAF personnel, fully respected Afghan customs and cultural values.
 - e) Finally, we worked in very close consultation and coordination with the local authorities, the representatives of the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organisations.

These guiding principles helped us to win the full confidence of the Afghan authorities and Afghan people.

3. Lessons Learned from Afghanistan

A number of important lessons were learned from Afghanistan during our leadership. I may say that mutual trust and respect between the people and the peacekeepers must be the most critical aspect of any Peace Support Operation. So, in my opinion, the main lesson in a Peace Support Operation should be 'to show polite behaviour to the local people'. Troop-contributing nations should train their troops in the delicate nature of Peace Support Operations, which requires politeness towards the local people, and everybody in the mission area.

Another important lesson is to maintain equal distance to all ethnic groups. All personnel should respect the country's customs and cultural values. If you do not respect these values, or if you discriminate among the ethnic groups and treat the people impolitely, people may easily see you as the invaders of their country. Working in close consultation and coordination with the local authorities, the UN representatives and other non-governmental organisations is another key issue. A detailed reconnaissance with the specialists is very important to clarify the real requirements of the mission before going to the mission area.

On the operational side, joint patrols with the Afghan Security Forces were very important to train the Afghan Security Forces and to show mutual support between ISAF and the Afghan Security Forces. For example, all patrols were conducted jointly during the ISAF-II. For the restructuring process of the Afghan National Army and the Police, providing equipment and training was another important contribution. As Lead Nation, Turkey donated many items and equipment for security, and we trained Bodyguards of the Ministries, and 1st Battalion of Afghan National Guard.

For peace support operations, the ratio of combat troops to combat service support troops should be carefully determined. For example, ISAF had roughly 4,800 personnel, but only 850 of these could be used as infantry in the area. The rest were staff and support personnel. The main reason for this is the preference of the most of the contributing nations to assign support troops, rather than combat troops. In addition, there were many restrictions placed by contributing nations on the use of their troops.

Timely and correct reporting by the troops is essential to react against incidents properly. Mainly for this purpose, we conducted seminars to train the staff officers and the commanders of the sub-units.

Force protection of all the units is also an important issue in a Peace Support Operation. Security equipment, such as detectors, x-ray devices, armoured vehicles and sniffer-dogs are essential to ensure the security and protection of the units.

Of course, logistics is often one of the main problems, especially in a country where there is no host nation support. However, because of perfect planning, there was no problem with the logistic support. Almost all logistic support was provided from abroad.

The UN Security Council resolutions on ISAF called for a trust fund to be established for common expenses. This was very necessary, but no contributions have been made to this fund. The lead nation, therefore, had to meet most of ISAF's substantial costs.

Two other important factors were well-established Communication and Information Systems, and careful selection of specialist personnel for the Operation. Information Operations and Civil–Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Operations are key elements in the success of a Peace Support Operation. Regarding civil–ilitary cooperation issues, working closely with the UN Agencies, non-governmental organisations, other international organisations, and local authorities is also important. In this context, ISAF conducted an extensive CIMIC programme, designed to provide assistance to the local community through carefully selected quick-impact projects.

The media played an important role in achieving our goals. Providing the local and international community with timely and accurate information about ISAF activities and incidents prevented incorrect news reporting. For this reason, a press briefing was held every day; these briefings also provided a suitable atmosphere for the media to get first-hand information.

4. Conclusion

By assuming command of ISAF, Turkey demonstrated its determination to fight against terrorism. Because of a deep-rooted friendship between Afghanistan and Turkey, the Afghan people felt secure with ISAF forces under Turkish leadership. During this period, stability and security in Kabul improved gradually. The night curfew was lifted for the first time in 23 years. According to surveys, the people of Kabul were very happy with ISAF's activities. This was demonstrated by the lack of attacks on the ISAF troops.

Finally, ISAF became one large family, with all its members supporting one another and joining hands to help the people of Kabul. I think this harmony was the reason behind ISAF's success. I would like to take this opportunity to

thank all troop-contributing nations once again for their participation in ISAF-II and their valuable support.

Finally, I would like to comment on the key questions which will be addressed during this Seminar.

Ad I. There should be a common understanding of Peace Support Operations, which will prepare a path that leads to the success of the mission, without any casualties. The current approaches of the international organisations are different.

Ad II. Many nations approach Peace Support Operations differently, which leads to difficulties in terms of command and control.

Ad III. There is a direct and mutually-strengthening relationship between security and development.

Create a better life for the Afghan people

Summary

Theo Vleugels

BGen. Theo Vleugels is the First Commander
of the Taskforce Uruzgan (COMTFU-1)

Introduction

In February 2006 the Parliament of the Kingdom of the Netherlands accepted responsibility for a Peace Support Operation in Uruzgan, a province of Afghanistan. The troops (a battle group and a provincial reconstruction team) were initially deployed in August 2006 for a two-year time period. This summary gives an overview of the approach of the Dutch government in Uruzgan in which both the planning and execution phase of the mission will be examined. First, some essential background to the mission will be provided. Second, the Dutch approach during the planning phase will be studied with a specific focus on the effect-based approach. Third, the executive phase will be reviewed by taking a close look at the challenges of the mission. Finally, a conclusion and some lessons learned will be presented.

The mission

The Taskforce Uruzgan was deployed under NATO's Regional Command South (ISAF-III) in the province of Uruzgan and included Dutch and Australian forces. Its main task was to assist the local governance in building its capacity, authority and influence, in order to set the conditions for a secure and stable Uruzgan province. In short, the Taskforce had to create a better life for the Afghan people.

The Taskforce was divided into three components: an Australian Reconstruction Taskforce that was to plan and conduct all kinds of rebuilding operations and training of local workers for the rebuilding of Uruzgan; a Dutch infantry battalion endowed with soft skin vehicles, light infantry and heavy infantry fighting vehicles; and a component that was made up of a former tank battalion, the Netherlands Provincial Reconstruction Team. These soldiers were trained to fight, but their task was to reconstruct the province of Uruzgan. In fact, there was nothing to reconstruct or rebuild since the province lacked even basic infrastructure and the soldiers had to build up the country from scratch.

An important aspect of the Taskforce was the cooperation between the various ministries within the mission. The Taskforce Commander (Ministry of Defence) had a political advisor from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a

development advisor from the Directorate of Development Cooperation. These representatives from the ministries needed to integrate policy and come up with solutions.

An effect-based approach

The Taskforce Uruzgan endorsed an approach that focussed on the preferred effects of the mission. Of course, the ultimate preferred effect was an end state in which the government of Afghanistan was able to exert an influence without international military assistance. To that end, four main effects were formulated in order to secure this main objective.


The first preferred effect was a credible Taskforce. The internal debate in the Netherlands required the Taskforce to yield results and consequently be credible. More important, however, was the credibility of the Taskforce to the local population. The Taskforce had to fight for the hearts and minds of the population by widening the gap between the Taliban and the people in order to provide a new future for the population. In essence the people formed the 'heart of the mission'. In addition, the Dutch counterinsurgency policy adopted the 'oil spot' approach. Since the Taskforce consisted of eleven platoons in a province as big as Belgium, they were based in two camps deployed in the most populous areas. From there they tried to control their terrain and extend their influence like an oil spot.

During the preparation of the Uruzgan mission, the government of The Netherlands made an in-depth assessment of the population in order to understand its main target. The assessment revealed that a small group was pro-ISAF and pro-government. The Taskforce tried to sustain and enhance this group. The majority of the population was neutral, assessing the situation in terms of their own survival. This part of the population (50%) was the main target of the mission, the hearts and minds that needed to be won. Finally, a small part of the population was classified as insurgents: economic insurgents, on the one hand, whom the mission aspired to transform; and hardcore insurgents aiming to re-establish Taliban rule, on the other hand, who needed to be eliminated.

The effect-based approach included three other preferred effects, which focussed primarily on the means of the mission. The Taskforce Uruzgan endorsed three effects or lines of operations: Governance and Justice, Security and Stability, and Development. The first of these focussed on good governance and the rule of law. The second aimed to provide security as a necessary precondition for stability. The third, development, focussed on the socio-economic recovery of the province.

These three lines of operations corresponded roughly to the Three-D approach, an effort to integrate Defence, Diplomacy and Development. Figure 1

provides an overview of the relationship between these three Ds — Defence (Security), Diplomacy (Government) and Development (Development). The figure shows that if the environment is permissive, more developmental efforts can be carried out and vice versa. The situation in Uruzgan was not stable and consequently the Taskforce



had to incorporate all three lines of operations simultaneously. The soldiers of the Taskforce were able to perform varied tasks: the military personnel might find themselves operating as reconstruction workers one day, and riflemen a day later. They had to be intelligence collectors, defence and police trainers, riflemen and reconstruction workers in one.

Challenges

While the effect-based approach was primarily a planning tool, we will now focus on the executive activities. The Taskforce pinpointed immediately the importance of winning the hearts and minds of the population. The military was based in two camps; from there they walked around in the area (instead of driving in armed vehicles) not wearing helmets or sunglasses. Of course, the soldiers ran a risk, but it was very important to find a way to convince the local inhabitants of their good intentions.

It was clear from the start that the effect-based approach would face some severe challenges. To start with, the government of Afghanistan lacked essential capacities. In the Department of Agriculture in Uruzgan, for instance, just eleven people were employed, of whom only three could read and write. Decision making in the Department of Agriculture focussed on short-term details such as how to repair the tractors. The Dutch agricultural experts focussed instead on long-term agricultural plans. Not surprisingly, this mismatch of perceptions between the two sides hindered progress in Uruzgan.

Second, the tribal composition of the province of Uruzgan was remarkably complex. Each tribe exerted its own authority and competence and most of the tribes were intermingled. The establishment of a democratic society — an aim of both the international community and the Netherlands government — was obviously compromised by this complex tribal situation on the ground. This mismatch was a second challenge.

A final challenge was posed by the different layers of the conflict in Uruzgan. In case of a conflict, the commanders and political and development advisors had first to understand the tribes to which the conflicting parties belonged; the political perspectives of the opposing parties; the position they had taken during the Cold War; and the power brokers they answered to. Such knowledge of the local population turned out to be essential in order to contribute effectively to the resolution of these conflicts.

Conclusion and lessons learned

In general, one might be cautiously positive about the mission in Uruzgan. The Taskforce has gained the confidence and acquired the trust of parts of the population in Uruzgan. On the one hand, the struggle for the hearts and minds of the population seems to be possible. The mission might be difficult but it is certainly not unachievable. On the other hand, since only parts of the population have so far come to trust the Taskforce, we should not expect this to be a short-term effort. Long-term international commitment and a common vision are of paramount importance.

The most important lesson learned was the synchronisation of effort between the various ministries, whether this is called the effect-based approach, the Dutch approach or the Three-D approach. The synchronisation of effort enhanced the toolbox of all three representatives in the Taskforce. Between them, they were able to cover most important international and national players in the field. The military commander remained in contact with military institutions like NATO; the development advisor liaised with development NGOs and organisations like the UN and USAID; and the political advisor was a diplomat in contact with the relevant states on various levels. As a result, it was possible to work on a common understanding of the situation in Uruzgan.

Views on the Three D's of Diplomacy, Development and Defence

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I work as the Development Advisor within the Netherlands Ministry of Defence. In the past I have worked in Development Cooperation, for UN agencies, as a private consultant and for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I have worked in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mozambique, Zambia and Pakistan.⁹ When I was invited to give this presentation, it struck me that the experiences of Turkey and the Netherlands in stabilisation and reconstruction operations are quite similar. I remember the important role of the Turkish armed forces in Afghanistan, just after September 11 2001. The Turkish armed forces have built quite some experience in stabilisation and reconstruction operations. I particularly refer to the lead-nationship of ISAF in Afghanistan before it was handed over to NATO and the Turkish PRT deployment in Wardak province in cooperation with your international development agency. The Netherlands also had its turn of ISAF HQ, just before NATO took over, and from 2003 till 2006 we ran a PRT in Baghlan (North) and since August 2006 in Uruzgan province in the South. This conference is an excellent opportunity to hear others share their experiences and perspectives. My presentation addresses the concept of 3D – Diplomacy, Development and Defence – and the experiences of the Netherlands in this way of working. I will look first at the *rationale* behind the 3D concept, then at the *issues and concerns*, and finally the *effects and challenges*.

Rationale behind 3D concept

I will begin with a note of caution. We should not see the 3D approach as a sort of “alpha and omega” of cooperation between all the various civil and military actors operating in a conflict area. The 3D approach is part of a far broader integrated approach or “comprehensive approach”. Besides the ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development many more actors are effectively involved in the reconstruction process: local, provincial and national authorities of the countries in question, national and international NGOs, the

⁹ The views expressed in this contribution are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of the Netherlands' government.

various UN agencies and civil society organisations. Even on the donor government side, the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Finance and Economic Affairs should also share in the process.

The 3D concept (Defence, Diplomacy, Development) did not come about overnight, nor was it a consciously planned strategy to deal with “new wars”. As the worldwide security context changed after 1989 and again in 2001, so did the international approach to peace operations and the integration of civilian expertise in military missions. Although 3D has become a catch-phrase in political terminology, it serves to hide a complex process with far-reaching consequences. Whereas the mismanagement of development funds leads to simple failures, the context of the 3D approach does not allow mistakes: lives of people are directly at stake, so there is immense pressure to “get it right” the first time around.

Current security context

So-called *intrastate* conflicts account for 95 percent of current conflicts worldwide. They often occur in fragile states which are experiencing poverty, uncontrollable flows of arms and weapons, and conflicting domestic political interests. One of the key aspects of these “modern” conflicts is the expressly socio-political context in which they occur. Conflicts are often linked to the lack of state capacity to guarantee security and other basic public services (health care, education) to its people.

During the first years of the new millennium a number of UN reports appeared on the subject of security and development. The 2000 Brahimi Report called for a robust mandate for UN peace operations and the integration of civilian expertise on good governance, human rights and rule of law within the peacekeeping missions. It also connected UN peace operations to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a set of developmental benchmarks to be reached by 2015. Although physical security is not one of the MDGs, it is explicitly acknowledged that a workable security situation is a precondition to obtaining sustainable development. At the UN Summit in 2005 this interconnection between security and development (as well as human rights) was once again stressed.

Two main observations are worth noting:

- First, the international community has a moral obligation to intervene when states do not sufficiently protect their people from fear or want.
- Second, an integrated effort between civil and military actors, state as well as non-state, is necessary, especially in countries that face a high risk of conflict.

SSR

Since many present-day conflicts can be characterised as multi-dimensional, complex emergencies, setting a number of priorities for the post-conflict reconstruction process is crucial. A secure environment and a reasonably well-functioning security system are prerequisites for political and socio-economic development in the long run. The process of so-called “Security Sector Development” has the objective of developing local capacity to handle security services, interact with the civil environment, and assert (democratic) political control over the entire security apparatus. Complex emergencies cannot be resolved with purely military solutions.

The need for a comprehensive and integrated 3D approach is widely accepted across the international community. Nevertheless, numerous issues concerning civil–military cooperation still have to be addressed, especially at the “how” level: we already know *what* we need to do, but the question is *how* to turn this framework for cooperation into workable policy on the ground?

Issues and concerns within the 3D concept

All three fields — Diplomacy, Defence and Development — have their own procedures, structures and goals in any sort of operation. As such, priorities set by actors in one domain may well interfere with those set by actors in other domains. The modus operandi of the different fields may also present a problem. Diplomacy and Defence (and also bilateral development aid) tend to focus on a top-down approach: taking the sovereignty of the country in question as the starting point, funds and aid are usually distributed by way of its central ministries, or national trust funds, and its ruling authorities are recognised as the main implementing partners for the bilateral effort. Development workers, unlike the other two D’s, primarily take a bottom-up approach, directing assistance to the people rather than the state.

There are also some fundamental tensions in the civil–military relationship in conflict areas:

- As the military mission is by definition of a mandate- and time-bound nature, NGOs and other developmental actors fear the military’s short-term goals will disrupt the long-term reconstruction effort. This is sometimes fed — often incorrectly — by the idea that the military “wants to score” during its time in the field.
- Those working in the development sector usually wish to be perceived by the local people as being neutral. Since they take no sides, they can more honestly claim that they care about *problems*, rather than a particular political agenda. Association with the military, which supports the legitimate government (as

internationally perceived), may have a negative impact on the population's perspective of NGOs and other field workers; if they come to be seen as accomplices of the government, this can endanger them or at least impede their work.

When the security situation does not permit unarmed development actors to enter a certain area, soldiers may be deployed to perform or supervise development tasks. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but there are a few crucially important disadvantages to the use of the military as a development actor.

- The whole idea behind development work is to build up local capacity so that, in due time, the reconstruction tasks can be carried out entirely by local workers. Local people should be the real owners of these reconstruction projects, which can be difficult when the military is involved.
- Soldiers are a much more expensive 'commodity' than the local workforce.
- The military is not trained for the many complex cross-cutting and mutually reinforcing projects within the development sphere, such as the rebuilding of political institutions, effectively engaging with civil society, etc.

Professional development actors are much better suited to these tasks. Not only do they have the experience and expertise, they have the time to build and maintain trusting professional relationships with key local players, and their involvement in the area in question is not restricted by a (finite) mandate and internal political considerations.

Thus it is clear that putting 3D into practice is far more complicated than the simple term suggests. As a conclusion I will discuss some practical points with regard to applying 3D concepts in complex (post-) conflict situations.

Effects and challenges

While the various actors involved must make a commitment to the common agenda in order to achieve synergy, it is important to realise that there can be no such thing as a blueprint. Any approach needs to be context-specific.

A number of trends within the development debate have helped the evolution of the integrated approach:

- Firstly, within development cooperation more attention is now paid to good governance as an *objective* of aid rather than as a *precondition*.
- Secondly, the growing acceptance of a certain international moral responsibility to try to prevent or stop conflict, to intervene if

necessary, and to rebuild 'failed states', has built a bridge between the security and the development sectors.

- Third, this 'bridge' has been further supported by a growing focus on an *effects-based approach* to development, which requires the various actors to combine their complementary capacities in order to support each other in the pursuit of maximum efficiency.

International preventive policies should aim to contribute to a secure and sustainable livelihood for the poor in conflict situations, by addressing the root causes of potential conflict, strengthening socio-economic development and supporting reform of the security sector. NGOs play an indispensable role in this process. Conflict prevention shifts the focus of the defence apparatus from combat activities to security sector development, which makes the mission much less costly and less politically risky. More importantly, fewer lives will be at stake and the potential for conflict escalation is diminished. Prevention puts the focus firmly on diplomatic and developmental activities, which are usually more cost-effective in these circumstances.

The basic starting point for a combined strategy is that all activities have to be as *context-specific* as possible, from the local up to the international level. From a policy perspective this means working on well-assessed regional and country strategies and operational plans which are regularly updated. These plans and strategies help to identify the views of the local population (men's *and* women's perspectives and needs, the latter being too frequently overlooked), local authorities, and other key actors on policy, security, development and humanitarian issues. It is also important to identify key "points of entry", leaders to work with, and other drivers of change. The Netherlands have only done this extensively for Uruzgan province (Afghanistan). Here, an in-depth civil and context assessment was made by the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, together with several NGOs, to serve as a basic framework to guide all priority activities in the area. This "Civil Assessment" has proven to be extremely useful so far, and I would recommend that such an exercise be carried out in any area of the world in which a collaborative strategy is to be undertaken.

To effectively integrate planning between the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, a measure of political leadership from the highest levels of ministerial authority is desirable. Although the various national governments and international organisations may each have their own ways of integrating their strategic planning procedures, a certain degree of top-down guidance has benefited most of them. Once the guidelines for cooperation are set this way, the "working level" process of collaboration between the various departments usually follows naturally.

Directly connected to the linking up of parallel processes is the need to strive for complementarities between the international players, based on their particular strengths and weaknesses. Organisations like the UN, the EU, NATO

and the World Bank all have important resources, comparative advantages that are needed for joint operations. NATO, for instance, is a military alliance, whereas the UN and EU have primarily diplomatic and development resources

Although civilian actors are better placed for certain tasks, sometimes conditions are such that only military actors are present to do the job. In general, governments should adopt the principle of using civilian actors wherever possible, and military forces only where needed. “Be as civilian as possible, and as military as necessary” has been coined as a catchphrase for the Dutch deployment of its provincial reconstruction teams and its CIMIC activities in Afghanistan.

The deployment of defence experts to advise partner governments and organisations on how to develop and/or reconstruct their security systems is becoming common, especially in African countries. The Netherlands, for example, has adopted this practice in Burundi, Rwanda, DR Congo and Mali, and also in Georgia. In this way, the 3D approach is furthered on a decentralised level.

As already noted, 3D does not fully cover all aspects of conflict prevention, management, or post-conflict reconstruction: the police, the judiciary and a wide range of other civilian expertise, from governmental as well as non-governmental organisations, should also be an integral part of the planning process and of missions in the field. This approach to post-conflict environments, involving actors from all the necessary fields, should strive for a “civilisation of security”, with a focus on conflict resolution, timely civil assessments and the use of civil expertise in military missions. Strategies promoting the global poverty agenda should be balanced with those that promote the geo-strategic interests of states. Both would benefit from a focus on good governance, stability assessments and the use of local knowledge. A country-specific approach to coordination, dialogue and consultation between the various actors, and a sharing of the financial burden, are also steps in the right direction.

International actors involved in reconstruction missions should put more effort into presenting a united message of their goals and methods. There are two basic aspects to public diplomacy that governments and international organisations should take into account. One is winning the support of the local population, crucial for the success of any joint operation. To support this goal, diplomats, peacekeepers and development workers should inform the local population of what they are doing, why they are doing it, how their activities are based on local needs and views, and in what way the local people can provide support.

For the military, post-conflict reconstruction theory must be made as concrete as possible to provide useful tools for future missions. For development actors, there is much to learn about the utility of force, and the military mode of operations. Building on that last point, cooperation between the

various civil and military actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction needs to move beyond bureaucratic inter-departmental working groups and the ever-growing (but rarely changing) body of recommendations from conferences and high-level get-togethers, towards practical implementation on the ground.

Beyond the Rhetoric: A critical perspective on the relationship between Security and Development in Peace Support Operations

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The importance of linking security and development in the context of peace support operations has been stressed by a number of speakers at this conference. Policymakers, academics, soldiers and development workers agree on the need to integrate the efforts of the various military and civilian actors in conflict and post-conflict situations. Strategy papers from around the globe stress the need for a “whole of government” approach to peacebuilding. Given the increasingly complex nature of today's conflicts, it seems obvious that close cooperation between different government departments (foreign affairs, defence, international cooperation), as well as between peacekeeping forces and non-governmental actors is a necessary precondition for success. It is widely acknowledged by security analysts that today's conflicts are not won on the battlefield alone. In order to achieve a sustainable peace it is necessary to address the structural causes of conflict (which can range from political marginalisation to poverty and underdevelopment) and to re-build fragmented societies.

Soldiers and civilians involved in reconstruction and nation-building efforts in environments such as Afghanistan and Sudan are mutually dependent, complementing each other's skills. Military men (and women) are poorly prepared to rebuild the political, social and economic infrastructure of a war-torn country, while at the same time the delivery of civilian assistance depends on a stable security environment, in particular as the traditional neutrality of humanitarian actors is often no longer respected by parties to conflicts. However, despite these widely acknowledged facts, there can be no doubt that in many countries the cooperation between security and development actors remains a challenge. This contribution attempts to look beyond the rhetoric and into the numerous challenges at the policy and operational level, before presenting a few suggestions on how to improve the situation.

1. Effective cooperation between security and development actors is often hampered by a lack of trust. In practice, these problems begin with understanding each other's roles and responsibilities in the context of peace support operations. For example, people from a military background often wrongly equate development with humanitarian efforts (not least because humanitarian agencies are the most visible

civilian actors during conflict and in the immediate post-conflict phase). An analysis of the political, socio-economic and cultural causes of conflict — which should be a prerequisite for development planning — is rarely a feature of military assessments, and many military analysts limit their assessments to mono-causal explanations (stressing, for example, poverty or lack of services). The increasing popularity of Civil–Military Co-operation (CIMIC) activities, such as involvement of peacekeeping forces in the reconstruction of roads, schools and hospitals, and other such activities, is a direct result of this train of thought. Development professionals often view CIMIC with suspicion; the military usually lacks the sophisticated instruments of “impact chains” and “participatory project planning” developed by the technical cooperation agencies. Many activities are ad hoc and are carried out with little consideration of sustainability. Furthermore, non-government organisations in particular see the adoption of CIMIC approaches by peacekeeping forces as an encroachment on their turf.

2. Development and security actors are working under different parameters and timeframes. The military can be deployed quickly, individual soldiers usually stay only for a relatively short period of several months and are financed through reliable national contributions (or, in the case of UN missions, through the assessed mission budget). This is in stark contrast to most development actors, who need a longer lead-in time before deployment, require more sectoral and regional expertise and are usually funded through voluntary contributions. Furthermore, unlike the military, very few civilian organisations maintain significant human capacities on standby, which means that professional staff need to be recruited before new programmes can begin. Depending on the size of the programme and the type of organisation, the lead-in time between the funding decision and the start of activities on the ground can be anything from three months (in the case of some humanitarian NGOs) to eighteen months. These sometimes long delays between commitments made at donor conferences and the start of implementation can be a source of frustration both for the local population and for peacekeeping forces.
3. Another problem is the fact that countries which are emerging from conflict usually have a very low capacity to absorb development funding, as national bureaucracies and civil society first need to get back onto their feet. Typically, donor funding is most easily available in the immediate aftermath of a peace agreement when public and political interest in a country is highest. In this situation, there is often intense competition among international NGOs (and to a lesser extent donor governments) for reliable local partners to implement programmes. While local capacities to absorb development funding grow over time,

donor fatigue also sets in after an initial phase of enthusiasm. In practice, there often seems to be an inverse relationship between donor funding and the absorption capacity of a post-conflict country, i.e. the absorptive capacity of a nation grows as the available external resources diminish. This is particularly true for post-conflict countries which do not attract a lot of public interest in the industrialised countries and which are seen as being insignificant from a geo-strategic perspective. The problem of donor fatigue can be critical in those areas where security and development are directly linked, such as in the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. Here, the disarmament phase is often financed out of the peacekeeping budget, whereas the complex and time-consuming task of social and economic reintegration falls within the remit of development actors, who are dependent on voluntary contributions.

4. Competition and turf battles between different government agencies are another problem for the development of integrated strategies for post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. Among the government departments involved in peace support operations are the foreign office, the defence department and the agency for international cooperation. In addition, the deployment of civilian police missions — for example as part of a UN or EU mandate — also requires the involvement of the interior ministry. Coordinating a diverse group of government departments can be a delicate task, in particular if there is no clear-cut hierarchy between the ministries. While international development cooperation is often a subsidiary task of foreign affairs, in some countries (such as Germany) it is the responsibility of a separate government department. On a practical level, this sometimes leads to a duplication of bureaucratic structures (as several ministries maintain country desks for the same country). There have also been instances in the past when, due to competition or lack of coordination, different departments were pursuing different policy agenda *vis-à-vis* the same country. These problems are also sometimes visible on the ground in the day-to-day operations of interagency structures such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan and Iraq.
5. Last, but not least, there are some problems associated with the dependence of government actors on NGOs to deliver development assistance on their behalf. While NGOs undoubtedly play an important role in post-conflict environments, it is extremely difficult to coordinate the efforts of various international NGOs and to avoid duplication. In the immediate aftermath of a peace agreement, there is intense competition among international NGOs and many actors are trying to get involved in the same sectors. At the same time, certain aspects of post-conflict reconstruction (such as assistance to refugees,

rehabilitation of schools and medical facilities) are more popular than others (such as DDR, rule of law etc.), which has on occasion resulted in a situation where some sectors are over-funded (creating the infamous “pipeline problems”), while others are neglected. This problem is compounded by the fact that a number of industrialised countries dissolved their technical cooperation agencies in the 1990s.

Recommendations: What needs to be done?

A number of steps could be taken to improve coordination between security and development actors in the context of peace support operations, both at headquarters level and in the field:

1. A key factor is the management of expectations. This is true both for interagency cooperation, and for cooperation between international actors, the host government and the local population. During the initial phase of enthusiasm following a ceasefire or peace agreement, international forces and their civilian counterparts are often welcomed with open arms. In this situation, force commanders and political leaders have to be careful about making promises. This is particularly the case for the development sector, as programme implementation is often delayed for months or even years. In order to avoid frictions, it is preferable to keep expectations on the speed of delivery low.
2. One option for overcoming the problems of coordination among different donors is the increased use of multi-donor trust funds, often administered by multilateral agencies such as the World Bank or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). By pooling resources from various sources and implementing (usually through sub-contracts) larger-scale programmes based on a jointly-developed strategy, this approach has many advantages over bilateral programmes. Nevertheless, there have been some administrative problems with these trust funds (most notably a slow delivery rate), which have decreased their popularity, while some donors complain about their own reduced visibility when using multilateral channels for aid implementation.
3. Both at headquarters level and in the field the use of standing, dedicated interagency task forces (rather than the more common practice of ad hoc coordination meetings) would improve coordination and avoid the risk of duplication of efforts. Ideally, such a task force should be complemented by a dedicated funding mechanism for post-conflict reconstruction, pooling resources from various government departments. For coordination among donors and implementing agencies in the field, it would be desirable to strengthen the role of

international agencies. However, as institutions such as the World Bank and UNDP are also, at the end of the day, dependent on national donors for their work, their authority *vis-à-vis* donor representatives is limited.

4. Last, but not least, the need for a joint strategic planning process both at the national level (among government departments and relevant implementation agencies) and among the donor community has to be stressed. Such a process should result in the formulation of common goals for peacebuilding in a specific country, the definition of indicators against which to measure success or failure (benchmarks), and the development of an exit strategy. Having, and adhering to, a common strategy would vastly improve the coordination among different actors and help to ensure that everybody is working from the same basic premises and principles.

Over the past couple of years, a number of important steps have been taken to improve coordination between military and civilian actors in peace support operations both at headquarters level and in the field. At the same time, donor governments have made a commitment to follow a common agenda *vis-à-vis* local partner governments. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness adopted by OECD in 2005 with the aim of harmonising strategies was an important step in that direction. What needs to be done now is to better adapt the funding instruments of the donor community to the specific challenges of post-conflict societies and to agree on an analysis of the structural causes of conflict in order to guide intervention strategies.

Post-conflict development and challenges for State-building

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Introduction

The purpose, legitimacy and effectiveness of international interventions have raised concerns over post-conflict development in the aftermath of the Cold War and in the context of 'failed states'. Thus, if we start our inquiry into the linkages between security and development in the context of failed states and the specific conditions of the post Cold War era, we have to demonstrate briefly how previous development agendas and state- or nation-building trajectories of different developing countries have generated a debate and to an extent contributed to the new security threats, including the ones that come from within states.

State-building or nation-building is nothing new. The state-building efforts of the past, and particularly those of the post World War II period, mean that the failed and quasi-states of the current era are intertwined with the international conflicts and the dynamics of state-building. There are abundant data to demonstrate the fact that the majority of conflicts since the end of World War II have been in the post-colonial states.¹⁰ However, recent international interventions, particularly those since September 11 2001, have neglected to consider the lessons of colonial nation-building and specific national trajectories that gave birth to failed or quasi states. As a result, the building of a new political order has become a complex and potentially contradictory task, which requires a long-term project of state-building beyond the immediate need for imposing order and regime change.

State-building is defined here as an externally facilitated attempt to establish or reconstitute a stable and, ideally, democratic government over an internationally recognised territory that entails international legal sovereignty recognised by the United Nations. While the terms state-building and nation-building have been used interchangeably, the increasing use of state-building post September 11 seems to reflect a political preference to delink current efforts from the nation-building failures of the Cold War era or the mixed record of other international interventions.

For example, while interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Namibia, El Salvador, Mozambique, East Timor and Sierra Leone brought an end to

¹⁰ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007).

violence, re-established some political order, and opened the way for a questionable democratic development, in Cambodia they only succeeded in ending violence. In Somalia, Haiti, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan and Iraq violence continues; and where a fragile political order is re-established, the legitimacy, development goals, and democratisation process remain highly vulnerable. Therefore, the normative and empirical studies on state-building should be briefly reviewed in light of the failures and challenges of rebuilding political structures in post-conflict states.

State-Building as an ‘Ahistorical Comparativism’

There is a large body of influential theories of political change and state-building in development studies.¹¹ The early normative theories of development and their influence on policy making by bilateral and multilateral development agencies were criticised since they carried an ‘ahistorical comparativism’ which neglected the historical roots of modern states.¹²

Taking a long-term historical perspective in considering how states and political systems were individually created still seems to be a challenge for development practitioners as well as policy makers. Furthermore, the transformation of the global political economy since the 1980s has reintroduced neoliberal models of state reform and development promoted by the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’, particularly after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.¹³ Thus, despite a renewed focus on the linkages and tensions between security and development, the orthodox policy making in bilateral and multilateral development agencies such as the World Bank and USAID operates within the limited prescriptions of a neoliberal agenda, without problematising the structural problems embedded in the universalisation of the nation-state system or seeing development problems as a post-modern phenomenon.

¹¹ For a comprehensive review see John Martinussen, *Society, State, and Market: A Guide to Competing Theories of Development* (London: Zed Books, 1997), p. 165-181.

¹² Jean-Francois Bayart, “Finishing with the Idea of the Third World: The Concept of the Political Trajectory” in J. Manor (ed.), *Rethinking Third World Politics* (London: Longman, 1991).

¹³ According to Mohammed Ayoob, the failed states or quasi states of the Third World should not be compared with industrial democracies today, but with the situation from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century in Western Europe, which was the period of state-building for the early modern sovereign states of Europe. It should be also noted that the building of modern sovereign states and the emergence of nation-states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were different processes. Mohammed Ayoob, “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure” in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (editors) *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), p. 96.

A recent study by F. Osler and D. Mendeloff provides a comprehensive review of the debate on intervention and nation-building.¹⁴ This study classifies nation-building approaches in three groups:¹⁵ (i) 'fast-track democratisation'. (ii) 'security first'; and (iii) 'slow democratisation'. 'Fast-track democratisation' takes the assumptions of traditional liberalism. Accordingly, nation-building is perceived as equal to democratisation, which is the ultimate goal to liberate oppressed societies.¹⁶ Similar to policy prescriptions in the early modernisation paradigm, this approach favours a mass intervention to bring in liberal institutions. Such an intervention is expected to unleash the democratic forces which are naturally embedded in all societies, regardless of their different historic, political, social, and economic features. The policy prescriptions consistent with this approach would take the challenge to identify the right mix of external military and political pressure needed to liberate and strengthen legal and electoral institutions. The lack of substantial pre-war planning for state-building in the post-intervention phase in the US-led invasion of Iraq is a prime example of such an ideological approach, which in that case was employed alongside the neoconservative means of intervention — coercive democratisation by military force.¹⁷

Major policy think tanks guided by the quantitative and technocratic approaches continue to operate on similar assumptions of fast track democratisation. For example, according to the RAND report on the challenges of 'nation-building', the most important 'controllable' variable in explaining the level of success in intervention is the amount of effort measured in terms of the number of troops employed, the amount of money spent, and the length of operation.¹⁸ Rather than problematising whether western liberal democratic institutions are transferable or not, these think tanks argue that what distinguishes international interventions in Germany, Japan, Bosnia, and Kosovo on the one hand, and Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan on the other, are not their levels of economic development, culture, or national homogeneity.

¹⁴ Fen Osler Hampson and David Mendeloff, "Intervention and the Nation-Building Debate" in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (editors) *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), p. 679-699.

¹⁵ F. Osler and D. Mendeloff prefer to use nation-building without specifying if any difference exists between nation-building and state-building. In contrast, this paper focusses on state-building which was defined in the introduction and recognises the fact that there has been an interchangeable use of state-building and nation-building with similar definitions presented in this paper.

¹⁶ Osler and Mendeloff, p. 680.

¹⁷ For a discussion of mistaken neoconservative assumptions and calamitous war-planning and occupation decisions see Larry Diamond, "What Went Wrong in Iraq" *Foreign Affairs*, 83, 2, March/April 2004; and Ahmed S. Hashim, *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).

¹⁸ James Dobbins and et al. *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, (RAND Corporation, 2003).

Strategies that reflect only quantitative and technocratic constructions of the state-building process should be reformulated to draw attention to a more critical, historical and post-modern conceptualisation of development ensuring local, regional, and global contexts that go beyond ethnocentric approaches to explain the relation between security and development.

The second category in the state-building debate is the 'security first' approach. This argues that security and political stability should be the immediate priorities of nation-building and international interventions. Therefore, the major challenge of intervention is not to establish or reconstitute political institutions, especially a democratic political order, but to provide physical security and political order. The 'security first' perspective stresses that without security a country cannot initiate a democratisation process.

Of particular concern for this approach are the cases of divided societies that experience violent conflict, oppression, war or civil war among ethnic, religious or clan-based tribal communities.¹⁹ Thus, rather than traditional liberal principles of freedom and respect for individual rights, the 'security first' approach would prioritise the strengthening of the state's monopoly of power in order to impose political order and prevent the dissolution of territorial integrity. Like the political order school led by Samuel Huntington in 1960s, the security first perspective prioritises the strengthening of state capacity via the components of civil administration as well as the military, since they are ultimately responsible for law and order.²⁰

When the physical security of some or all citizens cannot be guaranteed under even authoritarian regimes, the citizens should reserve their right to look for other alternatives. State-building strategies constructed through the 'security first' approach reinforce the top-down elitist representation of state over society without giving any consideration to historical circumstances of state-building in failed or quasi states, or the meaning of the state for the society. Consequently, no matter how much political will, capacity, and military power the intervention might carry, the replacement of existing authoritarian institutions to impose order might result in violence (as a post-modern phenomenon of perceived 'legitimate violence'²¹). Any claims to legitimacy of the state's monopoly of power which are based on an ungrounded modernisation or intervention process should be shifted to local, regional, and global context of marginalisation in the globalisation process.

¹⁹ Chaim D. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil War," *International Security*, 20, 4, 1996.

²⁰ Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).

²¹ Martinussen, p. 178. For a new conceptual framework to understand development, innovation, marginalisation, and legitimate violence see David E. Apter, *Rethinking Development, Modernization, Dependency and Postmodern Politics* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publication, 1987).

The third category is the 'slow democratisation' approach. In contrast to 'fast track democratisation' the means for establishing democracy envisaged by this approach is not restricted to holding elections and establishing legal institutions; rather, democratisation involves fostering a civic culture with a strong, well-functioning administrative state capacity.²² A civic culture is defined as a participatory political culture in which subject and parochial political orientations are not replaced but combined. A break in political socialisation due to a lack of physical security produces a high incidence of psychological confusion and instability, which in turn impedes the emergence of a civic culture. In such cases, as suggested by the early political development scholars, education and professional training can play an important role in closing the temporal gap between different historical trajectories in failed or quasi states.

According to this approach, there is no simple formula for the development of a political culture conducive to a well-functioning administrative state capacity. In fact, transforming political structures quickly to install competitive electoral policies without a highly competent administrative capacity and institutions developed through consensus, puts the countries concerned at risk of civil war, sectarianism, or terrorism. For 'fast track democratisation' a sufficient 'level of effort' measured in manpower, time, and money such as in Japan, Germany, Bosnia, and Kosovo is important for nation-building success.²³ But for the 'slow democratisation' approach, and following Fukuyama, institutional preconditions are more important, while international commitments are also necessary.²⁴ The determining factor is the extent to which local capacity-building is prioritised to create viable institutions through participation and ownership of the state-building process.

There is a range of political assessments and policy prescriptions which argue the limitations of local participation.²⁵ Consequently, there are many unanswered questions regarding the challenges in war-torn countries such as the role of collective memory and its results in achieving local capacity-building through participation and ownership. How do we achieve trust and reciprocity in institution-building without legitimate state capacity and congruent informal institutions based on historically embedded domestic social relations?

Thus, where preparedness for democracy is disputed, the 'slow democratisation' approach, like the 'security first' approach, favours stability and

²² Osler and Mendeloff, p. 686-687.

²³ James Dobbins and et al, 2003.

²⁴ F. Fukuyama's work is an ahistorical effort to analyse state-building and governance. Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).

²⁵ For a discussion of constitutional and political institutional design in multiethnic societies see Andrew Reynolds (ed.), *The architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild (editors), *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

order, and is willing to tolerate authoritarian rule as long as it effectively builds highly competent administrative capacity and institutions. In other words, it remains sceptical about traditional societies which lack civic culture and, therefore, local capacity and opportunities for ownership by the people.

In cases of failed states where there is no viable state apparatus or local capacity, there are scholars who favour international trusteeship or shared sovereignty.²⁶ But they do not convincingly demonstrate how the most critical issue of legitimacy is to be resolved. Without giving due consideration to the problems stemming from marginalisation and alienation of people, particularly the most disadvantaged groups in society such as women and children, in the uneven and unequal globalisation process, a discussion on the relationship between security and development and different models of state-building is doomed to fail.

Dichotomous or politically and ideologically driven state-building strategies which prioritise strong government over civil society development, without problematising the universalisation of the nation-state system, the construction of national identities during post-colonial nation-building, and the transformation of the global economy under a dominant neoliberal ideology, have contributed to the creation of patrimonial networks weakening state capacity and inflaming ethnic and sectarian conflicts.

Finally, the focus of 'slow democratisation' on local capacity-building to create viable institutions through participation and ownership of the state-building process creates a potential tension in the quest for security and development, since it offers no clear policy on how and to what extent the local administrations would ensure people's participation and contribute to a collective civic culture beyond securing ethnic, religious, and cultural rights which in turn might lead to fragmentation and dissolution of territorial integrity.

Challenges Ahead for Civil Society and Development

In the post-September 11 era, the increased attention to security and development has caused a shift in the environment of development processes and foreign aid. An ideological justification of aid seems to require a closer alignment of development aid with foreign policy and security issues.²⁷ This shift

²⁶ Stephen D. Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States." in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (editors) *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), p. 653-678; and James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States," *International Security*, 28, 4, Spring 2004.

²⁷ For a discussion see Jude Howell, "The Global War on Terror, Development and Civil Society," *Journal of International Development*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (January 2006), pp. 121-135.

has led to a different perspective in overall development policy making to maintain global stability. In this context, civil society has become a more subjective arena that seems to ignore previous experiences and empirical research on the benefits of participation in development projects. The appropriation of the language of terror by some governments, such as in Central Asia or the Middle East, to repress perceived political opponents, and the suspicion that governments cast over civil society actors as potential terrorists, undermine the contingent meaning of civil society and threaten its inclusion in development processes and policy. For example, in the aftermath of September 11, USAID required recipients of its grants to sign an 'Anti-Terrorist Certification'; the Ford Foundation and its alleged funding of Hamas caused a change in grant policies among donors; US funding was cut to several NGOs operating in Palestine; and NGOs struggling for democratisation in the former Soviet Union countries experienced a crackdown.²⁸

Consequently, at the operational level the linkage between foreign policy, security structures, and development objectives has to an extent increased tensions in the activities of development officers, government actors, and military forces involved in peace support operations. The challenges for civil society remain, six years after the launch of the 'Global War on Terror'. It is important to maintain a commitment to neutrality and impartiality as development policies are subordinated to broader security threats and subsequent peace support operations. One of the biggest challenges facing NGOs is how to continue development projects aimed at the most disadvantaged groups, namely women and children, in societies which are associated with terrorism or located where terrorist organisations operate.

²⁸ Howell, p. 128.

Conference on Peace Support Operations: the Past and the Future

Ankara, 12 and 13 November 2007

Venue:

- Izmir Room, Bilkent Hotel, Ankara

Organised by:

- Bilkent University, Ankara
- The Centre for European Security Studies (CESS), the Netherlands

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, new conflicts erupted, largely with ethnic and religious background. While in the past attention was focused on conflicts between states, today we are confronted with internal violence and fragile states.

From interventions in these new types of conflicts difficult issues of morality and legitimacy arise. Clearly mandates from the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) would provide a base for such interventions, but does not solve the problem if the UNSC is unable to act. Simultaneously traditional war tactics are inadequate in dealing with a-symmetric warfare.

During the last few years we have seen the necessity of operating multinational forces in a more robust way. Therefore all major international organizations are undergoing a number of significant changes in the way they operate. In order to elucidate the problems that the organizations and the different nations are facing, four key questions will be addressed during this seminar:

1. Is there a common understanding of Peace Support Operations and the way they should be prepared and organized?
2. What are the current approaches of the UN, NATO and the EU towards Peace Operations?
3. Do Nations approach Peace Support Operations differently? If so, what are the consequences for Command and Control?
4. What is the relationship between Security and Development?

In order to promote a better understanding of these complex phenomena this conference is organized by Bilkent University and CESS together. Over the years Turkey has made making a significant contribution to Peace operations so we are delighted to hold this event in Ankara. The aim is to have a free and open discussion, therefore Chatham House rules apply. This means anyone is invited to speak freely and without any hesitation. Introductions will take no longer than 20 minutes, in order to allow discussions to take place.

Monday 12 November 2007	
09.00 – 09.45	Registration and coffee - Izmir Foyer
09.45 – 10.15	Words of Welcome <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ali Dođramacı, Rector, Bilkent University. • Peter Volten, Director of CESS, Professor of International Relations, University of Groningen. • Ersel Aydınlı, Chairman, International Relations Department, Bilkent University.
10.15 – 10.30	Introductory Remarks <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hasan Göğüş, Ambassador, General Director for Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey.
10.30 – 11.00	Keynote Speech <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LGen. Hilmi Akin Zorlu, Chief of General Planning and Principles of the General Staff, former ISAF-II Commander.
11.00-11.10	Short Coffee Break
11.10 – 13.15	Session I – UN, NATO’s and EU Capacities and Limitations concerning Peace Operations; Cooperation between International Organisations Moderator: Wim van Eekelen , former Minister of Defence, former Secretary-General of the WEU. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The UN perspective: Anis Bajwa, Director Policy, Evaluation and Training, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. • The NATO perspective: Johan van der Werff, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Netherlands at NATO. • The EU perspective: Marc Bentinck, Deputy Representative of the Netherlands at the Political Security Committee of the EU. <p><i>Coffee, tea and refreshments are available in the room</i></p>
13.15 – 14.30	Lunch – Izmir foyer

14.30 – 16.45	<p>Session II – National Approaches towards Peace Operations and Reconstruction</p> <p>Moderator: Gen. (ret.) Cevik Bir, Former Force Commander UNOSOM-II (Somalia).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Turkish perspective: Gen. (ret.) Cevik Bir, Former Force Commander UNOSOM-II (Somalia). • The Netherlands perspective: BGen. Theo Vleugels, former Commander Task Force Uruzgan – 1. <p><i>Coffee, tea and refreshments are available in the room</i></p>
17.00–18.30	<p>Reception in the Bilkent Hotel, Ankara - <i>Konak 27 Red Room</i></p>
18.30 -	<p>Diner in the Bilkent Hotel, Ankara - <i>Konak 27 Red Room</i></p>

Tuesday 13 November 2007	
09.20 - 09.30	<p>Remarks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ritske Bloemendaal, Programme Manager Centre for European Security Studies.
09.30 – 11.45	<p>Session III – Relationship between Security and Development</p> <p>Moderator: Metin Heper, Dean, Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences, Bilkent University.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pinar İpek, Assistant Prof. Dr., International Relations Department, Bilkent University. • Jet van der Gaag-Halbertsma, Senior policy advisor Defence and Development, Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands. • Wolf-Christian Paes Senior researcher, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). <p><i>Coffee, tea and refreshments are available in the room</i></p>
12.00 – 13.00	<p>Final Session: Summing Up</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peter Volten, Director of CESS, Professor of International Relations, University of Groningen. • Ali Karaosmanoğlu, Professor of International Relations, International Relations Department, Bilkent University. <p>Closing Remarks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ersel Aydınli, Chair, Department of International Relations, Bilkent University.
13.00 – 14.00	<p>Lunch - <i>Konak 27 Red Room</i></p>

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