TRANSNATIONAL TRENDS:
Middle Eastern and Asian Views

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Editors

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Dear Reader,

The Stimson Center has embarked on an exciting exploration of the changing security environment and policy agenda in three critical regions: the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Since spring 2007, we have been engaging in cross-disciplinary conversations with diverse experts in these regions, listening to how they assess their security situation, at the societal, national, and regional levels. This project was inspired by the notion that traditional security discourse, focused on political-military threats to sovereign states, does not adequately capture the security challenges of these societies and states, and may be missing the systemic shift to a security agenda driven more by transnational issues than inter-state conflict.

This edited volume captures some, but surely not all, of the rich and stimulating exchanges that took place between the Stimson Center’s scholars and experts and activists in the three regions. We held three formal workshops in 2007, in Dubai in June, in Singapore in August, and in Bangkok in September. We also held dozens of smaller meetings and consultations in the regions with experts in a wide range of transnational concerns.

We hope you will find this volume a useful introduction to an emerging set of issues. It is a rich and varied menu of topics, from religion and ideology to management of natural resources and problems of governance. For regional specialists, it should provide a welcome break from the vast literature on regional conflict, and demonstrate the changing nature of security problems. For experts in the distinct issues, it may be useful to see how those issues play out in these strategically important regions, and how the policy challenges vary from region to region.

Amit Pandya directs this large project, with contributions from other Stimson Center Senior Associates and a talented team of researchers. The past year was a most rewarding partnership with several think tanks and security institutes in the regions. We are also grateful for the support from and collaboration with the National Intelligence Council, which has expanded its outreach to nongovernment experts as part of its series of Global Trends publications. It is our hope that our work will add some important insights to the work of government analysts who support strategic planning, in Washington and beyond.

Sincerely,

Ellen Laipson
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The analysis here would have been impossible without the advice, time, and participation of an enormous number of experts, in the United States and in the regions. Those who participated in our meetings or agreed to be interviewed are listed in Annex 2. That list cannot do adequate justice to all who were kind enough to lend their advice and expertise individually and informally or have otherwise lent assistance in our work. We are indebted to many not named here.

We are particularly indebted to our principal institutional partners, the Gulf Research Center in Dubai (GRC), the Regional Centre for Security Studies in Sri Lanka (RCSS), and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore (RSIS). We should like to express our gratitude particularly to Dr. Abdulaziz Sager and Dr. Christian Koch of GRC, Dr. Rifaat Hussain of RCSS, and Dr. Mely Caballero-Anthony of RSIS.

Interspersed throughout the longer essays herein are short analyses that focus attention on one particular aspect of the transnational trends discussed, note a particularly interesting conjunction of trends, or offer a succinct case study. In some cases these short pieces provide factual information to supplement and provide context for the longer essays. We are indebted to the following for their preparation of these: Philipp Dermann, Duaa Elzeney, David King, Junko Kobayashi, Jumaina Siddiqui, Vikram Sinha, and Elizabeth Young.

Finally, no acknowledgment is complete without mention of the contribution to this volume of the entire Regional Voices team. We particularly thank Kendra Patterson and Nicole Zdrojewski for their editorial work in preparing this volume for publication; Jacob Brown, Duaa Elzeney, Junko Kobayashi, and Nicole Zdrojewski for preparatory research and logistical organization of the meetings and consultations throughout the regions; our project interns for their work in support of those meetings; and Jumaina Siddiqui for her research on South Asia.
INTRODUCTION

The Henry L. Stimson Center’s Regional Voices: Transnational Challenges project has conducted a detailed and multifaceted inquiry over a period of one year in the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The present volume is a partial reflection of this exercise to understand the true dimensions and significance of transnational threats, challenges, and opportunities, as seen by those on the front lines. Our inquiry has taken the form of protracted individual dialogue and intellectual cooperation, research into the state of knowledge and opinion, group discussions, and organization of a two-day conference in each region, bringing together experts and thinkers from various countries and disciplines. Our interlocutors have spoken not only as observers, but also as potential or actual victims or beneficiaries of transnational developments, and as integral members of the affected societies. Our discussions with hundreds of interlocutors in the three regions have created a network of institutions and individuals with whom we will continue to maintain ongoing dialogue and intellectual cooperation on the changing security landscape.

We have drawn the parameters inclusively to ensure the inclusion of all that is relevant to an understanding of the prospects of social instability or conflict. Our areas of inquiry have included threats or challenges such as those posed by environmental change, public health crises, water shortages or conflicts, demographic trends, labor and refugee migration, competition for energy, poor education, or inadequate livelihood generation. We are interested in these to the extent that they do, or have the potential to, affect security and the security policy agenda of states in the region. We have therefore maintained equal emphasis on security as traditionally defined and on human or nontraditional security. We have sought to understand the common and complex sources and determinants of political and social stability, and of the processes and pace of change in societies. We have sought to avoid a labored “securitization” of threats to human welfare, but have been sensitive to where threats to human security also constitute threats to the security of societies and states.

Our interlocutors and collaborators have included academics, retired officials, lawyers, physicians, engineers, scientists, activists, and philosophers. Their fields of expertise have included intelligence, terrorism, law enforcement, conflict resolution, environment, water, energy, public health, migration, economics, public
finance, banking, commerce, fisheries, maritime issues, communications media, philosophy, and religion.

What do experts from a variety of disciplines and countries in the Middle East and Asia have to say about these trends? Which long-term trends are the most significant in explaining the current predicaments of their nations, their regions, and indeed the world as seen by them? What in their judgment constitute the determinants of these or of new developments that they anticipate in the future? What will their societies and their regions look like in the coming decade or two? What factors will either accelerate or inhibit any of these trends?

Some of the trends identified by experts from the regions are common to all three regions, and a good deal broader in their effects. Others are predominantly significant for one of the regions, or even one of its subregions or individual countries, but are nonetheless worth noting because of their potential effects on neighboring regions and countries.

Certain conclusions deserve particular attention: some because they recur often, both in the published literature and in conversations; others because of the pointed and forceful way in which they are urged by experts in the regions upon US interlocutors, as essential to proper understanding of the regions.

It is frequently noted that the United States is less influential in world affairs than might be expected from its prestige and the resources and capabilities at its disposal. It is frequently suggested that this stems from incomprehension both of the nature of global security challenges and of the ways that they are understood by people in other political and cultural contexts.

Therefore, the emphasis of the Regional Voices project has been on listening carefully to varied local perspectives on transnational security challenges, and on noting clear themes that emerge. Care was taken to solicit new voices to the policy conversations—voices that have not been much heard in US discourse about these issues. Particular attention was devoted to solicitation of dissident voices that may not comport with the emerging global consensus on politics and economics shared by the US, but which reflect recurring concerns and anxieties in various societies. We deemed these important reflections and determinants of political stability and prospective security threats.

This listening exercise has not only required a respectful consideration of unconventional ideologies or policy perspectives. It has also depended for its effectiveness on a degree of agnosticism about the conclusions that one wants to reach. It has therefore set out not to solicit prescriptions for solution but rather to drive toward a deeper level of diagnosis. It has eschewed conclusions in order to create platforms for the expression and discussion of expert experience and reflective thinking.
THE GEOGRAPHY OF POLITICS

The regions that we have worked in are those in which US policy has taken a high degree of interest in recent years. They are also those in which US intentions are viewed with perhaps the highest degree of skepticism and distrust. These regions are of course also a substantial portion of the realm of Islam. Muslims either constitute the majority in the region (the Middle East), or majorities of major nations (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia), or substantial and important minorities in non-Muslim nations (India, Sri Lanka). Thus, Islam has inevitably been a significant dimension of our inquiry, reflecting the fact that opinion in the regions treats it as the dominant terms of reference or as a perceived source of challenge. The high degree of US interest in the realm of Islam stems from the perceived origin there of terrorism directed against the West, and from the related concern with a sense of ideological challenge from Islam.

However, we have not focused our inquiry on the dimensions of Islamic ideology or terrorism. Although our regions are of interest significantly because of these twin concerns, we have sought to understand the regions in their totality of economic, political, ideological, scientific, and environmental experience; to understand the security landscape in its full context.

Such multidimensional understanding is also important because these regions evince some of the most acute instances of nontraditional security threats and threats to human security. Adequate understanding of and response to those global human security challenges demands attention to the particular form they take in these regions. Livelihood generation for demographic youth bulges, water scarcity, resource depletion, environmental degradation, natural disaster, climate change, pandemic disease, rapid and uneven economic development, and social conflict—all these and more are found in particularly acute form in these regions.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF CULTURE AND ECONOMICS

A traditional definition of the regions has been the starting point for our inquiry in its first year. We have held two-day meetings in each region that have principally brought together experts from various countries in that region. The agenda set for those meetings, the working papers prepared for those meetings, and the articulation of the research agenda following those colloquia, have been largely in terms of a Middle Eastern, South Asian, or Southeast Asian framework.

However, we have inevitably encountered the need for flexibility in how the regions are defined. In the Middle East, we find as much to distinguish within the region as between the region and its neighbors. Certainly sources of unity are found in the common Arab language, history, and institutions of the Gulf, the Levant, and North Africa. Nonetheless, the internal differences among these three
areas are as significant. In order to render the inquiry manageable, we have not sought to engage experts from, or address issues in, North Africa (with the notable exception of Egypt). Even within the area spanning Egypt and the Gulf, there is a clear distinction to be noted. The economically dynamic Gulf, with its capital surplus derived from fossil fuel, participates in an entirely distinct section of the global economy from the Levant, the Mashriq, the “old Middle East.” The latter, with its relatively large populations, its more cosmopolitan histories but less modern contemporary ways of life, its more sophisticated political systems but much deeper economic crisis, and crisis of political legitimacy, can seem like another world entirely.

In South Asia, there is a palpable sense of divergence between the life experiences of an India (and to an extent Pakistan) rapidly joining the global economy, and the other countries of the region stuck in a combination of underdevelopment and political dysfunction. In Southeast Asia, one is repeatedly reminded of the difference between the older members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the “Asian tigers” with their first world standards of living, and the newer members, such as Burma and Cambodia, whose third world condition is undeniable.

As important as the variations within the regions are the sources of unity between each region and its proximate regions. The wealthy countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, with their capital surpluses and global investment strategies, are significant players in the economies of North Africa, and South and East Asia. South Asia is a huge presence in the Arab/Persian Gulf, by virtue of Indian and Pakistani investment and the very large number of South Asian migrant workers there, whose presence has stamped the culture and intellectual life of the Gulf. The Gulf also hosts significant numbers of Southeast Asian migrant workers. Afghanistan, not traditionally considered part of the Middle East, has historically shared cultural traditions with Iran, and today shares ideological traditions, as both recipient and generator, with the Middle East. Simultaneously, political and ideological developments in Afghanistan have had and continue to have deep effects on Pakistan and India. Iran, very much a Gulf power and a substantial political and ideological influence in the Arab Middle East, is simultaneously very much a part of Indian and Pakistani strategic and economic calculations about future energy pipelines.

Burma clearly figures in the traditional and nontraditional security calculations of both its South Asian and its Southeast Asian neighbors. Insurgencies, human trafficking, narcotics trade, HIV/AIDS transmission, and forest degradation span its borders east and west, giving India and Bangladesh, Thailand and the other Mekong Basin countries equal stake in its affairs. Security experts in our South Asian discussions, particularly Indians concerned about Northeast India, treated Burma as a South Asian country, whereas our meetings in Southeast Asia, coinciding with the monks’ revolt there, looked at Burma as ASEAN’s problem. Through-
out, we were reminded of Burma’s role as the cockpit of contention for fossil fuels and other natural resources among India, China, and ASEAN. Southeast Asians in turn see the roles of Australian, Japanese, Chinese, Indian, American, Korean, and other outside actors, official and private, as almost equal in importance to the roles of those within ASEAN.

OVERARCHING THEMES

Over the course of our year-long inquiry, we spoke and worked with a wide variety of experts. These included technical experts as well as experts in policy analysis and strategic thinking. Notable as a common theme in our discussions in all regions and on all subjects was the extent to which our interlocutors agreed that those who wield power in their societies and are responsible for social outcomes are only occasionally influenced by the knowledge and analyses of technical experts such as scientists or economists. This theme is closely related to the observation that few political systems operate to address long-term or strategic challenges, and that the pursuit of short-term political interests is paramount.

Identity in the age of globalization presents many paradoxes. We have heard about how identities change along the path to citizenship and empowerment of individuals, how primordial identities can conflict with, be sharpened by, or even contribute to the process of transformation in a society or region, and how states and other governance structures and processes must cope with the realities of citizens holding onto more than one identity. Religion, Islam in particular but others too, is a critical component of the identity struggles under way, but it is not the only significant source of identity, and it does not lend itself to a single pattern or explanation.

Rapid change and the dislocations it causes are significant factors. Multiple processes of change are occurring at once. Throughout the three regions, birth rates, labor migration, economic growth, the spread of disease, and natural resource endowments, to name the most important, are all subject to dramatic fluctuation and change. These processes interact with each other in powerful ways, so that the public policy dilemma often consists of deciding where to begin, with underlying causes or with more acute manifestations of a societal imbalance. The management of natural resources—water, energy, forests, fish—figured prominently in the discussions and generated new questions about sovereignty, governance, and the global commons.

As intriguing as common patterns of what does get discussed are issues on which there is a common silence. One example is the question of gender. In gatherings of experts from the regions and of Western experts on the regions’ transnational threats, we would hear early in the discussion a reminder, often from more than one participant, that the question of gender is a key consideration. This reminder would be reiterated at the conclusion of a meeting. However, despite the presence of
women in the groups, and of scholars and technical experts on sustainable development, the intervening discussion rarely if at all turned to the gender dimension.

There can be little question that the most prominent issue in the global discussion of environmental perils, and particularly in the developed world's perception of salient global issues, is global climate change. We found that the issue is accorded far less importance as a major source of concern in conversations among experts and security thinkers in the three regions. Even the secondary effects of climate change, about which societies might be more immediately concerned, since these affect core concerns such as water and food security, engage only occasional interest. Climate change scientists are of course intensely active today, and particularly so in India and Bangladesh. In all three regions, general science and technology thinkers and experts take a keen interest in new technologies related to climate change, energy economists address the issue as significant, and political thinkers and analysts take the greatest interest in the diplomatic issues and sovereignty concerns arising from the search for global consensus on its mitigation. What appears to be rudimentary is the integration of the work of climate change scientists into discourse in other areas of human security.

Where issues of interest and concern in the region coincide with those in the West and the US, we have often found that the approach is fundamentally different. For example, there is an urgent sense that the West, the US in particular, must understand that issues such as terrorism or extremist ideology are inextricably related to core political and economic developments in societies. It is also necessary to better understand the important distinctions among the various facets (political organizing, terror, intellectual reformation) of the worldwide Islamic awakening.

It is repeatedly suggested that the distinction between terrorism and insurgency needs emphasis; that the former should be defined by its anti-social means and its covert character, and the latter by its social and political context. There is often an accompanying sense that repressive or avaricious local elites cynically use this conflation for their own interests. It is pointedly suggested that insurgencies using Muslim identity or Islamic slogans, such as those in northwest Pakistan, southern Thailand, or the southern Philippines, would be better understood in terms of their common origins with others not explicitly Muslim or Islamic; common origins in poor policy, group discrimination, graft, and natural or cultural despoiliation by plutocratic interests.

We are repeatedly reminded that internal security and political stability cannot be understood without reference to economic and social inequalities and developmental trends. These are often reflections of global economic policies or global economic interests, with a significant US nexus, that set at naught the perspectives and political consensus of the states and societies concerned. Alienated groups have social and economic aspirations and demands that can be addressed as matters of social policy. Policy makers should attend to these in those terms rather than focusing on the ideological rhetoric that articulates those demands. US rhet-
oric on terrorism and militant Islam, perceived as simplistic and brittle, encourages or presses states and elites to ignore this reality.

The State: Part of the Problem, Part of the Solution

A major theme raised by our interlocutors in all three regions is the problematical role of the state. The state is seen as both part of the problem and part of the solution for transnational challenges. Interlocutors are simultaneously highly critical of authoritarian and unresponsive states and concerned about states that evince weak capacity. They want states to have greater political will and greater competence for intervening to prevent catastrophic harm. The non-state sector, particularly the rise of civil society actors, is not seen as a substitute for competent states, though it is seen as a useful supplement to state capacity.

In all three regions there is concern about the rapid and bewildering evolution of the role of the state. It is often seen as the source of conflict and insecurity, rather than protection against them. One hears about the deliberate withdrawal of the state from its function as provider of social welfare or economic regulation; its deteriorated technical or administrative capacity; its lack of political will; its capture by private interests through graft or nepotism; and its role in implementing policies that increase economic and social inequality. On the other hand, when a society requires institutional and technical means to respond to pandemics or natural disasters, to conserve environmental goods, to engage in economic reform and regulation to attract investment and generate livelihoods, or to restrain predatory economic actors, the instinct remains to ask how the state can be re-capacitated for these purposes.

There is a pervasive sense of a crisis of legitimacy for the state. In many cases, this merely compounds an existing legitimacy deficit born of capture of the state by political and economic elites. In other cases it magnifies what is more the ineptitude of a state than its deliberate denial of popular aspirations. In yet others, the lack of meaningful response to global trends becomes the primary source of doubt about state legitimacy. On occasion there is a more or less rapid dissolution of ideologies or value systems that have tacitly guided and framed discourse in these societies. The combination of an ideological vacuum and a vacuum in political legitimacy opens space for the rapid advance of ideologies and rhetoric that may have little historical presence in a society. At times it allows ideologies that have historically appealed only to small minorities to expand their influence rapidly.

What distinguishes popular advocates from elites is the degree to which the former insist on placing the problem of the representativeness of the state at the center of the discussion. They draw attention to the extent to which even democratic states have stopped serving their own citizens, and have become instruments of elite interests from within the nation or outside. To some extent this is seen as reflecting the erosion of the integrity and vitality of previously established democratic procedures and practices. The concern about the representativeness of
political systems occurs particularly strongly in the context of Egypt and South Asia. Here too there is a difference of emphasis among societies. In Egypt and Pakistan, there is a demand for the establishment of authentic and reliable procedures of democratic practice. In India, there is a sense of established democratic norms eroding under the impact of both a power grab by economic and social elites and, ironically, the fissiparous effects of representation of a bewildering variety of politically awakening social groups.

Ambivalence about Outsiders
A part of the legitimacy crisis of the state stems from the sense of its capture by foreign interests such as governments, corporations, banks, multilateral lenders or donors. Concern about foreign interference takes different forms but recurs almost uniformly as a general issue. Opinion in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Singapore appears to meet economic globalization without flinching, yet in each there remains a strong sense of protectiveness and defensiveness against the prospect of having to accept more liberal global cultural or political values. The pushing of such values is perceived as Western blandishment and often also as bullying, self-righteous, and supercilious. Across the board such concerns are heard both from privileged elites and from radical critics of the status quo. It should be noted that this is not always an anti-cosmopolitan nationalist instinct. Critics of global economic integration are as ready as its proponents to contemplate and even welcome the model of a “post-Westphalian” international order, and contemplate overlapping sovereignties and various permutations of shared sovereignty between the state and meta-state institutions. What is questioned is the extent to which supra-national tools serve local interests. Transnational cooperation is seen as the inevitable consequence of the scale, scope, and complexity of the problems that affect citizens, which seem to exceed the intellectual and technical capacity of societies.

Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi anti-poverty campaigners expressed serious alarm at the extent to which their governments have been captive to a global consensus on economic policy (variously referred to as “neo-liberal,” “the IFIs,” or “the Washington Consensus”). This is associated with slashing of public resources devoted to providing social safety nets for the most vulnerable of their populations; redirection of public resources to infrastructure for the benefit of foreign investors rather than citizens; deregulation of economies to the detriment of consumers, workers, culture, and the environment; and inflation and other disruptions to economic life as a result of intolerably rapid integration into a global economy.

In the Middle East is heard concern about the political consequences to, and anger at, state elites caught in too close an embrace with Western strategic designs. This is sharpened by the perceived consequences of US policies on Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq. It also reflects resentment at the West’s perceived incomprehension of the causes of Arab anger, or of the warp and woof of local culture and values, and of the need to mediate the pace and the nature of change through those.
In Southeast Asia, political elites themselves adopt a distance from the purposes of the US and other outsiders. The reason for this distance is couched in terms of imposition of alien political values on societies that seek to maintain their indigenous Asian values. The relative ideological self-effacement of China is noted by these elites with contrasting appreciation. More activist and critical experts and thinkers focus on the roles of outsiders such as the multilateral development banks or large foreign corporations. These outsiders are seen as responsible for a pace and scale of development that critics see as environmentally unsustainable, and socially disruptive and inequitable. Where states are seen by them to be excessively close to those institutions or interests, their concerns about political legitimacy are heightened.

## Economic Inequality, Natural Environment, and Social Instability

There is a widespread sense in all three regions that economic development has benefited only limited segments of these societies, and has left large segments further behind. Economic development seems also to have left untouched the foundations of endemic inequality, based on group membership or geography. These have been left to fester or intensify, perhaps even fueling new discontents based on rising expectations from observation of the “winners” of globalization. Widespread poverty remains a significant factor in most of these societies. And in many of them, integration into the global economy means more rapid inflation and erosion of the national government’s capacity to control economic trends to buffer its citizens from the deleterious consequences.

Huge numbers of the populations of these societies, in many nations the overwhelming majority, subsist on their local natural environments and depend on water tables, rivers, arable land, fish stocks, forests, and other natural resources. Consequently, concerns about the pace of exploitation of the natural environment and its impact on environmental quality are added to concerns about the inequities of economic development. Examples include the burning of forests in Indonesia to the detriment of air quality and public health in neighboring states, the damming or polluting of upstream waters in international river systems such as the Mekong, Ganges, and Tigris and Euphrates, and the impacts of overfishing by factory fleets on local fisheries and on marine environments.

Recent trends of exponential increase in natural resource exploitation are also seen as constituting threats to security as conventionally defined, because they give rise to conflict, or exacerbate existing sources of conflict. These are often armed conflicts among contending private actors, as in forest resource wars in India or Indonesia, or between local groups and the state. Campaigners for environmental protection or poverty alleviation often note the swift metamorphosis of those grievances into conflict, resistance, and insurgency. Experts on insurgency will note how often it is substantially, if not predominantly, based on grievances about the economic inequities, governance failures, identity-based discrimination, and environmental impacts arising out of natural resource use.
Threats to Law and Order

Ideology is generally considered but one element of a complex of factors accounting for the origins and continuing appeal of insurgency. Others include governance failures, economic inequality, historical patterns of discrimination and disenfranchisement, suppression of group identity, and a close relationship between disfavored identity and disfavored religion. Experts from throughout Southeast Asia are convinced that the Muslim rebellions in southern Thailand, Indonesian Aceh, and the southern Philippines are more about local control of resources and political power than about religious ideology. Islam here is a source of unifying identity rather than ideology. In this respect, these Islamic insurgencies are seen as closer to other insurgencies based on class or group identity, such as those in Pakistani Balochistan and northeast India, or Naxalite peasant and tribal rebellions throughout the Indian interior.

Although there is often loose talk—in the regions as well as in the US—in which terrorism and insurgency are spoken of as interchangeable and indistinguishable, there is also substantial concern in the regions about this conflation of terms. Covert transnational networks for violent attacks on civilians are often distinguished from the uses of violence by insurgent movements occupying territory and seeking to resist perceived economic injustice or ethnic discrimination. The means used by each of these, their organizational structures, and their operating environments are seen as distinct. Terrorist groups are seen as wanting to weaken the state, whereas the fundamental purpose of insurgencies is seen as negotiation with the state for the accomplishment of political ends.

Religion and Ideology

As important as Islam is, so are secular ideologies, and movements of non-Muslim religious ideological renewal and political mobilization. Among religious ideologies, one is most forcefully reminded of radical Hindu mobilization in India and mobilization among Christians, both Roman Catholic and Protestant evangelical, in the Philippines and Indonesia. Among the secular ideologies are variants of Maoist ideology, which are particularly significant in India, Nepal, and the Philippines. One is also frequently reminded, by comments such as “the United States is the most ideological nation in the world,” that perceptions in the regions are that neo-liberal economics and missionary zeal for promotion of democracy are contested ideological ground. Secular anti-capitalism and secular anti-Westernism also retain substantial force, particularly in India and generally in non-Muslim South and Southeast Asia. In the Muslim world, though important as a minor theme in countries such as Bangladesh or Pakistan, they are eclipsed by the Islamic formulation of anti-capitalist or anti-Western sentiments.

That said, Islam is the most significant intellectual locus of ideological contestation, for non-Muslims and Muslims alike. Yet there is also significant ambivalence about its being so. Many observers, Muslim and non-Muslim, note that the use of
Islam by the West as the framework for understanding developments in the three regions has both obscured an accurate understanding of the substantive causes of political mobilization, alienation, and resistance, and has privileged Islam as a source of identity. Islam has thereby acquired cachet as a symbol of resistance to the US, and to globalizing cultural and economic trends seen to come from the West.

The impulse to move the focus of the discussion away from Islam per se to a more social and political analysis is seen in discussions about Islamist political parties. The weight of opinion is that they should be understood as political parties contending for public support, and subject to the political calculations and constraints of all political parties, rather than as religious zealots in pursuit of a single-minded agenda.

**THE REGIONS: BEYOND CONVENTIONAL WISDOM**

**The Middle East**

What is most notable in the Middle East is the vast difference—almost distinct paradigms—between the hierarchy of policy issues as defined by experts and thinkers from the region and those which constitute the principal concerns of US policy makers. More than one of our interlocutors described the latter as “terrorism, extremism, and Islam.” Whereas the security and political implications of Islamic mobilization are a source of high concern to the US, the experts from the region locate Islamic mobilization as a subordinate element of a larger concern with problematical governance and a cultural, intellectual, and ideological vacuum demanding to be filled.

The dominant anxieties and priorities expressed by our interlocutors, or found in our research in the Middle East, are globalization, modernization, reform, demographic trends, workforce development and employment generation, and science and technology.

In short, the hierarchy of concerns in the Arab world is remarkably like that in any other region of the world, and grapples with the challenges of modernization and participation in the “brave new world” of the twenty-first century, rather than being narrowly focused on the question of identity or oppositional politics, let alone a backward-looking sense of identity. Where oppositional politics is present it is opposed to the failure of local states to meet these larger concerns about modernization, and opposed to a perceived Western complicity with those state elites.

Above all, there is in the region a dynamic sense of belonging to a larger world, contrary to the misperception that it has an autarchic focus and that it relates to the wider world largely on the basis of a sense of grievance, whether about Palestine or about the West’s perceived anti-Islamism. There is rather a sense of being palpably connected in trade, investment, technology, and migration, as much with South and East Asia, with Russia and Latin America, as with the United States and...
Europe. This is the case as much in the Levant and the “old” Middle East as in the dynamic Gulf.

The US failure to understand political Islam particularly and the region more generally is seen as both the cause and the result of US pusillanimity about democracy in the Arab and Muslim world. The overblown alarm at the implications of political Islam and the timid embrace of unrepresentative and unresponsive governments are at the heart of anti-American feeling. The US is seen to fail to understand with sufficient clarity the crisis of the state in the Arab world.

A substantial amount of attention is devoted in the region to the question of intellectual and ideological renewal in the Arab world. There is a sense that at this historical juncture Islam is the overwhelmingly dominant paradigm for all political and social discourse. Even secularists despair that the secular Arab intellectual traditions are weak if not bankrupt. There appear to be dim prospects for secular counternarratives to political Islam.

What could be the basis for the next Arab renaissance? On this question Islamists appear to have grabbed the initiative following disappointment at US policy after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center. Some believe that the Islamist ascendency masks its own weakness: that Islamists have once again benefited by default from the shortcomings of their rivals rather than inherent strengths or appeal to mass opinion, and that ideological space remains open for alternatives. Science and technology, as well as offering tools for addressing emerging economic needs and technical challenges, also offers an implicit worldview, a rationalist and empirical dimension to culture and ideology, and is therefore discussed as part of the Arab intellectual awakening.

Our inquiry reminds us to not make the mistake of overstating either the optimistic prospects of the Gulf or the dismal prospects of the Levant. The latter is seen to possess substantial intellectual capital. Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian, Palestinian, and Lebanese scientists, scholars, and intellectuals remain active and highly influential in the collective intellectual life of the region, through *inter alia* networks of scientific and technical cooperation and of learned societies. Despite their difficulties with state repression and inequitable distribution of the benefits of economic development, the growing economies in the Levant and Egypt suggest the presence of latent sources of dynamism and human resources.

By the same token, questions are asked about the sustainability of the Gulf economic miracle, because of limited human resources to sustain it, the limits posed by the natural environment, and the possibility of war and related instability in the region. The Gulf is ostensibly able to meet its requirements out of its capital surplus, and thus able to import whatever technical and human resources it needs to keep growing. The counter-narrative cautions against such unalloyed optimism. It has been suggested that the Gulf’s model of economic development is in fact
largely capital-led and marked by jobless growth, which indicates that labor shortages are not as significant as assumed.

With educational improvements for local populations there is now in fact greater competition between expatriate labor and qualified local labor, which adds to the social tensions from indigenous concerns about erosion of local identity and cultural heritage in the face of large non-Arab and non-Gulf Arab migrant worker populations. Concerns are also expressed about the security implications of large expatriate populations, particularly South Asian Muslims who may transmit militant ideologies from or to their own societies.

Caution is also expressed about the ability of Gulf governments to deliver on raised expectations about rising standards of living and economic opportunities. If a global economic downturn or a local economic adjustment were to disappoint these, there could be new issues about political accountability that elites in the Gulf would have to contend with.

The Gulf’s reliance on import of public administration and private management capacity is also seen as a source of vulnerability and uncertainty. Official policies to encourage recruitment of qualified local managerial or technical workers seem to be undercut by the growing importance of private capital relative to the state, and by the fact that the workforce decisions of multinational enterprises reflect global compulsions and policies rather than national policy.

Expectations that Gulf societies can rely on their considerable capital resources to deal with the consequences of rapid increases in population and standard of living are also challenged by environmental limits. Given capital surplus, technical capacities such as water desalination and regional planning can be procured as necessary; and expansion of physical infrastructure required by the pace of economic and demographic development is financially feasible. In discussions focused on the scientific and technical challenges of addressing environmental protection, climate change, water quality and infrastructure, public health, and similar issues, the development solutions are seen as sources of additional stress on a fragile environment. For example, reliance on desalination of water requires substantial energy, which in turn raises concerns about increased carbon emissions.

**South Asia**

Our inquiry in South Asia also reveals a wide divergence between US perceptions and those of experts from the region. The latter challenge both the dominant US and Western narrative of India rising to take its role in a global economy of prosperity, and the notion that the principal source of political instability and security concern in Pakistan and the region is Islamic radicalization.

The overall aspiration toward “Western” standards of living by any significant portions of the populations of South Asia is also seen as being economically and
environmentally unsustainable. There is deep skepticism about whether the cosmopolitan material standards of living seen in media and advertising, or modeled by elites, can be extended to any significant portion of the populations even at very high rates of economic growth, given very low starting points for economic growth and the extremely uneven distribution of benefits of growth arising from the chosen models of economic development. Given the population sizes in the region, there is substantial skepticism about the environmental sustainability of efforts to meet the aspirations of a billion and a half people to Western standards of living within the relatively circumscribed geographic and ecological conditions of the region.

What seems salient to experts from the region is intensification of the already high degree of resource scarcity, a sense that the already burdensome effects on human prosperity and natural environment of population growth will intensify, and that the key to understanding South Asia’s prospects of instability and violence is poverty and uneven economic development. There is a high degree of skepticism about the framing of political and security discourse in terms of terrorism and counterterrorism. The question frequently posed is why terrorism has gained so much currency in US discourse on security and politics, whereas poverty has not.

The capacity or will of states to manage rapid processes of change is in question, as is control of powerful transnational influences, corporate or criminal. A related and equally worrying concern is found in the presence of pervasive corruption in all South Asian societies and the increasing influence of criminals in politics. There is frank acknowledgment of the insufficiency of judicial, law enforcement, prosecutorial, or intelligence institutions to respond to the new threats to public order arising from either the internal discontents spawned by rapid globalization and social change or the external threats brought by liberalization of financial transactions, travel, and trade.

Although there is some debate on the matter, the clear weight of opinion among our interlocutors locates the source of political instability and social conflict in growing disparities of wealth, marginalization of many groups, withdrawal of the state from social welfare and regulatory functions, and unwillingness of elites to accommodate peacefully articulated political demands. The source of these in turn is located in what are variously described as “The Washington Consensus,” “The Neo-Liberal Theology (or Dogma),” and the baneful role of the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.

The dominant picture is of two-tiered societies, divided between the few who, through ownership of capital assets or through education, are able to aspire to global standards of living, and the vast numbers mired in underdevelopment. This is seen most sharply in India, owing to the rapid rise of its internationally competitive economic sectors and its multinational corporations, but the trend is noted throughout the region, particularly in Pakistan, where economic growth and international investment have been relatively robust in recent years. This is seen as con-
tributing to the sense of alienation between the state and its citizens, and between elites and the rest. It is also seen as the source of substantial resentment capable of being expressed in social unrest or political mobilization, which sometimes takes ultra-traditional cultural and religious forms.

Thus, the “war on terror” and the use of terrorism as an organizing paradigm for security policy making are seen as distorting both US understanding of the region and policy making by local elites. There is concern that the paradigm affects the political postures of governments toward their own societies, encouraging them to adopt policies that harm human rights. The paradigm has also shaped the evolving ways in which people of these societies perceive their identities, whether Muslim or anti-Muslim. There is also a sense that, whereas governments of the region collaborate bilaterally with the US, they do not collaborate among themselves.

Armed challenges to the state are seen as arising more from the crisis of state legitimacy, which itself stems from its perceived identification with the rich; or from the struggle of the poor or marginalized against the economic consequences of global trends (Naxalite movements among peasants or tribal populations in India or the Nepalese Maoist movement); or from deep-rooted aspirations based on linguistic or ethnic identity (movements among Pakistani Baloch, Tamils in Sri Lanka, or various ethnic groups in the Indian northeast). It is noted that armed challenges based on Islamic ideology are but one minor strain in the region as a whole. These too (Waziristan or Swat in Pakistan) are explained in terms broader than mere religious ideology, as drawing also on resentments about economic marginalization by powerful outsiders or local elites, and related concerns about cultural identities undergoing intolerable stress and rapid evolution.

Indeed the role of ideology of all kinds is considered less significant than social and economic processes of destabilization. While many insurgencies are led by “Maoist” cadres, they are seen more as reflections of rural class conflict and the rebellion of marginalized peasants against a state seen as acting in the interests of the rural elites. It is noted that nominal Marxists are seen repressing peasant mobilizations against multinational capital in West Bengal.

It is suggested that the discourse between and about Islam and the West is a “sound-bite dialogue,” marked by epithets and simplistic formulae. The global penetration of this discourse is seen as affecting the perceptions and shaping of identity in South Asia. Concern is expressed that the excessive focus by the US on Islam and Muslim identity has privileged it even in the political discourse of the region, and has diminished other sources of identity. Pakistani Baloch express particular concern about the prejudicial effects of this on sub-national social and political movements not primarily based on religious identity, as the Pakistani state sweeps all under the rubric of terror and extremism. There is a pervasive sense, among Muslim South Asians as much as non-Muslims, that this is obscuring the fact that ethnicity and language historically have been as significant as religion in the construction of political identity.
The greatest awareness about climate change as a major transnational security issue is demonstrated by Indians and Bangladeshis. As citizens of a delta and coastal nation, Bangladeshis see issues of sea level rise and irregular river flows (flooding and shortages) as central to their well-being. Indian economic development enjoys short-term benefits from carbon emissions, and yet there is deep concern about the economic and human costs of the consequences of global warming in reduced food production, increased disease, and insufficient water supply.

There is also a sense, more among Indians than others, of the close relationship between the issues of climate change and energy security, owing to the overwhelming reliance of India’s rapid economic development on fossil fuels. There is widespread skepticism about the prospects of substantial reliance on renewable energy sources, despite the environmental imperative. Nuclear power and water power are discussed as the most viable alternatives to fossil fuels, but with a sense of concern about the long-term environmental and economic sustainability of either, and a sense of concern at the demographic, infrastructural, and social implications of population displacement and resettlement required by the building of dams.

Water is more widely discussed as a potential source of crisis in South Asia than it is in the Middle East. Several factors are seen to converge into a crisis: higher demand from rising living standards of urban middle-class populations, gross increases in population, increased demands from economic and industrial development, pollution of existing limited water supplies, falling water tables, intensification of traditional flooding problems as a result of environmental degradation of watersheds and melting of glaciers owing to climate change, and unpredictable rainfall patterns resulting from climate change. The disproportionate extent to which the agriculture and aquaculture of the region depend upon seasonal rainfall and upon river flows is seen as a significant source of vulnerability to crisis.

What is notable is the scant awareness about the sometimes dire transnational implications of actions taken in one country. Bangladesh, as the downstream nation in a major river system, and as the nation most vulnerable to a variety of natural and man-made disasters, offers an exception to this, as do the vulnerable island nations of Sri Lanka and the Maldives.

Southeast Asia

Our inquiry in this region evinced a far greater awareness of the transnational dimension of emerging threats, and of regional institutions and initiatives, than in the other two. To some extent this reflects the fact that the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) comprises all the countries of the region and, despite all the limitations arising from its principle of mutual noninterference, retains aspirations to be an effective multilateral body. The Gulf Cooperation Council
GCC in contrast does not reflect pan-Arab identity, the Arab League is ideologically divided, and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) divided by nationalist mistrust of the Indian giant. There is also a sense that the nongovernmental sector in Southeast Asia has found a way to establish transnational links by availing itself of the region’s relative political liberalism (excepting some of the newer members such as Burma), ease of travel, and unrestricted international economic relations.

The Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, transnational public health emergencies such as SARS and Avian flu, and the catastrophic tsunami are seen to have prompted a regional perspective. There remains skepticism about whether ASEAN or other regional mechanisms can effectively mitigate threats such as these. ASEAN’s failure to deal with the regional haze produced by forest fires in Indonesia is cited as an example.

There is a widespread sense throughout the region in all sectors that the significant framework for understanding the affairs of the region transcends ASEAN. The East Asia Summit (EAS) now looms as large in the search for responses to transnational challenges. What actually encompasses “the region” is repeatedly questioned. Increasingly, discussion extends to the roles of China (most of all), Japan, Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand. Discussions of looming environmental disasters bring in East Timor, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands and other Pacific Ocean island nations as sharing the predicament of the larger insular members of ASEAN.

China’s presence as an economic and diplomatic player in the region is so great as to merit substantial consideration across the board. Most Southeast Asians appear to be optimistic about the implications of China’s increasing presence in the region. Certainly, China’s relationship with Southeast Asian countries and intentions has improved in the past decade. There is some sense that China, by being less demanding and conditional in the way that it provides aid or investment, offers a useful counterweight to the US and to international financial institutions. There is greater criticism of China’s disregard of the environment and its highly exploitative approach to natural resources.

Experts in the region evince real ambivalence in their discussion of the US. There is an equally obvious, though contradictory, sense of resentment at both the hectoring and peremptory posture of the US in the region and its failure to play a sufficient role to balance the presence of China in the economic, political, and security affairs of the region.

Despite the sense of regional unity derived from membership in ASEAN, experts in the region nonetheless evince a sharp sense of internal inequality and divergence of historical experience and social character. The most obvious significant distinction noted is that between the older members of ASEAN, which was formed as a
bulwark against Communism, and the newer ones, most of which are in various states of economic transition but with controlled political systems under former Communist elites. Burma is of course seen as the laggard in the pack owing to its repressive and violent government and the severe economic underdevelopment suffered by most of its people.

At the same time, the economic integration of the region produces a palpable and transparent sense of the transnational character of its principal social, economic, and political challenges. Issues such as those arising from the regionwide exploitation of forest resources, or from the intensive exploitation of the Mekong River by most of the countries of mainland Southeast Asia, are seen as levelers. Given the candid admission that unsustainable exploitation and environmental degradation are rife in the “responsible” societies of the region, or perpetrated by their businesses in weaker neighbors, the practical distinctions seem marginal between societies such as Burma, Cambodia, or Laos on the one hand and Indonesia, Thailand, or the Philippines on the other.

The rising demand and opportunities for natural resource exploitation provided by global economic integration, along with the imperatives of governments to deliver rapid economic growth, are seen to have fueled the unsustainable exploitation of forests, minerals, fisheries, and increasingly scarce water resources. The over-exploitation of tropical forests also accelerates the effects of global warming by reducing carbon dioxide absorption, reducing precipitation, and lowering coastal water tables.

A number of experts express concern about the poor communication between technical experts and policy makers. Important studies have been conducted on all the principal environmental challenges spawned by economic development, but the information is not easily accessible or comprehensible to policy makers. For example, the environmental degradation caused by most methods of aquaculture is little understood, yet aquaculture accounts for a significant proportion of regional fisheries. While itself subject to political and bureaucratic complexity, the state is also seen to demand oversimplification of the technical understandings necessary to respond to many transnational threats. There is also observed a common tendency in various types of political systems to respond to short-term interests at the expense of long-term policy making.

Many people outside government regard the state itself as a significant threat to human security. There are concerns about the role of the state in facilitating penetration by large international economic units of natural environments relied on for local subsistence, as well as about abdication by the state of its historical responsibility to provide certain public services such as public health. Among the dimensions of this are political failure, corruption, lack of adequate law enforcement, lack of state capacity and resources, and bureaucratic dysfunction. The rapid pace of change characteristic of globalization is seen as straining the
capacities of states to adapt to new conditions those structures that were created to solve old problems.

Decentralization and democratization are often identified as adding to such problems. Tensions are seen between the paralysis of democratic government and the corrupt opacity of its opposite, and between the responsiveness to popular will of decentralization and the potential for capture by local elites or adoption of narrow local interests adverse to rational policy.

The capacity or will of states to address the salient transnational issues is also seen to be varied among the countries of the region. Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos often figure as examples of serious lack of state capacity, because of the legacy of war and because of the sclerotic character of their Communist or post-Communist political systems. Indonesia is considered to be weakening in terms of capacity as a result of transition to democracy and the weakening of central government, owing in part to a deliberate commitment to decentralization of power. Other countries such as Singapore or Malaysia are seen as capable yet limited to defensive responses against threats and challenges emanating from without their borders.

That said, the Southeast Asian region is distinguished by its relatively advanced state of international cooperation on issues such as readiness for response to natural disasters or pandemic diseases. On matters of response to pandemic or environmental threats, there is a palpable sense among important bodies of expert opinion that the region is treated by the global community as “the canary in the coalmine;” that the global community expects the countries of the region to take measures as much for global purposes as for their own. This sometimes occasions a degree of resentment, particularly when the economic costs of prevention (for example through the culling of birds) appear to be punitive.

HEARING AND UNDERSTANDING THEIR VOICES

The papers that follow reflect a wide variety of opinion in the three regions on a wide variety of issues. They include inter alia the reflections of an Arab scientist on the principal challenges in the Middle East, a sympathetic Arab assessment of the popular political and ideological processes under way in the Arab world, reflections from the state and the non-state perspective on Southeast Asian issues relating to exploitation of natural resources such as forests and fisheries, and a defense of secular and plural politics by an Indian Muslim leader. While no collection of essays can do justice to the range and complexity of perspectives that we have been privileged to encounter in the course of our year-long inquiry, we believe that the essays collected here can and do convey the rich and important deliberations on nontraditional security issues among experts in
the regions, and the ways in which their views differ from Western and US assumptions or postulates.

The papers by experts from the regions are followed by analytical papers by Stimson scholars who have been active in the work of the *Regional Voices: Transnational Challenges* project through interviews with experts, attendance at colloquia, travel in the regions, and research into the literature. These essays seek to understand and interpret what we have heard, and to emphasize its importance to US policy discourse.
Middle East
The objective of this paper is to review the general status of science and technology (S&T) in the Gulf and Levant regions and its bearing on transnational challenges. Given the similarity in socioeconomic situation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, this paper will focus on this geographical zone, with reference made to issues in the general Levant region. The oil-related boom in the economies of the GCC countries has enabled them to take significant steps toward building modern states. Clear progress has been achieved in building the facilities and infrastructures necessary to support the needs of a rapidly developing society. Growth, which was fast-paced in the early stages of development, has declined to a more moderate pace, even plateauing in some countries. It is becoming more evident that building state-of-the-art cities and towns is a completely different task from sustaining solid growth. Although many factors are known to contribute to national development, this paper will focus on the role of S&T in supporting national growth in this part of the world.

Decision makers in the Gulf region consider S&T to be an important factor in national progress. Thus, along with increasing oil exports came investments in national universities and scientific centers. The mandates drafted for these institutions highlighted their role in supporting society and industry. Decades later, however, we find the achievements of research and development (R&D) institutions to be lagging behind the expectations expressed in their goals.

After a brief review of the development gaps in the Middle East, this paper will discuss the status of R&D in the area with respect to the environment, water resources, energy, the economy, and the empowerment of women, with the aim of identifying the specific factors and mechanisms needed to realize the benefits of S&T.

DEVELOPMENT GAPS

The regions covered in this paper are in the western part of Asia. (See Figure 1.) Based on socioeconomic patterns, the GCC countries and the Levant/Mashriq countries can be divided into three categories. Israel, with an S&T system comparable to that of industrial countries, is in a category of its own. The GCC countries
have major oil resources and attract labor from other parts of the region. In contrast, the other Arab countries have abundant populations and limited natural resources and are labor exporters; most are limited with regard to both governmental institutions and human resources. Table 1 shows the main development indicators for various countries in the region.

Statistics on education, health, population growth, and environmental degradation indicate that countries of the Middle East are less developed than a quick glance at their economies and infrastructures would suggest. Despite a construction boom and some dynamic economic institutions, they face some serious environmental and health issues, as detailed in the following sections.

Enormous contrasts in the economic conditions and resources of the various countries are coupled with differences in income and opportunities within the countries. War-torn countries and those affected by war, such as Iraq, Lebanon, and the West Bank and Gaza, confront additional challenges. Their unstable conditions make it difficult to do any kind of sound analysis on them.

Currently, telecommunications technology is the area of S&T undergoing the great-
Table 1: Main Development Indicators

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Millions</td>
<td>People per Sq. Km.</td>
<td>Billions of US$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank and Gaza</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>128.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>289.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>6,438</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>44,983.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low income</td>
<td>2,353</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>1,363.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle income</td>
<td>3,073</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>8,113.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income</td>
<td>1,011</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35,528.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Rapid economic development in the Middle East, at a rate that exceeds global indicators. Israel has one of the most advanced telecommunications markets in the world, with very high broadband and mobile penetration rates. At the other end of the scale, Syria has low mobile and Internet penetration and negligible broadband penetration.

Government initiatives to broaden the installed PC base at educational institutions and homes, mostly supported by IT companies and private organizations, have contributed to growth in Internet use in many Arab countries. The UAE remains the Arab leader in terms of Internet user penetration rate, followed by Bahrain and Qatar. However, there remains a huge gap between Arab countries in terms of Internet penetration. While Internet use has become very widespread in GCC member states, where users are dropping dial-up access in favor of broadband connections, Internet use in other Arab countries is still reminiscent of the early years of public Internet. A serious inter-Arab digital divide is widening year by year. (See Table 2.)
Table 2: Statistics on Internet Usage

<table>
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<tr>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>7,000,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>288%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>27,200,000</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>188%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>7,200,000</td>
<td>1,270,000</td>
<td>3,700,000</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>191%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>5,400,000</td>
<td>127,300</td>
<td>719,800</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>465%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>2,700,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>367%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>4,600,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>133%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>285,000</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>217%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank and Gaza</td>
<td>3,100,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>243,000</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>594%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>219,000</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>630%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>24,100,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>2,540,000</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>1,170%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>19,500,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3,567%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>735,000</td>
<td>1,321,000</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL Middle East</td>
<td>193,500,000</td>
<td>3,284,800</td>
<td>19,539,300</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>495%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL World</td>
<td>6,574,700,000</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,173,109,925</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>225%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


THE ENVIRONMENT

Environmental problems in the Middle East present long-lasting challenges, with a significant impact on the economy and human health. As estimated in the National Environmental Action Plans of countries in the Middle East, the annual cost of environmental damage ranges from 4 to 9 percent of GDP, compared to 5 percent for countries in Eastern Europe and 2 to 3 percent for countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Overall, it is estimated that the environmental health burden is about 15 percent of the total health burden in the Middle East.
Slow progress in improving environmental quality and pursuing sustainable development in the Arab region is rooted in policy and institutional failures, coupled with a lack of public awareness and a poor knowledge base. In many countries, public access to environmental information has not advanced. Water subsidies, especially for irrigation, continue to be a major stumbling block for many countries, as do energy subsidies.

Development strategies can be sustainable only when countries integrate environmental protection into plans and policies. Arab countries should remove the incentives embodied in subsidies and price interventions, as they tend to exacerbate economic and ecological losses, particularly in the energy and agricultural sectors. The economic boom in the Gulf region has had an obvious positive impact on urban development and the standard of living. However, the ever-increasing urban sprawl and per capita consumption of water and electricity have had a concomitant adverse impact on national natural resources and the environment. Governments have introduced environmental protection programs and agencies, and vital laws have been enacted to channel national growth toward sustainable development. However, much more work is needed in this area.

Pollution-related health problems represent another major environmental challenge, particularly in urban and industrial centers. Sources of pollution include open municipal waste dumps, open burning of municipal waste, an aging and poorly maintained vehicle fleet, inefficient use of fossil fuels for power generation and in industry, and sulphur oxide emissions from industry.

Some specific environmental problems in the Middle East relate to the oil industry, military operations, Iran’s nuclear program, waste management, and the marine ecosystem.

The Oil Industry

Oil-related activities are a national priority in most countries in the Middle East. However, their adverse effects on the ecosystem need to be controlled and curbed. The marine pollution resulting from the ballast water of oil tankers is a major and increasing threat, given the closed nature of the Gulf waters. Ballast water is used to balance oil tankers after they off-load their cargo. This polluted water is emptied into the sea when the tanker reaches the filling port. With the highest concentration of oil-exporting ports in the world, the Gulf receives tremendous amounts of ballast water, resulting in both the deterioration of water quality and the introduction of alien microbial marine species. Oil spills are also an ever-present threat.

Military Operations

Though more than 16 years have passed since the first Gulf war, its environmental impact is still evident. Great efforts were made to conduct technical studies to
assess the environmental damage caused by that war. Those assessments were then used to determine compensation awards, to be managed by the United Nations. Although the compensation awards were approved in 2006, rehabilitation efforts have yet to be commissioned.

**Iran’s Nuclear Program**

Iran’s active nuclear program, with major facilities located along the shores of the Gulf (see Figure 2), is now considered to be the major environmental threat to the Middle East. Other governments are drawing up contingency plans and actively gearing up to deal with any mishaps that might result from Iran’s nuclear activities.

Although some work has been done on developing an early detection system to monitor radiation in the air and marine environments, further planning is required to cover threats to facilities that sustain the Gulf population. Water desalinization facilities are a top-priority sector that could be greatly affected by a nuclear accident.

*Figure 2: Iran’s Nuclear Activity*

*Source: Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 2006.*
Waste Management

Solid and liquid domestic waste contributes significantly to the environmental problems in the Middle East. Improper management of such waste poses a major threat to health. Rehabilitation of old solid-waste dumps is proving to be both hazardous and challenging, and the discharge of liquid domestic waste into the sea continues.

The fact that municipal waste is still being dumped in landfills without meeting proper waste management standards will lead to huge land reclamation requirements in the future. Already, the cleanup of Al-Qurain municipal waste landfill was a considerable obstacle to constructing housing on that land. The area still constitutes an environmental threat due to methane gas seepage that can affect air quality in adjacent residential areas. The low cost of landfills hinders any recycling efforts, with the exception of very limited paper recycling.

The inability of governments in the region to deal with domestic waste calls into question their ability to manage the hazardous wastes that will arise in the future from the rush to build nuclear power generation facilities.

Marine Ecosystem

The Arabian Gulf basin is a closed system that is fed mainly by the northern Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. (See Figure 3.) The discharge of freshwater into the Gulf

![Figure 3: Map of Tigris and Euphrates River Basin](image-url)
is vital to sustain the marine environment. Two phenomena are adversely affecting the quality of the water (salinity) and the microorganisms that fish feed on in the Gulf. The first is the drying of the Iraqi wetlands and marshes, which acted to filter water discharged into the Gulf. The second is the decreasing amount of freshwater available as a result of the enormous Turkish Ataturk Dam project, which involved the construction of more than 20 major dams on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. The Ataturk Dam, the world’s fifth largest, is part of the Southeastern Anatolia Project, or GAP, designed to bring electricity to the area and provide irrigation to almost 30,000 square miles of arid and semiarid land. These dams greatly alter the quantity and quality of water discharged in the northern Gulf region, adversely impacting both fisheries and the desalinization facilities that are the basic source of potable water in the Gulf.

**Environmental Science and Technology**

Science and technology can have a great impact on the environmental picture. Following are some points to consider regarding the role of S&T:

- Scientific knowledge, in the form of scientific assessments of the current situation and future prospects for the environment in the Middle East, should underlie the articulation of sustainable development goals. Such assessments should also be used to inform development of alternative strategies for long-term policy formulation.
- S&T should be directed toward more efficient utilization of energy in agriculture, industry, and transportation and the development of renewable energy sources, especially solar energy.
- Sources and effects of environmental pollution can be global, national, and/or local. Science can play a role in identifying sources and prioritizing issues and decisions in such areas as climate change, ozone depletion, pollution, and new technologies related to energy and transport.
- Decision makers must take action, even if their level of knowledge about adverse effects is incomplete. Decision makers operate under time constraints that differ from those of scientific research.
- Science can contribute to the development of policies designed to improve environmental management and environmental sustainability. Central to achieving environmentally sound and sustainable development is building up institutional and technical capacities for choosing, applying, and adapting suitable technologies for energy and transport and for industrial and agricultural production.
- A major objective is to develop a strong in-country capacity for S&T and facilitate the transfer of knowledge about improvements in natural resource management. Centers dedicated to such tasks would allow countries to better assess the regional implications of global change and enable them to par-
participate more effectively in international discussions and negotiations on the global environment.

- S&T is just one of many components that can positively influence environmental policies. Other factors include economic, social, and cultural issues.

**WATER**

Because of the scarcity of water in the Middle East, water-related issues are invariably a source of tension among the countries. The Jordan River basin has a shortage of water, and what is there is claimed by all five riparian countries—Jordan, Syria, the West Bank and Gaza, Israel, and Lebanon. (See Figure 4.) Individual countries’ attempts to develop different projects to use the water resulted in constant friction, until joint development of the water resources was peacefully achieved through agreement between Jordan and Israel. Another water issue confronting Israel is the use of underground water resources in the West Bank.

*Figure 4: Map of Jordan, Syria, the West Bank and Gaza, Israel, and Lebanon*
Water crises have always been a challenge in the Middle East. Throughout history, ancient civilizations flourished in the area through effective planning and cooperation, which is what nations need to do today, using global alliances to further enhance available technologies. Generally, within the Levant region, the political situation hinders transnational cooperation on the management of water resources.

Water resources in the Gulf states are limited to three types: seawater, groundwater, and sewage water. Seawater is the only source available in sufficient quantities to satisfy national demand for high-quality freshwater suitable for all purposes, both at present and for the foreseeable future. Groundwater, most of which is slightly salty, is relatively limited and is constantly exposed to factors that cause its quality to deteriorate. Therefore, effective evaluation, supervision, and management are required to protect groundwater from pollution. As water consumption increases, the production of wastewater also increases.

Thus, it is essential that methods and systems for wastewater treatment be developed so that the resulting treated wastewater can be reused. The most important ways in which it could be reused are in agriculture and in the recharging of underground reservoirs, both to decrease the demand for limited freshwater resources and to increase and improve the quality of strategic groundwater reservoirs. In light of the limited water resources available in the Middle East, it is also important that policies be adopted to economize on water consumption and better manage existing resources.

The major water issues facing the Middle East revolve around the reduced quantities of water available for human consumption and the significant water-quality issues emerging from inadequate municipal treatment, high amounts of agricultural runoff, and uncontrolled effluents from industry. A recent World Bank report on making the most of scarcity warns countries in the Middle East that, by 2050, the per capita water availability in the region will be reduced by half. The “social, economic and budgetary consequences could be enormous” if governments do not accelerate reforms to deal with water scarcity, the report says.

**POWER AND ELECTRICITY**

In their early efforts to invest in modern communities, the governments in the Gulf region formulated energy policies that fully supported their populations. Energy (basically electricity) was readily available at marginal or no cost to the consumers themselves. Subsidized provision of electricity, like that of water, has put a tremendous burden on national budgets. In Kuwait, the consumption of electricity has increased by a factor of 100 over the past 30 years. This increase has been caused not only by the rise in population, but also by the greater level of comfort being demanded. Electric power generation provides up to 45 percent of the nation’s energy, and electric consumption is strongly affected by the need for space cooling. In summer, up to 70 percent of the electric power generated is consumed...
in space cooling. Curbing the ever-increasing per capita consumption has proven to be a huge challenge and is reaching a critical stage in some GCC countries.

Following are some general characteristics of the GCC power sector:

- Demand is growing at very rapid rates.
- There is strong government involvement.
- Electricity and water production are generally combined.
- There are few grids interconnecting regions.
- Commitment to renewable energy and environmental issues is limited.

**Energy-Efficient Buildings**

Energy efficiency is of little concern to most of the architects who design offices and buildings in the Middle East. And competition among importers of air-conditioning equipment leads to the supply of large-capacity units at competitive prices, with no regard to the equipment’s energy efficiency. Most GCC countries have used building codes to address the need for more energy-efficient buildings; however, the enforcement of such codes is lax.

**Alternative Sources of Energy**

Although the GCC countries and the Levant region are among the areas in the world with the most intense sunlight, their sources of energy are and will continue to be fossil fuel–based. Wind energy, the economics of which are hotly disputed in Europe, is making only slow progress in the Middle East. People are not seriously concerned with the issue of global warming at present. This will change, of course, if emission commitments are imposed on developing countries and enforced after 2012.

Israel leads the Middle East in use of renewable energy, although other countries have recently announced moves toward the development and utilization of renewable energy. Jordan announced its intention to build its first nuclear power plant by 2015. The resulting nuclear energy will be used for various purposes, such as electricity generation and desalination. The GCC recently held a meeting to discuss a proposed nuclear facility for power generation.

**THE ECONOMY**

Despite increases over the past three years in all of the GCC states’ economic indicators (such as GNP, external budget surplus, commercial budget, and government revenue), the GCC’s economies have not changed, as the oil sector continues to control local income, imports, and exports. The GCC’s labor market continues to suffer from destabilization, one of the most important features of which is the concentration of the national workforce in the government sector coupled with a private sector that is hesitant to hire nationals. Table 3 shows main socioeconomic indices for the GCC countries.
### Table 3: Socioeconomic Data for the GCC Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Oman</th>
<th>Qatar</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP (ppp)</strong> (billions of US$, 2005 est.)</td>
<td>111.30</td>
<td>15.83</td>
<td>44.77</td>
<td>39.65</td>
<td>23.67</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP (ppp) per Capita (US$, 2005 est.)</strong></td>
<td>43,400</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>19,200</td>
<td>13,200</td>
<td>27,400</td>
<td>12,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP (ppp) Growth (2005 est.)</strong></td>
<td>6.70%</td>
<td>5.90%</td>
<td>4.80%</td>
<td>4.30%</td>
<td>8.80%</td>
<td>6.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area (km²)</strong></td>
<td>82,880</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>17,820</td>
<td>212,460</td>
<td>11,437</td>
<td>1,960,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population (July 2006 est.)</strong></td>
<td>2,602,713</td>
<td>698,585</td>
<td>2,418,393</td>
<td>3,102,229</td>
<td>885,359</td>
<td>27,019,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Life Expectancy (years)</strong></td>
<td>75.44</td>
<td>74.45</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>73.37</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>75.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labor Force</strong></td>
<td>2,800,000 (2005 est.)</td>
<td>380,000 (2005 est.)</td>
<td>1,670,000 (2002 est.)</td>
<td>920,000 (2002 est.)</td>
<td>440,000 (2005 est.)</td>
<td>6,760,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Nonnationals</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment Rate</strong></td>
<td>2.4% (2001)</td>
<td>15% (2005 est.)</td>
<td>2.2% (2004 est.)</td>
<td>15% (2004 est.)</td>
<td>2.7% (2001)</td>
<td>13% (male only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Budget (2005 est.)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenues</strong> (billions of US$)</td>
<td>34.93</td>
<td>4,662</td>
<td>47.21</td>
<td>14.36</td>
<td>17.31</td>
<td>143.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expenditures</strong> (billions of US$)</td>
<td>29.41</td>
<td>3,447</td>
<td>20.77</td>
<td>10.61</td>
<td>11.31</td>
<td>89.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exports</strong> (billions of US$)</td>
<td>103.1</td>
<td>11.17</td>
<td>44.43</td>
<td>19.01</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Debt—External</strong> (billions of US$)</td>
<td>34.47</td>
<td>6.814</td>
<td>16.12</td>
<td>4.361</td>
<td>21.13</td>
<td>36.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electricity (2003)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production (billions of kwh)</td>
<td>45.12</td>
<td>7.345</td>
<td>38.19</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9.735</td>
<td>145.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption (billions of kwh)</td>
<td>38.32</td>
<td>6.83</td>
<td>35.52</td>
<td>9.582</td>
<td>9.053</td>
<td>145.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oil</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production (bbl/day, 2005 est.)</td>
<td>2,396,000</td>
<td>188,300</td>
<td>2,418,000</td>
<td>769,000</td>
<td>790,500</td>
<td>9,475,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption (bbl/day, 2003 est.)</td>
<td>310,000</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>305,000</td>
<td>62,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>1,775,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proven Reserves (bbl/day, 2005 est.)</td>
<td>97,800,000,000</td>
<td>124,000,000</td>
<td>96,500,000,000</td>
<td>6,100,000,000</td>
<td>16,000,000,000</td>
<td>267,700,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Natural Gas

| Production (billions of m³, 2003 est.) | 44.79 | 9.65 | 8.3 | 16.5 | 30.8 | 60.06 |
| Consumption (billions of m³, 2003 est.) | 9.65 | 8.3 | 7.09 | 11.61 | 60.06 |
| Exports (billions of m³) | 7.19 (2003 est.) | 0 (2002 est.) | 0 (2002 est.) | 7.43 (2001 est.) | 18.2 (2004 est.) | 0 (2002 est.) |
| Imports (m³) | 0 (2003 est.) | 0 (2002 est.) | 0 (2001 est.) | 0 (2001 est.) | 0 (2002 est.) |
| Proven Reserves (billions of m³, 2005) | 6,006 | 92.03 | 1,572 | 829.1 | 25,770 | 6,544 |

### Population

| Growth Rate (2006 est.) | 1.52% | 1.45% | 3.52% | 3.28% | 2.50% | 2.18% |
| % of Nationals | 19% | 62.40% | 45% | — | — | — |

### Internet

| Hosts (2005) | 118,495 | 1,952 | 2,439 | 3,261 | 204 | 10,335 |
| Users (2005) | 1,384,800 | 152,700 | 600,000 | 245,000 | 165,000 | 2,540,000 |
| % of Users among Population | 53% | 22% | 25% | 8% | 19% | 9% |

The GCC countries have small, rich economies, supported by huge crude oil reserves. Crude oil extraction and refining account for more than half of the GCC countries’ GDP, as well as the majority of export revenues and government income. This overreliance on oil revenues cannot be sustained, nor can it drive economic growth.

Diversifying the sources of national income has long been a strategic objective of the GCC countries, yet it has not been realized. Trade regimes are often neglected and undervalued, although they have great potential to harness growth and diversify the countries’ economic activities, especially in the area of services.

There is a need for studies aimed at identifying and analyzing the key elements of an effective trade policy for the GCC countries, with a view to deriving strategic options to support government objectives of accelerating economic growth and improving the economic and social welfare of the citizenry. These objectives can be accomplished by making effective use of the current trade system, the GCC trade agreements with other countries, and the global and local push to liberalize trade, but policy makers need a mechanism with which they can assess the long-term benefits of trade agreements already negotiated or under negotiation by the GCC.

Science and technology can play a role in supporting decision makers by providing them with scientific studies and data related to the important economic issues facing the GCC nations. Such studies might focus on specifying the ideal usage of available resources, as well as methods for diversifying national income while broadening the productive base, supporting strategic planning, following up on privatization programs, evaluating industrial projects, and establishing mechanisms for the development and improvement of human resources. Financial and economic feasibility studies, along with other studies related to operations, research, and applied statistics, should be intensified and coordinated.

THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN

Women in the Gulf region are still socially and religiously restrained. They are increasingly working alongside men in banks, universities, and public offices, but age-old traditions and preconceptions about the role of women still hold sway. In some countries (e.g., in Kuwait), the leadership may be progressive, but society lags behind.

Following in the footsteps of Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar, Kuwait recently granted women the right to vote and hold public office. The country, however, still faces important challenges in achieving the full and equal integration of women into society. Although women in the Gulf are becoming increasingly visible in business, their political rights continue to be constrained by a combination of tradition, religion, and law. Ultimately, the women themselves must fight against unfavorable traditions to earn a more prominent place in society.
Four of the six GCC countries (the exceptions are Qatar and Saudi Arabia) have appointed women as cabinet ministers, and some have selected women to serve as members of various representative bodies. While these recent measures help dilute the “conservative” image of GCC societies and lend relief as well as confidence to those championing women’s rights, it is important to look at the road ahead.

Following are some facts about the status of women:

- The fertility rate in the Gulf is 3.8 live births per woman, compared to a world average of 2.7.
- Women constitute 33 percent of the Gulf’s workforce. The global average is 56 percent.
- The average proportion of women in Parliament in the Arab region is 6.9 percent.
- More women than men are registered for higher education in the Gulf states, and there are more Arab women than men among science graduates.
- Despite an increasing pool of highly qualified women in some Arab countries, few hold high-ranking positions in scientific institutions. More women work in the education sector.

Challenges hindering the realization of full participation by women include the stereotypical image of women in the society, the absence of women’s issues in the governments’ plans of action, the misinterpretation of some religious beliefs, and inherited social concepts challenging the advancement of women. Women participate only moderately in higher decision-making positions in organizations such as NGOs, where women’s participation is considered low in general.

**RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT**

Science and technology (S&T) in the Arab world suffers from a lack of national policies and strategies; insufficient science and technology funding, well below global levels; the absence of a visible information industry, belying published statistics on the importation of technologies; a lack of effective coordinating bodies or authorities to act as liaisons between research and development (R&D) and industry; and a general lack of coordination, resulting in a great amount of duplication in S&T.

Realizing the full impact of R&D requires moving toward a knowledge-based economy. Currently, the GCC states are technology consumers with a need to sustain and harness the best S&T in order to build markets, promote stability, and enhance trade. However, lack of knowledge about S&T already affects the level of government support for R&D. Informative S&T museums are becoming more popular in the Middle East. Successful examples are Kuwait’s science center, Jordan’s new science museum and various aquariums. Though great amounts of effort and money have gone into establishing such centers, visible linkage to national S&T strategies is lacking.
The public’s main sources of information on S&T, like those of people around the globe, are television, radio, newspapers, magazines, the Internet, and books. There is a limited amount of original local coverage in the form of specially produced programs and articles on S&T, and Arabic versions of international magazines are available (e.g., *Science* magazine, published by the Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences [KFAS]). Furthermore, the boom in communication technologies has given the public access to international scientific publications and TV channels (e.g., the Discovery, History, and National Geographic channels).

The GCC countries are linked by socioeconomic patterns that encourage close transnational cooperation. They have put some effort into establishing agencies to fund R&D; these include KFAS, the UAE and Zayed Universities, and the Saudi King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST).

In past years, lack of trust in the impact of R&D has played a major role in hindering long-term alliances with the private sector for support and funding. A recent report published by the Saudi Chamber of Commerce stated that 70 percent of industry does not benefit from available R&D facilities in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, most of the remaining 30 percent focuses its involvement on training, limiting the benefits from R&D.

Professional associations are essential to S&T. In addition to advancing their professions, they set and enforce standards, such as ethical codes. Their advocacy work is indispensable, particularly when it is aimed at consolidating the role of science in society. Although many professional associations related to S&T have been established, some with regional coverage, their impact has been barely visible. Few strong professional associations have endured long enough to score significant achievements in their presumed areas of competence. In many cases, professional associations have been torn apart by narrow-minded rivalries or have stagnated. Furthermore, professional associations are often politicized by opposition forces (notably by Islamic movements, the most potent political opposition force in the Middle East).

When political movements fail to get official credibility, they tend to use professional associations as platforms that provide some legal umbrella. Professional associations in Egypt and Jordan are governed by political movements that are mostly Islamic. In other countries in the Middle East, the governing regime dominates all professional associations.

A few S&T-related networks and NGOs have the potential to positively influence practices in the Middle East. They are primarily those established as part of international associations or linked by alliances to such international bodies. The relative success of such networks is due to their governance by the guidelines and bylaws of the international association. Interference by local governments is hindered by the existence of the international association or alliance.

Use of the world’s communication networks has contributed greatly to closing the knowledge gap. However, much remains to be done. Governments should encour-
age the dissemination of S&T results, and all communication technologies should be utilized. Continuous dialogue should be maintained between scientists and the media. Networks that have already been established should be fully utilized to train and empower new scientists.

Although S&T centers exist in the region, there is a need to develop programs that address long-term national issues (e.g., the environment and health) and make such programs prototypes for others. Almost all regional S&T centers (including universities) need benchmarking studies and standard evaluations. Then, through joint programs of national governments and international bodies, centers of excellence can be established to consolidate efforts of the various nations. Governments and high-ranking decision makers must understand that stronger S&T capacity is not a luxury but an absolute necessity, and that S&T development will be hindered unless it is integrated into the societal decision-making process.
Egypt: Deteriorating Services, State Neglect, and Citizen Disaffection

Egypt is the largest Arab nation and faces systemic development challenges that it shares with other non-Gulf Arab nations. Its difficulty in meeting the needs of its citizens reflects a crisis of state capacity that in turn feeds the rise of political Islam.

Egypt suffers unemployment of 10.5 percent, and 43.9 percent of its people live on less than US$2 per day. The quality of public education is abysmal. The low quality of public education adds to economic inequality, as poorly educated graduates are trapped in unemployment and poverty. Twenty-three percent of primary schools lack basic facilities such as a functioning water supply and sanitation, let alone adequate extra-curricular and recreational facilities. Thirty percent of schools exceed the legal limit of 30 students per class; many classes number 45 or more. Public university students are forced to stand in overcrowded lecture halls, which are poorly ventilated and dimly lit. Forty percent of eighth graders fail to achieve the low benchmark of an internationally administered test, and all eighth-grade students score below the international average. University graduates often do not have the skills required in the marketplace. Government expenditure is US$129.60 per student per year, compared to US$289.50 in Tunisia and US$1,337.60 in Saudi Arabia.

The government health-care system is outdated and inefficient, with poor coverage, low skill level of health-care professionals, and low quality of domestically made drugs. Negligence and corruption are not uncommon in government health institutions. A medical company led by a member of Parliament (MP) was granted a license to supply the Ministry of Health’s blood unit, despite a constitutional bar against public procurement from MPs and the company’s lack of experience; it supplied contaminated blood. Recommendations of government lawyers that the case be prosecuted were overruled by ministry officials.

The Egyptian state is viewed by its citizens as ineffective, authoritarian, and unresponsive to their basic needs. Low voter turnout is symbolic of widespread citizen alienation from politics. Despite promises of reform and democratization, the government has only allowed for partial reforms and has adopted measures that run counter to democratization. In 2005 the government permitted a constitutional provision to allow opposition parties to field candidates for the presidency, only to follow with resumption of authority to detain individuals without charge and refusal of demands by judges for greater independence of the judiciary.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s recent electoral advances, even under these restrictive conditions, have drawn on popular discontent about the government’s inability to meet basic needs. Part of the Brotherhood’s electoral appeal is built on its provision of services where the state fails, such as health clinics and 22 hospitals nationwide, schools in every governorate (26 in total), and numerous care centers for poor widows and orphans.

Sources: Al-Ahram Weekly (Cairo); Daily Star (Lebanon); Al Arabiya News Channel; Financial Times; Muslim Brotherhood Official Website; World Bank; Dubai School of Government; UNICEF.
The Arab world is experiencing its most turbulent domestic political period since perhaps the 1920s. Looking beneath the headline-grabbing wars, foreign invasions, and militia-backed confrontations and rebellions reveals a kaleidoscopic array of personal and collective indigenous identities, political movements, and ideological forces, alongside regional and global dynamics. All of these interact in a confusing landscape that offers neither regular patterns nor predictable outcomes. State nationalism, pan-Arabism, Islamism, Shiite empowerment, Kurdish nationalism, Christian self-assertion, globalization, tribalism, democratization, human rights activism, and other forces coexist. Led by presidents and rulers of sovereign states, sub-national ethnic and tribal leaders, and local militias and warlords, these identities and forces compete for the allegiance of a predominantly Arab population in the Middle East that has not had the opportunity to freely express its political sentiments or affirm its identities for many decades, perhaps even centuries. In the transition from Ottoman to European control and then gradually to independence, most Arab citizenries did not have the opportunity to define their own state borders or craft their own governance systems. The principle of the consent of the governed has rarely been implemented in the modern Arab world. The turbulence and dynamism in the region today perhaps reflect the desire of many people to make up for a lost century of political self-expression.

The Iraq war, the American-led “global war on terror,” and the 9/11 attacks all played a role in bringing this about, but the most important event that launched the complex political dynamics of the contemporary Arab world was the end of the Cold War around 1990. As the global ideological lids that had constrained the Middle East for a half century (the Iranian revolution being the notable exception) were removed, a wide range of sentiments, ideologies, and movements that had been forbidden or held in check underground suddenly had an opportunity for public expression. After 1990, the Arab world was defined by newly liberated expressions of identity and ideology that could compete in public for citizen support. Tribalism, religion, democratization, economic globalization, and other forces operated alongside persistent status quo forces that carried over from previous decades, including centralized state authoritarianism, security-based control systems, corporate-tribal alliances, quasi-liberal monarchies, and family-anchored elite leaderships. A rainbow of new political expression appeared, in an arena where old autocratic forces still mostly defined the playing field.
To fully understand the nature and meaning of current events in the Arab world, it is critically important to acknowledge that very different categories of phenomena—ideologies, identities, and governance systems—are at play in the region. Personal/tribal identity, religion, nationhood, statehood, and governance system are five different spheres of life and society, and all five of them are changing and interacting simultaneously throughout the region. Like apples and oranges, they cannot be compared or juxtaposed as elements of a single analytical framework. The configuration of states and the legitimacy of nations comprise one level of analysis and change. Society and state are also defined by forces of collective identity, such as tribalism, religion, ethnicity, and ethno-nationalism, which form a second level of analysis. These different elements of statehood, nationhood, and demographic identity usually do not coincide within most of the modern Arab states that the European powers created early in the twentieth century, which explains many of the region’s chronic tensions. A third level of analysis is the governance system, such as democracy, federalism, decentralization, or consensus-based consociationalism.* Underlying principles of society and governance, such as secularism versus religiosity or individual versus collective rights, constitute a fourth element of analysis. The Arab world is dynamic, turbulent, and violent because for the first time in modern history many of its people have the opportunity to speak out on and help to sort out these ideologies, identities, and governance systems and to configure and define themselves.

To make things more complicated, a fifth layer of analysis has become more pertinent since the post-9/11 American-led global war on terror: many people throughout the region see themselves as struggling to attain genuine sovereignty and to free themselves from foreign tutelage, influence, or hegemony. This local struggle for self-expression and self-definition in the Arab world takes place in parallel with a larger global struggle for self-determination.

This paper discusses each of these strands and concludes with portraits of two Islamist movements that illustrate distinct contemporary trends.

**LIMITED LIBERALIZATION AND EMERGING CHANGE**

The first stirrings of change occurred in the Arab world in the 1970s, as local movements started criticizing governments for policies that did not translate the post-1973 oil boom into equitable economic opportunities, but instead allowed corruption and inflation to take hold. This was the genesis of the contemporary Islamist movements that have challenged many Arab regimes. Declining external fiscal support, combined with the post-1986 drop in oil prices and increasing population pressures, forced many governments to liberalize their political and economic systems to some extent.

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* A political arrangement in which various groups, such as ethnic or racial populations within a country or region, share power according to an agreed formula or mechanism.
extent. More open systems were the price that autocratic regimes had to pay as they implemented harsh economic adjustment policies that allowed them to remain in power. The consequence was that in the 15 years from 1986 to 2001, the Arab region experienced small and sporadic instances of democratization and political liberalization. Sudan, Yemen, Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria, Morocco, and other countries saw the birth of hundreds of new newspapers, thousands of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and scores of political parties, all of which participated in a string of parliamentary and local elections. Most of these phenomena reflected rich identities and traditions—religious, tribal, ethnic, and ideological—that were national, regional, and transnational.

The most successful of the new groups were mainstream political Islamists, who tapped public resentment of the security state system that had slowly come to define and control many Arab societies in the previous two generations. The modern Arab security state was a powerful and persistent phenomenon that came into being after military coups saw army officers take power in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt in the 1940s and 1950s. The security threats resulting from the 1948 war and the creation of Israel, combined with Cold War–anchored support from abroad, prompted both Arab “republics” and monarchies to depend increasingly on their armed forces and internal security systems for national security, social stability, and regime incumbency. The 1967 Arab defeat by Israel ushered in a new generation of unelected military leaders in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and other countries, and the post-1973 oil-fueled boom provided cash resources with which such authoritarian regimes cemented their grip on power. Some of the military leaders, or their sons, still rule today, usually relying on a pervasive, professional security system to thwart any opposition. The modern Arab security state has occasionally been challenged domestically, but always without success.

The forced loosening of tight state controls that occurred in the 1986–2001 period allowed indigenous Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the newly formed Hamas and Hizbullah to show their strength. Tribal forces were not far behind. But few of the new political groups in the Arab world had any impact on the exercise of political power, because although the political process was liberalized, the substance of decision making was not. Liberalization and democratization proved to be limited in scope and content. Incumbent regimes allowed their citizens to vote, run for office, form parties and civil society organizations, and speak out in the media. These new opportunities occurred, however, within electoral systems and political contexts that were carefully controlled by the state. Thus, opposition groups could be represented in parliament and the cabinet but could not muster the majority needed to change long-standing government policies. The combination of new opportunities to exercise freedoms of expression and association and to sit in formal state institutions with the lack of any effect on policy had two main consequences. In the short run, it diffused tensions and pressures that were building in society and reduced the vulnerability of some regimes; in the longer run, though, the exercise of electoral politics without any real power
generated new frustrations among many citizens and political groups. These sentiments would translate themselves in the years ahead into political realities such as renewed support for Islamists, the growth of militias, greater demands for real democratization, emigration by many educated youth, and a small stream of converts to terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda.

Iraq has repeated this process in the past four years, since the removal of the Baathist regime by the Anglo-American invasion unleashed indigenous political and social sentiments that had been bottled up since the 1960s. Citizens who were suddenly more free to express themselves created a marketplace of identities, ideas, and ideologies. The lack of an institutional framework for the state after the removal of the Baathist-dominated structure unfortunately meant that an opportunity for a healthy and peaceful debate on state re-formation among Iraqis was lost. The process of expressing identity, configuring political power alliances, and reestablishing a functioning government based on power sharing and consensus has been erratic, often violent, in Iraq. This has been exacerbated by three separate sources of grievances that often result in systematic violence: internal power-sharing feuds among Iraqis, regional forces that intervene in Iraq (such as terrorists linked to Al-Qaeda or pro-Iranian groups), and the intense resentment against the American-led foreign forces that dominate the country.

In this difficult context, Iraqi Kurds, Shias, Sunnis, Assyrians, Christians, and others ponder how to preserve their rights as citizens in a now fractured state. Democratic activists and human rights advocates persevere in their quest for the rule of law. Constitutionalists work hard to create a credible republican and federal system, against great odds. Religious and ethnic identities manifest themselves powerfully, as do tribal loyalties and fealty to transnational forces, including terrorism, global capitalism, pan-Islamism, and even pan-Arabism (exemplified in widespread Iraqi reluctance to go against the Arab consensus on contacts with Israel).

The shape of things to come in Iraq and in the entire Arab world will reflect how religious, tribal, national, regional, and ethnic identities are integrated into a national political system that incorporates all parties, yet also fairly reflects real power balances.

**A WIDE RANGE OF GRIEVANCES**

Two main reasons explain the tensions that prevail throughout the region, keeping in mind the significant subregional differences in culture and history among the Levant, the Persian Gulf states, the Nile Valley, and North Africa. The first reason for political and national turbulence in the Arab world is that most existing Arab states were not created or configured by the self-determining will of their own citizens or validated by democratic and accountable mechanisms of governance. State, religious, tribal, and ethnic boundaries do not coincide in many Arab countries, creating chronic majority/minority tensions that are exacerbated by the abuse
of power by ruling elites. Some ruling powers are religious or tribal minorities that do not necessarily enjoy mass popular legitimacy.

The second reason for turbulence is that the majority of Arabs in the past half-century have experienced very erratic state development and have been denied political and personal rights. In most countries, the majority of citizens hold a range of serious and legitimate grievances against their own state, as well as against foreign countries. Unable to find redress of grievances in the institutions of statehood and citizenship, many people turn to subaltern identities—tribe, religion, ethnicity, village, neighborhood, and militia—that have functioned effectively for millennia in some cases. These provide identity, protection, and solace, as well as fill the critical need to have a means of collective expression for political interaction with other groups in society.

The tensions, pressures, and concerns that drive the sentiments and actions of ordinary Arabs throughout the Middle East are noteworthy for not having changed very significantly in recent decades and for spanning so many domains that define people’s lives—political, social, economic, security, and environmental. Many problems are connected and cannot be dealt with separately. For example, environmental stress (water shortages, pollution) cannot be separated from corrupt or inefficient authoritarian governance, which in turn cannot be separated from foreign support of the ruling autocrats. The following are the main grievances that drive citizen concern and political activism in many Arab countries:

1. The Arab-Israeli conflict, which provided a justification for autocratic rulers to avoid democratic transformations and establish security-minded regimes. In the late 1940s and beyond, many Arab military regimes that took power through coups justified their nondemocratic control by arguing that the conflict with Israel made security a greater priority than democracy. Early indigenous Arab stirrings for democracy and liberalism in the 1920s and 1930s were blunted and then eradicated by the 1940s and 1950s. The Arab-Israeli conflict also generated repeated and cumulative feelings of humiliation, which eroded the credibility of many regimes and fostered opposition and radical movements throughout the region.

2. Foreign occupations and invading armies that continue to impact the Arab world. Some Middle Eastern countries are currently subjected to sanctions, regime changes, and other foreign threats.

3. A sense of humiliation in relation to foreign powers. This feeling is widespread in Arab societies, especially in the sense that major Western powers apply a double standard to Arabs and Israelis when it comes to compliance with international law and UN resolutions.

4. The legacy of autocratic, sometimes authoritarian, rule that usually enjoyed the explicit, sustained support of foreign governments, including the two superpowers during the Cold War era, and that degraded the self-respect of many citizens.
5. The post–World War I colonial legacy that made it virtually impossible for Arab public opinion to manifest itself or engage in a process of self-determination, because colonial authorities usually transferred political and military power to hand-picked local elites. Those elites quickly consolidated their grip on power or were overthrown by military coups. Rarely has an Arab citizenry democratically elected or consultatively chosen its leaders in a credible, legitimate political process. Islamism and tribalism had mass appeal as a readily available, indigenous means to compensate for this.

6. Economic stagnation that has plagued many countries since the mid-1980s. As population growth outpaced economic expansion, real per capita incomes either stagnated or even declined (except in oil-fueled economies).

7. Corruption, abuse of power, and mismanagement that became increasingly prevalent. Ruling elites and families consolidated their grip on power after the early 1970s, when oil income significantly expanded the capacity of security-minded ruling elites to remain in power for decades.

8. Petty indignities that plague ordinary citizens in their interactions with the state. Many small indignities make people feel that their voice is not heard, their opinions do not matter, and their rights as citizens are not honored in a society where power is unjustly exploited by a small, nonaccountable elite.

**ECONOMIC STRESS AND POLITICAL TENSIONS**

Deteriorating or stagnant economic conditions are an important underlying reason for the growth of political movements based on ideologies and identities that often challenge, or exist in parallel with, the central state. The annual Unified Arab Economic Report confirms worrying economic trends that drive tens, perhaps hundreds, of millions of concerned citizens to seek political change that can better respond to their basic human and developmental needs. The statistics for all Arab countries where data could be collected for the 2001 report (Iraq, Palestine, and Somalia are excluded in many cases, because of their battered condition) indicate that real living standards in the Arab world remained essentially stagnant or declined in real terms in most cases in the two decades from 1980 to 2000. The real gross domestic product (GDP) per person (current prices) in the Arab world as a whole was US$2,469 in 2001, a drop from US$2,578 in 2000 and from US$2,612 in 1980. If these figures are adjusted for inflation and declines in foreign exchange value since 1980, the average income of the average Arab citizen dropped substantially in real terms.

Even these figures are deceptive, however, because they aggregate the oil-producing Arab states that have relatively small populations with the poorer Arab states that have large populations. In six relatively low-income, large-population Arab states (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen), the average per capita GDP for the 194 million citizens ranged between US$900 and US$1,040 in the period 1995–2001. Adding war-ravaged Palestine, Iraq, and Somalia to the mix
would make average income drop even further. If these figures were adjusted for inflation and declines in foreign exchange value, they would drop even more. For example, in that pivotal decade of political change, between 1985 and 1995, the per capita GDP in Jordan declined by 16 percent, from 748 to 626 dinars. When this is calculated in constant dollar terms, however, the actual decline in the purchasing power of an average citizen was a much steeper 59 percent—from US$2,244 to US$908—mainly due to the dinar’s devaluation in that period. Calculating per capita income in dollar terms is relevant because Jordanian and other Arab economies rely heavily on imported goods, basic as well as luxury items.

The stark political meaning of this is that about three-fourths of all Arab people are poor and have been getting steadily poorer in the last two decades, a period when virtually no Arab citizenry has been able to freely elect its leadership and hold it accountable in a credible manner. The net result is massive and cumulative inner tensions that drive many Arabs to despair, some to revolt, others to emigrate, and a handful to resort to criminality and terrorism.

**PERSISTENT AUTOCRACY AND CHRONIC CRISSES**

Since the 1960s, security-minded governments and states have dominated most aspects of life in Arab countries. External powers usually helped to perpetuate this autocracy, and civil society and the private sector have been largely contained and controlled by the state. Ordinary men and women have had few, if any, opportunities to express themselves, let alone to work for better governance or greater socioeconomic equity. Most people have responded by expressing their complaints and wishes in the language of religion or culture; they speak of their right to “justice and dignity,” rather than use the language of democratic republicanism. The challenges facing the Arab state can be summed up in terms of five fundamental crises that plague this region. They are interrelated and have developed over decades of erratic statehood:

1. **A crisis of sustainable human development.** Good progress in expanding basic services in the early decades of statehood has been replaced since the mid-1980s by stagnation and disparity in many sectors for the majority of Arabs (other than in the oil-fueled states).
2. **A crisis of sensible and stable statehood.** Few Arab countries are immune from civil war, rebellions, border conflicts, terror, and widespread emigration impulses.
3. **A crisis of citizenship rights.** Public power is exercised by small groups of unelected, unaccountable people who use force at will, leaving the ordinary citizen unclear about his or her place in society and civil and political rights.
4. **A crisis of identities.** The modern state, pan-Arabism, Islam, other religions, tribalism, ethnicity, regional affiliations, gangsterism, commercialism, democracy, resistance, terrorism, and other transnationalisms all
compete for authenticity and supremacy, at the personal, communal, and national levels.

5. A crisis of coexistence with Israel, other regional powers (Turkey and Iran), and Western powers (mainly the United States and the United Kingdom). There is no consensus on whether these powers are friends or foes, or both.

The bond of citizen-state relations is badly broken in many Arab countries. Not a single Arab country to date has adequately resolved any of these five crises in a sustainable manner. For instance, few if any Arab citizenries have had the opportunity to define the broad parameters of their statehood or nationhood. Most Arab countries had their borders defined by retreating European colonial powers, and Arabs have been largely absent from the process of defining their own statehood. This is one reason why so many Arab countries have serious internal tensions due to religion, ideology, and/or ethnicity. Simultaneously, few if any Arab citizenries have had the freedom to define their systems of governance, representation, and accountability, taking into consideration important issues such as cultural and ethnic pluralism and establishing realistic balances between religion and secularism, gender roles and rights, state power and individual rights, and central government and provincial authority. Most of the formative decisions that define the geography, demography, and governance systems of entire countries have been made by foreign powers or by local elites who were installed by foreign powers or took power by force.

The cases of Iraq and Lebanon suggest that the chronic crises of the modern Arab world will not be resolved by foreign armies or local militias. The answer to Arab crises is not to perpetuate their underlying causes—foreign armies, local autocrats, populist demagogues, rampant human despair, and fragile national institutions. The answer lies in granting the Arab people the opportunity to exercise their right of self-determination and to decide once and for all the most appropriate balance in their lands among the tribe, the gun, the law, the state, the foreign power, and the divine.

**Cultural Factors Driving Political Change**

Not surprisingly, election results throughout the Middle East since the late 1980s, along with public opinion polls and the media, clearly indicate a strong desire for change among the peoples of the region. That change can happen most smoothly and naturally if it reflects indigenous values, rather than communities imagined in the minds of Western politicians and generals. Political transformation throughout the Middle East must take into account some key differences between Arab and American cultures:

1. Americans probably value freedom above all other attributes, while most Arab societies stress the dignity of the individual more than his or her lib-
Dignity is defined and perceived as comprising the same range of values and rights that define democracy in the United States and the Western world: participation in political life and decision making, a sense of social and economic justice, equal opportunities for all young people in education and employment, and application of the rule of law equally and fairly to all individuals.

2. Americans organize their society and governance systems primarily on the basis of the rights of the individual, while Arabs define themselves and their societies primarily through collective identities, such as family, tribe, ethnic group, and religion. Americans tend to stress society’s obligation to ensure the individual’s rights to do as he or she pleases, within the limits of the law; Arabs tend to focus more on the obligation of the individual to fulfill his or her responsibilities to the family and wider community and to accept that individuals forfeit some of their personal rights in order to maximize the solidarity and power of their collective group. The importance of recognizing communal or group rights in pluralistic societies is reflected in the fact that some Arab countries (Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt) apply quotas or guarantee parliamentary seats for some minorities.

3. The United States is a secular society, while religion has played an increasingly important public role in most Arab and Middle Eastern societies in recent years. Religion does not necessarily formally organize public governance, but it has always been, and remains, one of the most powerful and legitimate means of expressing discontent and demanding change at the local or national level. In some Arab societies, especially among Islamists, religious values are replacing the secular ideologies that defined these societies in their formative decades, between the 1920s and 1960s. Empirical data from a 2005 public opinion poll by the leading American pollster Zogby International, based on face-to-face interviews in Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), revealed some nuanced attitudes toward the role of religion in public life. Three particularly relevant findings were that Arabs and Muslims in this region hold a very wide range of views on religion’s role in their lives and do not share monolithic perspectives, that religion is seen as an important part of people’s identities that should find expression in business and governance in a manner that raises the quality of life, and that people should continue to interpret religious law and its everyday applications.

4. The United States is predominantly an immigrant society with a short collective historical memory, while Middle Eastern cultures are deeply defined by their historical memories and past experiences. Immigration and migrant populations have become more important phenomena in the Arab region since the oil-fueled development boom began in the early 1970s. Millions of Asians and Arabs who relocated to oil-rich Arab countries to find work have not had the same impact on social and political systems as have immigrants in Western countries. Most migrants in the Middle East
are contracted laborers or professionals who see themselves as temporary residents in their host countries. They can spend 3 to 30 years earning, saving, and remitting money to their families back home, without expecting political or other rights in their host countries. Migrant workers and their families are expected to find political expression in their home, not their host, countries. The sole issue that occasionally rears its head relates to the rights of migrant workers to be treated fairly and decently, in terms of wages, living conditions, and basic work-related rights (rest days, safety, working hours, insurance, etc.).

5. In most Arab societies, the give-and-take of negotiated political relationships, power sharing, wealth distribution, and access to public resources takes place in the private realm, out of sight of the media and the institutions of statehood. Parliaments and judiciaries are mostly nominal or even decorative institutions, devoid of real power. In the United States and other Western societies, political contestation and power struggles are more routinely manifested in public, including in the media and parliaments.

6. A significant new issue that has created contention between many Arabs and Americans is the importance of democracy. The United States and others have turned to military action to install democratic systems in Iraq (and Afghanistan), arguing that democracy will provide the kind of stability and prosperity that the Middle East has largely lacked in modern times. Many in the Arab world admit that democracy is indeed a desirable goal, but they see true sovereignty and legitimate governments in their countries—free from foreign manipulation—as much more urgent priorities.

IDEOLOGICAL FORCES AND POLITICAL CHANGE

Islamist movements pushing for change and better governance, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Hizbullah, and the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and Turkey, have emerged in recent decades as the most powerful organized political force affecting Middle Eastern public opinion. But they are only one of the forces that compete for citizen allegiance throughout the region. Today, a decade and a half after the end of the Cold War, there are at least seven main ideological forces operating in the Middle East. They are of very unequal strength, and they continue to evolve from traditional to contemporary forms as they keep up with changing circumstances:

1. **Mainstream Islamists.** This is the largest single constituency in the region, comprising relatively moderate, mostly nonviolent, Islamist movements such as Hamas, Hizbullah, and the Muslim Brotherhood, which now engage in democratic elections. They use armed violence to repel foreign (mostly Israeli) occupation and, in the past, sometimes violently challenged their own regimes in Syria, Egypt, Algeria, and other lands.
2. **Terrorist groups.** A small number of Arabs, Pakistanis, Afghans, and citizens of other lands—including Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Fateh el-Islam in Lebanon, and others of that ilk—have broken away from mainstream political Islamism and adopted confrontation and terrorism as vehicles for political expression. These radical Salafist* militants draw on the same sources of mass resentment and sense of marginalization that plague most Arab citizenries and feed the mainstream, nonviolent Islamist movements, such as corruption, chronic foreign interference in the region, Israeli occupation and aggression, and a sense of loss of human dignity by ordinary citizens. While mainstream Islamists generally work within national political systems and seek to share power and change policy, the Salafist militant groups tend to appeal to individuals who have become detached from their national or local anchorage and see themselves engaged in a global defensive jihad to save Islamic societies from foreign domination and domestic misdirection.

3. **American-led Western hegemony.** This movement, which began to grow after the end of the Cold War and has strengthened since 9/11, aims to transform the Middle East into a set of Western-friendly societies that are free to spend their money and run their internal affairs as they wish (e.g., family-run monarchies, tribal-run police states, security-run oligarchies, father-and-son “kleptocracies”) as long as they eschew terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and pestering Israel. Libya, Qatar, Jordan, and Egypt are relevant examples.

4. **Anti-American, anti-imperial defiance.** This is the oldest continuous ideological force in the region, dating from a century ago, when various Arabs rebelled against European, Ottoman, and, to a limited extent, Zionist power in the region. Syria, Sudan, Hamas, Hizbullah, and some other Arab entities champion this idea once again, mainly targeting the United States. In some cases, this anti-imperial sentiment links with solidarity movements in other parts of the world, especially Europe, Iran, and Latin America.

5. **Home-grown Arab democracy and the rule of law.** This is the most recent and weakest ideology in the Arab world, represented by civil society activists and others who demand more participatory, accountable governance systems based on the rule of law. This fledgling force is exerted by citizens who have grown weary of and humiliated by their own country’s stagnation, autocracy, police state, corruption, mismanagement, and deference to foreign dictates. Some indigenous democracy and human rights movements

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* Salafism refers to the political and social expression of an Islamic fundamentalist school of thought that idealizes and seeks to restore the fundamental values of early-age Islam, seen as having been intellectually and socially corrupted by religious and political influences since then. While it is often used interchangeably with jihadism or Wahhabism, Salafism in reality is at the origins of various political and religious movements, ranging from the reformist to the violent.
are deeply influenced by Western models, and logistically and financially supported by Western governments and multinational agencies. This has proved to be problematic for some groups (e.g., in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Sudan, and Jordan), which have been accused of promoting foreign goals and have found themselves criticized, ostracized, or hounded by governments and other political forces. An important dimension of democratization in the Arab world is its slow convergence with mainstream Islamism, as groups such as Hamas, Hizbullah, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Action Front, the Islah Party, and the Justice and Development Party see democratic electoral politics as their route to power.

6. **Tribal loyalties.** Such loyalties are the most ancient form of collective identity in the Middle East, predating Islamic religious values, and they continue to have an effect on political systems that increasingly allow people to organize, express themselves, and vote. Kuwait, Yemen, and Jordan offer the best examples of political systems that liberalized and held elections and found their parliaments dominated by tribal candidates rather than representatives of ideological or political movements.

7. **Pan-Arabism.** This ideology remains a real but subdued force in the region, having been replaced by Islamism as the dominant populist ideology. Yet the discourse of leading Islamists, such as Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal, is tinged with implicitly pan-Arabist references to the collective American-Israeli threat faced by all Arabs and to the need for Arabs to join hands in resisting foreign hegemonic aims and in supporting the Palestinians. Pan-Arabism is an amorphous, intangible sentiment that is fairly common among ordinary citizens (as manifested by party platforms, public opinion polls, and mass media pronouncements) but is no longer championed by state authorities as it was in the 1950s and 1960s by Gamal Abdel Nasser. It was discredited to a large extent by the brutal police state character of many regimes that waved the banner of Arab nationalism in the 1960s and thereafter.

Given the relative strengths of these ideological forces, parliamentary elections in Arab countries predictably result in victories by three main groups: Islamists, incumbent regimes and parties, and centrist tribalists (who tend to be close to the regimes). It is no accident that in his final desperate years, Saddam Hussein attempted to shore up his regime’s weakening legitimacy by appealing to precisely these three forces: the security state, tribalism, and Islamism. He understood which forces enjoyed the most power and legitimacy among the public.

Today’s strong Islamist movements are not a new or sudden phenomenon. In fact, the current wave of Islamist political movements that is contesting and often winning elections in the region is the third wave of Islamism since the 1970s, and probably the most important one. The first wave, in the 1970s, engaged and challenged Arab regimes largely in the form of clandestine opposition movements or...
grass-roots social organizations in Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Sudan, Syria, and Kuwait. These were either harshly suppressed or were allowed to engage in electoral politics in the post-1986 liberalization phase. Some of those who were brutally suppressed joined forces with triumphant Islamist jihadists in Afghanistan and launched the second wave of Islamism, which took a violent form, including terror tactics of the kind favored by bin Laden, in the 1980s and early 1990s in Algeria, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other places. Initially, these groups primarily targeted Arab regimes (not Israel or the United States), especially—as in Algeria and Egypt—following failed attempts at political inclusion and participation. Islamists in that period were largely split between two very different groups: a small number of cultlike militant Salafists who used terror tactics against Arab regimes and Western targets, and much larger populist Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood that enjoyed widespread grass-roots support but were unable to gain power in the formal institutions of governance.

The third wave of Islamism consists of groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Hizbullah, the Islamic Action Front, and the Justice and Development Party, which are currently winning local or national power through democratic elections. They should be called religio-nationalists, because they combine the forces of religion and nationalism. (In Turkey, the mildly Islamist Justice and Development Party is in power and draws on popular support for state secularism and entry into the European Union, suggesting that politics and national interest, rather than theology, are the main driving forces of increasingly pragmatic Islamist parties). Arab Islamists use a combination of religion and nationalism efficiently, by crafting a message of hope, defiance, and self-assertive confidence that responds directly to the multiple complaints of their fellow citizens. Huge numbers of ordinary Arabs feel they have long been denied their cultural identity, political rights, national sovereignty, personal freedoms, and basic human dignity. Islamist groups have responded with a powerful package that speaks to their fellow citizens about religion, national identity, legitimate good governance, and resistance to foreign occupation and subjugation.

Islamist parties have generally increased their popular support and political profile in the past 15 years or so, though in recent years they seem to have reached the limits of the political power they can attain. The regimes in Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco, for example, have taken measures since 2005 to limit the role of Islamist parties, either by changing constitutional electoral rules or redistricting parliamentary constituencies. Some Islamist parties have also performed poorly while in parliament, causing them to lose appeal for some voters. The Israeli-American-European boycott of the victorious Hamas party in Palestine in 2007 was another setback to Islamist politics, as some citizens decided it is futile to pursue democratic politics in today’s anti-Islamist environment.

Should peaceful mainstream political Islamism be killed and buried by a combination of Israeli-Western sanctions and Arab regimes’ opposition, the subsequent
political landscape in the Arab world could very well see a coming together of five powerful forces that until now have generally been kept separate: Sunni Islamic religious militancy, Arab national sentiment, anti-occupation military resistance, Iranian-Persian nationalism, and regional Shiite empowerment among Arabs and Iranians. In fact, this convergence manifested itself for the first time in 2006–2007, as Iran, Syria, Hizbullah, Hamas, and other smaller movements in the region formed an informal coalition to challenge the United States, Israel, and some Arab governments.

**Two Case Studies: Hizbullah and the Muslim Brotherhood**

**Hizbullah in Lebanon**

Hizbullah is an example of a successful Islamist movement that touches on all the sentiments and political forces that swirl throughout the Middle East. A significant aspect of Hizbullah’s role in Lebanon and the region is precisely that it is not one-dimensional or static. Hizbullah has played a half dozen important roles in its history; these roles keep evolving, as some disappear to be replaced by others. Its policies, services, and rhetoric blend religion, resistance, politics, alliance making, nationalism, and transnationalism. It is one of several Islamist political groups throughout the Middle East that have played a significant role in resisting foreign occupation or domestic autocrats but now serve mainly as representatives of national constituencies in governance systems based on democratic elections. Throughout its short life of a quarter century, Hizbullah’s credibility and power have rested on five broad pillars:

- Delivering basic social welfare needs mainly to Shiite communities in different parts of Lebanon
- Resisting and ending the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon
- Being part of an (often Iranian-inspired) pan-Islamic movement that challenges American hegemonic aims in the region
- Providing efficient, noncorrupt governance at the local level
- Emerging as the main representative and protector of Shiite communal interests within Lebanon’s explicitly sectarian and confessional political system

Until 2005, Hizbullah also benefited from close ties to the Syrians, who had dominated Lebanon for 29 years. Since 2006, however, Hizbullah’s stands have been changing. The Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, Iran’s increasing diplomatic tensions and simultaneous negotiations with the West, the Israeli departure from South Lebanon in 2000, and recent international pressures through UN Security Council resolutions have forced Hizbullah to review and redefine its national role in Lebanon. This partly reflects the increased local and global talk, after Israel’s retreat from the south and the 2006 summer war, about the need to end Hizbullah’s
status as an armed resistance group operating beyond the control of the Lebanese national armed forces. This move is required by both the UN resolutions and the Taif Agreement, which ended the Lebanese civil war in 1990.

Hizbullah seems to recognize that it must continue the transition it has been making in recent years—from primarily an armed resistance group against Israeli occupation and a service delivery body operating in the south to a national political organization, sitting in parliament and the cabinet and operating on a national political stage. It is unrealistic to deal with Hizbullah as only an armed resistance force, a political adjunct of Iran, a friend of Syria, the main interlocutor for Shias in Lebanese politics and power sharing, a growing force in parliament, or an Islamist voice of global anti-imperialism. It is all these things simultaneously, and always has been. At the same time, though, it continues to evolve in response to the changing needs of its constituents and the evolving political and geostrategic environment in which it operates. For example, its initial stress on promoting an Islamic society in Lebanon has been put on the back burner in recent years, in acknowledgment of the need to bring about any ideological change in the country through consensus among all the sectarian groups represented in the government.

Having achieved two of its primary aims in the period 1982–2000—asserting Shiite rights and power within the Lebanese political system and forcing Israel to withdraw from south Lebanon—Hizbullah is now facing the complex challenge of contesting power in an environment in which it meets significant political resistance. Its challenge to the Siniora government in Lebanon in the fall of 2006 was met by a strong response by the American- and Saudi-supported government, including counterdemonstrations to mirror Hizbullah’s own show of force in the streets. An effective stalemate was quickly reached, with both sides seeming to enjoy equal popular strength inside Lebanon and equal foreign support. Hizbullah forged a daring political alliance with the leading Christian party headed by former General Michel Aoun, in an attempt to create an ideological front that transcends purely sectarian interests. This alliance seeks one-third of the cabinet seats, which would give it effective veto power over major policy moves; this power is necessary to ensure that the Lebanese government does not try to disarm Hizbullah, as the UN resolutions demand. This is a new battlefield for Hizbullah, in which its military prowess against Israel is not a major asset. It is learning that its political challenge to the government demands new tools and tactics, which it is acquiring by a process of trial and error. Some of its aggressive domestic moves, such as establishing a protest tent city in downtown Beirut that blocked the city center, have elicited strong protests from many Lebanese; the increasingly vocal public criticisms of its tactics and aims would have been unheard of three or four years earlier. As Hizbullah adjusts to the new political realities of its world, it will inevitably emphasize some of its many assets and downplay others. Recent events have clarified that it has a wide range of assets to draw on.
Hizbullah in the World

The war between Hizbullah and Israel in the summer of 2006, in part a proxy battle between the United States and Iran, revealed that Hizbullah taps into and mirrors political sentiments across the Middle East that are very much wider and deeper than its successful quest to repel Israel’s occupation of south Lebanon. Opinion polls in 2006–2007 indicate that Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah was the most admired leader throughout the Arab world. Hizbullah’s deep popular support throughout the region reflects its ability to tap into a wide range of political sentiments and views that are also noteworthy for three particular reasons: they reflect a very diverse range of issues that appeal to public opinion; these issues bring together groups and countries that have rarely worked together before; and, collectively, these forces represent a significant new posture of resistance and defiance of the United States and Israel that continues to shape politics and diplomacy in the region.

Hizbullah generated wide support across the Middle East during the 2006 summer war because it appealed to various constituencies through the following political sentiments and movements:

- Lebanese patriotism, supporting both the liberation of Lebanon from Israeli occupation and the desire to keep it free from Western domination
- Arab nationalism, whose themes and rhetorical symbols are increasingly evident in the speeches of Hassan Nasrallah
- The Islamist political resurgence throughout the Middle East, evident in mostly Sunni-dominated movements such as Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Turkish Justice and Development Party
- Shiite empowerment, a process that has been underway since the mid-1970s in Lebanon and other parts of the region
- Provision of social and other services at the family, neighborhood, and community levels throughout Lebanon, but primarily in Shiite-majority regions
- Solidarity with the Palestinians, whose cause continues to resonate widely and passionately among peoples throughout the Middle East
- Strategic and tactical alliances with Iran, which aims to be the regional if not the global leader of anti-American defiance
- Close working ties with Syria, whose hard-line Baathist secular regime is among the last of the Soviet-style centralized Arab security states that defy the United States
- Resistance to foreign occupation of Arab lands, whether the Anglo-American armies in Iraq or the Israeli army in Lebanon
- Promotion of good governance at the local and national levels in Arab countries, to replace the corrupt, inefficient, and often incompetent regimes that have ruled in recent decades
- Defiance of what Hizbullah and others call American-dominated Western imperial aims and hegemonic designs aimed at transforming the Middle East
into a region of compliant governments that fall in line with American-Israeli strategic aims. Specifically, Hizbullah’s domestic political challenge to the Siniora-led Lebanese government since December 2006 has revolved around the main accusation that the government is an American puppet.

Never before in modern Arab history have such different, and often antagonistic, sentiments and views come together in a single movement, or at least a temporary tactical alliance of convenience. The parties that converge in supporting Hizbullah also notably transcend many of the fault lines that had long been thought to define the contemporary Middle East: Shias and Sunnis, Arabs and Iranians, Islamists and Baathists, and secular and religious groups all seem to work together comfortably these days, brought together by their common desire to resist Israel, the United States, and some pro-Western Arab regimes.

It is unclear if this convergence, or even coalition, of forces represents only a fleeting surge of emotions or a historic shift of political direction in the Middle East toward a new regional Cold War, in which Arabs, Iranians, Islamists, nationalists, and state patriots join forces to confront the Israeli-American side, with its handful of Arab supporters. The only certainty for now is that Hizbullah taps into a combination of very diverse political, personal, ideological, national, religious, social, and other sentiments that millions of Arabs embrace in their continuing but elusive quest for stable, satisfying statehood and meaningful sovereignty.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan

Like Hizbullah, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is a mainstream, populist, and broadly successful political-social-religious movement that combines several different dimensions of identity in the modern Arab world. Unlike Hizbullah, it operates in an environment in which it must interact with a strong central state. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1942 as a branch of the Egyptian group. Its ceremonial office opening was held under the patronage of Jordan’s King Abdullah I—an indication of the consistently close relationship between the Brotherhood and the Hashemite monarchy.

When all other ideological organizations and political parties were banned in Jordan, the Brotherhood for decades was a licensed social and charitable organization that was allowed to open offices throughout the kingdom. It used its schools, clinics, youth centers, and religious instruction and charitable efforts to spread its conservative Islamic social message throughout society. The monarchy allowed it to operate because it was an effective counterforce to the Nasserite, Arab nationalist, communist, socialist, and Baathist leftist ideologies that swirled around the Middle East beginning in the 1950s. Relations with the regime fluctuated, however, in line with the political events of the day. When Jordan moved closer to the United States and Israel or worked against fellow Muslim Brothers in adjacent Syria, relations became tense. Domestic issues that the Brotherhood has routinely championed,
usually against state positions, include economic adjustment and liberalization policies, “normalization” with Israel (after the 1994 peace treaty), greater domestic freedoms, and revised election laws that do not restrict opposition groups.

The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood juggles a series of different identities and ideologies that often appear to contradict one another, yet it continues to be a credible and popular force in society—if not very effective in winning power or changing state policies. Its conservative Islamist, pan-Arab, and anti-Israeli orientation would appear to run counter to the Jordanian monarchy’s prevailing pro-Western, peace-with-Israel policies, which include a commitment to free market economics and a liberal social agenda that is open to Western cultural influences. The Brotherhood definitely works within a Jordanian-Hashemite framework, while ostensibly promoting transnational Islamist principles that transcend the confines of a single state. Since its inception, the movement has also delicately balanced its heavily Palestinian-Jordanian grass-roots support with its mostly trans-Jordanian leadership—though it seems to increasingly reflect the concerns of Palestinian-Jordanians in refugee camps and densely populated, low-income urban areas of Amman and Zarqa.

The Brotherhood continues to exhibit some confusion—at least inconsistency—about whether it wants to join or challenge the Jordanian political power structure and about whether it is primarily a movement to promote Islamic values in society or one to help define state political policies by joining the government and parliament. In recent years, it has leaned toward playing by the rules, even when it charges that the rules are rigged against it and other opposition groups. Brotherhood members have been consistently included in monarchy-managed institutions, such as the cabinet, the appointed senate, the recent national reform agenda committees, and the National Consultative Council, which replaced the suspended parliament in the 1970s and 1980s. When parliamentary elections were resumed, with by-elections in 1984 and a full election for the lower house of parliament in 1989, the Brotherhood did very well. It took three of the six seats it contested in 1984, and it captured 22 of the house’s 80 seats in 1989. That number declined to 16 seats in 1993. During those years, the Brotherhood was still operating as a social and charitable organization, and its candidates technically ran as independents. At one point, it held the speakership of the house and had five members in the cabinet, including the ministries of education and social development, sensitive positions from which it could spread its influence among youth.

The Brotherhood boycotted the 1997 elections, accusing the government of rigging the votes against it, though in that year it also formed its first legal political party in Jordan, the Islamic Action Front (IAF). In 2003, the IAF returned to electoral life and took 17 of the 110 seats in parliament. In the most recent election in 2007, it won just 7 seats. Its relative decline has been due to two main reasons: government manipulation of electoral districts to restrict the Brotherhood’s seats
in parliament, and some voter dissatisfaction with the party’s performance. It has been accused of concentrating on tangential issues—mixed sports classes for elementary school children or men allowed in jobs as women’s hairdressers—instead of using its role in the parliament and cabinet to affect more resonant political and economic matters. One of the issues it championed in the 1970s before any other politicians dared to speak out was corruption among government officials—but it has proved totally ineffective in holding accountable any accused officials other than minor miscreants. Its relative drop in public standing and decreased participation in parliament partly reflect its inability to translate lofty rhetoric and courageous political challenges into practical policies that respond to citizens’ real needs and concerns.

The IAF itself charges that its lost ground in parliament is mainly due to the government’s blatant gerrymandering of electoral districts and the state’s and other candidates’ ballot stuffing to favor pro-government candidates. Its relations with the government and the state remain erratic. For example, it withdrew from the 2007 municipal elections, claiming the government manipulated the votes of armed forces members, though some of its members who ran won seats and two mayorships.

In line with the polarization that occurs throughout Arab politics, the Brotherhood has nurtured a more radical wing alongside its moderate majority, with some members moving closer to Hamas in Palestine and a few openly praising the actions of anti-American militants in Iraq, including the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, himself a Jordanian national. The Jordanian government’s concern that the Brotherhood offers dangerous openings for Iran, Hamas, and Hizbullah to penetrate Jordanian politics is one reason for recent state moves to contain the party’s growth and power. However, the Brotherhood, working through the IAF, remains the permissible and preferred public face of political Islam in the eyes of the Jordanian monarchy. The monarchy also has allowed the IAF to contest power in the hope that this would curtail the tendency of more radical members of the Brotherhood to gravitate toward smaller, more militant organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir or Al-Qaeda–affiliated movements.

Six and a half decades after its formation in Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood continues to evolve in terms of the identities it reflects, the constituency it caters to, and its relations with the Hashemite monarchy and the Jordanian state. It remains a bedrock of regime legitimacy and stability, siding with the monarchy in times of existential threat (such as the internal Jordanian-PLO clashes in 1970). Yet it also rally’s support against the policies of incumbent governments—carefully avoiding criticism of the monarch—in areas such as foreign and economic policy and domestic political rights and freedoms. It is at once, and at different moments, monarchist, trans-Jordanian, pro-Palestinian, pan-Arab, anti-Israeli, anti-Western, and pan-Islamist. This multifaceted character partly reflects
the political and demographic environment in which it operates, where loyalty and acquiescence to the state and the monarchy are the entry price for participation in the political system. Its strong, consistent expression of Islamic values and its occasional challenges to government corruption or pro-Western policies maintain for it a core of popular support that usually hovers around 20 percent, according to public opinion polls. Its internal splits, the Jordanian-Palestinian tensions, its reliance on state authorization for its operations, and the imprecision with which it defines its own role as a religious or political force have weakened its impact in society.

CONCLUSION

The Arab world is a juxtaposition of many ideologies, identities, and governance systems. It is necessary to acknowledge and understand these phenomena both separately and as they interact. No one analytical framework is appropriate for encapsulating the dynamic interplay of forces within the region. Rather, a multi-level analysis that encompasses the wide range of identities and ideologies, from personal and tribal identity to concepts of statehood and nationhood, should be used. It is equally important to take into account the fact that the Arab world is currently experiencing a flourishing public discourse about these very issues. The region is in the process of defining itself, and more actors than ever before have a voice in that turbulent process.
Yemen’s Sunni-Shiite Divide

The current Yemeni state was formed in May 1990 with the unification of the historically Shiite-ruled North and the majority Sunni South. The stronger North dominates politics, and Yemen’s president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, is Shiite. Sunnis have always been excluded from positions of power in the North, and after unification the Sunnis in the South met with a similar fate.

One of the greatest sectarian challenges that Yemen currently faces, however, does not come from the Sunni-Shiite geographical and political divide but rather from a minority extremist Shiite group. Al-Shabab al-Moumin (the Youthful Believers), operating in Saada governorate on the Yemeni-Saudi border, has become a thorn in the side of the government and a concern to Yemen’s neighbors and the international community. The insurgency, commonly called al-Houthi after its founder, Hussein al-Houthi, rejects the current government as illegitimate because it is not run by a Shiite sayyid, a descendent of the Prophet Muhammad, and demands the restoration of the sayyid-led imamate that previously ruled the North for over a thousand years. The movement also denounces the government’s ties with the United States and demands an end to social and political reforms.

The conflict has raged intermittently for the last three years, and the government’s violent suppression of the movement has caused growing dissent amid claims that it is suppressing its Shiite minority (this despite the fact that it is also accused of discriminating against Sunnis). The government has responded by restricting journalist access to the Saada province, effectively creating a media blackout. Even so, it is estimated that 300 government soldiers and al-Houthis had been killed as of December 2007. There are also severe food shortages due to the displacement of nearly 80,000 civilian residents.

While the form of Shiism practiced by al-Houthi’s followers is distinct from that in Iran, Yemen and the other Gulf nations are increasingly worried by Iran’s interest in the conflict. The Yemeni government has indirectly accused Iran and Libya of financially supporting al-Houthi. In May 2007, Yemen recalled its ambassadors from Tehran and Tripoli for consultations, but it has not yet taken the step of cutting diplomatic relations. Iran denies accusations of involvement, and al-Houthi leaders maintain that the Yemeni government is playing off regional fears of an increasing Iranian influence.

Sources: US Department of State; International Religious Freedom Report 2007; World Press; The Middle East Research and Information Project.
DEMOGRAPHY IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
IMPLICATIONS AND RISKS

Paul D. Dyer

Demographic change is a slow, steady process, its outcomes fairly certain. By following trends in mortality and fertility, as well as net migration, one can easily predict long-term changes in populations. In this regard, the study of demography has been described as akin to watching the grass grow; however, this simile does not adequately express the powerful impact that demographic changes can have on populations and the pressures that they can impose on issues related to human welfare and security. It also fails to capture how demographic changes seem to catch us—as policy makers and researchers—off guard. We seem always to be reacting to the pressures that arise with changes in demography rather than anticipating them and creating viable policy solutions to these challenges before they arise.

In the context of the study of challenges related to demographic change, the Middle East provides an interesting case. The region has undergone tremendous demographic changes over the past half century, particularly changes in mortality and fertility. These changes initially led to enormous increases in population growth and heavy child-dependency burdens. In recent decades, however, the region has seen a decline in fertility and a subsequent maturation of its population. The region is currently in the midst of a youth bulge, wherein young adults make up a large part of the population. This factor is driving social, economic, and political outcomes in the region. In addition, the region has maintained substantial population migration over time—both within countries and internationally—which has played an important role in shaping regional societies.

This paper is intended as an overview of the demographic trends witnessed in the Middle East over the past 50 years. It focuses on life-cycle changes, changing age structures, and migration patterns, emphasizing recent trends in these areas. The paper also reviews the economic, social, and political issues that have driven or been exacerbated by these demographic developments. It serves to underline the important implications for security in the region, both with respect to traditional security concerns and when viewed through the wider lens of soft security issues. In this regard, it should be noted that the intention is to highlight a broad array of implications and issues, often at the expense of in-depth analysis of crucial issues and dependent, in some cases, on generalizations that may not necessarily apply to the region as a whole.
THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The population of the Middle East is currently estimated at nearly 258 million people, up from 59 million in 1950.* This population increase represents an average annual growth of some 2.7 percent a year, among the highest rates of population growth observed around the world over this time period. These high rates of growth are the result of the rapid, early decline of mortality in the region, coupled with a delayed decline in the region’s fertility rates. As late as 1975, fertility rates in the Middle East averaged some 6.4 children per woman. No country in the region was immune from high rates of fertility: the lowest reported fertility rate in 1975 was in Lebanon (4.3 children per woman), while the highest was in Yemen (8.5 children per woman).

Just as researchers and policy makers were turning their attention to the region’s high population growth, however, fertility rates in the region plummeted. The average total fertility rate for the Middle East fell to 4.7 children in 1990 and nearly 3.4 children in 2000 (see Figure 1). Currently, total fertility in the region is estimated at less than 3.2 children per woman, and the region as a whole will reach

![Figure 1: The Fertility Decline in the Middle East and Other Developing Regions](image)


* In this paper, calculations referring to the Middle East include the following countries: Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, the West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. Neighboring countries and regions, however, are referred to as necessary to emphasize the transnational nature of demographic changes. Population estimates and demographic indicators reported herein are drawn from the United Nations (2006).
replacement rates by 2035.* This decline in fertility has ushered in a decline in the region’s high rates of population growth, ending long-held fears of a regional “population explosion.” It has also effected a dramatic change in the underlying age structure of the region’s population and a bold rise in the share of the working-age population.

By and large, this acceleration of the fertility decline has been experienced across the region since the 1980s (see Table 1). Lebanon and Egypt stand out as early leaders in the fertility decline, having seen significant declines in fertility as early as 1970. Similarly, the Gulf countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) witnessed fairly early declines.‡ The majority of countries

*The replacement rate of fertility is considered to be 2.1 children per woman. Below this, without immigration, populations begin to decline in size.

‡ Importantly, while some of the lower fertility rates in the Gulf countries are attributable to the large expatriate communities resident therein, evidence suggests that the fertility rates of nationals did begin to decline early and are generally aligned with, if slightly higher than, the total fertility rates presented in Table 1.

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in the Middle East witnessed substantial declines much later than these early leaders, with an accelerated pace of decline after 1980. Iran stands out in this regard. Following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the country initiated a comprehensive strategy to reduce fertility rates. Total fertility in Iran fell from 6.6 children per woman in 1980 to 4.3 children in 1990. Currently, the fertility rate in Iran is nearly 2.0 children per woman, the lowest in the region and below replacement rates. Similarly, Syria has seen its fertility rate fall from nearly 7.3 children per woman in 1980 to 4.6 children in 1990 to a current 3.1 children.

The highest current rates of fertility in the Middle East are seen in Iraq (4.2 children per woman), the West Bank and Gaza (5.0 children), and most notably Yemen (5.7 children). Fertility rates in Saudi Arabia and Oman are also quite high, considering their relatively high incomes per capita, advances in health, and economic stability; however, these countries have seen substantial declines over the past decade. For these five countries in particular, it is important to note that while fertility rates are declining, the delay in bringing down fertility has led to a delay in the rise of the working-age population and a prolonged youth bulge, issues described in detail below.

Determinants of the Middle East’s Delayed Fertility Decline

The demographic transition experienced in the Middle East reflects general mortality and fertility trends seen across the developing world since 1950. The factors determining the initiation and rate of the fertility decline correspond with those underlying the global fertility decline seen over the past 50 years. The bulk of the fertility decline in the region and internationally is associated with increased female education, rising female labor force participation, economic growth, increased urbanization, and the changing economic role of children. However, the transition in the Middle East has been marked by a much delayed decline in the fertility rate, as well as a distinctive acceleration of the fertility decline since the 1980s. This raises questions as to the drivers of this unique pattern of the fertility decline in the Middle East.

Many explanations have been put forward in this regard, arguing that Islamic cultures have a uniquely pro-natal nature or that patriarchal cultural norms in the Middle East drive a preference for large families. Statistical evidence for these factors is weak. One factor worthy of note is the role of the rentier economy, which has served as the dominant economic model for many regional states. As argued by Courbage (1999), the dominant role of oil in the Middle Eastern economies, along with related workers’ remittances and grants in non-oil countries of the region, allowed governments to establish heavy subsidies that reduced the costs associated with children and reinforced preferences for large families. The collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s altered these effects, leading states to cut back on subsidies and increasing the costs associated with raising children. Importantly, the collapse of oil prices and the decline of subsidies in the region coincided with the acceleration of the fertility decline.
It should also be noted that prior to the 1980s, most states in the region maintained pro-natal population policies in order to strengthen their strategic positions and to develop their future labor forces. Governments limited access to contraceptives, set low legal marriage ages, and provided economic incentives for large families. By the 1980s, however, many states had realized the high costs of population growth (with respect to both budgetary constraints and rising social and political costs) and reversed their population growth targets. They established programs targeted at reducing population growth, including the free provision of contraceptives and maternal health care at government clinics, education programs for promoting modern family planning practices, a rise in the legal age of marriage, and a reduction of pro-natal salary benefits and subsidies. Importantly, many governments began actively encouraging female labor force participation through public sector hiring and protective legislation.

**Changing Age Structure and the Working-Age Population in the Middle East**

The gradual maturation of the Middle Eastern population following the initiation of the fertility decline means that dependency ratios (the share of youth and elderly in total population) have fallen and that the working-age population (calculated as the population between ages 15 and 64) is taking on a larger share of the overall population. Given the sustained fertility decline in the region, the child population in the Middle East has begun to decline, in terms of both growth rates and population shares. In 1980, those ages 0–14 made up more than 44 percent of the regional population. This figure had declined to less than 35 percent by 2005. At the same time, the working-age population of the Middle East has seen high, sustained rates of growth (see Figure 2). Its share of the total population has risen from 52 percent of the total population in 1980 to a current 62 percent. This share will continue to climb until 2035, at which point the working-age population is expected to make up 68 percent of the total population.

This rise of the working-age population inherently presents the region with new economic opportunities. Past research has drawn connections between a decrease in dependency ratios and per capita income growth. In theory, the decline in dependency ratios—or the transition out of a demographic burden—increases labor inputs per capita, boosts savings accumulation, and bolsters domestic investment while reducing a country’s dependence on foreign investment. This so-called demographic gift, however, is far from a guaranteed course of events. It depends largely on each economy’s ability to provide market instruments for savings and investment and, more importantly, to create jobs for the growing labor force. In this regard, in particular, the early stage of this transition—in which the growing working-age population is dominated by younger cohorts—often produces more challenges than it does economic benefits.
Youth in the Middle East

The Middle East is in the midst of a “youth bulge,” a factor that is much discussed in policy circles of late, particularly in the context of the Middle East and the post-9/11 context. However, the youth bulge in the Middle East is not a new phenomenon. In fact, regionwide, the scale of the youth bulge in terms of share of the total adult population is declining, having peaked in 1980 at 35 percent. Still, youth hold a dominant position in the regional population. Those ages 15–24 currently make up 33 percent of the Middle East working-age population, and currently total nearly 58 million. Over the next ten years, the youth population will decline as a share of the adult population (to an estimated 26 percent in 2015; see Table 2); however, its presence in terms of numbers will remain high.

Trends with respect to the youth population differ in various countries within the region, just as fertility rates have declined at different paces. In Lebanon, an early leader in the fertility decline, the youth share of the adult population peaked in 1975 at 34 percent. Egypt experienced a similar peak to the youth bulge, but it continues to experience a youth share of the adult population of nearly 31 percent (while Lebanon’s is now at 25 percent). Countries with later fertility declines have only recently started to see their youth bulges peak. In Iran, youth now make up...
35 percent of the adult population (having peaked at nearly 37 percent in 2000). In Syria, youth now make up 37 percent of the adult population, a share that peaked in 2000 at nearly 39 percent. Countries that have lagged behind in the region in terms of the fertility decline—including Iraq, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen—have experienced more drawn-out youth bulges and will continue to see youth dominate the adult population for the foreseeable future. In Yemen, for example, the share of youth within the adult population has remained at over 38 percent since 1970. This figure is currently at 40 percent and will not fall below 35 percent until after 2020 (see Figure 3).

It is also important to note that country population aggregates obscure some of the variety seen between groups (rural-urban, religious, economic classes) within the region, especially in those countries that have—by and large—weathered the youth bulge. The current situation in Lebanon poses some interesting questions in this regard. While Lebanon as an aggregate has passed through the youth bulge,
there are significant differences between its various confessional groups. In the 1990s, Christian women in Lebanon had an average fertility rate of 2.4 children; at the same time, Shia Muslim women maintained a total fertility rate of nearly 6.0 children. These children are now coming of age, meaning that confessional attributes of Lebanon’s youth population are quite different from those of their parents’ generation, with Shias in particular making up a large share of youth. In the context of Lebanon’s traditional confessional balance, and unequal economic and political prospects for these youth, this differential is a potential source of conflict and social unrest.

**DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

While migration, both internal and international, is a global phenomenon, it has played a unique role in the economies of the Middle East historically. In the countries of the region, the past 50 years in particular have witnessed significant flows of labor migration. This is the case domestically, particularly regarding migration from rural areas to urban areas; however, perhaps more profound has been the role of international migration out of labor-abundant countries to labor-importing countries. Conflict in the region has played an additional role as a push factor for emigrants seeking greater security. These factors, in turn, have created large diaspora populations that continue to play an important role economically and politically, both in their adopted countries of residence and in their countries of origin.
Urbanization and Internal Migration

Like most developing regions, the Middle East has experienced a rapid and profound urbanization of its population. On average, by 2005, more than 58 percent of the regional population could be found in cities. In 1990, this figure was 55 percent, up from 43 percent in 1970. Rates of urbanization are particularly high in Lebanon (87 percent), Jordan (82 percent), and Iran (67 percent). Despite extensive migration into Cairo, Egypt remains a largely agricultural society, with only 43 percent of the populace living in cities. In Yemen, only 27 percent of the population is urban, but this rate has risen from 21 percent in the past 15 years alone.

Urbanization represents an important aspect of economic development, as it marks a move away from agricultural work to a greater expansion of industry and services. However, there are important challenges posed by urbanization. The rapid urbanization seen across the Middle East has created intense pressures on urban infrastructure and its ability to keep up with the demands of the rising urban population. This is particularly the case in older, established cities like Cairo. Road networks are constrained, the environmental situation is often perilous, and services such as health care and education are overburdened. Much of the housing created to meet the demand of the region’s growing urban population has been built outside of the formal, regulated housing market. As a result, many cities in the region have seen a rise in slums and housing not built to code. This has resulted in dangerous living conditions and the unplanned, cluttered growth of cities. This unregulated sprawl has been accompanied by rising levels of unemployment, income insecurity, and the growth of informal labor markets.

The urbanization of the Middle East, however, is not entirely a story of overburdened, deteriorating cities. New urban areas, particularly in the Gulf (but also in new projects and developments around the region), represent a growing dynamism found in regional economies and populations. In the context of the new oil boom, these cities are drawing young, talented people seeking new opportunities. Dubai, in particular, has captured a place in the imaginations of youth across the region: it is seen by many as a city in which they can go to work hard and build their dreams, largely independent of their connections to patronage networks and their economic class.

International Migration

International migration, driven by workers in labor-abundant countries in the region seeking opportunities abroad, has long played an important role in regional economic development, providing an important vent for domestic labor market pressures. This applies both to migration between countries in the region and to migration out of the region altogether. Furthermore, migration is tied directly to the youth issue in the region, as youth make up most of those willing to migrate, whether legally or illegally, given that they face fewer opportunity costs in doing
so. Migration to particular countries is also reinforced by the establishment over time of larger migrant populations from particular countries. These diaspora populations help foster migration networks that ease the transition for new migrants.6

Many migrants from the Middle East have sought out opportunities in North America, Europe, and other developed economies. But much of regional migration occurs between countries in the region. Palestinian workers have long crossed into Israel to secure jobs. Unskilled Syrian labor provides much of the labor class in Lebanon, while Egyptian workers have migrated in large numbers to Iraq, Jordan, and Libya. As Turks migrate in growing numbers to Europe, job opportunities have opened up for an increasing number of Arabs in Turkey.

Worthy of specific note as destinations for the region’s emigrants are the oil economies of the Persian Gulf. These states have served as the primary destination for Middle Eastern migrant populations over the past 40 years. Between 1975 and 1985, during the first oil boom, the overall foreign labor force in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) grew from some 1.1 million to 4.1 million, increasing the share of the foreign labor force from 40 percent to almost 70 percent.7 Today, there are an estimated 13 million foreigners working or living in the countries of the GCC.8

The original influx of migrants to the Gulf was drawn from the Arab countries, primarily from Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Syria, and the West Bank and Gaza. Arabs (and to a lesser extent Iranians) continue to have a large presence in the Gulf. Notably, of the 2.8 million Egyptians estimated to be living outside of Egypt, 1.9 million are in the Gulf. Increasingly, however, expatriate workers in the Gulf, particularly lower skilled workers, come not from within the Middle East but from the Indian subcontinent and from countries farther abroad in Asia, notably the Philippines.

Migration and Conflict

Migration between countries in the region and out of the region has been largely impacted by conflict in modern times. Somalian and Eritrean refugees regularly cross into Yemen (and often find their way to Saudi Arabia). Conflict in Sudan has created a large number of refugees seeking protection in Egypt, and conflict in Afghanistan drove many refugees into Iran. However, three refugee populations in the region deserve specific comment: the Palestinians, Lebanese, and Iraqis.

Palestinians

During the establishment of the state of Israel and the 1948 war, some 711,000 Palestinians fled their homeland as refugees.9 Today, this event lives in the Arab social and political discourse as An-Nakba (the Catastrophe), and the number of Palestinians registered as refugees with the UN has since grown to over 4 million. Palestinian refugees are a rare exception to international norms of refugee status in that their descendants have retained refugee status. Out of fear that the permanent
settlement of Palestinian refugees would undermine Palestinian efforts to regain their homeland, the Arab League forbade Arab countries from offering Palestinian refugees citizenship. The status of these Palestinian refugees marks one of the most sensitive barriers to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Palestinian refugee population has had major impacts on regional economies and populations. On one hand, the Palestinians have benefited regional economies in terms of labor inputs and skills, especially since Palestinians have represented some of the most educated people in the Arab world. The Gulf has long served as a destination for young Palestinian men seeking employment, and Saudi Arabia alone is now home to more than 500,000 Palestinians. Jordan, the only country to have given citizenship to many of its Palestinian refugees, has benefited quite broadly in terms of economic development from its Palestinian population (Jordanians of Palestinian origin represent more than half of the Jordanian population). On the other hand, the majority of Palestinians remaining in refugee camps represent a young population mired in poverty and open to ideologues promoting violent resistance. In Lebanon, for example, some 390,000 Palestinian refugees are registered with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. They are largely limited to refugee camps notable for their poverty and outbreaks of political violence.

Iraq and Its Neighbors: The Human Dimension

More than 2 million Iraqis have left their country and have found varying degrees of welcome elsewhere in the Middle East. There is no realistic expectation that they will be able to return to Iraq in the foreseeable future. Almost 2.5 million Iraqis have been displaced within Iraq, and those who have returned to their homes have encountered security, housing, and livelihood problems. Iraqi refugees are therefore unlikely to seek repatriation and international organizations that will support it.

Iraq's professionals (doctors, engineers, and university professors from Iraq's Sunni community) have gravitated to the Gulf. Iraq's business community has favored Jordan, because Iraq's economy has long been closely tied to Jordan's. Iraqi Christians have chosen Syria and Lebanon because of the large Christian communities and tradition of multi-confessional coexistence there.

Poor Iraqis have gone to Syria, which is host to 1.5 million. The economic burden associated with Iraqi refugees has, however, proven enormous: rent and price inflation and the costs of government subsidies, health, and education have increased dramatically. The Syrian government recently adopted restrictive entry measures, but limited attempts at repatriation that were started in late 2007 have ended.

Jordan is host to as many as 750,000 Iraqis. The demographic, environmental, economic, and infrastructure impacts of the refugee influx have created a sense of crisis there. Jordan has long struck a delicate balance with its fragile natural environment, such as strict policies on use of water tables, and has struggled with the demographic challenges of a long-term Palestinian refugee population. It was already in
the process of dealing with the impact of remittances from expatriate Jordanians, which had led to a boom in the construction of large houses and the settlement of fragile arid or semiarid environments, creating stresses on the environment, infrastructure, and economy. Jordan now finds itself dealing with additional stress, with few resources either to support the refugees or to generate livelihoods sufficient to allow them to support themselves.

Observers have noted the political implications of Iraqi refugee movements into neighboring countries. In Lebanon, whose delicate balance of confessional politics is already under stress and a source of its security challenges, a disproportionate number of the estimated 50,000 Iraqi refugees are Christians. In Bahrain, where the government has been praised for an enlightened and welcoming policy that includes provision of housing for as many as 50,000 Iraqi refugees per year, it is believed in some quarters that Sunnis have been welcomed more readily than Shias and that ex-Baathists have been recruited as police, because the state fears the consequences of a Shia majority.

Jordan's long experience with the Palestinian diaspora gives rise to a concern that radicals will use refugee populations as a cover for subverting the state or that closed settlements will act as hothouses for the radicalization of frustrated and alienated populations, particularly youth.

Sources: UN High Commissioner for Refugees; International Organization for Migration; Financial Times; International Consortium for Arid Regions and Desert Agriculture (Syria); Inter-Islamic Network for Water Resources Development and Management (Jordan).

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**Lebanese**

The Lebanese (particularly the Christian population) have been migrating out of Lebanon in relatively large numbers since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, driven mostly by population pressures and pulled by trading and business opportunities (and family networks) abroad. However, conflict in recent decades has served as a decided push mechanism for Lebanese migrants. In particular, the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990) witnessed, besides the loss of some 144,000 lives, the displacement of 800,000 persons both inside and outside of the country. An estimated 250,000 persons emigrated from the country permanently as a result of the war.

Violence has returned to Lebanon in recent years. The assassination of Rafik Hariri in 2005 escalated tensions between Syria and anti-Syrian parties in Lebanon; as a result, Lebanon experienced heightened internal political violence. Then, as hostilities between Israel and Hizbullah began in 2006, the Lebanese population braced for a renewal of conflict in the country of a scope similar to that of the civil war. More than a million persons were displaced by the fighting. While many have since been resettled, a large number of Lebanese have fled the country seeking greater economic and political security.
Iraqis
Iraq's modern history is scarred by conflict: the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the First Gulf War (1991), and the Second Gulf War (2003) mark only the most open conflicts. Conflict in Iraq has led to substantial movements of refugees, both within and outside of the country. The First Gulf War also effected population movement external to the country. During the lead-up to the war, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other neighboring countries forcibly repatriated many of the Yemenis and Palestinians resident therein (in response to their governments’ positions in the conflict), while many among the large population of Egyptian workers in Iraq fled that country. In all, some 2 million foreign residents returned to their countries of origin from Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia during this period.10

The current Iraqi conflict has seen the displacement of nearly 4 million Iraqis since 2003, according to the UN. While many of these have sought out safer locations within Iraq, nearly 1.5 million have fled to Syria, between 500,000 to 800,000 are resident in Jordan, and significant numbers have migrated to other countries in the region, most notably Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, the UAE, Yemen, and Turkey. It has been suggested that the majority seek to migrate further to the West; for now, they are taxing the limits of their neighboring countries’ ability to provide for them.

As refugees, the majority of these migrants cannot legally work in their host countries, and neighboring countries are beginning to increase restrictions on their movement. In fact, Jordan has ceased accepting refugees from Iraq unless they can prove economic self-sufficiency, and nearly 50 percent of Iraqis are being turned away at its borders.11 These restrictions mean that the poorest and hardest hit Iraqis remain within the country, while the wealthier and middle class flee the country. Some 40 percent of Iraq’s middle class has fled the country, and many have no plans to ever return to the country.12 At a minimum, this represents a crippling of Iraq’s economic and political future, in terms of lost skills and knowledge, lost capital, and lost future leaders. In the long term, such a movement of people out of the country could presage the country’s political and economic collapse.

The Socioeconomic and Political Implications of the Region’s Demography
Demography in the Middle East over the past 50 years has had an important and often underestimated impact on the social, economic, and political structures governing the region. The dynamic demographic changes in recent decades, in particular, coupled with the influences of migration in the region, have redefined traditional social structures and the economic and political options open to the region’s political actors. In the long term, these changes suggest the potential for a new era of stability and prosperity; however, the demographic transition to date is one marked by substantial socioeconomic and political frictions.
These are best understood in the context of the decline of the overarching economic and political framework that evolved in the region during its peak years of demographic dependency.

Between 1950 and 1980, the average family in the Middle East had more than six children and the majority of the population was under 14. This demographic burden drove early economic policy in the region, which emphasized economic equity through the provision of heavy economic subsidies, job creation, and worker protection. State-driven industrialization of the economy and an expanding governmental structure provided the bulk of new jobs, and the state invested heavily in health care and education. In turn, the state came to dominate the economy, a position strengthened by high oil revenues (in the oil-producing states) and related grants and returns from workers’ remittances (in the non-oil-producing states). Its dominant economic role also allowed the state to monopolize the political sphere—an implicit “authoritarian bargain” was struck between the population and the state.13

This model of economic and political development in the region initially yielded positive results. The overall welfare of the population improved rapidly during the 1960s and 1970s. However, conditions changed remarkably beginning in the mid-1980s, when oil prices collapsed and states found their budgets under strain. The decline of the oil boom coincided with the rise of the youth bulge described above. In turn, the normative social, economic, and political structures of the region came under increasing strain. Today, the region as a whole remains in a position in which those with vested interests in the status quo struggle to retain the state’s monopoly over the political and economic spheres while, in the face of overwhelming demographic change, the state is increasingly unable to fulfill popular expectations and needs. This dynamic seems to have been only slightly altered by the recent rise in oil revenues. The following section highlights the primary areas of social, economic, and political life that have been most affected by changes in demography.

**An Increasingly Educated Population**

The growing working-age population is increasingly educated and skilled, a result of the region’s investment in human capital since the 1950s. In the 1960s, average educational attainment in the Middle East was among the lowest in the world, with less than a year of education per adult (over 15 years of age) on average. By 1980, the region had begun to close the educational gap with other developing regions, and in the past 20 years, the educational attainment of the adult population has increased by more than 150 percent. By 2000, adults in the Middle East had on average 5.3 years of schooling, placing the region higher than South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa and about a year, on average, behind Latin America and East Asia.14 These outcomes are especially impressive when one looks at the growth and sheer numbers of school-age children in the region over this period.
Currently, enrollment rates for primary school are nearly universal across the region, and enrollment on the secondary and tertiary level has increased substantially. Secondary enrollment in the region, as of 2006, was estimated at nearly 72 percent (ranging from a low of 31 percent in Iraq to a high of 90 percent in Bahrain and Kuwait). Furthermore, gender gaps in terms of educational outcomes have declined (or even reversed in some countries). The ratio of male-to-female years of schooling fell from 2.5 in 1960 to 1.4 in 2000. In terms of enrollment, primary and secondary enrollment rates for girls are roughly equal to those of boys (and are substantially higher for girls in some Gulf states). Importantly, educational spending is quite high, averaging nearly 5 percent of GDP within the Middle East, higher than in any other developing region.

This increase in education has bolstered the region’s human capital significantly. It has increased the skill level of young workers, placing them in a more competitive position against their global counterparts. Improved women’s education has played an important role in the region’s economies and helped empower women on an individual and political level. However, rising educational attainment among young people, both men and women, has also increased their expectations with respect to job quality and wages at a time when the state can no longer guarantee their employment. Furthermore, increased education has created a generation of young people who are more engaged with the world as a whole, more aware of their place in the world, and seeking to play a more dynamic role as agents of change in their societies. This has profound implications for the political sphere and the state’s ability to dominate it at the expense of alternative political forces.

The Rise in Labor Supply and Poor Labor Market Outcomes

Arguably, the most important economic impact of recent demographic trends has been the growth of labor supply in the region. The timing and pattern of the demographic transition in the region have led to dramatic increases in the labor force (see Figure 4). Following trends in the working-age population, labor force growth in the Middle East has outpaced that of other developing regions over the past three decades. The regional labor force grew by an average annual 3.3 percent during this period. Rates are expected to drop in the next decade, as the youth bulge moves through the population, to 2.4 percent a year. However, rates of growth will remain high between 2010 and 2020 in a number of countries in the region, including Iraq (2.9 percent), Jordan (2.6 percent), the West Bank and Gaza (3.7 percent), and Yemen (3.4 percent).

While rates of labor force growth might be declining in the region, the sheer numbers of new labor market entrants will remain high. Between 2000 and 2005, an estimated 15 million new entrants entered the Middle Eastern labor market. Over the next five years, another 15 million new entrants will have arrived. By 2025, the region will have to have created over 56.5 million jobs (2.8 million a year) to absorb new entrants alone. Given current unemployment rates of nearly 13 percent,
the total job creation challenge for the Middle East in that time period amounts to nearly 68 million jobs. This compares to a current estimate of the regional labor force of only 89 million.

**Growing Labor Force Participation**

Labor supply is not the product of demography alone: the impact of demography has been reinforced by rising labor market participation rates in the region. Historically, labor force participation in the region has been low, a factor driven primarily by the extremely low rates of female labor force participation. This, however, is changing rapidly. The regional average of female labor force participation has risen from 19 percent in 1980 to nearly 27 percent in 2000. In 2005, female labor force participation was estimated at nearly 30 percent; it is expected to rise to nearly 33 percent in 2010 and 36 percent in 2020. The female labor force in the region is currently growing at an average annual rate of 4.9 percent, whereas the male labor force is growing at about 3.0 percent. In turn, the total regional labor force participation rate, on average, has risen from below 50 percent of the working-age population in 1980 to 53 percent in 2000 and 55 percent in 2005. It is expected to rise further to 57 percent in 2010 and 59 percent in 2020.
Poor Labor Market Outcomes

The growth of the young working-age population and the rise in participation rates have led to increased pressures on labor markets, with regional economies demonstrating particular difficulties in absorbing new entrants. Job creation has not kept pace with labor force growth over the past two decades. During the 1990s, a period of weak economic growth in the region, unemployment rose to nearly 12 percent,* while real wages and worker productivity stagnated. Employment growth has increased in the context of the current oil boom, but unemployment in the region remains at more than 10 percent.16

Labor market outcomes have been particularly poor for new entrants to the labor market. Unemployment among women is over 18 percent (while that among men is 9 percent). This means that while women account for only 26 percent of the labor force, they make up nearly half of the total unemployed. Similarly, unemployment rates for youth are nearly 30 percent. In Iran, youth unemployment is nearly 23.2 percent. In Jordan, it is 31.2 percent, and in the West Bank and Gaza, it is nearly 34.2 percent. Importantly, unemployment is highest among those with higher levels of education, particularly those with secondary degrees.

These negative labor market outcomes arose in the region in the context of high labor supply and weak labor demand overall. However, they have been reinforced by institutions and labor market regulations that affect both demand and supply of labor. The most important of these are outlined below.17

- **The role of the public sector in the region.** The long-standing role of the public sector as the employer of first and last resort (particularly for educated individuals), coupled with relatively high public sector salaries, job security, and benefits, has made public sector employment the first choice for educated young people from the region. Budget constraints have led to a cutback in public sector hiring; however, educated youth have continued to queue for public sector jobs instead of seeking employment in the private sector. For example, in a recent survey, 60 percent of unemployed young people in Syria stated that they were interested only in securing a public sector job.18

- **Educational attainment.** Educational improvements have bolstered the skill level of young workers. However, rising educational attainment among young people has also increased their expectations with respect to job quality, reinforced preferences for public sector jobs (which provide higher returns on educational attainment), and boosted wage expectations. This has increased their reservation wages, leading them to favor unemployment while waiting out “good jobs.”

- **The skills mismatch.** There is a pronounced mismatch in the region between the skills and expectations of new labor force entrants and the skills de-

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* Equivalent to the widely reported World Bank estimate of 15 percent for the Middle East and North Africa.
manded by the private sector. Despite the vast investments in education regionwide, the regional educational system, by and large, has not produced graduates with job-relevant, productive skills for the modern workplace. Rising educational attainment has not translated into marketable skills for many new labor market entrants.

- **Restrictive regulations.** Finally, labor market regulations largely favor the rights of workers at the expense of private sector employers. Dismissal of workers, in particular, is costly and open to uncertain legal procedures, a factor that raises the risk of businesses in hiring new workers. Thus, potential employers have favored capital investments over investments that support job creation.

Future prospects for employment creation are more positive, especially in the context of rising oil prices and increasing revenues for regional governments, as well as a gradual decline in labor force growth rates. In fact, the region has, over the past three decades, demonstrated a high employment growth to economic growth ratio (0.9 between 1999 and 2003), meaning that in today’s high economic growth environment, unemployment could be brought down quickly. In fact, given an average annual economic growth of 5 percent, unemployment could drop to less than 6 percent by 2010. However, it is important to note that such job creation would be achieved only with a maintaining or worsening of the region’s low worker productivity.

To improve worker productivity and create higher quality jobs for the region’s educated youth, the region will have to move beyond a dependence on state employment and state-managed labor promotion policies to meet the needs of new entrants. Importantly, the private sector must serve as the primary engine for future job creation. In this regard, efforts at streamlining business regulations, bolstering opportunities for investment, and reducing trade barriers are vital. Furthermore, regional economies must make gains in introducing greater flexibility into labor market regulations. To date, few changes have been made in this regard.19

**Challenges to the Traditional Family**

Marriage and the formation of one’s own family is a central pillar of becoming an adult. Particularly in the Middle East, where extended familial ties remain important, marriage opens social networks and allows young people to become adults, as well as permitting socially legitimate sexual relationships. In the region, however, the institution of marriage is coming under strain through a combination of effects. These include longer duration of formal schooling, high unemployment, limited access to housing and the financial mechanisms with which to secure housing, high costs associated with traditional marriages, and the adoption of “modern” cultural norms.20

Evidence from the 1990s suggests that some 63 percent of Middle Eastern men married by their late 20s. Today, the share is just over 50 percent (in Iran, only 38 percent of men are married by their late 20s). In contrast, marriage trends in Asia
show that 77 percent of men ages 25–29 are married. In Latin America, 69 percent are married, while in Africa, 66 percent are married. Furthermore, 40 percent of women in the Middle East ages 15–49 are single and have never married.

Underlying these challenges has been a weakening of traditional family and social networks among populations moving to the cities. To a limited degree, rural family and social structures have been transferred to the cities; as people from a particular rural region move into a city, they tend to cluster together in neighborhoods. Overall, however, the transition to an urban environment is marked by a move to nuclear families and individuals, with many struggling to build a future in the city and facing problems securing the most basic services (as noted above), largely outside the context of traditional, family-based support networks and in the face of a declining ability by states to substitute for family in this regard.

Also inherent in these changes are a degree of generational tension and a pushing of the boundaries that define legitimate marriage and sexual relationships. An interesting development in this regard is the rise of alternative forms of marriage, some of which are gradually finding legitimization in certain Islamic religious circles. These include urfi, muta‘a, and misyar marriages. These forms of marriage—still largely controversial—allow for temporary unions or unions wherein the partners do not necessarily share a residence and have only limited rights over each other. They are often agreed to in secret, without the consent of the bride’s parents or the families involved. They provide few protections for women in the case of divorce or if children result from the union. The regularity of these alternative marriage practices should not be overstated; however, their increasing existence does demonstrate the level of pressures that exist.

**Changing Roles and Rights of Women**

Women in the Middle East have made important strides over recent decades with respect to their legal rights, their education, and their presence in the labor force. The fertility decline has placed women in a position wherein they can expand their roles in the public sphere, outside of the home. In fact, there is an important reinforcing structure inherent in the decline in fertility rates: education, labor force opportunities, and health improvements can effect declines in fertility rates, which in turn allow women the time to pursue options outside of child care, including higher education and labor force opportunities. However, in the region’s highly patriarchal society, women still face many cultural and legal obstacles.

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* Cairo’s Imbaba neighborhood provides an interesting example in this regard, as its residents are drawn largely from middle Egypt. In fact, the neighborhood served as a hotbed of political unrest in the 1990s, led by political groups that had originated in middle Egypt.*
With respect to labor force participation and employment, women in the region have received significant help from states, both through public sector employment and through legal empowerment (albeit on a limited scale). Most countries by law grant women maternity leave and restrict companies from firing women due to marriage or pregnancy. However, many countries have yet to pass anti-discrimination laws with respect to hiring women, and there are few proscriptions on wage discrimination. Furthermore, in many countries, women are restricted from working at night or in jobs considered “dangerous” or “unhealthy” to them or their unborn children. Thus, firms resist hiring women or pay them significantly lower wages, seeing women as unproductive and seeing the costs of employing them (in the context of adhering to their legal rights) as prohibitive. If states were to correct these imbalances in the law, the region might see women’s employment rise substantially.

Family and personal status law in the region still poses challenges to women’s rights. Despite recent reforms to family codes in some regional countries, women’s personal rights as they relate to the family remain fairly limited, and the balance of power in the home remains biased in the favor of men.24 Broadly speaking, women have limited rights to divorce and find it difficult to secure custody of children in the event of divorce (or even death of the husband). Women do not have equal rights with respect to inheritance, which is governed by religious law. In most countries, women cannot pass their nationality on to the children, which has important implications for the national identity of a small but growing number of children in the region.

Identity and Political Legitimacy

Since the colonial period, issues of identity have remained at the center of regional political and intellectual discourse. In an effort to reinforce the initial strength of regional states and to bolster popular allegiance to governing systems, politicians and intellectual elites fostered “modern” national identities distinct from traditional religious, tribal, or ethnic identities. Also, in many of the Arab states, pan-Arab ideologies arose in an effort to unite a diverse and fractious population. These movements were supported by many populist regimes, although they were resisted by other regimes (particularly in the Gulf) that saw in them the collapse of their own political legitimacy, built as it was largely on pan-tribal affiliations. While the language of political identity at this time remained largely secular, regional or national political unity was also reinforced with the promotion of Islam (notably an official, largely Sunni interpretation of Islam) as a binding force.

The largely secular nature of political organization at this time was, to a degree, beneficial to some minority groups, both religious and ethnic, and these groups often played unique economic and political roles in the new states of the region. However, the cultivation of the national and regional identity was secured at the long-term expense of minorities, as it emphasized Arab over non-Arab and Mus-
lim over non-Muslim. It also came at the expense of open democratic systems, as the political sphere in the post-colonial period developed as a reflection of national unity instead of a contestable space for political ideas.25

In the context of a state’s weakening ability to provide for the welfare of its maturing population (as described above), other ideologies have captured a place in the imagined identities of the population. This is especially the case for those who are among those most marginalized within the crafted national, Arab, and mainstreamed Islamic identities described above. It is also true for those educated youth who, in the old state-dominated economic system, would have been in a position to benefit economically but now find themselves with poor prospects. The region has seen a resurgence in support for and identification with a more diverse array of cultural identities (Kurdish and Shia are perhaps among the most notable). Perhaps more importantly, the region has also seen revitalization of religious affiliations. Mosques and churches of the region are regularly filled, often beyond capacity, and there has been a rise in religious volunteerism and activism among young people.

Youth Exclusion, Alienation, and Resistance

The youth of the Middle East reflect the future of the region: their expectations and actions have shaped and will continue to shape the economic, social, and political landscape of the region. However, youth face deleterious economic and social outcomes. The problems outlined above, of which youth have borne the brunt, have had the combined impact of effecting heightened levels of social exclusion and feelings of alienation among many of the region’s large youth cohort. Their personal investments in education have been significant but have largely failed to gain them access to quality employment. Their unemployment (or underemployment) has restricted their abilities to serve as independent economic actors and to begin building their own families. Furthermore, those that find themselves outside of traditional spheres of influence and lacking strong traditional family networks are increasingly powerless to change or redirect their lives. Weak governance structures and opportunities for civic participation render them voiceless, and they are excluded from playing a positive, constructive role in the political process.26

This sense of exclusion has resulted in a high level of frustration among the youth and a rise in destructive behaviors. It has led many of the region’s youth to find unhealthy coping mechanisms (e.g., alcohol and drug abuse). On a wider scale, it has led many youth to lash out at those they deem responsible for their state of despair (older generations, the government, and foreign governments). Their palpable sense of frustration has been particularly fruitful for ideological opposition groups (most notably, the Islamist parties), as an increased number of youth have joined the active opposition. As noted by Alan Richards, “Impatience and Manichean thinking are among the burdens of youth politics, whether in Berkeley or Cairo.”27

While facing limited success in penetrating regional governmental systems (by force or ballot), the Islamist opposition in the region, whether the more main-
stream groups like Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood or more radicalized elements, has attracted the support of many of the region's youth. This is the case for a broad range of reasons. Outside of the religious identity factor, these ideologies focus on justice and accountability, factors missing from the everyday political reality of many youth. Islamist groups also have been able to fill the economic voids left by a weakening state. They provide social services once fulfilled by the state. They offer employment or at least purposeful volunteer opportunities. Finally, they offer youth a chance to form empowering social networks and even an opportunity to meet potential spouses in a secure, respectable environment. For many youth in the region, this struggle for oppositional voice has been a constructive means by which to move political dialogue and economic goals forward. For a minority of the region's youth, however, frustrations have moved them toward more radicalized groups and political violence (see below).

**NEW SOCIOECONOMIC ISSUES RELATED TO MIGRATION**

For the countries of the Gulf region, the influx of migrant labor seen over the past four decades allowed for the rapid development of modern infrastructure and the introduction of much needed human capital, in terms of both unskilled and skilled labor. Furthermore, as noted above, migration out of labor-abundant countries in the region to the Gulf has long served as a vent for labor market pressures. However, this mutually beneficial equation has changed dramatically over the past decade or so. Importantly, traditional destinations in the Gulf do not provide the source of new jobs that they once did for young workers from the Middle East. While Arabs continue to make up large shares of the expatriate population in the Gulf, job opportunities open to them are no longer growing to the extent they once did.

Low-skilled workers from the region have largely been priced out of the Gulf labor market by workers from the Indian subcontinent and Asia. On the other hand, the Gulf's own youth bulge means that more skilled Arab workers are facing greater competition in the marketplace from the young nationals of the Gulf. In the GCC over the past decade, labor force growth among nationals has been higher than 4 percent a year. Currently, despite substantial oil incomes and a continued hiring of foreign labor, unemployment among Gulf nationals is quite high, ranging from 9 percent in Saudi Arabia to nearly 19 percent in Bahrain. Governments in the GCC countries have established hiring quotas and economic incentives for firms willing to hire local workers. They have also launched extensive training and job creation programs for young nationals, albeit with limited success. The pressures associated with labor force growth among nationals have continued to rise—even in the context of the oil boom—driven as much by the high expectations of young nationals as by low demand for their skills.

Migration to the Gulf has served as an important source of income for migrants' families (both within the region and abroad) and an important source of foreign exchange earnings for recipient governments. Several countries in the region,
including Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Yemen, are among those countries receiving the most workers’ remittances on a per capita basis. However, the export of workers’ remittances represents a massive loss of wealth and potential investment for the Gulf states. The four highest sources of workers’ remittances (on a per capita basis) are Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. Workers’ remittances from the Gulf countries were estimated in 2006 at $27 billion and have accounted for some $500 billion since 1975. The flow of remittance monies also provides a potential mask for illicit exchanges and money laundering that is difficult to regulate.

The Gulf states have also experienced a variety of social costs due to their dependency on migration. First and foremost is the widely reported abuse of workers. Regulations on labor migration in the Gulf operate on a sponsorship (kafala) system that restricts low- and medium-skilled workers to a sponsor and does not allow them to legally change jobs without the permission of the sponsor. Unscrupulous employers take advantage of these regulations to the disadvantage of workers, making them work long hours for little pay. They often are given substandard housing, have their passports confiscated, or are physically abused. Many arrive in the Gulf heavily indebted to their employers (or agents) and must work for years to repay these debts. Trafficking in persons has become an increasing problem.

A much less recognized social problem is the large population in the Gulf of second- and third-generation expatriates. These young people have grown up in the Gulf, and many have never been to their countries of official citizenship (if they do indeed hold citizenship). They often have grown up within the Gulf social and cultural framework and identify largely with Gulf social norms; however, because of citizenship restrictions, they are not citizens of the Gulf states. This poses significant and increasing challenges in regard to national identity in the Gulf. For those without official papers, it also poses challenges to their ability to secure gainful employment, let alone secure benefits and travel.

Gulf governments are also increasingly concerned about the cultural impact that the large expatriate population has had on their traditional societies. The influx of global culture in general and the establishment of neighborhoods and communities that have distinctive foreign cultural feels have raised concerns for the maintenance of local identity. Furthermore, the large migrant populations are seen as growing potential security threats. For example, the possibility of an armed conflict between the United States and Iran has some in the UAE concerned about the large Iranian population in the country; if a conflict were to involve the countries

* Notably, the Gulf states have had their own cultural impact on the source countries of many expatriates who return from the Gulf. Muslim migrants often return from the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, having grown more conservative than when they left and having taken on Wahhabi-influenced religious beliefs.
of the GCC in some way, the potential role for the Iranian population is a disconcerting unknown.

Finally and more broadly, recent migration related to conflict, particularly from Iraq and Lebanon, has had an important economic impact on regional countries. Countries like Jordan, Syria, and the Gulf states have been able to draw on the economic inputs and skills of the largely wealthy and middle-class Lebanese and Iraqis leaving their countries. Iraqis in particular, seeking financial havens, have been investing in property (particularly in the Gulf, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria), a factor that has raised property prices to the benefit of local sellers and the detriment of local buyers. Evidence suggests that property prices in Jordan and Syria, for instance, have tripled or quadrupled since 2003, owing largely to the influx of Iraqi money. This rise in property prices has been a boon to real estate developers and land owners in host countries; however, for young local families, it has added heavy financial burdens.

TRADITIONAL SECURITY ISSUES RELATED TO DEMOGRAPHY

The above sections describe some of the issues feeding into a discussion of soft security issues. However, there are direct and important relationships to be drawn between demography and traditional security issues. Perhaps most important in this regard is the relationship between the youth bulge in the Middle East and the rise of political violence and terrorism. There is also a larger strategic issue evident in the region: the shifting of traditional poles of political and economic influence in the region from the Levant to the Persian Gulf region.

A Shift to the East: Changing Poles of Influence in the Region

There has been in recent years a general shift of the Middle East’s poles of political and economic influence to the east, a trend noted by many researchers and analysts focusing on the region.²⁹ The traditional centers of cultural, political, and economic power—Egypt and the Levant—have seen themselves gradually replaced in terms of influence by the Gulf states and, increasingly, Iran. Part of this has to do with oil: the rise in oil prices has bolstered the economic power of the countries of the GCC and Iran, while non-oil countries have seen a negative impact on their budgets (especially in states that continue to subsidize oil heavily). It also has to do with regional conflict, particularly with respect to the US presence in Iraq. The fragmentation of Iraq has undermined the traditional balance of power between Iran and Iraq, and Iran has increased its strategic bearing in the region, with respect to both the presence of its operatives in Iraq and the development of its nuclear capability. Besides these two points, however, there is an important underlying role for demography.
With its population of nearly 71 million people, Iran has nearly bypassed Egypt as the region’s most populous country and now makes up 26 percent of the regional population. Importantly, given the uniquely rapid but delayed fertility decline in Iran, the youth population in Iran (ages 15–24) makes up 30 percent of the youth population in the region (compared to 27 percent for Egypt). At the peak of its youth bulge, Iran represents a growing cultural and economic power. Its youth are well educated (literacy is over 70 percent) and increasingly connected to the world in terms of telecommunications, culture, and technology. Its large diaspora population, albeit largely at odds with the current regime, resides around the world, with particular concentrations in Europe, the United States, and the Gulf oil countries. Despite economic sanctions, Iran’s economic growth has been high over the past decade, averaging 4.0 percent in the late 1990s and well above 5.0 percent since 2000.

Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has provided a potent ideological alternative for many in the region, of both Shia and Sunni persuasions, because of its stance against perceived American hegemony in the region and its vocal, if not vitriolic, resistance to Israel’s position in the Occupied Territories. It provides strong ideological and material support to the resistance movements of Hizbullah and Hamas, and in this regard the demography of the Shia population in Lebanon, as detailed above, is an interesting footnote. Furthermore, the rising power of Iran has also made it mandatory for the governments of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia to address the poor economic conditions and social exclusion of their large Shia populations.

Angry Young Men (and Women): The Youth Bulge and Political Violence

The relationship between the youth bulge in the Middle East and the threat or occurrence of political violence, whether in the form of interstate conflict, intrastate conflict, or nonconventional forms of violence such as terrorism, has increasingly drawn the attention of policy makers and analysts. Is there a link between the demography of the region and the significant interstate and intrastate conflicts in the region (Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Lebanese Civil War, Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait)? Perhaps more apropos, given the events of 9/11 and recent conflict in both Lebanon and Iraq, can the rise of non-state actors such as Hizbullah and international terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda (and the strong support such groups have been able to garner among the regional population) be attributed to the large youth cohort? Has the sustained resistance to American forces in Iraq been fostered by Iraq’s own youth bulge?

There is a commonsense link between the rise of the youth bulge and political violence: the passion of youth and their frustration with their economic and political situations can mix easily with ideological resistance to prompt violent reactions. Not only do we perceive a natural link between the youth bulge and vi-
violence in the Middle East, but we can read from the West’s own experience with regard to violent struggle and youth’s place in society. The English and French Revolutions both occurred during these countries’ own youth bulges. More recently, the relatively small youth bulge that occurred in the West during the 1960s brought its own share of political conflict. Although the 1960s live largely in the West’s cultural imagination as a period of youth culture and liberation, these years were marked by political tensions, Cold War conflict, and the rise of such domestic and international terrorist groups as the Red Brigades, the Red Army Faction, and the Weatherman Group.

Henrik Urdal has researched extensively the link between the youth bulge and political violence. His findings suggest a strong statistical association between the

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**Yemen—Awash in Arms**

Yemen has become a hub of the international arms trade, owing to the entrenched rivalries and violent conflict that mark its internal politics, its proximity to countries undergoing full-scale civil conflict, and its position close to the Arabian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and the maritime routes through the Suez Canal. Suspected links to transnational terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda, organized crime in the Balkans, and conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, and Saudi Arabia have made the arms trade in Yemen a source of international concern. The United States has recognized the threat and has supported the government in a buyback scheme.

Such efforts face daunting challenges. The 2007 *Small Arms Survey*, published by the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, ranks Yemen tenth in the world for the number of civilian-owned firearms (11.5 million). On a per capita basis, Yemen ranks second in the world with 61 small arms per 100 civilians, surpassed only by the United States (90 firearms per 100 civilians).

The central government’s inability to control much of the country and the corruption of ruling elites have made arms trading both lucrative and relatively risk-free. Suggestions that the military is involved in fueling the arms trade highlight the problem the international community faces if it wishes to restrict the flow of weapons through the country.

Yemen’s long and under-patrolled coasts and land borders make it vulnerable to the import and export of weapons. The effects on Yemen itself are severe: 2,000 revenge killings in a year. The trade has also destabilized fragile regional environments. Despite the UN Security Council’s repeatedly criticizing arms smuggling into Somalia by private individuals based in Yemen, the government itself broke the arms embargo when it transferred over 5,000 weapons to the Somali government. Yemen is also believed to be a primary supplier for the Bakaraaha Arms Market in Mogadishu. In late 2006, Yemeni security officials arrested eight foreigners living in Yemen for attempting to smuggle weapons to supply Islamist rebels in Somalia.

The shoulder-to-air missiles used in a 2002 attack on an Israeli airliner in Mombasa, Kenya and the weapons used in the 2005 attack on the American Embassy in Jeddah are believed to have originated in Yemen.

*Sources: Yemen Times, Khaleej Times; The Jamestown Foundation; 2007 Small Arms Survey.*
presence of the youth bulge in societies and the occurrence of political violence, particularly intrastate armed conflict, terrorism, and rioting. In fact, he finds, “For each percentage-point increase of youth in the adult population, the risk of conflict increases by more than 4 percent. When youth make up more than 35 percent of the adult population, which they do in many developing countries, the risk of armed conflict is 150 percent higher than in countries with an age structure similar to most developed countries.”

Why are young societies more prone to conflict than other societies? First and foremost, young people, particularly young men, have lower opportunity costs for engaging in violent behavior than older members of society. When young people are part of a youth bulge, in which the cohort size is relatively high compared to that of cohorts born in previous years, they generally suffer from a decline in economic and social outcomes. In short, if the economic pie remains the same size, there is more competition to secure a piece. Therefore, more young people end up excluded. This means that for members of the youth bulge, opportunity costs are even lower than they would otherwise be, and youth are thus more prone to opt for violence. This is particularly the case during economic recessions or periods of high unemployment, as occurred in the Middle East during the 1990s.

Notably, while higher education reduces the threat of armed conflict, there is a strong statistical association between youth bulges and terrorist activity when educational attainment is relatively high. Perhaps this should not come as a surprise. As noted by Richards, “The presence of widespread socio-economic dislocation de-legitimizes regimes in the eyes of those who spend much of their time thinking about what they see, such as intellectuals, journalists, and students.” In the Middle East, it may also be driven by a greater awareness of the past futility of securing change in the region through peaceful or conventional means. Either way, with the Middle East’s growing educational attainment rates, this relationship between educated youth bulges and terror strikes a particular chord.

It is important to note that youth violence in the Middle East is not fated by demography. Pro-employment economic growth would reduce youth grievances, and recent developments in the regional economy suggest positive gains in this regard. Securing employment for the Middle East’s increasingly educated youth population might be the best guarantor of future domestic stability. It is also important to note that when youth are given political voice, the violent response is much weaker. Movements toward democratization or at least greater political participation would greatly reduce the potential for violence in these societies.

**Drawing Conclusions and Looking Ahead**

Demographic changes in the Middle East and the rise of a particularly strong youth bulge have had profound impacts on the region’s economic, social, and political systems. The growth of the working-age population has fueled intense labor market
pressures, resulting, in the absence of a dynamic economic response, in high levels of unemployment. The region has also experienced significant sociopolitical tensions as a growing number of youth struggle with the transition to adulthood and as vested interests struggle to resist needed reform efforts. The probability that these tensions will be sorted out through violent means remains high.

For most countries in the Middle East region, however, the pressures associated with the youth bulge have peaked and, going forward, will gradually be reduced. Available projections suggest that the share of youth in the adult population will fall—regionwide—to 29.4 percent by 2010 and 23.5 percent by 2020. This suggests that the negative pressures associated with negative labor market outcomes and political conflict will abate, particularly in those states that led the fertility decline in the region. In turn, these states should see a rise in per capita economic outcomes. In the absence of youth-driven instability and a burgeoning middle class, these countries may also experience a wider political opening.

For a select number of countries, the youth bulge—along with its associated economic and social outcomes—will remain a real and foreboding challenge for the foreseeable future. As noted above, Iraq, the West Bank and Gaza, Saudi Arabia, and—in particular—Yemen still maintain high fertility rates and face high long-term youth bulges. Yemen will continue to see labor force growth rates of 4.0 percent over the next decade, and the total labor force will nearly double in size in the next 15 years. Furthermore, any pressures coming out of these countries will affect their neighbors—in terms of political security, rising migration pressures, and economic security. Also, the countries of Southwest Asia and sub-Saharan Africa bordering the Middle East are in the midst of their own youth bulges, the results of which will certainly impact the countries of the region.

Thus, the youth bulge remains the policy priority facing all the countries of the region in the future. Governments in the region must come up with viable means of addressing the concerns and challenges of their young populations. The greatest need is the creation of quality jobs that meet the expectations and needs of the region’s educated young people. This will require a broad range of economic reforms, particularly with respect to labor market regulations, but also reforms that enhance the standing of the private sector by decreasing the costs of adhering to regulations, fostering an improved investment climate, and decreasing barriers to trade. This will also require significant investments in improving the quality of the education that young people receive. Policies that help people get started as young, independent economic actors also must be put in place: effective credit lending is virtually nonexistent in the region.36

Changing demography also means that those countries that have progressed past the youth bulge will soon begin to face other challenges related distinctly to aging populations. Just as the policy window in the Middle East has shifted from providing for young, dependent populations to finding jobs for new entrants, the window will begin to gradually shift toward providing services for aging populations. This
is already beginning to have an impact on the state-dominated health systems (and budgets) of the region, particularly the Gulf, where we have seen a rise in age-related and chronic illnesses. Just as policy makers are getting a hold on youth-related issues, demography will continue to change the policy environment and effect a new set of policy issues.
South Asia
Indian Muslims: Political Leadership and Ideology

Irfan Engineer

Islam has been a significant presence in India for longer than a millennium. According to the latest census, carried out in 2001, Muslims were the largest minority in India: 13.4 percent of the population and numbering close to 140 million. It is estimated that there are now 150 million Muslims in India. Muslim populations are significant in almost all geographical quarters, in many rural areas, and in all the principal metropolitan areas of India, including all the principal locations of rapid economic growth. However, Muslims in India wonder about their future role and security in the Indian culture and polity. Their detractors raise pointed questions about their loyalty and the authentically Indian character of Indian Islam. Secular Indians of all religious identities worry about the future of Indian secularism, multiculturalism, and tolerance.

Overview

Any roster of prominent and accomplished Indians in all walks of life since Independence would include a sizable, perhaps even disproportionate, share of distinguished Muslims. Nonetheless, Indian Muslims as a whole today enjoy less education than the average Indian and suffer economic disadvantage and social discrimination. They also suffer from growing cultural hostility and physical violence, the results of the growth of extremist Hindu chauvinist ideology known as Hindutva. The Muslim community’s perception that the post-9/11 war on terror has been a cipher for anti-Muslim mobilization, the tacit empowerment of anti-Muslim attitudes in the guise of security concerns about radical ideology and militancy, and violent state-sponsored attacks on Muslims in Gujarat state, with the apparent support of the majority of non-Muslims, have created a sense of crisis in the community.

The issue that should be of greatest concern—and demand the greatest attention—is whether the community can find the coherent political will and voice to address the challenges that currently beleaguer it, which will require deepening political alliances with non-Muslim communities. Muslim political leadership has historically built alliances with non-Muslim political parties on a tactical basis, but what is required now is long-term collaboration on common concerns more directly related to the welfare of the Muslim community. These include strengthened democratic process and institutions, social justice, equal economic opportunity, and better education. The outcome is critical to the welfare and security not only of the Muslim community but of India as a whole.
Islam arrived in the Indian subcontinent during its first century of existence but became an integral part of Indian culture and history three centuries later. Muslim monarchs and elites, while at all times a minority across the subcontinent as a whole, ruled substantial portions of the territory that today constitutes India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The separation of the contiguous Muslim-majority areas of the subcontinent at Partition and Independence in 1947 could not undo the perva-

Islam and India's Syncretic Culture: A Resource for Political Unity

Notwithstanding the fact that Muslim rulers established kingdoms in the subcontinent by force of arms, the spread of Islam was by and large a peaceful affair. Conversions to Islam were mostly the work of Sufi saints, who embraced all human beings and considered love of God to be the highest form of worship. The Sufis believed in tawhid (unity of being). Because they saw all humans as God's creation, the Sufi saints did not dispute other ways of worship. Nizamuddin Awliya, walking on the banks of River Yamuna with his disciple the great poet Khusro, is reputed to have pointed to a Hindu woman performing the Hindu salutation to the sun and exclaimed, “Oh Khusro! Don't look at that woman with indifference, as she is also worshipping Allah, for Allah had devised as many ways of worship as particles of sand on the bank of River Yamuna.”

As a result of this legacy and interaction between various religious communities, there exist to this day various syncretic communities, with a composite Hindu-Muslim religious culture. These include the Meo Muslims, Pranam Panthis, and Rajput Muslims. The Meo Muslims, who live in the Mewati belt south of Delhi extending from Haryana to Rajasthan, are excellent reciters of the Hindu epics Ramayana and Mahabharata. Though Islam permits first cousins to marry, the Meo Muslims strictly observe Hindu lineal restrictions on such marriages. Integrated into the marriage ceremony of the Meo Muslims is the Hindu custom of saptapadi (seven rounds) around a holy fire. The holy book of the Pranam Panthis, called Kulzum Sharif, has both sacred songs from the Hindu Bhagavad Gita and verses from the Quran. Before touching the Kulzum Sharif, Pranam Panthis have to perform ablutions (as Muslims do with the Quran). If there are two male siblings in a family, one is buried like a Muslim and the other cremated like a Hindu.

Throughout India, the vast majority of Muslims are thoroughly rooted in the local culture. Language and culture often predominate over religion as a basis for group identification. A Mappila Muslim from Kerala will feel greater kinship with a Kerala Hindu than with a North Indian Muslim.

In rural areas and small towns, Hindus and Muslims actively take part in each other's religious festivals. Muslims contribute to, participate in, and even serve as officers in bodies that organize local festivals, such as one in Western India at which Lord Ganesha is worshipped or one in Eastern India devoted to the worship of the Goddess Durga. When images of Hindu gods and goddesses are carried in a procession, local Muslims gather to welcome the procession or offer cold drinks to the processionists. Likewise, when Muslims take images of the Karbala (tazia) through villages or towns, Hindus worship them in their traditional manner. Worshipping tazia has become part and parcel of Hindu rituals in many areas. In shrines where Sufi saints are buried, such as Haji Ali in Mumbai, Khwaja Garib Nawaz in Ajmer, Nizamuddin Awliya's dargah in Delhi, and Sai Baba in Shirdi, Maharashtra, one finds non-Muslim pilgrims alongside Muslim ones.
sive influence of Islam on Indian life, culture, and thought. Much that is understood as distinctly Indian reflects this influence, and India today, while exploring its secular or Hindu identity, remains a significant part of global Islamic history and heir to its own Muslim history.

The shared cultural and intellectual history throughout the subcontinent gives Indian Muslims a sense of shared identity with those in Pakistan and Bangladesh. This has led to questions among some non-Muslim Indians about the national loyalties of Indian Muslims. The tendency is to blame Muslims as a group for the “dismemberment” of India. There is no question that some Indians have found a sense of cultural and historical unity with their co-religionists in other countries of the region (though even here the question of identity is more complex than is commonly understood), but the majority of Indian Muslims have thought of themselves as Indians first, distinguishing themselves in combat and competition against armies and sports teams of neighboring countries.

As is often the case with beleaguered minorities, issues of identity and culture have loomed large in the Muslim community’s political mobilization. While these issues will remain important and perhaps even gain in importance if the community continues to face social discrimination and violence, the issues that are of greatest immediate concern to Indian Muslims are ones that they share with many non-Muslims and that can be addressed only as policy issues within the context of the broader Indian polity.

Where are Indian Muslims today, and what should be their future direction?

- Education is key if Muslims are to have a better future in India and take advantage of the growth and development in the country. First, Muslims must avail themselves of secular education. Second, they must ensure that the curriculum and the textbooks are objective about the role of Muslims in history and society. There is serious concern among secular as well as Muslim Indians about education taking a tendentiously Hindu-centric turn.
- Greater democratization of the Indian state is needed, and robust institutions for monitoring and protecting democracy and human rights must be promoted, particularly in the weaker sections of society. Discrimination on the basis of religion, caste, gender, or language needs to be addressed. There is a constitutional bar against any discrimination, but there is no effective remedy for violations. The courts are overburdened, and marshaling evidence to prove discrimination is too arduous a task to be undertaken by citizens of limited education and means.
- Muslims need to look within. Sharia as practiced now is discriminatory against women, particularly in allowing the practice of polygamy and in permitting the husband to obtain a divorce unilaterally by pronouncing the triple talaq. Such policies marginalize women and are not in the Quranic spirit of gender equality. Muslims will have to reform their society from within and adopt the best practices from the various Muslim sects and caste-based com-
HISTORICAL OBSTACLES TO UNITY IN THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY

Divisions in social status, theology, and sect are obstacles to unity within the Muslim community. *Ajlaf* Muslims are descended from low-caste converts, whereas *Ashraf* Muslims are descendants of feudal nobles and notables from royal courts. Besides the sectarian divisions within the Muslim community between Shias and Sunnis, there are sectarian divisions within each—for example, between schools of Sunni theology such as Deobandi, Barelvi, and Ahl-e Hadith.

There has been a history of violent conflict between the Shias and the Sunnis, particularly around the Shia holy festival of Moharram, in the city of Lucknow, where Shias form the majority of the Muslim population. Conflict is also found between, on one hand, revivalist, puritan, and fundamentalist Deobandis and Wahhabis and, on the other, the Barelvis, who are devoted to the defense of the syncretic South Asian Muslim culture. The Wahhabis and the Deobandis denounce religious practices such as the reverence of dargahs (tombs of Sufi saints), a practice popular among Muslims and non-Muslims alike. When Muslims of a particular locality or village come under the influence of revivalist and puritan sects and give up the local religiocultural practices, their non-Muslim neighbors feel betrayed by their abandonment of *tazia* worship.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY

During the ascendency of Europe and the decline of Muslim power in India, Muslim elites almost uniformly resisted Western education and intellectual currents. Theological schools such as the Wahhabi, Farazi, and Deobandi argued against it. Following the final abolition of the Mughal Empire and the establishment of formal rule by the British Crown in 1857, a group of reformers sought to encourage Muslims to embrace modern education. These modernizers, centered around the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College in Aligarh, laid the foundations for a Muslim middle class based on the professions. They argued that, with the end of the old order, unless Muslims embraced modern education, their status would continue to decline relative to that of the Hindus. Some Muslims prospered in the emerging modern economy.
The clash between modernism and traditionalism cut across religious lines. An anti-colonial commitment to resisting Western influence united militant revivalist movements among Muslims with similar movements among Hindus. Hindus joined enthusiastically in the movement to restore the Khilafat (the Turkish Caliphate) after World War I, even as modernizing Muslims puzzled at it.

Three major political traditions may be identified in Muslim leadership before Independence. First, nationalist Indian Muslims in the Indian National Congress believed that the common national struggle was in Muslim interests, and more important than religious distinctions. Second, the Muslim League represented the interests of Muslim elites—specifically, feudal elites from North and Eastern India in Uttar Pradesh and Bengal, modernist Muslim elites who had acquired an education in the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College and aspired to high positions in bureaucracy, and entrepreneurs from the Northwest. Finally, in Bengal, the Muslim peasantry, in a province economically dominated by Hindu landlords, supported the secular populist Krishak Praja Party, led by Fazlul Huq. Premier of Bengal from 1937 to 1943, Huq annoyed the British authorities, who found him unhelpful to the war effort owing to his persistent demands that the central government send grain to mitigate the impact of famine in Bengal.

With the separation of the greater parts of Punjab and Bengal from India under the Muslim League’s leadership, Indian Muslims lost the latter two political traditions—the educated modernists and the radical populist pro-peasant organization—to the areas that became Pakistan. Most of the emergent Muslim middle class, educated and mercantile, migrated to Pakistan in the wake of Partition, expecting to find better economic, professional, and political opportunities there. Although some of the Muslim elites remained in India and prospered, the community left behind was by and large backward socially, educationally, and economically, consisting of landless laborers, peasants, urban hawkers, self-employed artisans, and petty traders.

However, over a period of time a small middle class emerged in independent India from among the artisans. With the growing demand from foreign markets, some of the Muslim brassware artisans in Moradabad became traders and financiers in the brassware business, and some of the Muslim weavers of Varanasi graduated to positions as traders and financiers in the sari trade. Likewise, workers in the scissor industry in Meerut, the lock industry in Aligarh, and the beedi (traditional Indian-style cigarette) industry in Jabalpur catered to a national market and emerged as a new middle class.

The new middle class in the Muslim community emerged from among the Ajlaf (low-caste) Muslims. The rise of this middle class brought new aspirations and new dynamics into play. This new middle class at first supported secular education and emphasized ethnic identity based on language and shared with non-Muslim neighbors. However, when communal conflicts and riots arose—in part fueled by competition between this emerging Muslim middle class and established Hindu...
traders—and the property and businesses of Muslims were the prime targets, the situation changed.

The communal riots pushed the emerging middle class to seek refuge in a homogenous communal identity, and they turned to supporting an identity-based political agenda proffered by the new “moderate communal” leadership that emerged in the post-Independence generation. The new middle class became the social base of the moderate communal leadership for another reason also. With their newly acquired economic status, members of the emerging middle class were not happy with their backward *Ajlaf* identity, which continued to stick to them. They were struggling for a more dignified identity with higher social status. Within the syncretic Indian traditions, national or linguistic, there was no identity that offered the emerging middle class a social status commensurate with their new economic status. The emerging middle class imitated *Ashraf* Muslims while not completely breaking with their former caste-based *Ajlaf* identities: on the one hand they contributed generously to mosques and community religious institutions, while on the other they still relied on caste networks for marital relations and socialization. The more fundamentalist ideologies also appealed to some in this emerging middle class.

Today, the middle class within the Indian Muslim community is very small. Only about 5 percent of Muslims can be called middle class; this includes those in government jobs, other respectable employment, and small or medium business enterprises. There are few big businesses. While this middle class may be finding its own way to a working ideological construct, the rural and urban poor continue to suffer discrimination and to find no distinct ideology that answers their needs, other than those devoted to poor Indians in general. They find themselves increasingly isolated, on one hand from Muslim elites and on the other from society in general as a result of escalating Hindu hostility and violence.

**Ideology and Leadership of Muslims during National Consolidation**

The impact of Partition on Indian Muslims was profound. Separated from the large Muslim populations of Bengal and Punjab provinces, they saw their demographic significance decline from approximately one-third of pre-Partition India to one-sixth of post-Partition India. The animosities unleashed by the violence that accompanied Partition took some time to settle, posing a special challenge to Indian Muslims. This was ironic, as those who chose to remain in India as a minority rather than migrate to Pakistan were implicitly opting for the national identity they shared with other Indians over one based on religion.

The first generation of Muslim leaders after Independence consisted of nationalist members of the Congress such as Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (who, as Indian National Congress president in 1946, negotiated the Cabinet Mission Plan with the British government and the Muslim League), Dr. Zakir Hussain (founder of Jamia Millia University and the third president of India), Chief Justice Chagla of the
Bombay High Court, and Syed Hamid, the educator. Their common commitment was to communal harmony, composite nationalism, and secularism, with a strong emphasis on education.

During this period, Kashmiri Muslims wholeheartedly supported the accession of Kashmir to India and helped the Indian Army in their efforts to push the Pakistani Army back out of Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah, leader of Kashmir’s Muslims, supported the integration of Kashmir into India, though he bargained for autonomy within the Indian Constitution. This lasted until the early 1960s. Sheikh Abdullah was arrested and detained until 1964.

One important reason the religious divide did not threaten this phase of communal integration, in spite of Partition-inspired violence, was that the main focus of mass political mobilization (other than economic development) was the reorganization of provincial/state boundaries on a linguistic basis. Muslims wholeheartedly supported the linguistic reorganization of states, thus making common cause with their non-Muslim co-linguals. The Muslim poet Amar Sheikh wrote Marathi folk songs that inspired the struggle for reorganization of Bombay province into Maharashtra and Gujarat. This affirmed and strengthened regional and linguistic identity across religious lines. People were not interested in communal mobilization. By 1966, all the states had been reorganized along linguistic lines.

An economic crisis occurred in the mid-1960s. The value of the rupee had dipped to an all-time low by 1966, and there was unprecedented inflation. The country was dependent on the United States for its supply of wheat. Agricultural production also declined. The consequent unrest led to unprecedented gains for opposition political parties. In many states in North India, the Congress Party lost power at the state level for the first time. Opposition parties formed united fronts and coalition governments in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan. The Hindu chauvinist Jana Sangh Party, precursor of today’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), enjoyed power for the first time as part of these coalitions. Opportunistic politicians used anti-Muslim sentiment and official machinery to spread Hindu chauvinist or “Hindutva” ideology. Communal riots became a tool for consolidating Hindu mobilization across castes and regions.

The followers of the Jana Sangh Party questioned the ideology of inclusive nationalism in which minorities were accommodated and given their space, albeit underrepresented and within the dominant ethos of Hinduism. The Jana Sangh considered this policy to be an appeasement of Muslims. The Hindutva agenda was to exclude the minorities altogether and treat them as second-class citizens. Religious identity was but one basis for mobilization, and a minor one at first. The Praja Socialist Party organized around the issues of price increases and the economic crisis and was particularly successful in mobilizing the backward classes with a program of opposing caste-based oppression and domination by upper castes.

In 1961, more than 400 people were killed in a major riot in Jabalpur. The riot shook the secular foundation of the country. The Congress leadership particularly
was disturbed by this riot, the first major riot since the violence of Partition. The media and the state administration were partial to Hindus, and the message they sent about the place and status of Muslims in the country was not lost on the Muslims. No doubt the main factors behind the riot were economic, social, and political rather than religious. There was tough competition between a Hindu magnate and an emerging Muslim magnate in the beedi industry, and the media had been engaged in highly provocative reporting of the marriage of a Hindu scion and a Muslim scion. The official response to the riot in Jabalpur widened the divide between the two religious communities along social and communal fault lines.

In 1967, there were communal riots in Jamshedpur and Ranchi-Hatia in Eastern India, and in 1969, Ahmedabad, a textile city in Western India, witnessed riots that took the lives of more than 2,000 people. In 1970, over 600 people were killed in major riots in Bhiwandi, Jalgaon, and Mahad in Maharashtra state. These riots shook Muslims’ confidence in Indian democracy. Throughout the 1980s, riots continued in North India and in Western India.

In the mid-1970s, opposition to the dictatorship of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi coalesced in the Janata Party, which united socialists, secular economic conservatives, and adherents of Hindutva such as the Jana Sangh, significantly confusing the ideological picture in terms of Muslim interests. The resulting Janata Party victory brought the Jana Sangh to the center of power at the central and state levels. Helping the Janata Party to win these elections was the fact that the Muslim vote had shifted away from the Congress Party because of the disproportionate impact of Mrs. Gandhi’s policies—which included forced sterilization and bulldozing of slums without notice—on Muslim communities.

The unraveling of the Janata Party soon after its formation, principally though not exclusively over the issue of the continuing loyalty of its former Jana Sangh members to Hindu revivalist political movements, led to a struggle for dominance within the Hindutva camp. Having tasted power, the Bharatiya Janata Party also intensified the militancy of its competition with secular political parties. There was competition between upwardly mobile lower castes and Muslims for land and for other resources. Religious identity was a ready tool for political leaders on both sides. As a result of the mobilization and countermobilization of the backward classes and the Muslims, a series of communal riots occurred in the 1980s, particularly in Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and Rajasthan.

**Identity Politics in Second Generation Leadership**

The “moderate communal” Muslim leadership consisted of second-generation leaders who had developed under these adverse circumstances. They were bolder and more assertive than the first-generation leaders, who had been cautious in their use of Muslim identity in the aftermath of Partition. The new leaders emerged in the late 1960s but consolidated their hold on political discourse in the 1980s. This phase of
political mobilization of Muslims in India revolved around three emotional issues: preservation of a distinct jurisdiction to govern family and inheritance law for the Muslim community, preservation of the Muslim character of institutions such as the Aligarh Muslim University, and preservation of the Urdu language.

**Muslim Family Law**

The new moderate political leadership and the leaders of religious institutions cooperated most closely on the issue of Muslim family law. Article 44 of the Constitution of India (in the chapter on Directive Principles of the State) provides that the state shall strive to enact a Uniform Civil Code. Muslims fear that family laws based on the Hindu majority’s traditions and customary practices will be imposed on them in the name of a Uniform Civil Code. The religious leadership and the political leadership have very aggressively taken the stand that *sharia* is divine and there should be no secular interference in it. Religious leaders, as the sole arbiters of what *sharia* is, naturally have a vested interest in holding that it is divine. For political leaders, the issue is one of self-determination in the context of a beleaguered cultural identity.

Muslim political and religious leaders belonging to all schools of Muslim jurisprudence have come together in the All India Muslim Personal Law Board. The Muslim Personal Law Board has acquired much financial and political clout and deliberates on all the issues affecting the community. It strongly resists any effort to reform *sharia* or even reinterpret *sharia* according to contemporary conditions and needs. The Muslim religious leadership in India has gone to the ridiculous extent of validating divorces men obtained either by sending a text message consisting of three repetitions of the word *talaq* or by pronouncing the word three times over the phone, even while in an inebriated condition, while in a fit of a rage, or while sleep-talking. The Quranic requirement for divorce is of course more exacting: pronouncement of the word *talaq* must be followed by arbitration by representatives appointed by the wife and the husband. Reforms enacted in Muslim-majority countries have been resisted in India, not only by traditional religious thinkers but also by this second-generation moderate leadership. It must be said, though, that there have been Indian Muslim voices from the margins demanding the framing of a model *Nikahnama* (Muslim marriage contract) wherein a woman could stipulate conditions for marriage, such as that the husband could not take a second wife without her permission and that she would also have the right of divorce. However, the voices are extremely weak because of the feeling of cultural insecurity in the community.

**Aligarh Muslim University**

Aligarh Muslim University is another emotional issue that can bring the community into the streets, though recently it has lost much of its relevance. Aligarh Muslim University was initially established during colonial rule as Mohammedan
Anglo-Oriental College (MAO), to encourage modern education among Muslims. Interestingly, when Sir Sayyid Ahmed established MAO, the religious leadership opposed any attempt to equip Muslims with modern education. Slowly, the community came to see the importance of the college and modern English education. The graduates of MAO later provided leadership to the Muslim League, which demanded partition of the country. After Independence, by act of Parliament MAO was converted into Central University. The Muslim community demanded that the university remain a Muslim institution, administered by Muslims. The controversy was settled by a directive that the vice chancellor of the university should always be a Muslim and that the majority of the members of the court that runs the university should be Muslims.

**Urdu**

The importance of the issue of the Urdu language reflects the fact that the moderate Muslim leadership is drawn largely from North India. Except for those in Hyderabad, who speak a variant known as Dakhkani Urdu, Muslims from South India, West Bengal, and Assam do not speak Urdu. Although Urdu was originally a *lingua franca*, transcending religious identities, during colonial rule Hindu revivalists rejected Urdu, which is written in Persian script, and persuaded Hindus to accept Hindi, which shares a vocabulary and grammar with Urdu but is written in Devnagri script.

With the Pakistan Movement, Urdu came to be popularly perceived as a language of Muslims. Because it is now the national language of Pakistan, this perception persists in the minds of many non-Muslim Indians, despite the historical fact that many stalwarts of Urdu literature have been Hindus. Munshi Premchand, the celebrated Hindi short story writer, initially wrote in Urdu. Other popular Hindi Urdu writers include Krishan Chander and Jagannath Azad.

Urdu has been neglected by government educational and cultural policy. The government has stifled Urdu schools with a lack of funds, resulting in a shortage of teachers and poor school buildings. Urdu newspapers are discriminated against by the government, which does not place tender notices and other public advertisements in them. However, the language’s decline is also a reflection of larger cultural developments. Graduates of Urdu schools have little prospect of higher education or employment. Readers of Urdu language newspapers are on the decline, as Urdu schools produce fewer graduates. And because the Muslim middle class of entrepreneurs and professionals forms a very small section of the community, the Urdu press has difficulty obtaining revenues from private advertisements. The Bollywood film industry, which showcases Urdu songs and Urdu poetry, is Urdu’s lifeline.

As the neglect of Urdu stems from the public perception that it is a language of Muslims, many Muslims have become committed to its survival as a symbol, whether they speak Urdu or not. The decline of Urdu and the onslaught against it
are seen as evidence of the beleaguered state of the community. While the national moderate leadership has demanded policies for the encouragement and survival of Urdu, Islamists and religious fundamentalists have promoted Urdu as a common language for all Muslims in India.

The Babar Mosque

In the 1980s, the moderate Muslim leadership took up the defense of the Babri Masjid (Mosque of Babar). The mosque had been demolished in 1992 by Hindu zealots, who argued that the mosque stood on the birthplace of the Hindu god Rama. Although moderate communal Muslim leaders made emotional speeches to the effect that they would not allow the Babri Masjid to be touched, they had no coherent political strategy for working through democratic institutions to achieve their goal. Popular mobilization on the streets was futile, as the Hindu zealots could command greater numbers and enjoyed the tacit sympathy of the law enforcement agencies. Two organizations were formed, the All India Babri Masjid Action Committee and the Babri Masjid Coordination Committee, but they worked at cross purposes. Instead of focusing on saving the mosque, they competed politically with each other to pose as champions of Muslims. Although the issue of the Babri Masjid was as much a symbolic one of identity as the other issues discussed above, its significance was far more serious because it was both a reflection and a trigger of militant and often violent mass mobilization by the Hindu extremist movement, particularly the organization of a Rath Yatra (procession) through India by the BJP and its allies, to demand restoration of the site to a Hindu temple. This mobilized zealotry nationwide. The failure of Muslim leaders to offer an effective response on the community’s behalf has left the community with a leadership vacuum.

**Political Leadership on Identity Issues**

A small group of Muslim liberals has opposed both the moderates’ reactionary emphasis on identity and political Islamist ideology. These people have felt undercut by the secular establishment. When the Supreme Court, in the case of Shah Bano, granted maintenance to a divorced Muslim woman in accordance with secular law, the judgment was vociferously opposed by the moderate Muslim political leadership and political Islamists. Arif Mohammed Khan, a senior Congress Party figure and Minister of Sports, defended the judgment in Parliament, only to be sidelined when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi yielded to pressure from the moderate leadership and political Islamists and took parliamentary action to overrule the judgment.

In its attempts to ensure the unity of the Muslim community, the moderate leadership has found itself tacitly promoting policies and strategies that bear similarities to the Islamist goals of homogenizing the culture of the Muslim community around Urdu on one hand and religion on the other. It has mobilized around communal
demands to maintain Muslim identity and other cultural issues, such as declaring the Prophet Mohammed’s birthday a public holiday.

This strategy of unification has had serious liabilities. It is Muslim women who suffer most from rigid approaches to Muslim family law and the refusal to reform it even within a Quranic framework. The moderate Muslim leadership has not addressed the socioeconomic issues of the community, even though the community is educationally and economically backward. The moderate leadership has also utterly failed in securing justice for the victims of recent communal riots. None of the instigators, abettors, or conspirators were punished, and most were not even brought to trial. No law enforcement agents were prosecuted or punished for overt or covert collaboration with the rioters.

Successive governments have been happy to concede on symbolic religiocultural and identity-related issues that do not carry budgetary or political costs. In some cases, this has helped mobilize Muslim votes for secular political parties. Advancing these symbolic issues has allowed the moderate leaders to demonstrate their prowess and clout with the political establishment and thus continue to enjoy the support of the community. The leaders with visions and ideologies more responsive to the pressing economic and social needs of the community have been marginalized as a result of the resistance of successive governments to meeting their demands, which makes them appear weak to the Muslim community. Thus, notwithstanding government responsiveness on issues of identity, Muslims have continued to be discriminated against socially, educationally, and in government jobs. They have also been victimized by law enforcement agencies.

**ISLAMIST POLITICAL IDEOLOGY**

Traditional religious leaders organize around issues of public policy in their own forums in various towns, whether through Ulema Councils, sectarian institutions, or schools of fiqh (Islamic schools of jurisprudence). In speeches that promote the superiority of one sect over the other or one fiqh over the other, these leaders often brand their opponents as kafirs (nonbelievers) and their opponents’ practices as shirk (polytheism). There have been occasional violent conflicts between the Deobandi and Barelvi factions.

In contrast, political Islamists aim to establish an Islamic state and enforce Islam as understood by their particular sect. Unlike the moderates described above, who are content with using symbols to mobilize Muslims, Islamists would use the state to enforce compliance with Islamic cultural norms. What the two groups share is a lack of appreciation of the multiplicity of cultures within Muslim society and a desire to see Muslim society homogenized. The Islamists would reshape society to conform to a traditional, orthodox, and conservative understanding of religion, based on historical experience in the region. The Islamist goal of creating an Islamic state faces a tremendous obstacle, because Muslims constitute a minority in
India. Islamists not only encourage Muslims to learn Urdu but also, without much success, discourage their use of other languages. The idea is that Muslims should have not only a common religious identity, but also a common culture. In their emphasis on a common and homogenous culture and the blunting of linguistic and cultural diversity, the Islamists demonstrate similarities to the right-wing Hindu parties. The idea is that a culturally unified and homogenized Muslim community will be stronger and better equipped to fight Hindu extremism.

Maulana Abu Ala Maududi founded the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) in 1941. Maududi argued that it was the duty of every Muslim to fight to establish an Islamic state in India. Initially, JI opposed the demand for the establishment of Pakistan, which was led by secular figures like Jinnah. JI’s objective was to establish an Islamic state in the entire country. However, as soon as Pakistan was created, Maulana Maududi moved to Pakistan and established the Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan. The Indian branch of the Jamaat-e-Islami lay low for some time after Independence, concentrating on building its cadre by training students. The Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) was the front organization through which it reached out to students, emphasizing character building of young Muslims and providing ideological training to a select few.

During the 1980s, with communal riots occurring throughout India and militancy rising in Jammu and Kashmir, the stance of some of the leaders of SIMI hardened, and they adopted violence as a means to achieve the objective of establishing an Islamic state. Those opposing violence as a short-term means left SIMI and formed the Students Islamic Organization of India. A rise in the level of violence against ordinary Muslims was a catalyst for the radicalization of some Muslim youth.

After the demolition of the Babri Masjid, the Jamaat-e-Islami mellowed its stance and adopted a platform calling for peace, reconciliation, and communal harmony. JI now has formed an alliance with prominent secular intellectuals from the Hindu community. Reaching out to its cadres in all the districts, tehsils, villages, and cities where it has a following, JI organizes programs for communal harmony. It has also formed an organization called Movement for Peace and Justice. Jamaat-e-Islami cadres working in this organization have taken up the cause of social justice for all castes and communities.

**RECENT TRENDS IN MUSLIM MOBILIZATION**

The demolition of the Babri Masjid had a profound effect on the Muslim political leadership and on the ideological emphasis of Muslim political discourse. The moderate leaders’ failure to stop the demolition of the mosque exposed the emptiness of their rhetoric, causing them to lose standing. In recent years, Muslims have been far less responsive to emotional issues related to identity. There is a growing feeling within the community that education is the way forward. Many organizations focusing on secular education became more popular after the demolition of
the Babri Masjid. This trend has been accompanied by greater resistance to repressive traditions. Muslim girls have topped the Secondary School Certificate examinations in Maharashtra and other states. Recently, in Mumbai, two girls defied the edict of a few conservative elements within the community in order to attend college, and they sought police protection for that purpose.

In response to the new challenge, the moderate leadership is reconfiguring itself and re-working political alignments. The demolition of the mosque by a mob in defiance of court rulings engendered in the community a sense that the only solution lay in united action with all secular Indians for the survival of secularism, the rule of law, and democracy. Those Indians who were most concerned about the defense of secularism and the rule of law are also the most socially and culturally liberal elements—those least likely to sympathize with a reactionary defense of a hidebound Muslim identity.

This acknowledgment of the need for secular alliances was reinforced by the Muslim recognition that immediate security was at stake, as the demolition was followed by communal riots throughout the country.

Muslims drifted away from the Congress in even greater numbers after the party failed to prevent demolition of the Babri Masjid. The moderate leadership started actively seeking alliances with regional parties, most of them anti-Congress alliances and some merely non-Congress alliances. Before the demolition of Babri Masjid, the social base of Congress was an alliance of upper castes (mostly Brahmans), Dalits (untouchables), and Muslims. The alliance was dominated by the upper castes, but was accommodating to the Muslims. When the Muslims walked out of this alliance, the social base of Congress shrank, and the party lost power. By associating themselves with the regional parties in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal, Muslims aligned with upwardly mobile lower classes. In Gujarat, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh, which saw a straight contest between the Congress and the BJP because there was no strong regional party, Muslims continued to support the Congress Party.

The prevailing trend of moving away from emotional issues of identity has had its exceptions, as highly sensitive issues attracting global attention have arisen, such as the publication of literature or images considered offensive to Islam. In Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata, Bangalore, and other cities and towns all over India, hundreds of thousands gathered on the streets to protest against Danish cartoons. Muslim commercial establishments closed down for the day and asked employees to join the rally. Imams in most mosques asked people to join the rally. The mobilization coincided with US President George W. Bush’s arrival in India, and the rally also featured anti-American and anti-Bush slogans, opposing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Given that several issues were combined in this protest, what may have been the largest mass gathering of Muslims ever was likely a general re-
sponse to feelings of being victimized by US policies and being treated as second-class citizens by India’s law-and-order machinery.

The influence of Pakistani intelligence agencies seems to have increased considerably after the demolition of the Babri Masjid and the ensuing communal riots, in which Muslims were victimized. Underworld kingpin Dawood Ibrahim and gold smuggler Tiger Memon conspired with Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to carry out serial bombings in Mumbai on March 12, 1993. Muslim youth were trained in Pakistan by the ISI to carry out the bombings, in which over 287 people died. A small group of Muslim youth were attracted to the idea of getting revenge for the communal riots. They were psychologically prepared by watching videos of the demolition and the riots. A plethora of communal organizations like Al Umma also sprang up in the South for the first time after 1992. Muslims in the South had historically identified themselves with the Dravidian movement, anti–upper caste in its orientation and working across religious lines. However, after 1992, there was a rise of militant Islamic thought. As revenge for the demolition of Babri Masjid, the Tamil Nadu headquarters of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a radical Hindu extremist organization closely allied to the BJP, was bombed.

In Kerala, Maulana Madani started the militant organization Islamic Service Society (ISS), a group that often resorted to violence to counter Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. ISS attracted hundreds of youth. Madani was ultimately jailed and spent several years in prison for his alleged role in the Coimbatore bomb blasts. There were also bomb blasts in the Jammu region of Jammu and Kashmir, at Akshardham Temple in Gujarat, and at a Shiv temple in Varanasi in Uttar Pradesh. Bombs exploded in a public transport bus in Mumbai, and a series of bombings in local trains in Mumbai killed 147 people. Most of these bombings were motivated by a desire for revenge for attacks on Muslims in Gujarat in 2002 and in other communal riots. ISI seems to have provided training, weapons, and financial resources for these attacks.

Some fundamentalist and political Islamist organizations have rethought their ideology and are now working for communal harmony, secularism, and justice for all. As pointed out earlier, Jamaat-e-Islami is one such organization that has reviewed its stand on the issue of the establishment of an Islamic state. JI extended wholehearted support to Marathi Muslim writers organizing a conference of Marathi Muslims, and indeed even participated in the organization. This shows a significant change in the JI’s attitude toward local identity and regionalism. Such support would have been unthinkable when the organization was dedicated to Islamic identity and would accept no other sociocultural identity as valid.

The backward classes among the Muslims are currently working to obtain the benefits of affirmative action in government employment, hitherto restricted to disadvantaged Hindu castes. In doing so, they emphasize their regional identity and the
caste from which their forefathers were converted to Islam. The organization Pas-
manda Muslim Mahaz (Forum of Backward Muslims) in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar
reflects a variegation of Muslim identity and suggests the existence of a plural cul-
ture within the Muslim community. By emphasizing common interests with dis-
advantaged Hindu groups and demanding more equitable social and economic
policies from the state, these efforts also act to build interreligious unity.

Historically, no exclusively Muslim party has been a significant factor in elections
anywhere except in Kerala. In Kerala, the Muslim League routinely wins one or
two seats in Parliament and some seats in the State Assembly. It aligns itself tac-
tically with the Left Democratic Front or with the Congress-led United Demo-
cratic Front. In other states, Muslims align themselves with other political parties and
often are divided on the issue of which political party to support. In general, they
vote for secular parties to defeat the BJP.

If Muslim political leaders could establish a long-term collaboration with non-
Muslim political parties, they could tackle common concerns that are actually
more directly related to the welfare of the Muslim community, such as strength-
ened democratic process and institutions, social justice, equal economic opportu-
nity, and better education. Such collaboration would act as a disincentive to
opportunistic leaders who choose to emphasize divisive issues of exclusive reli-
gious identity.

**RISING VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS**

It is important to understand the ideological currents in the larger Hindu commu-
nity that shape Indian Muslim fears, anxieties, and political calculations, and mag-
nify their long-standing concerns.

The demolition of the Babri Masjid by the Ram Janmabhoomi movement was a
watershed moment in the development of Muslim leadership and political opinion,
as well as in the fortunes of the Hindu extremist movement that has come to pose
such a threat to Muslims. The former experienced a decline in confidence and se-
curity, and the latter a huge rise in popularity and political power.

In 1984, the Bharatiya Janata Party, the parliamentary face of the Hindutva move-
ment, had been reduced to 2 seats in Parliament. Few expected a recovery. Yet it has
seen its fortunes rise dramatically. It won 89 seats in Parliament in 1989, 119 seats in
1991, and 179 in 1996. Although its strength in the current Parliament is down to 129
seats, it is now the strongest and best-organized political party in India, and the Con-
gress government survives only by dint of support from the Communist parties.

At the heart of Hindutva lies the myth of a continuous thousand-year struggle of
Hindus against Muslims as the structuring principle of Indian history. Both com-
unities are assumed to have been homogenous blocks—Hindu patriots hero-
ically resist invariably tyrannical "foreign" Muslim rulers. More recently, a policy
of appeasing minorities (that is, of special treatment for Muslims and other religious minorities) is alleged to have perpetuated the oppression of Hindus. The contemporary social, economic, and political malaise that is ostensibly gripping Hindu society is seen to lie in this policy of appeasement.\footnote{1}

The Hindutva organizations do not limit themselves to using propaganda to spread hatred and stereotypes of minorities. In their over 40,000 shakhas (branches), they have also trained men in wielding lathis (long bamboo sticks). Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) regularly organizes distribution of tridents, justifying these as a religious symbol, though they are in fact lethal weapons. Some of the Hindutva groups have provided illegal arms training to their cadres.

There is no disagreement that a state-sanctioned pogrom took place against Muslims in Gujarat following the torching of the Sabarmati Express train in Godhra on February 27, 2002. More than 2,500 Muslims were brutally massacred and many Muslim women raped. Two aspects of these events are particularly troubling. First, the state machinery of police, along with voter rolls and other records, was used in a deliberate plan to identify and target Muslim neighborhoods and homes. The BJP state government, the Chief Minister, and lower level thugs have been open and unrepentant about their roles. Second, the BJP government and its Chief Minister Narendra Modi have recently been returned to power in elections, suggesting at least a degree of popular acquiescence or tolerance among Hindus. The lack of accountability has been a source of concern for Muslims throughout India, and fear about the future looms large.

These developments reflect a long-term trend in Gujarat. In 1998, Hindutva organizations organized several bandhs (general strikes involving closure of all shops and establishments) and persecuted a couple who eloped in Bardoli, in Surat district. Hanif, a Muslim boy, and Varsha, a Hindu girl, married on June 22, 1998; for this act of defiance, the entire Muslim community in Bardoli was singled out to be punished. Members of the Muslim community were violently attacked and their shops and businesses were burnt down, with police doing little to stop the violence. A social and economic boycott of the entire Muslim community was enforced by Hindutva activists. Gujarat police eventually arrested Hanif and detained him under the Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, legislation authorizing preventive detention, thus ending months of violence. When two Muslim boys married two tribal girls, 60 Muslim families in Randhikpur and Sanjheli (Godhra district) were similarly attacked and socially boycotted; they were forced to migrate out of Randhikpur and seek refuge in Godhara and Devgarh Baria.

**Politiciation of Religious Identity**

Over the millennium of Islam’s presence in India, though there were many conflicts to which Hindus and Muslims were parties, rarely were the conflicts about religion or religious identity. In fact, the dominant trends are peaceful coexistence,
composite culture, and syncretic religious practices. The use of religion and religious symbols as tools to mobilize the community started during the colonial period. Colonial rule was shaken by the First War of Independence in 1857, sparked by a mutiny of Indian soldiers. People from various regions and both religions united against British rule. The rebel soldiers, including the Hindu soldiers, wanted the throne to be restored to the Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar, whose power the British colonialists had usurped. The rebellion failed. The British thereafter introduced policies and measures that strengthened and deepened Muslim and Hindu identities. They encouraged the elites of each community to petition them for concessions and privileges along communal lines. During the independence movement that followed, secular and plural nationalism was joined by two communal ideologies: Hindutva and Muslim separatism. They both represented the political interests of the elites of their respective communities. The Muslim separatist ideology represented the interests of feudal landlords and the emerging educated and salaried middle class. The Muslim elites believed that their future was not secure in a united and independent India, and that they would be discriminated against and marginalized. The Muslim League, representing the Muslim elites and their demand for the establishment of Pakistan, bargained for their share of political power.

Hindu revivalism in general dates back to the nineteenth century, when attempts to revitalize Hindu culture and pull the Hindu community out of its stupor were used as a strategy for resisting colonialism. The modern Hindutva has a narrower agenda. The Hindu Mahasabha and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) were two Hindu communal organizations that adopted Hindutva as their guiding ideology and competed with Muslim elites to collude with the British colonial power and bargain for a greater share of political power under British patronage. The Hindu Mahasabha represented the interests of the feudal landlords during the freedom struggle. The broad-based secular nationalist Indian National Congress, comprising members of all religions, had already declared its support for land reforms, and this had broadened its base among tenant farmers and small landholders. After Independence, Hindutva extended its appeal to a section of the Hindu middle class.

The Indian Constitution is democratic and secular. It does not permit the state to promote identity or culture, nor does it permit the state to discriminate between citizens on the basis of caste, creed, religion, gender, or culture. It gives each person the freedom to practice, profess, and propagate the religion of his or her choice or refrain from doing so. The minorities in India have a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The state cannot interfere in the administration of institutions run by the minorities, nor can the state discriminate against educational institutions administered by minorities in giving aid. Hindutva implicitly stands against the spirit of the Constitution, its secularism as well as its assurance of equal rights for all the citizens. Hindutva continues to be inimical to and intolerant of the existence of any identity other than that of Hindutva. As the
practical consequences of Hindutva have become apparent, the importance of alliances between Muslim interests and those of secular and democratic Indians has become progressively clearer.

Muslims are routinely attacked as “antinationals” and “terrorists,” as “criminals” and “antisocial elements,” and as “traitors who partitioned the country.” Time and again, Muslims are alleged to be loyal only to Pakistan and, thus, a threat to India’s national security. The common slogan of Hindutva militants is “Musalman ke do hi sthan— Pakistan ya Kabristan” (“There are only two places for Muslims—either Pakistan or the cemetery”). The argument used by these militants may be summarized as follows: “The Muslims got their Pakistan. Even in a mutilated India, they have special rights. They have no use for family planning. They have their own religious schools. Restrictions are placed on our festivals, where processions are always in danger of attack, where expression of our opinion is prohibited, where our religious beliefs are cruelly derided.” This kind of statement is often followed by an appeal to Hindus to fight back against these Muslim oppressors, expressly calling for violent confrontation.

One myth about the Muslim minority propagated by Hindutva organizations relates to Muslims’ insistence on retaining a distinct Muslim family law. Hindutva organizations have seized on this as evidence that the state is appeasing the minorities by giving them special rights (not available to Hindus, whose family law was amended by Parliament) to marry up to four wives at a time. The Hindutva organizations also claim that Muslims are propagating more rapidly than Hindus, with a view to tipping the demographic balance in India. Loose talk to the same effect in countries such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia does not help Indian Muslims. People in responsible positions, such as Gujarat’s BJP Chief Minister Narendra Modi, have helped propagate this myth. Typical are posters that show a Muslim man with four burkha-clad women and several children, accompanied by the caption “hum paanch hamare pachchees” (“we 5 and our 25 children”), or that depict a Muslim saying “Ladke liya Pakistan, hanske lenge Hindustan” (“We fought and created Pakistan, now we will with ease be able to control Hindustan”). The figures do not support these assertions. In 1971, Hindus constituted 82.7 percent and Muslims 11.2 percent of the population. The corresponding figures for the 1991 census are 82.6 percent Hindus and 11.4 percent Muslims. The marginal change in the percentages has more to do with socioeconomic determinants of birth rates than with religious ones. Even if the current differential rate of population growth continues, it would take centuries before the Muslim population outnumbered the non-Muslim population. According to a survey carried out by the National Sample Survey Organisation in 1961, polygamy is practiced by 15.25 percent of adivasis (tribal peoples), 7.9 percent of Buddhists, 6.7 percent of Jains, 5.8 percent of Hindus, and only 5.7 percent of Muslims. Though the facts are ample to counter the stereotypes about the minorities, the resources and reach of liberal and secular opinion are limited.
CONCLUSION

By advancing stereotypes about Muslims, Hindutva strives to create the perception that all Muslims are politically united and share a political vision and that their religion is fundamentalist in nature. Hindutva insinuates that, since Islam originated in a foreign land, Muslims are alienated from the Hindu nation and cannot be in harmony with the Hindu nation; that all Muslims, guided as they are by the tenets of religion, internalize the concept of jihad against kafirs (nonbelievers) and cannot live in peace with Hindus. After scaring Hindus with the idea that Muslims, by claiming special rights like polygamy and by multiplying faster than the Hindus, will claim the country, Hindutva concludes that only the awakening of the spirit of Hindu Rashtra (Hindu Realm) and the creation of a strong authoritarian Hindu state can ensure the security of Hindus in their country.

Caste-based divisions within the Hindu community are obstacles to bringing about the awakening of the Hindu Rashtra spirit. To overcome these obstacles, there is a need to create a perception among Hindus of a Muslim threat. Rumors about impending attack and the storage of arms by Muslims are used to create a sense of insecurity among the majority community. Hindutva organizations offer themselves as more reliable guardians of Hindu security than the state. Muslim neighbors become “they,” somebody to fear rather than trust. Hate propaganda and stereotypes go hand in hand and are internalized. Feelings of hatred and fear of Muslims help justify the worst forms of brutality against them. Suppression of the democratic rights of minorities—their right not to be discriminated against (Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Constitution of India), to freely practice, propagate, and profess their religion (Articles 25 and 26), and to run institutions of their choice without interference from the state (Article 30)—then becomes a crying need of the majority community. The concept of Hindu Rashtra negates the constitutional scheme of democracy, the rule of law, and secularism.

What is worthy of note here is the extent to which this Hindutva strategy replicates the ideological and political strategies of extremist Muslim groups in almost every respect, with only the particular cultural, religious, and group content changed.

Since the late 1980s, terrorism has been on the increase in India—first in Punjab, next in the states of Jammu and Kashmir, and then elsewhere. Images of bomb attacks and armed actions against unarmed and innocent civilians have heightened the feeling of insecurity among Hindus, as has the media climate since the 9/11 attacks on the United States. An attack by terrorists on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001 shocked the nation. TV channels gave live coverage to the attack and subsequent security operations to clear the Parliament of the terrorists. Similar coverage was given to the attacks on Akshardham Temple in Gujarat and temples in Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian state then used draconian laws to arrest those suspected of having lent support to the terrorists. Often these laws were highly controversial, such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which was opposed
tooth and nail by the opposition and defeated in the Rajya Sabha (upper house of Parliament) but then pushed through in a joint session of Parliament.

Such terrorist attacks on innocent citizens and revered institutions of democracy and faith have bolstered the appeal of Hindutva’s call to build a strong Hindu state. Talk of human rights, democracy, and secularism has been relegated to the background. If the Hindutva organizations are to be put in their proper place in the margins of history, where they were prior to 1990, the secular and democratic forces will have to address popular concerns and resolve to contain terrorism rather than allow the Hindutva organizations to exploit it.

For the sake of their common welfare and the greatness of their shared homeland, Hindus and Muslims in India might be best advised to follow the words of a Muslim emperor of the Mughal dynasty, which ruled much of the subcontinent, endured for more than three centuries, and presided over a period of prosperity and cultural accomplishment:

*Written for the strengthening of the Empire of Hindustan, consisting of various religions. Domination and sovereignty whereof has been bestowed on you by the grace of the Almighty. It is incumbent that religious bigotries should be wiped off the table of the heart, and justice meted out to each religion according to its own tenets. Specially, abstain from sacrifice of cows as this would tend to win the hearts of the people of Hindustan and the populace of the country would be loyal to the Royal favours. The temples and places of worship of whatever religion under the Royal authority may not be desecrated. Such justice may be adopted that the King may be pleased with the Rayyat [subjects] and the Rayyat with the King. The advancement of Islam is better achieved with the weapon of obligation rather than with the sword of tyranny. Overlook the disputes between Sunnis and Shias since such weakness still persists in Islam.*
This paper examines the patterns that characterize terrorism, insurgency, and crime in South Asia and the degree to which the three phenomena overlap. The contribution of poverty, bad governance, and corruption to these security threats is explored, as well as their transborder dimension.

Terrorism here is understood as the use or threat of violence against civilians for the accomplishment of political objectives. The scope of the present analysis includes violence by non-state actors as well as covert state collusion in non-state violence.

Insurgencies traditionally are viewed as armed groups with some public support and relative freedom of control and movement in their areas of operations. In almost all cases, they espouse and/or promote an ideology based on class, identity, or other motivations for overthrowing or displacing governments. They may use terrorism for this purpose.

Transnational crimes are crimes committed by professional cartels spanning more than one country, usually with no primary political or religious motive. These cartels engage in activities such as extortion, irregular financial transactions like money laundering and hawala (an informal system of money transfers, suspected of being used to fund terrorist operations), contract killing, settling money disputes, and in some cases trafficking in drugs, weapons, and humans.

Investigation of cases of terrorism and/or transnational crime is hampered by poor bilateral relations in the region. Terrorism and transborder crime cannot be prevented unless there is an effective system in South Asia for regional cooperation. History has repeatedly shown terrorism and crime to be of equal concern to all the states of the region. Within all these countries, intelligence, enforcement, administrative, and judicial organs are in a state of decay due to politicization, bad governance, and corruption, leading to insufficient justice delivery systems. The resulting lawlessness directly contributes to general disaffection and emboldens terrorism, insurgency, and organized crime, with transnational effects.

Factors Shaping Popular Attitudes toward Violence
The history of South Asia has had an important effect on perceptions of the legitimacy of recent acts of violence. Terrorism has historical antecedents in the early struggle in Bengal against the British rule and the social and economic injustices
it perpetrated. Rural insurgency in the subcontinent traces its roots to armed mobilization around local grievances in the 1946 Telengana Agrarian Uprising in Central India. This in turn sowed the seeds for the modern Naxalites. Established in 1967, the group metamorphosed into the People’s War Group (PWG) in the 1970s and 1980s and then merged with the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) to become the CPI (Maoist) in 2004.

During the second half of the twentieth century, the distinctions between insurgents and terrorists blurred, and a degree of public sympathy was bestowed on those claiming to be “freedom fighters.” To this day, many human rights and economic justice activists in India do not consider Naxalite attacks to be terrorism because the cause is “justifiable.” The same might be said of various Pakistanis’ attitudes toward jihadis operating in Indian Jammu and Kashmir, in Afghanistan, or even within Pakistan.

The roots of this ambivalence lie in the ambiguity about political violence that marked the political history of the region under imperialism. Casual observers wonder about the high level of civil conflict in the country of Mahatma Gandhi, the architect of modern nonviolent political resistance. Ironically, Mohammed Ali Jinnah (who eventually led the Muslim League’s demand for a separate nation), while still a member of the Indian National Congress leadership, opposed Gandhi’s mass mobilization tactics on the grounds *inter alia* that they would lead to violence. Compounding the irony is that the mass mobilization from which Jinnah kept his distance was one in favor of a Muslim cause—namely, the restoration of the Turkish Caliphate. That the Muslim League, under Jinnah’s leadership, should eventually have availed itself of the tactical convenience of alliance with violent mobilizations in support of the establishment of Pakistan merely completes the circle of irony. Surely these antecedents are not immaterial to contemporary cultural attitudes to political violence in either nation.

The ability of the state to deliver welfare, services, and justice through its administrative and judicial organs is critical to maintaining the loyalty of the population and thus the legitimacy of the government. If this mechanism breaks down, there is danger of marginalized groups resorting to violence, including terrorism. Much of the left-wing violence in India and Nepal originated in this sort of neglect. Mani Shankar Iyer, Union Minister for Panchayati Raj, told the press in Mumbai on June 18, 2007 that the Naxalite movement was spreading in Maharashtra because the local government was not implementing rural development schemes. If the gap between government agencies and marginalized sections of society is wide, the prospect of marginalization metamorphosing into antistate violence, in the form of terrorism or insurgencies, becomes considerable.

NGOs may fill the gap as connectors between the administration and marginalized sections of society. In this connection, the role of the Mohalla Committee in Mumbai deserves special mention. Established in the wake of 1993 Hindu-Muslim communal riots, this NGO was able to act as a bridge between the two communities and
raise their confidence level to such an extent that there were no further incidents of communal violence in the sprawling city, despite riots occurring in the neighboring state of Gujarat. The role of this NGO in bringing communities together and fostering a feeling of participation among minorities may have been a significant factor in stemming what could have been an uncontrollable vicious cycle of community conflict, terrorist recruitment, and terrorist attacks. (In Kerala state in India, with close to equal numbers of Hindus, Muslims, and Christians, there is little social violence or terrorism. Various sections of Kerala society have a great deal of social and political empowerment, which functions as insurance against terrorism or insurgency.)

Acts of mitigation such as those carried out by the Mohalla Committee can be considered manifestations of democracy. Yet there is not a simple correlation between democracy and social peace. Indeed, a democracy has inherent difficulties in tackling terrorism and insurgency. Strong-arm measures cannot be taken, nor can draconian laws be enacted, since such measures turn key populations against the government. Even if terrorists are not bound by human rights rules, a democratic setup cannot ignore such considerations. It can be argued that India’s democracy did not prevent the strong-arm measures that destroyed terrorism and insurgency in Punjab. However, the fact that 700 Punjab police officers are now facing inquiries or prosecution for human rights violations cannot be ignored. Also, every encounter or arrest, even by the armed forces in special circumstances, has to be properly documented and detainees brought to the criminal courts for trial. Evidence in such cases is difficult to get. The police have no control over judicial delays, which tend to militate against prosecution since witnesses may lose interest or be intimidated.

An important part of the enabling environment for antistate violence in almost all South Asian societies is the tolerance and sympathy, among those social movements and critics of the state that are nonviolent as a matter of principle, for those who employ violence. This curious phenomenon relies in large part on the shared perception, by nonviolent and violent actors alike, of the state’s dubious legitimacy and responsiveness to popular will. Despite their very different tactical choices and their ethical opposition to the use of political violence, many nonviolent critics feel a high degree of antagonism toward an unresponsive and unjust state. Activists observe that their nonviolent demands are met with neglect or even contempt, whereas those who take up arms are often to be found in negotiations with the state, as has been the case in North-East India.

Finally, recent findings from India suggest caution in accepting the conventional wisdom about the motives of individuals engaging in violent antistate activities. Violence in Punjab between 1981 and 2000 led to 21,612 deaths. The common impression was that discrimination against the Sikh religion and the consequent Sikh religious militancy had led to this terrorism. However, a 1999 study by academics Harish K. Puri, Paramjit Singh Judge, and Jagrup Singh Sekhon, of Guru Nanak
Dev University, Amritsar, led to a different conclusion. Three hundred and twenty-three participants in terrorist violence in 28 affected villages in four districts gave the following reasons for participation: 38 percent for adventure and thrills; 21 percent because of peer pressure by other terrorists; 12 percent for looting and smuggling; 5 percent believed in the cause of “Khalistan,” an independent Sikh nation; 3 percent were under the charismatic influence of Sant Bhindranwale; and 4 percent were upset by the assault on the Golden Temple and the anti-Sikh riots that followed the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. This study also suggests caution in drawing conclusions about growing religious extremism in South Asia.

**INSURGENCY**

In North-East India, insurgencies in Nagaland and Manipur started immediately after Indian Independence, as a sizable faction of locals did not accept the merger with the Indian Union. Poor state responses, including bad governance, encouraged other separatist political movements such as the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU), which in turn led to the creation of insurgencies such as the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). Migration from Bangladesh exacerbated ethnic insecurities about cultural identity, demographic inundation, and competition for livelihoods, helping sustain the insurgencies in Tripura, Assam, and Meghalaya.

Insurgencies in South Asia have often gained momentum through promotion and support from neighboring states or sympathetic local government agencies. However, once started, insurgencies are difficult to control and have often had significantly destabilizing effects on the states that supported them. Fear of a communist takeover in Afghanistan in the wake of the Daud coup in 1973 led to support from successive Pakistani governments, starting with that of Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto, for the consolidation of Afghan Islamic forces operating from Pakistan. The roots of a variety of current problems in both Pakistan and Afghanistan are linked to the support by successive state actors for violent non-state organizations. This is also the case in Indian Jammu and Kashmir, where Pakistani government support for insurgency and terrorism has added to the tension and violence of the conflict. Similarly, Indian central government collusion with extremists was seen as an important facilitator of the Khalistan insurgency in Indian Punjab. Among the characteristics of the “Khalistan” movement are many typically associated with insurgencies in the region: ethnic grievances, rural insurgency, terrorist attacks on civilians outside the primary area of conflict, enmeshment with organized crime, transnational networks, and foreign support.

As insurgencies grow, they often take on a life of their own. In Burma, independence from the British in 1948 facilitated a communist insurgency in ethnic minority areas, and the communists almost captured power in the late 1940s and 1950s. The insurgency developed into a form of ethnic rebellion that lasted through the 1990s and may still be observed today, albeit in weakened form. In Sri Lanka, an
North-East India: Identity, Integration, Migration, and Conflict

Perpetually subordinated to the Kashmir issue by analysts and policy makers, the long-running insurgencies in India’s northeast region may eventually prove to be more dangerous, hemorrhaging the Indian state from within and destabilizing its neighbors. Isolated geographically, culturally, and politically from the Indian heartland, the eight states—Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura—have seen “perfect storm” conditions of ethnic diversity, illegal immigration, poor governance, and economic deprivation. This has given rise to dozens of armed groups such as the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), United National Liberation Front (UNLF) in Manipur, All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) in Tripura, National Socialist Council of Nagalim–Isak Swu-Muivah (NSCN-IM) in Nagaland, and Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) in Meghalaya. Starting in 1952, these long-running insurgencies have resulted in at least 40,000 casualties since 1979. Their demands range from autonomous states within India to secession.

With a history of de facto independence prior to political assimilation into India, many groups in North-East India have felt themselves to be under threat. Their cultures, traditional livelihoods, territories, and economic opportunities have felt threatened by illegal immigration from Bangladesh, as well as internal migration of other ethnic groups from other parts of India. They have accused the government of stripping the region of its mineral resources, ignoring economic development, and flooding the area with migrants. This has given rise to an ethno-tribal revanchism that inefficient and corrupt governance has not only failed to resolve but has exacerbated.

The situation in Assam presents a snapshot of the complexity of the problem. The ULFA insurgency has its roots in ethnic Assamese concerns about large flows of illegal migrants from Bangladesh through the 1970s and the resulting competition for land and jobs. What started as an anti-outsider and anti-foreigner movement has metamorphosed into a demand for an independent Assam. Concurrently, the state has also seen intertribal conflict, with another indigenous tribe, the Bodos, opposing the ethnic Assamese. Once the majority along the northern bank of the Brahmaputra River, the Bodos have been reduced to a minority, giving rise to the movement for a Bodo homeland carved from Assam. Although the main Bodo insurgent group, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), signed a ceasefire with the government in 2005 that held through 2007, there is increasing frustration on its part with the government’s failure to address its concerns. This represents the trend through the region. The government’s attempts at dialogue with the insurgent groups have met with only sporadic success, as a result of the unviability of the demands owing to the complexity of demographic distribution over particular territories.

Neighboring countries have been drawn into the North-East’s conflicts as well. Insurgent groups have sought safe havens across the borders in Myanmar, Bhutan, and Bangladesh, destabilizing the border regions and leading to joint operations between their respective military forces and Indian troops.

ethnic competition over employment opportunities in the 1950s took the form of a controversy over the official language, spawning both a Sinhalese anti-Tamil movement and a Tamil ethnic movement. These in turn led to an armed Tamil insurgency, which now shows no signs of being amenable to any form of negotiated settlement. Armed Tamil groups that have agreed to a political settlement have
been sidelined by the binary opposition between the armed forces and the armed rebellion. In Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Burma, insurgencies have assumed the shape of regular war.

Most insurgencies in this region had a substantial popular base initially, but many have lost public support as the authoritarian behavior of their leadership has alienated supporters. Also, the insurgencies’ original raison d’etre has become less relevant because of constantly changing social, economic, and political situations. Therefore, these groups have often had to seek public support through intimidation and coercion. It has been observed that insurgency and terrorism are “good business” for the leadership. Several insurgent formations, such as Naga and Assamese groups, extort funds from citizens, local bodies, traders, and other agencies, unimpeded by local administrations.

In the absence of a strong state presence, insurgencies can operate as forms of local government. The Nagas run a parallel government, undertaking tax collection as well as rendering instant justice in areas they control. Leftist groups like the Indian Naxalites or Nepali Maoists render quick justice and undertake small development projects. In Nepal, there are complaints that the Maoists do not allow government officials and other groups into their territory, despite having rejoined the interim coalition government after originally joining it in January 2007 and then leaving in September 2007 over a dispute arising out of the abolition of the monarchy. In Pakistan’s border areas such as Swat and Waziristan, groups have established varying degrees of administrative and ideological control.

As can be seen, in the South Asia region, classical differences among terrorism, insurgency, and guerilla warfare have blurred, and different groups adopt any convenient means, including frontal assaults on targets, to achieve their aims. An integral feature of the situation is the easy availability of illegal weapons and funds. Despite regulatory restrictions on financial transactions, militants and criminals are able to transfer funds relatively freely. The routine extortion of “taxes” from local industries and businesses goes unchecked.

**INEFFECTIVE REGIONAL AND BILATERAL COOPERATION ON TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME**

A nexus among terrorism, extremist ideology, and organized crime is apparent. The 1993 serial bomb blasts in Bombay were carried out by the Dawood Ibrahim organization, the most powerful criminal gang in Bombay, to avenge the killing of Muslims there after Hindu zealots destroyed the Babri Masjid (Mosque of Babri) in Uttar Pradesh. In February 1998, serial blasts were carried out in Coimbatore in South India on the orders of criminal turned fundamentalist S. A. Basha, to intimidate Hindu traders transgressing on Muslim commercial turf. In July 2001, the shoe tycoon Partha Roy Burman was abducted in Kolkata by the criminal Afzal Ansari for a huge ransom, which was delivered to Omar Sayed Sheikh of Jaish-e-Mohammed and later sent to Mohammad Atta before 9/11.
Two Pakistani nationals, Mohammed Asif of Karachi and Mohammed Rafiq Haji of Multan, were arrested by Mumbai police on December 30, 1999 for robbing a bank in suburban Mumbai in October in order to fund the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight 814 from Kathmandu on December 24, 1999. This hijacking had international ramifications, since the Pakistani hijackers succeeded in forcing the release of three terrorists from Indian jails: Maulana Mohammad Masood Azar, chief of Jaish-e-Mohammed; Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar, leader of Al-Umar; and Omar Sayed Sheikh, a British-born militant who is reported to have been involved in the killing of American journalist Daniel Pearl in January 2002.

There is a growing realization throughout the world that transborder terrorism and organized crime cannot be controlled without bilateral or regional cooperation. National leadership in the South Asia region recognizes the need for such cooperation, but is unable to translate the principle into action owing to historical bilateral suspicions.

The Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism was signed in Kathmandu in November 1987 and ratified by the Third SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) Summit in 1988. It committed member states to denying safe haven to terrorists and insurgents and to extraditing or prosecuting alleged terrorists. Member states also agreed to exchange information, intelligence, and expertise. As a result, the SAARC Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk (STOMD) was set up in Colombo to collate, analyze, and disseminate information about terrorist incidents. The Eighth SAARC Summit in May 1995 expressed serious concern over terrorism. The Fourteenth SAARC Summit in New Delhi in April 2007 decided to implement existing conventions on terrorism and enhance cooperation among member states in tackling organized crime. The Home Ministers’ meeting in Delhi in October 2007 resolved to take “proactive and sustained” measures to implement the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and Additional Protocol. Members also agreed to accelerate implementation of the Draft Convention on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and to upgrade the existing mechanism for cooperation and exchange of information.

In actual practice, however, no effective coordination is occurring because of a “trust deficit” among SAARC member countries. The only progress made through the SAARC mechanism has been an increase in the frequency of meetings of the police chiefs, who now get together twice a year. On the bilateral side, the much hyped Joint Anti-Terror Mechanism (JATM) announced by the prime minister of India and president of Pakistan (Havana Agreement, September 2006) also seems to have gone nowhere. The Hindu, on October 25, 2007, had this to say: “The October 22 meeting of the Joint Anti-Terror Mechanism (JATM) saw little other than mutual recrimination—recrimination, moreover, pulled verbatim from the last round of dialogue in March.” India regularly accuses Bangladesh of providing safe haven to the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and Islamic groups like
Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami (HuJI), while Afghanistan accuses Pakistan of active support of the Taliban.

The Bangladeshi newspaper *The Daily Star* reported on May 10, 2006 that SAARC police chiefs felt that STOMD was not “actively working, and they wanted to set up a ‘SAARCPOL’ along the lines of ‘EUROPOL.’” It is not clear whether the SDOMD (SAARC Drug Offences Monitoring Desk) is able to bring coordinated action against drug trafficking in the region. According to the US State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2007, only India and Pakistan regularly share information through SDOMD. In August 2007, the Home Secretaries of India and Bangladesh decided to revive the Joint Working Group (JWG) to exchange “actionable” information to check terrorism and render mutual cooperation. To what extent this will translate into action remains to be seen, in view of Indian suspicions that the Bangladesh-based terrorist group HuJI was involved in recent bomb blasts in Hyderabad.

**Multiple Threats: The Case of India**

India suffers from both cross-border and homegrown religious extremism, as well as ethnic and left-wing insurgency. Many terrorist and insurgent groups operate across borders and are either based in other countries or cooperate with groups in other countries. Although there is no evidence of an official Al-Qaeda presence in India, many incidents since 2006 bear the marks of ideological inspiration from Al-Qaeda. Islamic extremist groups that are based in Pakistan or Bangladesh and operate regularly in India, principally in Jammu and Kashmir, include Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Al-Badr, Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami, and Jamatul Mujahideen. It is believed that the top leaders of various violent Sikh groups, including Babbar Khalsa International, the Khalistan Commando Force, the International Sikh Youth Federation, the Khalistan Zindabad Force, and Dal Khalsa, are all based in Pakistan.

Some observers have reported a nexus between Indian Maoists and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and among Maoists, the Pakistani ISI, and Islamic or Kashmiri groups. There have also been suggestions of operational coordination between Nepali Maoists and their Indian counterparts. The present Maoist (Naxalite) movement in India is based largely in tribal areas in 170 districts in 12 states. During 2006, Maoists conducted 1,509 raids, killing 521 civilians and 157 security personnel. From January through October of 2007, they killed 172 security personnel and 197 civilians, mostly government servants or landlords. They also conducted attacks on jails in two states and freed the prisoners. In February 2007, they held a “Unity Conference” in an undisclosed location and decided to join the over-ground political opposition to several development projects being undertaken in tribal areas for the exploitation of natural resources. Although the connections between Indian Maoists and their Nepali counterparts, whom they consider to be
“revisionists,” have been disputed, both belong to the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA).

In North-East India, the major movements are two factions of Nagas (Isak Swu-Muivah and Khaplang), whose leadership is based in Europe, Thailand, and Burma. The Seven Sister States in North-East India comprise 75 major population groups that speak 420 languages and dialects out of a total of 1,652 Indian languages and dialects. Many fear the loss of identity of their separate cultures. Tripura, which had a 56 percent tribal population in 1921, now has less than 28 percent. There are 15 major insurgency movements in this area, accounting for

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### Burma and Its Energy-Hungry Neighbors

The discovery of large natural gas reserves in the Shwe field off the coast of Rakhine State, Burma, in January 2004 led to a race between China and India for access to Burma’s energy resources. Foreign companies that have signed agreements with Burma for oil and gas exploration rights include China National Offshore Oil Corporation, Essar Oil Ltd. (the first Indian private oil company to invest in Burma’s energy sector), and GAIL Ltd., a state-owned Indian gas company. In 2007, Indian and Chinese corporations signed contracts for further exploration in deepwater offshore blocks near Rakhine State. Both countries have also invested heavily in hydropower in Burma.

Rights to natural gas from the Shwe field became a focus of international contention. India had expected to obtain sole rights to it. However, a disagreement with Bangladesh over the building of a pipeline through that country stalled the plan. China took advantage of the delay to get first access to the gas and was awarded the right to build an oil-and-gas pipeline from the Shwe field to Yunnan Province.

India’s recent abandoning of its long-standing hostility to the Burmese junta reflects both its own interests and its concern about China’s increasing influence in Burma. China has supplied military equipment to Burma since the 1990s and has funded ports and military bases in Burmese territory. Burma gave the Chinese access to the Little and Great Coco Islands in 1992; this access allows China to monitor the movements of the navies of India and other nations throughout the eastern Indian Ocean. India also sees Burma as a means of access to the markets of Southeast Asia and as a necessary partner for countering the insurgency in North-East India, since Burma has become a haven for the Indian insurgents.

China’s and India’s investments in the energy sector in Burma have propped up the junta that is responsible for ethnic unrest, human rights abuses, widespread poverty, illegal drug trafficking, human trafficking and forced relocation, and the spread of HIV/AIDS. These problems do not respect national borders, and India and China can expect to suffer their consequences. Major infrastructure projects, such as oil-and-gas pipelines and dams, will only compound problems such as environmental degradation, forced relocation of villagers, unemployment, and increased militarization in the areas where the projects are constructed.

**Sources:** Asia Times Online; Daily India; Mizzima News (India/Thailand); Myanmar Times.
1,366 incidents in 2006, involving the deaths of 309 civilians and 76 security personnel. Three hundred ninety-five insurgents were also killed. The Burmese Junta, at the request of the government of India, raided 50 camps of Naga (Khaplang) in January 2007.

Cooperation was also extended by Bhutan in the form of the eviction of elements of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), based mainly in Bangladesh, and Bodo insurgents in 2003. (ULFA, which wants a “sovereign Assam,” got its first consignment of arms in 1995 from the Khmer Rouge stockpile; the intermediary was General Bo Mya of the Burmese Karen National Union. ULFA was responsible for 24 deadly bomb attacks in Assam in 2007. However, it has recently been losing public support. In January 2007, the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi cited results of a public opinion poll undertaken by Assam Public Works, an Assam NGO: 95.53 percent of the 2,564,128 respondents in nine districts did not support an independent Assam.)

Even when a cease-fire is proclaimed, an insurgent group can still operate as a deeply entrenched parallel government. The headquarters of the Isak Swu-Muivah, a faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) is found in Hebron, 40 kilometers from Dimapur, the official capital of Nagaland (called “Nagalim” by the Nagas). The headquarters is labeled Government of the People’s Republic of Nagalim (GPRN), and the parallel government has its own Parliament (Tatar Hoho) and an army based at Mount Gilead. It collects its own taxes (house tax, loyalty tax, and army ration tax), issues receipts for the same, and has an Accountant General, National Bureau of Intelligence, and Anti-Corruption Bureau. GPRN issues “work permits” to “migrant workers” from “India” for an annual fee of 130 rupees.

Many recent terrorist incidents in India have been anonymous:

- March 7, 2006: synchronized bombings in Varanasi (21 dead)
- July 11, 2006: Mumbai train serial bombings (209 dead)
- September 8, 2006: Malegaon Mosque bombing (38 dead)
- February 19, 2007: bombing of the India-Pakistan Samjauta Express train (68 dead, mostly Pakistanis)
- May 18, 2007: Mecca Masjid bombing in Hyderabad (16 killed)
- August 27, 2007: twin bomb blasts in Lumbini Park and a shopping center in Hyderabad (89 killed)
- October 11, 2007: bomb attack on Ajmer Sharif (2 killed)
- October 14, 2007: bombing in a Ludhiana cinema house (6 dead)

Evidence of an increased sophistication in methods has been seen in these attacks. The Mecca Masjid bombing was triggered through a cell phone, the first known application of this technique in the area. A cigarette bomb was used on June 20,
2007 against an ex-militant commander in Srinagar who had once belonged to Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. In most of these cases, the police were able to arrest only foot soldiers—those who transported explosives or rendered support services but did not have a hand in planning the incidents.

Because so many of these incidents apparently focused on Muslim targets, a degree of uncertainty has arisen about the presumption that terrorist incidents are the work of Islamic zealots and perpetrated by Islamic extremist groups. In the wake of the Ludhiana bombing, there were indications that the dormant Sikh militancy might be reviving. M. K. Narayanan, national security adviser, noted that a lot of efforts were being made to revive Sikh militancy and he also saw signs of the reemergence of militant groups in Canada, the US, and Germany.

NEPAL AND SRI LANKA: PERSISTENT CONFLICT AND ELUSIVE PEACE

Nepal

One of the remarkable stories of the twenty-first century is how the outlawed Nepali Maoist movement transformed itself into a parliamentary body after signing a peace deal in 2006, taking part in the interim government in April 2007, and offering its weapons for UN inspection. This movement, which had an armed force of 31,000, commenced its armed struggle in 1996; the conflict resulted in 13,000 deaths. The situation remains fragile, and there are complaints that the Maoist cadres are not allowing other political parties to enter their strongholds. In July 2007, they seized land belonging to former Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa in Dhankuta district in Eastern Nepal. They have also been accused of abducting people for parallel court trials for alleged criminal and antisocial activities. This did not prevent former US President Jimmy Carter from praising the Maoists and recommending that the US government engage in a dialogue with the former rebels, whose main demands have been abolition of the monarchy and proportional representation.

Despite the politization and domestication of the Maoist insurgency, other serious sources of armed political violence and insurgency remain. The Madhesis of the Terai region, which accounts for 40 percent of the population of Nepal, have advanced claims for federalism and proportional representation of their own. Eleven armed groups are operating in the Terai, including Jantantrik Terai Mukti Morcha and Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha, once part of the Maoists. The Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJP) also consists of former Maoists. Madhesi Peoples’ Rights Forum (MPRF) and the Madhesi National Liberation Front (MNLF), a Terai front of the Maoists, are the other main groups in this sensitive region. One of the worst cases of violence occurred between MPRF and MJF activists and the Maoist Youth Communist League (YCL) on March 21, 2007 in Gaur, when 29 Maoists were beaten to death. The Maoist leadership has
provoked the Terai parties by branding them as “hooligans” or pro-Royalists. They also allege that the Indian Hindu religious parties are meddling in the Terai region.

The situation is one of “Dormant War,” as one Nepalese writer puts it. There are also reports that Hindu extremists led by “Parivartan,” a former police officer, have formed a “Nepal Defence Army.” This shadowy organization made its debut on June 20, 2007 by bombing the Maoist office in Kathmandu. The splits among Maoists in the Terai are reflected elsewhere in the country. Nepal faces grave uncertainty, and democracy has done more to accentuate conflicts than to help in their mediation.

Sri Lanka

The conflict between the Sri Lanka government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has defied repeated attempts at solution, including international mediation. The conflict exhibits many of the characteristics of regular warfare, with the LTTE now having both aerial and naval military capacity. However, the LTTE’s willingness to deliberately attack civilian targets clearly marks the conflict as a terrorist phenomenon as well. At least 70,000 lives have been lost in this conflict. Jane’s Intelligence Review (July 2007) provides a detailed account of the global financial operations of this insurgent outfit with a profit margin exceeding that of a multinational corporation. It has strategically positioned around the globe well-organized financial and procurement structures that are integral to prolonging its campaign for a separate Tamil state. Two overarching financial and procurement bodies that are the main source of LTTE money, manpower, and weapons are the Aiyanna Group and the Office of Overseas Purchases (KP Department). The LTTE also has charitable front organizations to raise money from expatriate Tamil communities.

LTTE uses neighboring countries like India and the Maldives for storage and provisioning of arms, explosives, and military supplies. In January 2007, a major supply route for procuring ball bearings from Mumbai was unearthed with the arrest of an operative who is alleged to have sent almost six metric tons of ball bearings to Sri Lanka. In the same month, a consignment of gelex boosters (to augment explosive charges) was detected going from Andhra Pradesh. In December 2006, live rockets were discovered in Tamil Nadu. On May 16, 2007, India helped the Maldives to sink an Indian fishing trawler hijacked by LTTE guerillas, which was found to be laden with explosives. The Sri Lanka government strongly suspects that the LTTE has moved its hideouts from Mannar to South India in response to repeated government offensives.

A byproduct of this conflict has been the revival of a distinct Muslim political identity. Muslims, who once coexisted with the Sinhalese and the Tamils, feel victimized by the conflict, which they increasingly perceive as one between Sinhalese
and Tamils. The discourse and policies throughout the world in the aftermath of 9/11 have reinforced this sense of a threatened Islamic identity, adding to the increasingly combative attitude of Sri Lanka’s Muslims.

EMERGING ISSUES: BANGLADESH, MALDIVES, AND BHUTAN

Bangladesh

In the years before 9/11, Bangladesh suffered only 7 violent terrorist incidents, with a total of 58 fatalities. Between 2001 and 2006, there were 553 incidents, with 570 fatalities. This represents an increase 4.5 times the global average. International Crisis Group reported 450 simultaneous bombings in Bangladesh in August 2005. The first suicide bombings took place in December 2005.

Four Islamic terrorist organizations are particularly significant in Bangladesh:

- The Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami (HuJI) has a strong presence in coastal areas (Chittagong, Cox Bazaar). There are reports that this group was set up in 1992 with Osama bin Laden’s help. It is also reported to have had close links with the Indian Aftab Ansari, who was involved in the attack on the American Center in Kolkata in January 2002 and arranged the abduction for ransom of Kolkata “shoe king” Partha Roy Burman in July 2001. HuJI is reportedly connected with the Asif Reza Commando Force and also is alleged to be giving shelter to Assamese ULFA cadres. It is also reported to have been responsible for various terrorist incidents in India, including the Samjauta Express bombing, the Mecca Masjid bombing, and the Lumbini Park bombing.

- The Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) is reported to be pro-Taliban and fighting against the left-wing Purba Banglar Communist Party (PBCP). JMJB activities are in Northwest Bangladesh (Rajshahi and Jessore). However, the hanging of the JMJB top leadership in March 2007 seems to have seriously damaged this organization.

- The Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) is reportedly the origin of the JMJB. The JMB was linked to the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), which led the last civilian government, and to the Islamic Chatra Shibir, the student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami, which was in a coalition government with the BNP.

- A new organization named Zadid al-Qaeda threatened on May 19, 2007 to blow up the 100-year-old Hardinge Bridge, connecting the southwestern and northern regions of Bangladesh. This group exploded bombs in Dhaka, Chittagong, and Sylhet railway stations early in May.

Also of note is the Purba Banglar Communist Party (PBCP), led by Mofakkar Chowdhury. Its objective is to capture power through armed struggle. Like the Indian Maoists, the group targets rich landowners and contractors and extorts levies from them. The group’s area of operations is Southwest Bangladesh (at
the border with West Bengal and in Khulna). The PBCP was associated with 13 incidents in 2007.

There have been reports of the proscribed militants regrouping in southwestern districts. There are also concerns that Britons appear to be traveling to Bangladesh in increasing numbers for terrorism training. British counterterrorism officials have recently visited Bangladesh to brief local officials about this issue.

**Maldives**

On September 29, 2007, a bomb exploded in the Maldives capital, Male, injuring 12 foreign tourists and raising fears of a Bali-type situation, in which foreigners were blamed for importing Western mores that offended local Muslims. President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom termed the attack a conspiracy by disgruntled political opponents who wanted to tarnish the reputation of the country. The blast came soon after Gayoom won a referendum to maintain the presidential system of government, a vote the opposition dismissed as “rigged.” International jurists have criticized the misuse of antiterrorism laws in the country to deal with civil disobedience and the continued detention of political opponents. Meanwhile, there are fears that local Muslim youth are undergoing radicalization.

**Bhutan**

It is alleged that Bhutan has used Indian insurgent groups based in Bhutan, including ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam) and NDFB (National Democratic Front of Bodoland), to force the Nepali-speaking population to emigrate. India has asked Bhutan to flush out the Indian insurgents, but as late as February 2007 there were reports that ULFA had abducted an Indian border roads engineer and kept him confined in Bhutan.

**Crime as an Enabling Environment**

**Small Arms**

International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) estimates that 75 million small arms are present in South Asia, 63 million of which are in civilian hands. India accounts for 40 million, Pakistan for 20 million, and Nepal and Sri Lanka for 3 million.

In India, 47,311 lives were lost in the period between 1994 and 2005 as a result of small arms violence. In Pakistan, 250,000 illicit small arms had been confiscated and 129,980 people arrested for possession of small arms as of April 2003. A Tripartite Commission (Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United States) was set up in 2003 to tackle this issue. South Asian syndicates appear to be using Bangladesh as a transit point for smuggling weapons. Forty percent of Bangladeshi illegal arms are used by individuals under age 18. In March 2005,
the Sri Lanka government set up the National Commission Against Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms (NCAPISA).

Narcotics

The narcotics trade has various transnational dimensions. Pakistan serves as the processing and transshipment point for Afghan opium going to European heroin markets. Indian Jammu and Kashmir is an additional transshipment point for the Pakistani product. There is trade between Burma and India in opium, barbiturates, and methamphetamines. In each instance, the trade coincides with the presence of cross-border armed activity.

Pakistan is the transit point for 36 percent of Afghan exports of opium. Pakistani traffickers have a major share in funding poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, although Pakistan itself has reduced its poppy cultivation area by 39 percent as a result of stringent measures by the NWFP (North-West Frontier Province) government. It is estimated that 14 percent of the Afghan population is actively involved in opium cultivation. Eighty percent of that opium is produced along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, with Helmand being the center of both this trade and the Taliban insurgency. With such a high profit margin in poppy production—an Afghan farmer can earn US$4,600 per hectare annually if he cultivates opium and only US$530 if he grows wheat—there is not much incentive at local levels to stop it. Efforts at herbicidal eradication of poppies have fueled insurgency in parts of Afghanistan where poppy crops are interspersed with legitimate crops. In October 2007, a consignment of A-999 grade heroin, manufactured in Afghanistan and packaged in Pakistan, with a street value of US$400,000 was seized from suspected couriers belonging to the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Toiba in Indian Jammu and Kashmir.

Burma is the world’s second largest producer of illicit opium (380 metric tons in 2005—an increase of over 13 percent from 2004). Insurgent groups like the United Wa State Army and the Shans are deeply involved in this trade. India is a major importer of the drug, and the North-East India insurgent groups finance their activities by smuggling drugs to India from Burma. A serious riot took place on June 9, 2007 in Moreh in Manipur on the Burma-India border between two insurgent groups, the Kuki National Army (KNA) and the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) of the Meities, indigenous Hindu inhabitants of the area. Eleven people were killed in this dispute regarding illegal trade through the Moreh checkpoint.

An article in Manipur Online (February 18, 2006) by Subir Bhaumik, BBC’s Eastern India correspondent, graphically described the problem. The International Narcotics Control Bureau (INCB) has said that 70 percent of the amphetamines available in the world are produced in the Golden Triangle, particularly Burma. Production increased from 100 million tablets in 1993 to 800 million in 2002.
Bhaumik says that Burmese drug cartels are using North-East India to send their cargo to Bangladesh. This has resulted in increased drug addiction in the region. The Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) has estimated that there are at least 120,000 addicts in the region, and intravenous drug use has fueled the rise in HIV infections. One worrisome aspect is the emergence of collusion among rebels, drug lords, and officialdom. In Kolkata, the Narcotics Control Bureau raided a lab run by the Ah Hua network of Yunnan and North Burma in an apartment owned by

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**Afghanistan’s Illicit Trade**

Afghanistan lies at the crossroads of Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East and has been a hub for trade going back to the time of the Silk Road. Passes through its surrounding mountain ranges provide easy access to and from these different regions. Its location is Afghanistan’s greatest asset regarding trade, but its greatest problem regarding geopolitics. Instability both within and around Afghanistan has made it a hotbed of illicit trade.

The illicit trade ranges from the smuggling of legal goods such as timber and tea to the trafficking of drugs and small arms. Because of its position on the Silk Road, weapons have been brought into Afghanistan for centuries, with outside states sponsoring the central government being the greatest importers historically. Currently, weapons are procured in exchange for the fruits of Afghanistan’s biggest cash crop: opium used to make heroin. This trade has resulted in more than just a well-armed smuggling and drug trafficking mafia. Weapon ownership has never been illegal in Afghanistan and is seen as an inherent right of both individuals and groups. The country is awash in weapons and always ready to resume conflict.

Afghans are generally pragmatic when it comes to illegal trade. Decades of turbulence and war and the lack of development in areas of public health, infrastructure, and internal security have led to an attitude of disregard for centralized government and any laws it might try to enforce. Bribing local officials in order to procure basic services or other favors is a fact of life and not viewed as wrong. This attitude extends to illicit cross-border trade. Afghans do not necessarily differentiate between paying a “bribe” to a local power broker and paying a customs tariff to the government to obtain permission to trade a particular good. Traditional social networks based on ethnic and family ties still exert the greatest influence over life in Afghanistan, and cross-border illicit trade is bolstered by the strong ties between ethnic groups that span borders.

In order to counteract illicit trade, the Afghan government needs to better provide what the people require of it. This includes a functioning and less corrupt justice system, a concentration on basic infrastructure and health care outside regional and district capitals, and an increase of security in the south and east of the country. Appealing to the strong Afghan national pride could also help. If Afghans see illicit trade as a blot on their national honor and a tool of foreign influence in their affairs, they could be ready for a new paradigm.

**Sources:** United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; US Institute of Peace; Al Jazeera English; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
a police official. The six Chinese and Burmese nationals apprehended told officials that it was much easier to get the requisite poppy into Kolkata and sell the drugs in the Indian market than to transport tons of processing chemicals like acetic anhydride to remote Burmese locations from Kolkata.

**Human Trafficking and Illegal Migration**

Burma is a source country for the men, women, and children trafficked to East and Southeast Asia for sexual exploitation, domestic service, and forced commercial labor. It is also a transit and destination country for women trafficked from China. India’s Bureau of Police Research and Development noted that India is a source, transit, and destination country for humans trafficked for economic and sexual purposes, often through export to the Middle East. It is estimated that 200,000 Nepali girls are in Indian brothels, and 12,000 new ones are trafficked into India each year. A study by the Institute of Social Sciences in Delhi notes that 31 percent of the victims rescued from Delhi, Mumbai, and Kolkata brothels are from Nepal. A survey of 412 brothel owners showed that 34 percent of them have never faced prosecution. Fifty-three percent avoided arrest by bribing police, and 29.1 percent said that police had a share in their income.

The study also revealed that women and children from Assam and Bangladesh are trafficked to Burma and Southeast Asia via the Golden Triangle. One-third of these individuals were between 6 and 12 years old; children of 13 and 14 constituted another quarter. Respondents considered trafficking “low risk” and “high profit.” *Frontline* (June 15, 2007) quoted a Pakistani lawyers’ study finding that 200,000 Bangladeshi women were sold into slavery in Pakistan at rates ranging from US$50 to US$2,000 each. Most of them were then sold onward to West Asia.

There has also been a steep increase in the number of criminal networks devoted to smuggling Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, and others into developed economy labor markets. Migration from Bangladesh to India has grown from a few thousand in the 1970s to more than 3 million in 2002. Much of the domestic labor in Calcutta is now Bangladeshi and consists primarily of women and children. Living in constant fear of detection and deportation, they are liable to be underpaid and have little recourse if working conditions are unfair or even inhuman. The situation is similar for the hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshi men who work in India’s factories and increasingly on construction sites throughout cities. There may be at least 700,000 such illegal migrants in Mumbai.

**Financial Corruption and Currency Transfers**

Strict banking regulations in India do not seem to have prevented the generation of unaccounted-for cash. A New Delhi hotelier was caught in October 2006 in Hyderabad with 30 million rupees (US$700,000) in cash. Another 1.3 million rupees (US$30,000) was found in his locker in Hyderabad. His accomplice, a senior In-
Indian Administrative Service officer, was found to have 5.3 million rupees (US$120,000) in his possession. The origin or the purpose of this cash is unknown.

Illegal transfers also proliferate. In April 2007, a closed foreign bank (First Curacao International Bank) reappeared as a software firm in Bangalore (Transworld ICT Solutions) and conducted illegal money transfers worth several billion rupees. After the Ajmer Sharif bomb blast on October 11, 2007, investigation of the money trail led to a separatist leader in Jammu and Kashmir named G. M. Bhat, who was involved in a hawala transfer of 50 million rupees (US$1.1 million) from Delhi to the valley. Bhat had entrusted the funds, which were concealed in gas cylinders, to two couriers who were arrested by the police in Udhampur after they were involved in a car accident. It is illegal transfers made through legitimate channels such as the hawala network that are the hardest to detect and most common. Indeed, a report in Times of India (October 19, 2006) said that funds for most terrorist incidents in India were transferred into India through legitimate channels, such as wire transfers or the hawala system. This calls into question the efficacy of the Reserve Bank of India’s regulations requiring individual banks to check suspicious fund transfers.

GOVERNANCE FAILURES

All countries in South Asia suffer from inordinate judicial delays and consequent miscarriages of justice. The official website of the Indian National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) listed 1,013,240 criminal cases pending in 2005. Of these, 899,127 were more than one year old and 31,606 had been pending for more than 10 years. The trial over a communal riot in Bhagalpur (Bihar) in 1989, which killed 1,070 Muslims, was concluded only in June 2007. The cases arising from the 1998 serial bomb blasts in Coimbatore (Tamil Nadu), which killed 50 people, concluded in April 2007. Sentencing is still going on over the 1993 Bombay serial blasts, which killed 257 people. The Asian Human Rights Commission has spoken of similar delays in Pakistan, where a trial in lower courts can take up to 5 or 6 years and an appeal up to 20 years.

The fact that globalization has sharpened economic inequalities in India is putting serious pressure on security agencies. A recent report of the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector revealed that 836 million people (or 77 percent of India’s population) earn less than 20 rupees (US$0.45) a day. This is equivalent to the combined population of the United States, Indonesia, Brazil, and Russia. Dr. Arjun Sengupta, chairman of the Commission, said that three-fourths of the Indian population has been bypassed by the high rate of Indian economic growth.

Rural and urban poverty in India is spurring crime. The NCRB reports that thirty-five “mega cities” (those with populations of over a million) saw an increase in Indian Penal Code (IPC) crime, from 289,775 incidents in 2001 to 314,708 incidents
in 2005. Sixty percent of Mumbai’s 10.5 million people live in shanties. A 2006 study by the Tata Institute of Social Sciences in Mumbai found the homeless population to be between 250,000 and 500,000. Bangalore, the “Silicon Plateau” of India, has seen an unprecedented increase in crime. It has overtaken Mumbai and Delhi in crime, registering the fifth highest crime rate, or 9.2 percent of all the crimes recorded in India.

Many experts ascribe the growing strength of the Maoist movement to administrative lapses by the central and state governments, which do not understand the underlying issues of terrorism and insurgency and treat the phenomenon only as a law and order problem. This is despite the formation of the Inter-Ministerial Group (IMG) headed by the Additional Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), charged with focusing on underlying socioeconomic causes. The Asian Centre for Human Rights (ACHR) has estimated that 65 billion rupees (US$1.5

**Afghanistan’s Ethnic Faultlines**

Since the events of September 11, 2001, the conflict in Afghanistan has been viewed through the filters of the “war on terror” and radical Islam. It is illuminating, however, to apply a paradigm predicated on ethnic and tribal identities to current reconstruction efforts and the civil war that engulfed the country in the nineties.

When Afghanistan’s post-Soviet communist regime fell in 1992, Kabul was seized by Tajik and Uzbek troops commanded by mujahideen warlords such as Ahmad Shah Massoud and Abdul Rashid Dostum, who would go on to become commanders in the Northern Alliance opposing the Taliban. This was the first time in modern Afghanistan’s history that the Pashtun majority did not control the capital. The internecine conflict that followed was dominated by these warlords with power bases split along ethnic lines, paving the way for the emergence of the Taliban in the Pashtun-dominated southeast and involving neighboring countries ranging from Pakistan to the Central Asian nations.

NATO’s current reconstruction efforts continue to be hampered by this paradigm and the difficulty of understanding ethnic rivalry in the south. Adoption of the rhetoric of anti-terrorism has obscured the nuances of Pashtun mobilization along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. This has traditionally been the product of sub-national or tribal aspirations rather than fundamentalist ideology. It only exacerbates the situation that many of the warlords associated with the Northern Alliance and the ethnic rivalries and crimes of the civil war now hold positions of power in the Afghan government.

As long as this tension between democratization and ethno-tribal factionalism remains unresolved, stabilizing Afghanistan will be a difficult proposition. Although the Constitution provides for district, village, and municipal council elections, which might ameliorate ethnic tensions by enabling local participation and representation, they have not been held so far. Further, International Crisis Group reports point out that these elections are not mentioned in the Afghanistan Compact, the roadmap for future development that was the product of 2006’s London Conference involving the Afghan government and the international community. Likewise,
billion) allocated for the National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme (NREGP) in 2005 and 2006 were not spent. Similarly, more than 15 billion rupees (US$340 million) meant for tribal development could not be released by the Ministry of Tribal Affairs to state governments because the latter did not submit the requisite paperwork.

D. Bandopadhyay, chairman of the Expert Group of the Planning Commission on “Development Issues to Deal with Causes of Discontent, Unrest and Extremism,” blamed governments for not taking the initiative in resettling jobless tribal people displaced from Central India by large development projects. He cited estimates that, between 1951 and 2005, close to 55 million Indians were displaced because of development. Of these, only 28 to 30 percent have been resettled and rehabilitated; in the case of tribal people, that number is as low as 18 percent. He also said that the states are not interested in utilizing central funds in the Maoist

the Action Plan on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation—written in 2005 as an attempt to resolve the legacies of conflict—has yet to be implemented owing to the Afghan government’s reluctance to hold the Northern Alliance warlords accountable for their civil war crimes.

Principal Ethnic Groups of Afghanistan

**Pashtuns:** Forming the majority of the Afghan population, they provide the main power base for the Taliban in the south and east and have strong cross-border links with the Pashtuns of Pakistan’s border regions. The current president, Hamid Karzai, belongs to this ethnic group, as do a number of his ministers.

**Tajiks:** The second-largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and concentrated in the north and northeast, they were a strong element of the Northern Alliance and play a role in the current government, with Ahmad Zia Massoud, Ahmad Shah Massoud’s younger brother, serving as vice president. They are ethnic kin to the Tajiks of Tajikistan.

**Hazaras:** Concentrated in central Afghanistan, they are Shia Muslims. Not being part of the Sunni majority led to their persecution by the Taliban. Although their condition improved after the US-led military action, some discrimination still exists.

**Uzbeks:** Spread across northern Afghanistan, they have ethnic kin in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. The Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum was the principal leader of the Northern Alliance and continues to have a power base in the north. He serves as chief of staff to the commander in chief of the Afghan National Army.

**Turkmen:** Concentrated in northwest Afghanistan along the border with Turkmenistan, they are traditionally a nomadic people. They have little representation in the current government.

belt because the population there is not part of the “mainstream.” Another explanation for this neglect is that tribal peoples do not constitute the “vote bank” for any political party. In proposing possible solutions, he pointed to the West Bengal experience in the late 1960s, when the Naxal menace disappeared within 30 months of the redistribution of 1 million acres of land to the landless.

**CONCLUSION**

The traditional separation of terrorism, insurgency, and organized crime is no longer appropriate, as groups have evolved and learned to adopt a variety of methods to achieve their goals. Connections between terrorism and organized crime can be seen in the way terrorists have used the tactics of kidnapping and extortion. A crossover between insurgency and transnational crime is apparent in the trade in illegal small weapons and narcotics, which some insurgent groups in the region (usually those in border areas) use to finance their activities.

Although terrorism and sometimes insurgency are often seen in the West as manifestations of religious extremism, the earlier-cited study by academics at Guru Nanak Dev University points to an entirely different conclusion. The vast majority of participants—almost 40 percent—seem to have joined in the violence out of simple boredom (i.e., for “adventure and thrill”), with peer pressure and financial and material gain coming in as the second and third motivations. The suggestion that participants in terrorism and insurgency may lack a sense of inclusion and personal consequence in the wider society points to two root causes of organized violence that were antecedents of terrorism and insurgency in the region: social and economic grievances.

The solution to organized violence in the region lies in the constructive role of the state. Proper governance, which can assure the delivery of services, justice, and popular participation, will help the state gain legitimacy in the eyes of the populace and eliminate many grievances, both economic and social. It can also address the fundamental problem found in almost all South Asian societies: tolerance and sympathy, among nonviolent social movements and critics of the state, for those who employ violence. A responsive state would enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of its critics, even if they opposed elements of state policy. Violent opponents of the state would experience a corresponding degree of opprobrium, rather than the sympathy that they enjoy today owing to the popular perception that they have no recourse but violence.

An impediment to effective action is the poor bilateral relationships in the region, which hamper the investigation and prosecution of crimes related to terrorism and transnational crimes. Insurgencies often gain the support of states that wish to promote their own agendas. However, this is risky, as it is easy for the state to lose control as the insurgency can take on a life of its own. Unless states within the region can overcome their historical distrust, there can be no progress in eliminating terrorism and insurgency that cross national borders.
Armed violence in the form of terrorism and insurgency, although internal to states, often involves more than one state. Transnational crime, by definition, is a special case; the cooperation of more than one state is required if any one state is to respond effectively.

While traditional techniques of armed response and intelligence remain essential, terrorism and insurgency must be tackled by addressing the trust deficit that exists both between governments and their people and between neighboring states. As parts of South Asia experience rapid industrialization and economic growth, the demand among those left behind for effective representation and equitable access to state resources will only increase. When governments instinctively resort to violence to resolve international and internal problems, they prevent a system for the peaceful redress of grievances from flourishing. They also inhibit their understanding of the dimensions of the threat, a critical function of intelligence. Armed response to violence against the state is of limited value if the underlying causes of conflict remain unaddressed and ill-understood.

Like the new discontents that are contributing to armed violence against the state, these holistic approaches are outgrowths of modernization and development. A state that only adopts repressive measures, denying itself the panoply of policy instruments that a complex society must deploy to meet increasingly complex threats, is doomed to see long-term threats destroy or inhibit social and political development.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Over the last decade, the regional security status in Southeast Asia has changed dramatically. While the risks of interstate conflict are now low, the region is increasingly confronted with new security challenges emerging from a host of transnational threats. There is growing recognition that these emerging nontraditional security (NTS) challenges are more severe and more likely to inflict harm on a greater number of people than conventional threats of interstate wars and conflicts. As a consequence, policy makers in the region have had to rethink their security agendas and find innovative ways to address these new security challenges. These challenges have also had profound implications for security cooperation among states in the region.

**Comprehensive Security, Human Security, and Nontraditional Security: Drawing Linkages and Commonalities**

A trend that has been observed by a number of security scholars in Asia is the growing tendency to highlight and designate any security concern that is nonmilitary in nature as nontraditional security, or NTS. In Southeast Asia, environmental degradation, outbreaks of epidemiological diseases, transnational crimes, illegal migration, and other concerns have been classified as nontraditional security threats that plague the region. The attachment of the security label to these concerns/threats has been a significant development. It is significant in that “security framing” is deemed to be an effective way to bring attention to these concerns/threats to convey urgency, and to command governmental resources to address them. The question, however, is how NTS has fit into the evolving concept of security in Southeast Asia and the wider Asian region.

Within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), comprehensive security was, for a long time, considered the “reorganized security concept” that structured the understanding among the political elites about what security meant for the region. As noted by an Asian security scholar, Muthiah Alagappa, regardless of the labels and the varied interpretations that came with the term, comprehensive security implied security that “goes beyond (but does not exclude) the military to embrace the political, economic and socio-cultural dimensions.”
However, the concept of comprehensive security came under strong criticism particularly in the aftermath of the financial crisis that hit the Asian region in 1997–1998. During that period, the emphasis on state security as the main security referent was increasingly challenged as the plight of vulnerable groups and societies that had suffered as a consequence of the economic crisis was exposed. The debate on the reconceptualization of security has therefore gone beyond the general expansion of the concept to promoting human security as a possible framework to replace the conventional state-centric approach. Essentially, Asian analysts of human security have joined their counterparts outside the region in calling for a reorientation of the security referent, moving it away from the state to focus instead on the security of individuals, societies, and groups, and for expanding the scope of security to reflect the chronic and complex insecurities commonly faced by individuals and societies.

Against this background, where would the concept of NTS fit? One could suggest that if comprehensive security is the expanded notion of security beyond military security, then NTS can be viewed as a subset of comprehensive security that characteristically requires nonmilitary responses to address a number of emerging security threats. NTS can also be considered as a broader umbrella that covers issues of human security, since its security referent extends beyond the state to include individuals and societies.

What kinds of concerns/threats fall under NTS? Despite the emerging trend toward security framing, there is yet to be a consensus on what NTS really means, since the issues that would fall under NTS are often contextually defined. For example, what may be NTS issues in one country, such as economic security, food security, and energy security, could already be part of the traditional concept of security in another. As one scholar has pointed out, energy security, which is now included in the rubric of NTS across Asia, has long been one of Japan’s traditional security issues.

To help in the conceptualization of NTS, the newly established Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia has defined NTS issues as those that challenge the survival and well-being of peoples and states and that arise primarily out of nonmilitary sources, such as climate change, resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, famine, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and transnational crime. Aside from being nonmilitary in nature, these share other common characteristics: they are transnational in scope (neither purely domestic nor purely interstate); they arise at very short notice and are transmitted rapidly owing to globalization and the communication revolution; they cannot be prevented entirely, but coping mechanisms can be devised; national solutions are often inadequate, and thus regional and multilateral cooperation is essential; and finally, the object of security is no longer just the state (state sovereignty or territorial integrity) but also the people (their survival, well-being, and dignity), at both individual and societal levels.

As many of us have witnessed, these NTS challenges have direct implications for overall security in Asia and for the well-being of individual states and societies.
The gravity of the problem is indicated in the way transnational challenges are increasingly discussed not only in academic circles but also among policy makers. These issues are now portrayed and treated by officials as posing threats to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, as well as to the well-being of their respective societies. Yet it is undeniable that the spread and impact of NTS threats have been amplified by the accelerating effects of globalization.

**Nontraditional Security Challenges and Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Does State Capacity Matter?**

Within the last decade, the Asian region in general and Southeast Asia in particular have had to confront a series of major nontraditional security challenges. From natural disasters afflicting parts of the region with increasing frequency to the looming threat of pandemics, it has become increasingly clear that nonmilitary threats to the security of states and societies must be addressed urgently and comprehensively.

With the increase in NTS threats, the impetus for effective regionalism has become more urgent. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the current efforts to strengthen cooperation and deepen integration in Southeast Asia through existing regional frameworks, including ASEAN (e.g., ASEAN Security Community initiative), ASEAN Plus Three (e.g., Chiang Mai initiative), and, more recently, the East Asia Summit with its agenda on fighting pandemics and achieving energy security. It is important to note that many of the current regional initiatives addressing NTS threats are driven by the broader objectives of building capacity and achieving coherence in efforts to address emerging security challenges, particularly in the face of limited capacity at the state level. As the experience in the region has revealed, many of the states in Southeast Asia are ill-equipped to deal with emerging NTS challenges.

Thus, as states and societies in Southeast Asia work closely together in dealing with transnational security challenges through regional initiatives, we need to understand the problems at the state level, as this can significantly impact the effectiveness of regional efforts. In other words, in assessing regional efforts in addressing NTS, state capacity matters.

While addressing transnational challenges clearly requires regional and multisectoral approaches, it is important to pay more attention to the role of the state, which remains a critical actor in responding to most NTS threats. In this regard, it is useful to reiterate Theda Skocpol’s argument from the 1980s that despite the increasingly borderless world, one needs to “bring the state back in” in the face of the difficult circumstances brought on by the changes in the global environment.

**Why Bring the State Back In?**

A good starting point for discussing the role of the state in addressing transnational threats is to ask who the principal provider of human and state security is. In a number of works on human security, analysts have argued that the state bears...
the main responsibility for guaranteeing the security of its citizens. At least three explanations are cited here. First is the fact that state security and individual security are interrelated. Kanti Bajpai, for instance, has argued that the security of the individual depends on, among other things, the security of the state. If the state fails to maintain a minimum security, the security of all individuals within its boundaries is threatened. Second, the attainment of human security for the many social groups requires that the state produce coherent policies in sectors such as employment, education, health, and social security. Third, the fact that human security falls under the category of public goods requires the state’s action to ensure that every citizen receives them.

These facts make it clear that, for the state to be able to provide security, it must have the capacity to do so. In many developing countries in Asia, however, the state has failed to carry out its main duty of providing security to the people because of a number of factors, including resource constraints, bureaucratic deadlock, weak governance, and ongoing political instability. All of these factors act to reduce the state’s capacity to provide human security to its citizens.

This brings us to the analysis of state capacity in Southeast Asia. There are many ways of defining state capacity. One definition says that it is the ability of the state to enforce rules and norms governing relations within society. This ability depends on its institutions, the nature of its structural frameworks, the roles of the relevant actors, and so forth.

An interesting study on environmental scarcities, state capacity, and civil violence was conducted at the University of Toronto in 1997 and provides some useful insights. In this work, state capacity has been defined as a function of a number of variables, categorized broadly into two sets.

**Intrinsic Characteristics of the State**

- **Human capital.** The technical and managerial skill level of individuals within the state and its components.
- **Instrumental rationality.** The ability of the state and its components to gather and evaluate information relevant to their interests and to make reasoned decisions maximizing their utility. (Note that utility may be locally defined; that is, it may reflect the narrow interests of the component and not the broader interests of the state or society.)
- **Coherence.** The degree to which the state’s components agree and act on shared ideological bases, objectives, and methods, as well as the ability of these components to communicate and constructively debate ideas, information, and policies among themselves.
- **Resilience.** The state’s capacity to absorb sudden shocks, to adapt to long-term changes in socioeconomic conditions, and to resolve societal disputes without catastrophic breakdown.
State-Societal Relations

- **Autonomy**. The extent to which the state can act independently of external forces, both domestic and international, and co-opt those that would alter or constrain its actions.
- **Fiscal resources**. The financial capacity of the state or its components, which is a function of both current and reasonably feasible revenue streams, as well as demands on that revenue.
- **Reach and responsiveness**. The degree to which the state is successful in extending its ideology, sociopolitical structures, and administrative apparatus throughout society (both geographically and into the socioeconomic structures of civil society), as well as the responsiveness of these structures and apparatus to the local needs of the society.
- **Legitimacy**. The strength of the state’s moral authority—the extent to which the populace obeys the state’s commands out of a sense of allegiance and duty, rather than as a result of coercion or economic initiative.

**KEY NTS CHALLENGES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

Some NTS challenges in Southeast Asia that have significant coverage in local and international news are natural disasters, pandemics, and environmental degradation. Responses to these three challenges are cross-cutting issues that require a comprehensive and multisectoral approach and would benefit from regular studies and assessments of state capacity.

**Coping with Natural Disasters**

Asia is a region where major natural disasters often occur. The massive earthquake and tsunami in December 2004 was just one example of the many tragedies of this type that the region has had to cope with. Whenever such disasters occur, the region is faced with the grim tasks of undertaking disaster relief operations, providing humanitarian assistance, and instigating post-disaster reconstruction and development. Natural disasters generate complex emergencies that require rapid and coordinated responses from a broad range of state and nonstate actors.

Unfortunately, many states in Southeast Asia are not prepared to cope with these complex humanitarian emergencies. This gap was vividly illustrated by the region’s 2004 tsunami experience, where, without the assistance provided by other states in ASEAN, by Western countries, and by international aid agencies, the humanitarian emergency in Bandar Aceh, Indonesia could have been far more devastating. This disaster triggered an unprecedented outpouring of humanitarian assistance, as the international community came together to lend support to the disaster-stricken countries. The responses from both the regional and the international communities were indeed exceptional, and perhaps this was one of the very
few natural disasters in history where support from around the globe was immediately mobilized to reach out to the victims.

Now, several years later, are the states of Southeast Asia doing enough to protect the human security of its people? Within ASEAN, member countries agreed in 2005 to enhance cooperation with regard to emergency relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction, prevention, and mitigation. In the area of emergency relief, ASEAN members agreed to mobilize additional resources to meet the relief needs of tsunami victims and called upon the international community to convene, through the United Nations, an international pledging conference for sustainable humanitarian relief efforts. They requested for consideration the establishment of a “standby arrangement” for immediate humanitarian relief efforts.

While these initiatives are indicative of the significant impact the tsunami experience had on regional cooperation, making countries in Southeast Asia more aware of disaster preparedness and management, one can still question the extent to which a shift in thinking has really occurred and ask what else needs to be done. In this regard, one could argue that the affected states need to do more in the areas of prevention and mitigation.

**Combating Threats of Infectious Diseases**

Since the Asia-wide outbreak of the SARS virus in 2003, threats from infectious diseases appear to have become more severe. As the SARS experience showed, in this era of globalization and regionalization, infectious diseases have the capacity to detrimentally affect the security and well-being of all members of society and all aspects of the economy. This point was highlighted in the report “Global Risks 2006,” released by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland. The report ranked pandemics and natural disasters among the highest in a list of risks currently confronting the international community. It also concluded that despite the potential for devastation due to the interplay of these multiple global risks and their combined ripple effects, “disaster planning and crisis management suffer from a number of shortcomings.” Among these are limited investments of resources in health systems and varying responses to different assessments of threats.

How serious are threats from infectious diseases? In 2005, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared that Southeast Asia would be the “next ground zero” if the H5N1 virus (a subtype of Influenza A virus) mutates into a pandemic. The warning was WHO’s way of reminding the region’s governments that they needed to be the first line of defense if such an outbreak occurred and emphasizing the critical urgency of putting in place emergency plans and effective surveillance systems in the region. Despite this warning, how prepared are states in Southeast Asia for such an eventuality?

Information about disaster response and capability from most countries in the region is inadequate. As shown by their responses to the SARS outbreak, while
Singapore and Hong Kong were able to deal with the health crisis in a reasonably effective manner, other countries experienced a range of challenges in coping with the problem. Aside from the shortcomings at the national level, such as the lack of contingency planning and coordination among state agencies, there has also been very little institutionalized regional cooperation in the area of public health policy. As indicated above, it was only after the SARS outbreak that some regional mechanisms were proposed, and at the top of the list was building regional capacity for surveillance and disease control.

There are currently several proposals to strengthen the monitoring of disease outbreaks at the national and regional levels. In December 2004, ASEAN established a task force to respond to the spread of avian flu in the region. Responsibility was divided among the five original members of the group, with each country taking on a specific role. This plan was reinforced in October 2005 with the establishment of a regional fund for combating avian flu and a three-year action plan. Within the framework of a wider forum—the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and the East Asia Summit (EAS)—it is noteworthy that the measures outlined include strengthening of institutional capacities at national and regional levels to ensure effective and efficient implementation of avian influenza prevention, putting in place control programs and pandemic preparedness and response plans, and enhancing capacity building for coping with a pandemic. The latter includes establishing information-sharing protocols among countries and multilateral organizations to ensure effective, timely, and meaningful communication before or during a pandemic influenza outbreak.

One should note, however, that many of these proposed measures from ASEAN, APT, and EAS have yet to be implemented. Given the lack of resources allocated to improving public health systems at the domestic level, national and regional capacities to respond to transnational health crises remain inadequate.

Mitigating the Effects of Environmental Degradation and Climate Change

The recurring problem of air pollution in the form of haze originating from forest fires in parts of Southeast Asia has elicited an unprecedented reaction from official circles in the region. The complaints voiced by ASEAN officials, urging their counterparts in Jakarta to act decisively and address the increasing severity of recurring forest fires and ensuing environmental degradation, have led to more regional resolutions on environmental issues. These included the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution.

Data have shown that the recurring haze problem in the region has exacted a high price in terms of human security, as well as costs to health systems, economic productivity, and the general economy. It was reported that the three-month prolonged haze in Southeast Asia in 1997–1998 cost regional economies US$9–10 billion.
Reducing the effects of climate change demands a more complex approach to the problem of environmental degradation. The difficulties associated with implementing reduction in carbon emissions and promoting the use of clean energy technology are daunting challenges to the less developed countries in Southeast Asia. Given the lack of a general consensus on the measures that the international community should take to mitigate the effects of climate change, it is difficult to see this effort becoming a top priority for developing countries in the region. Yet ironically, it is these countries that have often borne the brunt of the effects of climate change—coastal flooding, loss of biodiversity, and colossal damage to the environment.

To sum up, with respect to the NTS challenges posed by natural disasters, infectious diseases, and environmental degradation, state capacity is indeed very critical. Thus, while it is commendable that ASEAN has come up with a number of initiatives to build regional capacity, many of these efforts at addressing transboundary challenges are and can be hampered by the problem of state capacity. The next section of this paper focuses on Indonesia to show why more studies should be done to examine the importance of state capacities in resolving NTS challenges.

UNDERSTANDING THE DYNAMICS BETWEEN REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY AND STATE CAPACITY: THE CASE OF INDONESIA

As noted above, there have been a number of regional efforts to address the recurring problem of environmental pollution in Southeast Asia; among these is the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. Experts have, however, expressed serious reservations about the ability and capacity of states in the region to implement these agreements. Aside from the often-cited factor of lack of political will, practical challenges confront many countries in the region. This is where understanding key aspects of Indonesia’s capacity to manage the haze problem and deforestation is useful. Of the indicators cited earlier from the study on environmental management and state capacity, four are most applicable here and cover both the component of state capacity (i.e., instrumental rationality and coherence) and the state’s relationship with its society (i.e., reach and responsiveness and legitimacy).

Numerous studies regarding the state of Indonesia’s forests have labeled the situation a crisis. If current rates of deforestation are not curbed, it is likely that Indonesia’s natural production forests will be depleted by the end of the decade and large areas of conservation forests will be severely damaged or completely lost. The roots of this crisis lie largely in the disagreement over who has the right to control and manage the country’s forests. The simplistic interpretations of the exact locations and extent of the country’s forests and the ambiguous jurisdiction of the Ministry of Forestry leave the forests vulnerable to exploitation by industries and the local people.
Political-Institutional Framework

Institutional Framework: National Environmental Institutions

Indonesia’s central government established the Ministry of Development Supervision and the Environment in 1978 in response to international pressure to reduce pollution in the country. The Ministry was meant to promote economically and environmentally sound development, with a conscious and planned effort to use and manage resources to improve the quality of life through sustainable development.

As part of this larger Ministry, the Office of the State Minister for the Environment is responsible only for environmental management and coordination. This office does not have sub-national branches in Indonesia’s provinces and is substantially less powerful than a full-fledged ministry. The Office of the State Minister thus plays a coordinating role from Jakarta and has no actual enforcement ability in the provinces.

The Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan (BAPEDAL), the Environmental Impact Management Agency, was established by the Indonesian government in 1990. Though this agency and the Office of the State Minister for the Environment were technically separate institutions, the division of responsibilities between the two was rather ambiguous, and institutional tensions and rivalries existed between them. Officially, the Office of the State Minister for the Environment was supposed to formulate and coordinate policy and to broadcast laws, while BAPEDAL was to enforce environmental regulations and supervise compliance and to monitor, measure, and analyze environmental pollution.

BAPEDAL had some provincial jurisdiction with some regional branches established in the provinces. The main enforcement mechanisms in the provinces were the police, the army, the local governments and prosecutors, and local BAPEDAL branches (where applicable). In 1999, BAPEDAL was merged with the Office of the State Minister for the Environment, and in 2002, former President Megawati Sukarnoputri dissolved BAPEDAL. At that time, BAPEDAL was handling some 23 violations of environmental laws.

Aside from these two environmental bodies, the Ministry of Forestry, established in 1983 (elevated from a directorate general in the Ministry of Agriculture), has been responsible for the management of all state forest lands. Provincial and district governments and the Ministry’s technical implementing units all over the country shoulder this responsibility since decentralization.

Strategic Environmental Planning

Various overlapping institutions manage environment-related issues in Indonesia. Aside from those mentioned above, other environment-related ministries include the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Energy and Mining, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Home Affairs. Unlike the Office of the State Minister for the Environment, these are full-fledged ministries with more
staff, resources, and provincial authority. However, the specific jurisdiction of each institution is rather ambiguous. This uncertainty is carried over to the local level. The enforcement responsibilities of local branches of national agencies, provincial and municipal governments, and local bodies such as police and prosecutors are also ill-defined.

A 1998 review by the Ministry of Development Supervision and the Environment and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) concluded that “Indonesia does not have a professional fire management organization. . . . Agencies involved in fire management do not have adequate mandates, level of competence and equipment to carry out their tasks.” The Ministry of Forestry was the only government agency with a specialized body for fire prevention and control, the Directorate of Forest Fires under the Directorate General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation.19

Some of the main weaknesses in Indonesia’s fire suppression and control abilities that were identified by the 1998 review were duplication of functions across agencies, ambiguous institutional authority and responsibility, inadequate mandates, and weak local institutional capacities. For example, in the forestry sector, national, provincial, and district offices are prone to issuing overlapping and conflicting timber licenses. Districts may issue licenses on lands where the Ministry of Forestry has previously granted concessions. “Each level of government vigorously asserts its authority to make a number of decisions and simultaneously denies the authority of other levels of government to do so.”20

**Impact of Decentralization (Distribution of Authority)**

In 1999, the Indonesian government passed two laws, which were to be implemented on January 2001, calling for decentralization of authority to the districts and provinces. Decentralization has boosted the country’s capacity in some aspects. Some local communities now have a stronger voice in shaping environmental policies, and local authorities have become more accountable. Decentralized governments are also better able than centralized governments to respond to local needs and demands.

However, decentralization in Indonesia happened through a single sweeping action, providing local governments with little preparation for the new decentralized framework. Thus, laws were enacted, but corresponding regulations were not, and local officials were left to their own devices to interpret and make discretionary judgments in many areas of their newly assigned responsibilities.21

Local governments also tend to support regional stakeholders because these are crucial generators of local revenues. After President Suharto resigned, the revised Basic Forestry Law was enacted in 1999, giving district heads the authority to hand out licenses for logging 100 hectares of lands under their jurisdiction. The law also stipulated that 80 percent of the revenue from each region’s natural re-
sources industries (including forestry) would be returned for use by the regional
government. This resulted in some district governments granting up to 10 logging
licenses to each applicant. Each of these concessions was found to correlate with
a revenue increase of US$5,000 to US$10,000 for the regional government.22

**Constitutional and Legal Framework**

A host of national and provincial agencies address different spheres of environ-
mental protection, and their jurisdictions sometimes overlap. Consequently, there
has been multiple legislation and confusion in the law. For example, the Industry
Act, the Forestry Act, and the Agriculture Act, administered respectively by the
Ministries of Industry, Forestry, and Agriculture, all contain provisions on environ-
mental violations.

Rampant exploitation of the country’s forests arose in part as a result of poor con-
stitutional and legal protection. Ambiguous laws and definitions regarding owner-
ship of land were the roots of the land misuse that has taken place over the past
few decades. There was uncertainty as to which government agency (and provin-
cial authority) should be responsible for addressing the problem of haze from the
clearing of forest land for plantation and industrial purposes.

When Indonesia became independent from the Netherlands in 1945, it was en-
shrined in the constitution that all natural resources were to be controlled by the
state. The 1960 Agrarian Law reiterated this point, stating that “indigenous law
shall be recognized, providing this does not contradict national and state inter-
est.”23 This constitutional and legal protection of the state’s control of land allowed
lands that were once community-owned to be licensed for industrial purposes to
relatives and political allies of Suharto during his reign. Most of Suharto’s cronies
exploited the lands, employing environmentally detrimental practices without fac-
ing prosecution. Conflict over land tenure continues today, and, as there is no sys-
temized way of determining land ownership, conflicting parties often resort to
setting fires to lay claim to lands.

There are also numerous laws in Indonesia that call for environmental protection.
However, many of these laws were enacted at different levels of government and
contradict each other. In the Riau province, local businesses can choose which
burning policy to follow, since the district government enacted a zero-burning pol-
icy but the provincial government allows burning up to two hectares of land. Con-
sequently, environmental laws are rarely enforced and provide no real basis for
judicial action.

In other cases, the authorities actively shield violators of environmental law. Bla-
tant illegal logging has occurred at Bukit Tigapuluh National Park in Sumatra and
Tanjung Puting National Park in Kalimantan without interference from the Min-
istry of Forestry. In fact, it has been alleged that authorities in the Ministry are in-
volved in the logging.
Indonesia has recently enacted a law requiring all companies to practice corporate social and environmental responsibility. According to consultancy enterprise CSR-Asia (Corporate Social Responsibility–Asia), “Indonesian company law states that companies with an impact on natural resources must implement CSR which is to be budgeted for as a cost.” The companies that will need to comply are those “engaged in natural resources or those in business in connection with natural resources.” Many aspects of this law remain ambiguous, such as exactly which industries need to comply, what are considered to be “natural resources,” and what types of projects or undertakings can be defined as socially responsible. Some have criticized this law as simply legislative philanthropy, rather than a true law that would require businesses to function in a socially and environmentally responsible manner.

**Cognitive-Informational Framework**

**Government’s Approach to Information Sharing**

Up-to-date and reliable information about the forest zones in Indonesia is not available to the public. Information on the ownership of lands, the groups that currently occupy them, and any conflicting claims to the lands is unavailable. The government has also acknowledged that the country’s procedure for forest inventory and mapping is weak.

Until recently, bureaucratic obfuscation and industry intimidation prevented researchers and the public from accessing environmental data, if they were even available. The Indonesian government collaborated with the World Bank in 2000 to compile a new set of forest cover maps. However, the latest maps use classification schemes that differ from previous ones, and thus direct comparability is lacking. Besides technical difficulties, overlapping administrative responsibilities, rapid personnel changes, and a lack of capacity still hinder information procurement.

**Involvement of Other Actors**

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have played a significant role in pushing for environmental protection in Indonesia. The Environmental Management Act of 1982 acknowledged the rights of NGOs to serve as community institutions for environmental management and development. Emil Salim, then State Minister for the Environment, actively pushed for the formation of environmental NGOs during his career. Even the Suharto government relied on the funds and expertise of NGOs. The political activism that the NGOs inspired was tolerated because they provided useful and inexpensive services to Indonesian communities and it served to channel students’ frustration.

Historically, the most influential environmental NGO in Indonesia has been WALHI (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia), founded in 1980. WALHI cre-
ated a precedent in leading a suit in 1988 against PT Inti Indorayon Utama Ltd., a pulp and rayon factory backed by Suharto’s son. Although WALHI eventually lost the suit, just a few months later it organized an international consumer boycott of the US firm Scott Paper. The NGO protested the company’s joint venture with PT Astra International, a project that would have displaced 15,000 people. Along with a coalition of other NGOs, WALHI embarked on an extensive and successful media campaign to embarrass the US firm, causing it to pull out of the venture.25

After Suharto resigned in 1998, restrictions on the mass media were relaxed, and the number of NGOs increased exponentially. Both of these actors have become a significant force in promoting environmental consciousness and making information available to the public. The roles and activities of NGOs have also become more diverse. Current NGO activities include, among others, advocating the land rights of local communities and sustainable forest management, participating in policy formation processes, facilitating land use mapping and information sharing, and continued monitoring of environmental violators. The relationship between NGOs and the government has also improved, as NGOs now do more than just criticize the government.26

Environmental consciousness among local businesses, especially small and medium enterprises, remains extremely weak. However, some political will and an acknowledgment of the need for businesses to have environmental interests were exhibited by the recent enactment of the CSR law.

Some multinationals have taken the lead in introducing the best environmental practices in Indonesia. Fiber plantation company APRIL adopted a “No-Burn” policy for its land-clearing operations even before this option was stipulated in Indonesian legislation. APRIL has also initiated secondary industries that support its business and engage local communities in long-term employment, drawing people away from relying on slash-and-burn agriculture for their livelihoods. Despite such efforts, environmentally conscious multinationals are still hindered by the political and institutional obstacles mentioned earlier. In general, companies dealing with natural resources that actively practice sustainable methods remain few and far between. Unless the government improves the enforcement mechanisms or creates economic incentives for companies to adhere to environmental policies, improvement in this area is likely to remain sluggish.

**Current Environmental Strategy**

In 2000, Indonesia made 12 commitments to the Consultative Group on Indonesia, chaired by the World Bank, to reform its forestry practices. However, following the extensive fires of mid-2001, it was reported that the Ministry of Forestry had “no plan to fight fires,” and officials subsequently admitted that they lacked a “clear blueprint” of how to rein in the annual massive forest burning.
The collaboration with the World Bank has continued, and the Ministry of Forestry released a new strategy in 2006 aimed at controlling the country’s forestry problems. The Ministry has stipulated the following five priorities for the period 2006–2009:27

- Eradication of illegal logging from state forest areas and of illegal timber trade;
- Revitalization of the forest sector, especially the forestry industry;
- Rehabilitation and conservation of natural forest resources;
- Economic empowerment of people inside and outside the forest area; and
- Determination of the forest area.

Despite the presence of clearly stipulated goals for resolving the country’s deforestation problem, consultation and cooperation among different levels of government remain weak. Whether the new strategy will result in some progress or become yet another failed attempt remains to be seen. However, local authorities who have gained more power since decentralization and members of the public who have benefited economically from the lack of regulation could deter any significant change.

To make any substantial progress, Indonesia will have to take a multidimensional approach, since even a reformed forestry sector will be plagued by other deep-seated weaknesses, such as corruption. Current President Yudhoyono has named the eradication of corruption as a top priority, and his continued public commitment to this goal will be necessary to provide a clear message and motivator for change.

Pressure from Other Actors

Increased environmental activism and public protests have influenced the Indonesian government to take action against offenders. In May 1999, following poor environmental impact assessment reports of the company’s activities, the Ministry of Forestry withdrew a 39,300-hectare logging concession granted in 1992 to the Medan Remaja Timber (MRT) company in Aceh Province, Sumatra. NGOs that sent information on the company’s environmental performance to the Ministry were the major force behind this action.

However, pressure from neighboring countries seems to be most effective in motivating the Indonesian government to take action. In 2006, after counterparts from the Singaporean and Malaysian governments informed President Yudhoyono of their disappointment in the lack of progress with the haze problem, response from the Indonesian government was swift. President Yudhoyono immediately convened a meeting with his officials, after which he issued an apology to Singapore and Malaysia for the fires. He also instructed his foreign minister, Hassan Wirajuda, to convene a subregional meeting of environment ministers in Pekanbaru, In-
Indonesia. Prior to these complaints from neighbors, political action by the Indonesian government had been slow-moving.28

Other Factors

Indonesia’s deforestation problem is compounded by poor enforcement of existing laws, a severe lack of resources, and rampant corruption.

Indonesia has a variety of environmental laws at the national and provincial levels that criminalize intentional burning, but these laws are rarely enforced. Legal action and legal penalties have rarely been taken against companies implicated in setting fires.

The Ministry of the Environment/UNDP review cited the following reasons for the lack of active enforcement of existing laws:29

- Lack of political will on the part of law enforcement agencies;
- Lack of access by enforcement authorities to data on fires;
- Lack of facilities and equipment to support field investigations;
- Differing perceptions by various agencies of what constitutes adequate legal proof of intentional burning;
- Lack of understanding of legal provisions on corporate crime that would allow companies, rather than individual employees, to be prosecuted;
- “Lack of integrity” on the part of law enforcement authorities; and
- “Conflicts of interest” between the agencies charged with conservation and fire suppression and those charged with promotion of plantation and other agricultural products.

The perceived urgency of the situation among the public is relatively low, since the impact of deforestation is not yet severe or directly felt. Burning is rooted in Indonesia’s slash-and-burn agricultural practices; the people have thus been used to the smoke generated from the burning (the most immediate impact experienced) and do not view it as an encroachment on their quality of life. Some may support stricter controls on forestry practices because the rights to their indigenous lands have been infringed upon, not because of an awareness of the deeper environmental implications. The lack of perceived urgency makes widespread public pressure for change unlikely. Reform in Indonesia will thus be fueled mostly by those of the educated public who understand the long-term implications of deforestation.

Distrust of the government is also high, built up over the years of Suharto’s regime, when the rights of ordinary locals were abused and exploited, in favor of his family and his rich political supporters. Unfortunately, this legacy of distrust will require the Indonesian government to work doubly hard to regain the confidence and trust
of the people, rebuilding in Indonesians the sense that the government’s goals and actions are legitimate.

CONCLUSION

While NTS challenges have increasingly become major issues for states in Southeast Asia, the success of regional efforts in addressing these problems is largely contingent on the capacities of individual states to complement and implement regional initiatives. The in-depth case study on Indonesia shows that without a better understanding of the constraints faced by relevant actors, policy prescriptions on how to effectively deal with NTS challenges will be impaired. Thus, a reexamination of the state’s role, its capacity, and the nature of state-society relations will be a necessary first step in any effort to turn states into effective instruments for achieving collective goals and managing regional security.
Southeast Asia has always been considered strategically located. Its territorial space and the resources it contains are considered to be important not only to Asia but to the world. Furthermore, its people face a complex array of political, economic, and social challenges whose effects are felt both inside and outside its boundaries. For example, this region is at a significant crossroads for global political security discussions, being considered both a breeding ground and a training ground for various terrorist groups. Meanwhile, its own people are exposed to the risk of the political fallout of a Western-centered anti-terrorist strategy that labels local political movements for autonomy and sovereignty as agents of terror.

Southeast Asia also plays an important role in global environmental security discussions. This is due to its high biodiversity levels, as well as its high rate of species extinction. For example, 59.6 percent of Indonesia’s 29,375 vascular plant species are endemic and not found anywhere else. Southeast Asia encompasses 4 of the 20 “biodiversity hotspots” identified in the world. Its rate of deforestation is the highest of any major tropical region, and it could lose 75 percent of its original forest cover and 42 percent of its biodiversity by 2100. The region includes about 20 critically endangered plant and animal species and as many as 686 vulnerable species of vascular plants, 91 species of fish, 23 species of amphibians, 28 species of reptiles, 116 species of birds, and 147 species of mammals. In discussions of this impending ecological disaster, the blame is often heaped upon the peoples of Southeast Asia, citing the inability of its political elites to implement conservation laws, the rent-seeking and environmentally damaging practices of its economic elites, the lifestyles of its middle class, and the cultural practices of its marginalized communities as contributors to environmental destruction.

The rest of the world sees Southeast Asia as a significant contributor to global problems such as climate change, deforestation, and fish depletion. The region is therefore expected to be responsible for the formulation of a solution to these crises. Painted as both culprit and savior, Southeast Asia is expected to establish social order within its states, as well as create a common agenda and course of action through regional groups, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and civil society regional interactions. For a region that contains complex political economies and a rich array of cultural and historical experiences, living up to such an expectation—that is, of implementing good national and regional governance—is a sizeable burden. The wide diversity among states
in the region is both a challenge and an opportunity for addressing issues that cross political boundaries.

This paper is divided into three main sections. The first section focuses on the various environmental issues that confront Southeast Asia as a region, particularly those that are transboundary in character. The second section discusses the societal context within which such issues emerge, taking into consideration the diversity within and among countries in the region.

Finally, the third section presents the various institutional mechanisms through which the region has responded to the environmental issues and identifies the challenges and prospects that such mechanisms face.

**ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES**

Of the many environmental issues that confront the Southeast Asia region, four are transboundary in character: haze and transboundary pollution, water governance in the Mekong subregion, environment-related issues in the South China Sea, and trade in environmental resources.

**Haze and Transboundary Pollution**

While forest fires in some parts of Southeast Asia may result from natural causes such as lightning strikes or from small-scale slash-and-burn agricultural practices, empirical evidence gathered by numerous studies indicates that most of the disastrous fires have been caused by the operations of large-scale commercial oil palm plantations in Indonesia, particularly in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua. Furthermore, while natural factors can exacerbate the effects of the fires, as the El Niño phenomenon did in 1997–1998, the lack of political will (and even the active complicity or tacit approval of policy makers) has constrained the meaningful implementation of fire prevention policies. The damage that is being caused by these fires is inflicted not only on the local communities and the ecology in Indonesia, but also in other countries. Forest fires have been identified as one of the causes of biodiversity depletion in Southeast Asia. The impacts of the Indonesian fires on health and productivity in the region, particularly in Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand and to a lesser extent in Myanmar and Vietnam, are equally significant. The 1997–1998 episode alone affected about 20 million people and caused damage ranging from US$4.5 billion to US$9.3 billion. An equally disastrous, albeit shorter, episode occurred on October 6–7, 2006. At this time, 1,496 fire hotspots were sighted in Sumatra and 2,075 in Kalimantan, with Central Kalimantan becoming the worst-affected area.

**Water Governance in the Mekong Subregion**

Unlike the haze problem, whose transboundary nature is derived from the fact that the problem is exported from Indonesia to other parts of the region, the issue of
water governance in the Mekong subregion of mainland Southeast Asia is transboundary by the very nature of the resource in question. The Mekong River originates from the Tibetan plateau in Yunnan, China, and empties into the South China Sea in the southern part of Vietnam, passing through Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. The drainage basin of the river covers about 795,000 square kilometers of land that contains diverse geological formations and landscapes, as well as a complex array of sociocultural, linguistic, political, and economic systems. Thus, any intervention by states aimed at governing the water resources in the Mekong, even to address a country’s internal needs, would have inevitable transboundary implications.

The main issue that confronts water governance in the Mekong subregion is competing interests for water resources. The main competing uses in the upper tributaries, such as those located in Yunnan, Myanmar, and upper Laos, are hydropower and irrigation. In Laos, for example, tapping water to irrigate local farms may be compromised by the need to generate foreign earnings by tapping the same water for hydropower and exporting the energy to neighboring Thailand. In Cambodia, the competition exists between commercial and wild-capture fisheries, both of which in turn contribute to the degradation of the fisheries resources in the Tonle Sap River and Lake. The main issue in Vietnam, at the tail end of the river system, lies primarily in the delicate balance between the needs of human settlements, particularly for water for aquaculture and household use by the 18 million inhabitants of the river delta, flood control, and irrigation infrastructures, on the one hand and the ecological needs for resource conservation of an otherwise fragile ecosystem on the other.

Thus, the defining issue of resource use and conflict in the region is the tenuous relationship between livelihood needs of local communities and the large-scale resource and infrastructure development projects usually promoted by states with transnational connections and markets. This complex interplay of demands centers on a natural resource that is already ecologically challenged. At the same time, the options of downstream states and communities may, in fact, be constrained by the choices and prerogatives of their upstream counterparts in the region. The flood pulse and the level of sedimentation, as well as the quality of water that flows downstream, for example, will be affected by infrastructural projects upstream.

Environment-Related Issues in the South China Sea

Much of the focus on the South China Sea is in the context of the territorial disputes emanating from competing claims by countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and China. However, the region is also the site of environment-related transboundary issues. The Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA) cites three major reasons why environmental issues in the South China Sea are transboundary: (1) marine resources occur in and move through many countries; (2) activities in the marine environment, such as shipping, fishing, and the movement of migratory and alien
species, involve multiple countries; and (3) the ocean is a medium through which pollutants are relatively easily transmitted from one country to another.

The coastal ecosystems of Southeast Asia are facing severe degradation. Eleven percent of its coral reefs have totally collapsed, 48 percent have been rendered critical, and 80 percent are endangered. Mangrove ecosystems are also badly damaged, with about 70 percent of cover lost. Seagrass beds have also suffered substantial depletion, ranging from 20 to 60 percent. This degradation of coastal habitats and the associated loss of biodiversity could have transboundary implications. It is known that seagrass beds of one country are strongly interdependent with nearby coral reef ecosystems, which in turn affect the stock of fish that may move through the waters to regular fishing grounds used by other countries. Increasing marine traffic due to trade also poses risks in the form of oil spills and water pollution that may have transboundary impacts. Furthermore, the ships may bring with them ballast water contaminated with alien organisms that may be unloaded in the open sea or at dock. This could threaten the health of both humans and ecosystems and could further contribute to the degradation of marine habitats.

Trade in Environmental Resources

Southeast Asia is considered to be a major hub for trade in environmental resources, mainly wildlife. While some of this trade is legally sanctioned, the magnitude of the trade is underestimated, and a majority of it is illegal in nature. While China and other countries in Asia remain a large market, a substantial regional market within Southeast Asia also exists. Singapore, for example, actively traded wildlife and wildlife products in 2000, with net imports of 7,093 live animals and net exports of 301,905 animal skins. One of the main drivers of this trade is the demand by practitioners of traditional medicine for plant and animal products. This demand has calamitous effects on wildlife species in the region, such as the Sumatran tiger, whose bones are in high demand for medicinal uses even though there are only about 500 of these tigers left in the wild. In the period from 1975 to 1992, Indonesia supplied 60 percent of the total market for tiger bones in South Korea, amounting to 6,128 kilograms. Another source of demand is the thriving pet industry in Southeast Asia. This is the reason the Bali starling, a species endemic to the island, has been driven to near extinction.

Another part of the illegal environmental resource trade is the active illegal timber trade in the region. The main suppliers of legal timber are Laos, Myanmar, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Thailand and the Philippines have banned or restricted logging operations and have since become net timber importers. There is evidence, however, that Thailand has also relied on timber illegally traded from Laos and Myanmar. It has also been discovered that Thai capital has been used in establishing logging concessions in neighboring countries, usually in collusion with rent-seeking elites in those host countries.
Illegal resource trade in Southeast Asia is enabled by the presence of high demand, the porosity of the borders, and the weakness of law enforcement in the countries involved. This is aggravated by the rent-seeking practices of political and economic elites. However, local communities can also be involved. This was evident during the 1997 economic crisis, when dislocated urban workers returned to their local communities and engaged in illegal capture and trade of wildlife and other forest products. A decline in the demand for rare and endangered animals and plants, brought about by the reduced purchasing power of the middle class that is the traditional market for these products, was offset by the huge Chinese market, which was not as affected by the economic crisis.

It is important to point out that while illegal trade in forest products and wildlife resources has indeed contributed to environmental and even social problems in the region, legal trade has also created serious problems. For example, the depletion of forests and their biodiversity in Thailand and the Philippines and the adverse implications for the livelihoods of local forest-based communities were consequences of legal extraction of timber by state-approved concessions, spurred by a lucrative export market. In many cases, the opening of forest areas by legitimate logging operators paved the way for the entry of a second wave of lowland migrant settlers, who deployed unsustainable farming practices and prevented the natural regeneration of logged-over forest areas. Furthermore, as in the case of the Philippines, weak and even corrupted government monitoring has allowed operators to engage in destructive and unregulated logging practices both within and outside their approved concession areas.

### Societal Context

#### The Role of the State

The transboundary environmental issues identified above exist within a particular societal context. Southeast Asia is a region of divergent political systems. Laos and Myanmar are ruled by single-party, military-led governments, while Cambodia and Vietnam are struggling to adopt democratic principles and juxtapose these with single-party regimes. Brunei Darussalam remains a sultanate. Singapore and Malaysia are both parliamentary democracies, albeit with stringent controls on political dissent. Both Indonesia and the Philippines have presidential forms of government, and both have fragile formal democracies that are the products of people-led democratization movements. Thailand is a constitutional monarchy with military-led governments punctuating its modern political history. Of these countries, it is the latter three (the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand) that have a relatively active community of civil society organizations engaging with both local and regional issues, including environmental issues. Historically, except for Thailand, most of Southeast Asia has experienced direct colonial rule by the British, French, Dutch, Spanish, Americans, and even the Japanese.
However, despite this divergence in political systems and historical experiences, there is a common thread that weaves through the development of the region’s political institutions. Modern states emerged in Southeast Asia as a product of the interaction between indigenous pre-colonial structures of governance and colonial forces, some of which were direct and penetrating (as in the Philippines), while others came in the form of acquired influences from an increasingly globalizing world (as in Thailand). This interplay between the local and the colonial positioned environmental resources to become primary targets for exploitation as important inputs for state-building processes, and, unfortunately, the resources were in the hands of the colonial elites and/or their native cohorts and later successors. Of these resources, the most affected were the forests of Southeast Asia. Forests in the Philippines, Malaysia, Myanmar, Indonesia, and what used to be Indo-China were logged by the colonial states and later by their successors, and the products were traded in global markets to generate the money needed to finance investments for the public good as well as to meet private elite interests. Thailand’s teak forests were depleted in the same manner, albeit without the direct participation of any colonial ruler, although the British invested in the forest industry and influenced the development of the bureaucracy as well as forest policy and science.9

These experiences of colonial and/or elite-led exploitation of environmental resources, aside from having serious ecological consequences, also have significant structural consequences. The historical role of elites in resource exploitation and their strong government connections have effectively weakened the processes and institutions of governance to the point where governments are either unable to rein in private interests or are, in fact, colluding with them. This leads to weak policies, weak implementation of policies that look good on paper, and even bad policies. On many occasions, policies and projects of states have undermined or pushed out the local practices of relatively powerless and marginalized communities in the region. For example, the traditional trade practices that existed among local communities in the Mekong subregion, which crossed borders prior to the development of modern state boundaries, were delegitimized when the state declared monopoly over forest-related trade. The current illegal trade in timber and other forest products, therefore, has to be understood in the context of this historical background.

Indigenous property rights, which were rather common in the region, were also often displaced by modern laws. Common property and communal practices were effectively delegitimized when privatization laws were passed or when powerful private interests were granted concession rights on communal lands, as when forestry laws displaced the land rights of the Orang Asli in Western Malaysia and of indigenous peoples in Kalimantan in Indonesia.10 Ancestral domains were snatched away from the control of indigenous communities in the Philippines by constitutional fiat declaring natural resources to be state property. In Thailand, the passage of the forestry code in the early decades of the twentieth century trans-
ferred the control of forests away from traditional leaders and into an elaborate bureaucratic system of taxes and permits.\textsuperscript{11}

State building and its attendant processes have also unleashed adverse consequences on local modes of production. In the Mekong basin in Cambodia, traditional wild-capture fishing practices of local communities were displaced and rendered unsustainable by the establishment of commercial aquaculture ventures, which are in the hands of outsiders.\textsuperscript{12} In the upland areas of Southeast Asia, the swidden farming system of forest dwellers was considered to be a sustainable practice; in this system, forest areas are cleared for agriculture, mainly by burning, but are allowed to regenerate through a period of fallow when the community moves to another area in the forest for another episode of cultivation. However, the spread of urban centers radiating toward the fringes of the forest and the sequestration of forest lands for private timber concessions and for infrastructure projects, such as the building of roads and dams, have effectively reduced the areas available to local forest-dwellers for cultivation. This has drastically shortened the fallow period, in some cases to the point that shifting cultivators eventually turned into sedentary farmers.\textsuperscript{13} The consequence for the sustainability of the land’s fertility has been severe, for these farmers were forced into a system that they do not have familiarity with. Further, lowland migrant settlers who chose to move into frontier areas or were forced to do so by economic difficulties they experienced in the lowland political economy began competing with the local forest-dwellers for space. These migrants use lowland farming techniques that are not in tune with the requirements of the upland ecosystems. Sloping and steep areas, for example, have been cultivated for shallow-rooted cash crops, thereby leading to fast rates of soil erosion.

The state-environment interactions in the region could be characterized in terms of a highly interventionist and centralized but weak state adopting command-and-control strategies over its environmental resources. This mismatch between organizational capacity and functional jurisdiction of control has seriously undermined environmental governance and has led to the unraveling of state initiatives. The region’s challenges in this regard occurred against the backdrop of a global trend in which the state, as an institution, has gradually yielded to more active participation of the private sector and civil society organizations in the development process. They also occurred in tandem with the emergence of democratization movements promoting political and economic reform. Such movements found great expression in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, although the latter’s history of strong military incursions into politics continues today. Attempts to bring civil society voices into the affairs of governance, including those involving the environment, have been made even in Malaysia and Singapore, where civil society activities are more constrained. Economic and political reforms continue to be espoused even by military and single-party regimes such as those in Cambodia, Vietnam (as expressed in \textit{doi moi}, the government’s term for reform and “renovation”), and Laos (through its campaign for \textit{chin thanakaan mai}, or “new thinking”).
Non-State and Transnational Actors

Southeast Asia as a region is characterized by dynamic political, cultural, and economic transformations. Civil society actors find stronger voices, even as new economic classes expand. With the advent of the information technology age, access to information is being democratized, as governments lose total monopoly over communication. This trend has created an opportunity for increased bilateral and multilateral interactions not only among states but, more significantly, among civil society actors. However, the widening of the political space that has allowed civil society actors and the private sector to get involved in environmental governance at local and regional levels has also led to a new wave of “colonization,” in which civil society has become “externalized” and transnational economic interests have gained influence. This may not necessarily be a completely negative development, considering that foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and investors can provide intellectual support and capital for local environmental management projects. Furthermore, the presence of an expatriate NGO community has facilitated more participatory and innovative environmental resource management approaches in countries in which local NGOs are either absent or have faced state restraint, such as Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

However, a downside to the entry of foreign interests is the increasing presence of predatory private initiatives. This is dramatically illustrated by hydropower development in the Mekong subregion, where rent-seeking transnational interests, in collusion with domestic players, are able to influence national policy makers to favor less efficient hydropower projects over other sources of energy, such as natural gas. These arrangements are usually in the form of bilateral agreements, in which state governments subsidize the transmission and distribution of power, thereby making the operations of foreign investors in hydropower generation economically viable at the expense of state funds and, indirectly, of taxpayers’ money.

The more insidious impact of the externalization of civil society and the involvement of foreign players is manifested in the domination of the formulation of strategies and policies and the generation of knowledge about environmental resources and processes. For example, in the Mekong subregion, irrigation technology has been deployed by national governments aided by foreign consultants, and local knowledge and practices have been sidelined by a growing dependence on modern infrastructures and scientific knowledge. The flood pulse, which the Mekong communities have traditionally adjusted to as part of the seasonality of their production cycle, has now been depicted as a “disaster” (instead of a part of nature’s cycle) and thus in need of control and management by infrastructural interventions. Also, as mentioned earlier, the promotion of modern technologies for fish production in the Mekong basin is actively supported by states and by foreign consultants to the detriment of local wild-capture fishing practices.

Thus, Southeast Asia is confronting environmental problems that it inherited from a problematic and diverse set of historical experiences, while taking advantage of
globalization as a resource to be tapped and simultaneously dealing with its attendant problems and challenges. This is the societal context for the transboundary issues in the region, which have to be addressed through various institutional structures and processes.

**INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES**

**Regional Bodies**

The dominant institutional responses that have emerged in Southeast Asia to address its transboundary issues involve formal mechanisms mediated by regional bodies such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Mekong River Commission (MRC). Both bodies theoretically allow their member countries to collectively address environmental problems that affect all or some of them. In fact, the existence of these bodies is a tacit recognition that mutually beneficial agreements can be forged to address such problems. However, evidence strongly points to the presence of structural limitations that seriously undermine the bodies’ abilities to fully address transboundary issues.

One of the transboundary issues that has exposed the limitations on ASEAN is the occurrence of haze and transboundary pollution. Responding to the crisis, ASEAN adopted the Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution in June 2002. It came into force on November 25, 2003, after ratification by six countries: Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Myanmar, Brunei, and Vietnam. Indonesia, where the fires causing the haze originate, has not yet ratified this agreement. It has been reported that Indonesia’s Ministry of Forestry is insisting on a quid pro quo, in which support for the agreement is exchanged for regional assistance with its efforts to combat illegal logging.\(^{15}\) Specifically, Indonesia expects Malaysia and Singapore to assist not only with its anti–illegal logging campaigns, but also with other activities such as anticorruption and extradition. While it may be realistic for a country to seek to protect its own interests and to maximize concessions to its advantage, nevertheless Indonesia is solely responsible for failing to implement its own laws on forest burning and illegal logging and for enabling the conversion of forests to lucrative oil palm ventures, thereby leading to clearing of massive areas of land through deliberate burning.

While the ASEAN agreement was a positive move and its ratification by Indonesia would give it added significance by, at least on paper, legally binding that country, the agreement offers very little in terms of compliance regulation. Its provisions do not include sanctions for states that do not comply, any compulsory dispute resolution mechanism, or any means of recourse to international courts or arbitration tribunals. These omissions are not surprising; they are simply reflections of the deep-seated ASEAN ideology of nonintervention and non-confrontation. In fact, the agreement stipulates that conflicts and disputes are to be settled “amicably by consultation or negotiation,” but no specific provision
is made concerning the recourse for an aggrieved party should such consulta-
tion or negotiation fail.\textsuperscript{16} Thus, while ASEAN, through this particular agreement,
can provide a venue for the emergence of a collective voice on resolution of the
haze problem, it unfortunately has imposed a structural limit on such capacity.

The Mekong River Commission (MRC) is another example of a formal regional
body that provides an opportunity for collective action but, in the end, may be
compromised by structural limitations. Like ASEAN, the MRC has no means
by which to push member countries to harmonize their national policies accord-
ing to the agreements forged. The MRC is a technically competent body, as ev-
edenced by its impressive database of information about the Mekong basin.
However, it is politically challenged, to say the least. The Mekong Agreement,
which it helped forge in 1995, is “weakly drafted, and it encourages rather than
commands. It lacks the legal ‘teeth’ to enforce any of its provisions, and there-
fore, though sustainable development is its noble intention, it is incapable of
translating this intention into real substantive achievements.”\textsuperscript{17}

While the signatory countries in the Mekong subregion participated in the draft-
ing of several procedures embedded in the agreement, there is no evidence that
they have made any reference to those procedures or other provisions of the
agreement in their national water policies and laws, including those they have
passed after the agreement came into force. This stems not only from the lack
of strong compliance provisions in the Mekong regional agreement, but also
from the weak, if not incoherent, water legislation in each of the signatory coun-
tries. The provisions of the Vietnam Law on Water Resources No. 8, passed on
May 20, 1998, and the Lao Water Resources Law, issued in 1996, for example,
not only fail to provide internal compliance, but lack provisions referring to the
Mekong Agreement, even though both were passed after the agreement entered
into force. Thailand and Cambodia have many pieces of water legislation, in-
cluding laws passed prior to 1995, but these have yet to be organized into one
coherent piece of legislation.

\textbf{Multi-Sector Coordination}

It is apparent, from the experiences of ASEAN and MRC, that transnational nego-
tiations are limited by the diplomatic obligations of member countries to be polite
to their neighbors, particularly given the ASEAN way of nonconfrontation. This
leads to symbolically significant but politically weak agreements. However, paral-
lel venues have emerged in the region in which non-state actors have been in-
volved in the discussion of relevant issues, including transboundary environmental
issues. These venues developed along with the growing civil society community
of the region. Furthermore, the technical nature of the transboundary issues that
confront Southeast Asia, and its formal regional bodies such as ASEAN and MRC,
have created an opening for scientists and technical policy analysts to be involved
in parallel discussions on a regional scale. Some of the venues for these multi-
stakeholder discussions are the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which conducts sessions that parallel formal ASEAN meetings, and the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) through its regularly held Asia Pacific Roundtable, among others.

While these venues provide the opportunity for nongovernmental actors, including natural and social scientists, to get involved and help to build confidence and a sense of community in the region, they nevertheless produce only nonbinding statements. They have also exposed independent nongovernmental actors to the possible risk of being compromised by close association with governmental parties. Nevertheless, such venues can serve as a source of pressure on governmental actors toward favorable outcomes and as a catalyst for the formation of consensus, for the identification of constraints that need to be addressed, and for the unveiling of problematic positions to public scrutiny and criticism. This was the case when the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), in partnership with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Indonesia and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) Indonesia, sponsored a workshop on the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution in May 2007. The workshop was attended by representatives of Indonesian NGOs, government officials, and provincial leaders, as well as regional actors from Singapore and Malaysia. Its aim was to increase understanding among the various Indonesian stakeholders about practical implementation of the agreement once it is ratified by Indonesia. This was the venue in which the conflicting positions of the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry, on one hand, and the Ministry for the Environment, the civil society organizations, and the local provincial governments, on the other, were brought to public scrutiny. The problematic position of the Ministry of Forestry, in its evident resistance to the agreement, became the focus of much critical commentary, which had the effect of adding to the emerging pressure on Indonesia and would not have been articulated in regular ASEAN meetings. The workshop also revealed an information gap between local and national understanding in Indonesia of the problem that needs to be addressed and made local efforts to curb the fires more visible to the non-Indonesian public.

The involvement of scientists in regional discussions of transboundary environmental issues is another area in need of institutional structure, particularly to allow science-based knowledge to translate into policy. The scientific community can provide technical information drawn from biophysical and social scientific research to support policy making. Networks of scientists, termed “epistemic communities,” exist to provide this type of support. The CGIAR Water Challenge Program, under the auspices of the Mekong Program on Water, Environment and Resilience (M-POWER), based in Chiang Mai, Thailand, sponsors research by an international network of research fellows and scientists and conducts meetings and dialogues at different levels, from the local community level to the regional level at MRC, in order to build capacity for institutional and policy analysis of water governance issues in mainland Southeast Asia.
What these types of alliances hope to achieve is to strengthen the otherwise tenuous link between science and policy in the Mekong subregion. Indigenous knowledge about water resources held by local communities is often marginalized by modern science, as evidenced by the manner in which wild-capture fishing practices and local attitudes toward floods have given way to modern aquaculture and infrastructure-fixated approaches. In contrast, scientific knowledge held by university-based researchers, as well as academic consultants and freelancers, is better off in this regard. Indeed, there is some degree of integration of research-based knowledge into the policy process, at least on paper and through rituals of inclusion such as joint research projects, consultancies, and conferences. In Vietnam, for example, the Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Association (VUSTA), the Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology, and the Institute of Energy have significantly contributed to the Energy Development Plan, even though these science communities could take a more critical stance toward some aspects of the plan. Similarly, university-based scientists have provided input to the development of a water privatization policy in eastern Thailand. Civil society organizations also tap scientific knowledge for their advocacies in the region. Actors with technical expertise can engage state policy makers more directly, and their technical knowledge can make their advocacy stand on firm scientific grounds.

However, the link between research-based knowledge and the policy-making process is constrained not only in the Mekong subregion but elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Institutional barriers prevent meaningful interaction. These barriers often derive from institutional inertia and manifest themselves as structural limits imposed by bureaucratic rigidity and state ideology. Their effect is seen in the difficulty of procuring documents and data, and in the engagement of scientists with only noncontroversial issues. A strong history of elite domination within countries in Southeast Asia and the growing presence of transnational economic interests in the region also enable power elites to further their agenda of control and domination of knowledge. One strategy they use is to co-opt resistance by accommodating alternative views that are not as threatening to their interests. Another strategy is to deploy views that cement the synergy between elite actors and science-based policy decisions so as to delegitimize any challenge coming from opposing voices and to project safe scenarios to justify their policy decisions as beneficial and aimed at socially desirable goals. Here, science is effectively co-opted to serve the interests of the dominant elites or state parties. This was most vividly illustrated by the environment impact assessment (EIA) conducted in connection with the Navigation Channel Improvement Project for widening the upper tributaries of the Mekong River in Yunnan, China. The scientific aspect of the EIA gave way to political expediency, as the true interests of the downstream countries Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand, which an honest EIA would have upheld, all yielded to the strategic self-interests of Myanmar’s sense of friendship with China, Laos’s self-preservation instincts relative to China, and Thailand’s seizing the opportunity for cheap energy from China, the project’s proponent.
It is, therefore, apparent that formal state mechanisms such as diplomatic channels and official venues, as well as mechanisms that accommodate the participation of civil society actors and of scientists, while opening the possibility for addressing transboundary environmental issues in Southeast Asia, nevertheless have their own structural limitations. The limitations that have hindered countries in the region in addressing the conflicts involved in the issue of transboundary haze pollution and in managing the water resources in the Mekong basin are also manifested in the difficulty that countries bordering the South China Sea have in initiating meaningful discussions about transboundary concerns other than territorial claims and traditional security. The countries in the region seem capable of forging only symbolic agreements that are further limited by an ASEAN culture of politeness and nonintervention. The relative silence of ASEAN on the illegal trade in forest products, evidenced by the absence of any concrete reference to it beyond a high-sounding statement on sustainable development and the protection of biodiversity resources in the Cebu Resolution on Sustainable Development, adopted in 2006, is also notable.

**Local-Level Engagement**

The limits that seem to prevent ASEAN and MRC, as well as ARF and other forums, from meaningfully addressing transboundary concerns, in turn, create a void for environmental social movements to occupy, while also giving them reason to exist. The region is hosting a plethora of regional NGOs, some of which are home-grown as distinguished from the expatriate NGO community of middle-class, Western, conservationist progeny such as WWF, IUCN, and TRAFFIC. NGOs such as the Asia-Pacific Women’s Legal Defense (APWLD), Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA), and Focus on the Global South (FOCUS), all of which are based in Thailand but have regionwide operations, have emerged as the local response to the need to offer a concerted civil society voice amidst the challenges brought about by more regional integration and globalization.

APWLD, formed in 1986, focuses on enabling women to use law as a tool for social change and for achieving equality, justice, and development. While it does not focus specifically on the environment, it is allied with other regional groups, including those having an environmental agenda, particularly on issues that involve women. TERRA is a regional offshoot of the Project for Ecological Recovery (PER), which was formed in 1986 around the issues of resources and livelihoods of local communities in Thailand. Established in 1991, TERRA’s main agenda is to focus on environmental issues affecting local communities in the Mekong subregion. FOCUS was formed in 1991 as a regional and multi-sectoral coalition of academics, NGOs, and people’s movements concerned with human security issues, such as socioeconomic and gender inequality, political exclusion, and environmental degradation. These NGO coalitions, together with locally based NGOs operating in component countries, offer alternative analyses, visions, and strategies for
sustainable development that encompasses indigenous rights, women’s empowerment, peace, and environmental protection.

While regional in scope, these NGO coalitions operate through localized translations of regional plans of action. After all, the actual behavioral changes in modes of engaging with the environment and its resources—from asking a local Indonesian farmer not to burn the forest, to influencing local wildlife trappers in Laos and Myanmar to shift to other forms of livelihood, to enabling local wild-capture fishers in Cambodia to acquire legal standing to fight for their rights, to organizing coastal communities in Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines to manage their mangroves and coral reefs bordering the South China Sea—are all local in character. It is in this wide range of local action that civil society actors find more relevance. Already, local communities and governments in Laos, working in partnerships with their counterparts in Yunnan, China, have forged direct legal and technical agreements not only to curb illegal trade but also to provide alternative livelihoods.19 In Indonesia, local NGOs have implemented projects in fire-prone areas and have deployed social support to the direct victims of fires. Local and provincial officials in Riau and Kalimantan, two of the more fire-prone areas in Indonesia, are also implementing fire prevention and control projects on their own.

One mechanism that has emerged recently is the promotion of more people-to-people interactions on a regional scale. An example of this is the ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA), which began in 2000, is sponsored by ASEAN-ISIS, and is conducted annually. APA hopes to promote the following goals:

- To promote a greater awareness of community among various sectors of ASEAN on a step-by-step basis;
- To promote mutual understanding and tolerance for the diversity of culture, religion, ethnicity, social values, political structures and processes, and other aspects among the ASEAN population;
- To obtain insights and inputs on how to deal with socioeconomic problems affecting ASEAN societies from as many relevant sectors of those societies as possible;
- To facilitate the bridging of gaps through various confidence-building measures, including participation in the APA, between social and political sectors within and across ASEAN societies on a step-by-step basis; and
- To assist in the building of an ASEAN community of caring societies as sought by the ASEAN Vision 2020.

Another mechanism that has emerged is the establishment of more direct partnerships between local community actors and regional civil society organizations to address issues that are transboundary in character. One example of this is the Indochina Biodiversity Forum, which was initiated in 1997 by the WWF. The forum is a venue to facilitate dialogues and partnerships among local actors working toward the protection of biodiversity and to increase the stability of border areas.
Such venues help to foster understanding and build confidence among actors from various countries concerned with issues that go beyond state boundaries. The forum also brings scientists, academics, and local government representatives to meet with local people’s organizations.20

However, civil society actors in Southeast Asia are also hampered by structural constraints. NGO-directed processes are encountering problems due to the weak technical capacity of local organizations. There is also a perception by the state that joint conservation efforts between local actors and transnational groups might erode national sovereignty, resulting in lukewarm state support, if not direct hostility and suspicion of multi-stakeholder and transnational efforts and partnerships. Internally, the NGO community is also threatened by the ideological battle between conservation purists who espouse protectionist policies to the detriment of human communities and social development reformers who struggle to achieve a balance between the protection of ecosystems and the social development of those whose livelihoods depend on them. For example, some NGOs are not comfortable opposing the illegal trade of forest products, a position espoused by their more conservationist colleagues, because they believe such trade may be the source of livelihoods for marginalized communities.

NGOs are also politically endangered in many countries, where their advocacies are considered to be radical voices that compromise national security and social harmony. Being labeled as radical, whether rightly or wrongly, can diminish the ability of an NGO to operate safely and/or meaningfully. Myanmar, with its draconian policies on civil society activism, is an extreme case. But elsewhere in the region, civil society activists are also threatened by state reprisal. Even in the absence of actual state reprisal, being labeled as politically dangerous could be very effective in delegitimizing NGO voices as valid conveyers of knowledge that should be considered in policy discussions. Those responsible for the coup in Thailand, for example, at one time restricted the activities of NGOs. However, even prior to that, the corporate mentality of Thaksin Shinawatra led to a discourse in which NGOs were labeled as national problems preventing meaningful progress. Civil society activists remain cautious in Malaysia and Singapore. Even in the Philippines, which prides itself as a bastion of civil society activism, NGO activists, particularly those allied with more progressive forces, have become objects of state harassment and even victims of unexplained disappearances. This coercive and repressive mentality is undoubtedly linked to the post-9/11 discourse and its attendant politics of fear, which infect not only Southeast Asia, but the entire world.

It is also important to recognize that a more insidious threat to local communities and to locally linked civil society mobilization is the encapsulation of local livelihoods, and the social processes within which they emerge and from which they draw their natural logic, in a national and global economic and political system. While being linked to a larger domain opens the possibility for upward
and progressive integration, notably through an influx of development and technical assistance, it can also bring difficulties in the form of imperatives to which local communities could be held hostage. Farming practices and even the choice of crops might no longer be autonomous decisions of local actors but imposed by outside forces that they would find difficult to escape from or resist.

**CONCLUSION**

This paper attempted to convey the complexity of transboundary environmental issues that confront Southeast Asia, not only their nature but the societal context within which they emerge and against which institutional responses are framed. The diverse political, cultural, economic, and historical experiences of the countries that comprise Southeast Asia require an equally diverse set of institutional responses. It is apparent that no single response could provide a solution to the overall problem. Several venues for discussion and action exist, from the more formal venues of ASEAN and MRC, to the parallel venues of ARF and ISIS, to the various civil society–based domains that nurture environmental movements. Institutional responses come in various forms—from formal agreements to science-policy partnerships, multi-stakeholder platforms for dialogue such as regional seminars and workshops, and local community action by NGOs and local governments. While these responses and their domains for emergence are also constrained by structural limitations, they are evidence of the dynamism from which various layers of interventions emerge. Some are tempted to see these limitations as disenabling constraints. Others, however, can see in this complexity the opportunity for addressing challenges by drawing on the strengths of the various institutional domains and the diversity of voices which they allow and enable.
Sixty percent of global fish production takes place in Asia, and developing countries produce over 75 percent of that share. Asia accounts for 34 percent of the world’s exports of fish and a staggering 87 percent of all fishery and aquaculture employees. The members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia—are responsible for one-quarter of global production—21 million tons of fish products—every year. Fish consumption is higher in Asia than in any other region of the world and is increasing worldwide. It is likely that the role of fisheries in providing livelihoods, trade, and food security in the Southeast Asian region will continue to grow.

Fish account for 22 percent of global trade in agricultural commodities, compared to 17 percent for meat, and this share is rising. As the global demand for fish products continues to grow and production increases, fish stocks will be in increasing peril of depletion from overfishing and harmful fishing practices. Environmental changes and degradation due to human activities and climate change will also affect fisheries. Both marine fisheries and freshwater fisheries, like those of the Mekong Basin, will be affected. The situation is further complicated by the links between fisheries and other sectors, such as agriculture, urban development, coastal industries, energy development, and shipping, all of which compete for land and water use. It will be necessary to negotiate solutions to these challenges.

The importance of fisheries’ future contributions to livelihoods, food security, and regional relationships in Southeast Asia cannot be underestimated. Because of the globalized nature of markets, the huge economic stakes, and the weakness of international and regional institutions for cooperation and sustainable fishery management, there is currently little reason for optimism concerning the fate of a number of marine fisheries and species.

**Definitions**

The term *fisheries*—the capture or farming of aquatic animals and plants—covers a large number of organisms in habitats ranging from lakes to deep oceans. This diverse sector includes a wide range of occupations related to catching, growing, processing, and selling—from individuals with hook and line to multinational
companies with vessels roaming the high seas, and from small-scale farmers with fishponds to corporations operating large-scale coastal cage farms. All of these are found in many of the region’s countries, adding complexities to the challenge of establishing equitable and sustainable management.

Fisheries can be divided into capture and culture (aquaculture). Aquaculture is broadly defined as the farming of aquatic animals and plants. Aquaculture production systems are commonly categorized as extensive, semi-intensive, or intensive, based on their sources of feeds and their stocking density. In extensive aquaculture, the fish depend entirely on natural food, such as plankton, in farm waters. In semi-intensive aquaculture, the production of natural food in farm waters is increased by fertilization, and supplemental feeds, such as rice bran, may also be given. In intensive aquaculture, the fish are given nutritionally complete feeds, either trash fish (captured fish that have little commercial value because of their small size or low popularity with consumers) or formulated feed in pellet form.

Capture fisheries involve catching or harvesting wild fish and other aquatic organisms in freshwater, brackish water, or seawater. Capture fisheries are often divided into two types: (1) large-scale, industrial or commercial fisheries, and (2) small-scale, or artisanal, fisheries. Large-scale fisheries employ capital-intensive technologies, with equipment owned by commercial entrepreneurs and operated by salaried crews. Large-scale fisheries operate primarily (but not exclusively) in marine waters. Small-scale, or artisanal, fisheries are defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) as traditional fisheries involving fishing households. Some small-scale fisheries are mechanized, but most are labor-intensive, using small craft with traditional fishing gear, such as handlines, small nets, traps, and spears, or hand-collection methods. Small-scale fisheries operate in rivers, lakes, and wetlands as well as coastal waters. However, as small-scale fishers take advantage of technological improvements, develop business acumen, and range further offshore, they are increasingly taking on the attributes of commercial operators. When the fish are not sold but consumed by the fishers and their families, the fishery is called a subsistence fishery. The growth in small-scale fisheries is greater than that of industrial fisheries, but both can be expected to feel the pressures of increased demand and dwindling stocks in the coming decades.

Marine capture fisheries depend on either demersal or pelagic resources. Demersal organisms reside near the bottom of the sea and are thus most commonly found in soft-bottom areas (sandy or muddy substrates) and near reefs. Commonly harvested demersal organisms are ponyfish, squid, threadfin bream, and blue crab. Fishing for demersal species is typically conducted at depths of 40 meters or less. Pelagic resources consist of finfish that are found in open water. These fish are further subdivided into small pelagics and large pelagics. Common small pelagic species include round scad and Indian sardine. Most small pelagic fish are captured in water less than 200 meters deep. Small pelagics account for more than
half of the total production of marine capture fisheries. Tuna is an example of a large pelagic species; these species are found in deeper waters. Most (about 70 percent) of capture fishery production now comes from marine fisheries resources.

**Livelihoods, Trade, and Food Security**

The total world fish production in 2001 was 130 million tons, of which 79 million tons came from Asia. The total fish production of the ASEAN countries was 21 million tons in that year. Some of these countries are among the world’s major producers of marine capture fish. Indonesia is the third-largest fish producer in the world, followed by Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam. (China and India are number one and two, respectively.) Indonesia produces 4.7 million tons, Thailand 2.8 million tons, and the Philippines 2.2 million tons annually. Myanmar, Malaysia, and Vietnam all produce more than 1 million tons annually.

Trade in fish represents a significant source of foreign currency earnings in Asia. Developing countries have become net exporters of fisheries products: in terms of value, 50 percent are exported, while only 15 percent are imported (see Figure 1). Between 1980 and 1999, the value of developing countries’ net exports increased from US$5 billion to US$16.5 billion. Within ASEAN as a whole, fisheries contribute up to 10 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). Regional trade in fisheries products is also growing, in part as a result of the removal of tariffs and quotas. Nontariff barriers (food safety regulations, quality standards, and leveling requirements) are becoming major factors affecting regional trade.

The proportion of people employed in fishery-related jobs in Asia—87 percent of the world’s total—has doubled since the 1970s. That these workers are responsible for 60 percent of global fish production demonstrates how important fisheries are to livelihoods within the region. Fisheries in ASEAN nations employ 30 million people. With average households numbering five individuals, the segment of the population directly dependent on fisheries for food and income comes to 150 million people. Another 60 million people work in associated industries such as boatmaking, manufacture of fishing gear, bait preparation, marketing, and processing. In the Philippines, fisheries provide employment to roughly 12 percent of the labor force working in agriculture, fisheries, and forestry and to about 5 percent of the country’s total labor force. It is important to note that women constitute a large proportion of the workers in fisheries, employed mostly in processing.

The importance of fisheries to food security within the region cannot be overestimated. The average annual per capita consumption of fish worldwide is 18 kilograms. Fish consumption is considerably higher in Asia, where annual per capita consumption is now estimated to be around 24 kilograms. Fish constitute over 50 percent of the average animal protein intake in some countries. In the Philippines, where per capita fish consumption was estimated at 26.8 kilograms per year, fish contributes 12.3 percent of total food intake, 22.4 percent of protein intake, and 56
Figure 1: Developing Countries’ Growing Share of Fisheries Production

percent of animal protein intake.\textsuperscript{15} Per capita consumption of fish in the Southeast Asian region is expected to increase by an additional 2 percent per year until 2020.\textsuperscript{16} However, as a result of circumstances that will be explored next, fish are becoming less available and relatively more expensive than other food items. This trend, which disproportionately affects poor people, is likely to continue.

**DECREASING FISHERIES AND MARINE BIODIVERSITY**

Overexploitation of many species, destructive fishing practices, and habitat losses are the main causes of declining levels of biodiversity in marine environments. Valuable aquatic resources are becoming increasingly susceptible to both natural and human-caused environmental changes. Researchers have long believed that the area with the highest diversity of marine fish species is the Indo-Malay-Philippines Archipelago (IMPA). A recent analysis of distribution of marine fish species indicates that the global center of biodiversity is the central Philippines islands, with a second center between peninsular Malaysia and Sumatra.\textsuperscript{17}

Based on mapping of the geographic distributions of reef fishes, corals, snails, and lobsters—organisms identified as “reasonable surrogates for reef diversity as a whole”—researchers have identified the world’s ten richest coral reef ecosystems.\textsuperscript{18} There is a high level of concordance in the patterns of species richness for the four categories, with peaks occurring in the so-called coral triangle of Southeast Asia. The richest ecosystems are found in the southern Philippines and in central Indonesia. Species richness falls off rapidly as one moves from the coral triangle east across the Pacific and less rapidly as one moves west across the Indian Ocean.

Marine biodiversity is threatened both by overexploitation of commercial species and by physical damage to ecosystems by certain destructive fishing practices. The process of “fishing down the marine food web”—that is, depleting higher-value fish species, thus making less valuable species dominant in the ecosystem—contributes heavily to loss of marine biodiversity.

**Resource Declines and Overcapacities**

Total world catches of marine fish continue to flatten, as most major fishing areas of the world are either fully exploited or overexploited. In some places, the fisheries are already in a senescent phase. It is generally recognized that most of the nearshore fishing areas in Southeast Asia are overfished.\textsuperscript{19} Production by coastal capture fisheries has been declining. Some researchers estimate that overfishing in South and Southeast Asia has depleted coastal fish stocks by 5 to 30 percent of their unexploited levels.\textsuperscript{20} Among the overexploited stocks are coastal demersal and small pelagic species in the Java Sea and the waters between Indonesia and the Philippines, demersal and small pelagic species and prawns in the Gulf of Thailand, and green mussels and pearl oysters off the coast of Vietnam.
Resources decline is associated with excess fishing capacity or overcapacity. According to some researchers, “based on current trends, production from capture fisheries in the Asia-Pacific region will decline over the next ten to twenty years unless excess capacity and fishing effort [are] greatly reduced.” Larger, more valuable fish species have decreased sharply, and there has been a disproportionate increase in smaller, less valuable, or nonedible species. Excess fishing capacity varies from country to country. The excess capacity of Indonesia in the Java Sea is estimated to be between 86 and 207 percent, while that of the Philippines is between 120 to 130 percent.

Unlicensed vessels contribute to the problem of overfishing. Overfishing is also accentuated by the harvesting of immature or undersize fish, as well as the use of destructive fishing techniques, such as cyanide and dynamite fishing. The vast worldwide increase in fishing capacity is exacerbated by the use of fine mesh nets, which capture large numbers of juveniles, in many countries and by post-harvest losses due to spoilage, which vary among countries.

**Habitat and Environmental Degradation**

Habitat and environmental degradation is having negative impacts on fishery resources. Loss of habitat means that fish have fewer areas in which to reproduce and grow. Human activities that continue to cause widespread destruction and alteration of important fish habitats in coastal zones include reclamation of intertidal areas, destruction of mangrove forests for fuel and to build aquaculture ponds for shrimp, damming of rivers (which disrupts flooding cycles), foreshore development and the creation of flood control structures (both of which alter patterns of sediment movement), extraction of corals and sand for construction materials or to create navigation channels, and use of destructive fishing methods.

In the last century in Southeast Asia, some 70 percent of mangrove forests, 11 percent of coral reefs, and at least 20 percent and as much as 60 percent of seagrass beds were lost. Anywhere from 41 percent of mangrove forests (in Indonesia) to 75 percent (in Thailand) have been destroyed. Most of these mangrove areas have been converted into fishponds, or the trees have been cut down so that the wood can be made into charcoal or used for other household purposes. The plight of the coral reefs reflects that of the mangrove forests. It is estimated that 56 percent of Southeast Asia’s coral reefs are threatened by destructive fishing techniques. In the Philippines, only one-quarter of the reefs surveyed had a live coral cover of more than 50 percent. In Thailand, over 60 percent of coral reefs are in fair or poor condition. Most nearshore reefs in Vietnam are heavily exploited. The use of explosives and sodium cyanide to harvest fish destroys coral reefs and causes major economic losses, estimated to be US$3.8 billion over the past 20 years in Indonesia alone.

Some commercial fishing techniques are affecting the ecologically valuable soft-bottom fishing areas. Bottom trawling in intensively fished areas also causes disturbances to other ecosystems. Trawling usually results in a substantial *bypatch* ...
consisting of undersized fish or unwanted species, which do not survive when returned to the sea. Worldwide, 27 million tons of fish are killed and discarded in this way, representing more than half of all annual marine captures for direct human consumption.\textsuperscript{30} Trawling can also destroy or modify plant and animal communities on the seabed, removing important shelter for juvenile fish and reducing biodiversity.\textsuperscript{31}

Destruction and alteration of habitats are considered to be the greatest threats to biodiversity, and the most widespread human impact occurs in coastal zones. Much of the damage is due to land-based sources of pollution, such as sediments from unregulated forestry practices and effluents such as inorganic fertilizers and pesticides from agricultural and industrial activities. Excess nutrients from agriculture and forestry also promote the growth of epiphytic algae and increase the risk of toxic algal blooms, which render fish unsafe for human consumption.

**Climate Change**

Climate change has become an important new threat to the productivity of fisheries. Fisheries, including aquaculture, are threatened by changes in temperature and, in freshwater ecosystems, in precipitation. As climate change progresses, storms may become more frequent and extreme, imperiling fish stocks and fishery infrastructure and, consequently, livelihoods. Greater variability in climate complicates the task of identifying areas of vulnerability. Research to devise and promote coping strategies and improve the adaptability of fishers and aquaculturists will become increasingly important.

**Energy**

The cost of fossil fuels will become a more critical factor for fisheries in the coming decades. Worldwide, some 50 billion liters of fuel are used to catch 80 million tons of fish. Marine capture fisheries are acknowledged to be the most energy-intensive food production method in the world. They rely almost completely on internal combustion engines that use petroleum-based fuels. Since the trend in developing countries is toward mechanization, small-scale fisheries are increasingly affected by energy costs. In terms of levels of employment, it is important from a social perspective to improve and maintain energy efficiency within small-scale fisheries.

**LEGAL AND GOVERNANCE FACTORS**

**Political Factors**

Political stability and policy continuity are important to effective fisheries management. Political changes—at times, upheavals—are realities to be contended with at both the national and the local levels. A turnover in political administrations may lead to a change in priorities or focus for fisheries. In the Philippines,
for example, a local election is held every three years. In both democratic and authoritarian countries, the power of special interests, the low level of scientific literacy among leaders and policy makers, and nationalism undermine the pursuit of cooperative and sustainable marine fisheries management.

Property Rights and Conflicts

Many conflicts in marine capture fisheries may be traced to unclear property rights. Despite national and local policies, rules, and regulations, many fishing areas remain virtually unregulated. Types of conflicts vary among countries. In Cambodia, conflicts tend to be about the allocation of fishing rights. In the Philippines, there are conflicts between small-scale (municipal) and large-scale (commercial) fisheries. Although the municipal fishers have proprietary rights up to 15 kilometers from the shoreline, commercial fishers often intrude into these waters. The situation is exacerbated in some cases when local governments explicitly permit commercial fisheries to operate between 10 and 15 kilometers from shore. In the Gulf of Thailand, for example, this kind of conflict arises between commercial anchovy fishers and small-scale operators such as net fishers.

Traditionally, inshore fishing areas have been open access, meaning that almost anyone may engage in fishing there without limit and with minimal state interference. In this “free-for-all” environment, resources are likely to be overexploited. Unless appropriate property rights are established, it will be extremely difficult to control and rationalize the access to fishery resources. When long-term rights of the fishers and associated users are well defined and secure, fishery resources are more likely to be used in a sustainable manner. Fishers are not likely to adopt sustainable fishing practices without an assurance that the ultimate economic or ecological benefits of such practices will redound to them.

Governance Failure

Generally, the institutional structures and mechanisms for fisheries management are either inadequate, inappropriately set up, or not in place at all. Three key factors contribute to this problem of governance. First, there is the perennial issue of limited institutional capabilities. Fisheries administration is often shared by national government agencies, local government units, and local communities. These institutional entities have varying resource limitations that prevent them from effectively fulfilling their mandated responsibilities. Fisheries management agencies are often hampered by inadequate financial and human resources. Within the agricultural sector, comprising crops, fisheries, and livestock, the lowest priority is accorded to the fisheries, despite their growing share of output.

A second factor is that fisheries management agencies are constrained by inadequate or inconsistent policies. Development-oriented policies are given priority over resource conservation at the national level. Policies that promote economic
growth, such as those related to energy and coastal industrial development, are given preference over fisheries-related policies. In the Philippines, contradictory policies on fisheries make their management difficult. That country's 1997 Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act promotes the full industrialization of fisheries, whereas its 1998 Fisheries Code pursues food security through management and conservation of fishery resources. In some cases, national policies and local regulations have either a limited technical basis or no scientific basis at all. International conventions or commitments may also have adverse impacts on fisheries, at least over the short term. For instance, trade policies on import liberalization are putting small-scale fishers at an economic disadvantage. Cheaper imported fish products compete with these people's already meager catch.

A third factor is the issue of weak institutional partnerships. Most often, this situation is the result of limited coordination (horizontally, vertically, or both) among organizations and institutions established to deal with fisheries management. Under ideal conditions, the better equipped national law enforcement agencies should collaborate closely with local law enforcement units. In most cases, however, the collaboration is ad hoc, resulting in weak on-the-ground enforcement of fisheries rules and regulations. Agencies whose primary mandates are in research and development also have formed few partnerships, which results in limited use of new knowledge and technical innovation.

**OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVED MANAGEMENT**

**Transnational Cooperation**

Regional economic integration offers a key opportunity. Economic integration is manifested or exemplified by the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), and the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA). ASEAN is committed to deepening and broadening its regional economic integration, with the participation of the private sector, in order to realize an ASEAN Economic Community by 2010. Fisheries were among the 11 priority sectors identified by ASEAN leaders in 2004. “Roadmaps” were developed to ensure that the various measures are implemented effectively and in a timely manner to create an integrated market and production base for each of the priority sectors.

The Roadmap for Integration of the Fisheries Sector focused on four areas:

1. Food safety issues, including use of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) fishing methods and reduction of use of TBT (tributyltin—a highly toxic biocide used in antifouling paints for ship bottoms), implementation of antipollution measures, compliance with international good practices and standards, strengthening of testing facilities in ASEAN countries, and recognition of testing results and product certification by regulators;
2. Research and development;
3. Human resource development; and
4. Information sharing. There has been a generally positive attitude toward the effects of market integration in both the public and the private sectors in Southeast Asia. Many believe that the integration will be good for the member countries as a whole, since it will bring higher product standards, greater investment, more exports, better market access, and improved cooperation. Moreover, because the ASEAN countries share common products and markets, economic integration will give those countries a stronger position in trade negotiations with non-ASEAN countries.

Worldwide, more networks are being established that are supportive of fisheries. The World Forum of Fishharvesters and Fishworkers is a prominent one. At the regional level, over 35 multilateral or regional fisheries organizations have been established, with functions ranging from consulting and advising to management, decision making, and enforcement. Several networks exist within Southeast Asia for transnational communication and cooperation among governments, NGOs, the private sector, and civil society groups. Multilateral bodies, such as the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization–Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission (FAO-APFIC), have a role to play. There are regional research institutions such as the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), whose departments are strategically located in various member countries. Some networks are habitat-specific in focus; for example, the International Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI), which is supported by over 60 countries, focuses on coral reefs and their associated ecosystems.

In the last decade, there has been a growing regional awareness of the importance of integrated, comprehensive management of fisheries. There are a number of regional programs and initiatives to encourage better management of fisheries resources. The Regional Programme on Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA), sponsored by the Global Environment Facility, the United Nations Development Programme, and the International Maritime Organization, and the South China Sea (SCS) Project, sponsored by the United Nations Environment Programme and the Global Environment Facility, are two such regional programs. PEMSEA has an environmental focus and aims to protect the life support systems of the seas of East Asia and to promote the sustainable use of their renewable resources through inter-governmental and inter-sectoral partnerships. The SCS Project aims to enhance collaboration among stakeholders in addressing the environmental problems of the region and to increase the capacity of governments to integrate environmental considerations into national development planning.

Finally, the approach known as integrated coastal management (ICM) or integrated coastal zone management (ICZM) repositions fisheries management within the broader societal contexts of livelihoods, trade, human development, and food
security. Through the ICM framework, the link between capture fisheries and aquaculture can become stronger. For example, ICM promotes the use of trash fish and low-value fish from capture fisheries as aquaculture feeds. The Philippines has recently committed to an ICM approach with Executive Order 533, signed by the President in June 2006, which declared ICM a national strategy for sustainable development of the country’s marine and coastal resources.

The Local Level

In order for international or transnational cooperation to be effective, there must be organizational, institutional, and policy changes at the local level. Some changes are becoming evident in Southeast Asia. There has been a recent trend in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand toward decentralization, which gives local governing bodies more control over local fishery practices. Although decentralization can be positive, it imposes requirements in terms of personnel, funding, and even time. Decentralization will fail if the local government bodies do not have the personnel or funds to undertake effective fisheries management. Building human capacity and providing funding are imperative in order to make decentralization a viable option in improving fisheries management.

Another promising trend is the institutionalization at the local level of internationally accepted fisheries management standards. It is essential to establish practices and standards that comply with international guidelines on fisheries such as the FAO’s Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing (CCRF). There is also a need to establish an ASEAN certification program for good practices and standards for capture fisheries and aquaculture. An early warning system for health hazards and disease outbreaks in fishing and aquaculture production is particularly desirable.

CONCLUSION

The present situation confronting the fisheries of the Southeast Asian region is largely the result of laissez-faire attitudes on the part of national governments, which have found it difficult to manage fisheries from the central level, and, where decentralization has occurred, on the part of local government bodies, which do not have the capacity or funds to undertake effective fisheries management. There is a clear disjunction between fisheries policy research (theory) and actual, on-the-ground management (action). Fisheries management measures are not currently addressing the identified challenges confronting the sector.

There is also a disjunction between inter- and intra-sectoral integration. Integration is not very apparent between small-scale and large-scale fisheries. Likewise, links between capture fisheries and aquaculture are not well established. Capture fisheries are also not effectively linked with associated economic sectors. For example, there are still very few integrated management policies covering coral reefs that are used both by capture fisheries and for ecotourism (e.g., the diving industry).
Without near-term action, over the next 5 to 20 years, several developments can be expected in Southeast Asian fisheries. Production from marine capture fisheries will likely not keep up with demand, causing concerns for food security in the region, because of both insufficient supply and the associated rising prices. The increasing demand for fish by an expanding population will create more stress on the already depleted coastal and inshore fishery resources in the region. External factors such as climate change also pose threats to fisheries.

There are several mechanisms by which change might come about. One approach is to change consumer preferences. The unbridled consumption of such fish as sub-adult coral red trout is simply not sustainable from the production standpoint. Likewise, the killing of sharks for shark fin soup puts tremendous pressure on already dwindling shark populations. Another approach might be to attempt to counteract traditional beliefs and practices. The increasing consumption of gonads of sea cucumbers for health reasons has already contributed to collapse of some stocks. Some age-old practices need some rethinking in relation to the sustainability of the fisheries. Third, change may come in economic terms. The ASEAN Economic Community, if it were to follow the European model, could contribute to better economic management of wild stocks. One sobering reality, however, is that agreements to promote sustainable fisheries management in European waters have not prevented European fishing fleets from carrying out industrial-scale commercial fishing in African and Southeast Asian waters. The European Commission estimates that US$1.6 billion of illegal seafood finds its way to European markets annually, while the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) estimates that up to half of the seafood consumed in Europe has been illegally caught by Chinese and other Asian fleets as well as by “pirate fishing” by European fleets closer to home.4

Fourth, stronger regional cooperation—through AFPIC, SEAFDEC, and other bodies—will help promote change. Fifth, there must be greater adherence to implementation of international agreements, including, among others, CCRF and the International Plan of Action (IPOA).

Information, education, and communication campaigns should be accelerated to elicit changes in patterns of fish consumption. Such campaigns could serve as focal points for regional cooperation and joint management. They might also act as catalysts for funding for technical assistance and for collaborative efforts at restoration, rehabilitation, and conservation and as facilitators of neutral mediation in resource-use conflicts.

Southeast Asian countries must also commit to continuous, long-term strengthening of institutions whose purpose is to sustain the management of capture fisheries in the region. It is essential to establish a monitoring program to ensure compliance with rules of origin, standards, and tariffs. Unfortunately, the political will, governance capacity, and effective institutions for cooperation do not currently exist. If the challenges explored in this paper are not effectively addressed, further declines in resources, greater environmental degradation, and more conflicts related to fisheries resources can be expected throughout the region.
BUILDING REGIONAL CAPACITY TO MAINSTREAM HIV/AIDS MANAGEMENT: ENGAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Anthony Pramualratana with Karabi Baruah

CAPACITY BUILDING: ADDRESSING THE EMERGENCE OF HIV/AIDS

The focus of capacity building should be to enable institutions to cope with change in proactive ways. The HIV/AIDS epidemic poses tremendous challenges to economic growth and the stability of the workforce in both the public and the private sectors worldwide. The epidemic continues to grow at an alarming pace. As of 2006, an estimated 39.5 million people were living with HIV, an increase of 2.6 million since 2004. Of these cases, 37.2 million were adults (15 to 49 years old), with newly infected individuals estimated at 3.8 million. Implicit in this trend is a grim picture of a world where HIV/AIDS strikes individuals in their most productive years. Experience drawn from the worst-affected nations of sub-Saharan Africa underscores the need for high-quality, cohesive, and accountable multisectoral responses to HIV/AIDS challenges.

Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region

HIV/AIDS has reached epidemic proportions in many nations across the Asia-Pacific region from the time of its first detection more than two decades ago. The epidemic has become a threat to global security and the socioeconomic stability and prosperity of nations. Since 2004, South Asia and Southeast Asia have recorded the fastest-growing HIV infection rates in the world. Southeast Asia has the highest national HIV infection levels. An estimated 8.6 million people in the region were living with HIV in 2006, including 960,000 people who had been newly infected the previous year; about 630,000 died in 2006 from AIDS-related illnesses. Additionally, in 2001, the economic losses from HIV/AIDS in the Asia-Pacific region were US$7.3 billion, and the Asian Development Bank and UN-AIDS project that continuation of current infection rates could result in annual economic losses of US$18.7 billion by 2010 and US$26.9 billion by 2015.

The challenges posed by the HIV/AIDS epidemic have been exacerbated by geopolitical as well as socioeconomic complexities and the increased interconnectedness of the nations in the Asia-Pacific region. While globalization has many benefits, a major consequence is the mobility of people and the resulting spread of
HIV throughout the region. Mobility and the spread of HIV/AIDS are both closely linked to development issues such as poverty, income differentials, and landlessness. The Greater Mekong Subregion provides an excellent example of the convergence of these two trends. With increased connectivity and disparate economic development between and even within countries, mobility and migration have become inevitable and bring with them the problem of HIV/AIDS.\(^3\) The Asia-Pacific region, characterized by wide-scale discrepancies in population distribution, wealth, and political organization, also shows variations in HIV/AIDS patterns:\(^4\)

- Rapid rise of HIV prevalence, as in Vietnam, Indonesia, and parts of China;
- HIV/AIDS already well entrenched and spreading among the wider population, as in Myanmar and parts of India;
- Decline of high-risk behaviors and of new infection rates as a result of intensive prevention efforts, as in Thailand and Cambodia;
- Low levels of HIV prevalence and great prevention opportunities in certain countries including Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Laos, and East Timor; and
- A potentially more severe epidemic in parts of the Pacific region than elsewhere in Asia.

Urgently needed across the Asia-Pacific region are interventions designed to reduce sexual transmission of HIV, accurate knowledge about HIV risks, reduction of risk behaviors, and adoption of protective behaviors that would in the long-term change trends of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, address sustainability issues, and improve societal responses. Differences in cultures, societies, economies, politics, and patterns of the epidemic have shaped the varied responses to HIV/AIDS by countries across the Asia-Pacific region.

**HIV/AIDS—A Challenge for All**

In the light of the experience gained over the years, it is clear that the capacity of national governments alone is not sufficient to tackle the HIV/AIDS epidemic. To confront the threat effectively, it is imperative to scale up mobilization and participation of all stakeholders (including nongovernmental organizations, corporations, and trade unions) in partnership with governments and international aid agencies. Globalization has added complexities and created a far greater need for collaboration and coordinated responses from nations across the region.

As far as the private sector is concerned, it is important to emphasize the serious consequences of inaction, even where the incidence of HIV is low. The documented evidence of declining productivity of companies in countries hard hit by the epidemic suggests that the private sector cannot remain a silent spectator to the onslaught of HIV/AIDS.\(^5\) It is important for the Asia-Pacific region not to be complacent but to deal with the pending catastrophe using effective measures.
Because of the large concentration of HIV-positive individuals among people active in the labor force, certain manifestations of the epidemic have particularly affected workplaces: discrimination in employment, social exclusion of persons living with HIV/AIDS, low productivity, depleted human capital, challenged social security systems, and threats to occupational safety and health, especially among certain groups at risk such as migrant workers and their communities and workers in the medical and transport sectors. Corporate executives around the world are realizing that, unless they respond to HIV/AIDS, both their customer bases and their labor forces are likely to be affected, thus threatening the profitability and efficiency of their businesses. Good business sense dictates the rationale for companies to engage in workplace programs to protect their employees from HIV/AIDS.

In recognition of the tremendous potential that workplaces have to provide prevention and care and protect workers’ rights, the UN General Assembly urged nations to “strengthen the response to HIV/AIDS in the world of work by establishing and implementing prevention and care programs in public, private and informal work.” The private sector possesses valuable resources that can be utilized in cost-efficient ways to reach the wider community through the workplace.

To deal with the challenges posed by HIV/AIDS in workplaces, existing capacities need to be strengthened or new ones built that are conducive to the changes that are taking place or are likely to occur in the near future. Recognition of this need has led some conscientious and forward-thinking companies to integrate HIV/AIDS policies and programs into their corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies. These employers’ responses to HIV/AIDS are, however, mostly generic in nature and often governed by existing company policies centered on health and workplace safety.

A need clearly exists for a common and recognizable standard for HIV/AIDS policies and programs similar to, for example, ISO 9000, which can become an international reference for quality HIV/AIDS management for businesses across the globe. Recently, the International Labour Organization (ILO), along with its member countries, established the Code of Practice on HIV/AIDS in the World of Work. This code is a globally accepted guideline but not an implementation tool (see Figure 1). Thailand is the only country in the world that has developed its own National Code of Practice, based on the ILO Code, which includes a national certification program called the AIDS-Response Standard Organization (ASO), a quality standard for HIV/AIDS prevention and management in the workplace. ASO was launched in 2000 by the Thailand Business Coalition on AIDS (TBCA), a nonprofit organization that currently manages Thailand’s national HIV/AIDS prevention and management in the workplace. So far, the ASO program has demonstrated remarkable success. Its success has fostered hopes of forging alliances with international organizations with the goal of replicating the Thai ASO model in the global arena.
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT: THE KEY TO SUSTAINABLE HIV/AIDS WORKPLACE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

HIV/AIDS Challenges and the Business Response

If HIV/AIDS challenges in workplaces are to be mastered, concerted efforts must be made to develop and strengthen existing human capacity. Like the epidemic, this capacity development concerns all stakeholders: nongovernmental organizations, the public sector, and private business enterprises.

According to a Business for Social Responsibility issue brief, “Estimates by the World Bank suggest that the macroeconomic impact of HIV/AIDS may reduce the growth of national income by up to a third in countries where the prevalence among adults is 10 percent.”9 Worldwide rates of infection are highest among people aged 15–49, who are also the foremost components of the workforce; thus, the spread of HIV/AIDS puts at risk a nation’s economic and social development. The negative socioeconomic impacts of HIV/AIDS include the following:

- Threats to labor supply and undermining of the livelihood of workers and their dependents;
- Risks to the survival of enterprises due to losses of expertise and experience;
- Rising labor costs resulting in diminished capacity to produce and deliver goods and services on a sustainable basis; and
- Declining morale due to workplace conflict, loss of coworkers, destructive rumoring, and discriminatory practices that undermine fundamental workers’ rights.10

Considering the high stakes involved, the business community’s response has been rather slow. Yet businesses possess valuable resources that can be used cost-

Figure 1: Characteristics of an Ideal Workplace with HIV/AIDS Policies Mainstreamed

The ideal workplace:

- Ensures that HIV/AIDS policies are institutionalized.
- Ensures that workers are not discriminated against or stigmatized on the basis of real or perceived HIV status.
- Promotes prevention and intervention programs.
- Ensures confidentiality of information.
- Ensures no pre-employment HIV/AIDS screening or testing of persons already employed, but provides for voluntary counseling and testing.
- Does not allow for dismissal of HIV-positive employees.
- Ensures confidentiality of a worker’s HIV/AIDS status.
- Promotes care and support to workers living with HIV/AIDS, through company clinics or in partnership with other health care providers.

Source: Adapted from The ILO Code of Practice on HIV/AIDS in the World of Work.
efficiently to reach the wider community through the workplace and to take up a leadership role in the HIV/AIDS arena. Companies need not only to promote and mainstream workplace policies but, more importantly, to institutionalize workplace programs on HIV/AIDS in order to build sustainability and continuity. More than two decades since the pandemic began, only a handful of large multinational companies identify HIV/AIDS as one of their core issues and have companywide programs to counter the threats that the epidemic poses to their businesses.\textsuperscript{11}

The key findings of a global survey by the World Economic Forum (WEF), in which 10,993 business executives in 117 countries were polled, show that nearly 50 percent expressed growing concern about the potential impact of HIV/AIDS on their companies’ operations over the next five years; this concern was particularly high in countries with HIV prevalence rates above 5 percent.\textsuperscript{12} In countries where HIV prevalence exceeds 20 percent, about 58 percent of respondent firms have formal HIV/AIDS policies. In countries where prevalence is less than 20 percent, about 20 percent of respondent firms have informal policies. Most company policies focus on HIV prevention; antiretroviral drug treatment is less common. Except for a few firms in wealthy regions, addressing discrimination based on HIV/AIDS status is rare.

The TBCA’s Mainstreaming Initiative

Prior to the establishment of the Thailand Business Coalition on AIDS (TBCA), a survey of companies in and around Bangkok in 1992 revealed that all the companies were aware of the AIDS problem, with 85 percent being greatly concerned, 90 percent willing to buy an AIDS manual if available, and 60 percent interested in employee training, but only 1 percent having actually implemented any training. Seventy percent of the respondents did not know where to turn for workplace assistance.\textsuperscript{13} At a time when HIV/AIDS was hitting working-age Thais the hardest, the survey highlighted the shortcomings in the private sector’s capacity to cope with HIV/AIDS workplace challenges.

With the epidemic showing no sign of abatement, the TBCA, the first coalition of its kind in the world, was established in 1993 to serve the needs of the country’s businesses through linkages with public health, international development, and nonprofit organizations. Its twin objectives were identified as (1) promoting nondiscriminatory workplace policies and education programs to businesses; and (2) bringing corporate resources, tangible (funds) and intangible assets (management skills, marketing know-how, and organizational training structures) to assist in HIV/AIDS prevention. The objectives and roles of the TBCA were shaped by the problems and obstacles associated with HIV/AIDS prevention in Thailand at the time:\textsuperscript{14}

- Lack of laws directly prohibiting discrimination in the workplace;
- Existence of discrimination and stigma associated with HIV/AIDS;
- Decreased donor funding; and
- Lack of promotion of existing government policies that emphasized nondiscrimination in the workplace.
Furthering TBCA’s Capacity-Building Process and AIDS-Response Standard Organization (ASO)

TBCA meticulously built up human capacity throughout the country, which paved the way for the introduction and success of the unique certification and award program called ASO. This program has six certification requirements, presented in Figure 2.

ASO has expanded nationally with support from the Ministry of Labor (MOL) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM). To achieve financial sustainability, TBCA not only established itself as a fee-based membership organization which companies could join, but also created partnerships with the business community. Thus, rather than merely seeking paying clients, it seeks project sponsorships, as well as project partnerships that serve business interests.

The level of involvement and commitment varies considerably from company to company, but members of TBCA can be grouped into three categories: (1) companies with comprehensive nondiscriminatory policies and active education and prevention programs; (2) those with partial policies and programs; and (3) those providing financial support for community programs.

TBCA advocates the replacement of nonsupportive practices such as pre-employment testing, screening, and dismissal with HIV/AIDS education and policies as the most effective means of reducing the incidence of HIV/AIDS in the workplace. The coalition concentrates its efforts in the following main areas:

**Leadership**

The TBCA acts as a mechanism by which the creativity and dynamism of business executives can be channeled to formulate solutions to the resource, technical, and strategic planning problems in mounting effective HIV/AIDS prevention and “living with AIDS” programs. It offers confidential consultation to enable executives to respond effectively to HIV/AIDS in the workplace.

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**Figure 2: ASO Certification Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The six standards for companies to obtain the ASO certificate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. HIV/AIDS policy development</td>
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<td>2. HIV/AIDS prevention training</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Confidentiality procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Appropriate assistance to staff with HIV</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Community outreach activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Complementary activities</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Coordination and Facilitation

The coalition provides a forum that fosters, guides, and supports efforts among businesses, governmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. TBCA, by working closely with the private sector, provides assistance to communities affected by HIV/AIDS. Through its Community Program, TBCA undertakes activities nationwide that support the coalition’s broader objectives in three key ways:

1. Direct community engagement through TBCA’s support to large networks of people living with HIV/AIDS ensures that the coalition remains aware of their issues and experiences.
2. TBCA acts as a conduit between communities and private sector actors who wish to invest in the communities, based on a sense of corporate social responsibility.
3. TBCA successfully draws on the expertise of the private sector to increase support services for HIV/AIDS-affected communities. This involves integrating private sector know-how into community projects through activities such as providing technical assistance and fund raising. TBCA’s key community initiative revolves around the Buddy Program, which directly assists individuals and families affected by HIV/AIDS.*

Communication

Through its Workplace Resource Center, the TBCA provides its clients with a range of services, including access to information, education, and communication (IEC) materials, quarterly newsletters, and consultation on management of HIV/AIDS in the workplace and policy development. An important tool developed by TBCA is the handbook *AIDS in the Workplace,* to be used by businesses or by NGOs that work with or are planning to work with private enterprises. The handbook includes the national guidelines for HIV testing and persuasive case studies, which have proven effective in convincing companies and organizations to adopt HIV/AIDS policies and programs.

Workplace Training Services

To assist members in their HIV/AIDS education efforts, TBCA offers various training services, of which workplace training is in the greatest demand and has been the most effective in instituting policies and programs. After a thorough

*This program was started in 1998 at the request of several member companies. Through the program, medical staffs at four hospitals in the Bangkok area are able to concentrate on providing needed medical care to persons living with HIV/AIDS. The budget was raised mainly from the UNESCAP Pro-Poor Public Private Partnerships, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration project, and fund-raising activities supported by TBCA’s private sector partners.
assessment of needs, TBCA developed multiple training opportunities for companies, each having specific objectives and designed for the different learning styles of various workplace target groups. The curricula take into consideration the requirements and constraints of the companies and balance these with the training needs of the participants. TBCA now has six educational curricula on HIV/AIDS that target management and employees: executive briefings for senior management, human resource (HR) workshops for HR management, workshop training for all staff, peer education training for management executives, training of counselors for HR and supervising management, and training of trainers for educating managers/staff.

Since its inception, TBCA has provided services to over 7,000 local and international companies spanning all major sectors, including manufacturing, hospitality, banking, and pharmaceuticals. Additionally, it also serves the diplomatic/international sector, having provided training for the entire UN system and various embassies in Thailand. Through their effective prevention and support programs, business partners of TBCA in Thailand have demonstrated the significant contribution the private sector can make in addressing HIV/AIDS.

Formation of Partners and Coalitions

TBCA has already laid the necessary groundwork for capacity building across Thailand and the Asia-Pacific region. Active participation of the private sector ensures considerable survivability without compromising a nation’s socioeconomic development. As an article from the World Economic Forum put it, “the potential of business associations and coalitions to tackle HIV/AIDS should continue to be utilized, as firms have a greater incentive to participate in and sponsor prevention activity if they can focus on the problems facing an industry sector or geographical area. Coalitions are also able to share experience and spread the cost of developing tools and approaches, ensuring lower start-up costs and greater efficiencies.”

Over the years, the TBCA has been able to develop sustained business partnerships, both domestically and internationally, by providing technical assistance to other organizations focused on HIV/AIDS in the private sector. Such organizations include the Myanmar Business Coalition on AIDS (MBCA) and the Business Coalition on AIDS Singapore (BCAS). In both countries, assistance was provided in administrative and office establishment, hiring of technical and support staff, development of HIV/AIDS training curricula, training of personnel in advocacy and implementation of HIV/AIDS training, development of company contacts, and marketing of services.

In 2007, TBCA began a formal partnership with the newly established Asia Pacific Business Coalition (APBCA), currently headquartered in Melbourne, Australia. This partnership involves strengthening training service delivery of existing business coalitions in Singapore, Myanmar, and Papua New Guinea, as well as newly
formed coalitions in India, Cambodia, and Indonesia. Because HIV/AIDS knows no political and economic boundaries, such national and transnational coalitions are vital to the development of effective nondiscriminatory and preventive workplace and community programs.

AIDS-Response Standard Organization (ASO)

The objective of ASO is to market a certification program on HIV/AIDS in the workplace. The program assesses a company’s HIV/AIDS policy, its training, support, and care procedures for employees, as well as its community outreach program (see Figure 3). Participating companies are evaluated before joining the program, given technical assistance to improve their performance, and evaluated again one year later. ASO certification is awarded to companies that meet minimum standards in dealing with HIV/AIDS. As an added incentive, these companies are offered reduced rates for the group insurance scheme of American International Assurance (AIA), Thailand.

TBCA realized very early the importance of receiving government support as a means of enhancing the outreach and recognition of ASO. With the endorsement of the Department of Labor Protection and Welfare (DLPW) of the Ministry of Labor (MOL), ASO has gained legitimacy in that the program is now nationally promoted as the certified quality standard in HIV/AIDS management. The DLPW’s mandate and infrastructure enabled the TBCA and its NGO partners to expand the program to a national status. Government support has enabled ASO to

Figure 3: ASO Certification Criteria

The ASO quality standard program has a scale of 100 points. Companies that achieve 60 points or more receive the ASO Gold Certification. Companies that achieve between 30 and 59 points receive the Silver Certification. These standards are evaluated by TBCA auditors and certified by the ministries of public health and labor. The six measurement indicators that total 100 points are shown below.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Points</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training and education</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Workplace activities such as condom promotion and integration of HIV/AIDS activities into other workplace programs</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of confidentiality procedures</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriate care and support procedures</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS policy announcements to staff</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community outreach activities</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
be fully integrated into the national Code of Practice on HIV/AIDS in the Workplace and into policy development and program implementation in workplaces and factories under Thai Labor Standards (TLS).

As of June 2007, ASO had accredited a total of 4,111 companies of all sizes, with a total of 230,000 employees who attended the standardized training program.

**CONCLUSION**

The TBCA experience in Thailand highlights that capacity building by all stakeholders is key to successful implementation of HIV/AIDS policies and programs in workplaces. The success of ASO in Thailand shows that such policies and programs need to strengthen capacity through the development of behavioral guidelines for all employees and to provide resources in compliance with local and national laws and standards.

To replicate the Thai ASO model across the Asia-Pacific region, it will be necessary to build a strong network of coalition partners and strengthen their capacity to implement standardized HIV/AIDS management in workplaces through a certification program. It is only in this way that we can effectively prevent the spread of HIV and reduce discrimination in the Asia-Pacific workplace. Large and small companies must come on board and demonstrate their commitment through the prevention programs and supportive company policies already championed by the business coalitions around the region.

The ASO expansion plan comprises three related strategies:

1. Inclusion of ASO into the upcoming ISO 26000 series, under the section on human rights through Thailand’s membership in the International Accreditation Forum;
2. Bilateral agreements with ASEAN and APEC members to develop a shared ASO international standard that would be promoted in the respective countries; and
3. Provision of ASO certification to multinational companies operating in Asia through the Asia-Pacific Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS (APBCHA), launched by former US President Bill Clinton in February 2006.

The establishment of a common regional HIV/AIDS standard and certification program for private businesses could play a tremendous role in fighting the epidemic, while at the same time strengthening the Asia-Pacific region’s global competitiveness.
INTERPRETING THE TRENDS
How the Middle East adapts to the rapid economic and social changes caused by globalization is one of the defining challenges for the twenty-first century. The capacity of the Middle East to cope with change will affect energy security, threats from terrorism and radical Islam, and other aspects of international peace and security. In one critical part of the Middle Eastern region—the Persian Gulf area, comprising the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—economic and social change has occurred quickly and with profound consequences; there has also been more gradual and incremental change in how matters of national security are considered and acted upon. An analysis of these phenomena—the transformation of social and economic life and the more modest transition in security culture—provides a perspective from which to consider prospects for state-society relations and for regional cooperation or conflict. The analysis also gives special attention to the rise of transnational issues as drivers of change and as public policy concerns.

**TWO DISTINCT PROCESSES OF CHANGE**

**Rapid Social and Economic Change**

Within a few decades, Gulf societies have undergone rapid transformation that rivals if not outstrips that of Western societies since Renaissance times. Rapid state formation and the growing importance of oil for the world economy have put significant strains on what were essentially fragmented social groups; at the same time, the nascent and imbalanced relationship between state and individual has created conditions that have prevented a more harmonious and gradual national development. As young, still maturing polities faced with complex development challenges, the Gulf states have had to adapt to a fast-changing environment while managing the expectations of their societies. Considerations such as regime survival, availability of oil revenues, patriarchal and tribal structures, and religious and social traditions have greatly complicated the tasks of adaptation, modernization, and institution building. Until recently, cautious leaders employed traditional forms of consultation and public administration as the means to preserve social peace and were not persuaded that rapid development was desirable.
The Gulf states differ in their histories. Some arose through territorial expansion (e.g., Saudi Arabia), and others from gradual consolidation of power by a family (e.g., Kuwait and Bahrain). But they experienced similar development conditions (e.g., external security guarantors, oil resources, and the persistence of strong religious and social traditions and expectations), which have largely determined state-society interactions. The states, awash with oil revenues and relying on social intermediaries whose power varies depending on the country (the clerical establishment in Saudi Arabia, major families in Kuwait, and established families in Bahrain and Dubai), have regulated most aspects of social life. By providing jobs and benefits, the states have shaped expectations and constrained behaviors. In their early years, Gulf regimes focused on building infrastructure, extending education and health services, and consolidating power while weathering the domestic repercussions of regional storms (communism, pan-Arab nationalism, Iranian assertiveness, and instability linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict).

What could have been a slow and incremental process was disrupted by the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks, which led to frantic and disorganized growth and social disturbances. The citizenry, exposed to these harsh changes, responded in various ways, with a minority expressing clear dissatisfaction with the countries' new direction. Unrest in Saudi Arabia, exemplified by the 1979 takeover of Mecca's Grand Mosque by Islamic fundamentalists, reflected this deep frustration with the nature and pace of change, which the kingdom quickly addressed by restoring more religious and traditional values at the expense of modernization. In this case, a small segment of the society questioned the foundations of the state’s developmental strategy by threatening the legitimacy of the regime.

Another rupture point came in the 1990s with a drop in oil prices. This led to a serious reassessment of the role and responsibilities of a state that no longer enjoyed endless resources. State mismanagement, demographic pressure and the related labor problem, and shrinking oil revenues ended the complacency and prompted governments to initiate a process of modernization aimed at redefining the role of the state and improving economic performance. Elites quite boldly suggested new approaches to public policy, which challenged conventional thinking and vested interests. While this challenge did not generate social disorder, it called into question the nature of state-society interaction. With the demise of the omnipotent welfare state, loyalty to the state had to be cultivated differently, mainly by improving state performance and building business-friendly, job-generating economies.

The various leaders in the Gulf region have sensibly concluded that the social and political costs of economic mismanagement and underperformance outweigh those of rapid growth. They have also decided that ambitious development strategies have the potential to transform their societies in positive ways while meeting the challenges of globalization. Such strategies must be moderated, however, by the building of a societal consensus about how to sustain the development choices and deal with their unintended outcomes and implications. While few citizens of
the Gulf region could reasonably long for the living conditions of a few decades ago, many, even as they enjoy unrivaled economic security, express a sense of alienation due to the rapid change. From the changing role of the state to the growing number of foreign workers, their living environment is undergoing drastic transformations.

Prior experiences seem to have helped today’s development in the Gulf states avoid past pitfalls. Yet the current growth is reminiscent of the situation in Argentina at the start of the twentieth century. Argentina was a rising and promising economic power, attracting capital, labor, and talent. But the speed of the economic growth soon outpaced the governance capacity of the Argentinean state, resulting in devastating social and economic dislocation. Like many analogies, this one is imperfect. The strategic, political, economic, and social context in which the Gulf states operate today differs dramatically from that of Argentina years ago. But a common thread in the two situations is the gap between governance capacity and economic development, occurring at a time when there is an urgent need to capitalize on a uniquely favorable economic moment.

Rulers in the Gulf region are not oblivious to the difficulties of making state formation, governance capacity, and economic development complement one another. They realize that for their growth strategy to be accepted, it needs to produce economic outcomes that will eventually outweigh the benefits provided by state welfare. They calculate that only diversified economies, generating additional revenues from sources other than oil and gas, can create sufficient numbers of jobs and provide sustained financial security. They acknowledge that an economic slowdown or breakdown, however unlikely at this time, could prove fatal to their legitimacy and authority. They realize that economic development brought a measure of (still) manageable social dislocation to their societies before they could develop adequate safety nets. Finally, they expect the right-sizing of the state and the concomitant growth of the private sector to positively affect state-society relations and citizens’ expectations and behaviors. In the future, merit and performance, not loyalty and nepotism, will determine one’s place in society.

The economic agenda of the Gulf states is therefore profoundly transformative, both better calibrated and more determined than the rapid and uncertain attempts at democratization. But visionary leaders will still need to work to build societal consensus about the way forward. The Gulf region suffers from a notable absence of systematic and institutionalized dialogue between rulers and ruled, resulting in the sense of alienation that many citizens experience. The transformational agenda is reshaping the fundamental social bargain between the ruling elites and the various social groups whose support was essential in the early days of state formation. While leaders of the Gulf states are confident that prosperity will lessen social tensions, it is clear that states with a more open political space (e.g., Bahrain and Kuwait) will need to demonstrate that economic transformation serves societal interests.
Significant parts of the state bureaucracy and diverse social and religious groups that currently play a pivotal intermediary role have much to lose from a transformation of the state-society relationship. This is a factor in Saudi Arabia, for example, where educational reform, perhaps the kingdom’s most urgent need, is resisted by the religious establishment, which fears the undermining of its position in Saudi society.

Opposition also stems from groups and individuals who see the economic and social change as an existential threat to their identity, essentially their religious one. What they reject is less the logic of the change than its transformational nature, which is likely to bring individual and gender empowerment, educational reform, social openness, and increased interaction with non-Muslim actors. In the perception of radical groups, the change presupposes an acceptance of values and models foreign to their cultures. Whether connected to the larger Islamic revivalist movement, including its most violent stream, or grounded in more local and regional dynamics, these groups feed on a combination of insecurity and idealism and seek a different kind of change.

In the middle is a large segment of the citizenry that is asked to accept and adapt to new societal conditions. While acknowledging the need for reform and not resistant to change in and of itself, this segment views the emergence of new players and rules with apprehension. Finally, political reformers perceive the modernization agenda as a way to entrench ruling elites and postpone indefinitely any serious efforts at democratization. They are, however, torn between their reformist inclinations and the sobering fact that state rulers are often more sympathetic to their demands than are the citizens. A liberal Saudi businesswoman conceded that Saudi women’s best ally against an oppressive system is the king, even though he is not a democrat.

Gradual Change in the Security Arena

Responsibility for decision making on matters of national security has long been considered the exclusive purview of the state. Legal considerations, questions of sovereignty, and the requirements of secrecy have reinforced a tendency to view security matters as comprising a special zone within public policy that is characterized by less transparency and less participation by societal stakeholders than are other policy concerns, such as education and transportation. In the age of globalization, however, this narrow concept of a national security community is evolving, both in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world, toward greater inclusiveness in terms of actors and agenda. Change, albeit modest to date, is occurring in the nature of the participants in debates and decisions that affect national security within Arab states. Also, a growing range of topics is being included on the security agenda.

States use a wide range of organizational structures to manage, coordinate, and plan national security policy. Many countries, and not exclusively Western ones,
employ some variation of the structure of the National Security Council of the United States; that is, they convene a forum limited to senior national officials responsible for diplomacy, military and defense matters, and international finance, where bureaucratic disputes can be resolved and division of responsibilities for implementing policies can be determined. Iran and India, for example, both have national security councils, and the leaders of those bodies, who report to various executive leaders, often speak authoritatively on matters of national security policy.

In many large, stable democracies, there is also a wider national security community that includes other stakeholders, including those outside government. Senior journalists, think tank analysts, academics, and former policy officials are included in this broader community and can be an important source of ideas about and feedback on official policies, as well as informal interlocutors with foreign governments seeking to understand the views and likely actions of the state. The concept of a national security community may be manifested more in the United States, with its strong tradition of revolving-door expertise (as individuals move in and out of government), than in European and large Asian states. But one effect of globalization is the increasing expectation that nonstate stakeholders will be involved in all aspects of public policy, including security-related matters. Thus, it is only a matter of time before the concept spreads to other societies.

Even the concept of national security seems to establish too narrow a boundary for the issues under consideration. Security issues now cover a wider menu—from traditional state-centric issues, such as geopolitical or military threats to the territory of a state, to transnational security challenges, such as public health crises or environmental degradation. And solutions for the latter challenges must be found at the supranational, regional, or global level. Increasingly, security experts and humanitarians are discussing human security, bringing security down to a micro level.

Most states in the Arabian peninsula have implemented modest changes in governance processes over the past decade. This incremental reform has occurred despite the discrediting of democratization associated with Iraq and despite the deep resistance to reform by power centers in major Arab states such as Egypt and Syria. The demand for change comes from business elites who are concerned about sluggish economic opportunity, from some intellectual elites who profess Western values, and from popular, largely Islamist movements. The goals of these groups are not necessarily compatible, and the very different visions of Islamists and Western-oriented businesspeople have allowed leaders to avoid moving too far in one direction or another.

Many of the modest changes that have taken place in civilian aspects of governance relate to such issues as eligibility to vote and types and frequency of elections. Many analysts believe that changes that focus on process are often cosmetic and do not reflect profound and durable shifts in popular values and behavior. Little evidence exists of a demand for change in the security sector, although experts on democratization processes insist that security-sector reform needs to be part of
systemic change in any society in transition. Political change in Indonesia in the 1990s, for example, led to profound restructuring of the security sector, which strengthened the prospects for sustainable democratization.

In the Middle East, security sectors remain very close to incumbent power and are not likely to initiate reforms on their own. In recent years, however, security-sector reform has entered the vocabulary, and local security establishments have engaged with international actors, from donor states to bilateral security partners to NATO, to discuss ways to improve their effectiveness as well as their accountability. The international community has worked most closely with countries where the security deficit is greatest: Iraq, the West Bank and Gaza, and Lebanon. In places where security at the state level is strong, such as the Gulf states, the engagement has been more subtle and indirect. NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) offers countries in the Gulf area a range of training and collaboration options and also has an important public diplomacy component, to make sure that military or security cooperation does not generate an adverse popular reaction. This concern on the part of NATO and regional governments in itself reflects a recognition that the relationship between state and society is subtly changing in the Middle East region.

THE EVOLVING SECURITY AGENDA: FROM TRADITIONAL TO NONTRADITIONAL SECURITY

Regional security experts, within government and outside, are very receptive to the nontraditional security agenda. In fact, the Middle East may be closer to the global norm in this aspect of security discourse than on other, more traditional topics. The receptiveness can be explained by the physical realities of the Middle East: demographic growth, water shortages, oil and its geoeconomic and geopolitical effects, and other resource issues have long been at the forefront of public policy concern. It can also be explained by the more limited political space in this largely non-democratic region: topics such as the environment have been considered relatively safe by nervous and mistrustful regimes. They would rather that academics hold conferences to discuss sea levels than ones to discuss electoral politics or human rights. (Of course, environmental topics can become sensitive politically, especially when they involve government capacity to address long-term problems that are not susceptible to quick fixes.)

It is interesting to observe where traditional and nontraditional security discussions intersect. There is no better instance than Iran’s nuclear ambitions, peaceful or otherwise. Nongovernmental experts in the small Gulf states near Iran have openly expressed their concerns about potential accidents at and environmental hazards of Iran’s seaside nuclear facility at Bushehr. These experts worry about nuclear safety provisions and the prospects for a Chernobyl-type disaster in the ecologically fragile Gulf region. Others maintain that this concern is a surrogate
for the real issue: Iran’s hegemonic ambitions would be accelerated if it achieved full nuclear fuel-cycle capability and eventually nuclear weapons. They suggest that the nontraditional security concern is merely a cover for the more traditional one, which is not expressed for fear of disrupting the Arab-Iran entente.

An alternative interpretation is that the nontraditional issue (a nuclear accident at a power plant) is a real and legitimate concern of a public that is better informed on that aspect of Iran’s nuclear program than on its weapons ambitions; it is also better able to raise this as a public policy concern. This concern does create space for elites to discuss Iran’s nuclear plans in ways that are not confrontational; one can imagine Track 2 initiatives between Iranian and Arab experts on a relatively benign nuclear agenda related to energy and safety issues, which would, in the right circumstances, feed into more official interactions and permit more effective discussion of the nuclear challenge.

Maritime safety and security is another realm in which nontraditional and traditional security meet. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London recently held an annual conference in Bahrain, involving all the GCC countries, Yemen, Iran, and Iraq. Each year, one session is devoted to transnational threats, such as rising sectarianism, demographic change and movement, and transnational crime. The discussions of maritime cooperation have revealed a porous threshold between traditional and nontraditional security concerns: one can cause or be caused by the other, and the military and political responses needed to manage or mitigate either kind of threat are often similar. In December 2007, the commander of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) told the IISS conference that cooperation between the United States and regional navies focuses holistically on a range of threats, from traditional military threats to threats from human trafficking, drug smuggling, environmental degradation, and terrorism.

**EXAMINING CHANGE AND AGENTS OF CHANGE**

This section considers four ways in which change (socioeconomic change and change in the security sector) is occurring in the Middle East, both within formal government structures and with key nonstate actors. Together, these four examples—relating to the business community, the parliament in Kuwait, the contribution of a Gulf think tank to the official positions of the GCC, and the creation by pan-Arab television of space for discussions about security matters—illuminate the process and product of change in the Gulf region.

**The Business Community: Promoting the Benefits of Globalization?**

Partly out of self-interest, the business community in the Arab Gulf states is emerging as a powerful ally of the leaders in the transformational drive. The business community is the first beneficiary of more open trade and investment policies
and of measures that provide greater flexibility in the labor market. Business leaders are also increasingly visible as advocates of broader liberalization measures, and they bring important knowledge about and insights into the demands and opportunities of globalization.

High oil prices, access to the world economy, new economic policies, and increased efforts at building regulatory frameworks are creating attractive opportunities in the Gulf states for businesspeople long dependent on government spending and limited domestic and regional market opportunities. Indeed, wealthy merchant families have been part of the fabric of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from the early days, as well as a backbone of state authority, as state contractors, job providers, and regime allies with a stake in its survival and prosperity.

But the newly identified value and heightened profile of the business community extend beyond its contribution to economic growth. Indeed, Gulf leaders have come to see the business community as a key instrument of change. More flexible in regard to labor conditions, closer to their workers and their concerns, and more adaptable to globalization, business leaders can play an ideal intermediary role between a state seeking to disengage itself from some activities and a citizenry that aspires to a higher living standard. More in tune with global standards and opportunities, business leaders are increasingly empowered to inform key economic and social decisions and allowed by the political leadership to spar with entrenched state bureaucracies. Their growing institutional role is illustrated by their presence within advisory and executive bodies such as the Saudi Majlis al Shura and the UAE’s various executive councils, where they provide counsel and guidance to leaders hungry for novel ideas.

By acting as an implementer of economic policies, the business community is helping political leaders redefine the relationship between state and society. The state remains involved through capital and strategic guidance of the economy, but increasingly relies on independent, more efficient actors to implement its vision. The business community also contributes to leading and managing state-owned and semiprivate companies, some of which have become world-class players. The investment, real estate, telecommunications, and hotel sectors of the Gulf states are quickly differentiating themselves from other institutions, with distinct management practices and objectives.

The business community also contributes to building a better image of the Gulf states and tying the region more closely to global decision-making networks. The sudden appearance of the Gulf region on the world scene in 2001 was accompanied by a higher profile for Gulf rulers, business leaders, and companies in the global media and in prestigious forums such as the World Economic Forum. New organizations funded by Gulf businessmen now routinely host international meetings where the rich and powerful gather to discuss world affairs and the critical role of the Gulf states.
The issue of foreign labor illustrates the tensions among the ambitious economic policy of the Gulf states, the business community’s interest in growing quickly, and the society’s anxiety about its future. The Gulf states are growing ever more dependent on foreign labor because of the lack of adequate and competitive labor locally. Their citizens, long satisfied with the state benefits they received regardless of employment or performance, now see foreign workers as a threat to their status and identity.

The Minister of Labor of Bahrain complained in mid-2007 that “the increasing number of foreign workers in the region erodes the national character of the GCC states.” This concern was quickly contradicted by a prominent businessman, who protested that the minister’s statement “is an oxymoron at best and hypocritical at worst—the status quo is that the unskilled labor pool is not in any position, even if it wanted to be, to erode the GCC’s national character of the country. It is kept as far as possible out of mainstream life.” This exchange, widely reported in the regional press, led to other debates positioning state bureaucracies and social leaders against the business community over the role of foreign labor and more generally addressing the conflicting interests of the society and business elites.

Governments in the region struggle to balance societal anxieties about foreign labor with the core economic realities of continued dependence on it. The staggering economic growth in the Gulf region could not have been achieved without foreign labor, and the prosperous consumer culture is completely dependent on a large service sector with many foreign workers. Governments work with the business community not only to regulate and control the movement of foreign labor and define the requirements for foreign workers, but also to train local people and challenge employers to gradually hire more local workers instead of foreign ones. Each Gulf state has a different priority for nationalization: for example, in Saudi Arabia, the focus is on the health-care sector, in Bahrain on the service sector, and in the UAE on banking and insurance.

The business community is not a public advocate for workers’ rights, but it has discreetly promoted standards that ensure a reliable and healthy labor force. The business community contributes to the nationalization effort, and many progressive business leaders are deeply concerned about the training and employment of local youth, both for business reasons and for social and political stability.

**Parliaments: The Kuwaiti Parliament’s Expanding Oversight of National Defense**

Kuwait, the victim in 1990 of an Iraqi avarice that led to a new era of Gulf instability, has, perhaps paradoxically, made the most progress in democratization and is widely cited as being in the vanguard of political reform in the region. One expert calls Kuwait the “counterexample” to Arab stereotypes of stagnant political systems, seemingly immune to processes of change. The monarchy is not at risk, but the politics of the country continue to evolve. The parliament is now able to
“substantially influence” public policy, in the view of one recent monograph, and its most important roles in security-related matters are its power to summon ministers for questioning and its right to scrutinize the defense ministry’s budget.2 The parliament has 65 members—50 members directly elected by the citizens and 15 cabinet members. Most of the cabinet members are appointed by the emir, but at least one must have been elected to the parliament.

The worldview of the Kuwaiti parliament is not consistently progressive, nor do the members of parliament, including the large Islamic bloc, seek reform as an end in itself. Some have suggested that the increasingly active parliament, ironically, serves more as a brake than as an accelerator of deep reform, because many of its members seek to preserve a traditional way of life and are concerned that the royal family is too Western or modernist in its outlook. There are few signs that the parliament actively seeks a larger role in security matters, but it looks at defense through an anticorruption lens and has already made an impact by questioning arms procurement plans and seeking greater transparency in defense-related matters.

Over time, increased public awareness of the role of the parliament and the balance of power between the royal family and other political actors will affect security-related discussions and decisions in Kuwait. Women received the right to vote in 2006 and are expected to begin to participate in the informal but politically influential diwaniyas (private gatherings where prominent citizens discuss public affairs). Assuming there are no existential threats to the regime comparable to Saddam Hussein’s attack in 1990, Kuwaiti elites and government decision makers will likely engage in a more open and democratic consideration of security policies, including Kuwait’s security relationship with the United States, its arms and energy deals with other superpowers, its role in the GCC, and its relations with Iran.

NGOs: The Gulf Research Center and Its Advocacy of a WMD-Free Zone

The Gulf Research Center (GRC) is a nongovernmental organization (NGO) that has been promoting the idea of the Gulf region as a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. The GRC is a privately funded, independent, transnational think tank, located in Dubai, chaired by a Saudi national, and staffed by experts and administrative cadres of multiple nationalities. Its focus is international relations in the Gulf region, and it has worked innovatively on topics such as the rising Asian powers and their relations with the Gulf and the environment.

The Arab world has long proclaimed its desire to see the region free of weapons of mass destruction, a desire partly motivated by the superiority of Israel’s advanced arsenal and overall military capabilities over the Arab states’ capabilities. This strategic view has been incorporated into Arab League summit proclamations for many years, invoked when Arab states discuss their adherence to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other international agreements, and considered doctrine, even while these states pursue their own WMD programs. The gap between rhetoric and realpolitik relates to the deep frustration at the international community’s inability or unwillingness to address the Israeli nuclear program as a source of regional imbalance and instability.

In 2004, the GRC took up the issue and tried to bring it to a more concrete and achievable policy level by focusing on the position of the GCC. The GCC, created in the early 1980s and focused primarily on coordination of economic policies for its six member states, is an organization that is weaker than its strongest member, Saudi Arabia, in terms of setting the regional agenda or pushing for specific policies. But because it holds a supranational position, it can consider positions independent of the official policies of its members, thus creating a more open space for GCC states to debate difficult issues.

In 2002 and 2004, the GCC’s annual summit spoke of a WMD-free zone for the whole Middle East, including the Gulf region. In December 2004, the GRC held a workshop entitled “Voices from the Region: The Gulf as a WMD-Free Zone.” The workshop focused on practical ways to get closer to the long-stated policy goal, starting with the GCC states, which are less directly engaged in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and feel less encumbered by that conflict in formulating security positions. The following year, the GRC collaborated with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and with the British NGO Verification Technology Information Centre (VERTIC), which is dedicated to helping countries fulfill their international obligations to verify their compliance on WMD-related issues, to further discuss and vet this bold policy initiative.

The GRC’s efforts to promote a WMD-free zone bolstered the GCC’s internal deliberations, and the initiative was essentially adopted as an official GCC position. From late 2005 through spring of 2006, GCC officials repeatedly expressed their support for such a Gulf initiative, often with reference to Israel’s nonparticipation in the NPT and in the context of the security requirements of the larger region.

The GCC’s willingness to consider a WMD-free zone that covered only part of the Middle East was a direct challenge to the Arab League, guardian of Arab world dogma with regard to Israel. There is a fascinating exchange of letters between Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa and his GCC counterpart, Dr. Abdul Rahman al-Attiya, in which they spar over the utility and long-term implications of the Gulf states’ establishing a security position independent of the coordinated pan-Arab position. It is clear that the Arab League was very displeased by the willingness of the GCC to set its own course, a willingness possibly motivated by greater concern over Iran’s nuclear program than Israel’s. After letting the idea of a WMD-free zone sink in with government bureaucracies and watching it evolve into a public policy debate, the GRC is now exploring the possibility of turning it into a framework to regulate the Gulf states’ civilian nuclear ambitions and create certainty about the real intentions of the various regional actors.
It is worthwhile to note the capacity of a moderate, well-connected NGO to introduce a new idea and find a regional organization receptive to it. Given the small number of Gulf elites, it is possible that personal connections and relationships facilitated the process, and generational change in the professional staff of the GCC institutions could also have played a role. Younger, modernist-oriented Gulf leaders, in NGOs and in regional organizations, are willing to challenge the conventional thinking and the ingrained passive approach to hard security problems that have characterized the GCC.

The Media: Talk Shows Addressing Security Topics

One of the most dramatic changes in the Middle East in the past two decades has been the revolution in media and access to information. This is one aspect of globalization that the region, despite efforts by incumbent powers, has not been able to resist. Ample funds are available for the development of new media outlets that take a regional, not national, approach to news. Journalists who work for the new media are free from the constraints of reporting on a single nation-state, where security controls by the royal or presidential palace are strong and inhibiting.

The standard bearer of what scholar Marc Lynch calls the “new Arab public” is Al-Jazeera, created in Qatar in 1996 with considerable technical and training support from the British Broadcasting Company (BBC). Al-Jazeera’s lucky break came after the September 11, 2001 attacks, when it scooped more experienced media outlets with a tape from Osama bin Laden. Al-Jazeera also covered the US attack on Afghanistan with reporters on the ground. Many other Arab satellite stations have mimicked Al-Jazeera, but it commands an important lead in viewership, with an estimated 40–50 million viewers in the Arab world. Since 2006, it has expanded to a new global audience with Al-Jazeera International, which broadcasts in English. Its closest competitor is Al Arabiya, a Saudi-financed station that is considered more sympathetic to Western perspectives.

Early critics accused Al Jazeera of being deeply ideological and feeding Arab viewers a steady diet of anti-Western vitriol. Deeper analysis of the content of its programming over time suggests an increasingly more professional and effective performance. Its political talk shows, with provocative titles like “The Opposite Direction,” “Open Dialogue,” “More than One Opinion,” and “No Limits,” present lively debates, which are sometimes heated and emotional. Viewers are obliged to form their own opinions and can interact online or through other means with the presenters. These programs stand in sharp contrast to the decades of state-run programming featuring pro-government proclamations. Instead of being one-way channels, the media are now two-way channels. Governments can learn a lot about popular sentiment by monitoring the talk shows and tracking media interpretation of events and government action, while viewers can increase their understanding and appreciation of public policy challenges. Al-Jazeera also takes on the existential issue of religion with its show “Sharia wa Hayat,” or “Religion and Life,” fea-
turing the Egyptian cleric Youssef al-Qaradawi, characterized by experts as a socially conservative, populist democrat who challenges incumbent power. The talk shows generally discuss with remarkable candor the role of women, family matters, and divergent interpretations of the Quran and legal commentaries.

The security-related content of these talk shows is limited, but the new Arab media are pushing the boundaries. Coverage of Iraq, for example, is in vivid contrast to coverage of Arab-Israeli issues, which is subject to a rigid dogma. The talk shows feature a wide range of views on Iraq and raise painful questions about Arab impotence with respect to Western power in ways that touch on core security concerns. The agenda of the shows may not get to the most sensitive questions about such issues as the transparency of security decisions, the legitimacy of power and authority, and the roles and shortcomings of the armed forces in key countries. But, over time, the format and style of thinking and engaging with other topics of concern to TV viewers could affect the way society and nonstate organizations participate in security debates, leading to a broader ability and willingness to engage on public policy matters. There is no question that the new media are transforming aspects of Arab political culture, but they cannot do it alone; for the process of change to be meaningful, there must be institutions that can respond to citizens’ greater awareness and ability to engage in public policy matters.

**CONCLUSION**

The process of change in the Middle East is uneven, but there is no doubt that the region—and the Gulf area in particular—is in a period of important transition. Regimes have trouble embracing the notion, touted by some in the West, that some short-term instability will build stronger, more resilient systems over time. No incumbent government believes that the uncertainties of change, of empowering citizens whose ideas, interests, and behavior are not well understood, are worth the risk. But governments have slowly acknowledged that change has occurred in how citizens obtain information and that education and employment patterns need to adapt to a globalized world. Governments of Gulf states have all become “advocates” of reform, although their attitudes and behaviors suggest a wide range of underlying beliefs and expectations. Some observers of the region see the Middle East as a cynical laboratory for a kind of superficial reform that is leading nowhere and puts form over substance. They also see leaders trying to appease foreign donors and security partners, rather than addressing in more profound ways the evident deficits in legitimacy and accountability.

Many actors in the region are becoming, intentionally or not, agents of change. The business community, benefiting from extraordinary oil wealth and the opportunities for development and growth that wealth provides, are both self-interested and altruistic agents for change. The region is now home to an increasingly global expatriate community—not only politically passive laborers from South and
Southeast Asia, but also Western academics and investors who find new receptivity to establishing Western-style educational, industrial, and media institutions. The interaction between this new wave of foreigners and local elites is generating new behavior and new expectations for change.

On the security front, a new security community does not yet exist in the Gulf region, but there are small signs of change, particularly in the way that security issues are discussed, who has knowledge and influence, and how wide a range of issues is considered under the security rubric. This incremental process does not guarantee that nongovernment players can or will challenge power, but it does raise the quality of the debate for citizens who seek to be informed and could, over time, shape choices for leaders and politicians. The wider lens on the security agenda that is embraced by nongovernment experts in the region can also make an important contribution to public policy through its public education function.

Legislatures, with the notable exception of the Kuwaiti parliament, are not yet important players on security-related matters, but the role of parliaments is gradually changing. In most Middle Eastern countries with elected parliaments, questions about the behavior of executive authority tend to focus on domestic issues but are moving into issues such as human rights and political prisoners, which cut close to the sensitive domain of state security matters.

The new media, particularly pan-Arab media outlets that do not have a national focus, more directly challenge the status quo and are affecting citizens’ awareness of security matters. The new Arab media are often criticized for taking a narrow and politically correct approach to chronic regional problems (the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular), but there is increasing professionalization, and the coverage of Iraq and the Israel-Hizbullah war in 2006 suggests that the Arab media will, over time, affect Arab perceptions of security issues and preferences for solutions. Talk shows are taking new risks and can become important platforms for information and ideas about national, regional, and human security topics, raising the level of public knowledge and awareness and helping citizens set new boundaries for discussion and debate.

Nongovernmental think tanks with public policy expertise are an emerging factor. Like the new media, think tanks that have a regional focus, and are not limited to the study of a single country, are more independent and tend to have more impact. Even nationally funded think tanks increasingly want to engage on regional or transnational topics, partly because those issues are considered safer than sensitive national debates and partly because cosmopolitan elites in these organizations want to relate to the work and the priorities of their extraregional counterparts. Think tank leaders from the Gulf states, Egypt, and Lebanon participate actively in international forums, and their own institutional agendas have been adapted to the global agenda. Middle Eastern think tanks can make important contributions outside the region; the challenge is to ensure that their own governments take advantage of the knowledge and analyses they provide.
Role of Leadership

The transformational agenda on social and economic development was initiated by a new kind of leadership, at once visionary and charismatic, best embodied by the ruler of Dubai and quickly replicated elsewhere. This style of authority is gradually replacing patriarchal, deferential governance in several Gulf sheikhdoms, with the notable exception of Saudi Arabia. The second generation of rulers continues to pay more than lip service to traditional ways of ruling but clearly prefers to earn legitimacy by establishing a record of economic performance. The sons of the founding fathers of the area’s sheikhdoms have indeed emerged as key drivers of modernization, gaining strong recognition even beyond their borders. At home, they increasingly emphasize efficiency and competence in rewarding government work and increasingly recognize the role of the private sector as a full-fledged partner in progress, not a secondary actor.

The leaders in the region are also rethinking the role and reach of the state, a momentous transformation for societies organized around a once omnipotent and omnipresent authority. Some rulers are determined to move away from state-driven, rent-based, heavily subsidized economies and patriarchal governance. For example, this process is slowly leading to a new, narrower definition of state responsibilities and a privatization of services (health, education, and possibly utilities at some future stage) in the UAE.

Improving government efficiency and responsiveness requires comprehensive state reform. Parallel state institutions are seen as a better vehicle for change than large, entrenched, and often inefficient bureaucracies. In Dubai, for instance, the Executive Council plays that role so successfully that it has become the benchmark for other states. In Abu Dhabi, the Program Management Office is essentially a parallel and often overriding government bureau charged with promoting and coordinating the restructuring of local government. Qatar has established a policy shop tasked with implementing the vision of the emir through the many branches of government, including quasi-governmental agencies such as the Qatar Foundation.

The diverse nature of those who own and lead this transformation agenda reveals the depth of the divide. Surrounding the visionary rulers are successful businessmen, brilliant bureaucrats, motivated financiers, and foreign consultants who see integration into the global economy as the best way to address the important challenges of demography and competitiveness.

Role of the State

There is no doubt that the role of the state is evolving. The Gulf states, particularly the small littoral city-states from Kuwait to the UAE, are actually quite young and still in formation. They are quickly moving to the postmodern concept of an agile state with strong corporate partnerships, open to sharing the implementation of
state policies with smart and well-vetted nonstate players. This concept embodies both a recognition of the limits of state power and an embrace of an up-to-date notion of how to achieve good governance without building inefficient and cumbersome governments.

The theme of governance capacity has become a recurring and dominant one in discussions about the future of the Gulf states. Governance capacity is defined here as the state’s ability to initiate, accompany, and regulate social, economic, and political change in a timely, efficient, and fair manner, through institutions, mechanisms, and rules that enjoy legitimacy and credibility. Governance capacity will determine the legitimacy and sustainability and, eventually, the fate of the transformational visions of the Gulf states’ new generation of rulers.

As evidence of their seriousness, the Gulf states are quickly building regulatory frameworks, physical infrastructure, and other important supports to sustain the incredible economic development of the past few years. These efforts are greeted warmly by the international economic system, which regularly issues rankings and forecasts praising the competitive and business-friendly environment fostered by Gulf region authorities. Their economies stand in stark contrast to other Middle Eastern economies, many of which are plagued by high unemployment and other economic woes.

Importantly, the Gulf states have started to upgrade and expand their judiciaries, a very sensitive move given the weight of religion and tradition in legal matters in the region. Abu Dhabi has initiated a significant overhaul of the emirate’s courts, choosing the new name “Judicial Department” to replace “Sharia Court.” Even more significant is Saudi Arabia’s overhaul of its judicial sector. The scope and depth of judicial reform make its policy significance hard to overstate. By increasing the efficacy and transparency of their judicial systems and procedures, the Gulf regimes are gradually establishing better foundations for rule of law and thereby transforming their relationships with their citizens.

**Role of the Citizen**

The Gulf region exhibits an emergence of new actors, new processes, and new ways of thinking. Globalization and the information culture provide new ways for like-minded elites in the region to engage and interact with their counterparts outside the region. A new and different security dialogue between experts in the region and those outside it involves a broader set of actors and a wider range of issues. It is still too early to say whether this dialogue will affect government decision making, the careers of independent experts on regional security issues, and the prospects for new approaches to regional security challenges. But clearly some of the precursors of a new national security culture are being put in place in this region as well as in key countries in the Levant.

The key to sustainable change in the region will ultimately be citizens’ ability and willingness to participate as engaged stakeholders in national and regional policy
shaping and policy making. Leaders, progressive as they may be, cannot be the sole agents of change. In the Gulf region, one sees discrete groups that are developing new forms of behavior and of engagement with centers of power. Kuwait and Bahrain have the most overtly contestational politics, with groups and individuals challenging the prevailing political culture. All of the states of the region have nationals with radical agendas, including allegiance to Osama bin Laden, but they are for the most part underground or overseas. Regimes are largely effective, since 2001, in controlling the most extreme elements of the population, even though there remains a nontrivial risk of violence against regimes and Western presence in most Gulf countries.

Prospects for radical upheaval in the region appear modest for the short to medium term, whereas the gradual change promoted by key societal groups—elected officials, media, the intellectual class, businesspeople, and labor leaders—is taking place at a different pace in each of the GCC states. Factors that may accelerate the process and create more demand in Gulf societies for citizens’ participation include discussions of electoral rights, the enfranchisement of women, and the citizenship status of resident aliens and the presence, in the littoral states at least, of a growing cosmopolitan expatriate community. The process of change will face considerable resistance from traditional social groups and from incumbent power, which still sees political reform as a privilege it can offer rather than a right or entitlement. In the absence of a new and strong consensus for significant structural change, and in an age of remarkable economic growth that is affecting most parts of society, the capacity of the individual citizen to effect change may remain more modest in the Gulf region than in other regions in political transition. But it is the next logical step for a reform process that has produced important social, cultural, and economic change over the past two decades.
The Transnational Impact of the Oil Boom in the Gulf Region: Sovereign Funds

Contributing substantially to the Gulf states’ increasing financial power and integration into the global economy is the rapid growth and the importance of their sovereign funds. With more than US$1.5 trillion in assets, two-thirds of which is invested in Europe and the United States, the sovereign funds of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar are adding a new dimension to the economic boom in the Gulf region. Fueled by high oil prices since 2002, these funds have tripled their size in the past few years and are fast becoming major economic actors, able to intervene rapidly to seize opportunities and make strategic acquisitions around the globe. This newfound power stirs concerns abroad over transparency, governance, and intentions of these investment giants, but also shows the extent to which the Gulf states see themselves as part of the global economy.

Though not traditional instruments of state power, these sovereign funds address multiple purposes. They help the Gulf states diversify their sources of income. They serve as crucial reserves for the future. They give the Gulf states an important role in the global economy and its direction. They allow the Gulf states to cultivate contacts, influence, and prestige abroad. Abu Dhabi’s Investment Authority and Mubadala Development Company are cases in point and models that other sovereign funds and investment arms seek to replicate. Managing over US$800 billion in assets, they are quickly branching out from cautious investments into more aggressive but also more strategic placements abroad, as well as financing ambitious domestic business and industrial projects launched by the Gulf states.

The transnational nature of sovereign funds is already having an effect on development in the wider region. The funds are drivers and beneficiaries of regional integration in the Middle East. One analyst has noted that they show a bias toward investing in Muslim and developing markets. With more than US$60 billion invested in the Middle East and North Africa, sovereign funds will increasingly be seen as an extension of the power of their governments, even when their decisions are made strictly on the basis of return on investment. As Middle Eastern countries progress toward liberalization, privatization, and regulation, they create friendly environments for transregional investment, fueling faster economic growth rates from Morocco to the Gulf region. Already in Morocco, Egypt, and Syria, high unemployment is being addressed through foreign investments in telecommunications, construction, tourism, and industry.

The real long-term effect of sovereign funds in the Middle East is still difficult to evaluate. Foreign direct investments from Europe and the United States, driven by trade opportunities and the need for cheap products for their large markets, will continue to create more jobs and create more sustainable economic development, especially in North Africa. And sovereign funds will continue to favor investing in the politically stable, economically affluent United States, Europe, and East Asia. But as the Gulf region emerges as a pivotal economic zone, its demand for goods and services and the extra liquidity of these funds may also fuel growth in resource-poor, labor-rich countries in dire need of fresh capital.
WATER MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT: 
THE CASE OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Kendra Patterson

Middle Eastern societies have learned over millennia how to manage their scarce water resources and balance the competing demands of agriculture, animal, and domestic use. In the last 50 years industrialization, urbanization, and growing populations have caused the landscape of those demands to change. New competing demands, such as urban versus rural and human versus industrial, are complicating the scene.

Both rural areas and cities in the Middle East have seen significant population increases in the last 50 years, but urban growth has far outpaced rural growth. According to UN statistics, Saudi Arabian urban populations saw a more than 28-fold increase from 1950 to 2005, while rural populations didn’t quite double. In Egypt during the same period rural populations grew by 185 percent, while cities saw a 354 percent increase; in Syria the growth figures are 287 percent and 800 percent, respectively. Urban populations in the region will continue to grow: Saudi Arabia’s current urban population is likely to almost double by 2030.

Irrigation still accounts for the largest demand sector—over 90 percent—but growing cities are upsetting the traditional balance between agricultural and domestic uses. In addition, attitudes toward water change with the coming of prosperity. Many people in developed societies would consider a daily shower and water to keep their lawns green basic needs. The thriving Gulf states have some of the highest per capita water consumption rates in the world: between 300 and 750 liters per person per day. (The World Water Council reports that the average per capita daily use in the United States is 350 liters, in Europe 200 liters, and in sub-Saharan Africa 10–20 liters.) It is estimated that by 2050 all countries in the region except for Iraq will have water scarcity problems. The intersection of growing populations, changing and growing demand for water, and the looming threat of water scarcity in the Middle East has the potential to create conflict within the region.

Countries and territories in the Middle East can be divided into two groups: those that have low levels of renewable water resources, such as flowing rivers, and must rely on groundwater and desalination for most of their supply, and those that get much of their water from river systems they share with other countries. The former group includes Gaza, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen. The latter group consists of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan,
Lebanon, the West Bank, and Syria. In order to meet the needs of growing populations and cities in the last 50 years, countries in both groups planned and developed large-scale infrastructure projects to source, control, and deliver water. These projects, such as dams, desalination plants, and river diversions, focused almost entirely on the supply side of water management; that is, they harnessed or created more water rather than conserved already existing supplies. While these large supply projects were meant to alleviate conflicting demands domestically, they often created conflict between states that share water resources, such as rivers.

In recent years a model of water management that considers conservation on the demand side, called integrated water resource management (IWRM), has been incorporated to different extents into national water policies in the Middle East. This paper will look at some past conflicts over water in the Middle East and examine how IWRM, which stresses cooperation between states in order to develop sustainable water use policies, is changing the ways in which states interact over water.

PAST CONFLICTS OVER SHARED WATER RESOURCES

Water resources come in two forms, renewable and non-renewable. Renewable resources consist of river systems and shallow aquifers that are replenished with rainwater, while non-renewable resources include the majority of deep aquifers (filled with fossil water), desalination, and wastewater reuse. More than three-quarters of underground aquifers are considered non-renewable because they would take many centuries or millennia to replenish naturally. The Middle East is one of the most arid regions in the world, with an average rainfall of 56 millimeters/year (to put this in perspective, the average rainfall in central Australia, another arid region, is 127 millimeters/year). Transnational rivers supply over 50 percent of renewable water resources in the Middle East, while underground aquifers and desalination plants make up the bulk of the non-renewable sources.

In the past 50 years much of the water-related conflict in the region has been over shared rivers. Upstream states often base their claim to a shared river on the concept of “absolute territorial sovereignty,” which lets them do what they want to the river regardless of the downstream effects. Downstream nations prefer an interpretation based on “absolute integrity of the river,” which denies upstream nations the right to do anything that disrupts its flow and water quality in the downstream portion. While it has long been considered customary law that “an upstream state is acting unlawfully if it changes the waters of a river in their natural condition to the serious injury of a downstream state,” this is not accepted by many upstream states.

The Jordan River

In the early years of Israel a significant part of the new country’s national goal was attracting immigrants and supplying them with a good standard of living, which included adequate water. The new state devised a National Water Carrier (NWC)
plan, meant to divert water from the Jordan River, which Israel shares with downstream riparians Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, and the Sea of Galilee to the Negev Desert in the south. Israel considered harnessing the waters of the Jordan to be a key part of its national development plan.

From the Arab point of view, the NWC was part of Israel’s plan to establish itself permanently in the region by achieving economic independence. Diverting the Jordan was seen as a plot meant to provide employment (farming) to 5 million new immigrants in the Negev region, whose presence was perceived as a security threat by neighboring states. Arab states, led by Syria and Egypt, devised their own diversion plan for the Jordan. Fully expecting the diversion operations to cause Israel to attack, they also began planning a Joint Arab Command with an Egyptian commander. In the years leading up to the Six-Day War in 1967, water became a defining characteristic of the Arab-Israeli struggle.

While the river was a rallying point of pan-Arab nationalism, it also became a bone of contention between Arab states when their respective internal conditions caused them to reevaluate their stances towards Israel. Egypt favored delaying confrontation but going ahead with diversion plans. Lebanon feared the issue could exacerbate domestic tensions between its Christian and Muslim inhabitants, creating instability, and began work on diversion plans only half-heartedly. Syria was the only country that favored immediate confrontation with Israel. Eager to bolster the legitimacy of the Ba’th Party, the president of Syria began full-scale diversion operations. From 1963 until the Six-Day War in 1967, these were the focus of repeated military incidents between Israel and Syria.

The Tigris and the Euphrates

Turkey controls the headwaters of both the Tigris and the Euphrates, which flow through Syria (or in the case of the Tigris, along the border) and into Iraq. Turkish leaders began discussing harnessing the waters of both rivers for the purpose of national development as early as the 1950s. The project, called GAP from its name in Turkish (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi; in English, the Southeastern Anatolia Project), began in the 1980s with plans for 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric power plants. The project will eventually divert enough water to irrigate 1.7 million hectares of land and provide 27 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity annually. This will not only mean less water for Syria and Iraq, but will also give Turkey the power to cut off water to downstream riparians completely if a serious conflict were ever to occur. In 1990 Turkey did cut off the entire flow of the Euphrates for three weeks. Blackouts occurred in the Syrian towns that depend on the hydroelectric power generated by the river’s flow.

The GAP project will predominantly benefit southeastern Turkey, which has high levels of unemployment and political instability, as well as being the center of the separatist Kurdish movement. In the 1980s Syria surreptitiously supported the Kurdistan Workers Party in its campaign against the Turkish government as a way of
sabotaging the GAP project. Turkey and Syria eventually reached an agreement in 1987, in which Turkey agreed to maintain a minimum flow of 500 cubic meters per second from its dams on the Euphrates in exchange for Syrian cooperation regarding the Kurdish rebels, but Turkish attitudes are far from compromising. At the opening of the Ataturk Dam in July 1992, future President Suleyman Demirel said, “Neither Syria nor Iraq can lay claim to Turkey’s rivers any more than Ankara could claim their oil. This is a matter of sovereignty. We have a right to do anything we like. The water resources are Turkey’s, the oil resources are theirs. We don’t say we share their oil resources and they cannot say they share our water resources.”

The Tigris and Euphrates river systems have also caused conflicts between Iraq and Syria. In the early 1970s, the filling of Lake Assad behind the Tabqa Dam in Syria (currently a major source of hydroelectric power) significantly reduced the flow of the Euphrates into Iraq. Iraq complained to the Arab League that Syria was withholding water. Syria soon withdrew from the negotiations, and in May 1975 closed its airspace to Iraq. Both countries began massing troops at their borders in preparation for a conflict, which was only averted when Saudi Arabia brokered a deal between the two countries in which Syria agreed to let 60 percent of the waters flow into Iraq.

The Nile

The situation of the Nile is somewhat different from that of the Tigris and Euphrates and the Jordan; in the case of the Nile it is the downstream riparians (Egypt and Sudan) that feel they have the dominant claim on the river. Although 85 percent of the Nile’s water originates in Ethiopia and the river passes through ten countries, it is Sudan and Egypt that have determined who “owns” the waters of the river, and how much. Both of these countries get less rainfall than other riparians further south and rely heavily on the Nile for irrigation. Together they use 94 percent of the Nile’s water.

Egypt and Sudan have almost come to blows over allocation of the Nile’s water between the two. When Sudan achieved independence in 1956, the first prime minister immediately requested that all previous agreements between the two countries be revised and lodged an objection to Egypt’s plan to build the Aswan High Dam. Egypt responded by withdrawing its support for Sudan’s reservoir project at Rosseires on the Blue Nile. When Sudan stated it would not adhere to any past agreements at all, Egypt massed troops on the border in preparation for conflict.

The two countries eventually signed the Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters (Nile Waters Treaty) in 1959, after a military takeover in Sudan resulted in a more Egypt-friendly government. Egypt, however, continued to experience conflict with its neighbors over water rights. In 1970 it threatened Ethiopia with war over the proposed construction of a dam on Lake Tana on the Blue Nile, and in 1979 President Anwar Sadat famously said, “The only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water.” The sentiment was echoed by Egyptian Foreign
Minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1988 when he said that the next war in the Middle East would be over the waters of the Nile. In October 1991, Egyptian Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Mohammed Hussein stated that Egypt would not hesitate to go to war to defend its claim to the Nile River.

A potential future source of conflict is Ethiopia, whose population of 77 million is expected to reach 126 million by 2030, according to UN statistics. Poor access to clean water poses one of Ethiopia’s greatest challenges: currently, only 22 percent of its population has access to safe drinking water, compared to 98 percent of the population in neighboring Egypt.\(^5\) While in the past Ethiopia has not contested Sudan and Egypt’s claims to the Nile waters, if it is pressured by internal conflicts and instability due to the growing population and continued poverty, it could claim that the Nile belongs to Ethiopia, considering the majority of the headwaters originate there.

In 1997 the UN adopted the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, which stipulates, in part, that rivers should be used in an equitable manner, and that upstream use cannot cause significant harm to other riparians. This does no more than codify what was already customary international law. In the past, when many Middle Eastern countries were experiencing the pressures of growing populations, internal instabilities, and the need for rapid development, customary water law did not prevent conflict—often armed—from occurring. It is unlikely a UN convention will help mitigate conflict in times of stress in the future.

What is needed is a fundamental change in how states manage and interact over water. In the past decade many Middle Eastern states have adopted a new approach to water management that focuses more on the human, ecological, and economic aspects of water. This approach, IWRM, fills in the legal framework with a concrete set of concepts on how to manage water resources and provides an opportunity to cooperate with neighbors over shared resources.

**INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (IWRM)**

As was examined in the previous section, international conflicts over water have often resulted from governments’ attempts to mitigate political and ethnic tensions at a local or national level, and a supply-side focus on managing water exacerbated those conflicts. In recent years IWRM, which considers the relationship between supply and demand, has gained increasing attention as a better way to not only manage water, but also create cooperation between riparian states.

IWRM is a system for sustainable use of water resources. It is based on the philosophy that all uses of water are interdependent, and that water is a social and economic good. For example, agricultural runoff can pollute aquifers and rivers, which can lead to poor-quality drinking water and environmental degradation. Conversely, limiting agricultural water withdrawals for ecological reasons, such
as sustaining fisheries, can mean fewer crops or poor crops. These issues have security ramifications when they create or add to instability within a state or between states.

The perception of water management as having social, economic, environmental, and security ramifications began to gain mainstream attention in the 1990s. At the 1992 International Conference on Water and the Environment (ICWE), held in Dublin, some guiding principles for an integrated, more holistic approach to water management were proposed. The Dublin Principles, as they are called, can be paraphrased as follows:

- Water management requires a holistic approach that links social and economic development with the protection of ecosystems. Water management policies also must consider land use in the vicinity of the water source.
- A participatory approach to water management is needed, which includes raising awareness among both policy makers and the general public and involving stakeholders at all levels.
- Women, as primary providers and users of water domestically, need to play a pivotal role in water management.
- Water is an economic good, and as such should be managed efficiently and equitably, with special attention to conserving and protecting water resources.

These principles were presented at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) later in the year, and echoed at the 1st and 2nd World Water Forums in 1997 and 2000, respectively. At the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in August and September 2002, which all countries dealt with in this paper attended, a target was set to develop national integrated water resource management and water efficiency plans by 2005. At the 4th World Water Forum held in Mexico in 2006, it was judged that of the Middle Eastern countries, Yemen, Palestine, Jordan, and Egypt had been the most successful in formally incorporating IWRM into their national water policies. Kuwait, Iraq, and Oman were judged to be the least successful.

The first challenge for most states in the Middle East was accepting water as something more than just a resource to be exploited for purposes of development and modernization. Part of this process included moving towards a recognition that water resources are limited and that water management needs to focus not just on finding new sources and exploiting current ones, but on educating water users on conservation techniques—that is, on demand management. In addition, before being able to effectively institute IWRM policies, many countries in the region had to deal with a fragmented control of water management characterized by overlapping responsibilities between different institutions and water-using sectors. At the same time, they suffered from a rigid, overcentralized control carried over from the previous 50 years of rapid development and large water infrastructure projects.
It was necessary to both locate water management in one ministry at the national level and involve stakeholders at municipal and community levels in order to encourage better management and conservation.

Egypt has been particularly successful in adopting these changes. In January 2005, the Egyptian Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation issued the National Water Resources Plan, which is based on IWRM concepts. The first part of the plan aims at conserving current water resources rather than tapping or creating new supplies. The sustainable use of current resources includes changing the operation of the Lake Nasser reservoir to reduce evaporation, mining fossil water in the Western Desert with an eye to conserving the aquifers for future generations, harvesting rainfall and flashfloods, and utilizing desalination. On the demand side, the plan includes provisions for improving irrigation techniques to minimize waste. Specifically, in the West Delta area, Egypt has instituted a design, build, lease (DBL) system for farmers that involves constructing three major channels to deliver irrigation water. The idea is that local stakeholders will be more likely to conserve water if they feel they own the water delivery mechanism.

Jordan also provides a good example of how IWRM is being used in the region to cope with growing water scarcity. Jordan’s Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI) reports on its information website that the country has 11 renewable aquifers, all of which are subject to over-pumping. Average annual withdrawals range from 146 percent of the renewable recharge in minor aquifers to 235 percent in major ones. In 2002 the MWI created the Water Demand Management Unit (WDMU), which “aims at reducing the demand on fresh water in a serious attempt to match it with the available supplies before embarking on the development of additional water resources and supplies.” The WDMU’s responsibilities are divided into three general areas: educating the public and other entities on the importance of and methods for conserving water, monitoring water use and recommending enforcement and regulatory measures, and tracking water conservation.

By its nature IWRM encourages riparian states to cooperate through its focus on the sustainable and environmentally sound use of water resources, and many countries have used IWRM policies with the view of promoting regional cooperation. The star example of this regional cooperation involves the nine Nile Basin states (Uganda, Tanzania, Sudan, Rwanda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Burundi), which instituted the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in 1999. The purpose of the NBI is to “develop the river in a cooperative manner, share substantial socioeconomic benefits, and promote regional peace and security.” Projects the NBI is involved in include environmental protection, stakeholder education, and agricultural water use efficiency. The NBI prioritizes both the economic and the security ramifications of water management and shows a real shift in regional thinking about water.
Several regional institutions are dedicated to encouraging IWRM cooperation in the region. One is the Arab Integrated Water Resources Management Network (AWARENET), which seeks to foster regional communication on how to incorporate IWRM into national policies. The Arab Water Council, established in 2004, is also concerned with supporting IWRM in the region and focuses particularly on a multidisciplinary approach to water management and the sharing of scientific information.

Bilateral agreements in the region are also beginning to reflect IWRM: the 2002 Agreement for Sharing the Water of Al-Kabeer Al-Janoubi River and for Building a Common Dam between Lebanon and Syria includes the implementation of the principles of integrated water resource management for the management of the waters of that river. The Al-Kabeer Al-Janoubi River is significant because it forms a border between the two countries, rather than beginning in one and ending in the other. The agreement is based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, which both countries ratified. The benefits that can be expected from this and other IWRM-based agreements between states sharing water resources include:

- **Cooperation.** Cooperation between the two countries improves the management of the river, increases agricultural production and energy generation, and facilitates preparedness for disasters, such as floods and droughts.
- **Reduced costs.** Costs are shared between the two countries, and thus tension and conflict between them are reduced.
- **Security.** Cooperation in the management of water resources facilitates the improvement of political and economic relations between the two countries.7

For countries on the Arabian Peninsula, which get most of their water from aquifers, reservoirs, treated wastewater, and desalination plants (Saudi Arabia has the largest desalination capacity in the world), the conservation philosophy of IWRM is even more important. These countries’ biggest water challenge is that they are currently using significantly more water than they have. Saudi Arabia suffers the biggest gap between supply and demand: it has only 2.4 cubic kilometers per year of renewable water resources, but uses 17.33 cubic kilometers per year. Figure 1 presents resources-to-withdrawals ratios of other countries in the region.

At the 4th World Water Forum held in Mexico in 2006, Yemen was the only Arabian Peninsula country judged to have successfully incorporated IWRM into its national water policy. In 2003 the newly created Yemeni Ministry of Water and Environment issued the IWRM-based National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program, 2005–2009 (NWSSIP). Plans include involving farmers in water management by introducing cost-sharing investments in new irrigation techniques that conserve water, as well as reducing government subsidies for diesel fuel, used in the majority of water pumps, to encourage conservation.8 Sana’a University in Yemen has offered a master’s of science degree in IWRM since 2004, offering courses on the
environment, gender in water management, and water value and economics. Of all the IWRM targets, recognizing the primary role of women in the use and allocation of water at the local level has received the least attention, and it is significant that it is part of the master’s degree coursework at Sana’a University.

On the other end of the spectrum, at least according to the 4th World Water Forum documents, is Oman, which, along with Kuwait and Iraq, is judged to have been the least successful in incorporating IWRM policy into its national water plan. A careful examination of Omani water policies exposes the limitations of IWRM as the international standard of water management. It also reveals a virtually ignored aspect of water policy: the importance of cultural and religious values in water management.

**THE CASE OF OMAN**

Oman relies on precipitation to provide most of its renewable water resources. Rainfall, which replenishes shallow aquifers and reservoirs, provides 65 percent of Oman’s water needs, and the country depends on desalination to provide the rest. Most rain in Oman falls during mid- and late winter. Amounts range from 20 to 100 millimeters a year on the coast and interior plains to 700 millimeters a year in the mountains in the north. Although some of the mountain rainfall seeps into aquifers that supply irrigation water for the plains, much of it runs down wadis.
(gullies that are usually dry) in seasonal floods. Some of this water is caught in aboveground reservoirs, but these have a high evaporation rate.

According to the Omani Ministry of Regional Municipalities, Environment and Water Resources, water demand in Oman exceeds water supply by 25 percent. *The World’s Water 2006–2007* estimates that demand to be 36 percent more than supply (see Figure 1). Desalination cannot be relied on to fill that gap because of the expense involved. Energy accounts for as much as one half of the cost of desalination, and Oman, unlike Saudi Arabia, is not a large producer of fossil fuel. Raw materials for building plants, such as steel, are expensive as well. Desalination plants also have significant environmental impacts that could contribute to future costs. These include the discharge brine that contains decaying organisms caught during in-flow and chemicals and heavy metals introduced during the desalination process. Cleanup and building more environment-friendly plants are likely to make desalination even more expensive.

The star of Oman’s water management system has been, and to some extent still is, its aflaj system. Aflaj are water channels that take advantage of the earth’s gravity and land incline to deliver water from underground sources. They have a history of thousands of years in the region and currently deliver one-third of the water from renewable sources for irrigation (wells account for the rest). Shares of aflaj water can be either owned or rented, and they are traditionally measured by complex calculations based on seasonal variations in the length of the day and night and the position of the stars. Conserving its aflaj has been a key part of Oman’s modern water policies. In 1997 the Sultanate established the National Aflaj Inventory Project, which counted 4,112 aflaj in the country, of which about 74 percent are currently in operation. The Sultanate takes responsibility for the maintenance of both aflaj and wells (a parallel Well Inventory Project was initiated in 1992) and continues to fund research on desalination and other water-sourcing technologies, such as fog collection.

Oman is an absolute monarchy governed by Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said, who deposed his father, whom he accused of mismanaging the country, in 1970. The Sultan instituted a council of elected advisors in the early 1990s, and granted universal suffrage to his people in 2003. Even with the elected council, the Sultan still rules as an absolute monarch and has a great deal of power over policy making in his Sultanate. The Sultan of Oman has been far-sighted in his management of the country’s water resources. In 1984 he created the Ministry of Regional Municipalities, Environment and Water Resources, which located water and environment issues at the level of municipal governance (and made Oman the first Arab state to have a ministry dedicated to environmental issues, according to the ministry website). In 1986 he strengthened these links by combining the council responsible for environmental resources and the council responsible for water resources to form the Council for the Conservation of the Environment and Water Resources. These steps were far ahead of their time in recognizing the relationship between local
governance, environment, and water management. They also reflect an understanding of the importance of maintaining a strong national authority that is not fragmented among various ministries, as well as decentralizing water management and involving stakeholders at lower levels. These were concepts that would only enter the international discourse some years later, at the Dublin Conference in 1992 and then in 2002 in Johannesburg.

The objectives of the water resources sector of the Ministry of Regional Municipalities, Environment and Water Resources include many of the same targets as plans formally incorporating IWRM: a focus on sustainable use, demand management, protection of the environment, and involvement of the public through education. The three objectives are as follows:

- Supplying sources of potable water and creating a balance between water utilization and renewable resources
- Enhancing water resources and protecting them against depletion and pollution and rationing water consumption
- Establishing water preservation principles and increasing awareness of the importance of rationing water use

In addition, the Ministry’s website predominantly displays a “kids” section with activities and information aimed at teaching children about the importance of the environment and water conservation.

From an outside perspective—such as that of the 4th World Water Forum in 2006—Oman is behind other countries in the region in adopting IWRM. This interpretation of Oman’s water management is based on the fact that Oman, unlike other countries in the region, has not developed a national plan incorporating IWRM concepts and terminology, like the one Egypt issued in 2005 that states at the beginning of its preface that it is based on an IWRM approach. In fact, Oman has incorporated IWRM-like policies into its water management for decades. This illustrates that international standards and targets, while useful in encouraging cooperation, can stand in the way of accurate understanding when only those standards and targets and their particular language are used as measurements.

The Sultan’s 21st National Day speech in November 1991 perhaps best indicates his integrated view of water management, including its importance to regional, and global, security:

*Of all the gifts with which God has blessed us, water is the greatest. . . . If extravagance is forbidden by Islam, it is even more applicable to water. Indeed, Islam emphasizes in its teaching that it is our duty to conserve it. We cannot stress too strongly the need to observe the conservation measures laid down by Government in this respect. The use of this vital resource throughout the world can have a great impact on future development strategies, and indeed could become a decisive factor in political tension and thus, world security. Our Government has*
plans to increase our country’s water resources to meet our national requirements without arduously affecting the demands of conservation.

Oman’s emphasis on maintaining a traditional Islamic religious and cultural core to its modernization efforts sets it apart from other water-scarce states on the Arabian Peninsula in its own eyes.\textsuperscript{9} As the Sultan’s speech indicates, modern water management and traditional Islamic values are far from incompatible. Water conservation and equitable distribution are core values in Islam. The Quran stresses the importance of not wasting water, even when supplies are plentiful. It also teaches that water belongs to everyone and cannot be owned: of the three people Allah will ignore on the day of resurrection, one is the man who had more water than he could personally use and refused to share it with travelers. The IWRM principle of involving all water stakeholders in decision making and development of water management is echoed in the Islamic principle of \textit{shura}, which states that decisions that affect a community should take place within the community through group consultation and consensus.\textsuperscript{10}

Many Islamic countries in the Middle East have, like Oman, used Islamic principles to further their water management goals. Perhaps the clearest example of this is the 1978 \textit{fatwa} (a ruling on Islamic law issued by an Islamic scholar; contrary to Western interpretation, a \textit{fatwa} is not a law, but rather an explanation or guide) issued by the Council of Leading Islamic Scholars (CLIS) of Saudi Arabia, which dealt with the issue of reusing wastewater. Water purity is extremely important in Islam, but in a water-poor country like Saudi Arabia, treated wastewater is an important water source. The \textit{fatwa} stated, in part, that “impure waste water can be considered as pure water and similar to the original pure water, if its treatment using advanced technical procedures is capable of removing its impurities with regard to taste, colour and smell, as witnessed by honest, specialized and knowledgeable experts. Then it can be used to remove body impurities and for purifying, even for drinking.” Similarly, Jordan has been using Islamic teachings in its IWRM-based public awareness campaigns about water conservation for years,\textsuperscript{11} a fact that was ignored in the 4th World Water Forum report that acknowledged Jordan’s success at implementing IWRM.

These cases from Saudi Arabia and Jordan are examples of how traditional Islamic values can work with modern integrated water policy. It is important not to use international IWRM standards exclusively when judging a country’s progress in integrated water management. Oman’s case in particular demonstrates the importance of examining a nontraditional security concern in the Middle East, such as water scarcity, from a perspective that takes into account how it is viewed within the region. Oman’s emphasis on incorporating Islamic values into its water policy conversation may turn off many Western observers, particularly in the current climate, but its success should not be discounted. As water becomes more of a security concern in the coming decades, it will become even more critical to understand the mechanisms with which integrated water management can take place from within an Islamic discourse.
CONCLUSION

Conflict involving transnational rivers has plagued the Middle East over the last 50 years, but river systems are not the only water resources shared by states in the region. Whereas only some of the states share significant rivers, all of them share underground aquifers with their neighbors. (See Figure 2.) The Mountain Aquifer shared by Israel and the West Bank, but primarily underlying the latter, is one example of how an underground water source has contributed to conflict within the region. The Mountain Aquifer is the sole source of water for the Palestinians in the West Bank. After Israel occupied the West Bank at the conclusion of the Six-Day War, it established strict control over the Mountain Aquifer in order to supply its growing immigrant population with water. Israel currently uses 80 percent of the aquifer water. Both Israel and Palestine feel they have historical and cultural claims to the territory of the West Bank, and thus to the water contained under it. The conflict over the aquifer is informed by the mutually perceived religious and ethnic differences between the Israelis and Palestinians and is part of the broader violent political conflict between the two groups. As this case demonstrates, shared aquifers are as likely as river systems to contribute to conflict in the region.

Figure 2: Underground Resources in the Middle East

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The past 50 years of supply-side water management have created some severe problems that could have long-range implications for regional security. The most obvious of these is water scarcity: water is a finite resource in all of these countries, and IWRM conservation and demand management policies cannot restore what has already been depleted. Another problem, and one that will become increasingly significant as water becomes more scarce, is pollution of existing sources. Pollution of rivers due to industrial and domestic runoff is well documented. Underground water sources face the same threat and are also vulnerable to salt pollution resulting from over-pumping. Saltwater intrusion is especially a problem in coastal aquifers, where even a 5 percent contamination of seawater can cause the water to become unusable for human, animal, and agricultural consumption. Parts of the Mountain Aquifer under Israel and the West Bank passed their sustainable pumping levels in the 1970s, and some of the water is now so brackish it requires treatment before being used. While countries on the Arabian Peninsula, which depend on aquifers for freshwater, are beginning to conduct experiments with salt-resistant crops, salt pollution is only likely to continue increasing if aquifers continue to be overexploited. Desalination, another important source of water on the Arabian Peninsula, contributes to air pollution and pollutes land and coastal areas due to out-pumping of salt and contaminants introduced during the desalination process. It is not enough for a government to guarantee adequate water to its citizens. It must also guarantee clean water. Violent conflict due to polluted water sources has already occurred in other parts of the world: in 2005 citizens in China clashed with police after occupying an industrial complex they blamed for ruining their crops by polluting irrigation water.

As water scarcity grows in the Middle East, aquifers will become more important as sources of water. States will need to negotiate policies for extracting this water. Issues they will need to address include sustainable management of underground water and equitable allocation of water from shared aquifers. The important role underground water sources, and in particular fossil water reserves, will play in the security of the region in the next 50 years is largely unrecognized by the rest of the world. No international law has yet been set for underground water. While the 1997 UN Convention recognized the future importance of underground water sources and called for more study of the issue, it limited its application to underground water either “tributary to, or sharing a common terminus with, surface waters covered by the document’s Articles.” As mentioned earlier, three-quarters of underground aquifers are considered non-renewable because they take centuries or millennia to replenish. Aquifers connected to river systems or other aboveground water sources, and replenished by them, are in the minority. Most underground water is fossil water, which could aptly be called the final reserves of freshwater on the planet. It is possible that these may become the new “rivers” over which states experience conflict in the next 50 years.

Water in the Middle East is more than just a resource—it is tied to national, cultural, and religious identity. Oman’s case in particular demonstrates how intri-
Cately entwined are water and culture. As conflict over river basins and shared aquifers such as the Mountain Aquifer underlying Israel and the West Bank illustrates, it is simplistic to view water conflict as involving only water. It is often the case that internal ethnic, cultural, or governance issues serve as a catalyst for conflict over water between states. While there is a better chance that countries in the region will be able to avoid water-related conflict if cooperation is institutionalized through the application of IWRM techniques, as long as there are ethnic, national, and religious tensions, the possibility for conflict over water remains.
The pressures of globalization, regional economic integration, and the quantum increase in energy demand in Southeast Asia have created serious transboundary impacts on the environment and natural resources that thus far have exceeded the political will and capacity of governments and regional institutions to manage. The resources-rich but economically less developed countries of the region, in particular, are pursuing economic growth at the expense of the environment and the human security of the majority of their populations, who still carry on traditional, village-centered subsistence livelihoods.

The political economy of diverse Southeast Asia derives from at least four underlying components. Geographically, the region can be divided between mainland Southeast Asia and island or maritime Southeast Asia. The former is composed of the five countries of the Mekong River Basin: Myanmar (Burma), Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. It is bounded by China to the north and east, and India and Bangladesh to the west.

Maritime Southeast Asia includes the countries of the Malay Archipelago—Brunei, East Timor (Timor Lest), Indonesia, Malaysia (peninsular and the states of Sabah and Sarawak on the island of Borneo), and the Philippines. The East-West border between Indonesia’s West Papua province (formerly Irian Jaya), on the island of Borneo, and the independent state of Papua New Guinea (PNG) is generally accepted as the dividing line between Southeast Asia and Oceania.

Culturally, the Southeast Asia region is generally divided between the predominantly Islamic countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei; the Philippines, with its admixture of indigenous culture, Catholicism, and Islam in the South; the countries and territories influenced by Hinduism and Buddhism, including Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Indonesia’s island of Bali; predominantly Chinese Singapore; and Vietnam, which has been influenced predominantly by Chinese Confucian culture, indigenous animist beliefs, and to a lesser extent, Christianity.

Strong traditional patterns of social relationships underlie competing modern political ideologies. This applies even to Islam, arguably the most important contemporary ideological phenomenon. Traditions of kingship and local autonomy have
strongly influenced politics and governance in both the Malay and the Hindu-Buddhist worlds, while Confucianism and social conformity still play a strong role in Communist Vietnam, as in China.

Finally, while all countries of the region have adapted or are in the process of adapting to the globalization of world markets and the free flow of international capital, Southeast Asia remains divided between the generally poorer economies based on natural resources extraction and those that have grown relatively rich by opening to investment in manufacturing by multinational companies and continuously upgrading their human capital and economic infrastructure.

One unfortunate common thread has been the prevalence of relatively risk-free “crony capitalism” based on state-granted monopolies or quasi-monopolistic licenses for a range of activities, from importing foreign goods to cutting and exporting timber. To one degree or another, most countries of both Southeast and East Asia operate under state-led or state-centered, export-oriented development models that are highly susceptible to political favoritism and corruption.

Most of these underlying cultural-ideological and even economic factors strongly influence patterns of politics and governance. Whether democratically elected or ruled by a sovereign (Brunei), a military junta (Myanmar [Burma]), or a Communist party, the political culture of all of the ten Southeast Asian countries contains some degree of authoritarianism and ideological and social pressures for conformity.

Among other consequences, these different cultural and historical influences tend to undercut efforts to promote greater regional economic and political cooperation on transboundary and nontraditional security issues. On the more positive side, this regional “unity in diversity” and the persistence of pre-modern traditions tend to militate against the regional spread of nontraditional security threats to peace and security, such as pan-Islamic terrorist movements.

Almost every Southeast Asian country has significant problems of natural resources governance. In both mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, ill-considered development projects, weak laws and enforcement, and corruption have decimated forests, polluted the air and water, and greatly reduced biodiversity. Overfishing, pollution, and hydropower dams have brought some of the most important food fish species to the brink of extinction, including the giant Mekong catfish, the world’s largest freshwater fish, and a number of smaller catfish species and other food fish. Destructive factory fishing by Japanese, Chinese, Taiwanese, and Korean fleets have pushed ocean fisheries to the point of collapse. The unsustainable exploitation of natural resources in the less developed countries has led to unprecedented urban-rural income inequality and created major transboundary and nontraditional security (NTS) threats to national well-being and regional stability.

The more developed Southeast Asian countries—Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand—are better able to take advantage of the positive aspects of globalization, but cannot avoid the effects of environmental degradation from neighboring countries
that often constitute their economic hinterlands. Haze from the annual dry season burning of forests and coastal peat lands in Sumatra and other parts of Indonesia have created serious air pollution problems in Singapore and Malaysia. Narcotics and human trafficking from Myanmar (Burma) and China are growing problems for Thailand and, increasingly, Vietnam. Pandemic diseases such as SARS and avian flu have been spread by increasing cross-border trade and travel. Uneven development and the destruction of traditional livelihoods have led to the uncontrolled movement of millions of illegal workers throughout the region.

Ironically, the more developed Southeast Asian countries themselves are major drivers of environmental destruction. They consume more energy and produce more carbon dioxide (CO₂). They have created strict legal regimes to maintain what is left of their forests, but some of their industrial and trading conglomerates are involved in illegal logging, often for the purpose of clearing land for environmentally destructive palm and rubber plantations. Their electric utilities and construction companies play a major role in the uncoordinated and environmentally unsustainable construction of hydroelectric power dams in the Mekong Basin.

**General State of Discourse in Southeast Asia**

Awareness of transboundary issues and the concept of NTS are widely accepted in Southeast Asia. In fact, Southeast Asian intellectuals at universities and think tanks have been among the most prominent promoters of the concept. The growing importance of transboundary and NTS issues has been formally recognized in a number of regional academic frameworks and fora. These include:

- The 14-member Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia (NTS-ASIA), whose secretariat is situated in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University;
- The ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) network, which includes some of the same regional institutions and whose secretariat is situated at the Indonesian Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta; and
- The NTS-oriented Network of East Asian Think-Tanks (NEAT), which is composed of government-designated institutions in the ten ASEAN countries as well as Japan, China, and South Korea. NEAT was launched in Beijing in 2003 under the auspices of the ASEAN Plus Three Summit. It includes some of the same institutions as the NTS-ASIA and the ASEAN-ISIS network, including the RSIS in Singapore and a number of other academic and government-affiliated research institutes.

Some Southeast Asian scholars argue that post–Cold War concepts of NTS should be at the core of the proposed ASEAN Security Community. It remains to be seen whether and in what form the proposed community will develop.
Despite the general acceptance of the NTS concept, the definitions and implications of these new kinds of security threats are highly contested. Broadly speaking, the advocates of differing perspectives can be divided into a number of sometimes overlapping groups:

- Academic and think tank analysts in the more economically and politically developed countries have played a leading role in calling the attention of the state to new kinds of existential threats which are not susceptible to military force. In Singapore and Malaysia, whose political systems combine “soft authoritarianism” with procedural democracy, the responsibility of the state for protecting the health and welfare of the population is well accepted by the NTS community, and these centers have ready access to government officials. These think tanks and some other government-affiliated institutes of strategic and international studies tend to view transboundary and other NTS threats as appropriate matters for “securitization,” albeit with the state “as a means, not an end to various issues, ranging from the individual security to international terrorism.”

- In many less developed Southeast Asian countries, environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations critical of unconstrained globalization accept the NTS concept but tend to put most emphasis on the human security aspect. These groups generally view the state itself as a major cause of the problem because of its preemption, and often unsustainable exploitation and mismanagement, of the natural resources of the “commons” for the benefit of urbanites and other politically important constituencies. This is particularly the case in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, where NGOs operate with comparative freedom. In these countries, NGOs and other advocacy groups seek to change government policy through political action, publicity, and partnerships with regional and global counterpart organizations.

- Think tanks in the countries in transition to market economies—Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—tend to focus on the more “hard” security aspects of transboundary issues and are especially wary of treading too deeply into politically sensitive issues such as human rights, transparency, corruption, and other issues that pose implicit challenges to the state.

- NGOs, academics, and journalists in both authoritarian and more democratically ruled countries with natural resources–based developmental policies tend to view the state as the main threat to the environment and human security as a result of its continued focus on large-scale infrastructure projects, lack of transparency in governance, and corruption. Because of continued authoritarian rule by communist parties, these stakeholders seek to work within the system and the limitations imposed on the press and free speech.

Despite these important differences of perspective, most Southeast Asian intellectual elites and members of civil society tend to agree on a number of basic issues. Interlocutors from most groups acknowledge the broader and more generic causes
of NTS threats. These include the impact of globalization, poor or inadequate governance, inadequate human capacity, endemic corruption, and a low and possibly declining level of scientific knowledge.

Southeast Asians also widely accept the need for regional solutions to transboundary and NTS issues, but many, if not most, Southeast Asian interlocutors express skepticism about the possibility of addressing issues involving high-stakes national economic interests in regional frameworks such as ASEAN and subregional mechanisms such as the four-country Mekong River Commission (MRC) and the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) cooperative infrastructure development program led by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Major obstacles include concern for national sovereignty, the lack of political will and capacity, and the lack of enforcement mechanisms.

More fundamental are the high priority regional states attach to national sovereignty, no little amount of mutual suspicion and rivalry, and the limitations of ASEAN and other regional frameworks in resolving transboundary problems. Some are more optimistic about so-called Track 3 “people-to-people”–type meetings such as the ASEAN People’s Assembly, an association of civil society organizations initiated under the ASEAN-ISIS network. These meetings feature parallel communities of academics, think tank scholars, and activists who share certain assumptions and focus on NTS issues including haze, the underlying causes of terrorism, governance, corruption, human rights, and human security. Some participants at the Regional Voices: Transnational Challenges Bangkok workshop in September 2007 argued that Track 2 meetings were too influenced by the presence of bureaucrats and diplomats in their personal capacity, whose excessive adherence to “the ASEAN way” made them reluctant to speak frankly to their counterparts from other countries.

Civil society representatives criticize ASEAN for failing to deal with the severe problem of haze and acrid smoke caused by the deliberate setting of forest fires on Indonesia’s islands of Kalimantan and Sumatra. Long an annual dry season phenomenon, the problem reached record levels in 1997–98 as a consequence of an extended El Niño and the rapidly increasing burning of forests and peat for the creation of palm oil plantations, often by Malaysian-Chinese companies. The 1997–98 fires caused an estimated US$9 billion in suspended airline flights, business closures, health problems, and natural resources impacts. Fires in Kalimantan and Sumatra were almost as severe in 2005 and 2006, with smoke and haze in the latter year affecting visibility and health 2,500 miles downwind in Marianas and Guam in the South Pacific. Some Southeast Asian academics and civil society representatives argue that Track 2–type meetings, where officials participate only in their personal capacity, have been more productive than any of five ASEAN agreements, none of which has any provision for specific actions, enforcement, or consequences for noncompliance.
Governmental Attitudes

Governmental attitudes toward the NTS concept in Southeast Asia vary widely. The governments with the highest capacity and the greatest sense of vulnerability, especially Singapore and Malaysia, have generally embraced the concept and are open to the suggestions of research institutes and universities. These governments generally have accepted the concepts and ideas suggested by the NTS communities, including institutions which they support and which serve as sources of research, analysis, and policy advice.

Generally speaking, the less developed the country and the more authoritarian the government, the less the NTS concept is appreciated and viewed as a matter of urgency. There is also a hierarchy of governmental concerns. Depending on their capacity, most governments take seriously threats such as pandemic disease, uncontrolled labor migration, and cross-border crime. Environmental concerns are strongest in the most developed countries, which also tend to have the most extensive civil society. The idea of securitizing food or other aspects of human security remains a hard sell.

The governments of the more authoritarian countries tend to be firmly wedded to the desire to achieve rapid economic growth regardless of the cost to the environment and marginalized groups, which puts them at odds with NGOs and civil society. In addition, national leaders usually do not have a good understanding of environmental science and the sociological and socioeconomic impacts of the infrastructure projects they support.

Among the poorest countries with weak governance, low capacity, and corruption, concern about issues like human trafficking tends to be less about the human impact and suffering than fear that transborder criminal groups will become rival power centers in remote areas. These governments are also the least concerned about the rights and welfare of isolated and politically marginalized ethnic minorities.

Some NGOs and other civil society representatives argue that the leaders and bureaucratic decision makers in these countries could be open to more environmentally friendly and human security-oriented development approaches if they had a better understanding of the longer-term consequences of their policies. Unfortunately, this is not yet the case, even among leaders and decision makers who publicly have evinced concern about the consequences of unsustainable development and the threat posed by global warming. For instance, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen has expressed great concern about the threat from hydropower dams in China, Laos, and Vietnam, yet Cambodia is reported to be negotiating with China for the construction of a series of dams on the main stream of the Mekong River. The Vietnamese government is alarmed about the impact of upstream dams on the Mekong Delta but continues to carry out an ambitious dam-building program upstream in the Central Highlands.
Relationship to Global Warming

The depletion of fisheries, decimation of forests, and environmentally unsustainable development of hydropower already have become sources not only of transboundary impact but also of tensions both within and among Southeast Asian countries.

Rapid deforestation in Southeast Asia, often for the purpose of creating palm oil and rubber plantations, is having a global impact. The United Nations calculated in its annual Human Development Report for 2007 that because of rapid deforestation and the dry season burning of trees and peat bogs, Indonesia had become the largest net emitter of CO₂ after the United States and China.

Large hydropower dams may generate as much CO₂ as oil- and coal-burning thermal power stations because of the loss of tree cover, the methane generated by the rotting of trees and vegetation that have been inundated by the reservoirs, and the creation of microclimates over large reservoirs. Large dams also hold back silt (which seriously reduces their useful life) and affect the basic hydrology of the river system, which is the source of its productivity and biodiversity. Already dams and navigational enhancements have accelerated coastal flooding and the intrusion of saltwater into low-lying agricultural regions in lower Cambodia and Vietnam’s Mekong Delta, its “rice basket.” Jakarta in Indonesia faces a similar crisis as the result of the unsustainable depletion of the water table to support the needs of a fast-growing urban population.

Principal Drivers of NTS Threats: Competition for Scarce Energy, Food Resources, and Other Sea-Based Natural Resources

Conflicting claims to marine fisheries and undersea oil and gas reserves are increasing as the fish catches decline and the price of energy increases. China and its Southeast Asian neighbors have fundamentally incompatible methods for defining the boundaries of exclusive economic zones (EEZs). China’s assertion of a historical claim to nearly the whole of the South China Sea is at variance with established international rules. Yet even Southeast Asian countries that base their claims on established principles have disputes over boundaries.

South China Sea disputes have already generated harsh rhetoric and some non-violent confrontations involving China, Vietnam, and the Philippines, most notably the 1995 occupation of Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands by China, less than 80 miles off the Philippines coast. China and its ASEAN neighbors have agreed to a stand-still agreement and, in principle, the sharing of the fisheries and sea-based resources, but no concrete action has taken place to date. China and Vietnam have agreed to share the resources in contested parts of the Gulf of Tonkin, but to no visible result. In general, Vietnam and other littoral countries of the South China Sea feel at a great disadvantage in seeking a share of these resources because of China’s size and military power.
Southeast Asian fisheries experts also complain about the damage caused by the violation of EEZs by foreign factory fleets in the so-called Coral Triangle, an area of 5.2 million square kilometers ringed by Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak, on Borneo), Indonesia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Fiji, and Northern Australia. Coral reefs, which play a key role in nurturing fish populations and supporting biodiversity, are already under stress because of the warming of the world’s oceans, which interferes with chemical processes that are necessary for the reefs’ survival. The factory-scale international fishing fleets of Japan, China, Taiwan, and South Korea are said to be the prime offenders in the destruction of deep-sea coral and decimation of fish stocks in the Coral Triangle, but local fishers also have wreaked havoc on in-shore coral.

**Improved Regional Transportation Networks**

The rapid improvement in air, sea, road, and rail transportation, along with regional agreements to reduce trade barriers and promote tourism, have contributed to regional economic growth but also created new or greatly expanded vectors for diseases, uncontrolled transborder labor movement, and narcotics and human trafficking. As one unintended result of new road networks in Indonesia, often financed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank, Indonesian ports are clogged with illegally cut logs awaiting shipment to China, Malaysia, and global destinations.

The same process is occurring in the Mekong Basin as a consequence of the upgrading and expansion of regional road networks under the ADB-led Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) cooperative infrastructure development program. The GMS is one of the most ambitious programs of regional economic integration being promoted around the world by the World Bank and regional multilateral development banks (MDBs), including the ADB in the Mekong, the African Development Bank (ADB or AfDB) in sub-Saharan Africa, and the Inter-American Development Bank in the Amazon.

The vast bulk of the estimated US$31 billion final cost of the GMS involves three major transportation corridors and several spurs that link the five Mekong countries of Southeast Asia—Myanmar (Burma), Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam—to each other and to Kunming, the capital of China’s Yunnan Province, and the Quangxi Autonomous Region, which shares a long border with Vietnam. While promoting trade and economic integration, the same roads also have unintentionally opened up the lower Mekong Basin to increased illegal logging and polluting mining operations.

**Deforestation and Haze**

Apart from its contribution to global warming, deforestation is one of the biggest threats to human security in Southeast Asia. Especially in the poorest Southeast Asian countries, large numbers of people depend on the forests for food, fuel, and the raw material for tradable handmade goods.
Indonesia lost 30 percent of its primary forest between 1990 and 2005, while Cambodia lost 58 percent and Vietnam an astounding 77 percent during the same time period. Total deforestation, which takes into account degraded second- and third-growth forest, is less, but still in the range of 19–38 percent in the same countries.5

Most forest cutting in Indonesia and northern Laos currently is being carried out by commercial contractors to both harvest the logs and create palm oil and rubber plantations. Malaysian companies are prominently involved in cutting forests and creating these plantations in Indonesia, while Chinese companies predominate in northern Laos. In Laos, these plantations also are growing sources of water pollution.

Environmentalists and fisheries experts have also expressed dismay about what they see as Cambodia’s record of lawlessness and corruption in the seizure of

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**The Greater Mekong Subregion**

The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) is a cooperative development project led and substantially financed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). It is arguably the single most important infrastructure project in mainland Southeast Asia and has a substantial impact on nontraditional security. The GMS comprises Myanmar (Burma), Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and China (Yunnan Province and Guangxi Autonomous Region).

Launched in 1992, the GMS is one of the world’s largest regional economic infrastructure projects, with an estimated total cost of US$27.6 billion, about half of which will be financed or cofinanced by the ADB and the rest provided by Japan and other donors. The project has made great strides in its main objective of promoting basin-wide economic integration, but it has also been the object of criticism for failing to fulfill its principles of cooperative, environmentally sustainable, and equitable development.

The GMS involves nine sectors: transportation, energy, telecommunications, environment, human resource development, tourism, trade, private-sector investment, and agriculture. The lion’s share of GMS funding has been devoted to roads, bridges, railroads, and a regional power grid and telecommunications backbone in three transportation “corridors”:

- **North-South:** From Kunming, Yunnan’s capital, to Bangkok, with a multilane spur linking Kunming to Hanoi and Haiphong on the Tonkin Gulf
- **East-West:** From Da Nang on Vietnam’s South China Sea to Moulemein, Myanmar (Burma), on the Andaman Sea/Indian Ocean
- **Southern:** From Vung Tau on Vietnam’s southeastern coast to Bangkok, via Ho Chi Minh City and Phnom Penh

The road network will greatly boost trade and reduce shipping costs, times, and distances, but it will also facilitate illegal logging and unsustainable plantation cultivation, seriously diminish biodiversity, and facilitate movement of disease vectors, narcotics and human trafficking, and uncontrolled labor migration. International and Southeast Asian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also argue that the road network will benefit urban areas more than the countryside, creating a widening income gap. Environmentalists note that planners ignored the multiple ecosystems through which the transportation corridors run.
A number of European countries, principally France, have also contributed financing to the GMS, but mainly in sectors in which their companies are competitive, like telecommunications and hydropower. China is cofinancing, with Thailand, a bridge over the Mekong that will be the final link in the North-South Kunming-Bangkok highway; China is also constructing a section of highway in northern Laos. It is, however, a net recipient of GMS grants and loans for road and other development projects and, in economic and geopolitical terms, may prove to be the largest beneficiary of the GMS projects.

Financing of the GMS Cooperative Development Program
as of December 31, 2006 (US$ in millions)

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<thead>
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<th>ADB Cofinancing (1)</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Nordic Countries</th>
<th>Others (2)</th>
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<td>Hydropower</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>176.8</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>1452.5</td>
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<td>5.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<td>8.0</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td><strong>1245.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>460.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>204.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>17.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>2034.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) ADB loans and grants with supplemental third-party financing
(2) UN agencies, World Bank, European Investment Bank, OPEC Fund, various commercial banks, bilateral donors including Singapore, Thailand, and China Development Bank (only projects in China)
(3) Includes projects aimed at general development, subregional cooperation, telecommunications, and tourism

Japan—largest GMS contributor; US contributes to ADB generally, but not GMS specifically; China—beneficiary and contributor—US$30 million contributed, received US$17.95 billion in ADB loans


major tracts of forest land from the poorest of the poor, whose subsistence livelihoods depend on traditional access to forest resources. The Phnom Penh government likewise has failed to prevent the wholesale destruction of wetlands and coastal mangrove forests. The replacement of forests with plantations and the expansion of food production from irrigated fields is of little benefit to the dispossessed forest dwellers and fishing communities who have no alternative sources of income and livelihood.

Even political leaders in the most exploited parts of Southeast Asia are concerned about deforestation, but efforts thus far, such as bans on cutting in forest reserves and bans on the export of logs, have failed to have any significant impact because of an inadequate legal and enforcement regime and widespread corruption.
Unsustainable Hydropower Development

The rush to exploit the hydroelectric potential of the 2,880-kilometer long Mekong River and its tributaries also looms as a future source of conflict as well as a major threat to the human security of tens of millions of people who depend on the river and its tributaries for their livelihoods. In the longer term, there just isn’t enough water to meet every country’s development aspirations. Compared to other major river systems of the world, the Mekong remains relatively unspoiled, but this is changing fast. As many as 260 dams of various sizes are currently being planned or are under consideration. The effects of global warming, including the shrinkage of snow cover and the retreat of glaciers on the Tibetan Plateau, where the Mekong rises, is likely to exacerbate this problem. The potential for a future conflict over water resources cannot be ruled out.

All of the six Mekong Basin countries, including China, which controls the upper half of the river, view the Mekong’s waters as a “free” source of energy that can be used for both domestic consumption and export. Thailand, which already has tapped most of its hydropower capacity, now plays a leading role in the construction of dams in neighboring countries.

The five lower Mekong countries of Southeast Asia feel threatened by China’s construction of a massive eight-dam cascade of hydropower dams upstream in Yunnan Province and its blasting of rapids and shoals to facilitate navigation by ships carrying oil and other cargoes. These dams, including the world’s highest concrete arch dam nearing completion in the middle reaches of the river in Yunnan, raise and lower water levels without warning, erode river banks, and threaten to create on the Mekong River the kind of catastrophic ecological damage that the Three Gorges Dam has caused to the Yangtze. China (and Myanmar [Burma]) has thus far accepted only observer status in the four-country Mekong River Commission, which was created to promote cooperative and sustainable development of the river’s hydropower and irrigation potential.

The downstream countries have been unwilling to challenge China over the downstream environmental, economic, and human security costs of its projects because of the disparities of national power, dependency on Chinese economic assistance, and/or the prospect of greater access to the Chinese market. The lower Mekong countries have not shrunk from criticizing each other, however, and transboundary damage caused by upstream dams has begun to raise regional tensions. Cambodia has for some years complained to Laos and Vietnam over the construction of hydropower dams that have damaged downstream villages and threatened the critical “flood pulse” hydrology of the Tonle Sap River and Great Lake of Cambodia. The interaction of this unique hydrological phenomenon, with its seasonal extremes of flood and drought has made the lower Mekong the most biologically diverse and productive freshwater river after the Amazon. Its fisheries provide more than 70 percent of the animal protein consumed by more than 60 million people in southern Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam’s Mekong Delta.
Hydropower and Mekong Fisheries

*The dry[ing up] of the Tonle Sap, believe me, will not just affect Cambodia but the whole region. A study to look at the downstream impacts is urgently needed for the sustainability of resources management in the Mekong.*

—Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, 2003

The 800,000-square-kilometer Mekong Basin, roughly the size of the Lower Mississippi Basin of North America, rivals the Amazon as the world’s most productive and biologically diverse freshwater basin. The basin has at least 1,200 species of river fish and approximately three times the fish diversity of the Amazon per unit of catchment, considerably more than most coral reefs.

The 4,880-kilometer-long Mekong River (estimates vary), the tenth or eleventh longest in the world, rises in the Tibetan Plateau, tumbles through the high gorges of China’s Yunnan Province, and then borders or passes through five Southeast Asian countries before debouching into the South China Sea in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta. The Mekong and its Southeast Asian tributaries provide as much as 80 percent of the animal protein consumed by 70 or so million people, mainly in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam’s Mekong Delta. The river’s unique hydrology, which depends on extremes of wet and dry, and its annual monsoon “flood pulse” are keys to its immense productivity. Farming on river beds and banks during the dry season also plays a critical role in supplying vegetables and other crops at a time when other rural employment is scarce.

Scores of large dams are now under construction in China’s Yunnan Province, in Laos (which aspires to become the “battery” of Southeast Asia), and in Vietnam’s Central Highlands, seriously threatening the livelihoods and food security of millions of people, many of them indigenous minorities who are forced off their riverine homesteads. Thailand, with the biggest economy and highest energy demand in Southeast Asia, has already dammed most of its own rivers, but the state-owned Electrical Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) builds dams in Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar (Burma) and imports their electrical output under long-term purchase contracts. The severe ecological and environmental damage caused by these dams is being magnified by the absence of any transboundary cooperation or coordination.

China’s Yunnan cascade and its dredging of the river in northern Laos to facilitate navigation already pose an existential threat to thousands who live near the river because of rapid and unpredictable changes in the water level. Vietnam and Laos are building major dam cascades on three tributary rivers that are critical to fish reproduction in the middle reaches of the lower Mekong. Laos plans to build a dam at Khone Falls that will block the only one of the river’s 18 channels that is navigable year round by many species of fish on their way to their spawning grounds. The area below the falls currently is the last sanctuary of the endangered giant Mekong catfish and numerous other food species, as well as the freshwater Mekong dolphin. The loss of hundreds of millions of dollars worth of fish is just a small fraction of the total socioeconomic cost of poorly conceived hydropower projects, a fact that is causing increasing opposition by those most affected and their civil society advocates.

In its boldest move to date, Cambodia took Laos to task at a November 2007 meeting of the MRC over the Lao government’s plan to construct up to four hydropower dams on the lower Mekong near the Laos-Cambodia border. Cambodia is concerned that these dams, especially a proposed water diversion project at the Don Sahong (channel) in the Khone Falls area, will decimate fisheries. The Don Sahong is the only one of 18 such channels through the Khone Falls rapids that can be transited year round by migrating fish. Reportedly, Cambodia’s senior representative to the MRC declared, “At the moment this is just an initiative by Laos. When they begin to build [dams] we will stop them.”

This boast has less credibility because of Cambodia’s own ambitious hydropower development and irrigation projects that also reduce wetlands and fish populations. Environmentalists and some unnamed hydrology and fisheries experts at the MRC Secretariat have deplored Cambodia’s decision in late 2006 to sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the China Southern Power Grid Company to explore the feasibility of a dam on the Mekong’s main stream at Sambor, downstream from Laos’s proposed Don Sahong dam. Laos, for its part, has signed MOUs with Chinese engineering and power companies to conduct feasibility studies on three other mainstream dams.

In one of history’s more remarkable ironies, the mainstream dam projects that are the subject of separate bilateral negotiations between Chinese state-owned hydropower engineering and transmission companies were once part of a vast lower Mekong Basin development plan promoted by the United States during the early Cold War era, when concern for the environment was hardly in the hydropower engineering lexicon. Long moribund, the resurrection of these projects by Chinese companies not only poses the most serious threat yet to the environment and human security in the lower Mekong Basin, but also has troubling geopolitical implications.

Details regarding the proposed dams have not been publicly released, but the original scheme envisioned locks that would facilitate navigation from northern Laos to the South China Sea. The Chinese themselves have long dreamed of a water highway from Yunnan to the Sea.

THE STATE AS A THREAT TO HUMAN SECURITY

One of the most important common threads in discourse with Southeast Asian NGOs and social scientists is the role of the state itself as a threat to human security because of its preemption of land and natural resources and the traditional rights of ethnic minorities for development projects, and its poor stewardship of those resources. Especially in Laos, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines, the unscientific and unconstrained exploitation of natural resources has become a primary threat to human security. In many if not most cases, the exploitation has been carried out by foreign private contractors in league with corrupt officials. Illegal or inadequately regulated companies have ravaged forests and mineral-bearing lands,
created serious transboundary environmental pollution, and displaced tens of thousands of people from their lands and traditional sources of livelihood. Increasingly, the taking of traditional lands by the state and politically connected timber, mining, and hydropower interests has become a source of political instability.

Conflicting Roles of the Multilateral Development Banks and Aid Donor Countries

Although many of the development projects with environmentally unsustainable impacts are the result of governmental action or inaction, environmental and human security activists in Southeast Asia tend to have a highly jaundiced view of the MDBs and some donor countries. Most major economic infrastructure development projects involve a wide variety of actors, including the MDBs and donor countries that provide financing and the engineering and construction companies that carry out the projects. In the case of hydropower projects, the companies that supply key components such as pumps, turbines, and control systems often are promoted by their national governments, both through ODA grants and loans and through lobbying on the MDB boards on which they sit, and by state-owned utilities such the Electric Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), which finances projects in neighboring countries and buys the power for domestic use.

Japan and the Scandinavian countries provide large loans and grants to gain business for their companies. Ironically, these same countries are also among the largest providers of funding for environmental protection, though mainly for research and technical studies.

The banks are increasingly in an awkward position because of their embrace in the past two decades of public-private partnerships. In the case of the ADB and the World Bank, their mandate to promote environmentally sustainable development has been compromised by the resistance of governments to conducting credible environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and the banks’ desire to remain relevant. This has become more difficult as a result of the growing willingness of China to finance these projects and the internal politics of these organizations, in which borrowers are also shareholders.

The Limited but Growing Role and Influence of NGOs

NGOs and civil society organizations that promote environmental protection and human security are thriving in most Southeast Asian countries, with the exception of the most authoritarian countries, Laos and Myanmar (Burma). The impact of these organizations varies from country to country, but NGO representatives and members of research organizations say that governments pay little heed to them.

NGOs and other civil society organizations in Thailand are the most influential, partly because they (along with those in Singapore) are the most developed and democratic, and because the destruction of natural resources reached a point of equilibrium. Indonesian NGOs are increasingly active because of post-Suharto
democratization, but their impact is limited by widespread corruption and the ongoing devolution of government resources and functions to the provincial level.

Because of the strong role of the United Nations and the international community in bringing peace to Cambodia in the 1990s, the perspectives of NGOs, research institutes, and many senior government officials have been significantly influenced by global environmental and human security values. NGOs and research centers such as the Cambodian Development Research Institute, which receive support from major foundations, have had some success in working with the government.

Even in Vietnam, which still maintains a rigid system of Communist Party control, environmental and human security NGOs have had some success in working within the system in at least two ways. First, some organizations gain modest impact by serving as intermediaries between the public and the next higher echelon of government above corrupt local authorities. Second, they produce data and materials that can be used to influence government policy. Also, on issues such as large-scale hydropower development, the Vietnamese government’s alarm about the damage being done to the Mekong Delta has caused it to at least acknowledge that it is both an upstream and a downstream country.

The China Factor in Transnational Issues in Southeast Asia

China’s seemingly insatiable demand for natural resources and semi-processed industrial inputs has had a major negative influence on the unsustainable exploitation of national resources and development of energy resources in Southeast Asia. Especially because of its fast-growing energy needs, China has sought to expand its influence and involvement in the oil and gas sectors in Myanmar (Burma) and areas of the South China Sea, where Beijing has sought to advance territorial claims that are not in keeping with established international law.

China’s growing regional influence has been aided by the completion of all-weather roads and bridges connecting all parts of the Mekong region to each other and to China’s dynamic Yunnan Province, under the multi-billion-dollar GMS cooperative development program led and largely financed by the Manila-based ADB. The GMS project also includes the construction of a regional electric power grid, largely to facilitate the export of power by the least developed countries, such as Laos and Cambodia, to Thailand and Vietnam. Some unintended negative consequences of expanded transportation infrastructure and economic dislocations have included the rise of illegal labor migration, human trafficking, and the spread of HIV/AIDS and diseases with pandemic potential such as SARS and avian flu.

China is hardly the main cause of transboundary issues in Southeast Asia, but problems such as deforestation, overfishing, and the environmental damage caused by China’s search for energy and national resources cannot be solved without Beijing’s cooperation. Chinese companies engaged in extractive industries in Myanmar (Burma), Laos, and Cambodia are widely viewed as enjoying the sup-
port and encouragement of Beijing and Kunming. Changing its current approach would be a major element of China’s emergence as a “responsible stakeholder.”

**UNDERLYING OBSTACLES TO ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY**

Southeast Asian interlocutors generally cite three underlying factors as the main causes of the environmentally unsustainable development of natural resources and energy in Southeast Asia, and the resulting impact on human security. These are problems of governance, corruption, and human capacity. All of them interact with one another.

**Governance**

Especially in the less developed countries of Southeast Asia, governance is regularly cited as a major underlying problem. Many Southeast Asian observers and analysts cite the inability of regional countries to formulate and carry out sound development policies. Laos and, to a lesser extent, Cambodia do not have adequate governance capacity and the technical knowledge to properly manage major projects. Even in the most authoritarian of the less developed Southeast Asian countries, the central governments have remarkably limited control over lower levels of administration and weak mechanisms for financial management. In Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, for instance, many poorly conceived and environmentally damaging hydropower projects are carried out locally, sometimes even without the awareness of the central government.

One problem for the CLV countries (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) is their adoption of the Chinese model of economic liberalization, coupled with the continued dominance of the Communist Party. As in China, the efforts of senior officials to defuse potentially destabilizing abuses by local authorities, such as the expropriation of land, are undercut by low-level party officials and politically connected bureaucrats. The improvement of governance has long been an area of emphasis by the MDBs and bilateral aid donors, but the results thus far have been modest at best.

**Corruption**

Rampant corruption, which is the single most mentioned complaint by Southeast Asians, undermines governance as well as the legitimacy of governance and creates great harm to human security. Corruption is a complex problem that defies easy solution. Among Southeast Asians, corruption is the most frequently cited obstacle to sustainable development. For instance, Laos, Indonesia, Cambodia, Vietnam, and other countries ban the cutting and export of logs. Yet long lines of log-laden trucks are common at crossing points on Laos’s borders with China, Vietnam, and Thailand. Indonesian ports handle millions of tons of logs, almost
all of them cut illegally by Chinese and Malaysian-Chinese companies. NGOs in Southeast Asia complain that big commercial contractors operate with impunity, while local villagers, who traditionally depend on the forests for food, firewood, and energy, are arrested for minor infractions. The lack of an adequate legal system and fragmented law enforcement responsibility, coupled with corruption, makes it impossible for governments to enforce their edicts.

Corruption also undermines already inadequate programs to relocate and provide compensation to thousands of Southeast Asians—most often, ethnic and tribal minority groups—who are displaced by the construction of hydropower dams, highways, and other economic infrastructure. Many NGOs in Southeast Asia organize protests and petition the government and the multilateral banks which help design and finance the projects. Yet efforts by the MDBs in particular to promote the adoption of credible plans for relocation and compensation are undermined by corruption, leaving those displaced from their villages and homes more impoverished than ever.

**Human Capacity, Including Insufficient Technical and Scientific Understanding**

A number of Southeast Asian interlocutors at the Bangkok workshop decried what they described as a broad decline in the scientific and technological capacities of many Southeast Asian nations. While all of the countries have the legitimate right to develop their national forest, mineral, fishery, and water resources to promote economic development, poorly conceived projects are producing environmental and ecological damage that is worse by several magnitudes than is necessary.

Most Southeast Asian political leaders and bureaucratic decision makers lack sufficient scientific and technical understanding to make good decisions. Some NGOs in the least developed Southeast Asian countries express cautious optimism that governments and leaders might be prepared to adopt more environmentally friendly development policies if they were better informed about the adverse long-term consequences of environmentally unsustainable development projects. The rationale for these hopes is a belief that most authoritarian governments do not consciously make decisions about infrastructure projects that will eventually backfire and undermine their legitimacy.

The more optimistic regional interlocutors assume that leaders and bureaucratic decision makers of the Mekong Basin countries generally understand that dams do environmental damage and that some unique species such as the giant Mekong catfish and freshwater dolphin have already been pushed to the edge of extinction. They may generally understand this basis of opposition to controversial projects such as large hydropower dams, but they appear to not grasp or not be willing to consider the full environmental and socioeconomic costs of these projects. In
many cases, they also lack the ability to control smaller but highly damaging projects in provinces and districts that are dominated by local oligarchs or party bosses who may be outside their effective control.

**Urban Bias**

NGO and other civil society representatives and social scientists also decry the inherent urban bias in governmental decision making and development projects. In Southeast Asia, as in most developing regions, economic, social, and political elites tend to be urban based, and policies are formulated largely with urban constituencies in mind. NGOs and civil society groups give low credibility to the “anti-poverty” rationales for major infrastructure projects supported by the ADB, the World Bank, and bilateral donors. They point out that Laos’s hydroelectric power is almost entirely exported for hard currency earnings, leaving displaced villagers themselves without electric power. Most of the output of China’s dams in Yunnan Province is used to meet the growing energy needs of Guangdong and other coastal provinces, as well as Kunming, the provincial capital. Because of corruption and poor project design, some environmental and human security–oriented NGOs claim that the 70 or more percent of the people in developing countries who live in rural areas seldom see any benefit from development projects, and many end up in the slums of cities as day laborers and prostitutes.

**Energy Issues**

Governments in Southeast Asia are very concerned about meeting their growing energy needs or producing energy for export. The less developed countries look primarily to their own natural resources, especially oil and gas deposits and hydropower. Rising energy prices are a burden, even for energy-rich countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, because they have developed to the point where they consume more energy than they produce. The region still has a number of energy bottlenecks, such as the scarcity of oil-refining capacity, which is mainly centered in Singapore.

Most Southeast Asian governments simply cannot afford to invest in energy security. To the extent that they cooperate on energy security, it is only tangential—for instance, the cooperation of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia on anti-piracy and anti-terrorism patrols in the Strait of Malacca and adjacent waters.

**The Inadequacy of Current Institutions for Regional Cooperation**

To date, frameworks for regional cooperation such as ASEAN, the MRC, and the GMS cooperative development program have largely failed to deal with environmental and human security threats. Southeast Asian interlocutors express dismay over ASEAN’s continued commitment to the “ASEAN way” of consensus decision making and polite discourse. Indonesia, the main source of haze from forest
and peat burning, has not even acceded to the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution.

With regard to the rush to build hydroelectric power dams, the member countries of the MRC have refused even to provide transparency regarding their dam projects, let alone cooperate for the environmentally sustainable and equitable development of hydropower. Myanmar (Burma), with extensive hardwood forests and large reserves of fossil fuels and hydroelectric power potential, effectively remains outside any regional cooperation framework.

Interlocutors from the Philippines and Indonesia expressed serious concern about the rapid depletion of marine life and the destruction of coral from offshore drag nets used in commercial-scale fishing, the use of dynamite and cyanide for inshore fishing, and pollution. The Coral Triangle includes the 200-mile EEZs of six countries—Indonesia, East Timor, the Philippines, Malaysia (the states of Sabah and Sarawak on Borneo), Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. Some call the area the “epicenter” of global marine life productivity and biodiversity. Under the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI), proposed by Indonesia and launched at the 2007 APEC meeting in Sydney, the six countries committed to cooperate to preserve the coral reefs. However, while the CTI calls for a number of specific actions, it has no mechanism for cooperation or holding countries accountable for their commitments.

**Prospects**

The prospects for near-term improvement in the unsustainable consumption of natural resources and the attendant socioeconomic and sociopolitical impacts are not at all promising. To date, efforts to promote cooperation on the environment and sustainable development have been largely undermined by the litany of limitations—inadequate governance and human capacity, corruption, nationalism, and a single-minded focus on resources-based economic development. Most trend lines are going in the wrong direction.

Because of the major share of both carbon sources and carbon-absorbing forests and seas in mainland Southeast Asia and the Malay Archipelago, the region will continue to be a major contributor to global warming. By one calculation, 30 percent of the world’s sequestered carbon is locked up in Indonesia’s widespread peat bogs. The dry-season burning of these bogs not only eliminates their absorptive role, but releases the most concentrated sources of carbon into the atmosphere.

Understanding of transboundary and NTS issues remains narrowly located among regional intellectual elites. Some of them remain more focused on securitizing the issues than on the human security dimension, but in general there has been considerable growth in parallel regional intellectual communities with expertise in specific NTS issues. NGOs have growing visibility, but in the less developed countries especially, they still receive little positive attention from governmental policy makers.
The prospect for positive action in the medium term could be more promising if only because the impacts of unsustainable development practices and global warming are becoming increasingly apparent. In time, the warnings of environmentalists and advocates of human security may be based on demonstrable evidence. By that time, however, Southeast Asian societies may have undergone wrenching and possibly destabilizing adjustments. The Mekong Delta, for instance, may shrink drastically and no longer serve as Vietnam’s “rice basket” and export earner.

Some trends cause knowledgeable Southeast Asians great anxiety. These include the still rapid growth of fish farming on every feasible bit of coastline. Similarly, deforestation and environmentally and socioeconomically unsustainable dam construction seem unstoppable, at least until—as in Thailand—only small stands of forest are left for national parks and nature preserves and all of their rivers have been dammed.

One especially troubling aspect of this gloomy scenario is that most of the countries that depend on the exploitation of natural resources for development simply do not have the necessary other-factor endowments or a sufficiently educated workforce to reach Thailand’s level of prosperity—especially since Thailand itself has prospered to a significant degree because of its exploitation of its economic hinterland, in the territory of its less developed neighbors.

In both the medium and the long term, the question is whether political leaders and bureaucratic decision makers will be able to understand the science and other practical aspects of the problem and take action. Another major question is whether there are sufficient time and resources to make major course corrections before tipping points are reached, beyond which new paradigms for societies and economies will evolve of necessity.

It would be helpful if the multilateral development banks could play a stronger role in promoting sustainable development. Unfortunately, the MDBs worldwide continue to put most of their resources into infrastructure development, and their environmental and human capacity–building efforts are playing a losing game of catch-up.

Apart from the environmental and global warming threats, there is also a distinct possibility that what are currently viewed as nontraditional security issues could become sources of traditional conflict. For instance, with the melting of the snow and ice cap in the Tibetan Plateau, coupled with the uncoordinated development of hydropower dams on major Mekong tributaries in Laos and Vietnam, there simply may not be enough water to go around. Likewise, future conflict in the South China Sea over fisheries and seabed resources is well within the realm of possibility. Moreover, if the deterioration of human security and resources scarcity should exceed the capacity of some countries’ “social contracts,” the resulting political upheaval could generate nationalistic impulses that might be difficult to manage within the existing regional framework.
Disease outbreaks have threatened the stability of states and societies throughout human history as the constant companions of war and commonplace barriers to travel and trade. In the last century, steady advances in understanding the sources and spread of infectious diseases fostered increasingly successful public health interventions, culminating in the global eradication of naturally occurring smallpox in 1977. Although creating public health infrastructure—from water and sanitation systems to disease surveillance networks—requires significant resources and organization at every level of government, such efforts tangibly improve the quality and length of life for entire populations. Nations that have substantially reduced their infectious disease burdens have a powerful motivation to protect their vital interests against imported health threats. More than a century ago, the world’s maritime powers negotiated the first international treaty to prevent the spread of infectious diseases at ports of entry without hampering free trade. Although the regime’s emphasis on a few historically important diseases rendered it obsolete in an era of changing health risks, this demonstration of international public health cooperation for mutual benefit laid the foundations for the current global health regulatory framework and the creation of the World Health Organization (WHO).¹

Paradoxically, the low profile of successful public health programs often undermines social and political commitment to continued investment in their maintenance. With the eradication of smallpox and the restriction of once ubiquitous scourges such as cholera, polio, and measles primarily to the developing world, policy makers in resource-rich nations developed a sense of invulnerability about disease threats. The focus of international public health cooperation shifted from protecting national interests to providing development aid or humanitarian assistance, areas much more susceptible to budget cuts and political pressures. At the same time, structural adjustment policies imposed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund as conditions for refinancing debts or obtaining new loans indirectly encouraged borrower governments to cut spending on public health and other social programs. Cumulatively, these conditions eroded the capacity of public health systems around the world to respond to unexpected threats.

The eruption of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the 1980s hinted at the scope of this miscalculation. New economic theories looked beyond the humanitarian aspects of
the AIDS crisis to link poor population health, stagnant economic progress, and socio-political instability, suggesting that HIV/AIDS and other persistent health threats could undermine already fragile states and decimate forces responsible for maintaining regional security. The 2003 outbreak of SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) and the ongoing spread of an avian influenza strain with pandemic potential emphasized the vulnerability of even highly developed nations to emerging infections in an age of rapid travel and economic interdependence. Emerging and re-emerging infections include diseases that are newly recognized, have spread to new populations, or have acquired new traits (such as antibiotic resistance) that enhance their virulence. According to WHO, investigators discovered an average of one emerging infection of public health importance each year from 1973 to 2002.

Policy makers and analysts increasingly include emerging infections and health status in critical regions in a growing list of nontraditional security challenges—threats to national political, economic, or social interests that require more than state-centered military solutions. Renewed awareness that individual nations, regardless of resources, cannot insulate themselves effectively against transnational health threats has encouraged governments to strengthen and expand mechanisms for supranational cooperation in detecting and containing potential crises. However, integrating public health issues—managed for decades by stakeholders almost entirely disengaged from national security mechanisms—into the security framework remains challenging. This paper examines health security issues in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. All three regions confront new public health challenges, such as disease outbreaks with pandemic potential and external pressures to avert such crises, against a background of extremely varied state capacities, past health governance failures, and ongoing tensions about the role of the state in providing basic public health services.

**Public Health: The Traditional Role of the State**

Public health interventions comprise efforts to promote health at the population level through measures such as sanitation, pest control, and vaccination rather than curative clinical care. Although public health research can improve the effectiveness and accessibility of health services, success in preventing diseases or injuries also relies on engineering, education, environmental safety, nutrition, and other nonmedical sectors. Even before the turn of the twentieth century, decision makers in growing US and European cities sought new tools to alleviate the periodically deadly epidemics that accompanied urbanization. Early successes demonstrated that basic public health services organized and supported by the state can mitigate the worst societal impacts of rapid economic change.

Most functional states now develop national public health policies, using external technical guidance to augment indigenous expertise. National policies consistent with international standards contribute to economies of scale for goods and services, reducing the costs of technologies such as vaccines and facilitating skills transfer.
Responsibility for implementing these policies varies with political system, cultural factors, and resources, but generally demands engagement by state or provincial and local officials. Effective public health systems promote economic growth directly by freeing human capital (reducing the numbers of acutely or chronically ill workers at any given time) and indirectly (avoiding the need to divert resources and human power to caring for ill dependents). Preventing rather than treating infections reduces the burden on the clinical health sector, which tends to benefit poorer communities and individuals disproportionately.

Nonstate actors play a significant role in shaping public health policies at every level. Bilateral aid, including funding and technical assistance with concomitant policy demands, comprises a significant portion of international public health cooperation. United Nations (UN) organizations, the World Bank, and other international development institutions support public health capacity–building efforts ranging from specific disease control projects to meeting the global health targets set by the Millennium Development Goals. WHO, a specialized agency of the United Nations dedicated to “the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health,” marshals technical resources to develop the framework for global health campaigns, establish norms and standards, provide technical assistance to governments and other stakeholders, articulate a global health research agenda, compile data on disease incidence and health indicators, and coordinate international outbreak detection and response activities. WHO administers programs through six regional offices, which frequently divide geographically contiguous areas for historical rather than pragmatic reasons. International and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provide public health services, policy analysis, and advocacy. Public-private partnerships supported partially by large-scale philanthropy, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, have become increasingly important donors, steering public health policies by funding disease control projects through national or local governments. Recent unprecedented increases in funding for global public health have allowed governmental and nongovernmental organizations to tackle health threats on a level unimaginable only a few years ago. However, the proliferation of donors focused primarily on specific diseases, with distinct methodologies and accountability demands, creates new burdens and tensions for recipient nations.

PUBLIC HEALTH PROFILES: A REGIONAL OVERVIEW

Southeast Asia

For the purposes of this paper, Southeast Asia includes Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Unsurprisingly, differences in health status, accessibility and quality of health systems, and public health infrastructure mirror the wide variation in economic development among these nations. At the extremes, total life expectancy at birth in 2002 ranged from about 55 years in Cambodia and Laos to 79 years in Singapore.
Malaria, tuberculosis, and other endemic infectious diseases remain a serious challenge in the less developed nations and in rural areas of the middle-tier economies. The densely populated urban centers face increasing rates of chronic noncommunicable diseases (such as cardiovascular disease), accidents, and water-, air-, and food-borne hazards. Both urban and rural areas throughout the region have seen a resurgence of the mosquito-borne dengue virus. Even in the middle-tier nations, where general health status has improved with economic growth, causes of morbidity and mortality vary widely with geography (especially in Indonesia and the Philippines) and socioeconomic status, particularly for migrant populations. The region faces a still evolving HIV/AIDS epidemic, with pockets of high prevalence among vulnerable, often highly mobile, populations. In Vietnam and Indonesia, nascent HIV/AIDS epidemics may still be contained before they explode from high-risk groups (intravenous drug users and commercial sex workers) into the general population, but internal cultural obstacles and conditions limiting “harm reduction” practices imposed on programs receiving US foreign aid complicate containment efforts. After a period of denial in the early 1990s, Thailand’s government launched a notable effort to reverse a burgeoning HIV/AIDS epidemic, reducing disease prevalence to less than 2 percent.\(^7\)

Climate, economics, trade and travel patterns, and the resulting proximity of humans to animal and insect disease vectors combine to make Southeast Asia particularly vulnerable to emerging infections. Although the 2003 SARS epidemic affected East Asia more directly, its effects vividly demonstrated to policy makers in Southeast Asia that the impact of emerging infections cannot be measured in mortality alone. Despite causing fewer than 800 deaths worldwide, estimates place the cost of SARS to Southeast and East Asia at US$18–60 billion in direct expenditures, lost tourism and business, and slowed economic development.\(^8\) The SARS outbreak created political momentum toward regional cooperation on public health emergencies within a comprehensive security framework, and this momentum has been maintained by periodic and economically disastrous outbreaks of highly pathogenic \(H5N1\) avian influenza throughout the region. However, effective regional coordination strategies remain strained by wide variations in state capacities and by difficulties in reshaping institutions designed as tools for economic cooperation into conduits for sharing and responding to health data. Many regional diplomatic efforts have focused on limiting the cross-border movement of animal disease vectors. In contrast, questions of health security for highly mobile human populations (including large expatriate labor forces and displaced persons) continue to be addressed nationally or locally rather than regionally. Efforts to provide basic and emergency health services to these marginalized groups frequently rely on civil society.

WHO divides Southeast Asian nations between two regional offices (Southeast Asia and Western Pacific), reducing the efficiency of external coordination. The region has received large amounts of international public health aid to fight specific diseases (such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria) as well as humanitarian aid.
for the 2004 tsunami disaster. Recent external interest in strengthening regional capacity to detect and contain potentially pandemic influenza has prompted an outpouring of private and public sector resources for disease surveillance systems.

Middle East or Southwest Asia

The Middle East in this paper includes Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen. The health profile of the region also reflects wide disparities in health status based not only on national capacities, but on socioeconomic class and immigration status. Tremendous resources allow the economically dynamic oil-producing Gulf states to import health expertise—or even outsource medical demand—without developing the local academic research and training centers necessary for self-sustaining public health systems. Nonetheless, steadily improving health indicators for citizens in these nations (with life expectancies commensurate with the rest of the developed world) evince the rapid development of adequate, if paternalistic, government-funded health systems. This stands in marked contrast to neighboring Yemen, where life expectancy at birth is less than 63 years. In the middle-income Levant states, severely uneven health systems and a paucity of sustainable, locally supported preventive public health services have fostered a growing private market for expensive curative healthcare, placing a disproportionate burden on the poor and leaving a gap to be filled by nonstate actors.

In 2006, total fertility rates in the region ranged from 2.5 children per woman in Bahrain to more than 6 in Yemen, where complications of pregnancy and childbirth remain a leading cause of death. Although fertility has declined throughout the region in recent years, comparatively high birth rates in the Levant still contribute to a skewed age demographic, with large and relatively youthful populations whose needs exceed available labor opportunities and resources. Although reproductive health matters are among the most pressing public health concerns in the region, population issues continue to be addressed primarily through labor-export agreements and national measures, rather than through regional family planning campaigns. Health status indicator reporting throughout the region rarely reflects the dramatic variations in public health services and infrastructure accessible to urban and rural communities, to religious or ethnic minorities, and to the large expatriate labor populations in the Gulf states. Most of the Gulf states partially or completely exclude these migrants from government-supported health services.

HIV/AIDS prevalence remains low in the Middle East, especially when compared to the noncommunicable disease burden related to tobacco use, chronic diseases such as cardiovascular conditions and diabetes, and accidents. However, trading patterns and uneven disease control measures at ports and borders render the region extremely vulnerable to imported animal diseases, including those that cross into the human population directly or via insect vectors. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have experienced outbreaks of H5N1 avian influenza in poultry, with dozens of
human cases in Egypt. Despite growing awareness of the problem, few states in the region have devoted significant resources to preparing for public health crises, and neither transparent sharing of health data nor pandemic planning have occurred beyond the subregional level. To date, regional cooperation on disease control has depended substantially on the expectation that wealthy nations will subsidize outbreak containment efforts to protect their own interests. For example, Saudi Arabia dedicates significant resources to preventing disease outbreaks during the annual Hajj. When the first epidemic of Rift Valley fever (a livestock disease transmissible to humans directly or via mosquitoes) outside Africa occurred on the Arabian Peninsula in 2000, the Saudi government conducted a cross-border vector control campaign in affected parts of neighboring Yemen. In 2007, the Saudi government pledged significant funds to Yemen’s malaria eradication efforts and set about galvanizing the other Gulf states to contribute similarly. In contrast to Southeast and South Asia, the contiguous states of the Middle East (with the exception of Israel) fall into one WHO administrative region, allowing viable external regional health coordination.

South Asia

In this paper, South Asia refers to Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Health status in South Asia also varies widely based on socioeconomic, cultural, and rural-urban disparities. However, overall health indicators among nations in this region are almost identical. (The exception is Sri Lanka, where the total life expectancy of more than 70 years exceeds that in any neighboring nation by almost a decade. Sri Lanka’s per capita total health expenditures also exceed any neighbors’ two- to three-fold.) Governments throughout the region face similar challenges, such as high levels of maternal and child mortality, endemic malaria and tuberculosis, food- and water-borne disease outbreaks exacerbated by urban crowding, poor nutrition, frequent natural disasters, industrial accidents, and an emerging problem with noncommunicable diseases such as diabetes and cardiovascular ailments. Both India and Pakistan struggle with profoundly uneven implementation of public health measures at the provincial and community levels, resulting in public perceptions of health governance failures and poor accountability. India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan struggle to ensure safe water supplies in rural and urban areas. Although statistics are unreliable, the proportion of the population with access to safe water appears to fall to 10 percent or less in remote provinces of Pakistan; the private sector has proved no more reliable, as testing has shown contamination in almost 40 percent of commercially bottled water in Pakistan’s cities.

Pakistan has reported the only case of human H5N1 influenza in South Asia to date, although poultry outbreaks have also occurred in Bangladesh and India. The region is certainly no stranger to periodic and devastating epidemics. Due to its geographical, political, and social complexity, India proved to be one of the most challenging nations to the WHO smallpox eradication campaign and remains
one of the few nations in the world with endemic polio and regular cholera outbreaks. A 1994 epidemic of plague in India precipitated the flight of hundreds of thousands of refugees (with subsequent border closings by neighboring nations), accusations of biological warfare against a local separatist group that exacerbated internal and external religious tensions, and estimated costs of US$1.8 billion in lost trade and tourism. This incident illustrates obstacles to regional disease surveillance and response strategies stemming from weak intra- and international cooperation and unresolved intra-regional conflicts.

WHO divides South Asia among two regional offices, grouping Afghanistan and Pakistan with the Middle East and the other nations with Southeast and East Asia. The region has received relatively large amounts of external public health assistance for specific disease threats, as well as emergency and humanitarian aid in response to the 2004 tsunami, the 2005 South Asian earthquake, the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, and numerous floods, cyclones, and other natural disasters in Bangladesh.

**Providing Basic Services—the Consequences of Failure**

The failure of states to confront endemic disease burdens and health crises effectively does not represent a new phenomenon. Such failures can result from absolute lack of capacity due to insufficient resources or technical capabilities, or from poor public health governance stemming from causes that range from mismanagement to corruption. However, globalization and increasingly broad access to information have changed the popular perception of state obligations to provide public health and other basic services. Put simply, populations appear far more sensitive to state failures to address social problems such as serious public health challenges and more motivated to migrate to areas where public health and other basic services appear adequate. Inadequate state reactions to public health demands fall into predictable patterns that cross all three regions:

- **Official unawareness of health threats.** Governments around the world (even those with adequate resources) tend to neglect health issues such as HIV/AIDS as long as the problem remains confined to marginalized populations and the direct costs of confronting the problem in the short term exceed political palatability. Thailand’s early denial of its growing HIV/AIDS problem until the increasingly obvious epidemic threatened tourism and economic growth exemplifies a resource-saving mechanism not limited to the developing world. Characterization of both endemic and epidemic disease threats requires appropriate disease surveillance systems, which can be technically difficult to achieve even when costs present no barrier. Failure to collect data on disease prevalence can absolve governments—at least temporarily—of acting on disease threats until they become enormous in scope or cross borders. However, this failure also leaves governments open
to charges of lack of transparency and accountability once threats become obvious, as in the case of SARS in China. In developing nations, failure to detect health threats may result from a simple lack of state capacity rather than deliberate policy actions. For example, the inability to detect H5N1 avian influenza outbreaks in poultry in Cambodia, Laos, and rural areas of Indonesia before they spill over borders or into urban areas can be seen as the inevitable result of weak public health infrastructure. When disclosure will most likely lead to economic damage (such as bans of livestock imports), or in the absence of practical solutions to specific public health challenges (such as a comprehensive strategy and sufficient resources to compensate backyard-poultry owners for the loss of their flocks to preemptive disease control culling measures), governments have little incentive, aside from external pressures, to invest in disease surveillance infrastructure.

- **Urbanization of public health.** Governments in all three regions have pursued a strategy of consolidating basic services, including public health infrastructure, in urban areas to promote cost-effectiveness through economies of scale. This strategy can mitigate concerns about uneven public health program implementation in the immediate wake of decentralization of services (a common phenomenon throughout all three regions) to provincial or local governments. However, this strategy can perpetuate rural-to-urban migration stresses, intensifying social and economic dislocation of migrant populations that are frequently already poor and marginalized. Resulting urban growth can exceed economic viability, inflate joblessness, and exacerbate already difficult public health challenges in densely populated urban areas. Slums, where all the problems of poverty (e.g., poor access to safe water and food, high incidence of infectious diseases, and increased accidents and violence) are magnified, feature prominently in the metropolises of all three regions.

- **Reluctance to encourage individual risk management.** Successful disease prevention campaigns rely, at least in part, on education that empowers individuals to diminish their own health risks (e.g., by eliminating tobacco use, treating water to remove pathogens and impurities, using effective insect control techniques, and deliberately spacing childbirths). Authoritarian regimes, as well as politically or ideologically motivated nonstate actors determined to supply basic services when states fail in their obligations, may deliberately refrain from promoting public health measures that encourage self-determination, literacy, and increasing demands on government services. This averts the conflation of individual health awareness with issues of civil rights, freedom, and citizenship, especially for marginalized populations. Cultural factors, such as serenity or fatalism, may also play a role by diminishing public curiosity about emerging and existing public health issues.

- **Deliberate government ceding of the provision of basic services.** In all three regions, but particularly in South Asia and the Middle East, governments have increasingly abdicated the provision of basic goods and services, including education and public health, to nonstate actors. With the exception
South Asian states tend to regard public health systems and safe water as services rather than basic rights, a paradigm reinforced by international institutions that frame public health as a commodity to be managed and distributed. Such policies ostensibly encourage more economically efficient provision of services by the private sector. Although the private sectors in less developed nations of both regions may be willing to exploit the commercial opportunities freely, they lack the capacity to deliver goods and services at necessary levels. Increasing government reliance on uneven private sector providers frequently exaggerates two-tiered health systems, in which the costs of curative care necessitated by inadequate preventive health services disproportionately burden poor and migrant populations. Both India and Thailand also manifest a variant of withdrawal from public services with the promotion of “medical tourism,” or the commercial provision of highly skilled medical care aimed almost exclusively at foreign consumers (including Gulf state residents). While these industries do not directly subvert health services intended as public goods, they do divert the limited resource of health expertise from the public sector into profitable private sector care that the majority of citizens cannot afford, effectively creating internal brain drain. Saudi Arabia intends to concentrate medical services for tourists in deliberately centralized entrepreneurial centers through its planned “economic cities” project.

Obviously, states in all three regions face complex health security challenges. Real or perceived failures in meeting health security needs can stem from lack of state capacity to provide necessary services, governance failures that impede effective delivery of services, or policies deliberately designed to evade costly measures that could spare relatively unvalued human lives. When state capacity (or will) to deliver basic public health services decreases as public awareness increases, concerns about governance can create serious tensions between the state and civil society. In the worst case, these deficiencies can exacerbate conditions in densely populated cities filled with displaced persons (whether internal migrants or immigrants) who perceive that they have been neglected or even abandoned by the government, and who are open to any promises of effective alternative leadership. History has demonstrated that these circumstances can foster instability and outbreaks of political violence, as during the cholera riots that once rocked Europe and Asia.

**Disaster and Health Crisis Preparedness and Response**

Public sensitivity to state failures also extends to concerns about disaster preparedness, mitigation, and response. In the past five years, South and Southeast Asian nations have experienced disasters ranging from the tsunami catastrophe and major earthquakes to smaller (but still deadly) incidents involving floods, landslides, industrial accidents, urban fires, and even the annual haze that drifts from controlled burns in Indonesia to blanket Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. These
incidents reveal weaknesses in state planning, response, and regulatory capabilities, usually rapidly and dramatically, providing citizens with direct evidence of governance failures at the community level.

Although disasters tend to motivate generous humanitarian responses from the international community, their impacts frequently persist long after donor commitments and the goodwill these commitments engendered among local recipients (the halo effect) have been exhausted. For example, many already marginalized people, including ethnic/religious minorities, displaced by the tsunami in areas of Thailand, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka remain dislocated years later due to the disproportionate loss of primary caregivers and essentially insurmountable legal and pragmatic barriers to restoring former livelihoods. As a result, community composition, demands on public services and resources, and productivity levels may have changed permanently throughout the regions. In Bangladesh, the confluence of geography and weather patterns exaggerated by climate change practically guarantees that natural disasters will occur with increasing frequency. In the absence of strengthened state capacity for managing the health and social aspects of disasters, and without national and regional approaches for accommodating the small but permanent changes in land habitability, social structure, and economic prospects likely to follow, each crisis is likely to ripple through the region in the form of refugees seeking jobs and basic public services. Refugee movements can only exacerbate existing tensions in India and other neighboring nations over irregular migration from Bangladesh, already framed as a national security problem, in an example of low politics becoming high politics.

Political elites and an increasingly informed public in the more developed economies of all three regions have begun to demand government accountability for the management of public health crises, particularly those perceived as the predictable results of human behavior or environmental damage. In response, the governments of Singapore and Thailand have developed comprehensive all-hazards disaster preparedness strategies calculated to earn political capital as well as protect economic interests during emergencies. Far more concerted efforts and coordination will be needed to expand these plans into a network capable of promoting true regional resiliency, and South Asia and the Middle East lag in embracing resiliency concepts. In this age of globalization and interdependent economies, a lack of regional planning for the public health consequences of disasters may threaten global economic security.

**FILLING THE GAPS: OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONS AND EXTERNAL AGENDAS**

State failures to provide basic public health services—whether the result of lack of capacity, governance deficiencies, or deliberate policy decisions—create opportunities for outside organizations to secure influence by filling previously unmet needs. Organizations that supplement or supplant state delivery of public health
services include other governments, local or international civil society (including politically or ideologically motivated organizations), and multilateral institutions. In the short term, nonstate actors can compensate for a lack of public health systems, alleviating suffering and averting potential health crises. In the long run, these actions can absolve governments of the obligation to provide services by obscuring governance failures and create self-perpetuating funding cycles that channel resources into NGOs or the private sector, resulting in permanent loss of state capacity.

Lebanon provides one example of how governance failures and lack of state capacity to supply basic public health services can result in an increasing receptiveness among disaffected populations to any organization capable of delivering critical services, even if that organization is motivated primarily by political or ideological goals. During the 2006 military conflict in Lebanon, governments and multinational and nongovernmental organizations pledged humanitarian aid, including public health services to support overtaxed local health systems. Most of these efforts were transient by design. In contrast, Hezbollah secures popular support and political advantage by supplementing public health services on an ongoing basis, while subverting opportunities for individual empowerment by encouraging behavior modification in the name of religion rather than education about personal risks. Examples of politically or ideologically motivated groups that have gained popular influence by organizing and providing basic public services no longer offered by the state can be found in all three regions.

Inescapably, donor governments or organizations set policy priorities that reflect their own agendas. These can affect national and regional efforts to build public health infrastructure and health systems both positively and negatively. International pressures can establish norms that promote improved public health services or strengthen civil society (e.g., encouraging accurate risk perceptions and humane treatment of HIV-infected individuals). In all three regions, NGOs provide direct assistance with noncontroversial public health challenges that nonetheless occupy tricky political spaces, such as containing and treating cross-border disease outbreaks in refugee, migrant, or stateless populations. Hands-on technical assistance can accomplish the transfer of desirable skills to local partners. In some nations, NGOs that provided community public health services during the transition to full or partial democracies helped pave the way for the further development of civil society. However, funding offered by NGOs, multilateral organizations, and partner governments can also skew local policy priorities to meet donor expectations, resulting in programs whose benefits cannot be sustained without a continued influx of outside funding. On a purely pragmatic level, donors often sponsor parallel programs in response to the same health threat, such as HIV/AIDS, presenting recipient nations with a poorly harmonized array of policy and administrative requirements that further strain scarce human resources. International NGOs are rarely locally accountable, enhancing concerns about transparency and fund raising “on the backs of the poor.”
Public health programs supported by bilateral agreements or multinational organizations also elicit criticism when local political elites and technical experts believe that they address the donor’s political agenda rather than local priorities and needs. Reservations about the sustainability of such programs range from polite dismissal of their effectiveness to frank resentment about dedicating already scarce state resources to seeking and maintaining donor approbation at the cost of other urgent needs. The jarringly jubilant editorial responses to recently re-evaluated HIV/AIDS prevalence data from India illuminated the resentments engendered by externally driven public health campaigns. A 2007 study of HIV/AIDS in India’s general population halved the estimated HIV burden in India, revising previous extrapolations based on studies in “sentinel” public clinics. Even though the new data still suggest that India may have 2.5 million HIV-infected adults, Indian government officials and policy elites seized upon the downward revisions as an opportunity to refute previous criticisms from WHO, UNAIDS, and other international organizations about India’s reluctance to take prompt actions to avert a domestic HIV/AIDS epidemic.

In South and Southeast Asia, concerns about the supply and cost of pharmaceutical products and health technologies—both the transfer of materials, knowledge, and ideas applicable to innovation out of the region and the intellectual property and costly trade protections imposed by developed economies—have become issues with an increasingly prominent public profile accompanied by politically popular resentment. In 2007, the government of Indonesia elected to withhold viral isolates from suspected human cases of H5N1 avian influenza rather than share the specimens with WHO for confirmatory testing and genetic analysis. Indonesian officials, with the support of their Thai counterparts, argued that the isolates would be used by Western pharmaceutical companies to manufacture vaccines or develop treatments solely for the profitable US and European markets, with no direct benefits to Indonesia or other vulnerable Southeast Asian populations presumed to be at the epicenter of a potential pandemic. Although WHO convened a meeting to forge acceptable alternatives, including a commitment to share any hypothetical therapies with developing nations in Southeast Asia during an actual pandemic, the standoff continued for months. Potential consequences go beyond just slowing pharmaceutical or vaccine development; in the absence of genetic analysis performed at one of WHO’s influenza collaborating centers, neither Indonesian nor foreign experts can track the evolution of genetic markers associated with increased virulence or drug resistance of H5N1 influenza, which may be critical in forestalling or at least foretelling a pandemic.

An internationally acceptable standard of fairness in acknowledging ownership of materials, knowledge, and ideas applicable to innovations that benefit humankind might prevent such concerns from becoming a permanent feature of global health security negotiations. The current intellectual property framework does not favor nations that collect and share clinical specimens with research partners in developed nations. With the exception of Singapore and India, few nations in the three
regions have developed adequate technical capacity to conduct such research locally. With increasing pressures on all nations to collaborate transparently in global disease surveillance and response, questions of how to share specimens and knowledge as a global public good, while developing local technological capacity appropriately, will need to be addressed.

MECHANISMS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION

As described above, each region has pursued varyingly effective strategies for coordinating cross-border responses to endemic and epidemic disease challenges. For obvious reasons, already unfolding disasters and epidemics motivate supranational cooperation more effectively than planning exercises or endemic diseases, even when these endemic diseases present more than a theoretical risk of spread through highly mobile or displaced populations. In all three regions, shared public health efforts have grown largely out of existing mechanisms for regional cooperation and coordination, rather than being developed _de novo_.

In South Asia and the Middle East, efforts at regional health coordination have been limited by the paucity of effective and broadly inclusive regional organizations. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) includes health and population activities in its Social Agenda, but the organization has been hampered by interregional hostilities and the exclusion of civil society and technical expertise from its decision-making processes. While the Middle East boasts a number of regional and subregional organizations, most cooperation on health issues has occurred on an ad hoc basis, impelled by specific crises. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) recently agreed to support a Saudi-led plan to achieve malaria eradication in Yemen and announced plans to develop a pandemic influenza strategy. Although GCC’s commitment to security issues bodes well for implementing an effective supranational strategy for sharing health security information, the effort would necessarily be limited to the six member states; Egypt (the only nation in the region with endemic H5N1 avian influenza) is not a GCC member. Outside of the GCC, political pressures within and among Middle Eastern regimes limit transparent health data sharing. The Arab League initiated some pandemic preparedness meetings and funding plans following avian influenza outbreaks in Egypt but catalyzed little obvious regional action. Similarly, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) has a health mandate but has made little apparent progress on disease surveillance and response activities.

In contrast, several regional cooperation mechanisms in Southeast Asia have been pressed into service to coordinate disease detection and response efforts. In the wake of the SARS outbreak, the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) issued a series of health-related agreements, dedicated an annual meeting to health themes, and developed a technical working group to strengthen regional capacity for coordinated outbreak responses. Actions included
assigning responsibilities for overseeing specific technical tasks, such as strengthening regional laboratory capacity, to particular member states. Because WHO divides the Southeast Asian states between two regional offices, the governments involved deliberately selected ASEAN over WHO as the organizational mechanism for information sharing. The pan-Asian East Asia Summit (EAS) also adopted an avian influenza prevention strategy. Under the aegis of the larger Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), a standing Health Working Group addresses endemic diseases as well as preparedness for emerging infectious diseases. Subregional organizations include the small Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance project (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Yunnan Province of China), an organization founded with support from NGOs to address HIV/AIDS and other emerging health concerns; the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS), covering Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar, and Vietnam, has pledged mutual support for avian influenza preparedness. The challenge for achieving regional coordination on disease issues through these organizations is twofold: First, these potentially redundant cooperation mechanisms themselves require coordination. Second, most of these organizations were founded to promote economic cooperation and market integration, not to coordinate disease detection and response. Some technical efforts have met with false starts, and others elicited resentments about the disproportionate burden on and influence of more technologically advanced states. Maintaining momentum and making the initiatives work effectively remain daunting tasks.

Public-private partnerships and other nonstate actors play a role in regional coordination of public health efforts, most obviously by directing funding into specific programs or through WHO initiatives. However, nonstate actors can also catalyze cooperation at the local and regional levels through matching services to population needs. As an example, the Thailand Business Coalition on AIDS (TBCA) offers a program to create a quality standard similar to ISO (International Organization for Standardization) for good management practices to deal with HIV-infected employees. At the beginning of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Thailand, even large multinational businesses found few resources for context-sensitive approaches to the disease’s increasingly obvious impact on human resources. Throughout Southeast Asia, the extremely uneven patchwork of worker protection laws allowed, or even encouraged, employers to dismiss migrant and local employees with HIV or other medical conditions. The AIDS-response Standard Organization (ASO), developed through collaboration between the nonprofit coalition and the Thai government, entices commercial enterprises to participate by providing them with guidance on practices that increase efficiency and improve business outcomes, while simultaneously increasing human security for HIV-infected individuals. This approach has already expanded beyond Thailand and offers one avenue for promoting the concept of human security, protecting the development of social capital, and creating awareness of the nexus between labor, migration, and health.
FROM “THE HIGHEST ATTAINABLE LEVELS OF HEALTH” TO “INTERNATIONAL HEALTH SECURITY”

In 2007, revised International Health Regulations entered into force, expanding WHO’s authority to detect, report, and respond to transnational health threats. This framework dramatically expands global data sharing and cooperation, requiring nations to strengthen core capacities for detecting health threats such as disease outbreaks at the local level, determine whether the incidents constitute potential “public health emergencies of international concern,” and, if so, report them to WHO in a timely way. If experts judge that these crises pose authentic threats, WHO will notify all necessary stakeholders and coordinate any international assistance. Compliance currently depends on “shaming” nations that fail to disclose health catastrophes. No funding has been made available to assist nations with capacity building; the cost of full implementation is unclear. These regulations reflect a renewed commitment by developed nations to international public health cooperation as a tool for protecting national interests, fueled by concerns that China’s lack of transparency during the 2003 SARS epidemic prevented interventions that might have limited the epidemic.

Increasingly, the language employed by WHO and its partner organizations mirrors the securitization of health issues by the United States and the G8 nations, driven by fears of bioterrorism before the more recent focus on pandemic planning. In all three regions, this shift has affected local perceptions of disease and disaster, allowing avian influenza and other outbreaks to be framed as security concerns instead of humanitarian concerns. Based on levels of supranational engagement, the concept has gained the most traction in Southeast Asia, where the 1997 economic crisis and environmental concerns fostered a more general spirit of cooperation on nontraditional security issues and receptiveness to a human security framework. Public health experts in the region have characterized the securitization of disease as an opportunity to normalize the concept that security and development are “two sides of the same coin,” and that nations are not secure if their citizens are not healthy. The security focus allows mobilization of resources and political will at levels necessary to effect real change but carries the possibility of backlash from stakeholders in the security and public health communities. This could be a particular problem if funding targeted at developing disease surveillance capacities throughout Asia results in redundant networks poorly integrated into national health systems. A possible compromise to unite the two paradigms is the promotion of a broader application of the responsibility to protect doctrine: the concept that sovereign states and the international community are responsible for protecting vulnerable populations from foreseeable catastrophic health threats as well as crimes against humanity.

Although the new international health security framework describes the need for all states to build public health infrastructure in the name of mutual protection, the scope of the demands may also be perceived as an enormous obligation for devel-
oping nations assumed primarily for the benefit of wealthy states. While the international community shows little hesitation in mobilizing massive amounts of humanitarian aid in the wake of health catastrophes, assistance in preparedness remains limited primarily to transient bilateral agreements. Integration of global health security into the broader paradigm of reciprocal responsibility could conceivably include the following concepts:

- All nations have an obligation to share health information and specimens with the international community, and no nation can fairly withhold either for reasons of national sovereignty or economic security.
- The international community must ensure that all available cost-effective and feasible interventions are supplied to states that share information and specimens, and provide support to build necessary public health infrastructure for those nations that lack sufficient internal resources.
- The International Health Regulations alone are not sufficient to provide global health security, even if implemented exactly as currently written. Further assessments will be required to determine what infrastructure will be realistically needed to monitor, detect, and respond to threats effectively on a global basis, and to establish the right balance of incentives and sanctions for reporting.

Although the timing of a future pandemic cannot be predicted accurately, expert consensus suggests that the global disease surveillance and response infrastructure is being built on borrowed time. The international community could play a much larger role in strengthening regional frameworks for health security by creating and sharing planning instruments to set local, national, and regional health security priorities. All three regions could benefit immensely from strategic planning tools to rank transnational challenges based on the potential of specific health threats to cause significant problems, the feasibility of control, and the potential for national cooperation. In conjunction, resource-rich nations could provide the means to conduct health assessments for real needs, particularly along national borders, and build capacity that is context-sensitive, appropriately scaled, and cost-effective. Even nations that can cope with limited health crises might require international assistance to scale programs up to national and regional levels and to manage market issues, such as supply/cost obstacles to securing public health interventions such as pharmaceuticals or vaccines. At the regional level, stakeholders must define the most appropriate actors and roles by comparing needs to existing programs and networks to identify areas of competency and potential linkages. Finally, global cooperation is required to reduce the international transfer of risk—the export of environmental hazards and communicable diseases beyond national borders.

Only decades ago, the relatively slow travel of disease outbreaks allowed nations to protect their vital interests through quarantines, regulations that amounted to
trade protection, and basic public health services at home. Decreasing public tolerance in the developed world for disabilities and deaths on the scale that once unremarkably accompanied periodic epidemics now coincides with increasing interdependence of economic systems, rapid transit of people and goods, near-instantaneous communication, and profound changes in ecosystems at every level. The emerging infectious diseases now discovered almost annually can no longer be relied upon to remain safely in remote forests and farmlands. Health crises constitute a real threat to national security in an era of globalization; effective pre-emption relies upon institutional strength and international cooperation. The intertwining of information, economic, and security systems across the world creates an interdependence of vulnerability among nations, within and between regions. In view of the profound inequalities in resources and capacities among nations, a commitment by resource-rich states to strengthening public health institutions in developing nations represents not just a humanitarian dream, but an investment in mutual defense.
Whether it be global jihad or global climate change, food security or financial markets, fisheries or forests, it is clear that the daily lives and welfare of people everywhere are increasingly subject to natural, economic, and ideological forces that transcend national boundaries. It is equally clear that these forces are progressively less susceptible to the control of the governments and societies of individual nations. These trends are likely to have profound impacts on all aspects of security: the human security of citizens, the possibility of conflict between states and among groups within states, the legitimacy of states and of important sub-national social institutions, and the capacity of states and societies to maintain political stability and social peace.

Security discourse is increasingly focused on issues of nature and human development, and is moving beyond the traditional concern with conflict between and armed threats to states. Global climate change has now become an urgent challenge to the very survival of small island nations. Flooding, a recent UK government study concludes, is a greater security threat to Britain than terrorism. The people and government of Bangladesh have had palpable reason to reach the same conclusion a little earlier.

Transnational threats as we understand them are those which transcend national borders, and those which are national in scope but recur in many societies in a region. These may be triggers of conflict or instability, or may offer opportunities for transnational cooperation. Examples include water shortages and shared use of water tables or river systems. Some may principally threaten individual societies, but may produce sufficient instability to spill over into neighboring countries, or may offer fertile ground for foreign interference or the appeal of transnational militant ideologies.

The determinants of these challenges are global trends toward integration within and between national economies; an ever-accelerating pace of social, economic, and technological change; the rapid diminution of the capacity of states and social institutions to interpret, mediate, and act upon these changes on behalf of their citizens or clients; and declining capacity of established political or religious ideologies to appeal to people’s search for ideological “maps” with which to navigate
this brave new world. It is hardly to be wondered at that the result has been social and political instability and a sense of crisis. Equally unsurprising, in light of historical experience, is that rapid change of this nature results in a plethora of conflicts between beneficiaries and victims.

There is both threat and promise here. Threat because the efforts of states to variously accommodate opposition or repress it with force have often been unsuccessful, and may even have compounded the problem. Alienation and despair, or more calculated strategies for dominance, have often manifested themselves as civil unrest, insurgency, or terrorism. Promise because globalization has sometimes brought assets: rapid communication and greater transparency empowering populations and raising expectations, intellectual resources (including ideologies) from societies that have been more successful in addressing challenges, and the necessary scientific and technical resources.

If ever a complex analytical model—a “theory of everything”—were needed, it is here. In whatever dimension one begins the analysis, one is compelled to address all others. Economic analysis, issues of state capacity or political legitimacy, impacts on the natural environment, political instability, prospects of inter-group or anti-state violence, and cultural and ideological developments are all part of a seamless whole that demands attention to all its parts.

Global integration has only intensified and expanded the always transnational character of ecology, ideas, trade, and migration. It has accelerated the pace of change, eroding local and historical cultures and identities, in large part by homogenization of consumer taste, and destabilizing settled expectations and personal or household economic calculations. Penetration of national economies by multinational corporations with substantially greater revenues than the gross domestic product (GDP) of many nations has subjected populations to trade and investment regimes perceived as made in the developed world largely for its own benefit. The rapid economic changes triggered by global integration have led to sharpening of inequality between beneficiaries and victims of new trends, and to competition over natural resources between local and remote interests and between traditional and high-tech means for their exploitation.

The extent and effect of each of these have in turn both determined and reflected the myriad ways that states respond to the challenges of change. State responses, as well as the underlying processes of change, have in turn fueled political instability, new forms of consensus, competing ideologies, and new threats to the state or the strengthening of old ones. The legitimacy of states in developing countries often depends on their capacity to deliver the benefits of economic development. They often find themselves confronting the challenge of managing the environmental and cultural instabilities resulting from economic development, even as their human and material resources seem increasingly unequal to the task. The state’s failure to do this effectively will undermine it, the sole legitimate and authoritative guarantor of peace, security, public order, and the rule of law. That in
Crime in the Malacca Strait

Over 60,000 vessels, carrying around a quarter of world trade and half of global energy needs, pass through the Malacca Strait each year. Maritime terrorism has so far not occurred, but many believe that it may become a threat in the future. There are also fears that terrorists and pirates might collaborate or adopt each other’s techniques. There is debate in Southeast Asia about how to define piracy and how to best deal with it. If piracy is classified as terrorism, an international coalition must be organized to deal with it; if it is viewed as local or organized crime, existing law enforcement agencies should handle it.

In 2007, 70 cases of armed robbery and piracy were recorded in Southeast Asia. (By comparison, there were 263 cases worldwide in 2007, an increase of 10 percent over the previous year, with Nigeria and Somalia showing the biggest increases.) These crimes affected less than 0.1 percent of the ships transiting the Malacca Strait. In Southeast Asia, the number of such incidents has shown a downward trend since 2003. Most of the incidents involve only small-scale thefts, with knives being used more frequently than firearms. More serious incidents in 2007 included three hijackings and one kidnap for ransom. The majority of the attacks have been made on the more vulnerable slower and smaller vessels, even though the larger and more sophisticated vessels carry most of the cargo through the Strait.

Other types of maritime crime are illegal fishing and smuggling of arms, narcotics, wildlife, and people. The Malaysian prime minister suggested recently that smuggling and illegal migration are more serious problems in the Malacca Strait than the threat of terrorism.

Key nations have differing perspectives on the problem of crime in the Malacca Strait. Of the littoral states, Singapore, as a small group of islands adjacent to the Strait, finds the prospect of an environmental accident resulting from hijacking particularly threatening. Both Malaysia and Singapore express impatience at Indonesian efforts. Indonesia, for its part, lacks the capacity of those two states to deal with the crime and seeks international technical and material support. The perspectives of some littoral states differ from those of key extra-regional nations that have economic or strategic interests in the Strait, such as Japan and the United States. The latter believe that enhanced multilateral naval patrolling and, therefore, an enhanced presence for their national navies are essential to meet the challenge. Some littoral states have concerns about their sovereign prerogatives and often see the threat as less significant than do outside powers.

Sources: The Edge (Malaysia); New Strait Times (Malaysia); Jakarta Post (Indonesia); Business Times (Singapore); Straits Times (Singapore); Asia Times Online (Hong Kong); Asian Survey; Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Singapore); International Maritime Bureau.
one nation. River systems shared between nations, the earth’s atmosphere, the maritime realm, and its fisheries—many of these are long-standing sources of international contention, as is suggested by the development of a customary and positive international law governing the rights and obligations of states relating to maritime matters and rivers.

The availability of well-established rules has been of only partial use in reducing the prospects of conflict between competing uses, or promoting cooperative action between states. For example, India and Pakistan have been able to address their competition over the Indus River basin, but India and Bangladesh have had less success on the Ganges/Brahmaputra River systems. The countries of the Nile Basin seem to have established rules for management at least of its waters (though not their ownership). The countries of the Tigris and Euphrates system seem to have further to go. It has proved possible to use international cooperation and laws to address piracy but not fisheries.

Even where there have been established bilateral agreements or mechanisms for cooperation, the pace of economic development or the intensification of use has had the effect of vitiating those agreements or mechanisms. Greater demands for water for industrial and agricultural development, proliferation of shipping, and exponential increase in the effectiveness of marine fishing technologies have cast a pall of uncertainty over international understandings, and over allocations between sectional interests within nations, whether tacit or explicit.

**VARIETIES OF VIOLENCE: TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY**

In discussions of the core security issues such as terrorism, many informed people in these regions express anxiety about a simplistic US approach to terrorism, which appears to have compounded rather than ameliorated instability and insecurity, and thus disserved US interests as well as those of their own societies.

Not all political violence is “terrorism.” Terrorism and insurgency are distinct phenomena with distinct origins. Distinct responses are appropriate to each. The imprecise understanding of “terrorism” produces a failure to understand the distinct social, economic, political, organizational, psychological, and ideological main-springs of each, and thus to adequately respond to the challenge that either poses. Among the clearest proponents of such precision are retired and active police, intelligence, and other internal security officials in the regions. Though they will sometimes use the term “terrorism” to describe popular insurgencies because of the violent means employed, they nonetheless insist that smart policing, intelligence, and internal security policy demand an accurate understanding of the social, political, and economic causes and sources of insurgency, and of the distinct character of covert terrorism.

Conflation of terrorism and insurgency is also seen by critics of the status quo in the regions as a political strategy for delegitimating authentic movements for social justice or social change.
Violence in the course of insurgency operates against symbols or institutions of the state or dominant social and economic interests; civilian casualties are incidental and rarely intentional. In contrast, terrorist groups are seen to direct violence specifically against civilian bystanders, to induce terror, not as a means of leverage for political ends, but rather to discredit or weaken the state. Insurgencies frame their demands in political terms and appeal to social norms, albeit dissident ones. Terrorism rarely is anything other than a threat to public safety, susceptible to established tools of law enforcement and intelligence. It may sometimes have political utility to disaffected elites seeking to restore their power or influence, and thus be used as an extension of jockeying for political power. However, its means and postulates entail rejection of political frameworks and social norms.

Terrorism is of course a manifestation of socio-psychological factors common to societies, such as alienation and the “rejectionist” culture and frustrated aspirations of youth. However, it is an extreme and pathological manifestation. The range of prestigious ideologies on offer at a given time in a given environment will determine what model of rebellion against society youth or other alienated groups will gravitate to; why terrorism rather than insurgency, or why violence rather than religiosity or avant-garde culture or other expressions for youth alienation? Those ideological choices are themselves functions of recent history and the history of the local culture. In that respect, the actions and perceived purposes of the US and the West will play a role. Resentment against perceived US incomprehension or hostility will burnish the appeal of anti-Westernism, including political Islamism or terrorism.

It is important to locate political Islamism accurately relative to other challenges to the state. Some Islamist political parties may be ambivalent about or even sympathetic to the use of violence, but they remain political in their orientation, methods, and objectives. They should be understood in the same political terms that are used to understand all political parties. This is not to say that political Islam does not pose an existential and ideological challenge to the very foundations of the established order and the elite culture that supports it. However, it does so as a political movement susceptible to political analysis and understanding.

It is highly misleading to allow their common Islamist rhetoric to suggest that Islamist political parties and covert and conspiratorial groups such as al Qaeda occupy points on a single spectrum. Islamist parties are distinguishable in their use of the traditional means of politics, including propaganda, provision of welfare, and grass-roots organizing. They share a spectrum with secular political parties. While the ideological frameworks or rhetoric of Islamist parties may overlap with those of more violent groups, this could prove an asset to political stability. It could provide political expression for points of view that would otherwise be marginalized and therefore susceptible to the siren call of terrorist groups.

Both insurgency and Islamist political parties are distinguishable from terrorism by being reflections of political, economic, and social dynamics. Their force and appeal derive from the perceived failures of states and elites to address the social
and political stresses resulting from rapid change in the realms of environment and natural resources, economic development, and political participation. Knowledgeable discussions of Muslim insurgencies in Pakistan, Thailand, or the Philippines, and of organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, inevitably focus on the very same issues as arise in discussions of rebellions based on ethnic or class interests. These are failures of governance, poor policy, group discrimination, graft, service of plutocratic interests, exploitation of local natural resources by outsider interests, disproportionate repression, and state violence.

Several areas suffering high levels of armed conflict also suffer extremely high rates of unemployment and stressed livelihoods from traditional occupations. They also experience high proportions of populations in the age groups at the threshold of or at working age. If these age groups are not provided with opportunities for participation in society, violent, criminal, or extremist options will be attractive. This inevitably creates a vicious cycle, as the capacity of states and societies to offer education, training, and jobs remains compromised by high levels of violence and political instability.

Many insurgencies occur where the encounter between modernity and traditional ways of life has been insistent and rapid. Many of these areas have been experiencing and continue to experience substantial dislocation from natural resource exploitation, and attendant environmental degradation. This is often accompanied by collusion between states and corporations, and lack of consultation with local opinion. Often, the groups in rebellion against the state are distinguished from the mainstream by their minority ethnic or cultural identity. Thus, the rapid changes contributing to instability build upon a sense of grievance based on historical discrimination, and ethnic or cultural identity becomes the unifying factor of their armed rebellion. Irian Jaya, Aceh, the Indian Northeast, and Jammu and Kashmir are among the clearest cases of such “national” identities asserted against a homogenizing state. Experts, including senior officials formerly responsible for security or administration in these areas, agree that rapid economic and ecological changes in livelihoods, land use, or demographic balance as a result of internal migration, have often been the catalysts to transform a distinct sense of identity into a casus belli.

Whereas it is essential to avoid conflation of terrorism and insurgency through imprecision, there are important cases where the distinction is hazy in fact. Terrorist groups and insurgent groups are sometimes seen to inhabit common geographical and political terrain. In the Moro areas of Mindanao, Abu Sayyaf has profited from the erosion of state authority and public order resulting from an insurgency for self-determination. In Indian Jammu and Kashmir, jihadi terrorist groups have availed themselves of the opportunities provided by long-standing nationalist insurgency. In Pakistan’s Pashtun belt, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and local insurgencies have engaged in tactical cooperation while remaining distinct in their political objectives. Other insurgent groups have deliberately and extensively used terrorist vi-
olence against bystanders as well as against political antagonists; an example is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka.

More problematical is an armed movement like Hizbullah or Hamas. Each is clearly an organized political movement with political legitimacy grounded in popular support and the consent of its constituents. Each also performs civic and state-like functions in providing security and social welfare to populations under its control. Yet each engages in armed attacks on civilians.

A significant dimension of organized violence can simultaneously be anti-state in its effects on public order and be sponsored or even carried out by the state itself. Anti-Muslim violence by extremist Hindu chauvinists in India, sometimes (as in Gujarat) using state resources, emboldened by state rhetoric, and yielding electoral gain to its state perpetrators, is the source of serious alienation of the Muslim community nationwide. This community has hitherto been loyal and anything but militant. There is a looming concern in both the Muslim and the non-Muslim populations that the alienation and insecurity have widened the appeal of voices counseling extreme measures of Muslim resistance. That state-sponsored violence has blown back on its state sponsors is an experience only too familiar to the security establishments of India (the Khalistan insurgency in Punjab) and Pakistan (support to insurgents in Indian Jammu and Kashmir and in Afghanistan).

The three regions considered here have recently been of heightened interest to the US as sources of violence against the West. In the local perspective, political violence often feeds upon a more generalized political volatility that in turn reflects larger concerns about economic and social inequality, about trends in the cultural and intellectual lives of their societies, and about the performance, responsiveness, and legitimacy of states. Economic, environmental, and intellectual concerns and struggles are often more immediate and important in the political debates of those societies. These debates may be articulated in ideological terms that are Islamist, or are otherwise at odds with conventional wisdom or with a global ideological consensus desired by the US. Policy makers should avoid focusing on the ideological rhetoric that articulates political demands, and look at these societies as complex and integral wholes. This is not to suggest a facile equation of, or a simple relationship between, violence and social injustice or governance failures, but rather the need for an integral awareness that does not isolate security concerns from their larger context.

The US interest in security would be well served by a more sympathetic understanding of these concerns about the impact of global economic policies, and of popular social and economic aspirations and demands. Social and economic policy may be more availing than security policy. The perception that the US is a significant author of a global consensus on global economic policy (including the belittling of the role of the state in economic regulation), and therefore complicit in the implementing policies of national governments, is as damaging to US standing in these societies as any explicit security posture adopted by the US. Where
developments in those regions proceed from global economic policies on which the US has substantial influence, the US should understand their impact on political instability and violence.

Where there is an implication that national governments have adopted economic or security policies reluctantly or under duress, the damage to US standing is the greater. It is also damaging when national governments are perceived to be under pressure from US policy on terrorism and militant Islam, and US policy is seen as pressing societies to take political or security initiatives that provoke instability or violence, particularly if such policies appear to devalue the perspectives and political consensus of the societies concerned.

**WEALTH AND INEQUALITY**

Economic globalization, with its integrative effects on societies (some catastrophic), is of course as old as the modern world and the early stages of European colonization. What is it about globalization today that threatens stability and security? A historical perspective suggests that the distinctive characteristic of globalization today is the relentless pace of change, with its effects on the capacities of states and other social institutions to respond, on the expectations of populations brought unprepared into the global economy, and on the resilience of nature.

Because the benefits of economic development based on integration into the global economy have been enjoyed unequally, the process of economic change has become a source of social and political discontent. Not only have the new benefits been unequally distributed, by creating new winners and shutting many out from winning, but the removal of regulatory protections and the changing of the rules of economic competition have in fact created new losers as well. Erstwhile middle classes and even the well-to-do have experienced precipitous declines in their economic status. Economic changes have also destabilized settled expectations about social status. The relatively massive increase in the wealth of the very wealthy as a result of global economic integration has constituted a new source of social resentments, a sense of injustice, and potential political stress.

The upshot is that, even as some social groups have become satisfied clients of the new order, new sources of political stress and social resentment have been generated in almost all the societies of these regions. Inequality has had deleterious effects on the possibilities of consensus around particular political dispensations and social contracts. Where such consensus had existed in the past, however limited, growing inequality has eroded it. In other cases, the inequality has simply made the possibility of constructing such a consensus more remote. All members of these societies other than the most obvious winners, even the educated, have experienced a sense of insecurity resulting from rapid inflation and erosion of the national government’s capacity to control events, to buffer its citizens from their vulnerability to economic trends generated in a remote global economy, such as the steep rise in food prices noted recently.
Egypt offers an apposite example. In one perspective, it appears a model of economic growth which, according to neo-liberal theory, should lead to significant reduction in poverty. With annual growth of 7 percent and significant increases in prosperity for certain classes, it seems to offer cause for optimism. However, more than 20 percent of Egyptians continue to live in poverty, and this number has increased rather than decreased during recent years of high economic growth. Meanwhile, Egyptian wage

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**The Rising Cost of Food**

Food security has traditionally been discussed in terms of amount of food being produced. Today, however, the cost of food has become the more significant determinant of its availability to individuals—and thus the greater source of food insecurity in most societies.

Ten thousand people took to the streets in Indonesia in January 2008 to protest a 125 percent increase in soybean prices in the year 2007. In a country where soy provides 22 percent of the average protein intake, a price increase that more than doubles costs is a serious blow to food security. Indonesia is not the only country experiencing disquiet over the cost of food. Food prices worldwide rose 50 percent in the last year, and even Saudi Arabia, long known for its zero inflation rate, is coming to terms with a possible 30 percent rise in food costs over the coming year.

At the center of this phenomenon are competing demands for the staple crops of grain and soy, as these crops are increasingly being used for biofuel production and animal feed in countries where meat consumption is growing. In China, as in much of the developing world, people are eating twice as much meat as they did 20 years ago. The demand for soy feed for Chinese livestock is partially responsible for the shortage of soy to feed people in Indonesia. The majority of corn and soy grown in the world is now consumed by animals destined for the dinner table. The biofuel industry is proving to be as hungry as this livestock for staple crops. In 2007, Thailand mandated that all gasoline must contain 10 percent ethanol, which is produced from crops containing sugar or starch.

Growing populations are putting additional pressure on food security. In India, grain production has been failing to keep up with population growth since the mid-1990s. Like people in many other countries, Indians are eating more meat; their per capita consumption of grains has actually declined over the past 30 years. However, the population is growing steadily—it will hit 900 million by 2020—and so total demand for grain has not dropped. On the contrary, it is projected to continue to grow by 2 percent a year for the foreseeable future.

Because they are traditionally plentiful and cheap, staple crops such as grain and soy constitute the major part of people’s diets the world over. When the cost of these foods rises, violence can erupt quickly. In Mexico last year, people rioted over a rise in the price of corn flour due to an increase in the use of corn grown in the United States to make biofuels. In November 2007, there was a deadly stampede in Western China as people rushed to buy subsidized cooking oil. If the cost of food continues to rise, this kind of social conflict is likely to be more frequent in the future.

*Sources: New York Times; Financial Times; Economic and Political Weekly (India); UN Food and Agriculture Organization (Cairo); World Economic Forum 2008.*
earners have experienced a sharp diminution of their share in national income. The security implications of this have been glaringly evident in recent civil unrest over the sharp worldwide increases in food prices, the effects of which on Egypt have constituted a tipping point for many working-class households.

**Rising Stars of the Global Economy**

One narrative of contemporary economic globalization finds the rapid rise of underdeveloped societies into stars of the global economy, such as Vietnam and India. Careful examination reveals a counternarrative that deserves attention.

Vietnam raises high expectations of rapid economic development, on the basis of a well-educated workforce and low costs of labor. It is positioned in the robust and complex transnational economy of ASEAN and East Asia. It enjoys the ready availability of substantial investment from Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, the US, and European nations, as well as from within ASEAN. This makes it a particularly promising prospect. However, certain developments, some of them direct results of integration into the global economy, have emerged as challenges to the rosy scenario for the “tiger cub.” Foreign direct investment, other inflows of foreign resources, and the rising prices of food and fuel have triggered inflation above 10 percent. This has undercut not only its competitive position in the global economy, but also poverty reduction. It has also imposed new hardships on a population just emerging from hardship, in the context of reductions in public welfare initiatives.

India today suffers from rates of malnutrition equal to those of sub-Saharan Africa. This problem will only worsen as wages fall behind soaring (globalized) food prices. One hundred and twenty million Indian families are living from hand to mouth on subsistence agriculture, and are vulnerable to loss of their tenancies to landowners seeking higher returns from capitalist agriculture for the global market, or to expropriation by governments in collusion with developers or with multinational or Indian corporate interests. Forty percent of rural Indians are already landless. Landlessness on this kind of scale, with its impact on basic subsistence, is likely to breed disaffection and resistance in populations with nothing to lose. It will also lead to rapid and uncontrolled urbanization, with further socially and politically destabilizing consequences.

Several reasons for caution about the sustainability of the trajectory of India’s economic development should be noted. The sectors in which the growth of the Indian economy is focused, a reflection of the benefits of global economic integration, are high technology, information, and financial and business services. These sectors provide almost no absorption of people thrown off the land by modernization and by concentration of agriculture for a global market. Meanwhile, the limited capacity of India’s educational system to produce sufficient numbers of qualified workers for those sophisticated sectors has already become identified as a crisis in national education policy discourse.
Globalization and Discontent in India

Integration into the global economy has seemed to yield significant benefits for India. However, clear warning signs of trouble have already appeared.

Mumbai, burgeoning with financial development and prosperity, suffers chronic power shortages that limit economic growth. Gurgaon, the business suburb of Delhi, is experiencing a construction boom in high-cost housing and business facilities, including many corporate (including multinational) headquarters. However, Gurgaon is expected to run out of water within a decade. The construction of sufficient power-generating capacity is constrained by the fact that Indian and foreign manufacturers of power-generating machinery are over-subscribed with orders. Additionally, major projects of foreign investment have been stalled or aborted because of security concerns, such as the Posco steel plant in Orissa. Foreign direct investment in India actually declined between 2005 and 2006.

New security threats have arisen from the integration of the Indian countryside into the global economy. In Nandigram in West Bengal, local farmers have offered militant resistance to the taking of their land by government fiat to establish Special Economic Zones (SEZ) for foreign and Indian corporations to locate export production facilities. Popular mobilization has led to armed violence by proponents and opponents.

Movements that are involved in insurgency elsewhere have also sought involvement in these new types of disputes. A variety of local insurgent movements described as “Naxalite” or “Maoist” operate in more than one quarter of India’s administrative districts, often exercising substantial enough administrative and police powers to render areas inaccessible to officials. The Naxalite movement dates to the 1960s (its precursor, the Telengana movement, dates to the 1940s). Its origins lie in responses to endemic Indian inequalities making it therefore entirely Indian. To a large extent the sources of local rural discontent to which the movement appeals today remain peculiarly Indian injustices, mostly caste discrimination. However, whereas Naxalism seemed almost entirely defunct in the last decade, the extent to which it has recently been able to revive and grow is a reflection of the impact of the economic trends set in motion by the global economy.

The land and other natural resources such as forests and water upon which many rural communities depend for livelihoods and subsistence have been subject to de facto expropriation by Indian and foreign economic actors extracting and producing for the monetized economy. There is little disagreement that this constitutes a substantial part of the discontent which Naxalites have tapped.

Where rural smallholders have sought to avail themselves of the opportunities offered by the global economy, they have found themselves ruined by the high cost of inputs for cash crop production, uncertain markets and unstable commodity prices, and loss of the safety net of their subsistence agriculture. The rash of peasant suicides resulting from such ruination is now a pervasive part of Indian political discourse.

Sources: Financial Times; Indian Express; International Herald Tribune; Asian Age (India); Hindustan Times; Times of India; The Hindu.

The development of traditional consumer and producer industries, which might absorb surplus rural populations, is constrained by serious limitations in the form of insufficient numbers of trained workers and poor infrastructure. The lack of minimally literate and numerate workers in turn reflects the failure of basic education.
This failure is itself a result of the under-allocation of public resources to basic education relative to higher education, the latter being the basis for India’s competitive edge at present. There is also repeated hand wringing about the infrastructure’s inability to sustain any protracted process of economic development.

The rapid development of India’s economy has given rise to new sources of disintegration of social structures and cultures that have historically been important guarantors of social order and political stability in a notoriously ungovernable state. They have also given rise to significant increases in rural-urban migration and to uncontrolled urbanization, with its own challenges to social order and governability. Substantial hardships and shocks have been experienced, particularly by India’s rural poor, in the process of integration of the Indian economy into the global economy. The social conflict, economic insecurity, and natural resource degradation that have resulted have spawned various forms of resistance, many violent, and some in a form that has explicitly posed a challenge to the authority of the Indian state. One quarter of the districts in India now experience some form of armed presence of anti-state groups, and in many the writ of the state (police presence, revenue collections, administration) runs little or not at all. Retired senior intelligence and police officials are pessimistic about the capacity of the agencies of law and order to meet the challenges to political order that lie ahead.

It might justly be noted that all developed societies have managed the wrenching adjustments of rural-urban migration and change of livelihoods. India might do the same, albeit with the same significant costs in human suffering. What distinguishes the Indian experience is the absence of a strong state capable of acting coherently for these purposes. The political system in India is seriously fractured and its administrative system seriously compromised. Unlike Britain during its industrial revolution or China today, the Indian state is not capable of resolute response to the instabilities and resistance spawned by these rapid economic and social changes. Indian law enforcement and intelligence professionals note the seriously compromised capacity of the state to maintain law and order; they anticipate deterioration in the current chronic state of public disorder. Among India’s particular obstacles must be noted the bewildering variety of its political parties and the social groups and interests they represent, and the imperative necessity of ad hoc coalitions among them. Opportunistic and short-term political calculations render coherent long-term policy almost impossible.

It should be noted here that many elements of the foregoing analysis of India could be applied to other South Asian societies, though differences in the political context or levels of development or complexity of economies would require some modification of the model. For example, to the extent that Pakistan has also experienced a significant improvement in its macro-economic performance and high rates of growth, and has been noted as a model for poverty reduction, it might be seen as another example of a South Asian economic miracle. Thus, its foreign reserves have increased tenfold during the Musharraf years, its GNP doubled, and its foreign investment quadrupled, with nominal poverty diminished by 10 percent.
Nonetheless, with 8 percent inflation adding to fuel and food costs, and rates of
unemployment high, the political mood among the mass of Pakistanis is clearly
anything but positive. The rhetoric that resonates most in political discourse is still
the promise of jobs, shelter, and affordable food. And experts in policing and in-
ternal security come to the sober and gloomy prognostications of their Indian
counterparts. Moreover, there is widespread pessimism about the prospects of a
new political compact to resolve what seems like an impossible fracturing of po-
titical life among parties and ideologies.

**Nature and Its Limits**

The global economy has seen accelerating growth and an aggregate rise in con-
sumer demand resulting both from expansion of populations of consumers and
from rising demand for new luxuries and tastes for new products. This is of course
good news in many respects, as prosperity and economic expansion feed each
other. However, it has also spelled accelerating impact on natural resources, and
on patterns for their exploitation. The extraction of minerals to feed the producer
industries that serve the industrialization of emerging economies, the felling of
timber to feed increasing consumer demand in developed and emerging
economies, and the extraction of raw materials to feed luxury consumer tastes
have also contributed to despoliation of the environment, to pollution of air and
water, to degradation of soil quality, to increased susceptibility to disasters such as
flooding, and to global climate change. In this process, the modern global econ-
omy has come closer than ever before to traditional rural and wilderness commu-
nities and ways of life.

The state’s political imperative to usurp and exploit natural resources in the inter-
est of development generally, or to facilitate corporate use of them, has had a neg-
avative effect on the human security of the large population that traditionally sustains
itself by subsistence farming, gathering of forest products, and fishing. Deforesta-
tion and mining, much of it carried out illegally, destroys watersheds and pollutes
rivers and streams, as does the rapid development of hydropower resources. Yet, at
the local level, where problems such as chemical contamination of water are ex-
perienced, are found the fewest technical or financial resources, and least admin-
istrative capacity or political authority for addressing such problems.

The pace of change and the scale of impact are equally important sources of con-
cern. Whether we look at desertification or the deterioration of hitherto sustainable
arid environments (including agricultural environments), it is apparent that an in-
tolerably rapid pace of impact overrides the environment’s capacity to regenerate
itself, and that an appropriate level of exploitation can be sustained by fragile en-
vironments only if they are not stressed beyond their natural capacity.

Livelihoods and environmental degradation are closely linked. If settled means of
livelihood are disrupted, more people will be thrown upon even greater reliance on
nature for subsistence. In the course of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s,
Climate Change and Water in India

Melting glaciers, radical changes in rainfall, more frequent and severe weather events, and degradation of coastal areas from a rise in the sea level are confidently predicted for India, and to some extent have already been noted. They are likely to be greatly compounded by the effects of exponentially increased carbon emissions resulting from rapid economic growth, which is highly reliant on “dirty” sources of energy such as coal and petroleum, and the huge increase in automobile use expected to result from economies of scale and increased consumer resources. The likely outcomes are severe flooding, droughts, and soil degradation, with serious impacts on agriculture, human settlements, and coastal fisheries.

The melting of glaciers in the north will lead to flooding of the Indus and Ganges Rivers. The Indus River system covers 20 million hectares and provides annual irrigation capacity for more than 12 million hectares. The melting of glaciers will also result in severe and chronic droughts, as the river valleys will lose freshwater replenishment capacity. India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh will permanently lose their source of strategic water reserves.

A temperature rise of 2.5–4.9 degrees Celsius in India would reduce its staple crops of rice and wheat by 32–52 percent. The impact on gross domestic product (GDP) would be a drop of between 1.8 and 3.4 percent. Over 60 percent of Indian agriculture is dependent on the monsoons. Changes in rainfall patterns (increases in variability, more rain falling in shorter periods, or heavier rainfall) could have devastating effects. Twenty-five percent of India’s land is already prone to drought. Declines in soil fertility, water-logging or flooding of farmland, increases in the salinity of water, and drought will affect not only food security but also employment and profits in Indian agriculture—and therefore the Indian economy.

Coastal fisheries, subsistence and commercial, will be affected by significant reductions in fish stocks as a result of changes in water temperatures, in the chemistry of the water, or in currents. India is the second-largest producer of fish in the world, and the fisheries are crucial to the livelihoods of millions of people in coastal areas. Coastal populations, including those engaged in agriculture, will also suffer degradation of their living environments from coastal flooding and saltwater intrusion, as a result of a rise in sea level.

Among the effects on urban populations and infrastructure identified by Indian and international scientists and social scientists are problems with urban drainage and waste disposal, increased demand for water and electricity as a result of rising temperatures, and threats to human health from changes in local ecologies.

India draws 213 billion cubic meters of groundwater annually, the largest draw in the world. The rate of replenishment of the water table is insufficient in many places. In 1995, 7 percent of water table blocks were semicritical, critical, or overexploited. By 2004, this figure had increased to 28 percent. With 16 percent of the world’s population but only 4 percent of its water resources, India is already highly vulnerable to natural shocks. With a growing population, a shift toward urban areas, and an increase in industrial and consumer demand, the likelihood of internal political conflict will increase greatly.

Sources: Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research; Economic and Political Weekly (India); Center for a New American Security; Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests.
Bangladesh: A Perfect Storm

Bangladesh is one of poorest and most densely populated countries on earth. Its 144.3 million people, two thirds living in extreme poverty, occupy 144,000 square kilometers. It is highly likely to face threats from nature, compounded by the effects of human intervention in nature, many closely related to global warming and climate change.

The prospect is one of flooding, radical changes in temperature, increases in sea level, and more extreme weather disasters such as cyclones, as well as greater vulnerability to storm surges which will reach further inland. This will have serious impacts on the livelihoods and minimal food security provided by agriculture and fisheries, as well as on the secondary industries and commerce based on those. Other side effects will be disrupted communications in an already challenging river delta environment, serious shortages of water for human consumption and household use, and water-borne diseases. Decades of investment in human development and infrastructure could be quickly wiped out.

Both Bangladesh’s principal source of grain (rice) and its principal source of protein (fish) are water dependent. Rice accounts for approximately 92 percent of all the food grain that is produced and employs almost 60 percent of Bangladeshi labor. A temperature increase of 2 degrees Celsius would decrease the rice yield by 19 percent. Changes in rainfall patterns would also impact crop yields. For example, in the 2006 monsoon season, a decrease in rainfall resulted in the decrease of rice crops by 25–30 percent.

Bangladesh faces an almost certain rise in sea level, which would reduce the amount of land available for crop production as well as harm the quality of groundwater used for irrigation. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts that for every 45 centimeters that the sea level rises, 10 percent of Bangladesh will be under water. The sea level increase will make storm surges more powerful and increase their reach inland. In the coastal areas of Bangladesh, the salinity of the ground and rivers has already increased owing to both the increase in the sea level and the decrease of fresh water from the Ganges. Fisheries, both riverine and maritime, remain highly vulnerable to these radical and rapid changes.

Because Bangladesh is predominantly a river delta, and the lower riparian of river basins controlled by India, it is highly vulnerable to planning decisions over which it has no control. India is engaged in massive and escalating uses of these rivers for agriculture and industry. Before the Farakka Barrage was constructed in 1974, Bangladesh had 1,000 rivers; it now has 250. Its waterways have dwindled from 24,000 kilometers to about 4,500 kilometers.

India is already vulnerable to Bangladesh’s predicament, and should be cautious about exacerbating it. Loss of land, livelihoods, and food sources in Bangladesh would force mass movements of people into India, which almost entirely surrounds it. India has already begun building a wall on the border to deter illegal migration. The 2001 Indian Census notes that 3,084,826 Bangladeshis have migrated to India. This has already spawned hostility and discrimination against them. Catastrophe or rapid deterioration of conditions could build on historic patterns of migration and lead to the migration of as many as tens of millions of Bangladeshis into India over a short period.

Sources: World Bank; Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies; Bangladesh Rice Research Institute; The Daily Star; 2001 Indian Census; Center for New American Security.
societies witnessed return migration of urban dwellers to their rural villages of origin. The accelerated pursuit of livelihoods—by local communities engaging in traditional uses of nature, by corporations generating employment, or by governments building infrastructure—leads to environmental degradation. Environmental degradation in turn erodes the long-term sustainability of livelihoods, through depletion of resources such as fish stocks or forests relied upon for subsistence, or through secondary despoliation of natural resources such as water or soil, which in turn affects the quality of subsistence agriculture.

Not only are transnational economic trends the sources of many of these practices. They in turn have impacts that transcend national boundaries, reaching across into shared space and natural resources, into the atmosphere, rivers and river systems, water tables, and fish stocks and habitats. The burning of forests in Indonesia to the detriment of air quality and public health in neighboring states, the damming or polluting of upstream waters in international river systems such as the Mekong, Ganges, and Tigris and Euphrates, and the impacts of overfishing by factory fleets on local fisheries and on marine environments: all constitute sources at least of international tension, and potentially of conflict.

When environmental degradation, or radical environmental changes such as flooding of farmlands by dams, makes livelihoods, life, or health unsustainable, or results in natural or environmental disasters, the result is often significant migration. In Bangladesh, for example, experts anticipate that rising sea levels and flooding resulting from a combination of global warming, increased human intervention in natural flow of rivers, and the effects of soil erosion on watersheds will increase the already substantial unlicensed migration of Bangladeshis into India, already a source of ethnic, religious, and international tension.

**Expropriation of the Commons**

The commons in traditional English law and custom were lands that were available for common uses such as pasture, where property rights could not be exercised to exclude such common use. Their enclosure by private landholders constituted the first and essential element in the move of England toward capitalist agriculture, and simultaneously resulted in the impoverishment of numbers of peasants and their eventual movement away from the countryside. This concept has been in increasing use as a means for explaining the patterns of expropriation of nature witnessed in many of the societies of the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia. The customary practice in most societies has been to think of certain natural resources as commonly available, rather than privately owned. Traditional uses of the entire ecosystems of forests by communities engaged in subsistence livelihoods have included food, building materials, and pharmacopeia. Fish stocks and the marine environments in which they are found have also been depended upon by coastal communities and been available as a common resource.
The commons may be expropriated in several ways. The modern state has played the role of expropriating these to itself, and then enjoying beneficial ownership or use itself, or licensing or selling beneficial ownership or use to private interests. Examples include expropriation of forest resources, or interventions to radically

### Floods and Forests: Indonesia and Malaysia

In the past two years, Indonesia and Malaysia have experienced catastrophic floods. In December 2006, over 100 people were killed and 70,000 driven from their homes by rain-triggered flash floods in Aceh’s eastern coastal areas. Two thousand three hundred houses were swept away and 7,000 seriously damaged, as were school buildings, mosques, and bridges.

In February 2007, Jakarta was hit by its worst flood in recent decades. The flood killed at least 80 people in the capital and surrounding areas and displaced thousands, unleashed disease outbreaks such as diarrhea, fever, flu, and skin irritation, and disrupted transportation, communications, and power supply. The flood paralyzed the center of Indonesia’s economy for several days. Businesses lost about US$1 billion.

At the end of July 2007, over 20,000 people were forced to evacuate to safer areas because of floods in Morowali district, Central Sulawesi. Thousands of hectares of farm lands were damaged.

In Malaysia, destructive floods due to continuous rainfall hit the southern region twice, on December 19, 2006 and on January 10, 2007. Several states, in particular Johor and neighboring states Pahang, Negeri Sembilan, and Malacca, were affected. These floods displaced approximately 100,000 people, and caused major damage to roads, bridges, palm oil estates, and fish farms. The floods were the most costly disaster in Malaysian history, with the loss estimated to be in the vicinity of US$500 million.

A wide range of Indonesian officials have publicly acknowledged the connection between deforestation and floods, from President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to district and environmental officials. Environmental activists have blamed illegal logging activity for floods in certain parts of Indonesia.

In Malaysia, opposition members suggest that large-scale illegal logging has contributed to the floods, and they have criticized the government for not dealing with deforestation effectively. Malaysia’s press takes it as a given that there is a link between deforestation and the flooding in 2006–2007.

There is disagreement among experts about the extent to which deforestation increases the risk of flood disasters. Researchers from Australia’s Charles Darwin University and the National University of Singapore believe they have evidence of a link. Analyzing data from 56 developing countries across Africa, Asia, and Central and South America between 1990 and 2000, they extrapolated that a 10 percent decrease in natural forest area increased the frequency of flooding from 4 to 28 percent.

*Sources: Antara (Indonesia); New Straits Times (Malaysia); The Straits Times (Singapore); Consortium on Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia.*
change watercourses and water uses, through dams, irrigation networks, and similar means.

In some cases, the commons have been used by outside “free-riders” with technical or capital resources superior to those of local communities. As a result the commons either have been depleted to the detriment of local livelihoods and environments, or have been environmentally damaged as a side-effect of other economic activities. Overfishing, degradation of marine environments through other economic practices, and degradation of water quality, land erosion, and similar consequences of mineral extraction may be considered examples of these.

In some instances, the predominant issue has been simply economic: competition for use of commons between different interests. Examples include competition between local coastal fisheries and multinational factory fleets or concerns that the economic benefits of extraction of minerals by multinational corporations are not being equitably shared with local communities. In other cases, the concern is primarily environmental, related to traditions and cultures rooted in local ecological balance.

In yet other instances, the issue of expropriation of the commons arises at a broader social level, with effects of general scope. Such effects raise public policy questions that transcend local communities or even nation-states. When planting of cash crops leads corporate interests or even local communities to burn forests in Indonesia, this expropriates the atmosphere throughout the region by polluting it with smoke and haze. It also reduces nature’s contribution to carbon reduction, a unilateral impact on the global environment. Notably, the entire issue of global climate change has been repeatedly framed by experts in all three regions as an instance of competing and unregulated expropriation of the commons.

**Natural Resources and Conflict**

Recent trends in natural resource exploitation also constitute threats to security as conventionally defined, because they give rise to conflict or exacerbate existing sources of conflict. These are often armed conflicts among contending private actors, as in forest resource conflicts in India or Indonesia, or between local groups and the state. These conflicts have become threats to the authority of the state because of the role of the state in facilitating the entry of outsiders for exploitation of natural resources, because of the corrupt practices often associated with this, and because the state’s efforts to constrain the worst excesses (social, economic, or environmental) are often hampered by incapacity or lassitude.

Conflict and armed challenges to the state arise repeatedly from the interplay of economic, political, and environmental factors. Highly similar dynamics recur in places as culturally and politically varied as the Philippine island of Mindanao, the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya, areas throughout India, the Pakistani province of Balochistan, the Pashtun areas of the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea.
The common elements are combinations of the following factors: political struggle over grievances about inequitable distribution of the economic benefits of mining operations by large corporations; a sense of discrimination on the basis of group identity; and concerns about damage (say from mining operations or deforestation) to the natural environment associated with a traditional way of life, in terms of traditional livelihoods and culture.

Precise district by district data collected by Pakistani environmental and development experts demonstrate the highest incidence of insurgency in districts experiencing the most intense levels of degradation of livelihoods and environment, and the highest levels of food insecurity. Tribal areas in the Indian heartland are simultaneously areas of a high degree of exploitation of mineral or forest resources and of Naxalite insurgency. Areas in India’s Northeast, which have suffered insurrections for a half century and continue to do so today, are also areas of intense natural resource exploitation by technologically sophisticated and politically well-connected corporations in culturally and ecologically vulnerable environments. The same is true for areas of Burma that have long-standing ethnic insurgencies.

Particularly rapid acceleration of the pace of natural resource exploitation is often seen to overwhelm the very cultural and institutional mechanisms that could mediate and contain the stresses and conflicts that arise from that rapid change. These changes also constitute threats to human security because they prejudice the long-term sustainability of livelihoods, economies, and ways of life. They simultaneously threaten to create environmental stresses and natural disasters that could themselves pose challenges to the physical security of those affected. They also contribute to migration from the countryside to the cities or across national borders, which brings attendant human hardship for migrants and stresses on their host communities.

Another significant source of instability is seen in the extent to which attempts to regulate and control water resources through construction of dams lead to social dislocations on a significant scale. It is estimated that 56 million people have been displaced by dams in India alone, without adequate planning or provision for their resettlement. This is a source of social disruption in their new locations, as well as creating alienated and economically deprived populations with few sustaining social institutions. Yet dams are considered central to the water strategies (agricultural irrigation as well as municipal supply) of Pakistan and India.

Meanwhile, the changes effected by dams in major river flows have profound implications for the human security and welfare of downstream users, and have already spawned significant disputes (and could trigger conflict) between nations and even between provinces and states within nations. The human security impacts will also be likely contributors to social and political instability. Institutional mechanisms such as the international bodies purporting to regulate the Mekong or Ganges systems remain weak and unequal to mediating the rapidly changing natural profile of river flows and the rapidly changing use patterns from rapid and unregulated economic development.
The Case of Mindanao

The multiple insurgencies in the Philippines, and particularly on the island of Mindanao, suggest the complexity of the relationship among the economics of natural resource exploitation, its environmental implications, and cultural identity. It is commonly understood that there is more than one insurgency in the Philippines, a Communist one conducted by the New People’s Army (NPA) and one in the “Moro” Muslim areas of Mindanao. What is less clearly understood by observers outside the Philippines is the complexity of the situation in Mindanao. Clearly the shift of center of gravity from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) suggests a change in emphasis from an ethnic basis of identification (albeit an ethnicity also marked by religion) to a specifically Islamic basis of identity. Nonetheless, it is quite clear from the demands that are articulated by MILF that, like the rebellion in Muslim southern Thailand, the Moro rebellion remains more about grievances based on identity than about Islamic ideology, more about local control of resources and political power than about theology.

What is most interesting is to place the Moro rebellion (limited to a small portion of the island) in the larger context of economic development throughout Mindanao (mineral resources in the central uplands, deep sea oil and gas reserves, and agro and fish-processing). The larger political-economic context consists of multinationals extracting mineral resources in partnership with Philippine corporations, and aided by a government perceived to be highly corrupt. Whereas the contention between these interests and local communities is predominantly about a fair share from these activities, the failure to arrive at a formula for this has led to the demand that local communities, including the Moro, have political control of those resources and of the local structures of law and order and administration. Meanwhile, locals describe the situation as being “like Aceh or Papua,” where corporations act as a state with their own armed forces, with the Armed Forces of the Philippines available to these companies as subcontracted security forces.

Equally interesting is the play of cultural factors in this complex mix. Whereas the issue of fair share of economic benefits of extractive activities (and the related issue of full participation in governance to ensure a local role in decision making about distribution of economic benefits) is a common cause of all armed resistance in Mindanao, there are significant ideological and cultural variations on other issues. Within the Moro community, the majority are concerned with the core issues of governance and fair share, but a minority finds itself also concerned with the environmental impacts of the economic activities in contention. This environmentalist element shares common interests with the more inchoate armed resistance found in central Mindanao, where the aboriginal populations have heightened concerns about a threatened way of life. They also feel threats to their cultural identity, including their strong sense of identification with elements of the physical environment, such as mountains that they consider sacred which are being mined...
by Canadian corporations. For example, these communities have established what are called “schools of living tradition” which see reclamation and protection of the environment as tantamount to establishment of educational and cultural resources and institutions.

The absence of organized political movements here, in contrast to the Moro areas, has led to the sole recourse of sporadic armed resistance, small scale, uncoordinated and *ad hoc*. In contrast to the fracturing of resistance on a community by community basis, the Moro political leadership seeks to advance a vision of unity, of all local struggles in Mindanao sharing common interests. An alternative vision is offered by the NPA, seeking to unify these local struggles with a larger nationwide Communist insurgency also largely based on local injustice and grievance, but with a class-based national orientation.

**THE STATE**

The state is often the source of conflict and insecurity. Its deliberate withdrawal from its function as provider of social welfare or economic regulation; its deteriorated technical or administrative capacity; its lack of political will; its capture by private interests through graft or nepotism; and its role in implementing policies that increase economic and social inequality: these factors often contribute to the alienation and despair of already economically or socially marginal populations. By the same token, there remains a prospect that the state could be re-empowered as an instrument of security and social and political order if it demonstrated the capacity to meet the most pressing challenges faced by societies. When a society requires institutional and technical means to respond to pandemics or natural disasters, to conserve environmental goods, to engage in economic reform and regulation to attract investment and generate livelihoods, or to restrain predatory economic actors, the opportunity presents itself for the state to win the confidence of its citizens or subjects.

There appears to be an almost universal trend in all three regions of a significant diminution of the state’s role as provider of basic education, basic health services, and other common goods such as clean water. An exception might be noted in the paternalistic welfare states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Here too there is growing concern about the relative insufficiency of public support to meet need (certainly as compared with past state munificence), though their elites at least have the means and the will to outsource these functions to the private sector and expatriate expertise.

There is also a universal trend of either withdrawal from regulatory functions or the revision of regulatory policy so as to leave citizens less protected than before. Corruption emerges as a significant common factor here, varying from the outright graft seen in most of the states in the three regions to the more predictable but still inequitable preferences and privileges of elites in the Gulf.
Of particular concern and a particular source of vulnerability for the state is its capacity to respond to catastrophic events of nature or human health. Most societies in the three regions (prosperous Gulf societies and Singapore and Malaysia excepted) already suffer from fragile infrastructure and lack administrative capacity to meet even normal needs. The potential consequences of a catastrophe on the social well-being of their societies, and the possibility that subsequent political and security consequences will lead to a serious erosion of state legitimacy and public order, remain a sword of Damocles.

At one end of the spectrum are found those states that are considered at peril of failing for one reason or another, each related to a transnational threat or (more commonly) a combination of them. At the other end of the spectrum are states that are strong and evince little sense of concern about their capacity to control events. Singapore and the Gulf monarchies are the clearest examples of the latter. Malaysia and Thailand seem fundamentally capable, but their capacity seems to be in question owing to recent stresses to their political systems. The states at the edge of failure include Cambodia and Bangladesh, and the more self-evident cases of countries suffering armed conflict, such as Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Afghanistan presents a potentially disastrous conjunction of natural resources eyed eagerly by foreigners and poor state capacity to negotiate sovereign interests in these. Its hydrocarbons, copper, iron ore, gold, gemstones, and marble have already both attracted the attentions of corporations and been significant sources of income for belligerent forces in recent civil conflicts. There is a vast inequality in technical knowledge and resources between the Afghan government and international corporate and government bidders for its wealth. The corrosive effects of pervasive corruption are also a significant source of vulnerability. There is a high likelihood that negotiations could result in an agreement that undervalues the Afghan economic stake, insufficiently protects environmental equities, and therefore undercuts the fragile political and ideological legitimacy not only of the present Afghan government (already widely excoriated as a foreign puppet) but more widely of the present Afghan political system.

Most of the states in the three regions fall between strong states and those at the edge of failure. They are stressed by several factors, principally declining capacity and willingness to provide social protection to their populations, either through exercise of regulatory functions over economic activity, or through provision of clean water, basic education, basic health care and protection against chronic or acute public health threats, and infrastructure such as sewage and electricity. The rising expectations and higher level of alienation, born of greater transparency and global communications, have led to these factors having greater political consequence than might have been the case. The falling off from a baseline set by traditions of basic social protection under erstwhile autarchic statist systems such as those in Egypt and India has also been a significant factor.
Legitimacy and Sovereignty

As social conflict has intensified as a result of growing disparities of wealth and opportunity, or over competition for resources, the state has also been stressed in its capacity to provide law and order to its citizens. In part this diminution of capacity is a result of diminished resources in the hands of the state relative to total resources in the society. In part it is the result of increased need, owing to increases in population, the increased sophistication of criminals, and the availability to them of more lethal and sophisticated tools. In part it is the result of increased demands for police resources from new economic installations and new elites with more to protect.

The combination of diminution of absolute protection and rising expectations has resulted in serious erosion of the state’s legitimacy with its citizens. In some cases, alternative sources of social and/or police protection have emerged to occupy the vacuum left by the state. Examples are Hizbullah in Lebanon and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. More localized militant and armed alternatives to state authority have emerged in many of the countries of the three regions, including Pakistan, India, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

In cases where states are perceived as being captive to foreign interests—whether governments, corporations, banks, multilateral lenders, or donors—their legitimacy is subject to yet another source of challenge.

The increasing role of foreign and multilateral interests and institutions in the affairs of all nations is of course a natural reflection of the processes of global integration. The question of sovereignty is a complex one as it is applied to the range of transnational trends and challenges. Many of these, such as climate change, migration, pandemics, natural disasters, transnational crime, and terrorism, exceed the capacities of individual states to address effectively. Nonetheless, at a time when the social and economic inequalities within states and between states are rising steeply, it is highly problematical to contemplate the loss of effective national sovereign control (which in democratic states means popular control) over the policy decisions that can address these emerging transnational threats.

What is clear is that the losers from global integration seem to have common interests with similar social groups in neighboring states. For example, Pakistani, Indian, and Bangladeshi peasants have a common interest in changes in the forces of nature (river systems, climate change) that will determine their livelihoods and food security. Their advocates certainly are among those most avidly supporting regional cooperation, even as they criticize the state’s willingness to collaborate with foreign capital. Nongovernmental groups in Southeast Asia, particularly those working on anti-corruption advocacy, on environmental protection, and on grass-roots organizing on natural resources, have also developed a web of transnational technical collaborations and a sense of transnational solidarity. Critics of
global economic integration are as ready as its proponents to contemplate and even welcome the model of a “post-Westphalian” international order. All this suggests that what drives resistance to globalization is its particular form and effects, not a xenophobic rejection of cosmopolitan identity.

In all three regions, the state is often seen as the source of the problem rather than the solution. It is often seen engaging in acts and adopting policies that will add to rather than mitigate transnational threats such as environmental degradation, migration, or terrorism. The inability of the losers to participate in the design and implementation of development and reform strategies is likely to contribute to a widening gulf between state and society. Shared political norms and commonly accepted ideologies will consequently become increasingly irrelevant or lose their sense of legitimacy. This diminution will open the way for narrower, less modernizing, and more divisive ideologies. It is essential to look behind the institutional forms of democracy and governance, and to take account of how power relationships between social groups affect on the one hand their participation in and perceptions of the state, and on the other the quality of governance.

A sign of the future is found in three relatively democratic societies—Lebanon, the Philippines, and India. In Lebanon, the state appears to have effectively bifurcated, and is essentially in a process of negotiating a confederation. The causal varieties and territorial extent of insurgencies in India and the Philippines are cause for alarm. All three challenge the facile narrative about democratic states and societies, or economically liberalizing ones.

Two trends together constitute a volatile mix: on the one hand, a diffusion of knowledge and increasing awareness in civil society and among individuals and, on the other, serious impairment of the legitimacy of the state and its capacity to maintain public order. The relationship between the state and its citizens is a major feature of the political instability and political violence widely anticipated as a result of rapid social change.

The state’s legitimacy is closely related to the overall resilience of societies in facing transnational challenges. Non-state actors have assumed increasing importance at this historical juncture, and this trend will continue. These non-state actors include commercial and financial interests and Islamist movements.

As significant are the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that serve vulnerable populations or unpopular causes such as environmental protection. Yet these often evince ambivalence at their own indispensability; they are wary of being the default substitute for the state’s failure. They feel that only the state has the sovereign authority, administrative capacity, reach, and technical or financial resources to adequately respond to the scale of need. Although their lack of self-confidence sometimes causes the state to ignore them, they are often the greatest advocates for restoration of the capacity of the state. Yet their contentious struggles on the front lines of pressing transnational issues often cause them to sympathize with
others who compensate for the state’s shortcomings, including ideologically radical or even violent anti-state movements.

The hampered capacity and political will of the state to respond to the threats of greatest concern, to populations as a whole and to particular constituencies, has created a crisis of legitimacy for the state. In many cases, this merely compounds

Climate Change and Indian Opinion

The government of India adopts the posture of a conscientious party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol. Its statements at multilateral meetings note that it has

- Created the National Council on Climate Change, chaired by the Prime Minister and tasked with developing a national strategy.
- Adopted the Energy Conservation Act, establishing the Bureau of Energy Efficiency and outlining the national government’s authority to enforce conservation and efficient use of energy.
- Adopted the National Environmental Policy (NEP) in 2006 as a comprehensive framework.

The government takes the position that all countries do not bear equal responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions, and that developing countries are less responsible for climate change but will bear the brunt of its effects. It resists calls to curb India’s emissions and has objected to UN calls for developing countries to cut carbon emissions by 20 percent. It rejects “quantitative targets of emissions limitations” as “counter-productive” and as having “a negative effect on ... development.” It asks developed countries to take the lead in emissions reduction.

However, India’s emissions are growing rapidly, and it is poised to become the world’s third-largest emitter by 2030. Elements of Indian civil society evince a different position. A survey conducted in 2005 by WorldPublicOpinion.org finds that half of Indians surveyed believe that India should limit its greenhouse gas emissions, and that 85 percent of those surveyed see the effects of global warming as a threat. The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) Climate Confidence Index of July 2007 notes that out of the 9,000 people surveyed in nine countries, Indians are the most concerned about climate change and committed to steps to mitigate it. Climate change ranks as the second-greatest concern for Indians after terrorism. The HSBC Index finds that 70 percent of Indians believe that developed economies should take the lead in mitigating climate change, compared to a world average of 85 percent.

Indian citizens appear to support more resolute unilateral action than does their government. Critics of official policy find little evidence that the government incorporates the issue of climate change into national policy discussion related to electricity generation, transportation planning, and other related sectors. They also note the absence of assessments of prospective economic damage from climate change, suggesting that such assessment would require hard choices about investment priorities.

Sources: Government of India National Environmental Policy; Statement of Minister of External Affairs at Meeting of Major Economies, Washington, DC, September 27, 2007; Economic & Political Weekly (India); WorldPublicOpinion.org.
an existing legitimacy deficit born of capture of the state by political and economic elites. In other cases, it magnifies what is more the ineptitude of a state than its deliberate denial of popular aspirations. In yet others, the lack of meaningful response to global trends becomes the primary source of doubt about state legitimacy. On occasion there is a more or less rapid dissolution of ideologies or value systems that have tacitly guided and framed discourse in these societies. The combination of an ideological vacuum and a lack of political legitimacy opens space for the rapid advance of ideologies and rhetoric that may have little historical presence in a society. At times it allows ideologies which have historically appealed only to small minorities to expand their influence rapidly.

**IDEOLOGY AND IDENTITY**

Rapid change in ways of life has led many to seek reassurance in traditional identities and cultures, has provided *entrée* for new ideologies. The latter are often “neo-” versions of traditional identities and ideologies, severed from their social, cultural, and historical contexts, and grossly simplified or distorted in content. They often answer to the anxieties and discontents born of social dislocation and destabilization. This is associated with an increase in religiosity, particularly in the Middle East and in South Asia, and in all religious groups. This has both a psychological and a practical dimension. The vacuum left by withdrawal of the state from the provision of social safety nets such as low-cost food or functioning public education or primary health services has been filled by traditional religious charitable groups or by political movements.

Across the three regions Islam’s influence is the most widespread, in the formation of contemporary identities and in the elaboration of contemporary ideologies. It is not however the only important ideology. Both secular ideologies and movements of non-Muslim religious ideological renewal and political mobilization also deserve attention.

In the domain of secular ideologies, neo-liberal economics and liberal political values remain fiercely contested ideological ground. Secular anti-capitalism and secular anti-Westernism retain substantial force, particularly in India and generally in non-Muslim South and Southeast Asia, as well as in important Muslim countries such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, though in these latter they are generally accompanied by an acknowledgment of the primacy of Islam. In most of the Muslim world, secular forms of anti-capitalism and anti-Westernism are eclipsed by the Islamic formulation of anti-capitalist or anti-Western sentiments. The most significant ideologies giving rise to armed challenges to state authority are variants of Maoism, which are particularly significant in India, Nepal, and the Philippines.

Among religious ideologies, most significant is radical Hindu mobilization in India. It has also begun to be seen in Nepal. Buddhist mobilizations are assuming increasing importance for political stability, either as threats to social unity and se-
curity and generators of conflict, as in Sri Lanka or Thailand, or as peaceful challenges to state authority as in Burma. Also significant are various forms of mobilization among Christians, Roman Catholic and Protestant evangelical, in Southeast Asia, particularly in the Philippines and Indonesia.

Each of these, with the exception of the mobilization in Burma, implicitly or explicitly asserts religious ideology as a basis of division in society, and thus poses actual or potential threats to political stability through provocative and divisive mobilization for social conflict. It is hard to overstate the widespread concern among Indians of all religious groups about the threat to social order, and to the fragile political consensus, posed by Hindu chauvinist mobilizations. This concern is intensified by the aid, comfort, and legitimacy lent by some state officials to manifestly illegal and violent sectarian activities. These are also seen as contributing to militancy and sympathy for covert terrorist groups among Indian Muslims, youth in particular. In Southeast Asia, concerns are expressed about the socially and politically destabilizing consequences of Christian evangelism and related business activity. Evangelical Christians and the Roman Catholic Church (hierarchy and membership) play a significant political role as supporters of government counter-insurgency efforts in the complex security picture in Mindanao, where indigenous Muslims, aboriginal populations, long-established Christian settlers, and outsiders both Filipino and foreign, contend over the island’s natural resources, including minerals and agricultural land, in a heavily armed environment, in the context of armed insurgency and counter-insurgency operations.

Islamism, Muslim Identity, and Intellectual Renewal

Islamist politics is one manifestation of a global Islamic revival which comprises intellectual, cultural, and theological renewal and reform. That revival is about the growth and development of Muslim societies, not their opposition to the West. Intellectually imprecise condemnation of Islamist politics can be mistaken for hostility to that larger revival, and thus to the energy of Muslim societies to renew themselves. Because that revival takes place in societies the vast majority of whose members are also concerned with benefiting more fully from the economic fruits of modernization, the revival is not necessarily in opposition to modernity. Its oppositional stance is as much against perceived externally dictated modernization and against states and local political elites that appear to be closer to the purposes of the West than to the aspirations of their own populations.

Among Muslim communities, whether at the level of state and society in Muslim-majority countries, or at the level of society in Muslim-minority countries, Islam remains the predominant source of authority and legitimation even for the most secular of political and social strategies. Public health campaigns in Muslim societies benefit from fatwa and the appeal to religious principles. Attempts to provide gender-sensitive policing can be justified by appeal to Islamic values. Societies as distinct as those of Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, India, and Iraq find elites and dissidents, state and non-state actors, appealing to Islam as a source
of justification for social policy. In the realm of thought, Islam functions as a source of presumptive and self-evident intellectual validity, its role akin to that of reason or logic in secular philosophy. In Muslim-majority societies, the strategy of the most secular and de-Islamicized of Muslim intellectuals is to begin with the argument that a particular course of action is not contrary to Islam. What distinguishes this from developments among, for example, Hindu Indians is the fact that in Muslim communities the appeal is not only to a religious identity, but simultaneously to Islamic values and intellectual tradition.

Not all anti-state violence carried out by Muslim groups has religious or Islamist inspiration or goals. Muslim groups in armed rebellion for control of territory (such as those in southern Thailand, the southern Philippines, Aceh in Indonesia, or Indian Kashmir) may identify themselves in terms of their religious identity, but are more often in opposition to the state for the same reasons as non-Muslim groups such as those in the tribal areas of India, in northeast India, or in Irian Jaya in Indonesia. All have in common their struggle for control of local resources, for self-determination, and for freedom from discrimination by governments or majority ethnic groups. This distinguishes these Muslim insurgent groups quite sharply from groups with a more explicitly Islamic religious agenda, such as Islamist political parties or covert jihadi terrorist groups. Jihad as a rationale for violent attacks (usually covert) on civilians, however thoroughly elaborated as ideological, is quite similar to the modus operandi of non-Muslim terrorist organizations. Jihadi terrorism should also be distinguished from the use of Islamic identity as the basis of political organization and political parties. The extent to which the latter are covert is as often as not a function of state repression rather than a preference for conspiratorial methods for their own sake.

These distinctions have implications for political strategies and the political stability of important states such as Pakistan. The view from within the Pashtun belt suggests that the interests of the US and the Pakistani state would be better served by an understanding that the issue is less one of Islamic ideology than it is an issue of governance and local control. Such an understanding suggests political and administrative approaches based upon local networks and loyalties that among Western observers are understood only by ethnographers (certainly not by military planners), and upon the seamless and complex political, economic, social, and ideological continuities and unities between the areas of conflict and the rest of the society and country. That said, it should be acknowledged that Pashtun rebellion in Pakistan is different from Muslim rebellions in Muslim-minority countries. In a national polity dominated by Islamic religious-political discourse, this opposition to a nominally Islamic government has articulated a more religious rationale, purist relative to the perceived hypocrisy of the national body politic. This has also meant that the lines are more blurred between this predominantly local political resistance and the activities of jihadi groups and Islamist political parties, as all three forces jockey for political alliances based upon shared Islamic referents.
There can be little doubt that Islamist political parties throughout the three regions do have a political agenda based on religious identity and values, and that their commitment to the firmer establishment of sharia is serious. That said it is just as clear that the predominant explanation for their appeal is simply political. These parties often appeal to pragmatic political concerns, such as rejection of Israel or alienation from Al Fatah misgovernment among Palestinians, and the failure of government institutions and weakness of civil society among Egyptians or Lebanese Shia. Their appeal is bolstered by their provision of many services that governments or secular institutions are incapable of offering, such as humanitarian food aid, basic education, and health clinics. That said, these Islamist parties have not systematically developed political programs incorporating these aspirations of voters. It has been the case where they have governed, as in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan, that the challenge of governing has exposed the fragility of their political base, and they have been succeeded by secular parties. Something similar is predicted in the event of the Muslim Brotherhood being allowed to assume power after free and fair elections in Egypt.

Among the strategies that state elites have employed to compensate for their deficit of popular political legitimacy is selective adoption of the rhetoric and policies of critics. Where states pursue substantive policies that promote global integration and its consequences, they “buy” political space to do so by the embrace of religious-political rhetoric. This has occurred in Gujarat state in India, which is simultaneously a “poster child” for economic growth from global integration and for vicious anti-Muslim pogroms, and in the Wahhabi state of Saudi Arabia.

**THE FUTURE**

The growing religiosity of political discourse reflects the delegitimation of secularism owing to its perceived failures or its association with corrupt or unrepresentative political orders. Those secular ideologies that appear to have greatest continuing viability are anti-capitalist, or those which articulate demands for democracy that move beyond a sole demand for representative institutions, to encompass a full range of governance issues, including economic inequality, transparency, the rule of law, and the social support needs of vulnerable groups of society.

Looming above the trends projected by experts, and the mapping of the current ideological, cultural, and intellectual terrain, is a question about the ideological implications of demographic trends. The youth bulges found in much of South Asia and the Middle East (less so in Southeast Asia) raise significant questions. With the coming to maturity of this large age group, not only does the issue of employment generation come to the fore, with all the political and security implications of failure. As important are the cultural effects.

What will be the psychological and ideological dimensions of youth’s response to social, economic, or environmental crisis in their respective societies? What will
they learn from each other across borders and through cyberspace, that epitome of youth? Above all, what will be the ideological implications of the cultural center of gravity in many large societies shifting to populations that have little living memory or historical awareness (and even less if educational systems continue to fail) of political or cultural traditions such as Arab or Indian secularism or the syncretic Hindu-Muslim culture of the South Asian subcontinent?

Behind all these intellectual trends and more lurks a question of what will be the future sources of cultural and ideological prestige and authority. What is clear is that the sharp dialectic between the status quo and reformist or revolutionary modernization is no longer useful. Tradition, in the form of what we might call neo-traditionalism, is as much a tool for radical questioning of the conventional trajectory and dominant narrative of a beneficent integration into a global society. Economic and political modernization is often seen as the instrument of consolidation of elite interests and dominance. Indian “Marxists” line up on the side of both multinational corporations seeking displacement of Indian peasants and those resisting them. Islam is both the basis of the monarchical authority of superwealthy elites, participating with sophistication in the complex global economy, and a call to mobilization of dispossessed Palestinians, disadvantaged Lebanese Shia, or Egyptian urbanites.

This ideological vacuum and intellectual ferment provide both the opportunity and the necessity for all contending social forces to articulate a new vision. Clearly, a growing religiosity is a significant factor that will shape the ideological landscape of the future. Equally clearly, ideologies based on the antagonistic class interests of the dispossessed and the possessors have substantial viability. How does a secular vision and narrative compete in this environment, where the secularisms of a previous generation have been exhausted or discredited by their association with failed political systems or elites?

**IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY**

There is growing recognition that violent threats to security and uncontrollable threats to political order cannot be understood without reference to other realities. These realities include general trends in societies and economies, and trends in the relationships between human societies and nature. This demands that what has been called “human security” or “nontraditional security” be placed in the mainstream of security discourse and salvaged from the sometimes patronizing indulgence accorded it as an intellectual fashion *parvenu*. With the ever greater likelihood of catastrophic droughts, floods, or coastal inundation, the security consequences of resulting migrations towards urban centers and across international borders deserve urgent attention. The prospects of social instability resulting from large and uncontrolled movements of people are great. As great are the prospects of conflict over essential resources such as water rendered even scarcer as a result of these catastrophes. Among the cluster of potential outcomes of climate change
and resulting environmental degradation identified by the recent European Union report on Climate Change and International Security are mass migration, radicalization, and state failure.

Without an analytical understanding that comprises a complex set of issues, it will be harder to accurately diagnose security threats, and to bring to bear the appropriate instruments of power for their mitigation or solution. What has become apparent in recent years is that single or simple instruments of power have been unequal to the task. The overarching governance challenges of the early decades of the twenty-first century will be to devise the appropriate analytical models to understand our world, and to adapt cultures and ideologies for marshalling social consensus in support of policy responses.

As important as an integral analytical model is reliance on multiple and representative sources from the front lines. Careful listening to experts from those societies prevents hasty decisions, gives pause where appropriate, and cautions as to how complex things might be. Policy decisions can only benefit from this closer reading of the terrain over which policy will be implemented.

Diplomatic or development initiatives, and decisions about the uses of military power, can only benefit from accurate reading of that terrain. An understanding of the complexity of the social and political environment is essential to any of the following: the appropriate diplomatic posture to secure collective action on pandemic diseases; the development of options for, or effective pursuit of, military operations; or the appropriate combination of military force and development. One could avoid inadvertently compounding the problem, for example in the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderland, if one understood the political implications of rapid environmental deterioration, of rapid change in people’s livelihoods, of removal of traditional trade routes as a result of security operations, and of rapid change in structures of local political authority.
--- Annex 1 ---

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES

AUTHORS FROM THE REGIONS

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Hayfaa Almudhaf is Director of the Public Relations and Publications Division of the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research (KISR). An engineer by training, she has led a number of research projects at KISR and in the past served as Director of the Policy Research and Planning Division. She has also served on the Board of Directors of Kuwait’s Environment Public Authority (EPA) and as a member of the Higher Committee of Kuwait’s Public Authority for Housing Care. She has authored more than 40 publications, including technical reports, conference papers, and journal articles. Her areas of expertise include development and workforce issues in the Gulf.

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V. Balachandran is a Mumbai-based independent security consultant with a background in intelligence and in the Indian Police Service. He served as Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, Minister in the Embassy of India in Washington, DC, and headed the Special Branch in Mumbai. Mr. Balachandran’s areas of expertise include police intelligence, counterterrorism, crime, and insurgency. He is a regular contributor to major Indian and international dailies.

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Mely Caballero-Anthony is Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. She also holds the concurrent positions of Coordinator of the School’s Programme on Non-Traditional Security in Asia and Secretary-General of the newly established Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia (NTS-Asia). Dr. Caballero-Anthony’s research interests include regionalism and regional security in the Asia-Pacific; multilateral security cooperation, politics, and international relations in Southeast Asia; conflict prevention and management; and human security. Her recent publications include Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way (2005), UN Peace Operations and Asian Security (2005), Studying Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Issues and Trends (2006), and Understanding Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitization (2006). She has also published extensively in journals such as Asian Survey, Asian Perspective, and Journal of International Affairs.
Antonio P. Contreras
Antonio P. Contreras obtained his PhD in Political Science from the University of Hawaii in 1991, as an East-West Center Fellow. In 2001, he joined the faculty of the Political Science Department of De La Salle University, where he is Full Professor, and is currently the Dean of the College of Liberal Arts. Previously he taught at the College of Forestry and Natural Resources of University of the Philippines, Los Banos, and in 2003 he was a Research Exchange Fellow with the Southeast Asia Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN). His academic areas include comparative politics, political theory, political economy, environment and natural resources policy and governance, and gender and development. His research focus is on state–civil society relationships, particularly on the role of non-state actors in governance at all levels, and political processes in domains not traditionally considered political. His current research includes studies on the politics of the media and the politics of commercial sex work.

Paul Dyer
Paul Dyer is a Research Associate at the Dubai School of Government. His research interests include demographics, labor policy, public service provision, and the political economy of reform in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Mr. Dyer received a master’s degree in Arab Studies with a concentration in Economics and Development from Georgetown University, where he was the Sheikh Sultan bin Mohamed Al Qassemi Scholar. Prior to joining the Dubai School of Government, he worked with the World Bank for four years as a consultant in the Office of the Chief Economist, MENA Region. While at the World Bank, he served on the core team of authors for several regional reports, including *Unlocking the Employment Potential in the Middle East and North Africa: Toward a New Social Contract* and *MENA Economic Developments and Prospects*. He is the author of several articles on employment in the Middle East and co-authored a chapter on employment in the *2007 Arab World Competitiveness Report* and a chapter on the fertility decline in *Labor Markets in the Middle East and North Africa*.

Irfan Engineer
Irfan Engineer is Director of the Centre for Study of Society and Secularism (CSSS) in Mumbai. The Centre undertakes research projects in the fields of religious, communal, and ethnic conflicts and comparative religions; organizes interfaith discussions; conducts training programs; prepares community-based mass awareness programs; and networks with other organizations in order to promote communal harmony and the spirit of secularism in India. Mr. Engineer is a prominent social activist and advocate and is also the Associate Editor of the *Indian Journal of Secularism*.

Len R. Garces
Len R. Garces has been with the WorldFish Center in Manila for 16 years and currently holds the post of Research Fellow, through which he is involved with the Center’s coastal fisheries projects. He has extensive fisheries and aquaculture re-
search experience in several Southeast and South Asian nations. In addition to other Integrated Coastal Zone Management research and training activities, Mr. Garces has been leading the multidisciplinary project *Fisheries Rehabilitation in Tsunami-Affected Indonesia* since 2005. In the past, Mr. Garces worked on the ADB-funded project *Sustainable Management of Coastal Fish Stocks in Asia* and *Fish Fights over Fish Rights in Southeast Asia*, and he supervised coastal area fieldwork activities as a part of the Resource and Ecological Assessment Studies team in the Philippines. His research focuses on innovative ways of assessing and managing small-scale fisheries in developing country situations.

**Rami Khouri**

Rami Khouri is currently Dubai Initiative Senior Fellow, Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, and Editor-at-Large of the Beirut-based *Daily Star*, which is published throughout the Middle East. In addition, he writes an internationally syndicated column for the *International Herald Tribune*. He was a 2001–2002 Neiman Journalism Fellow at Harvard University and was appointed a member of the Brookings Institution Task Force on US Relations with the Islamic World. He is a Research Associate at the Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflict at the Maxwell School, Syracuse University; a Fellow of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (Jerusalem); and a member of the Leadership Council of the Harvard University Divinity School. He also serves on the board of the East-West Institute, the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University, and the Jordan National Museum. He was executive editor of the *Daily Star* newspaper from 2003 to 2005, and before that had been Editor-in-Chief of the *Jordan Times* for seven years.

**Anthony Pramualratana**

Anthony Pramualratana, Executive Director of the Thailand Business Coalition on AIDS (TBCA), has been involved in HIV/AIDS-related issues since 1990, after graduating with a PhD in Demography from the Australian National University. After his studies in Australia, Dr. Pramualratana assumed a teaching and research position at Mahidol University. In 1996, he joined the United Nations Development Programme in the position of HIV/AIDS Management Specialist and assisted, among other activities, in the establishment of the UNAIDS Programme in Thailand. In 1997, Dr. Pramualratana joined the Thailand Business Coalition on AIDS as its second Executive Director.

**Authors from The Henry L. Stimson Center**

**Richard P. Cronin**

Richard P. Cronin has headed the Asian Political Economy project at the Stimson Center since July 2006. Currently, he is working on issues concerning hydropower in the Mekong Basin, US-ASEAN relations, and issues concerning China and Southeast Asia. Previously, Dr. Cronin worked with the Congressional Research
Service (CRS) as a Senior Asian Affairs Specialist in the Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division. CRS is the nonpartisan research and information arm of the US Congress. His responsibilities included both research and research management, spanning a wide range of US policy issues regarding South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia. Dr. Cronin has taught comparative political economy of Asia at Johns Hopkins and Washington, DC–area universities and has taught in Japan and lectured on Asian political and security issues in more than a dozen Asian-Pacific countries. He received his PhD from Syracuse University and his MA and BS from the University of Houston.

**Emile El-Hokayem**

Emile El-Hokayem is a Research Fellow with the Henry L. Stimson Center’s Southwest Asia/Gulf program, which he joined in June 2004. His current research focuses on the security and politics of the Persian Gulf, with a particular emphasis on the Iranian nuclear issue, Iran-GCC relations, and regional security. He is also analyzing the defense and security policies of the Arab Gulf states. Mr. El-Hokayem is also an analyst of Lebanese and Syrian politics and security. He earned his Master of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown University, where he focused on international security, US foreign policy, and the Middle East. He also served as Editor-in-Chief of the *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, the school’s academic publication. He has worked as an independent consultant on Middle East issues, including human rights, refugee affairs, and political reform. His Washington experience includes research work on Middle East issues at the International Crisis Group and the Middle East Institute. He holds degrees in economics and finance from the University of Paris–Dauphine. He is fluent in French and Arabic.

**Julie E. Fischer**

Julie E. Fischer leads the Stimson Center’s Global Health Security program. Dr. Fischer is a former Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow (2003–2004) and American Association for the Advancement of Science Congressional Fellow (2000–2001). As professional staff with the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, she worked on issues related to domestic terrorism preparedness and the consequences of biological, chemical, and radiological exposures during military service. She served as a Senior Research Fellow at the University of Washington/Seattle Biomedical Research Institute and an independent consultant to a Thai Ministry of Public Health–US CDC collaboration aimed at identifying and controlling emerging infections of regional and global significance. Dr. Fischer received a BA from Hollins University and a PhD in microbiology and immunology from Vanderbilt University.

**Ellen Laipson**

Ellen Laipson is currently President and CEO of The Henry L. Stimson Center. She joined the Center in 2002 after nearly 25 years of government service. Key
positions included Vice Chair of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) (1997–2002) and Special Assistant to the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations (1995–1997). At the NIC, Laipson co-managed the interdisciplinary study *Global Trends 2015* and directed the NIC’s outreach to think tanks and research organizations on a wide range of national security topics. Her earlier government career focused on analysis and policy making on Middle East and South Asian issues. At the Center, Laipson directs the Southwest Asia project, which focuses on a range of security issues in the Gulf region. Laipson is a frequent speaker on Middle East issues and on US foreign policy and global trends. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the Middle East Institute, and the Middle East Studies Association. In 2003, she joined the boards of the Asia Foundation and the Education and Employment Foundation.

**Amit Pandya**

Amit Pandya directs the Stimson Center’s Regional Voices: Transnational Challenges project. He is a South Asia expert and international lawyer. He has been Counsel to the Government Operations and Foreign Affairs Committees of the House of Representatives, and held senior positions at the Departments of Defense and State and at the US Agency for International Development. His areas of expertise in government have included national security and civil liberties, congressional oversight, public diplomacy, refugee and immigration policy, foreign assistance, humanitarian intervention, human rights, post-conflict reconstruction, and military-civilian coordination. He has also practiced law and worked in various civil and human rights nonprofit organizations, and was formerly an ethnographer and teacher.

**Kendra Patterson**

Kendra Patterson is Research Associate with the Regional Voices: Transnational Challenges project at The Henry L. Stimson Center. Her current areas of research include hydropolitics, climate change, and security. Prior to joining the Stimson Center, her primary research interests were constructions of gender in China and Japan, the role of national identity in international relations, and East Asian security. Ms. Patterson earned her BA from Global College (Long Island University) while studying at Zhejiang University in Hangzhou, China, and the Japan Center in Kyoto. She was awarded the Heiwa Nakajima Scholarship to study at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies in 2002 and received her MA from the Australian National University in 2004.
— Annex 2 —

EXPERTS CONSULTED

Middle East

Regional Meeting, Dubai

Salim Adib, Department of Public Health and Health Management, St. Joseph University, Lebanon
Mustapha Alani, Security and Terrorism Studies, Gulf Research Center, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Waleed Al-Banawi, Banawi Industrial Group, Saudi Arabia
Adnan Ali Alkadhim, Iraqi Red Crescent
Ebtisam Al Kitbi, Department of Political Science, United Arab Emirates University, Al Ain
Hayfia Almudhaf, Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research
Lama Al Sulaiman, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency
Jaafar Altaie, Energy Analyst, Iraq
Hady Amr, Brookings Doha Center, Qatar
Paul Dyer, Dubai School of Government, United Arab Emirates
Gamal El-Banna, International Islamic Confederation of Labour, Egypt
Habib El-Habr, United Nations Environment Programme Regional Office for West Asia, Lebanon
Wassim Harb, Arab Center for the Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity, Lebanon
N. Janardhan, Gulf-Asia Relations, Gulf Research Center, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Gerassimos Karabelias, Department of Sociology, Panteion University, Greece
Rami Khouri, Issam Fares Institute of Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut, Lebanon
Christian Koch, International Relations, Gulf Research Center, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Faryal Leghari, Security and Terrorism Studies, Gulf Research Center, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Basmah Omair, Khadija bint Khuwailid Center, Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Saudi Arabia
Muhammed Raouf, Environment, Gulf Research Center, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Abdulaziz Sager, Chairman, Gulf Research Center, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Adnan Shihab-Eldin, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, United Kingdom
Eckart Woertz, GCC Economy, Gulf Research Center, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Experts Interviewed

- **Bahrain**
  
  Abduljalil Alsingace, HAQ: Movement of Liberties and Democracy
  Waleed Zubairi, Hydrogeology and Water Resources Management, Arabian Gulf University

- **Egypt**
  
  Mohamed Albraithen, FAO Regional Office for the Near East
  Haytham Al-Khayat, World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean
  Ahmed Chikhaoui, FAO Regional Office for the Near East
  Shahira El-Rafei, Egyptian Civil Society Media Project
  Nihad Gohar, International Labour Organization, Cairo Office
  Mohamed Kadry, Military Studies, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies
  Altaf Musani, Emergency and Humanitarian Action, World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean
  Diaa Rashwan, Comparative Politics; Islamic Movements, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies
  Abdel Monem Said, Chairman, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies
  Mohamed Abdel Salam, Regional Security and Arms Control; Military Studies, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies
  Richard Tutwiler, Desert Development Center, American University in Cairo

- **Jordan**
  
  Reem Abu Hassan, International Women’s Forum
  Adnan Abu Odeh, Former Minister of Information
  Ali’a Al-Dalli, Poverty and Human Development, United Nations Development Programme, Iraq
  Mousa Al Fayad, National Center for Agricultural Research and Technology Transfer; International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas
  Riad Al Khouri, Economist
  Walid Badawi, United Nations Development Programme, Iraq
  Angelina Eichhorst, European Union Delegation
  Nasri Haddad, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Jordan
  Tayseer Abdel Jaber, Former Minister of Labor
  Taher Kanaan, Higher Council for Science and Technology
Dima Masri, Arab Center for the Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity
Shihab Najib Al-Beiruti, Inter-Islamic Network on Water Resources Development and Management
Ibrahim Saif, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan
Saleh Shdiefat, National Center for Agricultural Research and Technology Transfer; International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas
Mahjoob Zweiri, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan

• Kuwait
Mohammad Al-Attar, International Center for Biosaline Agriculture
Abdul Mohsen Al Haroon, Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research
Ahmad Al-Haroun, Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Redha Al-Hasan, Faculty of Science, Kuwait University
Muhammad Al-Rashed, Water Resources Division, Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research
Azzam Alwash, Eden Again Project, Nature Iraq
Mohammed Hajeeh, Techno-Economics Division, Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research
Faten Jabsheh, Techno-Economics Division, Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research
Othman Mohamad, Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research

• Lebanon
Khalil Gebara, Transparency International
International Labour Organization Regional Office for Arab States
Salim Nasr, Programme on Governance in the Arab Region, United Nations Development Programme
Ziad Abdul Samad, Arab NGO Network for Development

• United Arab Emirates
Samir Hamrouni, Arab Science and Technology Foundation, Sharjah
Jamal Sanad Al-Suwaidi, Director General, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi

South Asia

Regional Meeting, Singapore
Qazi Kholiquzzaman Ahmad, Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad
Jalaluddin Ahmed, Health Programme, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
R.A. Ariyaratne, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Sri Lanka
V. Balachandran, Retired Police and Intelligence Official, India
Rajesh Basrur, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Amitabh Behar, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, India
Navnita Chadha Behera, Jamia Millia Islamia University, India
Tapan Kumar Bose, South Asia Forum for Human Rights, Nepal
Mely Caballero-Anthony, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Irfan A. Engineer, Centre for Study of Society and Secularism, India
Khalida Ghaus, Social Policy and Development Centre, Pakistan
Rifaat Hussain, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Sri Lanka
Pervez Iqbal, Water, Environment and Sanitation Society, Pakistan
Ferdous Jahan, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh
Sridhar Khatri, South Asia Centre for Policy Studies, Nepal
Yamini Mishra, Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, India
Partha Mukhopadhyay, Centre for Policy Research, India
Ligia Noronha, The Energy and Resources Institute, India
Amjad Rashid, Taraqee Foundation, Pakistan
Aasiya Riaz, Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency
Athula Senaratne, Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka
Prakhar Sharma, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Experts Interviewed

• Afghanistan
  Hekmat Karzai, Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies

• Bangladesh
  Imitiaz Ahmed, Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh
  Shahidul Alam, Bangladesh Human Rights Network
  M. Hyder Ali, Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of Bangladesh
  Salma Ali, Bangladesh National Women Lawyer’s Association
  M. Asaduzzaman, Sustainable Development Networking Project
  Afsan Chowdhury, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
  Mushtaque R. Chowdhury, BRAC University
  Debapriya Bhattacharya, Centre for Policy Dialogue
  Manzoor Hassan, Centre for Governance Studies, BRAC University
  Ainun Nishat, International Union for Conservation of Nature

• India
  Bal Kumar Agarwal, Former Civil Servant, Mumbai
  Saleem Ahmadullah, Mohalla Committee, Mumbai
Zaheer Ali, Former Head of the Department of Political Science, Ismail Yusuf College, Mumbai
Javed Anand, Muslims for Secular Democracy; Co-Editor, Communalism Combat, Mumbai
Mohammed Aziz, Jamaat-e-Islami, Mumbai
Sushobha Barve, Center for Dialogue and Reconciliation, Delhi
T. S. Bhal, Maharashtra Government Officer, Mohalla Committee, Mumbai
Tejal Chandan, Centre for Security Analysis, Chennai
Rakesha Chaturvedi, Teacher, Political and Current Affairs, G. D. Somani School, Mumbai
Mehrunnisa Desai, Ahmedabad Muslim Women’s Association, Ahmedabad
Asghar Ali Engineer, Institute of Islamic Studies; Centre for Study of Society and Secularism, Mumbai
A. H. Farooqui, Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, Mumbai
Navnit Gandhi, Mohalla Committee, Mumbai
Colin Gonsalves, Human Rights Law Network, India Center for Human Rights and Law, Delhi
Ashok Gulati, International Food Policy Research Institute, Delhi
Sajid Gulroz, Mohalla Committee, Mumbai
Ruchira Gupta, Apne Aap, Kolkata
Wajahat Habibullah, Chief Information Commissioner, Government of India, Delhi
Abid Hussain, Former Ambassador to the United States, Delhi
Muhammed Inamullah, Al-Hira Foundation, Mumbai
Maria Ishwaran, Mohalla Committee, Mumbai
Gollapalli Israel, Janodayam Social Education Center, Chennai
Hidubhai Jani, Ahmedabad
Maulana Shoaib Koti, Mumbai
Sankhya Krishnan, Centre for Security Analysis, Chennai
N. B. H. Kulkarni, Mohalla Committee, Mumbai
Rakesh Maria, Joint Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch, Mumbai City Police
Ved Marwah, Former Governor of Manipur, Nagaland, Jharkhand, and Bihar, Center for Policy Research, Mumbai
R. H. Mendonca, Former Maharashtra Commissioner of Police, Mumbai
Arundhati Mundlay, American Consulate, Mumbai
P. Muthu, Trust Help, Chennai
Ajay Parida, M. S. Swaminathan Research Foundation, Chennai
Burhan Parkar, Mohalla Committee, Mumbai
Hemantha Kumar Parmathy, Hand in Hand Micro Finance Limited, Chennai
K. P. Raghuvanshi, Additional Director General of Police, Anti-Terrorist Squad, Maharashtra, Mumbai
S. V. Raju, Editor, Freedom First, Mumbai
Virochan Raote, Mohalla Committee, Mumbai
Visa Ravindran, Centre for Security Analysis, Chennai
Venkata Reddy, Retired Superintendent of Police, Mumbai
Uttara Sahasrabudhe, Department of Political Science, University of Mumbai
Kalpana Sankar, Hand in Hand Micro Finance Limited, Chennai
S. R. Sankaran, A.S. (Retired), Convener, Committee of Concerned Citizens, Hyderabad
Yasmin Sheikh, Mohalla Committee, Mumbai
L. K. Shinde, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad
Jay Shreedhar, Centre for Security Analysis, Chennai
K. Srinivasan, Centre for Security Analysis, Chennai
Rajendra Sueraya, Kolkata
Usha Thakkar, Former Head, Department of Political Science, Shreemati Nathibai Damodar Thackersey Women’s University, Mumbai
Hormis Tharakan, Retired Intelligence Official, Mumbai
M. Vinola, Janodayam Social Education Center, Chennai

- **Pakistan**

Khurshid Ahmad, Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad
Khalid Ahmed, *The Friday Times*, Lahore
Sarwar Bari, Pattan Development Organisation, Islamabad
Khadija Haq, Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre, Islamabad
Parvez Hassan, Hassan & Hassan Advocates, Lahore
Tariq Junaid, International Republican Institute, Islamabad
Sardar M. Yusuf Khan, Xenel Industries Ltd, Islamabad
Talat Masood, Retired Lieutenant-General, Pakistan Army, Islamabad
Ahmed Bilal Mehoob, Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, Islamabad
Khalid Rahman, Institute for Policy Studies, Islamabad
Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Political and Defense Consultant, Islamabad
Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad
Eleanor Valentine, Development Alternatives, Inc, Islamabad

- **Sri Lanka**

Manel Abeyskera, Consultant, Gender and Development Issues
A. P. Ajith Kangara Arachchi, Crown Group of Companies
C. D. Casie Chetty, Lakshman Kadiragamar Institute
Lorna Dewaraja, Bandaranaike Diplomatic Training Institute
Bernard Edirisinghe, South Asia Small Arms Network
John Gooneratne, Former Secretary General, Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process, Government of Sri Lanka
Zacki Jabar, News Editor, *The Island Newspaper*
Amal Jayawardena, University of Colombo
Ranga Kalansooriya, Sri Lanka Press Institute
Charlie Mahendran, Former Civil Servant
Gayathri Nanayakkara, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies
Denis Perera, Retired Lieutenant-General
Charan Rainford, International Centre for Ethnic Studies
Arjuna Ranawana, Sri Lanka College of Journalism
Muralidhar Reddy, *The Hindu*
M. Selvanayagam, Department of Zoology, Loyola College
Pramilla Senanayake, Global Forum for Health Research
Thusitha Tennakoon, Bandaranaik Centre for International Studies
Nira Wickremesinghe, International Centre for Ethnic Studies, University of Colombo

**Southeast Asia**

**Regional Meeting, Bangkok**

V. Balachandran, Retired Police and Intelligence Official, India
Indrajit Banerjee, Asian Media Information and Communication Centre, Singapore
Mely Caballero-Anthony, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore
Pun-Arj Chairatana, Bangkok Innovation Forum, Thailand
Chap Sotharith, Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace
Chea Vannath, Girl Guide Association of Cambodia
Antonio Contreras, De La Salle University, Philippines
Soedradjad Djijwandon, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore
Len R. Garces, WorldFish Center, Philippines
Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia
Carolina Hernandez, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Philippines
Rifaat Hussain, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Sri Lanka
Le ‘Thi Quy, Hanoi University of Social Science and Humanities, Vietnam
Lu Guangsheng, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Yunnan University, China
Alfredo Ferrariz Lubang, Nonviolence International Southeast Asia, Thailand
Nguyen Manh Hung, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Vietnam
Wiput Phoolcharoen, Thai Healthy Policy Foundation
Anthony Pramualratana, Thailand Business Coalition on AIDS
Leonard Sebastian, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore
Djisman Simanjuntak, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia
Chitr Sitthi-amorn, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand
Pranee Thiparat, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand
Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, Indonesian Institute of Sciences
Marites D. Vitug, *Newsbreak*, Philippines
Soulivan Vongmany, *Vientiane Times*, Laos

**Experts Interviewed**

- **Cambodia**
  - Roland Eng, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  - Kao Kim Hourn, University of Cambodia
  - Net Neath, International Union for Conservation of Nature
  - Top Neth, Cambodia Development Resource Institute
  - Chem Phalla, Cambodia Development Resource Institute
  - Ly Se, Cambodia Ministry of Economy and Finance
  - Chan Sophal, Cambodia Development Resource Institute
  - Erin Soto, United States Agency for International Development
  - Jean-Francois Tain, Radio France Internationale

- **Hong Kong**
  - Valentina Chan, Independent Commission Against Corruption
  - Ricky Man-kin Chu, Independent Commission Against Corruption
  - Shui Shan Lee, Faculty of Medicine, Chinese University of Hong Kong
  - Simon Shen, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies
  - King Kwan Tsao, Department of Government and Public Administration, Chinese University of Hong Kong
  - Fengshi Wu, Department of Government and Public Administration, Chinese University of Hong Kong
  - Simon N. M. Young, Department of Law, University of Hong Kong

- **Indonesia**
  - Patrick Anderson, WALHI—Friends of the Earth Indonesia, Jakarta
  - Anshari, IAIN—State Institutes of Islamic Studies, Medan
  - Pandita Arjuna, Forum for Religious Harmony, Medan
  - Jaya Arjuna, Transparency International, Medan
  - Azyumardi Azra, State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta
  - Tuanku Luckman Sinar Basarshah II, Sultan of Serdang, Medan
  - Krittayawan Tina Boonto, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, Jakarta
  - Irham Buana, KPU—Indonesia Election Committee, Medan
  - Monica Ciupagea, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Jakarta
  - M. Djadjiono, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta
  - Agus Dwiyanto, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta
  - Erwinsyah, World Bank Consultant, Jakarta
  - Edy Ikhsan, Pusaka Indonesia, Medan
  - Nanang Ismuhartoyo, Consumers Institute of Yogyakarta
  - Rita Kristyani, Center for Energy Studies, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta
Nur A. Fadhill Lubis, Foundation for the Development of Indonesian-American Friendship, Medan
Landen Marbun, Keadilan Sejahtera Party, Medan
Dra. Murniati, Criminal Investigation Division, North Sumatra Provincial Police, Medan
Jonner Napitupulu, North Sumatra Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Medan
Darwin Nasution, Patriot Pancasila Party of North Sumatra, Medan
Gregorius Sri Nurhartanto, Faculty of Law, Atma Jaya University, Yogyakarta
Oktoviana S. Perangin-angin, Yayasan Pondok Rakyat Kreatif, Medan
Imam Prakoso, Community Based Information Network, Yogyakarta
Wahyu Prasetyawan, Lembaga Survei Indonesia, Jakarta
Chris Purdy, DKT International, Jakarta
James Bharata Putra, Graha Bunda Maria Velangkanni Church, Medan
Lies Rahayu, Center for Natural Disasters, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta
Sofyan Raz Ak, Yayasan Pendidikan Shafiyyatul Amaliyyah, Medan
R. Sabrina, Bureau Office of Women Empowerment, Medan
Tiorida Simanjuntak, Kardopa Group, Medan
Ningrum Natasya Sirait, University of North Sumatra, Medan
H. Soffyan, Harian Analisa, Medan
Sean Stein, US Consulate Medan
Ahmad Suaedy, Wahid Institute, Jakarta
Muhadi Sugiono, Center for Security and Peace Studies, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta
Rizal Sukma, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta
Suparlan, WALHI—Friends of the Earth Indonesia, Yogyakarta
Endro Susilo, Faculty of Law, Atma Jaya University, Yogyakarta
Nasaruddin Umar, Nadatul Ulama, Jakarta
Rezki Sri Wibowo, Transparency International, Jakarta

- Laos

Joshua Archibald, US Embassy Vientiane
Chris Barlow, Mekong River Commission
John Metzger, Hydrology Consultant
Peter-John Meynell, United Nations Development Programme
Keoxomphou Sakdavong, Vientiane Times
Michael Waters, Mekong River Commission

- Malaysia

Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, Institute of Strategic and International Studies
Sivakumar K., Education and Research Association for Consumers
Adeeba Kamarulzaman, Department of Medicine, University of Malaya
Vijayakumari Kanapathy, Institute of Strategic and International Studies
Stephen Leong, Center for International Dialogue, Institute of Strategic and International Studies
Mak Joon Nam, Consultant, Maritime and Migration Issues
Philip Mathews, Bureau of Science, Technology and the Environment, Institute of Strategic and International Studies
Robert Phang, Malaysia Crime Prevention Foundation
Patrick Pillai, Institute of Strategic and International Studies
Subramaniam Pillay, Coalition Against Healthcare Privatization
Mohan Sankaran, Education and Research Association for Consumers
Charles Santiago, Monitoring Sustainability of Globalisation
Steven C. M. Wong, Bureau of Economic Policy Studies, Institute of Strategic and International Studies
Richard Yeoh, Transparency International

• Philippines
  Emmanuel Anglo, Manila Observatory
  Mary Ann Arnado, Initiatives for International Dialogue, Mindanao Program, Davao
  Maria Eugenia Bennagen, Resources, Environment and Economics Center for Studies, Manila
  Rochelle Coronel, Manila Observatory
  Alvin Culaba, Center for Engineering and Sustainable Development Research, De La Salle University, Manila
  Emmanuel Esguerra, School of Economics, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City
  Ky Johnson, Asia Foundation, Manila
  Exaltacion Lamberte, Social Development Research Center, De La Salle University, Manila
  Carolyn Mercado, Asia Foundation, Manila
  Augusto N. Miclat Jr., Initiatives for International Dialogue, Davao
  James Bernard Simpas, Manila Observatory
  May Celine T. M. Vicente, Manila Observatory
  Lorna Villamil, Philippine Center for Policy Studies, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City
  Maria Antonia Yulo-Loyzaga, Manila Observatory

• Taiwan
  Shawn Shiuan-wu Chang, Environmental Protection Administration, Republic of China
  Lin-wu Kuo, Office of Homeland Security (Counter Terrorism Office), Republic of China
  Jih-Heng Li, Department of Health, Bureau of International Cooperation, Republic of China
Y. F. Liang, Environmental Protection Administration, Republic of China
Chia-Hsiu Liu, Department of Health, Bureau of International Cooperation,
Republic of China
Donald Tong-fu Shang, Department of Health, Bureau of International Coopera-
tion, Republic of China
Bradley Winterton, Taipei Times
Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang, Council of Advanced Policy Studies
Victor Te-sun Yu, Department of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, Republic of China

• Thailand
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The mission of the school is to provide a rigorous professional graduate education with a strong practical emphasis; conduct policy-relevant research in defense, national security, international relations, strategic studies, and diplomacy; and build a global network of like-minded professional schools. Research at RSIS takes place within the following components: the Institute of Defence and Strategic
Studies (predecessor of RSIS), the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, the Centre of Excellence for National Security, the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, and the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia. The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region.

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The principal areas of research for RCSS include conventional defense build-up and proliferation of nuclear weapons; defense expenditures and disarmament; intra- and inter-state conflict and relations and their implications for regional and inter-regional cooperation and development; external factors in the security and stability of the region; refugees and migration; ethnic, religious, and sectarian conflict and their transborder implications; problems of governance; political violence, terrorism, and other types of low-intensity conflicts; sharing and management of resources; geopolitical, economic, and environmental factors in security, stability, and cooperation in the region; conflict resolution and management; and confidence-building and cooperative security.
Notes

Chapter 4


5. Urbanization data are drawn from World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007).


7. Ibid.


9. UN estimate from 1950.

10. de Silva and Silva-Jáuregui, op. cit.

11. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), various sources.


16. Unemployment rates and aggregate calculations are based on official country sources.


33. Urdal, “Devil in the Demographics.”

34. Urdal, “The Demographics of Political Violence.”

35. Richards, op. cit.


Chapter 5


2. Ibid.


4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. R. Nath, The Secret Will of Babur, a paper published by the Centre for Study of Society and Secularism, Mumbai.

Chapter 7

1. See, for example, Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers, and Amitav Acharya, eds., Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitisation (London: Ashgate, 2006).
2. In this chapter, ASEAN is used interchangeably with Southeast Asia. ASEAN groups the 10 states of Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam.


10. *Public goods* are defined as goods that can be consumed by all actors or from which no actor can be excluded and whose cost is not increased by the addition of more consumers. See F. O. Hampson and M. W. Zacher, *Human Security and International Collaboration: Some Lessons from Public Goods Theory*, paper for the Commission on Human Security (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, January 2003).


15. Ibid.


18. Ibid.

21. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
29. See *The State of the Forest: Indonesia*.

Chapter 8

4. Sodhi et al., op. cit.
11. Phongpahichit and Baker, op. cit.

Chapter 9

1. S. Sugiyama, D. Staples, and S. Funge-Smith, Status and Potential of Fisheries and Aquaculture in Asia and the Pacific (Bangkok: FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, 2004).
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. FAO, op. cit.; Sugiyama et al., op. cit.
11. Sugiyama et al., op. cit.
12. Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), Philippine Fisheries Profile (Quezon City, Philippines: Department of Agriculture-Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, 2004).
14. Pomeroy et al., op. cit.
15. BFAR, op. cit.
16. Delgado et al., op. cit.

20. Silvestre et al., “South and South-East Asian Coastal Fisheries.”
21. Sugiyama et al., op. cit.
22. Silvestre et al., “Assessment, Management and Future Directions.”

24. UNEP, op. cit.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
33. Pomeroy et al., op. cit.

**Chapter 10**

7. For more details on ISO 9000, see the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) website at www.iso.org.


14. Ibid.


Chapter 11


2. Ibid., p. 5.

Chapter 12

1. Mexico 2006: 4th World Water Forum, Middle East and North Africa Regional Document. Agriculture contributes a comparatively low amount to national GDPs due to the fact that most crops being produced are low-value. There is also a general cross-regional low efficiency of use of irrigation water, which contributes to the high percentage of water used for agriculture.


Chapter 13


Chapter 14

11. Ibid.