LUST/CAUTION IN IR:

Democratising World Politics from Postcolonial Asia

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ABSTRACT

Theorising in International Relations (IR) needs to be democratised. It remains under the hegemony of a singular worldview (‘warre of all against all’) with a singular purpose (‘conversion or discipline’). We propose that the field needs to: (1) integrate with the humanities, especially their ability to express the dialectics of subjectivity that comprise global life, (2) engage with the trans-national solidarities that emerge through international relations, and (3) place Western concepts, theories, methods, and experiences within a larger context of other worlds, traditions, and histories. As an example, we apply Ang Lee’s film, ‘Lust/ Caution’, as a metaphor for Taiwan-China relations. This method offers an alternative, not just substantively but also analytically, to the conventional top-down, state-centric, and exclusivist approach in IR that rationalises the conventional truism that ‘only great powers matter’
INTRODUCTION

The ‘global war on terror’ has re-centered the national security state in world politics. In so doing, it entrenches a realist truism that ‘only great powers matter’.1 Those who depart from or disagree with this top-down, state-centric, exclusivist logic for world politics face an ultimatum. They can either convert into a subaltern version of the hegemon (e.g., post-financial crisis Asia) or endure discipline by the hegemon (e.g., contemporary Afghanistan, Iraq). In either case, US-led neoliberal ‘universalism’ erases difference or dissent, and world politics seems filled with the Hobbesian nightmare of ‘a warre of all against all.’

Yet our globalised lives daily repudiate such binary-induced nightmares. Neoliberal globalization may have triumphed at the end of the Cold War but we do not live in a ‘flat’2 or ‘borderless’3 world of uniformity defined by Western corporate capital. Nor does neoliberal globalization justify greater US hegemony, as some suggest, because

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1 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
reactionaries’ agitate for civilizational or cultural ‘jihads’ against the ‘march of progress.’ Rather, neoliberal globalization unbound by Cold-War polarities intensifies processes of heterogeneity and complexity already mobilised by global encounters over the centuries. What surfaces in sharp relief are the entwinements of ‘multiple worlds’ and their legacies in the constitution of contemporary world politics.

Put differently, ‘borderlands’ permeate our daily lives as well as world politics. The concept of ‘borderlands’ refers to those spaces in-between territories where life, work, languages, religions, and ideologies mix beyond the reach of sovereign control. Unlike ‘frontiers,’ ‘borderlands’ does not connote a lawless no-man’s-land; instead, it signifies a way of being and relating to Others under conditions of sustained interaction, multiplicity, and complexity that requires negotiation, not domination, as a way of addressing problems or conflicts. ‘Borderlands,’ in short, obviates binaries by showing the connections between so-called die-hard opposites despite their durability.

Theorising in International Relations (IR) must catch up. The notion that ‘only great powers matter’ sets up a national security state that perpetuates three core assumptions: i.e., (1) the national Self is irreconcilably opposed to an alien Other (however defined) (2) the state’s inter-national interests always supercede any trans-

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national welfare or solidarities, and (3) the center (whether political, economic, or intellectual) invariably directs the periphery. These assumptions ensconce imperialist/colonial relations of race, class, gender, and culture in world politics such that conventional IR resembles a colonial household. The exploitative relations between ‘theorists’ and ‘area specialists,’ for example, approximate those of masters and servants.

Specifically, we propose that IR needs to (1) integrate with the humanities, especially their ability to express the dialectics of subjectivity that comprise global life, (2) engage with the trans-national solidarities that emerge from inter-national relations, and (3) place Western concepts, theories, methods, and experiences within a larger context of other worlds, traditions, and histories. From this basis, we may shift world politics from an isolating nightmare of deadly competition among bordered sovereigns to a relational vision of engagement and negotiation exemplified by daily life in the ‘borderlands.’ IR theorizing, in other words, needs democratising. By this, we do not refer simply to having the field exhibit diverse schools of thought like feminism and constructivism alongside more conventional ones like realism or liberalism. Rather, we mean opening up discursive space within IR to consider seriously and systematically the hybridities that already make our worlds, especially at those sites, like Taiwan, that are usually considered ‘peripheral’ or ‘marginal’ to theory-building.

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7 For elaboration on the connection between these three assumptions and the national security state, see Steve Smith, ‘Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11’, *International Studies Quarterly* (September 2004): 499-515.
8 See, for example, Branwen Gruffydd Jones (ed.), *Decolonizing International Relations* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).
This paper proceeds in five parts. We begin by identifying conventional treatments of the relations between Taiwan and China, particularly by the defense establishment in Taiwan. Analytical economy compels this singular focus; nonetheless, our conclusions apply to the defense establishments in the US and China as well. They utilise a similar discourse that locks Taiwan and China into demonised enemies, each primed with the violence of the national security state. Next, we note the ‘borderlands’ that link Taiwan and China, spread by an increasing traffic in capital, goods, people, ideas, and desires across the strait. Third, we focus on an emerging postcolonial sensibility in Taiwan that takes its ‘borderlands’ as a premise, thereby highlighting the need for an alternative to the national security state model. This quest matches a comparable movement in IR theorising that turns to the Humanities, rather than Economics or the Natural Sciences, for intellectual inspiration and analytical guidance. Forthwith, we draw on Ang Lee’s 2007 film of Eileen Chang’s (Zhang Ailing) 1977 novel, *Lust, Caution*, as a filmic metaphor for ‘borderland’ subjectivities and what happens when the national security state denies or eradicates them. We conclude with the implications of this analysis for Taiwan-China relations, in particular, and IR theorising, in general.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE:
(Taiwan vs. China) US

Conventional approaches divide Taiwan and China into mutually-opposed camps, each a sovereign antithesis of the other. Accordingly, policy bifurcates into two impossible goals: unification with China or independence for Taiwan. Either would mire
the region in state violence and destruction. Impasse thus becomes the only acceptable interim, with the US receiving credit for the ‘peace.’ It was US President Harry Truman, after all, who ordered the 7th fleet to Taiwan in 1949, thereby preventing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from occupying the island after Chiang Kai-shek withdrew there in defeat. For conventional analysts then, inter-state politics directed by the US necessarily supercedes any other considerations between Taiwan and China. Here, the ‘center’ refers as much to the US, as the reigning hegemon of both substantive and intellectual power, as to the central governments of Taiwan and China and what their analysts might think.

These presumptions prevail even after Taiwan ushered in a new president and a new administration in March 2008.

New President, New Administration, Old Policies

Ma Ying-jeou’s landslide victory to the presidency seemed to augur a new era in cross-strait relations. A scion of the new, post-Chiang generation of Kuomintang (KMT) leadership, Ma’s victory upset the previous ruling party, the Democratic People’s Party (DPP), which had vowed ‘independence’ for the island. Within two months, weekend charter flights between Taiwan and China were initiated. Taiwan also allowed more tourists from the mainland to visit. Constructive talks were to be held by the Strait

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10 We list the names of scholars from Taiwan in both Chinese form (i.e., surname first) and English style (i.e., surname last), depending on how they list their names and the venues of their publication. A general rule is that names with a hyphen between them indicate the given name; accordingly, the name preceding them is the surname.

11 The new charter flight deal still does not allow direct flights across the Taiwan Strait. Only weekend charter flights are allowed via the air space of a third party like Hong Kong.
Exchange Foundation (*haijihui*) and its counterpart on the mainland, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (*haixiehui*).

In his inauguration speech, however, Ma reiterated the longstanding US-sanctioned policy of ‘no unification, no independence and no use of force’ (*butong, budu, buwu*). Indeed, Secretary of the State Condoleezza Rice raised this issue in an interview in the *Wall Street Journal* on 19 June 2008. Prominent China/Taiwan analysts cautioned Taiwan to improve relations with China ‘gingerly’; that is, not to tilt toward the mainland. They advised against ‘free-riding’; hence, they urged the Ma Administration to continue purchasing weapons from the US to demonstrate Taiwan’s ‘determination’ to defend itself from China.


13 See [http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/06/106122.htm](http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/06/106122.htm) (Downloaded: 26 August 2008).


15 Although President Ma announced a ‘diplomatic truce,’ the Chinese representative to the UN emphasised yet again that Taiwan has no right to participate in any UN affiliated organisations (*The United Daily* 29 August 2008: A10). Taiwan’s mainstream establishment interpreted this response as hostile to Ma’s friendly initiative; consequently, Ma was criticised for his seeming subservience toward China (*The China Times* 29 August 2008: A13). Raymond F. Burghardt, head of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), unofficial ‘embassy’ for the US in Taiwan, expressed concern that while Taiwan is negotiating with China on Taiwan’s international space, Taiwan cannot relax its position on the matter of sovereignty. That is to say, according to the US, there are two ‘no’s’ in the new negotiation: no claim of sovereignty over Taiwan for China and no right for China to approve of Taiwan’s international activities (*The Liberty Times* 28 August 2008: A1).
Taiwan’s defense intellectuals agree. For Edward I-hsin Chen, Taiwan’s diplomatic and cross-strait agenda completely depend on the US; therefore, it cannot afford to ignore US preferences on Taiwan-China relations. Taiwan should continue buying weapons from the US and treat the proposal for a ‘diplomatic truce’ with caution to prevent China from taking advantage of Taiwan. 

Chih-Cheng Lo used to criticise the US for applying a double standard vis-à-vis Taiwan’s democratic referendum but now harshly accuses President Ma of abandoning democratic values and embracing ‘Chinese nationalism.’ Many urge the new president to buy enough weapons to bolster Taiwan’s self-defense while not alienating the island’s two chief allies, the US and Japan.

Demonising China also continues in official circles. For example, the newly elected Chair of the DPP, Tsai Ing-wen, compared the Beijing Olympics with the 1936 Berlin Olympics, thereby analogising the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to Hitler’s Nazi regime.

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16 Here, we use the term ‘defense intellectual’ to refer to those who contribute to the public discourse on defense in Taiwan: e.g., officials, scholars, journalists. Carol Cohn popularised this term in feminist analyses of IR but her usage included a specific techno-muscular rationality that we do not presume for our case. Carol Cohn, ‘Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals’, *Signs* 12, no. 4 (1987): 687-718.


18 In Ma’s ‘diplomatic truce,’ neither Taiwan nor China would sabotage the other’s diplomatic ties with allies through coercion or co-optation. One source mentioned a country that currently recognises the Republic of China (Taiwan) but sought some considerable compensation for switching diplomatic recognition but was refused by China (Liu 2008).


Hegemonic Loyalty

Boyu Chen and Ching-Change Hwang note that Taiwan’s defense intellectuals have long adhered to US policies and strategies. These come in three main types: i.e., (1) positive, (2) fearful, and (3) challenging new voices. Positive loyalty slavishly models after the US mainstream discourse for the region. For example, Chang Ya-chung advocates following US policies even against significant dissent within Taiwan. One justification is that Taiwan’s ‘Americanisation’ could serve as an example to ‘democratise’ or otherwise ‘modernise’ China. Philip Yong-ming Yang places US priorities over those of Taiwan’s to underscore that the island-state is neither an ‘ideological fundamentalist’ nor ‘troublemaker,’ so as to avoid any kind of ‘punishment’ from the US.
Fearful loyalty reflects the underside of positive loyalty. What if, fearful loyalists hypothesise, the US betrays Taiwan due to pressures from China? Edward I-hsin Chen and Joanne Jaw-Ling Chang fear betrayal by the US motivated by arms sales to China, leading to a ‘co-management’ of Taiwan by the US and China. The US, Arthur S. Ding cautioned a decade ago, should not give the impression that it did not ‘care’ about Taiwan.

A third voice of loyalty now surfaces also. It builds on US norms of liberal capitalism, democracy, and self-determination but contextualises these founding principles to suit Taiwan’s own needs, interests, and aspirations. These voices demand greater accountability from the US especially given Taiwan’s impressive gains in democratization in recent decades. Lo Chih-Cheng, for instance, calls for a more flexible and lenient policy from the US toward Taiwan. Others criticise the US for inconsistencies regarding Taiwan’s democratic demand for independence. In

28 Lo, ‘Ma zhengfu zhanlue zhuanxi taizhimei tongmeng piaoyi’ (‘Ma Government’s Strategy Shifting; Taiwan-Japan-US Ally Drifting’).
30 Lo (2007).
particular, Lin Wen-cheng and Lin Cheng-yi argue, the US should recognise Taiwan’s indigenisation and democratisation efforts of the past decade.\(^{32}\)

Even so, the national security state discourse remains hegemonic. It sustains the US-led, Cold-War narrative that Taiwan and China, as singular, self-enclosed national entities, are irreconcilably opposed.

**BORDERLANDS:**
Taiwan-China Entwinements

Interactions between the people of Taiwan and China belie this fixation with sovereignty and the national security state. Substantial stretches of ‘borderlands’ bind Taiwan and China, especially since the end of martial law in Taiwan in 1987. These include soaring trade and investment and social ties based on family, popular culture, religion, and a revival of that fundament of pre-Communist life, Confucianism. Indeed, such ‘borderlands’ are transforming and shrinking the geopolitical space between Taiwan and China.

Note these recent developments:

1. Trade and Investment. In 2007, China became Taiwan’s largest export market, accounting for almost 25% of all Taiwanese goods for over $62 billion.\(^{33}\) Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs estimates that, in March 2008, total Taiwanese investment in China amounted to approximately $66 billion. In 2008, 55% of Taiwanese foreign


direct investment went to China with almost 21% of total trade going in the same direction.34

2. Transportation and Tourism. In July 2008, China and Taiwan announced direct weekend flights after nearly 60 years of prohibition.35 Governments on both sides are considering further liberalization of such direct links. Previously, over 2 million Taiwanese each year flew to China for business and work through a third entry port.36 For instance, Taiwanese tourists in China numbered 5 million in 1979 compared to 47 million in 1993.37 Chinese nationals are also increasing their visits to Taiwan.38

3. Popular Culture. Since the end of martial law in the late 1980s, Taiwan’s cultural and media products like music, novels, soap operas, and films have been wildly successful in China.39 In 2000, Taiwan’s aboriginal singer, A-mei, was listed among the 50 most popular figures in China, Taiwan and Hong Kong combined.40 Similarly, audiences in

38 [Will provide later.]
China and Taiwan idolise the same film stars, singers, and other media celebrities, regardless of national origin. In 2001, a soap opera from Taiwan, ‘Meteor Garden’ (*Liuxing huayuan*), was one of China’s most popular dramas on television.\(^{41}\) Audiences in Taiwan also routinely watch soap operas produced in China, especially historical dramas like ‘Yong-zheng Dynasty’ (*YongZheng wangchao*), ‘Kan-xi Dynasty’ (*Kanxi wangchao*) and ‘The Family’ (*Da zhaimen*). ‘Yong-Zheng Dynasty’ replayed six times in Taiwan yet its ratings continued to rise; ‘Kangxi dynasty’ reached 2.8% of the audience qualifying as the ‘king of mainland dramas’.\(^{42}\) On any given night in Taiwan, at least half a dozen soap operas from China would be broadcast along with those from Korea, Hong Kong, Japan, and elsewhere. In comparison to the 1960s-1970s, shows from the US have declined.\(^{43}\)

4. Family Ties. Family visits across the strait started in 1987, when martial law ended in Taiwan. Since then, over 2 million Taiwanese have moved to the mainland, including 750,000 Taiwanese businessmen.\(^{44}\) In turn, many from the mainland now live in Taiwan due to marriage to Taiwanese citizens. Marriages across the strait have increased over 40% per year: e.g., 100 couples in 1988; 5,942 in 1994; 12,408 in 1997.\(^{45}\) Today, 65% of

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\(^{41}\) The plot centers on the romance between a plain teenage girl called Shan Cai, who is from a poor family, and the leader of a gang of university students called the F4. He is from rich family with a strict mother. The two leads became big stars in Asia after the TV program aired. In November 2002, the F4 held a concert in Shanghai with nearly 80,000 fans packed in the Shanghai Stadium. The concert was held at the same time as the 16th Communist Party National Congress. Some 3,000 public security officers and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers couldn’t suppress the fans’ enthusiasm, their screaming voices echoing loudly in the stadium (Lin 2002).


\(^{44}\) *China Times* 12 November 2007.

\(^{45}\) [Source]
all ‘foreign spouses’ (*waiji peiou*) in Taiwan come from China; these far exceed those unions with other nationalities.\(^{46}\)

Such kinship ties became apparent when the Sichuan earthquake hit on 30 August 2008. With nearly 70,000 deaths and 19,000 people still missing,\(^{47}\) ordinary citizens and other civic groups from Taiwan contributed more than 1 billion *renminbi* worth of material goods and money to aid China. Before the earthquake, presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou had reprimanded China’s repression of Tibet during the riots of March 2008. He branded Chinese premier Wen Jiabao a ‘barbarian’ who was ‘arrogant and stupid’ in handling the Tibet crisis.\(^{48}\) After coming to office, Ma named Lai Shin-yuan, a long-time advocate of Taiwanese sovereignty, as Chair the Mainland Affairs Council. These moves irritated the CCP government and shadowed what seemed a newly constructed amicable atmosphere across the strait. In light of Taiwan’s generous and genuine outpouring of aid and public sentiment, however, the Chinese government softened its stand against Ma and granted requests for negotiating the weekend charter flights and other more open policies.

5. Religious Ties. Though officially not allowed, the people of Kinman/Matzu (islands belonging to Taiwan) and Fujian (a province in China) have interacted with one another

\(^{46}\) Yu-xia Zhuang, ‘*Jing ershinianlai liiangan tonhunmoshi de lanjing ji chushi tansuo*’ (‘An Analysis of Intermarriage between Mainland China and Taiwan Over the Past Twenty Years’), *Nanfang Zhenkou* 22 no. 6 (2007): 23.


\(^{48}\) See [http://www.nownews.com/2008/03/19/301-2247523.htm](http://www.nownews.com/2008/03/19/301-2247523.htm) (Downloaded: 24 September 2008).
through small-scale fishing trade and commerce for decades.\textsuperscript{49} (Kinman and Matzu are located off China’s southern coast, near Fujian province.) Today, the ‘mini three links’ policy (i.e., direct mail, transportation, and trade) merely formalises what were well-established informal ties between the two sites.

The first to sail directly from Matzu to Meizhou in Fujian in January 2002 were pilgrims of the ‘Mazu’ religion, common to both Fujian province and Taiwan. (Many Taiwanese claim ancestry from Fujian.)\textsuperscript{50} These pilgrims sought to visit Meizhou, birthplace of the Mazu Sea Goddess. In 2002, over 100,000 pilgrims traveled from Taiwan to Meizhou to pay homage, despite government prohibitions.\textsuperscript{51} The sheer number of pilgrims involved, however, convinced the Ma administration to relax these restrictions.

6. Intellectual Exchanges. Academics from Taiwan and China routinely lecture and conduct research at each other’s universities. Students at both undergraduate and graduate levels also participate in exchange programs across the strait. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council reports that scholarly exchanges across the strait in 2007 have increased 1,000 fold since such visits were first permitted just a decade before.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{49} Horng-ming Tsai, ‘Xiaosantong duei liangan hudong de yingxiang’ (‘The Impact of Mini Three Links on the Interactions across the Taiwan Strait’) Yuanjing Jikan 2 no. 2 (2001): 135-161.

\textsuperscript{50} According to one source, there are more than 3000 Mazu temples scattered throughout Taiwan. Quan-Chung Song, ‘Mazu Xinyang zai Taiwan’ (‘The Mazu Belief in Taiwan’) XunGen 4 (2007): 4-11.

\textsuperscript{51} Ling-xia Li, ‘Cong Tianshang Mazu dao Zhunghua Mazu’ (‘From Heavenly Mazu to Chinese Mazu’) Taiwan Yuanliou 41 (2007): 129-140.

\textsuperscript{52} See, for example, the graph on cross-strait scholarly exchanges produced by the Mainland Affairs Council on their website: (http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/index1-e.htm) (Downloaded: 27 September 2008).
7. Revival of Confucianism. Confucianism is returning to post-Mao China. This millennia-old tradition, once reviled during the Cultural Revolution, is enjoying a popular resurrection. A classics professor, Yu Dan, has sold more than 10 million copies of her book, *Reflections on the ‘Analects’ of Confucius* (2006), based on lectures on Chinese television. The *Los Angeles Times* reports that ‘the Confucius Institute, a Chinese language and cultural center, had 140 campuses in 36 countries as of mid-2007.’

Confucian rhetoric and concepts are also re-emerging in Chinese politics. President Hu Jintao now touts a new policy line, ‘harmonious society,’ based on the Confucian precepts of unity, morality, and respect for authority. Most recently, Chinese foreign policy offers the notion of ‘harmony with difference’ (*he er bu tong*), another Confucian concept, to deflect anxiety, especially in the West about a newly resurgent, ‘muscular’ China.

China’s return to its Confucian roots signals the greatest potential, so far, of cultural solidarity with Taiwan. The latter reveres Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of

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55 Levitin, “China’s New Confucianism.”
56 Ni, ‘She Makes Confucius Cool Again.’
China’s republican government that overthrew the Qing dynasty in 1911. Dr. Sun explicitly built Chinese republicanism and its tricameral form of government on a synthesis between Confucian norms and liberal ideals drawn from his schooling in the US. Sun modeled his ‘three principles of the people’ after Lincoln’s famous decree of ‘government by the people, for the people, of the people.’ But it also echoed ancient Confucian and Mencian teachings about minben (‘people as base’) as the foundation of benevolent rule.

MATCHING POSTCOLONIALITY: Taiwan and IR

A postcolonial sensibility is emerging in Taiwan, and it theorises specifically about such ‘borderlands’ in Taiwan and with China. This postcolonial scholarship takes as premise a Taiwan that has always been a mix of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity,’ ‘democratic debate’ and ‘authoritarian rule,’ ‘patriarchal standards’ and ‘feminist challenges,’ rather than the singular, self-enclosed entity presumed by the national security state. ‘Foreign spouses’ from Vietnam and Indonesia, for example, along with migrant workers from the Philippines (feiyung), daily diversify Taiwanese society,

60 For instance, a public plaza in Taipei still commemorates the memory of Dr. Sun whereas a similar site for Chiang Kai-shek was renamed two years ago but regained its original name after Ma came to the presidency.

61 For more on this concept and its contemporary usage in Taiwan, see Ling and Shih (1998).
culture, and economy. Even patriarchal, Confucian family relations are transforming in Taiwan, as women have made impressive gains in all walks of life in recent decades.

Taiwan’s postcolonial scholars come primarily from literary and cultural studies. Authors like Chen Fang-ming, Tseng Kuei-hai, Chen Kuan-hsing, Chiu Kuei-fen, for example, detail Taiwan’s ‘multiple worlds’: e.g., experiences as a former Japanese colony whereby one generation of Taiwanese (including the former president Li Teng-hui) speaks Japanese, rather than Taiwanese or Mandarin, as a mother tongue; the island’s subsequent enrollment into the American sphere of influence during half a century of the Cold War; and, all the while battling China on claims of a ‘Chinese’ identity at the expense of an ‘indigenous’ one, including the island’s aboriginal population (yuan zhu min). ‘Taiwan’, for these postcolonial scholars, is neither

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63 According to the UN’s Human Development Report (2007-08), Taiwan ranks 52 in the world with women comprising 21.4% of all legislators, a higher percentage than Japan or South Korea. Women in Taiwan also account for 59% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, ranking 59 in the world. Taiwan’s GEM (Gender Empowerment Measure) is 19, a much higher performance than Japan or South Korea which rank at 55 and 65 respectively. (Directorate-General of Budget 2008). Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Taiwan (http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=835&ctNode=3259) (Downloaded: 1 September 2008)

64 Fang-ming Chen, Houzhimin Taiwan: wenxueshilun jiqi zhoubian (Postcolonial Taiwan: Essays on Taiwanese Literary History and Beyond) (Taipei: Rye Field Publishers, 2002).

65 Kuei-hai Tseng, Zhanhou Taiwan fanzhimin yu houzhimin shixue (Anti-Colonial Postwar Taiwan and Postcolonial Poetics) (Taipei: Avanguard Publishers, 2005).


67 Kuei-fen Chiu, “Faxian Taiwan”: jiangou Taiwan houzhiminlunshu’ (Discovering Taiwan: Constructing Taiwan’s Postcolonial Discourse), in Houzhimin lilun yu wenhua rentong (Postcolonial Criticism and Cultural Identity), ed. Jing-yuan Zhang (Taipei: Rye Field Publishers, 2007), 169-191.
exclusively ‘Chinese’ nor ‘Japanese’ nor ‘American’ nor, even, ‘indigenous’ but an amalgam of all these ethnicities, histories, languages, and politics.

As Chiu Kuei-fen notes, Taiwan’s spoken vernacular reflects these polyglot influences. Taiwanese Mandarin, for instance, departs from the mainland version not just in terms of words, phrases, images, and metaphors due to different historical experiences with and immersion in Fukienese, Hakkanese, Minnanese, Japanese, and English. But the grammatical structure of Taiwanese Mandarin has changed also. Chiu cites an example from the 1984 Taiwanese novel, *Rose, Rose, I Love You (Meigui, meigui, wo ai ni)*.68 The protagonist of the novel, a PhD in English trained in the US, returns to Taiwan and transplants many Americanisms to her speech. She rattles off in Mandarin an almost direct copy of American colloquialisms such as ‘*duome hushuo!*’ (‘what a lot of nonsense!’), ‘*wuo hen gaoxing ni gen wuo tongyi*’ (‘I’m very glad you agree with me’), ‘*zhe shi wuode renwei*’ (‘this is my view’).

Sociologist and cultural studies pioneer Chen Kuan-Hsing emphasises Taiwan’s multiplicity of nodal points (*zhidian*). These emerge from overlaps among and intersections with various life networks (*wangluo*): e.g., ‘local Taiwan’ (*taiwan zaidi*) within ‘cross-strait relations’ (*liang an guanxi*) within a ‘Mandarin international’ (*huawen guoji*) within an ‘Asian region’ (*yazhou quyu*) within a ‘globalised region’ (*quanqiu quyu*).69 Taiwan is a part of Asia and should locate itself more explicitly so, Chen argues. From this basis, Taiwan should normalise relations with China. For too long, he writes, Taiwan has treated China as an enemy. He is reminded of the wrenching

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68 The title is drawn from a 1940s mainland song of the same title later turned into a hit in English in the 1950s. See, Kuei-fen Chiu, “*Faxian Taiwan*: jiangou Taiwan houzhiminlunshi” (Discovering Taiwan: Constructing Taiwan’s Postcolonial Discourse).
human cost of such enforced national divisions when, by chance in Seoul in mid-August 2000, he witnessed families reuniting for the first time in forty years:

In both instances, North and South Korea, Taiwan and China, the ‘national’ and the ‘personal’ historical experiences are clearly intersecting. For the encountering subjects, the emotional plane of affective desire seems to be at the forefront, overshadowing any other aspects of these ‘reunions’, no matter how imaginary or real the bodily experience (ti-yan) can be (original emphasis).70

More so, Chen refers to ‘Asia as a method.’ He draws this phrase and concept from Takeuchi Yoshimi (1910-1977), a Japanese scholar who admired the Chinese revolutionary writer, Lu Xun (1881-1936).71 Lu was a leader of the May Fourth Movement that vernacularised Chinese literature, thereby democratising public discourse and political participation in China.72 Takeuchi skewered modern Japan for unreflectively emulating the West like an ‘honor student’ grubbing for grades, then passing itself off as a model of superiority to ‘backward’ others less inclined to this ‘slave’ mentality.73 In contrast, Takeuchi argued, China through intellectual giants like Lu Xun turned to others within Asia who had endured similar oppressions and humiliations from the West but who could still articulate a sense of self. As an example, Takeuchi cited the difference in response between Japan and China to one such voice: i.e., India’s Tagore.

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73 Yoshimi Takeuchi, What is Modernity?, 68.
Many Chinese writers identified with Tagore’s opposition or resistance from their position as fellow colonised… [Tagore’s anger] was understood in China yet ignored in Japan. At this time, Tagore was seen here as merely a poet of a ruined nation, whose poetry represented the grievances of the weak.74

‘Asia as a method,’ then, means learning reflexively from oneself and others in comparable conditions, rather than blindly copying a hegemonic power like the West/US. For Chen, this analytical starting point highlights a dialectics between the international and the local. It constitutes what he calls a ‘new international-localism’ (xin guoji defang zhuyi) that is ‘non-essentialising,’ ‘non-valorising,’ and ‘non-anti-Westernising’ (fei benzhi hua, jiazi hua, kangxi hua).75 Rather, international-localism compels a ‘new logic’ (xin luoji) premised on the hybridities (hun za ti) and other new forms (xin xingshi) that emerge from systemic encounters. These hybridities dismantle the sovereign binaries of Self vs. Other and their policy outcomes like ‘unification’ vs. ‘independence’, thereby helping us to ‘de-colonise’ (qu zhi min), ‘de-imperialise’ (qu di guo), and ‘de-Cold War’ (qu leng zhan). He explains:

To de-Cold War, at this point in history, does not just mean to be rid of Cold War consciousness or to forget that episode of history and to look towards the future, as all the state leaders and politicians have called for. It means to mark out a space, beginning to re-open the unspoken histories and stories, to recognise and chart out the historically constituted cultural-political effects of the Cold War. Thus, the task to de-Cold War is, in the similar sense, parallel to and connected with the historical project of decolonization on various levels of abstraction in the Third Word (original emphasis).76

74 Ibid., 159.
75 Kuan-Hsing Chen, Qudiguo: Yazhou zuowei fangfa (Towards De-Imperialization: Asia as Method), 359.
Emancipating IR

Similarly, a comparable move aims to emancipate IR theorising. IR scholars have a dual responsibility, urges Steve Smith, to voice the ‘unspoken histories and stories’ of the colonised, the imperialised, and those subjugated to Cold War power politics. At the same time, they must critically examine how their histories and stories of IR ‘bring the world into existence.’ Failure to do so, cautions Smith, reinforces hegemony, whether it is intended or not. And, as the attacks of 9/11 have demonstrated, many now refuse being marginalised and silenced in face of unrelenting exploitation and extraction, even if they have to martyr their own bodies to do so.

Anna M. Agathangelou and L.H.M. Ling present ‘worldism’ as a paradigmatic alternative. Worldism acknowledges the ‘multiple worlds’ that make our world politics. Defined as multiple traditions of thought, action, and being that entwine into hybrid legacies, multiple worlds as a concept and a method resonates with Chen’s ‘new international-localism.’ It illustrates the dialectics of power negotiated between the local and the global, centers and peripheries, Self and Other. The national security state, for instance, becomes contextualised as only one part of a vaster, more complex set of human possibilities. Worldism, moreover, draws on the Greek concept of poisies to demonstrate this ‘new logic’ of hybridity. It locates subjectivity as a reverberative process between at least two entities to form a collectively-understood, institutionalized set of social

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77 Steve Smith, ‘Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11’.
78 Ibid., 499.
79 Anna M. Agathangelou and L.H.M. Ling, Transforming World Politics.
80 Agathangelou and Ling also refer to comparable traditions like Buddhism’s ‘co-dependent arising’ (pratītyasamutpāda in Sanskrit, yuanqi in Chinese) and Confucianism’s ren.
relations. Extending the call for a ‘linguistic’ or ‘artistic’ turn in IR theorising,\textsuperscript{81} Agathangelou and Ling deploy a variety of discursive modes (poetry, storytelling, a play) to demonstrate these multiple worlds at work. In so doing, they show a way out of the hegemony of a single and singular worldview propagated by a minority at the expense of the majority. In this way, worldism can de-colonise, de-imperialise, and de-Cold War IR. Like Chen’s formulation, worldism does so without resort to essentialising, reactionary moves like anti-Westernization.

In particular, L.H.M. Ling articulates Buddhist dialectics to dislodge hegemony in world politics.\textsuperscript{82} With the 18\textsuperscript{th}-century Chinese novel \textit{Dream of the Red Chamber} (\textit{Honglou meng}) as an iconic resource, Ling shows how dialectics between supposed opposites like ‘love’ (qing) and ‘lust’ (se) or the ‘human world’ (hong chen) and the ‘mythic world’ (huan jing) produce binding intimacies even when bounded by supposed oppositions. These dialectics of ‘reinforcements amid contradictions’ are demonstrated through a variety of venues: e.g., dreams, fables, conversations-within-conversations-within-conversations, poetry, songs, and plays, each entity relating to its other reverberatively, contrapuntally, rotationally, oppositionally, complementarily, and iteratively, just to name a few. This panorama of possible relations exposes the limitations and narrowness of conventional, dualist theorising that subjectivities are


absolute, divisible, and mutually-opposed. Indeed, *Dream of the Red Chamber* winks at us, reality and fantasy are as deceptive as any pair of dichotomies: e.g., prosperity and decline, union and separation, orthodoxy and eccentricity, love and lust, Taiwan and China.

To wit, *Lust/Caution*.

*LUST, CAUTION:*
A Metaphor

Eileen Chang never lived in Taiwan but she has been hailed as ‘a Taiwanese author.’ For Chen Fang-ming, Chang voiced a triple marginality that speaks to the Taiwanese experience of being dismissed, subjugated, and overlooked.83 Like Chang’s Shanghai, Taiwan faced hegemony from imperial Japan and Cold-War US; like Chang’s underworld, Taiwan’s ‘dark side’ was covered up by a glossy and removed Confucian elite; and, like Chang’s women characters, Taiwan was yoked by Confucian patriarchy compounded by Japanese and American patronage. Yet Chang’s very perspective upset the hegemony that installed such triple marginality, especially in her explicit treatment of women’s sexuality. Note, for example, this passage from *Lust, Caution*, voiced through Wang Chia-Chih, the novel’s female protagonist:

The English say that power is an aphrodisiac. She didn’t know whether this was true; she herself was entirely oblivious to its attractions. They also say that the way to a man’s heart is through his stomach…[A] well-known Chinese scholar was supposed to have added that the way to a woman’s heart is through her vagina. Though his name escaped her, she could remember the analogy he had

83 Fang-ming Chen, *Houzhimin Taiwan: wenxueshilun jiqi zhoubian* (Postcolonial Taiwan: Essays on Taiwanese Literary History and Beyond).
devised in defense of male polygamy: ‘A teapot is always surrounded by more than one cup’.  

Here, Chang interplays fantasy with reality. She suggests that a fantasy (‘catching’ a man from a woman’s perspective) is sometimes more real than reality (‘capturing’ a woman from a man’s perspective), and reality a mere whisper of fantasy (who doesn’t want to fantasize about love?). But in juxtaposing reality (woman = vagina = love) with fantasy (man = food = love), Chang shocks us to reconsider both (what does love mean anyway?).

Ang Lee’s film commits us to a similar rude awakening. Like the novel, fantasy and reality suffuse Taiwan’s history. For forty years, Chiang’s transplanted KMT imposed a fixed, absolutist national identity (‘Republic of China’) against another (‘China’) to ‘recover’ (guangfu) the latter, in contrast to the daily experiences across the strait that brims with multiple subjectivities (‘Taiwan/China’). Yet, today, fantastical Taiwan offers a very real model of successful Confucian-capitalist development matched by thriving democratic politics for a China that fantasises itself a communist state despite capitalist policies and practices. In putting Eileen Chang’s play with fantasy/reality on the screen, Ang Lee aims to shake us from these stupefying conventions.

Let us recount the story of Lust/Caution.

Chang’s terse novel is set in 1940s Shanghai, at the height of the Sino-Japanese war. Wang Chia-Chih, a young woman of beguiling sensibility, is planted in the home of Mr. and Mrs. Yee. Ostensibly, Wang is Mrs. Mak, the wife of a Hong Kong businessman. She is staying with the Yees while running a small-scale smuggling business on the side for the Shanghai elite. Actually, she has been sent by underground resistance forces to ensnare Mr. Yee, who is Head of Security for the Wang Ching-wei government, a puppet regime installed by the Japanese. Mr. Yee, in short, is a traitor and Wang, the patriot sent to assassinate him.

Ennui and despair drive Wang to play this role. In effect, she has nothing to live for: Wang is without family (her father abandoned her to marry a new wife), without meaning (she takes Japanese classes despite rampant anti-Japanese sentiment), and without love (the one man she cared for similarly abandoned her). When contacted by the underground, Wang seems purposeful again. She remakes herself from a mousy college girl into a sophisticated woman of means, resplendently curvaceous in her silk chipao.

She succeeds in enticing Yee, though each remains wary of and mysterious to the other. Neither fully trusts the other even though they are now lovers. Still, Yee decides to present her with a ring to commemorate their affair. This requires them to go to a

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86 In the original Chinese version, the novel is less than 40 pages; in English translation, it is less than 50 pages. Chang started Lust/Caution in the 1950s but didn’t publish it until the late 1970s. She mentioned returning to the manuscript ‘dozens of times,’ revising and rewriting.  
87 ‘Mak’ is the Cantonese pronunciation of the word ‘mai’, written as the character for the noun ‘rye’ which is also pronounced exactly the same as the verb ‘to sell’ (mai). With this word play, Chang suggests that Wang Chia-Chih, as Mrs. Mak, is a woman who sells herself.
jewelry store, and Wang’s cohorts take advantage of this opportunity to nab Yee. But something unexpected happens. The sight of the six-carat, pink diamond, surrounded by two rows of brilliant, smaller ones, a rare commodity in any economy much less a war-devastated one, moves her. It is the only present anyone has ever given her. She also knows that Yee cares little for such baubles. At the beginning of the novel, we hear Yee pooh-poohing such an expense when his wife pouted at him for not getting her a ten-carat diamond. ‘You wouldn’t have been able to play mahjong with that rock on your finger,’ he jokes. At the jewelry store, a faint plea escapes from Wang’s lips: ‘Run.’ Her lover understands instantly and bolts. By ten that evening, Wang and her co-conspirators are all dead, executed by order of Mr. Yee, Head of Security.

Chang ends the novel with Yee’s seeming triumph over Wang, over war, over love:

He was not optimistic about the way the war was going, and he had no idea how it would turn out for him. But now that he had enjoyed the love of a beautiful woman, he could die happy – without regret. He could feel her shadow forever near him, comforting him. Even though she had hated him at the end, she had at least felt something. And now he possessed her utterly, primitively – as a hunter does his quarry, a tiger his kill. Alive her body belonged to him; dead, she was his ghost.

The Film, In Contrast

Clearly, the story conveys much more than this bare-bones retelling. What is more relevant for us here, though, are the differences between Lee’s film adaptation and

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89 Ibid., 46.
the novel. These indicate the film’s significance for Taiwan-China relations, specifically, and IR theorising, generally.

The opening of each is instructive. Chang’s novel begins with a highly interior, intimate, and feminine focus that gradually extends to the larger scene. ‘Though it was still daylight, the hot lamp was shining full-beam over the mahjong table.’90 Diamonds flash from the players’ hands as they ‘wash’ the tiles; the white tablecloth, tied tightly at the legs, blinds the eye; black capes tied by gold brooches signal the high status of the women at the table, the heavy curtains in the room evoke comparisons with Nanking,91 and so on.

Lee’s film opens with an exterior, alienating, and muscular shot, portending with all the violence of the national security state. The first frame shows a guard dog, ‘straining at his leash, sniff[ing] the ground.’92 The camera zooms out to a row of ‘elegant residences,’ now ‘slightly seedy,’ under the gray, Shanghai sky.93 ‘In front of every house there stands a security guard with a gun,’ the screenplay reads. ‘And on the rooftops, guards with binoculars, [are] keeping watch.’94

Unlike the novel, our first glimpse of Yee is not at the mahjong table. In the film, he emerges from a dark, dank basement. ‘He winces almost imperceptibly at the sounds of torture emanating from the room behind him.’95 Yee is a powerful man but, the film underscores, still just a lackey for the Japanese. Yee’s assistant reminds him: ‘[General

90 Ibid., 3.
91 Nanking was the KMT ‘capital’ during the Sino-Japanese War.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid. 59.
Taicho] asks that you report first thing tomorrow morning – at Japanese headquarters.\footnote{Ibid.}

We see Yee as a hounded, haunted animal, oppressed by his own power, constantly protected by bodyguards, ducking from car to house for fear of an assassin’s bullet.\footnote{Ibid., 60.}

Early in their mutual seduction, Yee reveals to Wang that he doesn’t like to watch movies because, he explains, ‘I don’t like the dark.’\footnote{Ibid., 130.} At one point, when Wang complains that Yee has kept her waiting in the cold car, he lashes out with surprising honesty: ‘…His blood sprayed all over my shoes. I had to clean it off before I came. \textit{Do you understand?}’ (emphasis added).\footnote{Ibid., 191.} Later on, Wang meets Yee at a Japanese teahouse. It is full of servile \textit{geishas} catering to drunken Japanese soldiers. Oppressiveness pervades. Wang teases Yee by saying that he brought her there to show that she’s his whore.

‘Whore?’ he laughs softly. ‘It is I who was brought here…So you see, I know better than you how to be a whore.’\footnote{Ibid., 201.}

Yee is a powerful man who is circumscribed in every way while Wang is full of surprising subversion. She is so despite (perhaps because) of her position, as she puts it, as Yee’s ‘sexual slave.’ She unhinges Wu, the seasoned underground operative, with her unsparing rawness after he bullies her with loud, patriarchal authority:

\begin{quote}
Wang Chia-Chih: Don’t worry. I will do what you say!

Old Wu (\textit{takes Wang by the shoulders}): Good! Keep him in your trap. And if you need anything…
\end{quote}
Wang Chia-Chih: You think I have him in a trap? Between my legs, maybe? You think he can’t smell the spy in me when he opens up my legs? Who do you think he is?

Old Wu listens, becoming increasingly nervous.

Wang Chia-Chih: He knows better than you how to act the part. He not only gets inside me, but he worms his way into my heart. I take him in like a slave. I play my part loyally, so I too can get inside him. And every time he hurts me until I bleed and scream before he comes, before he feels alive. In the dark only he knows it’s all true.

Old Wu: Okay, stop it!101

She doesn’t stop until Old Wu storms out, unable to understand or control this force of nature that Wang Chia-Chih has become.

Yet the film rests not with contrasts or opposites. Rather, it focuses on the ambivalences or liminalities that weave through supposed oppositions, binding them like an undertow. Note this exchange between Wang and Yee after he has been away a few days:

Wang/Mak: I hate you!

Yee: I said I believed you. And you know, it would be the first time in a long time that I believed anyone, anyone at all. Let me hear it again, I want to believe…102

Yee believes Wang only when she expresses an undiluted emotion like hatred. Yet it is in this hatred that they make a connection, turning it into something resembling love.

Ang Lee accentuates the film’s fluidity and complexity with language. His actors speak at least three dialects of Chinese (Shanghainese, Mandarin, Cantonese) along with

101 Ibid., 195.
102 Ibid., 180.
spots of English. In the background, we hear Japanese in the teahouse and Hindi in the jewelry store. The film’s décor and costumes reflect the fusions of East and West, respectability and criminality, light and dark that Shanghai epitomised at that time.

Most explicitly, Lee uses sex to convey liminality. Here, the director interprets graphically on screen what the author intimated on the page. Lee presents Wang and Yee’s first sexual encounter, for example, as a rape. The screenplay details:

As she begins to unbutton her dress, he suddenly leaps up, grabs her, and pushes her against the wall, ripping the side seam of her chipao. He flips her around facedown onto the bed, unbuckles his pants, and enters her from behind.\(^{103}\)

None of their trysts convey any tenderness or eroticism. But it is precisely when Wang and Yee’s writhing bodies entwine into one that we see their transformation from resistance, suspicion, alienation, and separation to something larger, more encompassing, and mutually binding. Yee, the puppet government’s torturer, tortures Wang but so does she to him, in turn. At the same time, each finds in the other a burgeoning sense of humanity, imprinted through concrete contact rather than a performance of romance. It is also in these scenes of brutal physicality that Ang Lee compels the audience to confront the porousness between reality and fantasy, even when bordered by something as solid as one’s body.

A hint of acknowledgement glimmers between Wang and Yee in the Japanese teahouse. We hear a \textit{geisha} singing in a room down the hall. Yee is slightly drunk. When General Taicho passes by, Yee covers his face with his hand, not wanting to be seen, and

\(^{103}\) \textit{Ibid.}, 175.
‘pours himself some sake with his head lowered.’ Wang sees this and offers a song.

‘I’m a much better singer than they!’ she promises.

[Wang] takes a sip of sake, licks her lips, and stands up. She positions herself in front of him, posing like a classic singsong girl. At first her voice is barely a whisper, but then we can make out that she is singing ‘Girl Singing from Earth’s End.’

The song comes from a famous movie, ‘Street Angel’ (Malu tianshi), made in 1937 also set in Shanghai. The film tells of a tragic singsong girl victimised by power and poverty. The song pays poignant tribute to a love that shines in innocence and purity despite the desperation and depravity that surround her.

From the end of the earth
To the farthest sea
I search and search
For my heart’s companion
A young girl sings
While he plays his harp
Your heart is my heart...

Yee almost forgets who and what he is. What the song means for them, given their context, and Wang’s graceful Chinese femininity, amid the vulgar goings-on at the teahouse, strengthen their bond. His eyes glisten and he wipes them with a trembling

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104 Ibid., 200.
105 Ibid., 201.
106 Ibid.
hand. In that one moment, these two souls come together as human beings rather than as avowed enemies, each a disposable pawn of state power.

‘It’s the other side of the patriotic story,’ Ang Lee said in an interview. Lee was referring to the novel but he could be alluding to, also, the push/pull of Taiwan and China as reality and fantasy, and the impact that has on a growing imaginary:

All my life I feel like [an] outsider… Culturally I feel like an outsider, anywhere I go, even where I come from. My real cultural roots [are] in classic[al] China and what I was taught now feel[s] like a dream. I feel more of an insider in movies than real life. Very much like the girl in this movie. By pretending, actually you connect with the true self. My characters are all trying to find the truth about themselves through pretending. To me pretending is filmmaking, acting. That’s what I do best.

*Lust, Caution*, both the novel and the film, swirls around supposed opposites like patriot vs. traitor, torturer vs. victim, reality vs. fantasy. Yet the story also demonstrates the entwinements – the ‘borderlands’ – that emerge from these states of being. One subjectivity slides into the other, forming something completely unexpected, exciting yet shocking in its liberation.

‘Lust, Caution’ reminds us that ‘borderlands’ prevail even under conditions of absolute sovereignty. Both Wang and Yee think themselves committed agents for their respective governments. Each seeks to destroy the other but, in their performance as lovers, they discover their ‘true’, albeit inchoate, selves.

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110 Ang Lee quoted in *Ibid*. 
Yee does not escape Wang’s death unscathed, as in the novel. In the film, he’s back home in his study when he signs the order for her death. He throws the diamond ring aside, claiming to not know anything about it. But he can’t resist going to Wang’s old room. He sits mutely on the bed, blanketed in white, as shadows loom over his face in the dark.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR IR**

Our metaphor is complete. Wang and Yee stand for the personal, social relations that unfold within those public, national entities called ‘Taiwan’ and ‘China.’ But where Eileen Chang uses the political as backdrop only, Ang Lee foregrounds the political to account for the personal. In so doing, he shakes us loose from the familiar confinements of the national security state to something quite different, perhaps shocking but liberating at the same time. And in making this analytical and conceptual shift, Ang Lee moves us, ever so slightly, from the personal, artistic realm to the public, political one.

Like Yee, the central governments of Taiwan and China are powerful. But also like him, they must abide by an inter-state context of power politics. For Yee, it was Japanese imperialism; for Taiwan and China today, US hegemony. Perhaps more so for Taiwan than China, Wang’s subversive femininity, taken by hegemonic patriarchy as exploitable and disposable, alerts us to another undercurrent to power relations. Just like the ‘diamond’ that Yee gives to Wang, the material exchanges between Taiwan and China bear significant emotional consequences. The pilgrims of Matzu-Kingmen and the ordinary citizens who donated millions to the Sichuan earthquake, for example, managed to subvert the ‘strong’ and ‘masculine’ state’s policies despite being treated, as
interpreted by patriarchal convention, as ‘weak’ and ‘feminised’ agents of civil society. Furthermore, the film’s array of languages underscores the postcolonial fluidities, complexities, and liminalities that run through Taiwan, certainly, and China as well, if only these would be recognised. Yet the brutality and violations incurred by cross-strait relations, akin to Yee’s rape of Wang in their first encounter, cannot be denied. For Taiwan, this ‘rape’ invokes several layers of historical brutality: e.g., treated as an afterthought to the Chinese empire, as a throw-away colony to Japanese imperialism, as a target for KMT violence and hegemony for almost half a century, as a target of possible CCP violence and hegemony to come. The very sediments of this history, however, entwine the people of Taiwan and China. They remain enamored of each other as family, as kin, as national souls. ‘Your heart is my heart.’

*Democratising IR*

It is at this juncture that we need to democratise IR – and none too soon. Without a serious overhauling of equating ‘world politics’ with the Westphalian inter-state system, based on the primacy of national sovereignty and its interests, the ‘borderlands’ of our daily lives with their potential for transformative love and sustainability will be crushed.

Postcolonial theorising offers one means of checking such hegemony, both intellectual and practical (see Table A). Postcolonial studies recognise the hybrid or mixed legacies of global encounters over the centuries through peoples, goods, and ideas where selves-and-others proliferate, rather than singular, isolating sovereignties of Self vs. Other. We need not remain fixated with ‘competition’ in an ‘anarchical world,’
requiring a ‘balance of power’ or other such defensive strategies. Instead, postcolonial
IR reframes these social relations as ‘borderlands’ of daily life suffused with
complexities, ambivalences, and liminalities. Negotiations become paramount, forging
links between the inter-state and the trans-national, the center and the periphery, rather
than a unilateral domination by one over the other.¹¹¹

Reframing center-periphery relations involves knowledge-production as well.
‘Area studies’ in the world of IR is no longer relegated to a knowledge ghetto, consulted
only when a ‘crisis’ erupts. Instead, ‘area studies’ can generate their own theorising, as
suggested by Chen Kuan-Hsing via Takeuchi Yoshimi via Lu Xun in their call for ‘Asia
is a method’. That ‘Asia’ as a concept is premised on multiplicity and liminality, for
instance, differs radically from an analytical framework that begins with singularity and
certainty. But here, ‘Asia’ functions metaphorically to represent all areas of knowledge
production, rather than that of one location, culture, or history.

Put differently, the ‘native informant’ is as well endowed to theorise as the
‘theorist.’ Conversely, the ‘theorist’ can no longer be privileged with knowing only
type, formal or any other kind, and generalising from one case (i.e., the
West/Europe/US) interpreted from one perspective (i.e., elite, androcentric
history/philosophy) but applied to the rest of humanity. Neither can ‘area studies’ experts
resort to ‘thick description’ without accounting for its theoretical, political, and normative
implications. Any theorising must refer to a larger context of human experiences and
knowledge production but examined critically and reflexively.

¹¹¹ See, for example, L.H.M. Ling, Postcolonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire
between Asia and the West (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
CONCLUSION

Conventional analysis considers the half-century-old impasse between Taiwan and China, secured by US hegemony, an acceptable ‘peace.’ But it is precisely this approach, we argue, that threatens instability in the region. In allowing sovereignty to supercede all other considerations, we argue, neither Taiwan nor China could risk compromising it in any way, especially in an inter-state system prone to hegemonic power grabs.\(^{112}\) A bifurcated policy results where ‘unification’ vs. ‘independence’ locks all parties concerned, including those in the larger region, in an uneasy interim. At the same time, ‘triangulation’ renders both Taiwan and China highly vulnerable to US desires for the region, making for an explosive mix given China’s recent economic prowess and Taiwan’s maturation as a democratic nation. And what of local desires, aspirations, and needs? As suggested by our reading of ‘Lust, Caution,’ both the novel and the film, denial or eradication of the liminalities that come with ‘borderlands’ results in violence for both victim and perpetrator. Analysts in the US need to take heed, as much as those in Taiwan and China.

Of note is that postcoloniality is beginning to enter cross-strait discourse. ‘Taiwan,’ Shih Chih-yu argues, comes not from the realist logic of inter-state relations where the state remains a fixed, unitary, and eternal ‘black box.’\(^{113}\) Rather, Taiwan qualifies more as an idea constructed by its leaders. Cold-War politics transformed Taiwan into a ‘state’ after its previous incarnation as a Japanese colony, signed away by a deteriorating Qing dynasty at the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1898). Before that, Taiwan

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was a mere outpost of the Chinese empire, an occasional refuge for criminals and dissenters alike escaping from the ruling dynasty. Moreover, Shih stresses, Taiwan wields its own agency irrespective of US hegemony. Indeed, Taiwan has always acted on its desires, contrary to the conventional portrayal of Taiwan as helpless, fragile, and dependent on US protection. The ‘rules of the game,’ in other words, are not decided by the US alone. Shih points to former President Chiang Ching-kuo (1978-1988) ending martial law in Taiwan and allowing families to visit across the strait for the first time in forty years. With such social porousness between China and Taiwan, Shih suggests, the likelihood of military force from China against Taiwan will diminish over time. This would give Taiwan the geopolitical space to ‘find its own way’, with or without formal independence.

And this, perhaps, is the story behind the film behind the novel. The lust for sovereignty, whether in love or power or the national security state, may be heady and self-serving but it bears an all-too familiar, cautionary tale of alienation, repression, and violence. ‘To me,’ Ang Lee remarks on Eileen Chang, ‘no writer has ever used the Chinese language as cruelly… [N]o story…as beautiful.’114 Yet in his filmic adaptation of the novel, Ang Lee urges us to intervene. We cannot remain so entranced, he suggests; otherwise, tragedy and death will be our only future.

### TABLE A

‘Taiwan’/’China’ and IR Theorising

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Personal Relations</th>
<th>Local Relations</th>
<th>National Relations</th>
<th>International Relations</th>
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<td>1940s</td>
<td>Lust/Caution:</td>
<td>Shanghai/Hong Kong/Nanking</td>
<td>Puppet gov vs nationalist gov</td>
<td>World War II Allied vs Axis China vs Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wang/Yee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s-1990s</td>
<td>[informal</td>
<td>Taipei/Beijing/</td>
<td>KMT vs CCP</td>
<td>Cold War US vs USSR</td>
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<td></td>
<td>interactions]</td>
<td>Kingmen-Matzu/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Xiamen-Fujian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s - present</td>
<td>[informal</td>
<td>‘three links’</td>
<td>‘Taiwan’ vs ‘China’</td>
<td>Global War on Terror + Neolib Glob US</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>interactions]</td>
<td></td>
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<td>hegemony vs ‘terrorists’</td>
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**IR Theory**

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<th>Conventional IR: top-down, state-centric, exclusivist, fixed, Western</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Center &gt; Periphery</th>
<th>Inter-state priorities &gt; trans-national engagements &amp; solidarities</th>
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