

# Network Paper

## In brief

- This Network Paper describes an emergency cash relief programme carried out by Horn Relief and Norwegian People's Aid in the Sool Plateau in Somalia in 2003-2004. The programme distributed \$691,500 to 13,830 drought-affected households, making it the largest cash response ever mounted in Somalia.
- The paper explores the motivations and objectives that underpinned the programme, the context in which it was delivered, the problems it encountered and the effects it had on the targeted community.
- The paper concludes that, even in areas of political instability, cash relief can be an effective and viable alternative. There can be no 'blueprint' for the use of cash across all emergencies and in all circumstances. However, evidence is growing to suggest that, where circumstances are amenable, there is scope for increasing the use of cash as an instrument in humanitarian response.

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## Cash relief in a contested area Lessons from Somalia

Commissioned and published by the Humanitarian Practice Network at ODI

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Printed and bound in the UK

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**ISBN:** 0 85003 747 6

Price per copy: £4.00 (excluding postage and packing).

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
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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

Commodities, rather than cash, remain the predominant form of emergency relief: relief agencies typically distribute food aid, seeds, tools and shelter materials; they rarely give people the cash with which to buy these things themselves. Supporters of cash responses in emergencies argue that they can be more cost-effective and timely than commodity distribution, give the recipients greater choice and dignity and benefit the economies into which they are injected. Sceptics argue that cash responses are often not practical, particularly in complex emergencies, where security risks and the risk of corruption are deemed unacceptable. Even where cash responses may be feasible, there are concerns that women may be excluded, and that the cash may be spent in unwelcome or anti-social ways. A sudden access of cash may increase inflation and depress local markets, and may encourage conflict in areas of instability.

This paper seeks to contribute to this debate by describing one example of an emergency cash response: the Emergency Cash Relief Program (ECRP) in the Sool Plateau in Somalia in 2003-2004. The programme, implemented by Horn Relief and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and funded by Novib/Oxfam Netherlands, distributed a total of \$691,500 to 13,830 drought-affected households, making it the largest cash response ever mounted in Somalia.

The paper begins with a short summary of the political, social and livelihood context in which the intervention took place. This context was far from simple, with many of the features critics argue make cash responses unwise. Somalia is the epitome of a complex emergency, and Sool and Sanaag are at the centre of a territorial dispute between the self-declared states of Puntland and Somaliland, posing significant challenges for the delivery of international assistance. Social structures are patriarchal, though women's political exclusion is not matched by economic marginalisation and women typically control the household economy. Finally, widespread use of the narcotic *qat* raised the risk, cited by opponents of cash, that cash distributions would not be spent to meet household needs.

The second part of the paper describes the inter-agency assessment that triggered the cash response, and explores some of the key issues that influenced how the programme was designed and implemented. The assessment concluded that, after seven consecutive rain failures, over 12,000 households confronted acute food and water insecurity; many faced destitution. A cash response was recommended as the most flexible, immediate and viable programming option, allowing communities to prioritise

how they met the vast array of needs identified by the assessment. Cash was deemed appropriate because food was available on local markets (but people did not have the money to buy it); local credit systems were overstretched (which meant that the very destitute had no means to access cash themselves); and well-functioning money-transfer companies were present (making cash a viable option in practical terms). The programme began with a training workshop between 21 and 24 December 2003; households were registered on 28 December, and the majority of the distribution was complete by the end of January 2004: in all, 13,830 households were registered and reached in just four weeks.

The paper concludes with a short discussion of the results of the monitoring and evaluation exercises that followed the distribution, and offers some conclusions and lessons for the future. Overall, the evaluations found that the ECRP had been implemented well, and had largely achieved its main objectives of slowing down the destitution of pastoral livelihoods and reviving the local economy. Concerns over security and inappropriate spending proved largely unfounded. Politically, however, the cash intervention antagonised the Somaliland government, which chose to believe that the cash would be used to buy arms and *qat* on behalf of the Puntland administration, instead of for investment in livelihood restoration. The credit system revived, as did trade and the local economy. There were programming difficulties; it proved hard to get hold of sufficient cash in the right denominations, for example, and a combination of factors including exchange-rate fluctuations meant that some beneficiaries received substantially less in local currency than others. Due to the fact that the programme was designed as a stop-gap measure to stabilise the communities until long-term interventions were implemented, its effects were diminished because the follow-on interventions only got under way several months after the cash was distributed.

Despite these difficulties, and notwithstanding the lessons that need to be learnt, the ECRP experience has shown that cash relief is a valid option in Somalia. In emergencies in the developed world, governments provide cash grants because doing so is recognised as the most flexible and efficient way of helping affected people. If the preconditions are right, why should people in Africa or Asia be ineligible for similar help? Why is emergency aid so commonly restricted to food and other limiting resources? If we can recognise that the answer lies in fear and paternalism, then we have eliminated the core barrier to the acceptance of cash relief as a viable intervention in Somalia and other parts of the developing world.



## Chapter 2

### Context

#### Political and ethnic context

Somalia is in many ways the epitome of a complex emergency. Since the fall of Siad Barre's dictatorship in 1991, the country has lacked a functioning and internationally recognised national government. It has also suffered from inter-clan warfare. Several regional administrations have been established, and a transitional national government (TNG) was created in September 2000, but in each case authority has been limited or unstable. International peace initiatives finally succeeded in establishing a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in October 2004, but significant challenges remain.

One of the issues confronting the TFG concerns the status of disputed areas such as Sool and Sanaag. Both fall within the boundaries of the former British protectorate of Somaliland, which unilaterally declared its independence from Somalia in 1991. Communities in Sool and Sanaag share the same clan lineage as people living in Puntland, which has also declared itself independent from Somalia. These communities are mostly Darood, from the Harti sub-clan. However, Somaliland as a whole is predominantly Isaaq. Tensions persist between these communities, stemming from perceived persecution of Darood by Isaaq immediately following the civil war, and the territory is disputed between Somaliland and Puntland. In addition, due to proximity to Puntland and for reasons of logistics and commercial interests, the majority of the trade in much of Sanaag and Sool is with Puntland, and particularly its commercial capital, Bosaso. In most of Sool and Sanaag, the currency used is the Somali Shilling, rather than the Somaliland Shilling. During elections in Somaliland in April 2003, many polling stations remained closed in Sool and Sanaag because of insecurity.<sup>1</sup>

#### Livelihood context

The Somali population is predominantly pastoralist, practicing transhumance within and across borders. The nomadic and semi-nomadic segments of the population traditionally engage in cyclical migrations related to the seasons. This migration is an important coping mechanism aimed at ensuring the survival of livestock. Pack camels are crucial during these long migrations to pasture and water: they carry mobile homes, clothes and other valuables. Camel milk provides 30% of pastoralist income during normal years.<sup>2</sup>

Climate, specifically rainfall, is the most critical factor in much of Somali life. The Sanaag and Sool

regions are made up of arid and semi-arid agro-climatic zones experiencing high temperatures and very low, erratic rainfall. For the nomadic population, the timing and amount of rainfall are crucial determinants of the adequacy of grazing and the prospects of relative prosperity. There are four seasons in Somalia, two rainy seasons (*Gu* and *Deyr*) and two dry (*Jiilaal* and *Hagaa*). Short-lived droughts have been part of the normal cycle of pastoral life in the region. However, with the rapid destruction of the environment (mainly due to tree-felling for charcoal production), the length and frequency of droughts have increased, and the recovery periods between them have significantly shortened.

#### Social context

The vast majority of Somalis are Muslim and value Islamic practice and moral codes. The clan system is the basis of Somali society, which acts as a support system that provides protection to individuals in case of economic hardship or conflict. The entire community relies on the wisdom and experience of elders, who use customary (*Xeer*) and Sharia laws to resolve disputes.

The credit system is a key feature of pastoral societies. Livelihood systems follow seasonal cycles, in which debtors and creditors depend on each other. Pastoralists often purchase commodities on credit during times of hardship, and redeem the debt when they have animals or milk to sell. During lean times, pastoralists also rely on a strong system of social assistance, with wealthy relatives taking care of their drought-affected kin. There are, however, indications that communities are becoming more



A group discussion as part of the inter-agency assessment, Sool Plateau, October 2003

stratified, with an increasing number of pastoralists owning trucks and water reservoirs, and depending largely on support from the large Somali diaspora. In general, the diaspora provides crucial support to many families, channelled through money-transfer companies (*Xawalaad*) and traders. Up to \$1bn is thought to be transferred each year from the diaspora via the *Xawalaad* money transfer system.<sup>3</sup>

Gender relations are skewed in favour of men. For example, boys are still given preference over girls in education, and with food in times of hardship. Men control all decision-making bodies at the local level. However, women are in charge of household expenditure and often support their families through small trading such as tea shops and frankincense and honey sales. Control over the economy has not, however, translated into increased political participation. The addictive narcotic *qat* is widely used by men, with significant negative effects on the social and economic aspects of Somali life. The addiction reduces productivity, and salaries are diverted to the purchase of *qat* in large quantities. While *qat* is primarily used by men in urban areas (including larger towns in rural areas), consumption is increasing among pastoralists as more become urbanised through destitution, or begin to lead semi-pastoral lives.

## The humanitarian presence in Sool and Sanaag

Potential insecurity in Sool and Sanaag means that there are major constraints to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, both in terms of dealing with the authorities and obtaining security clearance to visit the area. The Sool Plateau has as a consequence been largely neglected: only two international organisations, Horn Relief and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), have managed to maintain a consistent, long-term presence in the area.

Horn Relief has worked with the pastoral communities of Eastern Sanaag for the past 14 years. The organisation focuses on natural resource management, environmental rehabilitation, women's empowerment and education. The agency also uses information collected through a network of hundreds of community volunteers, regular field monitoring and a yearly research exercise conducted by pastoral youth (dubbed the Camel Caravan) to raise awareness among international actors of the issues affecting Sanaag. NPA has been involved in Somalia since 1994. The organisation has given substantial assistance to health institutions in Sool region, largely funded by the Norwegian government. NPA has also been active in the education and water sectors, and has worked on emergency programmes, women's rights and HIV/AIDS.



## Chapter 3

# Assessment and response

*When the land dies, the animals die and people follow.*

Aden Haji Ali, 73, pastoralist of Hingalool village, Dhahar District, Sanaag, October 2003

The Emergency Cash Relief Program (ECRP) was initiated following an OCHA-led inter-agency assessment in ten villages in Sool and Sanaag, carried out in October 2003.<sup>4</sup> This work largely confirmed the findings of earlier assessments by Horn Relief and field reports from the FAO Food Security Analysis Unit (FSAU), which indicated that, as a consequence of seven consecutive rain failures, an emergency existed in the Sool Plateau. In all, some 12,172 households were reported to be facing acute food and water insecurity.

The assessment used a household food economy approach as its main methodology to collect information and analyse findings. The assessment teams focused on health/nutrition, food security, livestock/pastoralism, the environment and the water sector. The main findings of the OCHA-led assessment were as follows:

- All *berkads* (reservoirs used to collect water) and surface water in the region were dry, and many boreholes were inoperable. In some locations, the yields of boreholes had fallen by 50–60%.<sup>5</sup> In addition, poor maintenance and little investment in infrastructure had led to the large-scale degradation of permanent water sources. The need for water trucking, and the costs of doing it, had reached an all-time high. Pastoralists were spending 60% of their (borrowed) income on water. Deprived of water, many pastoralists had little option but to watch their livestock and livelihood wither and die.
- Cumulative livestock losses had decimated herds and rendered them unproductive. Camels were particularly badly affected, with herds reduced by 60–70%. Mortality among pack camels was 80%. This translated into the loss of the pastoralists' oldest and most reliable coping mechanism: migration. Livestock prices had fallen by 60–70%, mainly because of poor body condition, and milk production had plummeted, affecting both consumption and incomes. Camel reproduction rates were reported to have decreased from 20% to 1%. Coping strategies were negative, resulting in an increase in charcoal burning as an alternative source of income.
- Over-reliance on credit as a coping mechanism had resulted in economic stagnation, bringing the credit system near to collapse. The majority of households were indebted at rates that far exceeded the norm, with debts of \$50–\$100 per household just for water. Many traders were unable to continue to extend credit. The

capacity of wealthier members of society to support poorer sections of the population had steadily decreased as the number of destitute households increased, bringing social assistance systems to the point of collapse. Loans, remittances and family support were either dwindling or operating at maximum capacity. Pastoralist families increasingly required cash to sustain not only water trucking activities, but also other basic needs including food and medical care.

In December 2003, the FSAU reported severe acute malnutrition rates of 3.8%, and a global acute malnutrition rate of 17.8%, among children in the Sool Plateau.<sup>6</sup> In the same report, FSAU noted that 'there is evidence to suggest a deterioration in the nutritional status of the population. Malnutrition rates appeared significantly higher among children from pure pastoral households than those in major villages'. The assessment highlighted that malnutrition, morbidity and mortality were likely to increase rapidly if the situation worsened. Meanwhile, the inter-agency assessment team forecast that 'Most remaining livestock will die, the local economy will collapse and this could trigger large-scale population movements to towns that would adversely affect the health and welfare of the communities, in particular children'.<sup>7</sup>

In response to these findings, the assessment team recommended a package of short-term interventions, including cash and food assistance, emergency water provision, emergency health service provision and veterinary services. A second phase would include cash or food for work projects to help support and rebuild livelihoods, and emergency borehole repairs to improve water supplies. Longer-term interventions were recommended to address the underlying environmental, income and range-management problems in the Sool Plateau.

### Designing the cash relief programme

In response to the assessment's recommendations, Horn Relief proposed a cash relief programme as a stop-gap measure and a complementary response, allowing time for intermediate and longer-term interventions to be developed. The proposal was received positively by the assessment team, and the OCHA team leader had prior experience of cash-based interventions from a different context. This was critical as a lack of experience with using cash in emergency response often means that it is not even considered during the assessment phase.

#### *Aims, objectives and target groups*

The ECRP set out to alleviate immediate acute food insecurity by providing the most vulnerable households in Sool and

Sanaag with temporary one-off payments of \$50, to meet food, water and medical needs over a six-week period. The programme aimed to increase the purchasing power of vulnerable households, reduce pressure on local social support systems and improve health and nutrition.

The target group comprised the most structurally vulnerable drought-affected pastoral communities in Sool and Sanaag. These included women-headed households, the disabled and the elderly. The criteria by which households would be *excluded* were:

- Livestock ownership of more than 60 shoats (sheep and goats), based on FSAU wealth rankings (pack camel ownership was ruled out as an indicator of wealth, since even middle-wealth groups were suffering large-scale pack camel deaths).
- Ownership of assets such as *berkads* and water tanks.
- Social capital (such as external and/or local remittances or access to extended family support).

Due to the magnitude of the needs, the project was designed to target only pastoralists who were at risk of destitution. The project was not, in other words, designed to meet 'normal' vulnerability or to address issues of general poverty. For this reason, poor non-pastoralists, or non-destitute pastoralists, were not eligible.

### **Setting the size of the grant**

The optimum size of the grant was subject to a great deal of discussion during the project design phase. The inter-agency assessment recommended a \$100 grant to households, based on the minimum amount of poor-household expenditure per month (for food, sugar, oil, water for livestock and household consumption, human and livestock drugs and relocation costs for livestock). This grant was expected to last for two months. However, because funding was likely to be limited and the number of households in need of assistance was likely to be high, the grant amount was reduced to \$50, to last for one and a half to two months.

### **Dollars or Shillings?**

It was decided to distribute the grants in US dollars rather than Somali Shillings. The Somali Shilling has depreciated significantly since the collapse of the central government, and bills are printed in denominations of 1,000. At the time, the average exchange rate obtained by the beneficiaries



A livestock carcass, Sool Plateau, October 2003

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was 18,600 Shillings to the dollar. This would have meant distributing 930 banknotes per household: with nearly 14,000 households to reach, the project would have had to obtain and distribute in the region of 13 million notes. Transporting truckloads of cash on this scale in a country without the rule of law was clearly not a practical or sensible proposition. Getting hold of such large volumes of notes was also expected to create critical delays in the implementation of the programme.

### **Securing funding**

In the wake of the inter-agency assessment, various donors and agencies, including ECHO, DFID, CARE, WFP, Novib/Oxfam Netherlands and UNICEF, indicated an interest in supporting response programmes. The assessment had succeeded in putting the crisis on the map for an international community that had previously been reluctant to intervene in Sool and Sanaag on account of the complex political situation, limited agency presence and concerns around the capacity of implementing agencies in the area.

Following the assessment, various interventions took place in the area, including the provision of fuel subsidies to lower the cost of trucking in water, a UNICEF nutrition and health campaign and a food distribution by WFP. However, most donors were cautious about supporting a cash-based response. DFID considered funding the programme, but opted instead to finance the creation of a larger humanitarian emergency fund under OCHA's management, to support the quick implementation of relief interventions. Several other donors indicated interest in funding the follow-up phases recommended in the inter-agency assessment, but were not willing or able to become involved in the initial phase for cash relief.

Why were donors reluctant to fund a cash relief programme? In part, they were concerned that the cash would be misused or diverted to buy weapons or *qat*. Insecurity was a worry, given the unstable political environment, and existing clan tensions raised the possibility of conflict should one segment of the population feel itself under-served in relation to another. Some agencies also expressed reservations over Horn Relief's capacity to deliver cash to beneficiaries, since this kind of work was outside of the agency's traditional operating framework. Donors were not convinced that targeting would be effective and impartial, and there were concerns about possible negative impacts on other interventions: in essence, some actors were concerned that the provision of what was in effect 'free' cash would undermine cash for work projects, for example, which relied on a community contribution.<sup>8</sup> It was also felt that cash relief would create a precedent for a type of aid that most agencies were not willing or able to deliver in Somalia.

Finally, Novib/Oxfam Netherlands decided to engage with the ECRP and, after a careful assessment of the risks, the agency approved the programme. At the same time, however, Novib insisted on additional guarantees to ensure that the cash reached the most vulnerable in the Sool and Sanaag regions, and asked OCHA to monitor the programme and undertake a post-distribution survey to gauge its impact, and to assess how the cash grants had been used at the household level. Accordingly, NPA, as a long-time international organisation operating in the Sool region, was sub-contracted to ensure that affected communities in Sool were served (Horn Relief has not traditionally operated in Sool). Horn Relief and NPA signed a tripartite agreement with OCHA giving it an oversight role in monitoring the project. NPA implemented the programme through a local partner, the Steadfast Voluntary Organization (SVO).

## Implementing the programme

### *Workshop training*

The programme began with a training workshop between 21 and 24 December 2003. The training aimed to enhance understanding of the programme's goals and objectives; familiarise staff with community-based targeting through clan structures; promote a basic understanding of the Household Economy Approach in targeting; develop registration and distribution methodologies; streamline documentation; develop a realistic zonal work and logistics plan; brief cash-transfer companies on the distribution system and come to an agreement on monitoring and reporting processes. A list of villages to be targeted by each agency was also developed. It is worth noting that field staff or zonal teams assigned to the programme areas were selected not only on the basis of competence and trust, but also based on their knowledge and understanding of the dynamics at work in the villages

and clan structures. This approach was crucial to ensuring reliability in verifying and cross-checking the data on the registration lists.

### *Community mobilisation*

As part of the initial implementation phase, the ECRP promoted strong community involvement, in an effort to gain trust in the project, and to minimise potential conflict. The implementation partners introduced the ECRP to targeted communities through a series of public meetings designed to develop a full understanding of the programme and its objectives among communities and Village Relief Committees (VRCs). Members of the VRCs entered into formal agreements with Horn Relief and NPA to codify principles of transparency and impartiality, and to provide clear guidance on the VRCs' role in the implementation of the programme. Members of the VRCs were elected by the members of the community to ensure fair representation. Membership guidelines encouraged the participation of women, elders, businesspeople and traders, minorities and pastoralists.

The VRCs were responsible for identifying the most vulnerable people in their localities based on agreed selection criteria. They were also tasked with informing beneficiaries of their registration, conducting verification and identification during the distribution, mediating and resolving conflicts among community members, sharing all relevant information with the implementing partners and facilitating coordination with the community. The participation of trained national staff was key to fostering understanding and cooperation within the community. Likewise, the involvement of the VRC in programme management at the community level immediately after the social mobilisation was crucial in reducing expectations and maintaining dialogue with stakeholders. In this regard, Horn Relief and NPA's capacity and experience in the field and deep-rooted understanding of the communities was an important advantage. The network of community volunteers, national staff and developed infrastructure was seen as key for the implementation of the programme on the ground, and in conducting social mobilisation, reinforcing community trust and mitigating the risk of conflict.

### *Targeting issues*

Targeting methodologies were specifically chosen to promote impartiality and minimise the risk of conflict as a result of the cash distribution. Channels of communication remained open with beneficiaries and targeted communities, who could communicate their grievances to the project team or relevant community representatives. National staff were assigned to supervise the distribution in their own areas, on the assumption that they would have strong knowledge about the veracity of the registration lists provided by the VRCs, and were able to recognise when people did not fulfil the criteria, and prevent double registration.

The implementing agencies used two different allocation methodologies: clan-based and village-based. In village-based targeting, the village population was represented by the VRC, which selected beneficiary households eligible for the cash grant according to agreed criteria. This approach was used by NPA/SVO to target 2,780 beneficiaries in Sool, most of whom were from the Dulbahante sub-clan.

The portion of the ECRP implemented in Sanaag used a clan-based methodology. This targeted a significantly larger population (11,050 beneficiaries), most of them from the Warsangeli clan, but also including various other sub-clans. While village-based targeting is the usual unit for pre-allocations, a clan-based methodology was deemed more appropriate in targeting pastoralists. The clan system is the strongest traditional structure in Somalia, and is also the core governance mechanism in the pastoral community. The clan system was therefore judged to be the best way of promoting an understanding of the registration process, and minimising the risk that minority clans would be excluded from the distribution. It was also expected that clan-based targeting would better suit a situation where the majority of recipients were pastoralists not based in villages. By having a pre-allocation established ahead of time, the national staff in a particular village would be susceptible to less pressure from the communities.

Pre-allocation by clan required a rapid population assessment to determine levels of vulnerability. Due to the lack of census data, the implementing agency used alternative information sources, including the blood price (the customary compensation for death or injury paid to the victim's family by the offender's clan or sub-clan), interviews with community elders and previous reports from organisations such as FSAU. The number of grants for sub-clans and clans in each targeted location was pre-allocated based on this information.

### **Registration and distribution**

Household registration began on 28 December, and the majority of the distribution was completed by the end of January. A deliberate strategy to target women was built into the programme, taking into consideration gender roles, and the fact that women are better equipped to prioritise household expenditure. Gender inclusion in the

distribution process was promoted by registering both wives and husbands in dual-headed households and informing families that the wife should collect the grant (in female-headed households, women naturally collected the grant).

In a nomadic-pastoral setting, a synchronised distribution is important to avert conflict, and to limit migration into and out of the targeted area. For this reason, both agencies ensured that distribution began simultaneously. In order to ensure that pastoral families could easily travel to collection points, the distribution area was divided into zones. All the villages in these zones were targeted for registration and distribution, and pastoralists therefore had opportunities to collect their grant from a location fairly close to them. The village was chosen based on the availability of a wire-transfer company, the village's centrality to surrounding pastoral settlements and the distribution of sub-clan groups.

Given the potential for diversion, the implementing agencies never handled the cash physically; instead, two money-transfer companies, Dalsan and Dahabshil, were used. These companies were chosen for their flexibility, professionalism, network coverage, reputation and capacity. They took full liability for all project monies, and agreed to cover any lost or misallocated funds. They also agreed to ensure security during the actual distribution. Altogether, Dalsan and Dahabshil transferred \$691,500 from their Nairobi offices to their agents in the region, who in their turn passed the funds on to the 13,830 recipient households in Sool and Sanaag. The wire companies received a list of beneficiaries upon completion of the selection process.

On the day of disbursement, Horn Relief and NPA/SVO staff were present, along with the VRCs and community elders, to verify the *bona fides* of the recipients, and to document and monitor the process. The companies provided distribution receipts to the beneficiaries. Daily log sheets were completed to record all the events that transpired on any given day, including the main highlights of any meetings, the names of all individuals interviewed, challenges encountered and solutions proposed. Senior staff from the implementing agencies accompanied the various zonal teams and rotated across the programme areas to monitor the activities and progress of each team.

## Chapter 4

# Evaluating the impact of the cash programme

Several assumptions informed the ECRP's design and implementation. The primary assumption was that the amount of cash distributed to each household (\$50) would be enough to prevent further deterioration in the household's position until medium- and longer-term interventions such as cash for work had been established. It was assumed that this would take approximately two months. Second, the programme assumed that the operating environment would be peaceful, and that the funds would be distributed to beneficiaries securely. The cash-transfer companies would prove capable of effectively managing the cash distribution, and affected communities would collaborate in identifying the most vulnerable households. The relatively small size of the transfer would ensure minimal inflationary effect, and deter recipients from unproductive spending on weapons or *qat* (the market price for an AK-47 was \$350, and \$10 for a bundle of *qat*). Given the magnitude of the needs prevailing at the time of the distribution, it was assumed that the grants would be invested in ways that would help to meet them. Finally, it was assumed that, in line with the recommendations of the inter-agency assessment, other programming would follow the cash intervention, and that coordination among the various actors and stakeholders in the region would be effective. This chapter tests these assumptions, drawing on the key findings of the monitoring and evaluation work that was conducted as part of the ECRP.

### Monitoring and evaluation in the ECRP

The ECRP was an innovative approach to programming in a contested environment. As such, proper monitoring was key to document the process and promote accountability towards the beneficiaries, the organisations involved and the wider humanitarian community. A great deal of attention was therefore given to the monitoring and evaluation component of the programme.

Clear monitoring agreements were negotiated with the beneficiaries, the VRCs and the money-transfer companies, and specific clauses were included in the agreement between the three partner organisations (OCHA, Horn Relief and NPA). Horn Relief and NPA/SVO staff deployed in the field reported on a daily basis, tracing teams' locations, assessing progress and noting any unexpected security incidents. Coordination was also important to gauge progress and ensure simultaneous distribution between the implementing agencies. Regular contact was maintained via radio, e-mail and satellite phones.

The VRCs along with the community completed registration lists based on the allocations for each sub-clan provided. A



©Acacia Consulting

Cash relief beneficiaries, Sool Plateau, June 2004

streamlined registration form was used (a sample form is reproduced in Figure 1). Completed registration lists were cross-checked with key informants, in particular women and youth groups, as well as businesspeople and traders in the community.

### Assessing the impact of cash relief

In a first attempt to assess the impact of the ECRP on communities and the local economy, Horn Relief undertook a post-distribution monitoring survey in March 2004. Subsequently, OCHA undertook a second survey in April-May 2004 to review the mechanics of the grant distribution and its outcomes, and to analyse cash grant distribution patterns. Finally, an external team of consultants conducted a more in-depth evaluation exercise in June 2004 to review both the impact of the programme, and its general implementation mechanisms. The main findings of this evaluative work are presented below.

#### *Beneficiary targeting: were the most vulnerable people reached?*

The evaluations confirmed that the criteria established to identify the beneficiaries ensured that the most vulnerable people received cash grants. Overall, the evaluations indicated that 97% of the total beneficiaries were well targeted through the distribution process, and received the cash grants. An estimated 3% of beneficiaries met criteria that should have excluded them from the programme. In two villages (one in Sool and the other in Sanaag), members of the VRCs registered themselves, as well as other village members that did not qualify according to the criteria set.<sup>9</sup>

**Figure 1:**  
**Sample registration form**

Names of household heads – 4 names required	Household size	Clan	Sub-clan	Location	Livestock holdings		Names of VRC members
					Camels	Shoats	
Wife							1.
							2.
Husband							3.
							4.
Remarks:							5.
							6.
							7.


**Expenditure patterns: were priorities met?**

According to the external evaluation, all the cash grants were invested towards meeting needs in food and water, health and debt repayment. The Somali culture of sharing played a key role in maximising the scope and impact of the ECRP on the communities. Although the practice may to some extent have reduced the impact of the project on individual households, it revived the cyclical process of sharing, and temporarily reduced the burden of social assistance on the better-off members of these communities.

Beneficiaries targeted for distribution reported that their daily food intake increased by at least one meal.<sup>10</sup> The cash grants enabled some households to move physically weak and emaciated herds away from overgrazed pasturelands to less-affected locations. One month after the cash distribution, communities reported that the incidence of begging and level of dependence on social support systems had fallen by an average of 90%, based on accounts from the households interviewed.<sup>11</sup>

Figure 2 represents the cash grant expenditure patterns as determined by the OCHA evaluation team.

**Figure 2:**  
**How households spent their cash**



### ***Women's control over the grant***

Men interviewed as part of the external evaluation reported that they handed over the grant to women. It is worth noting that some members of the community, especially elders and some women above the age of 60, resented the decision to promote gender equity and emphasise the role of women during the distribution. This group indicated that the move was irreligious and culturally insensitive, and had the potential to disrupt the social stability of the communities. On the other hand, a large majority of the population, especially women, embraced the decision. There was also a general feeling among the majority of interviewees that the funds were mostly invested towards meeting the household's needs because women remained in control of the cash.

### ***Allegations of cash misuse***

There was no evidence to suggest that the money had been used to buy weapons or cash. Typical responses indicated in fact that the amount distributed relative to the level of need was such that the beneficiaries could not afford to buy *qat* or guns. Responses included:

*Qat costs almost US\$10 per bundle. Do you think that someone who received US\$50 will buy qat?*

*How can a hungry person buy a gun, for what reason? Believe it or not, people have already been disarmed by the drought. A brand new AK costs about US\$350. Those who had one or two guns have sold them.*

That said, the OCHA post-distribution survey noted an increase in *qat* purchases after the distribution. Further investigation indicated that this increase 'reflected a circulation of cash among the urban business community rather than a change in *qat* usage among vulnerable rural pastoralists'. In other words, the increase in *qat* use was due to the ability of pastoralists to repay debt and purchase items on a cash basis from urban traders, who were then able to purchase more *qat*. The increased use of *qat* was down, not to the ECRP beneficiaries, but to indirect beneficiaries such as local traders, who now had more cash available.

### ***Impact on the local economy***

The cash distribution contributed to the revival of the credit system, with a trickle-down effect on trade and the local economy. In all the villages visited, at least one retailer who had been forced to close his/her shop (due to customers' inability to repay debt and suppliers' inability to further extend credit) was able to resume trading as a result of the distribution. The programme also enabled pastoralists to settle debts or extend their credit. However, most households interviewed still had debt, ranging from 250,000 Shillings (just over \$14) to 3,450,000 Shillings (just under \$200).

Research into cash distributions indicates that their success depends on the 'quantity and quality of service

supplied by the traders'.<sup>12</sup> The OCHA post-distribution survey indicated that local traders, who were well-informed of the upcoming cash distribution, had provisioned their shops in preparation for the influx of cash, therefore averting inflation risks. As they were aware that the grant would be relatively modest, none of the traders deemed it necessary to inflate the price of commodities. In that sense, the beneficiaries were able to access shops and services at a fair price. Market price reviews looked at by the evaluations indicated that the price of commodities on the market did not fluctuate as a result of the distribution. The post-distribution survey also indicated that 97% of the cash distributed was spent locally, directly benefiting local traders.

Unfortunately, the one-time grant did not lead to any long-term improvements in business and trade. Nonetheless, within these limitations the grants contributed to a short-term revival in the economy. The majority of the grant was used to repay debt. This was a sound decision on the part of the beneficiaries because it enabled resumed access to credit, thereby ensuring longer-term assistance after the ECRP had ended. It was thus likely that the impact of the grant extended beyond the four to six weeks reported.

### ***Impact on migration patterns***

The ECRP did not cause a large-scale movement of pastoralists to the areas of distribution. To avert this risk, the implementing agencies had made significant efforts to discourage people from expecting a further round of cash distribution.

### ***Impact on social relations***

The cash grants did not result in conflict at community level, nor did they cause a deterioration in social cohesion. On the contrary: the evaluations found indications that cash grants were in some cases shared between recipient and non-recipient households, mostly along kinship lines, thereby helping to reinforce social ties. Elders interviewed confirmed that the grants had benefited the entire community.

### ***Impact on beneficiary empowerment***

One of the main benefits attributed to cash-based responses is that they respect the dignity of the beneficiaries by enabling them to prioritise their needs. The external evaluation reported that giving people cash and enabling them to spend according to their priorities was 'an extremely empowering tool'. The post-distribution monitoring survey indicated that '97% of the cash grants were used for food or non-food purchase, and/or debt repayment'.<sup>13</sup> In this case, resource-based interventions would have failed to address debt repayment, which the community identified as a top priority, and which featured prominently in the way households spent their grant.

### ***Impact on local security conditions***

Overall, insecurity was not a major issue. According to the OCHA post-distribution survey, rumours of insecurity, rather than actual security incidents, ‘appeared to have been the largest threat looming over the program implementation’.

It was anticipated that the ECRP would exacerbate tensions between Puntland and Somaliland, given pre-existing strained relations between them over the status of Sool and Sanaag. Relations did worsen between the two administrations, and this threatened to delay the start of the programme. Before the cash distribution began, the Puntland government moved to take full political control of Las Anood, the Sool capital, by ousting from it the Somaliland government representatives. The move broke a tradition of relatively peaceful ‘power-sharing’, with each administration maintaining a representation in the town. Security conditions suddenly declined, both sides massed troops in the surrounding district and there were fears of conflict.

Intense discussions took place between Horn Relief and NPA/SVO, and all three implementing parties agreed that full-scale war was unlikely. It was agreed that the most likely scenario would be a continued stand-off. Nonetheless, senior NPA staff visited Las Anood to assess security conditions first-hand, and evaluate the impact on the ECRP. The assessment concluded that the security problem was confined to the area around Las Anood town, and that it was safe to proceed to the drought-affected areas, which were some distance to the north. NPA was able to continue the distribution after a week’s delay. The security incidents in Las Anood had no repercussions on overall security in Sanaag. Neither agency was significantly delayed and both were able to undertake simultaneous distribution of the cash grants without any further difficulties.<sup>14</sup>

### ***Impact on political relations***

Although the ECRP appeared to have no significant impact on security conditions, it did have a political effect in terms of agencies’ relations with the Somaliland administration. The Somaliland government became far more antagonistic towards the implementing agencies, UN agencies and local and international organisations based in Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland. Despite strenuous efforts by OCHA to share information about the intervention prior to implementation, the Somaliland authorities dismissed the programme as a cover operation for the purchase of arms and *qat* on behalf of the Puntland government. One agency was accused of operating in Somaliland without a valid registration.

Relations within the aid community were also strained. Other aid actors expressed the view that the distribution had created expectations among beneficiaries that they could not meet, and accused the implementing agencies of

not participating in coordination meetings organised by the Somaliland government. The antagonism went so far that the OCHA post-distribution survey was rejected as biased. Although the external evaluators concluded that this hostility was politically motivated and unfounded, the implementing agencies were strongly encouraged to take steps to improve their relations with the Somaliland authorities and with other NGOs working in the same area.

## **Programming issues and lessons learned**

### ***Cost-efficiency***

The ECRP appears to have borne out one of the arguments most commonly used in favour of cash distributions: that they are significantly more cost-effective than commodity-based interventions. The external evaluation reported that the total overheads of the programme were 17%, meaning that 83% of the programme funds went directly to the beneficiaries. The evaluation estimated typical overheads at between 25% and 35% – a quarter to a third of total funding. It concluded that ‘In this regard cash relief is more cost-effective than other interventions’.<sup>15</sup>

### ***Financial issues***

Since distributing the grant in Somali Shillings would have created substantial and fundamental implementation and logistical problems, it was decided to use US dollars instead. The OCHA post-distribution survey noted that ‘the beneficiaries received markedly different exchange rates within and between settlements’, with the rate ranging from 14,000 to 19,000 Shillings to the dollar. Depending on the rate they obtained, beneficiaries thus ultimately received anything between 700,000 and 950,000 Shillings, a variation of up to 35% in the amount of cash available for use to the household. Several factors contributed to these exchange rate fluctuations. First, recipients had the flexibility to change their grant where they pleased, with some converting their cash in the main urban centres, where the dollar value is often higher. Second, some beneficiaries exchanged their grants with independent creditors, who had the upper hand in negotiations over rates. Although the implementing agencies reached a verbal agreement with one of the money-transfer companies to change the currency at a fixed rate, this contract was never applied. Further investigation on how to deal with this specific issue is in hand. Finally, the exchange rate in areas of operation fluctuated during the distribution.

- *Lesson learned: More formal arrangements should be reached with the remittance companies to provide a low and fixed exchange rate to beneficiaries.*

One of the money-transfer companies (Dalsan) encountered difficulties in withdrawing large sums of money quickly from its Kenyan account, due to the highly restrictive systems in place for any large cash withdrawal. This was significant as the company was handling the



largest portion of the cash distribution. Eventually, Dalsan was able to withdraw all the cash it needed, with some delays, and transfer all of the funds to Puntland. Dalsan and Dahabshil also found it hard to obtain the \$50 notes it needed, either in Nairobi or in Somalia. Field staff had to revise their plans, and ask that two registered households share a \$100 note. Due to the strong kinship ties in the area, this was easily handled with no implications for the ECRP.

- *Lesson learned: Financial regulations and restrictions should be taken into consideration during the planning process to avoid delays and ensure smooth implementation.*

### **Security during the cash distribution**

The cash-transfer companies, which were responsible per the contract for ensuring security during the distribution, reported that no specific security arrangements were required. Only two contracted security guards were employed per site. A minor security incident did, however, occur, when a non-recipient assaulted a national staff member with a wooden stick. The VRC and on-site security intervened to restrain the man, who was referred to the relevant local authorities. It is worth noting that this type of incident is not specific to cash interventions, and is likely to occur during commodity distribution.

- *Lessons learned: Despite ever-present tensions in Puntland and Somaliland, security incidents in Sool and Sanaag are in fact comparatively rare, suggesting a need for a specific and nuanced security analysis capable of understanding local patterns of insecurity: general conclusions about security and its lack are unlikely to be meaningful within the relatively small areas covered by programmes like the ECRP. Security conditions in complex emergencies tend to fluctuate, meaning that agencies contemplating cash distributions must analyse local security with care.*
- *Given the potential of cash to create tension at the community level, implementing agencies should require partners to employ an adequate number of security staff, and should explicitly state this in the contract. In 'normal' emergency situations, this could involve requesting the assistance of the local authorities, or contracting an accredited security company on-site. However, in the context of Sool and Sanaag, either of these arrangements could have fuelled tensions between the two administrations claiming control over the region. In such an environment, strict guidelines are required, and special arrangements for security during the distribution period need to be made.*

### **Coordination with other aid actors**

As most organisations did not start implementing longer-term interventions until four to six months after the completion of the ECRP, communities' ability to cope with

the drought was once again significantly reduced. The impact of the programme was, therefore, short-lived. The external evaluation pointed out that, taking into consideration the scale of the disaster, the amount of cash distributed was 'too little, too late' to achieve a major long-term impact among the beneficiaries. The cash relief was planned as an emergency intervention until medium- and long-term programmes could be organised, hence the ECRP's stated goal of increasing beneficiaries' purchasing power for four to six weeks. However, medium- and longer-term interventions were never synchronised, and did not occur until several months after the distribution. Consequently, the potential impact on beneficiaries' ability to prioritise and manage their income was significantly reduced. The status of Sool and Sanaag as contested zones emerged as a key obstacle to providing a timely response to the crisis.

- *Lessons learned: Proper coordination should be planned to enable complementary interventions and maximise the impact of all interventions on the community. The mobilisation and involvement of all aid actors should be emphasised at all levels of programme management, including design, community mobilisation and implementation and monitoring. In cases where the grant to be distributed is too small, agencies implementing cash relief should approach donors to prepare or obtain guarantees for follow-up complementary interventions.*

### **Availability of reliable population data**

Although the need for accurate population data applies to all types of intervention, it is perhaps particularly important in the context of Somalia, where clan systems and clan or sub-clan conflicts are predominant. In addition, the fact that cash is an interesting resource for everyone requires accurate population data to ensure that communities are targeted according to their needs. The implementing partners allocated the grant on the basis of a standard six people per household. This is the international standard, and is used in Somalia by FSAU and most organisations. In reality, very few pastoral families in collective societies fit this model. The OCHA evaluation concluded that family sizes in the programme area ranged from two to 24 people per household, or an average of 8.45. The external evaluation report indicated that household size in Sool and Sanaag was 9.5. The level of destitution, combined with strong systems of social assistance, may have increased household sizes as destitute pastoralists moved in with their wealthier relatives in the towns. Such a difference in household size has major repercussions in terms of the impact of the grant on the family.

- *Lessons learned: Agencies with the appropriate resources and capacity to undertake cash programmes should take the lead in organising a census and collecting up-to-date population data. Where agencies cannot rely on good data being available on their target group, they will often require a deep understanding of local*

*conditions to develop methodologies to estimate population data. In the case of Somalia, the blood price proved useful in estimating the clan and sub-clan population size in Sanaag.*

### ***Managing community expectations***

Like questions around the reliability or otherwise of population data, the need to manage a targeted community's expectations of relief is part of any intervention, irrespective of the type of resource being

distributed. Managing a community's expectations can be a challenging task. Although the ECRP's social mobilisation phase stressed the one-time nature of the grant distribution, the post-distribution survey noted that 'Some traders restocked in the expectation of further cash distributions and then experienced falling or no demand'.

- *Lesson learned: The expectations of the community can only be reduced and managed, but never completely removed.*

## Chapter 5

### Conclusion

#### Cash relief: an option for Somalia?

*The fear of giving money is almost pathological among aid agencies, even though, or maybe because, it would be simpler and cheaper to give than any other form of help.<sup>16</sup>*

The distribution of cash relief under the ECRP proved to be an effective means of alleviating the emergency arising from prolonged drought, where livelihoods had been in distress for some time. The programme benefited more people than other interventions in the shortest possible time, with the impact being felt immediately both at the household level and the micro-economic level.<sup>17</sup>

Several key factors made the ECRP work:

- *Cash relief was recognised as an appropriate intervention.* The programme was based on a holistic analysis of the situation, which identified cash as a viable option in response to the immediate humanitarian crisis. This required a thorough understanding of the livelihood system – pastoral livelihoods, social support systems and credit systems – as well as a deep understanding of the social, political and security context.
- *The assessment identified that the basic preconditions for a cash-based response were in place.* Market conditions were conducive. Imported food and other commodities were available on local markets: what people lacked was the cash with which to buy them. Cash provision was expected to enable beneficiaries to decide themselves how best to meet their needs, allowing room for a level of choice and flexibility lacking in resource-based interventions. In the case of Sool and Sanaag, needs were especially diverse.
- *Preliminary discussions with traders indicated that the market could respond to increased demand without inflation.*
- *The injection of cash for the most destitute and at-risk families was likely to relieve pressure on the credit system.* This system was so overstretched that some traders were no longer able to extend their own credit with suppliers, or provide supplies to communities on credit alone. This meant that the very destitute did not have access to credit, forcing them to resort to begging or rely on the sympathy of other members of the community.
- *Well-functioning money transfer companies made cash injections a viable option in practical terms.* Cash relief could be implemented rapidly, with a minimum of administration and logistical support.
- *Basic security conditions were conducive.* Despite prevailing tensions between Puntland and Somaliland, Sool and Sanaag were relatively secure. This is not, of course, the case across Somalia: were a similar programme to be implemented in parts of southern

Somalia, for example, security issues would pose a more significant challenge.

Crucially, implementation capacity on the ground was able to deal with potential social, political and security sensitivities. The design and implementation of a cash-based response in a contested area is quite a challenge; it requires a community-based approach and coordination and good relations with all stakeholders on all sides. Horn Relief in particular had strong roots in the programme area, with a thorough understanding of the community/clan dynamics, and a network of supporters and key informants. It had established long-standing relationships and trust with the communities. The fact that Horn Relief had been using a community-based approach in all of its operations in the past ten years was key to the project's success, and its ability to manage potential security risks. The capacity of, and support for, field staff was also crucial to enable them to deal with potential sensitivities on the ground on the basis of clear humanitarian principles. Similarly, the members of the Village Relief Committees needed to be informed and involved. Capacity-building of field staff in relation to the implementation of the ECRP was also important, though the fact that Horn Relief had a long-standing presence and had been building up the capacity of its local staff for some time supported successful targeting and the management of security risks.

Effective communications and coordination with stakeholders were also key in a contested area like Sool and Sanaag. The need to make explicit efforts to inform and involve all stakeholders operating within and outside of the area – in particular the authorities and agencies operating in Somaliland – emerged very clearly from the ECRP, and is likely to be a relevant lesson for operations in any contested area. The money transfer companies were another challenging stakeholder. As discussed above, clear agreements relating to responsibilities for currency, exchange rates and security should be negotiated with these companies.

#### Wider lessons from the ECRP

While important features of the ECRP experience were specific to the context in which it was implemented, a number of broader lessons emerge that might be generally applicable to cash interventions elsewhere.

First, international organisations need to *consider cash as an option*, and to rationally analyse past experiences with cash to address the question of *how* cash relief could be successful in their area of operations. The use of cash seems to be fundamentally inhibited by an *a priori* reluctance to even consider it as an option. Getting cash

and vouchers onto the humanitarian agenda and into the humanitarian toolbox would mean moving away from resource-driven assessments. As a first step, agencies need to explicitly consider a range of intervention options as part of the assessment process. The success of the ECRP has proven that cash relief can be implemented under challenging conditions, provided that the implementing agencies conduct a proper risk assessment, and provided that key preconditions exist.

Second, the overall *architecture of the humanitarian system* will have to be revised to promote cash relief as a viable relief intervention. The system's current structure seems to inhibit consideration of cash responses. In the UN system, in particular the consolidated appeals, the almost complete absence of cash approaches suggests that cash is not being seen as an option in part because the dominant operational agency is mandated to provide food. There is a wider debate about the dominance of food aid in current humanitarian responses and the extent to which this is due to the continued tying of aid to food surpluses in donor countries. UN agencies need greater flexibility to be able to promote and include cash as a possible intervention. Incorporating a clear focus on cash within the UN system would go a long way towards mainstreaming cash as a viable relief intervention.

Third, *standardised operational guidelines* should be developed for cash-based responses, including cash for work, similar to those that already exist for other forms of intervention, such as food aid and supplementary feeding. This would go some way towards meeting the operational concerns of implementing agencies. One argument against cash aid is that aid agencies do not possess the skills and expertise to carry out this work. These skills are indeed in short supply, and existing guidelines and manuals often do not include cash. However, a growing number of practitioners are developing experience with cash responses, and this will be taken into new assignments and organisations. Manuals are also starting to be developed. It is worth pointing out that many of the essential elements of commodity programming – doing assessments, developing targeting criteria, managing community expectations, analysing population data – are directly transferable to cash relief. In that sense, cash uses many of the same skills as other interventions.

Across the humanitarian sector, evidence is beginning to emerge that providing people with cash relief works. Broadly speaking, the experience of the ECRP supports this conclusion. It is possible to target and distribute cash safely, even in apparently insecure environments such as Sool and Sanaag. People spend the money how they are meant to - overwhelmingly on food, debt repayments and water, in the case of the ECRP. Evidence from this intervention and others simply does not support the

assumption that cash is spent destructively, rather than constructively: despite insecurity and the potential for conflict, cash grants in Sool and Sanaag did not fund the purchase of weapons; despite widespread use of *qat*, cash grants did not go on drugs. Cash injections do stimulate local economies and crucial credit systems, and inflationary effects are not inevitable. Overhead costs can be significantly lower than with commodity interventions. If the ECRP is any guide, cost savings can be considerable: for every \$100 of funding, just \$17 went on overheads, compared with the \$25–\$35 typical of other forms of intervention.

There are, of course, caveats to these positive indications, and evidence from the ECRP supports these too. Clearly, cash is not a cure-all, nor is it universally appropriate. Despite the generally conducive security atmosphere in the programme areas themselves, Sool and Sanaag are part of a wider zone of conflict. Clearly, the ECRP's experience does not remove insecurity as a key concern in cash distributions. Nor does it go far in resolving debates about potentially inflationary effects: inflation was avoided, but the amounts of cash in question were probably too small to have had an inflationary effect. This might not be the case in larger-scale interventions.

Clearly, the ECRP experience shows us that there can be no 'blueprint' for the use of cash across all emergencies and in all circumstances: agencies need to weigh the risks and opportunities on a case-by-case basis. Nonetheless, the evidence from the ECRP and elsewhere suggests that, where circumstances are amenable, there is scope for increasing the use of cash as an instrument in humanitarian response. Perhaps success will breed success: the broadly positive outcomes of the ECRP have prompted DFID to fund cash intervention programmes, including cash relief, in Puntland and Somaliland, and agencies were looking into the appropriateness of cash relief in response to the effects on Somalia of the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004.

The comparative advantage of cash relief in empowering communities cannot be over-emphasised. It was a central factor in the decision to undertake such a challenging and controversial programme in Sool and Sanaag, and it is one of the main reasons why the aid community should take the risk and undertake cash relief in the future. Cash relief gives genuine meaning to the intent to empower contained in the mission statements and in the jargon of many aid agencies. Beneficiaries rarely have the freedom to choose and prioritise their needs in a context where aid has so many strings attached, and the aid community decides what beneficiaries need. Perhaps the most powerful lesson to emerge from the ECRP is the need for some honest self-assessment and a shift in attitudes among the aid community towards the people we claim to assist.

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## Notes

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- 2 *Ibid.*
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- 4 *Inter-Agency Drought Assessment on Sool Plateau and Gebi Valley*, UNOCHA, October 2003.
- 5 *Evaluation of Cash Relief Report Implemented by Horn Relief Commissioned by NOVIB/OXFAM Netherlands*, Acacia Consultants External Evaluation Report, June 2004, p. 12.
- 6 Food Security Assessment Unit Nutrition Update, December 2003.
- 7 UN press release, Nairobi, 30 October 2003.
- 8 The fact that Horn Relief is led by a Somali-American from the Warsangeli sub-clan and has been mainly operational in Eastern Sanaag (largely populated by members of the Warsangeli sub-clan) exacerbated concerns about its impartiality. However, Horn Relief has been a strong advocate in Nairobi for the inclusion of Somalis in decision-making. In the specific case of the ECRP, Horn Relief encouraged NPA to implement the programme in Sool

- region to ensure that affected populations in those areas benefited. In Horn Relief's area of operation during the ECRP, many clans outside of the Warsangeli benefited, such as Isaaq, Dhulbahante, Majerteen and Hawiye, as did large numbers of minority groups.
- 9 Horn Relief's monitoring survey is *Post Distribution Monitoring Survey: Emergency Cash Relief Final Report*, Horn Relief, Kenya, May 2004. The external evaluation is *Evaluation of Cash Relief: Report Implemented by Horn Relief Commissioned by NOVIB/OXFAM Netherlands*, Acacia Consultants, June 2004. The OCHA report is Simon Narbeth, *Emergency Cash Relief to Drought Affected Families of Sool Plateau: Post-Distribution Survey Findings*, OCHA-Somalia, 2004.
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## Network Papers 1995–2004

Network Papers are contributions on specific experiences or issues prepared either by HPN members or contributing specialists.

- 9 *Development in Conflict: the Experience of ACORD in Uganda, Sudan, Mali and Angola* by ACORD (1995)
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- 21 *Humanitarian Principles: The Southern Sudan Experience* by I. Levine (1997)
- 22 *The War Economy in Liberia: A Political Analysis* by P. Atkinson (1997)
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- 31 *The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Health and Well-being* by R. Garfield (1999)
- 32 *Humanitarian Mine Action: The First Decade of a New Sector in Humanitarian Aid* by C. Horwood (2000)
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