

**Conflict Studies Research Centre**



**Joint Peacekeeping in  
The Eurasian Region:  
Structures & Prospects**

**Yury Morozov**

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## **Key Points**

- \* Despite differences of theory and practice, institutional frameworks exist within which practical cooperation in peacekeeping operations and training can be developed between international and regional organisations. Though drawing up mechanisms and procedures will be complicated, the NATO-Russia Council and others offer appropriate forums.

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# **Joint Peacekeeping in The Eurasian Region: Structures & Prospects**

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## **Local Conflicts: A Threat to National & Regional Security**

In the early 1990s, local conflicts were recognized as a threat to international security and a global problem. This was due to the fact that towards the end of the twentieth century and in the early twenty-first century the world community more and more often faces the armed conflicts of a new generation, ie domestic armed conflicts taking place within the territory of one state.

In the Eurasian region, in general, there were two main reasons promoting their development: destruction of the bipolar system of the “Cold War” era and the dissolution of the USSR and the Yugoslav Federation. Having acquired the status of independent states many republics of the former federations became victims of the separatist movements, as their territorial borders did not always coincide with ethnic ones. Moreover, domestic separatism as well as other disintegration processes caused a decline in living standards for large groups of people and transformed conflicts into military confrontation.

In the present situation, local conflicts predominate among all the armed conflicts in the world. Thus, in the period 1900-1941 there were 24 armed conflicts, of which 19 were international and only five were domestic. The proportion changed after the Second World War (in the period 1945-1970). 97 armed conflicts took place in that period, of which a mere 15 were international, 26 domestic, and 56 were of mixed character or anti-colonial wars.

Later on the predominance of domestic conflicts has become absolute. In 1993, there were 33 armed conflicts in 28 regions of the world. In 1994, 31 armed conflicts took place in 27 places, none of them being international; all the conflicts were domestic.<sup>1</sup> 28 large armed conflicts happened in the world in 1998 and all of them were domestic as well.<sup>2</sup>

In 2003, most countries faced the same security problems which predominated in the period after the Cold War. All 15 large armed conflicts were internal, touching neighbouring countries and crossing international borders. The conflict between India and Pakistan demonstrated the possibility of scaling domestic conflicts up to intergovernmental as a result of violence in the disputed territory of Kashmir. The situation in the Balkans remains unstable.

This tendency is also observed in the post-Soviet area.<sup>3</sup> Among the republics of the former USSR conflicts have primarily impacted on Transcaucasia, Central Asia and Transdnestr, turning these regions adjoining to the Russian border into centres of instability.<sup>4</sup> Latent conflicts (between Azerbaijan and Armenia, in Georgia, Tajikistan, Moldova) on ethnic, territorial and other grounds are among them.

A number of factors encouraged the emerging conflicts in the post-Soviet area: the break-up of the USSR; break-up of economic ties; disassembly of the totalitarian political system which artificially deterred any manifestation of conflict; an ideological crisis linked to discredit of former ideological statements; absence of explicit national development programmes in a number of countries; a slump in living standards of large parts of the population in the newly independent states; exploitation of these factors by reactionary and chauvinistic groups to seize power; loss of control over military equipment of the USSR Armed Forces located in the post-Soviet space.

Several self-proclaimed republics (Abkhazia, Nagornyy Karabakh, Transdnestr Moldavskaya Republic) not being recognised internationally, but de facto existing, appeared on the territory of a number of independent states, as a result of armed conflicts. At the same time, common features and peculiarities of the conflicts in the post-Soviet area do not necessarily imply any universal ways of settling these conflicts (for example - on a UN mandate). However, due to active intervention of the CIS member states, other international organisations and some individual countries (mainly Russia) they managed to neutralize the armed conflicts. At the same time, having stopped fighting eight or nine years ago, the conflicting parties and their mediators have moved only slightly towards politically settling their differences. The conflicts tended to “freeze”, and if the military-political situation deteriorates (partly owing to ongoing elections in the CIS countries), the weapons may begin to speak once more.

The present situation in the conflict regions contributes to an increase in crime, especially drug trafficking, illegal arms sales and illegal migration; thus it furthers all kinds of terrorism.

Russia, the successor of the USSR, managed to avoid further disintegration and maintain its traditional resources.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, Russian foreign policy resources have been reinforced by more drastic actions of the state leaders, who were able to overcome some archaic stereotypes of the Cold War era. As a result of these actions,<sup>6</sup> the foreign policy situation has been improved. For many of the world's states a theoretical possibility to break away from a position as “semi-enemy - semi-partner”<sup>7</sup> has appeared.

## **European Organisations & Associations: Peacekeeping Characteristics**

The existing threats in the Eurasian security sphere are not only challenges to regional stability but also a possibility for regional organisations and unions to revalue their relationships taking into account their interdependency whilst securing their vital national interests. This is connected with the fact that the Eurasian nations' basic national interests<sup>8</sup> may be subject to various threats caused by any change of the military-political situation practically anywhere in the world, be it in political, military-political or forceful in form.<sup>9</sup>

In order to implement the ideas of peacekeeping in accordance with the UN Charter and in order to be able to respond to these security challenges regional organisations (such as OSCE, CIS/CSTO) and alliances (such as the EU and NATO) began a transformation process.<sup>10</sup> These organisations apply various peace supporting methods in specific conflicts, varying from military observers' missions to peacekeeping (enforcement) operations and post-conflict settlement.

It should be mentioned that military force is more often used in peacekeeping operations to solve conflicts at the regional level. Due to such operations, the authority of regional organisations and alliances in implementing these functions, as well as the mechanism of finding consensus in the world community concerning goals, and admissible and inadmissible forms of such operations have become the subject of acute international discussions.

This trend is most noticeable given the deterioration in the importance of the existing universal stability and security mechanism (the UN) while the alliances' (NATO) and regional organisations' (OSCE, EU, CIS/CSTO) peacekeeping actions are gaining momentum. Thus, by the end of the century peace support operations, in all their forms, have become the focal point of acute and actual problems in modern international relations, which demand both new analytical approaches and practical recommendations concerning their development and further implementation. Given the fact that peace support efforts are gaining momentum in theory and in practice at the regional level, "European Schools of Peace Support Activities" are taking shape. These schools have their own characteristics that differ from the UN "traditional" peace support activity.

For example, the **OSCE** in practice makes its own political decision to conduct peacekeeping operations on the member states' territory (alternatively, on a UN decision). The decision is made on the basis of consensus (or "consensus minus one"). At the same time, emphasis is put on the political or humanitarian component - not the military. In the course of operations in the Balkans (in 1992-93, in 1995-96, since 1999), in the Caucasus (in 1992, in 1996 and 1999), the Baltic (in 1993), and in Tajikistan (in 1997) enforcement operations were principally rejected. When forming a contingent for an OSCE mission, countries located far from the conflict are preferred.<sup>11</sup>

In **NATO**, the NATO Council makes a political decision concerning an operation. As a rule, it is based on a UN or OSCE request. Since 1999 it has been envisaged to conduct peace enforcement operations (without a UN mandate) outside the Alliance's area of responsibility. There are three possible basic forms of operations: independently; as the core of a coalition of states; as a "subcontractor" in UN operations. The Alliance's countries have already used military power to achieve goals in the Persian Gulf<sup>12</sup> and in the Balkans<sup>13</sup> and in Afghanistan. At present NATO is conducting four operations: Stabilization Force (SFOR) (commenced in December 1995, after operation IFOR), NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR, June 1999), Task Force "Harvest" (June 1999), Task Force "Fox" (September 2001) and is involved in Macedonia.<sup>14</sup> Financing of operations is generally carried out independently, with each member state contributing proportionally.<sup>15</sup>

The area of responsibility of the **EU/WEU**, when conducting peacekeeping operations, is by doctrine not limited to the territory of the member states. It is supposed to conduct operations wherever necessary in the interests of common European security. There are four possible variants of operations: by its own mandate; with participation of two interested countries; in a NATO operations context or coalition of states; by UN mandate and as part of UN or OSCE Forces. It is admissible (as an exception) to use enforcement actions without a UN mandate. Financing of operations is either from member states' budgets or by creating a "basket" of contributions for a separate operation. Due to the protracted process of establishing multifunctional armed EU framework formations (final creation has been postponed from 2003 to 2004) large-scale EU operations have not yet been conducted.

EU structures were employed to impose the blockade of former Yugoslavia (1994) and in operations in Kosovo (since 1999).<sup>16</sup> Before 1 July 2001, the EU/WEU conducted three operations in the Balkans: Monitoring Mission (since July 1991) in Albania, former Yugoslavia; Multinational Advisory Police Element for Albania (since May 1997); WEU Demining Assistance Mission in Croatia (since May 1999). Two missions (the police in Albania and demining in Croatia) have been completed since the WEU was included in the EU structure (2001). A programme of assisting the police forces in Albania has been ongoing since 1 June 2001.<sup>17</sup>

### **CIS-countries' Peacekeeping Activities: Successes & Shortcomings**

When speaking about peacekeeping practice in the CIS it should be pointed out that during the USSR's disintegration the peace support activities in the post-Soviet area were of a reactive character and were complicated by the frail and at times negative relationship between the CIS countries. None of the leaders of the new states realised their responsibility for the developing situation beyond their countries' borders. There was neither experience nor the legal basis for peace support. It was connected with the fact that the former USSR did not ever send its troops to establish peace within the framework of the UN, though many Soviet military observers were sent to conflict zones.

The threats to the CIS' collective security forced its leaders to create a legal basis for peacekeeping activities and literally at the same time launch peacekeeping operations, learning all the theoretical and practical aspects of peace support activities, adjusting others' experience to the specific conditions of the conflict regions.

During the process of conceptualising and systematising national interests, it became impossible to implement the policy of involving peacekeepers only in reaction to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It became necessary for the CIS countries to elaborate a complete foreign policy on peacekeeping operations and other forms of conflict settlement, to include strategy and tactics.

The CIS often conducts peacekeeping operations on the basis of a decision providing for "consensus of the interested parties". The formal zone of responsibility is the territory of the CIS countries. Doctrinally, the possibility to act by UN mandate is provided, though in practice the CIS has never obtained this mandate. The UN observer missions, acting in the same regions as the CIS peacekeeping forces, function independently, interacting with the CIS forces only fragmentarily. The use of a military force in order to stabilize the situation in the conflict zones depends on a UN Security Council Resolution. The principle of recruiting peacekeeping contingents from countries having no immediate interests in a conflict region is not observed. Military contingents representing the warring parties were included in the peacekeeping forces in South Osetia and Transdnestr - thus breaking the generally known principles of UN peacekeeping activities. However, that sort of structure in specific conditions turned out to be not only admissible but also effective.

Characteristics of CIS peacekeeping operations are in many aspects predetermined by the specific conditions of internal armed conflicts and correspond to the general trends in modern peace support activities. Thus, for example, in Tajikistan the operation was launched at the request of only one conflicting party - the Tajik

government, in the absence of the cease-fire agreement that is typical for non-interstate conflicts. In the course of this operation no line of separation between the conflicting parties, no security zones, no weapons free zones were defined due to the fact that the conflict more or less included the whole country.

None of the CIS peacekeeping operations were conducted outside the Commonwealth and none was enforced, the limit of minimum necessary use of force was not exceeded. The operations of the CIS military contingents were completely legitimate, and they were to different extents, but undoubtedly, successful. This notwithstanding, one of the main problems - peaceful settling of conflicts - has never been realized fully.

One of the main problems of CIS peacekeeping activities is that having brought military violence to an end, the conflicting parties and their mediators have not yet substantially moved forward in political settling of the existing contradictions. Only the first stage of peacekeeping operations has been carried out in Abkhazia, South Osetia and Transdnestr. The peacekeeping forces have separated the conflicting parties and do not allow resumption of military actions. The conflicts are "canned". At the same time the unstable situation in these regions, their ruined economies and life support systems, broken communications, hundreds of refugees and displaced persons living in a foreign country are still the reality.

The CIS countries, in making a decision on their participation in peacekeeping operations, very often do nothing but make declarations. A most striking example of that sort is the CIS peacekeeping operation in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict where the peacekeeping forces are represented only by Russia. Financing of the operations is also carried out from the Russian budget with some CIS countries and conflicting parties contributing now and then.

## **Cooperation in Joint Peacekeeping: Pro and Contra**

In spite of certain differences concerning organisations' and alliances' views on planning and conducting peacekeeping operations it can be stated that in the future their cooperation in joint peace support may become the key point of providing peace and security in the Eurasian region. Since Russia in its peacekeeping activities does not appear to be striving for its self-isolation and realising that these conflicts are a threat to both regional and global security it favours robust participation in the UN, OSCE and other international organisations in settling conflicts in the CIS.

Transformation of current CIS and UN peacekeeping operations into integrated, multi-faceted operations with broad participation of military, police and civil personnel of other states and organisations may become a possible alternative for developing conflict settlement in the post-Soviet space. Changing focus from separating the parties to peace building will allow us to exploit the accumulated potential of peacekeeping cooperation in the Balkans to take more efficient measures concerning the return of refugees and internally displaced persons and economic rehabilitation of the post-Soviet regions.

However, there are a lot of problems along this road that may slow down the joint efforts of the regional structures in providing peace and security in the common geo-political area. In general they may be compiled into a group of questions demanding replies from the leaders of organisations in the nearest future. In principle they may lead to some "naïve" questions:

- Are the countries where domestic conflicts are taking place willing to admit interference by external forces? What about unrecognised but existing states that appeared as a result of states' dissolution (Abkhazia, Transdnestr, Nagornyy Karabakh)?
- Will the member states of organisations agree to participate in a peacekeeping operation in a region where they have no national interests and at the same time observe the relevant organisation's agreements and charters?
- Under the auspices of what organisation would it be possible to conduct joint peacekeeping operations in the post-Soviet area? Are Western European countries interested in participating in such operations under the auspices of the CIS/CSTO?
- Who would plan joint operations, how should these operations be supported and financed? What kind of command and control system should be employed?
- And finally, the main question: having taken responsibility for joint regional peace support, are the heads of organisations ready for *real* cooperation in this sphere?

Answers to these questions are necessary in order to form a real mechanism of cooperation between the OSCE and the EU, NATO and the CIS/CSTO where it is possible to join (or redistribute) their efforts. Though it is difficult to solve the questions above, those who support integration in the sphere of peacekeeping have some good arguments proving the necessity of joining efforts in the interests of stabilizing the situation in the common geo-political area:

- **Firstly**, the countries belonging to the organisations are equally interested in peace and stability not only in their countries and in the nearest neighbourhood but also at regional and global levels (this is in particular proven by the legislative acts which the member states of the organisations are guided by).
- **Secondly**, in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century the regional organisations have faced the sort of threats and dangers parrying of which excludes the use of military force in traditional ways and forms. At the same time, the use of military force to halt warring parties' military operations was necessary in some situations (for example, peace enforcement operations in the Balkans).
- **Thirdly**, these organisations have not only legislative acts but also appropriate mechanisms to implement them (these are the NATO multinational strategic forces and the rapid reaction forces of the EU under construction in the West, the collective peace support forces in the CIS, rapid reaction forces in the CSTO).
- **Fourthly**, at the regional level the NATO and CIS countries have some experience of conducting peacekeeping operations, and military contingents of these countries have some experience of joint actions when conducting operations (Operations IFOR, SFOR, KFOR, FYROM etc in the Balkans).



- **Fifthly**, bridging the West and the East, the post-Soviet area is of geo-political and economic interest for the Western European countries as a potential market, as the power supplier etc. And, perhaps, most essentially, instability in the post-Soviet area damages the national interests of many Western states.
- And, finally, **sixthly**, in modern conditions the peacekeeping forces of “a coalition of the willing states”, able to react rapidly to a conflict situation in a region are more and more often used to localize conflicts in the Eurasian region (for example, “the coalition peacekeeping forces” in Afghanistan).

Thus, the above-mentioned facts serve as an argument in favour of profound cooperation between the OSCE, EU, NATO and CSTO/Russia in the sphere of joint peacekeeping operations.

### **Joint Peacekeeping Operations: Possible Areas Of Cooperation**

There is no doubt that the establishment of a new system of relationships in the sphere of peacekeeping operations would meet the interests of the West and the countries of the post-Soviet area. Then, in the future, it would be possible to realize the following pattern of interactions of regional structures and unions in the sphere of peace support. The peacekeeping forces of the EU/NATO and Russia/CSTO or “a coalition of willing states” would be able to conduct joint peace making and peacekeeping operations in their common geo-political area.<sup>18</sup> The OSCE would be able to focus on fulfilling functions of preventive diplomacy, post-conflict settlement and restoration of peace in cooperation with other organisations.

Taking into account the Balkan experience of the multinational peacekeeping forces' joint actions, the main areas of future cooperation in peacekeeping operations may be the following:

- Establishment and development of a joint monitoring system of the military-political situation in conflict regions of Eurasia;
- Joint influencing of conflicting parties, first of all using diplomatic and economic means, and in extraordinary situations, military force in order to provide peace and stability;
- Active joint support of former conflicting parties not wishing to continue the conflict by use of military force;
- Developing cooperation between military and civilian components of the peacekeeping forces at different levels and stages of joint operations; developing joint training of the peacekeeping contingents.

It is reasonable to expand on some areas:

#### **Joint Monitoring of the Developing Military-Political Situation**

The efficiency of the process of joint international control and managing of the situation in a potential conflict region obviously depends on a *multilevel and multilateral system of monitoring of the military-political situation in the common geo-political area*. It is obvious that such a system must be based on different technical

resources, but on unified organisational and methodical principles and must comprise joint information and analytical authorities and sensors in order to obtain different national information.

The process of crisis management also plays an important role in stabilizing the situation in a region. At the same time, managing a conflict in a joint operation may include: forecasting indicators of a possible conflict and possibilities of its resolution; definition of ways of preventing and de-escalating conflicts; establishing algorithms of pre-emptive responses at different stages of a conflict. The Balkans peacekeeping practice shows that information-psychological, political and economic measures were the most effective measures to prevent the conflict at the initial stage. The military measures include demonstration of power and a determination to use it, and pre-emptive deployment of peacekeeping forces in a conflict zone.

### **Developing Cooperation Between Military & Civilian Components of Peacekeeping Forces**

Taking into consideration the involvement of different civilian organisations and military units in a joint peacekeeping operation, cooperation before the beginning of the operation is best carried out at three levels:

**Strategic level** of cooperation implies working out of the mandate on conducting operations and co-ordinating efforts of political, military and civilian leaders of the peacekeeping forces with former conflicting parties. Political bodies responsible for the operation should play the leading role.

**Operational level** of cooperation implies co-ordination of efforts of civilian and military components of the peacekeeping forces on separate stages of the operation. The military bodies should bear the brunt here (since operations, as a rule, start with a military phase).

**Tactical level** of cooperation implies cooperation between command and control organs, the peacekeeping units as well as representatives of the former conflicting parties (at the corresponding levels) when solving specific missions of a peacekeeping operation.

Clear wording and strict implementation of principles to manage military and civilian components of a peacekeeping operation will be really important to achieve the final goals. These principles are as follows:

- common goals and tasks (one mission);
- “unity in command” (unified command and control system), combined with separation of command and control functions on operational and administrative functions of military and civilian management;
- regular exchange of information.<sup>19</sup>

At the planning stage of a joint peacekeeping operation, its military and civilian aspects should be co-ordinated as to goals, terms and forces and employed assets.

### **Developing Joint Training of Peacekeeping Contingents**

An analysis of the multinational forces' operation in the Balkans confirms the necessity of unifying the principles of conducting a peacekeeping operation even before joint actions commence (especially issues concerning rules of engagement).

The rules and principles should be in concordance not only with the Charters and provisions of the UN and CIS/CSTO, EU/NATO, but also with the provisions of national legislative acts which any participating state first of all adheres to. Obviously, at this point feedback should be observed.

The peacekeeping troops' basic training for functions will be important for the joint peacekeeping practice, where the content of training should be rather diversified. Obviously, it may include: improvement of individual training; command staff training and exercises; and musters and training on the most difficult tasks. As the analysis of the joint peacekeeping practice in the Balkans shows, in the course of training it is appropriate to focus on clarifying the military-political situation in the zone of conflict, the conflict's history and development, local customs and traditions and legal aspects.<sup>20</sup>

As experience of the use of multinational forces in the Balkans shows, immediate joint training of forces should comprise conducting common reconnaissance, conferences, musters, exercises, and training. Special attention should be paid to the issues of liaison and co-ordination as well how to react in unforeseen situations and to the rules of engagement (use of weapons). In the future it would be appropriate to consider the possibility of direct joint training of the units in national training centres that have similar geographical conditions to the zone of conflict.

In the course of joint operations focus should also be put on *forces training directly in zones of responsibility*. At the same time it is reasonable (and the Balkans experience proves it) to plan: joint training and exercises, visits to the location of joint troops; conferences and tactical exercises without troops (CPX) on logistics, security and other issues. From a political point of view, joint training is also attractive, because it encourages the peacekeepers to join the multinational forces in the interests of providing international security.

### **Possible Ways of Implementing Cooperation in Joint Peacekeeping**

In order to implement plans on joint peacekeeping activities in the future it is appropriate to elaborate on a number of questions. The most important of them are as follows:

- implementation of international agreements concerning joint peacekeeping operations between regional organisations, as well as between some countries from the suggested "coalition of the willing";
- harmonisation of international (regional) and national legislative bases for peacekeeping activities;
- establishment of integrated systems of monitoring regional situations and control over the peacekeeping forces;
- specifying the principles of logistics and financing of joint operations.

Obviously, the first step on the way to joint peacekeeping operations, after the agreement on joint actions in the common geo-political area have been implemented, may be elaboration of a project "Concepts of Peacekeeping Activities in the Eurasian Region" with the participation of international experts of the UN, OSCE, CIS and NATO, EU and some other countries.

The next step, after national and international examination of that document, may be adoption of the Concept at the international regional level and its adoption in

national legislative acts. Unification and revision of the relevant national legislative basis may be done simultaneously with the elaboration of the Concept.

Afterwards, within the framework of the common geo-political area, an integrated system of monitoring and joint analysis of the developing situation may be established or improved, to determine potential zones of conflicts at the regional level. This system might include interconnected national technical means of controlling the regional situation and joint (international) analytical organs.

At the same time, it would be reasonable to work out a system of Joint Practical Measures of Preventive Action in possible conflict regions with a view to prevention of disputes leading to armed conflict. These measures should imply joint information-psychological, political and economic measures directed towards the initiators of a conflict.

One important step on the way to joint peacekeeping operations is improvement of the decision-making mechanism to conduct joint operations, with the participation of the relevant national control bodies. At the same time it would make sense to create an integrated military and civilian command and control system at regional and sub-regional level.

In the sphere of joint peacekeeping activities it would be important to establish and gradually implement investment programmes for training and joint employment of the peacekeeping forces. Undoubtedly, this task is the most complicated but it is necessary, to increase the effectiveness of peace support. However, this problem may be solved by means of political will and the parties' desire and their appropriate economic contribution in joint peace support activities.

In the future it would be appropriate to accomplish a set of tasks falling under the military command organs' competence. The most important are:

- Defining the main parameters of a comprehensive contingency (modular) plan for a peacekeeping operation including military and civilian aspects. This plan may be expanded and revised depending on the specific situation in the appropriate region of an upcoming joint operation. It is also necessary to revise the terminology and the staff procedures for planning and conducting joint operations as well as to ensure interoperability - both organisationally and technically in the spheres of reconnaissance, command and control as well as fire control. Moreover, drawing up standing operational procedures pertaining to the use of military force as well as their use are also important.
- As a result of the above-mentioned tasks it will also be necessary to draw up joint standards of conducting basic and special training of the national peacekeeping forces and to establish joint (regional) training centres on the basis of existing national centres for joint training of peacekeeping units.
- From the military-political and from an economic point of view it is, of course, important to work out a mechanism to assess the efficiency of the use of peacekeeping forces in the course of operation, with an approved system of indicators which show the level of fulfilment of the tasks of a given stage of an operation. This requires establishing joint peacekeeping analysis teams for joint gathering, processing and analysing planning, preparation and conduct of joint operations on the basis of cohesive methods.

The process of seeking ways to increase efficiency of regional peace support is cumbersome and has both positive and negative features. On the one hand, it is positive that the UN has efficient partners for crisis response in the form of regional organisations that are close to the regions of real and potential conflicts and that are interested in the most expedient and energetic response to crisis situations. As the operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan show, joint participation in multinational peacekeeping operations furthers the transformation of former geo-political enemies into partners for the sake of consolidating peace.

On the other hand, as peacekeeping activities are developing and becoming regionalised, the problem of reaching a common understanding of its essence is very acute. It should be stated that in spite of a relative fusion of conceptual approaches and corresponding common ground for understanding peacekeeping within the framework of regional organisations and some countries, for the time being a unified and agreed terminology, and a unified internationally adopted conceptual instrument describing elements of peace support do not exist. Insufficiency and sometimes shortcomings of unified approaches to peacekeeping (especially when conducting peace enforcement operations) do not allow us to create an effective regional security system as yet. This leads to dangerous precedents of uncontrolled interference and causes a certain antagonism in relations between states.

The necessity to codify international peace support is a very concrete task. This codification should be a result of co-ordinated work of the UN, regional organisations and individual countries who actively participated in the peacekeeping process in order to fill juridical gaps that reduce the efficiency of peace support activities and make it possible to break general principles of the UN Charter under the pretext of peacekeeping activities.

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In the long perspective, it is obviously not possible to predict what will be typical for this century: “eternal peace” - or wars, as in the case of the 20th century. But it is beyond doubt time to introduce fundamental changes into existing guarantees to preserve peace and stability in the Eurasian region using general mechanism of peacekeeping.

Without practical measures in the field of joint peacekeeping, all independent attempts to provide national security at the regional level will prove inefficient. Though it will be difficult to overcome possible problems and discrepancies in this sphere, every attempt of the European countries to join efforts in order to oppose common challenges and threats will contribute to global security.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> S A Yegorov, *Armed Conflicts and International Law*. Doctoral thesis (law). Moscow, 1999, pp147-143.

<sup>2</sup> T B Sybolt, *Major Armed Conflicts*, SIPRI Yearbook 2002, p25.

<sup>3</sup> In this article the term *post-Soviet space* means the territory of the former Soviet Union, and *the former Soviet republics* in relation to Russia's military security questions mean the territory of all the 14 former Soviet republics except the former Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR). The new independent states in the post-Soviet area occupy a unique geostrategic position in the central part of the Eurasian continent. The

population minus Russia totals approximately 145 millions, and their territory covers some 6 million sq km. The countries' share of gross output totals 1.2% of the world's. The region possesses considerable reserves of natural resources (especially Transcaucasia, Central Asia and the Middle East). Qualified labour is inexpensive. Major lines of communication and pipelines cross their territory, thus uniting Europe and Asia and with ice-free port facilities to the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, Sea of Azov and Caspian Sea. The countries are located in the immediate vicinity of the EU and NATO and the Middle East which in its own way bridges East and West. The former Soviet republics are members of various international organisations, ie the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); the Union State between Russia and Belarus; the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (ODKB, CSTO); the Eurasian Economic Community; the Central Asian Cooperation Organisation and GUUAM. They are also members of UN, OSCE, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Association, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, etc. M Abdurakhmanov, V Marulov, V Pirumov: *Fundamentals of Russia's National Security*, Moscow, 1998, p114.

<sup>4</sup> I L Prokhorenko, *Intergovernmental and International Conflicts on The Post-Soviet Territory*, EPI No 8-9, 1994, p65.

<sup>5</sup> Eg nuclear potential; historical heritage; territory; human capital; foreign political, research-and-production and natural resources.

<sup>6</sup> The Rome Summit in 2002 appeared to be one of the most important political events concerning European security. The heads of state of the Russian Federation and the NATO member states signed the Declaration *NATO-Russia: A New Quality*. The document reads: "At the start of the 21st century we live in a new, closely interrelated world, in which unprecedented new threats and challenges demand increasingly united responses. Consequently, we, the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Russian Federation are today opening a new page in our relations, aimed at enhancing our ability to work together in areas of common interest and to stand together against common threats and risks to our security ... to bring together NATO member states and Russia to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at twenty, we hereby establish the NATO-Russia Council. In the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, NATO member states and Russia will work as equal partners in areas of common interest. The NATO-Russia Council will provide a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action for the member states of NATO and Russia on a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region ..."

<sup>7</sup> *Russia and the New Security Challenges*. The Council For Foreign And Defence Policy, Moscow, 2002, p3.

<sup>8</sup> Sovereignty; territorial integrity; social-political stability of society; constitutional system; strategic stability; free access to vitally important strategic-economic zones and lines of communication etc.

<sup>9</sup> *Actual Questions Concerning Development of the Armed Forces of The Russian Federation*, Moscow, 2003, p19.

<sup>10</sup> In accordance with the UN Charter regional organisations and unions are entitled to perform regional peace support operations without the authorization of the UN Security Council (SC), provided that they are carried out with the consent of the conflicting parties; peace enforcing operations are only to be carried out with the authorization of the UN SC.

<sup>11</sup> A I Nikitin, *Peace Support Operations: Theory and Practice*, Moscow, 2000, pp36-37.

<sup>12</sup> During Operation Desert Storm and Desert Fox.

<sup>13</sup> *Allied Force; Joint Guard*.

<sup>14</sup> *SIPRI Yearbook 2002*, Moscow, 2003, p143.

<sup>15</sup> A I Nikitin, *Peace Support Operations: Theory and Practice*, Moscow, 2000, pp33-34.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid*, pp42-43.

<sup>17</sup> *SIPRI Yearbook 2002*, Moscow, 2003, p148.

<sup>18</sup> UN-mandated peace enforcement operations may be possible.

<sup>19</sup> Joint command and control of deployment of both military and civilian components; co-ordination of press policy.

<sup>20</sup> Yu V Morozov, V V Glushkov, A A Sharavin, *The Balkans Today and Beyond: Military-Political Aspects of Peace Support*, Moscow Institut politicheskogo i voyennogo analiza, 2001.

Yury Vasilyevich Morozov is a Member of the European Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Candidate Of Military Science, Professor, Colonel (Retd). He served as United Nations Military Observer in missions in the Balkans (1994-95) and in the Caucasus (2000-01).

This article reflects the author's personal opinion and does not necessarily coincide with that of official Russia.

## **Want to Know More ...?**

See: Michael J Orr, "Peacekeeping – A New Task for Russia's Military Doctrine", CSRC, A97, June 1994

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Telephone: (44) 1276 412995  
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Email: [csrc@da.mod.uk](mailto:csrc@da.mod.uk)  
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