

**Conflict Studies Research Centre**



# **The Russia-USA Relationship**

**Dr Mark A Smith**

**May 2004**

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## **Key Points**

- \* Russia is concerned about the unilateralism of US foreign policy, but is reluctant to risk a major rupture.
- \* The Russia leadership strongly believes that USA and Russian views on international security largely coincide.
- \* However, Russia knows it is too weak to challenge the USA. The leadership sees cooperation with the west as the best way of modernizing Russia and ensuring that it can play a significant international role.
- \* Russian analysts believe that the USA sees Eurasia as a major new foreign policy interest, and this gives Russia scope to become a valuable partner.
- \* They argue that US differences with France and Germany should not be overstated.
- \* Russia does not wish to see a US-European split, or to have to choose between them. Long term, Moscow is likely to believe it has more in common with Europe than with the USA.

This paper looks at the viewpoints of Russian foreign policymakers and academic analysts on current US foreign policy and its implications for the Russian Federation.

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# The Russia-USA Relationship

**Dr Mark A Smith**

The extremely assertive foreign policy of the USA since September 2001 has been a cause of concern in many countries, as posing a major challenge to the entire post-1945 structure of international relations. It causes concern to nations that have been allies of the USA since the end of the Second World War, as well as to possible rivals (such as China), and to nations that could be either potential allies/partners or potential rivals (such as the Russian Federation).

The Russian leadership sees US foreign policy conduct as a source of major concern, given that it sees itself as a major power in the international arena, and in many respects sees the bilateral Russo-US relationship as the most important of its kind in the contemporary international system. The USA's leading role in NATO, its alliances with Japan and South Korea, and its role in the Middle East bring the USA into direct contact in areas which are perceived by Moscow as being of fundamental interest to the Russian Federation.

The US-Russian relationship appears to have survived the test of the Iraq war, in that its basic aspects remain untouched, despite the Russian leadership's opposition to the US decision. Russian President Vladimir Putin commented in September 2003 that Russia and the USA were allies in fighting terrorism, and partners in other issue areas, implying a close and cooperative relationship.<sup>1</sup> In September 2003 the then Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov commented that disputes between Russia and the USA over Iraq were 'history', and that cooperation between the two sides was deepening.<sup>2</sup> However he also warned at the UN General Assembly that Russia opposed unilateral approaches to the resolution and prevention of conflicts.

The Russian leadership continued to advocate a close partner-like relationship with the USA, whilst disagreeing with the USA's increasing tendency to resolve major international security problems outside of the UN framework. In this light, it continued to argue for a reformed UN, with a much larger Security Council.

Similar comments were made by Ivanov in *Kommersant* in February 2004, when he noted that "there has not been a rollback on any of the areas of cooperation" between the Russian Federation and the USA. He dismissed claims that the bilateral relationship was based solely on the good personal relationship between Vladimir Putin and George Bush, although he argued that more effort should be made to institutionalise the relationship. He commented that both powers will have differences in the future, noting that "the main thing is that we should also have mechanisms for resolving the contradictions that would allow us not to jeopardize Russian-American relations as a whole".<sup>3</sup>

A similar tone has been taken by the new foreign minister Sergey Lavrov. In April he reiterated the notion of the USA and Russia being the closest of allies in the fight against international terrorism, noting that "Russia, the United States, and the

European Union countries have a vast joint agenda based on the common responsibility for security and stability in the world".<sup>4</sup> In his first press conference after becoming foreign minister, Lavrov noted that Russia's disagreements with the USA were only of a tactical, rather than a strategic character.

There is practically nothing to separate us with the Americans in the vision of the strategic tasks before humanity in the field of ensuring security and stability. And that there are different readings as to how to achieve those tasks is something that's quite natural between partners. As the saying goes, truth is born in disputes.<sup>5</sup>

Whilst concerned about what it sees as unilateralist tendencies in US foreign policy, the Russian leadership is likely to continue with this line. There is little point antagonising the USA, as the latter is too powerful to be stopped. Russia's most logical choice in this situation is to emphasise the importance of partnership with the USA, whilst at the same time expressing moderate disagreement over differences, and to attempt to build informal coalitions with powers that share Russian concerns in order to lobby Washington to change course. The formation of what may be termed an informal coalition with France and Germany in 2003 over Iraq may be regarded as such an attempt.

Those outside government are able to express their views more forcibly. **Konstantin Kosachev**, the chairman of the Duma international affairs committee warned in February 2004 that the USA should not try to speak to Russia from a "position of strength".<sup>6</sup> He considered that US policy towards Russia was complicated by the fact that elements within the Bush Administration had differing approaches toward Russia. A hard line was taken by Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Vice-President Dick Cheney, and a more moderate one by George Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Russian international relations specialists have a variety of views on the USA's current foreign policy role and its implications for the international system, for America's allies, and for the Russian Federation.

## **The USA's Position in the International System**

No one disputes America's current domination of the international system. The Russian Americanist **Anatoly Utkin** describes the USA as the world hegemon, and indisputable vanguard of the West, which he regards as having military, scientific and technical supremacy over the rest of the world.<sup>7</sup> One may regard this as a statement of the obvious. However, what is significant is Utkin's analysis of the possible threats to America's dominance.

Utkin considers that global demographic changes pose the greatest long term threat. He notes that in 1950, the industrial world comprised 29 per cent of the world's population. By 2000, this share had been reduced to 18 per cent, and by 2050, it could go down to 10 per cent. In 1900 the population of the north was superior to that of the south by a ratio of 2.5:1. By 2050, the ratio is likely to be directly reversed. Europe's population could be one-third of its current level by the year 2100. This raises the question of whether the USA would be interested in maintaining the Atlantic Alliance. Utkin quotes the American conservative Pat Buchanan:

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What is it that it is proposed that the Americans should defend in Europe? Christianity? It is dying in Europe. Western civilisation? But the Europeans by their own decisions are dooming themselves to disappearing in the 22<sup>nd</sup> century.

Utkin quotes the German Chancellor Bethman-Hollweg commenting to the Kaiser in 1914 that by allying with Austria-Hungary, Germany was acting as the ally of a corpse. Utkin suggests that Americans are now saying virtually the same thing about Europe.

The USA itself is undergoing demographic changes. Utkin quotes former President Clinton as stating that by the middle of the 21<sup>st</sup> century no one race will predominate in the USA. The USA would thus cease to be a European oriented Anglo-Saxon power, which could result in radical changes in the internal US political system and in its foreign policy. Utkin goes on to argue that the West as a whole is dying out, commenting that the population of the non-western world currently outstrips that of the West by a factor of 5:1, and in 2050 it could outstrip the western world by 10:1. Utkin notes the potential challenge to the USA in the following way:

In 1990 America was victorious in the war in the Persian Gulf, having 600 warships. In the period of the new aggravation of relations [ie the build up to the Iraq war], the number of vessels of the US Navy had been reduced to 300. The projection for 2010 is 200 ships. But even this is not the most important factor. Will the USA be prepared after 2025 to maintain the independence of Kuwait in face of 100 million strong Iran, or 50 million strong Iraq? The USA will simply not be physically able to create a version of the “Macarthur regency” over the huge Arab world. Along with this one must take into account that Iran at this time will probably possess nuclear weapons and missiles.

Utkin goes on to argue that the west’s future enemy will not be a traditional military opponent, but a world which has another way of looking at God and man. Utkin is pessimistic of the West’s ability to counter this challenge successfully. He therefore casts doubt on the long-term ability of the USA to sustain the dominance it has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War. He does not discuss how Russia should respond to such a scenario. One of the logical implications of his argument however, is that if the USA’s dominance of the international system is eventually doomed because of the shifting demographic balance, then Russia needs to position herself carefully vis-à-vis the USA and the “South”.

Other Russian analysts view the implications of this Trans-Atlantic drift in different ways. **Natal’ya Narochnitskaya**, who became deputy chairman of the Duma foreign affairs committee after the December 2003 elections, argues that the USA, in alliance with Britain, has had a long-term strategy, which originated long before the Second World War, to dominate and control Eurasia.<sup>8</sup> She is of the opinion that the USA has sought to penetrate and control Europe for decades as part of this strategy. Narochnitskaya believes that although anti-Americanism is growing in Europe, and the disputes in NATO have been very serious, the US-European partnership is not at an end, as Europe has yet to demonstrate that it has the desire to put forward its own cultural-historical and political project as an alternative to the USA’s global management. She is cautious about the differences that arose over Iraq, and states that there is no evidence to suggest that these differences will put an end to the Trans-Atlantic partnership. By contrast, she

considers that both the USA and Europe have sought in 2003 to overcome their differences, although the accomplishment of this objective has been hindered by Washington's tendency to judge all actors in the international system, including the UN, by the criteria of whether they agree with the USA and are willing to serve US interests. Narochnitsakaya is also of the view that the USA's and Russian Federation's approaches to the war on terrorism differ significantly. The USA is fighting a war on terrorism in order to maintain its domination of the international system, whereas Russia is doing so simply in order to survive.

The US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's use of the term "New Europe" of the former communist states, in contrast to the "Old Europe" of France and Germany is seen as part of the US desire to create a sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe in order to extend American influence into Eurasia. The break up of the old Soviet Empire is not benefiting "Old Europe", but instead helps the USA's long-term goal. According to Narochnitskaya, NATO widening, NATO's role in former Yugoslavia, the US' expanding presence in Transcaucasia and Central Asia are all part of Washington's strategy.

Narochnitskaya is of the view that moves to enhance Europe's independence vis-à-vis the USA by developing the EU have so far failed to reduce American dominance of Europe. She argues that Europe needs to develop as an alternative power centre. The post-Cold War international system is not stable. She notes the number of conflicts that have erupted since the end of the Cold War, which makes it impossible for the international system to become self-governing. The spread of nuclear weapons technology makes this instability dangerous. She also argues that the USA does not possess sufficient power to maintain this system, and it will therefore eventually collapse.

Narochnitskaya repeats the standard Russian line about the need for a multipolar international system, which would permit globalisation to develop along positive lines, and also enable Russia to modernize. She sees a Russo-European partnership as a desirable development for both parties, as it would be able to prevent the Anglo-Saxon goal of dominating and controlling Eurasia. Noting the problems in relations between "Old Europe" and the USA, Narochnitskaya comments:

The most important thing for Russia in this situation is to consider the extent of old Europe's awareness of the reason for its situation, and also its desire and capacity to pour out its accumulated dissatisfaction into a historical and geopolitical conception of a European common dwelling place (*obschezhitie*), different from the one that is accepted as being named Atlanticist.

Narochnitskaya calls on Europe to reconsider both its place in the world, and its attitude towards Russia. She says Europe should stop seeing Russia as a humiliated power, and stop feeling uncertain in facing Russia's huge size, potential self-sufficiency, and unusual tenacity in the face of tests which no other state could endure. She argues that Russia by opposing extremist Islam is protecting the western world, yet Europe remains ungrateful for this. She argues that France, Germany and Russia have a common spiritual foundation, and these three powers therefore have a special responsibility for the choice of Europe's future and the form of its unity.

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Narochnitskaya contends that a stable international system at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century should comprise a triangular relationship between the USA, Russia and Europe. This requires Russia to re-establish what Narochmitskaya sees as her natural historical mission as the upholder of an equilibrium between East and West. Thus Russia cannot permit herself to be pushed out of the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions. Narochmitskaya believes that the notion of a choice between “with America versus Europe”, or “with Europe versus America” is a false one. Instead she sees it as important that Russia is not used as a card in any struggle between America and Islam, America and China, America and Europe. She favours George Kennan’s axiom that US-Russian relations should be both good and distant to a rational degree.

**Vladislav Inozemtsev**, editor of *Svobodnaya Mysl'* and director of research at the Centre for Post-Industrial Studies, like many analysts, believes that the current international system is much less orderly than the one which prevailed during the Cold War.<sup>9</sup> “Once the economic and political apex of the world shifted from Europe to the United States, globalisation became much more rapid and chaotic.” Globalisation has brought chaos partly because it has undermined national sovereignty, one of the foundation stones of international politics since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.

Inozemtsev argues that a new world order should be created to overcome the instability caused by American-led globalisation. In his view, this new world order should consist of an alliance of the USA, EU, Japan, plus Russia, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and other minor “Western offshoots”.

The new alliance would be the undisputed global economic, technological and military leader, embracing the best-educated and wealthiest part of the world’s population.

Such an integration of the core countries would gradually change the global configuration, with the unipolar world finally becoming a reality. If the leading world powers succeed in establishing institutions that would operate on the basis of their principles – such as an International Criminal Court; an International WMD agency; an International service combating illegal trafficking of drugs and people; and some others – these collective institutions would not have to consider problems of legitimacy since they would comprise an unprecedented power.

Moreover, this alliance could guarantee security to countries committed to its ideals (eg countries that have renounced their nuclear or chemical arsenals). Such guarantees would be a major factor in ensuring international stability. However, the above does not mean that this new “northern alliance” would initiate any dramatic transformations in the rest of the world: quite the opposite, its primary objective would be “maintaining the distance” between the core and the periphery. Such a strategy would guarantee the rigid protection of its economic interests, security, freedoms and lifestyles. Taking into account that some level of policing the periphery will be unavoidable, one should admit that the United States would become the natural leader in most of these issues.

Inozemtsev believes that the creation of such a core is quite feasible, as many of these countries have been allies for decades, and Russia’s cooperation with them has grown considerably in recent years. Many may, however, consider such

proposals utopian, particularly as they seem to partly concede the idea of US dominance of the international system, and Russian acceptance of it. It also appears to overlook the likelihood of policy divergences between the USA and the European Union, let alone between Russia and the USA. When discussing contemporary US foreign policy, Inozemtsev makes the following points:

US foreign policy today seems extremely wily. American leaders recognize the principle of sovereignty but always find casuistic pretexts for violating it. They preach universal values yet increasingly pursue a strategy of unilateralism. They proclaim devotion to economic freedoms but, at the same time, charge many European imports with customs duties and impose arbitrary economic sanctions against other countries. They think it is natural that the United States is the main crossroads for global money flows, but they cannot get used to the idea that America is now becoming the main target of extremists' and terrorists' attacks. And most importantly, US policymakers seem to be sincerely surprised that their state powers are now losing the war against terrorist networks, but consider quite natural the ease with which their corporate networks subjugate peripheral countries' governments.

It is hard to see why the USA should change if Inozemtsev's core alliance is ever formed, given that he accepts that the USA would be the "natural leader" of this core. It also appears to run counter to his thinking as expressed elsewhere. In an article on Russo-US relations in *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'* in October 2003, he argues that Russia has obtained little from the USA since September 2001, in spite of Moscow's support for Washington over "9/11".<sup>10</sup> The USA continued to pursue a discriminatory policy towards Russia in trade relations, and withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002. Russia took only a mildly critical line towards the USA over Iraq in 2003, but was rewarded only by rebukes from Washington about the need for the Putin leadership to refrain from authoritarianism. Inozemtsev also believes that the USA does not appreciate fully that the Russian Federation also suffers from terrorism, even though cooperation in the war on terrorism is supposed to be one of the key features of the post-September 2001 Russo-US relationship.

Inozemtsev argues that US foreign policy is driven by a missionary zeal to establish freedom and democracy throughout the world, with the USA alone defining what is democratic. This means that the USA is only interested in temporary alliances with non-democratic countries. Inozemtsev believes that the USA has only partially deideologised its approach towards the Russian Federation, and imposes tough conditions on Russia as the price for US-Russian partnership: Russia should put forward her own conditions. He believes that this is feasible, as, like many other Russian analysts, he considers that the US power is limited, and that the USA is burdened with weaknesses.

Inozemtsev argues that the military challenge which the USA faces in Iraq shows the limitations on US military power, and that the USA needs the rest of the world more than the rest of the world needs her. He is also of the view that the USA faces significant economic difficulties, such as her massive trade deficit and her equally large budget deficit, and that the US unilateralist approach runs the risk of making her isolated. He notes that the USA in 2002 had imposed sanctions without the consent of the international community against 75 states comprising 52 per cent of the world's population. Inozemtsev feels that these factors make the USA vulnerable, therefore Russia does not need to view the USA as a "senior partner", and can therefore seek partnership on an equal basis.



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This approach appears unduly optimistic at present. Inozemtsev does not suggest what conditions Russia could insist on as her price for partnership, or what else Russia could do to try and restrain US unilateralism.

**Aleksey Bogaturov** argues that the US political elite is motivated by what he terms the “American project for Russia and the whole world,”<sup>11</sup> which is aimed at the creation of a US-led international system. He states that the USA ideally does not want rifts with other states, preferring them to follow its lead. Bogaturov considers that a key goal of US strategy is to use the resources of its allies and partners in order to achieve her foreign policy goals, not by conquering and seizing the resources of other states, but by political and economic integration. He considers NAFTA and the plan to create a free trade area for the entire western hemisphere as part of this process, along with close political, military economic ties with Japan, and increasing trade and economic ties with China, Taiwan, South Korea, ASEAN and Australia. Bogaturov calls this a universal pan-integrationist strategy. The USA’s NATO partners and the Russian Federation are also objects of this strategy.

Bogaturov sees US-Russian partnership within this context. He says that the USA understands more clearly than Russian liberal politicians Russia’s value and potential, not so much as a source of energy resources, but her geo-political, geo-economic potential, plus that afforded by the geographical space she occupies. This, and the potential of Russian influence in key points of the belt of neighbouring territories (the Far East, Central Asia and Transcaucasia), transforms Russia into a valuable potential partner of the USA. Bogaturov concludes that for the USA, Russia’s democratisation is not a goal in itself, but an instrument for maintaining partnership with Moscow.

Bogaturov notes that although the international system is US dominated, it is also pluralist, as other major states often differ with Washington, as over Iraq in 2003. He sees the main contradiction in international relations being between the networked, dispersed character of trans-state threats to international security, and old mechanisms of managing international relations by the major powers and fora such as the UN and G8. He argues that the world faces a triple headed threat, namely international terrorism, narco-business, and international financial flows which fund terrorism, and which are beyond the control of nation-states. This is a consequence of globalisation, which is a phenomenon largely encouraged by the USA.

In this situation, is a Russo-US alliance feasible? Bogaturov believes that Putin has a far better chance than either Gorbachev or Yel’tsin to build a lasting alliance. This is not just because the two powers face a common threat. Bogaturov believes Russia is now extremely attractive as a partner for the USA because Washington has re-configured her geopolitical interests, and Russia has begun to play an important part in this new configuration.

Bogaturov argues that US foreign policy is being “Eurasianised”. In contrast to Narochitskaya, Bogaturov believes that the US interest in Eurasia is new. Previously (during the Cold War) Europe was the USA’s front line of defence. Europe is now the rear, and the new front is Central Eurasia, that is Afghanistan, the former Soviet Central Asian republics, and the two new nuclear powers of India and Pakistan. He writes:

Here in the new century is a new geopolitical centre of the world. To the east of it is China, powerful and dangerous. To the west, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia – three mighty oil powers, openly, as the first two, and half openly, as the last, hostile to the United States. Europe cannot, or almost cannot help the Americans in this part of the world. Its lot is to play an auxiliary, and not the main partner role in American global strategy.

Bogaturov goes on to note the declining importance of NATO to the US, and suggests that bilateral alliances may be more important to Washington, mentioning Britain, Japan and possibly India as examples. It is in this context that Bogaturov places the significance of Russo-US partnership. He believes that the USA has a double approach towards Russia. On the one hand, Washington will criticise Moscow over issues such as Chechnya, whilst at the same time pull Russia into a long-term political and military-political interaction in which the USA plays the guiding role.

This gives Russia the chance to enhance its position among the major world powers, but it also means that the Russian political elite will have to take into account US views when formulating both domestic and foreign policy to a greater extent than hitherto. Bogaturov feels that the Russian elite is not yet prepared for this.

However he feels that Washington, despite its dominance, desires to cooperate with other major powers and avoid rupturing relations with them. Bogaturov notes that during the diplomatic manoeuvrings that took place in early 2003, neither the USA, France nor Germany desired a total break in Trans-Atlantic relations, and both sides sought to repair the breach once the war was over. Bogaturov argues that Russia can play the same game of trying to influence the USA within the camp of US allies rather than outside it. This is how he views Franco-German-Russian diplomatic cooperation over Iraq, rejecting the idea that Russia is playing the old Soviet game of trying to exploit “inter-imperialist contradictions” between the USA and Western Europe. Bogaturov is obviously assuming that the rift will not fatally widen. If that were to happen, then Russian foreign policy would face a hard choice.

**Aleksandr Terent'yev** of the Institute of the USA and Canada believes that the USA and EU have radically different views of international order which are not compatible.<sup>12</sup> He shares the views expressed by American Robert Kagan in his book *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*. The Bush Administration is dominated by advocates of realpolitik, who adhere to the use of force to establish and maintain US dominance, and have little interest in cooperating with other states except where it facilitates US hegemony. The USA thus has little interest in international law and international institutions. American strategy threatens the sovereignty of other nations and so undermines the Westphalian state-centric model of international relations. The USA justifies her approach with a messianic belief that her values are “good”, and that she is fighting “evil” in the international arena. US moral values are thus superior to the constraints of international law.

Terent'yev contrasts with Bogaturov, Pavlov and Bessmertnykh (see below) in highlighting the differences between the USA and Europe, and downplaying moves since the end of the Iraq conflict to overcome these rifts. He considers that the USA is now highly unilateralist, with little interest in the UN or in cooperating with allies.

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He argues that there is a crisis in Trans-Atlantic relations, although he accepts that they may later reach a rapprochement.

The crisis in relations of the two trans-Atlantic partners is conditioned above all by the anti-thesis of the USA's "new world order" and the European peace-structure (*miroustroystvo*), and up until now, while the American administration does not reject a unilateral foreign policy, Europe will take a critical attitude towards its ally.

Terent'yev argues that the situation in the Middle East shows the difference in thinking on the two sides of the Atlantic. The USA, seeing the inadequacy of international institutions, decides to use force unilaterally without UN sanction in accordance with her doctrine of preventive war. Europe, by contrast, holds to its project of a peace-structure, rejecting the tenets of realpolitik. The two approaches to international relations are not compatible, hence the current US-European split. Terent'yev notes the irony of both the USA and the European Union challenging the Westphalian model of international relations; the USA by threatening the sovereignty of other states, although she remains a sovereign state, committed to protecting the American national interest as defined by the Bush Administration. The European Union challenges the model from a different perspective by its construction of a European peace-structure that transcends the nation-state and seeks to avoid using force. Terent'yev does not discuss the implications for Russian foreign policy of this conflict. It is interesting that he does not rule out a rapprochement between the USA and Europe, which perhaps echoes the current Russian desire to have partnerships with both parties and to avoid having to choose between either.

## US-Russian Relations

In November 2003, a round table discussion on US-Russian relations appeared in *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USA and the USSR.<sup>13</sup> **Aleksey Arbatov** accepts that US-Russian partnership in general cannot be based upon equality, given the disparity in power.<sup>14</sup> However he believes that in specific issue areas it can effectively be a partnership of equals. He argues that due to its geographical position, ties and influence in various regions, Russia can be an extremely important partner of the USA, eg over Afghanistan in 2001. Arbatov suggests that in fighting international terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, and in seeking the resolution of various regional conflicts in the Middle East, South Asia and potentially in the Far East, there could be similar close cooperation between Moscow and Washington. He also suggests that the two states propose to jointly build new reactors that will not leave waste products that could be used to construct nuclear weapons.

He warns, however, that there is currently in Russia only a narrow base of support for partnership with the USA; only a small number of Duma deputies see Russo-US cooperation as intrinsically good. Most either support or oppose cooperation because the Putin himself favours cooperating with Washington. Arbatov goes on to say that there is no deep understanding of the idea of cooperation with the USA amongst the Russian political elite and security community as a whole. This means that Russo-US relations depend too much on the personal relationship between the presidents. He suggests that meaningful cooperation in the future will require that Russian policy be more consistent, and US policy less unilateralist.

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He believes that cooperation with the USA should also be pursued via the development of cooperation with the EU and Japan, as both of these entities are also allies of the USA. He outlines Russia's importance as follows:

As the most important state in the Eurasian super-region we can adequately cooperate with the USA and her allies in the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the struggle with terrorism, spread of WMD, and with threats of a new type: narcotics, crime, illegal immigration, contraband, poaching, and of course epidemics. In a word, in spheres which are global in character. The borders of such cooperation are truly limitless, but this does not mean that the path to it will be smooth and direct. In order to proceed along the line of such cooperation, the West, meaning by this the West and its far eastern allies, seriously need to change their attitude towards Russia, to accept her as a serious partner, respect her legitimate interests, and must not to deceive her.

Many analysts in the discussion were of the opinion that it is an illusion that Russia could ever form an extremely close relationship with the USA. **Viktor Kremnyuk** of the USA-Canada Institute noted that while relations became closer after the end of the Cold War, they never reached the closeness of US-UK or even US-French relations. He considers that Russia is currently in the position of seeking to define its optimal model of US-Russian relations: deep cooperation is currently not possible.

Kremnyuk argues that there are two versions of Russia with which the USA could have relationships. One is a source of energy and raw materials. This is the type of relationship America prefers, "our resources and their technology." The second version is a Russia which seeks to develop its space, defence and nuclear industries in order to turn itself into a technologically advanced power. America seeks to prevent Russian access to foreign markets to sell her high-tech products. He advocates that Russia should use earnings from the export of raw materials to modernise her high-tech sector. At the same time she should seek western (including US) investment in this sector. He notes that if Siberia is not developed then Russia may face pressure from China to divide up this region. He implies that this could enhance Chinese power vis-à-vis the USA, and so argues that it is in America's interest that she does not just see Russia as a source of raw materials. He advocates Russo-US cooperation in areas such as space research and anti-missile defence.

Most analysts appeared to be of the view that it was difficult for Russia to decide what sort of relationship with the US would be suitable. **Aleksandr Belonogov**, who was a deputy foreign minister from 1990-92 and the USSR's representative at the UN from 1986-90, argued that the USA is still heavily influenced by Cold War stereotypes, and that the American political elite still manifests an anti-Soviet syndrome in its approach towards Russia. This therefore means that Washington desires to keep Russia in a subordinate position. He notes that Russia is now peripheral to US interests, which means it will be difficult for Russia to be taken seriously by the USA.

**Sergey Kortunov**, deputy chairman of the expert council of the international affairs committee of the Federation Council, feels that an opportunity was missed after 1991 to build Russo-American relations on a new ideological basis. He feels that the Russian political elite was then more interested in creating a new relationship than the USA, presumably as the latter had emerged victorious in the Cold War.

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However he feels that there are solid reasons for building a very cooperative relationship, as Russo-US security interests coincide to a very significant extent in areas such as the Middle East and Central Asia. He thus welcomes the US presence in these regions. He goes on to suggest that Russia and the USA undertake large-scale joint projects. He proposes a project for the “Greater Caucasus,” although he provides no details of what this project would comprise. He also suggests that the two states could also promote reform in Belarus, although he again provides no details.

### Lessons of the Iraq War

**Aleksandr Konovalov** of the international relations institute MGIMO argues that the goal of US policy towards Iraq was regime change all along.<sup>15</sup> He cites an unnamed member of the US political elite as admitting this, stating that it was proposed to US President George Bush that he should have openly proclaimed this as the US goal, using the argument that Saddam Hussein was a threat to world peace. The US source claimed that Colin Powell successfully argued against this, as regime change could not be justified in international law.

Konovalov says that the US is now more open in its declaration of its war aims, and that the USA now sees Iraq as a suitable launch pad for democratising the Middle East, believing that a democratic Middle East would no longer be a breeding ground for terrorism. Konovalov notes, however, that the task of building a stable democracy in Iraq will be extraordinarily difficult for the USA. Since 1945 the USA has attempted regime change 16 times in different countries. Only in two cases (Germany and Japan) has regime change produced stable democracies.

Interestingly, Konovalov does not oppose the US goal of regime change in Iraq, so contradicting the position taken by the Russian leadership.

Thus the USA began in Iraq the first experiment in recent times of the forcible change of a totalitarian regime. The goals of this operation do not, to a large extent, contradict Russian foreign policy interests, although the methods of carrying out the operation, and thinking behind it, do give rise to certain doubts. In these conditions, what is important for Russia is that the declared goals were successfully achieved, and that these achievements do not violate the norms of international law. This does not exclude that in case of need, the rules of the game adopted by the international community, can be jointly improved, corrected and brought into correlation with the new challenges and threats to international security.

In the final account, if the Middle East ceases to be a refuge of international terrorism, a source of conflict and threats to international security, and will be successfully “written into” the globalising world economy, having preserved its civilisational identity, then Russia will only gain from this.

Konovalov seems to be close to arguing that regime change is not necessarily wrong, and that there may be a case for altering international law to take this into account.

**Nikolay Pavlov** of IMEMO draws nine conclusions from the US-Iraq war of 2003 for Russian foreign policy.<sup>16</sup>

1. The world will remain unipolar. The USA's predominance will remain unchallenged. USA is becoming an imperial power, with its national interests embracing the whole planet. The notion of multipolarity proposed by some Russian politicians and analysts is unrealistic. This is a significant divergence of opinion, as many in Russia argue that American unipolarity can only be a temporary phenomenon, which will be superseded by the emergence of other national centres of power. Pavlov considers that Russians who advocate multipolarity have failed to see how much international relations has changed in the last decade, and are still thinking in traditional realpolitik terms.
2. A unipolar world means that the USA will seek to maintain the status quo for as long as possible, and prevent the emergence of any possible rival in Europe and Asia. Other states will have to surrender part of their sovereignty to the USA. This affects both allies and opponents of Washington and requires a global US military presence, for which 9/11 was the catalyst.
3. The USA will be unable to sustain her current global role indefinitely. In the long term US military and economic power will dissipate as a consequence of carrying this burden. It could cause a serious economic slowdown, or even a crisis. In addition, the pursuing of an imperial policy will undermine both the material and ideological foundations of "hyperpowerdom", and therefore of a unipolar international system. It is likely to lead in the long term to a new wave of anti-Americanism, an upsurge in international terrorism, and new inter-religious and ethnic conflicts which will disturb the balance of the international system.
4. Splits in the western camp are likely to be only tactical in character. Countries such as France and Germany are unlikely to terminate their alliance with the USA, despite differences over Iraq.
5. The main tendency in contemporary international relations is the globalisation of economic ties due to advanced information and communication technology. Another major tendency is the internationalisation of bilateral relations in connection with the increased weight of leading international, principally financial-economic organisations. Globalisation and internationalisation increase the interdependence of states, and narrow the scope for independent activity. The development of Russo-European relations must be seen within this context. A united Europe linked with Russia will not be able to become a power centre independent of the USA.
6. Iraq demonstrates that USA no longer regards the UN as necessarily playing a central role in maintaining international security. Russia and other countries do not share this view, seeing the UN as a means of trying to influence the USA and restrain her imperial ambitions.
7. Since 9/11, there has been a legitimisation of the following foreign policy objectives pursued by democratic countries: supporting the extension of democracy and human rights; countering international terrorism and dictatorships, the spread of WMD, illegal migration and drug-trafficking. This forces Russia to reconsider her relations with a whole range of countries regarded as rogue states. There are both political and economic implications. She has to consider her image and her economic relations with these states. For example, in the case of Iraq, Moscow acknowledged the positive impact of the overthrow of a tyrannical regime, but was cautious about whether she should write off Iraq's debts.

## The Russia-USA Relationship

8. The debate within the Russian political elite about Iraq in 2003 revealed that Russia has no national consensus about the fundamental questions of foreign policy. Pavlov argues that there is a discord between the interests of the state and the interests of the nation in foreign policy.

9. The Russian leadership needs to reconcile this divergence, and to build on this base a foreign policy which is clear, logical, flexible yet predictable, supported within the country and respected by the international community.

Pavlov does not expound points 8 and 9 in detail, and provides no concrete examples of what foreign policy should be, or where state and national interests currently diverge. His comments about multipolarity are interesting, as he runs counter to the generally held Russian viewpoint. However, if US power eventually declines, which he considers inevitable in the long term, then presumably in such circumstances other national power centres could emerge. Although strong economic ties (globalisation) may make it difficult at present to contemplate Europe ever emerging as a strategic rival to the USA, it should not be assumed that economic ties guarantee the prevention of such rivalry in the future.

Former Soviet foreign minister **Aleksandr Bessmertnykh** believes that the US war against Iraq has had both positive and negative consequences.<sup>17</sup> On the positive side, Saddam has been removed, and international terrorist organisations will have learned that the USA will not hesitate to use force in response to their actions. However US actions have given rise to concern about the future of the Westphalian system, and the future role of the UN and international law. Bessmertnykh argues that the USA's greater willingness to use force means that it is more important than ever to ensure that the use of power in foreign policy must be combined with ethics. He repeats standard Russian concerns that the mixing of the war on terrorism with regime change could undermine anti-terrorist cooperation between major powers. He also echoes other Russian politicians and analysts in urging the USA not to treat its allies and partners as mere tools of US policy.

Interestingly he argues that the USA's decision not to seek a second UN Security Council resolution in 2003 paradoxically helped minimise splits in NATO. He suggests that if France had vetoed a resolution and the USA had gone to war regardless, then the rift between the USA and France (and Germany) would have been greater than it actually was. Like Bogaturov and Pavlov, Bessmertnykh does not believe that splits over Iraq will destroy the Trans-Atlantic relationship, or US-Russian partnership. He notes that the Bush Administration has returned to the UN in an attempt to stabilise Iraq; it does therefore act pragmatically. He considers it important for Russia to continue to develop close ties with both Europe and the USA.

## USA & International Law

Given that the USA's attack on Iraq in March 2003 was carried out without the sanction of the UN Security Council, there are obvious implications for international law. This has been a cause of concern for the Russian leadership. In November 2003 **Leonid Skotnikov**, who is Russia's plenipotentiary ambassador at the UN in Geneva, expressed concern in an article in *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'* over the USA's National Security Strategy of 2002, which in his view sought to justify the use of force by the USA in preventive strikes without prior legal sanction.<sup>18</sup> He argues that

the existing role played by the UN Security Council in determining when force can legitimately be used cannot be set aside, and it is wrong to attempt to write off the UN by arguing that its Charter no longer corresponds to the security problems of the modern world, as this could completely destroy the entire international legal order.

Deputy foreign minister Yury Fedotov took a similar line in the same issue of *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, in which he expressed the standard Russian line over the UN, arguing that it should play the central role in maintaining international security, and that its role was both required and irreplaceable.<sup>19</sup>

## Implications For Russia

The evolution of the international system and the role played in it by the USA as the most powerful nation in it obviously has implications for Russia's position, and this too is the object of discussion by Russian analysts. In July 2003, **Sergey Medvedev** developed the discussion about the future world order and Russia's place within it.<sup>20</sup> He does not specifically devote attention to US foreign policy, but takes it as axiomatic that the current international system is dominated by the West, in particular the USA. He argues that in order to change the world, the task of Russian foreign policy is first to adapt to this.

When considering the changes in Russian foreign policy since 1991, he notes that there has been a "deterritorialisation" in Russian foreign policy thinking. The Russian political elite (and society as a whole) no longer sees the holding on to territory at all costs as an immutable principle, as it was during the Soviet era. Neither the Russian leadership nor society is willing, for example, to pay any price to re-establish Russian control over Ukraine or Belarus, even if such a re-establishment were possible.

A second important factor has been the increased importance of economics in Russian foreign policy. Geo-economics is replacing geo-politics as a motive force in the formulation of foreign policy, with economic lobby groups such as the oil and gas industries, the banking and financial elites, civil nuclear power industry and the metallurgy sector playing an increasingly important role in the foreign policy process. This creates strong integrationist pressures, and increased Russian interest in joining major international organisations in the 1990s. The financial crisis of 1998 made clear Russia's economic dependence on the West, which is why Russia's foreign policy has avoided any major rift with the West since 1991. Even the anti-western sentiment that arose in 1999 as a result of the Kosovo crisis soon dissipated as the leadership realised that cooperation with the West was essential for Russia.

The Putin leadership has accepted this state of affairs. According to Medvedev, Putin realised that Russia needed to cooperate with the West in order to overcome her internal problems. He also realised that Russia was in danger of losing out on benefits from globalisation, and that to carry out internal reforms, he needed western support in order to create a predictable external environment and demonstrate that Russia can be a reliable international partner. Hence the major effort at cooperation with the West and a shift away from the multipolar rhetoric of the late Yel'tsin period.



## The Russia-USA Relationship

Medvedev argues that Putin has reversed the traditional paradigm of Soviet/Russian foreign policy. The traditional paradigm is that control of national territory is the over-riding strategic objective, and alliances, treaties and norms are tactical objectives. Medvedev believes that Putin sees territory as a tactical resource, and alliance with the West as a strategic goal. He is therefore not concerned about NATO widening, the US military presence in Central Asia or the Russian withdrawal from bases in Cuba and Vietnam.

For the first time in all of Russia's history, the national interest is not directly linked with the might of the country, and control over territory, but with internal reform, the economic well-being of the nation, and efficiency of the leadership. Putin undoubtedly sees Russia as a power (*derzhava*), but in a new way. His policy cannot be called pro-western (as for example, Kozyrev's policy); Putin's policy is pro-Russian in the pragmatic sense of the word. If for Kozyrev association with the West was an ideological step, an act of faith, then Putin is moved by enlightened egoism: he needs the West so that Russia can triumph in the era of globalisation. As is known, one of the principles of judo is to use the strength of one's rival in one's own interests.

If Medvedev is correct, if Putin's rapprochement with the West leads to a stronger Russia, then in the long term Russia may not continue with a pro-western policy if she feels strong enough to hold her own in the international arena. This would not necessarily be an anti-western foreign policy orientation, but perhaps akin to that of contemporary China towards the West. Medvedev also uses the term "West" without distinguishing between its different power centres, although he does note that it is an open question whether the West in the future will be Hobbesian (motivated by realpolitik and using force like the USA under George Bush), or Kantian (seeking to resolve disputes through the use of soft power and international law as favoured by the European Union).

**Viktor Sheynis** of the international relations institute IMEMO also discussed the subject in *MEMO* in April 2003.<sup>21</sup> He accepts that intervention in the affairs of other states is under certain circumstances an acceptable feature of international relations in the current era. He argues that that the international community cannot permit regimes such as the Iraqi (under Saddam Hussein) or North Korean to acquire WMD, and that this raises the question of what is to be done about such regimes if political and economic pressure fails to resolve the security problem they pose. He also accepts that egregious violations of human rights may also justify some form of international intervention. In expressing such thinking, Sheynis seems to be coming close to the viewpoints expressed in some western (particularly American) circles.

He goes on to discuss the vexed question of who can then decide to intervene militarily. He states that only the UN can legitimately do this, but accepts that this organisation is often not able to respond effectively to such crises. He is thus once again echoing the thinking expressed by some conservative American thinkers. He goes on to note that these decisions are now often being taken by western alliance organisations, by groups of states or individual states acting unilaterally. He quotes a British scholar, Alex Butler, who notes that international security is being "formed by the most powerful economically and strong politically states, which permits them to impose their national interests on the rest of the world, transforming them into international interests. There are two means of accomplishing this: either become strong, or join the strong states." Sheynis writes that in "these conditions, the

participation of Russia, albeit not as a superpower, but as a world class country, in structures similar to the G8, or Russia-NATO Council could become an important instrument of influence on the path of world affairs". From this Sheynis advocates closer cooperation by Russia with western powers so she could play this role. He criticises Russian foreign policy for not making sufficient efforts to be cooperative. This is an interesting contrast to many Russian analysts who accuse western powers of having no real interest in cooperating with Russia as a serious partner.

He decisively rejects the favourite Russian notion of multipolarity, arguing that the diversity of the current world does not alter the fact that its basic structure is a western unipolarity led by the USA, and that it will remain so for generations. Attempts to create alternative power centres will be unsuccessful and counterproductive. He rejects the idea of Russia cooperating with Europe in order to counter the USA. He therefore seems to argue that Russia should throw in its lot with this unipolar structure, which echoes Inozemtsev's idea of a core alliance.

Sheynis takes the view that the breakdown of the global security system formed after 1945 is irreversible, and that there is little point in opposing the USA as that will only hinder Russia's own attempts at internal modernisation. He argues that the only worthwhile allies for a modernising Russia are democratic ones. This poses a dilemma for Russia. Sheynis believes that there is little support within the Russian political establishment for the close cooperation with the West that Putin has advocated since September 2001. This establishment would prefer to create an anti-US Eurasian "pole" in a multipolar international system. He also argues that there is a contradiction between Putin's foreign policy orientation of close cooperation with the West and his disregard for democratic norms at home. He feels that this makes a full alliance with the USA impossible, which he considers to be damaging to Russia's national interests.

## Conclusions

The Putin leadership accepts the reality of the current international system, namely that it is dominated by the USA. Putin himself sees no point in opposing the status quo, given the USA's strength and Russia's weakness. However this acceptance of the inevitable contains many paradoxes. Perhaps most interesting is the point made by Sergey Medvedev, when comparing Putin's current foreign policy with that of the Kozyrev period in the early 1990s. Both Putin and Kozyrev favour close western partnership, but whereas Kozyrev saw this partnership as a means whereby Russia could become an integral part of the West, fully sharing its values, as West Germany did after 1945, Putin sees partnership as simply a means of not being marginalised by US-led globalisation. Marginalisation would destroy any hopes of regaining great power status. This is a paradox, as Putin is pursuing a western oriented foreign policy, but has no interest in westernising (ie democratising) Russia. The lack of interest in becoming part of a western *Wertegemeinschaft* places limits on the extent of possible partnership between Russia and the USA. It carries the possibility that a stronger Russia might at some point turn its back on partnership. Hence partnership with the USA is not an end itself under Putin, but rather a means to an end. There is little support within the Russian political elite for genuine partnership with the USA, thus any *volte-face* by Putin or a successor resulting in a rejection of close partnership would probably carry a good deal of support.

## The Russia-USA Relationship

Russian approaches towards the USA have also been dominated by the fear that Washington may see Russia as irrelevant.<sup>22</sup> This concern was heightened by attitudes displayed by elements of the Bush Administration when it first came to office. However, if the claims made by certain Russian analysts that the USA now sees Eurasia as a core interest are correct, then this should give Russia an opportunity to enhance her importance as a partner to Washington. This is certainly the approach that Putin has taken since September 2001.

Russia's relations with the USA always raise the question of the interaction between Russo-European, US-European and Russo-US relationships. In the Cold War, Soviet foreign policy was often seen as attempting to decouple the USA from Western Europe. Similar claims have been made about post-Soviet Russian foreign policy. The Putin leadership has taken great pains to deny this. Then foreign minister Igor Ivanov stated in March 2003 that Russia was "not interested in the aggravation of relations between the USA and Europe". He also made similar comments in April 2004 in his new capacity as secretary of the Security Council:

Our country does not seek unilateral advantages, nor will it do so in the future, from the differences of opinion which have recently been hampering coordinated actions in the Euroatlantic space. On the contrary, it is precisely the unity of the states located in the Euroatlantic space, regardless of their affiliation to this or that alliance and grouping, that we see as the guarantee of effectively and jointly countering the threats and challenges which our states are currently confronting.<sup>23</sup>

This is probably true. Moscow has no desire to introduce unnecessary and fruitless irritants into its relationship with the USA. To do so would jeopardise the policy of cooperation undertaken by Putin as part of his strategy of modernising Russia in order to ensure that it becomes an important part of a globalised world. Cooperation with the USA and with Europe can both be regarded as key components of this strategy.

There consequently has been relatively little concern expressed over the second wave of NATO widening that took place in March 2004, when Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia became members of the alliance. Whilst no Russian analyst or policymaker is likely to welcome the eastward expansion of the Alliance, particularly into the territory of the former Soviet Union, this is probably offset by their awareness of NATO's reduced importance to the USA. Col-General Aleksandr Rukshin, deputy chief of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces, made the interesting comment in January 2004 that "we cannot prohibit NATO from accepting one state or another, which meets its requirements. However, it is worth mentioning that the more member-states NATO accepts, the less controllable it becomes."<sup>24</sup> Defence minister Sergey Ivanov commented in April 2004 that Russia's attitude to NATO widening was "calmly negative", and this appears to sum up the official Russian attitude.

If Putin is unconcerned about the stationing of US forces in Central Asia, then he is unlikely to be overly perturbed about US forces being stationed in Eastern Europe. However if Arbatov's assessment that the pro-American constituency in the Russian political elite is small, then NATO widening will enhance their negative perceptions of the USA's international role, particularly if Russian foreign policy does undergo any radical change in the future.

It is significant that most analysts have tended to downplay the importance of the rifts that arose between the USA and “Old Europe” in 2003 over Iraq, and have instead seen the attempts to heal these differences as evidence that centripetal tendencies in the Trans-Atlantic alliance prevail over centrifugal ones. The problems were depicted as a dispute within the western camp which will not decouple the Atlantic Alliance. This is not to say that Moscow would not welcome a looser relationship between the USA and Old Europe, with Russia in the long term becoming a more important partner of the major European powers. The possibility of the USA stationing its forces in Poland and other former Warsaw Pact states makes the development of Russia’s ties with “Old Europe” an important counterweight to the USA’s focus on “New Europe”. However, Russia is unlikely at present to desire a major rift, as she would hate to have to choose between the two, not least because of her current weakness. A strong Russia, on the other hand, may feel that if she ever did have to choose, then in the long term she is a European power, and therefore has more in common strategically with Old Europe than with the USA. Therefore, even though Moscow has in 2004 expressed some concern over the economic implications for her of EU widening, and has also been discomfited by EU criticisms of certain human rights issues, this will not dissuade her from seeking to see the EU as an important economic and security partner.

## ENDNOTES

- 1 See BBC Monitoring 27 September 2003, <http://news.monitor.bbc.co.uk/>.
- 2 Ibid, 25 September 2003.
- 3 See *Kommersant*, 13 February 2004. This article also appears on the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, <http://www.mid.ru>.
- 4 See Sergey Lavrov’s article in *Kommersant* and the *Wall Street Journal*, 1 April 2004.
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- 8 Nataliya Narochnitskaya, ‘Yevropa “Staraya” i Evropa “Novaya”’, *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, No 4, 2003. See her website <http://www.narochnitskaia.ru>.
- 9 Vladislav Inozemtsev, Rethinking the New World Order, *Russia in Global Affairs*, Vol 1, No 4, October/December-2003, <http://eng.globalisation.ru/live/about.asp>.
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- 11 A Bogaturov, ‘Irakskiy krizis I strategiya "navyazannogo konsensusa”’, *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, No 3, 2003.
- 12 A Terent’ev, ‘Kontury novogo miroporyadka. “Novy Mirovy Poryadok” SShA ili Yevropeyskoye miroustroystvo’, MEiMO, No 7, 2003.
- 13 ‘70 years of diplomatic relations between Russia and the USA’, *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, No 7, 2003.
- 14 Aleksey Arbatov was deputy chairman Duma defence committee 1994-2003. He is now at the Carnegie Centre in Moscow, <http://www.carnegie.ru>.
- 15 Aleksandr Konovalov, ‘Irak: Peyzazh posle bitvi’, *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, No 8, 2003.
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- 17 Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, ‘Irakskaya voyna I yeye vozmozhnyye posledstviya’, *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, No 7, 2003.
- 18 Leonid Skotnikov, ‘Pravovyye ramki primeneniya sily’, *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, No 11, 2003.
- 19 Yury Fedotov, ‘OON Garant mezhdunarodnogo mira i stabilnosti’, *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, No 11, 2003.

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<sup>20</sup> S Medvedev, 'Kontury novogo miroporadka. Rossiya: vneshnyaya politika, bezopasnost', identichnost", MEiMO, No 7, 2003. Medvedev is based at the George Marshall Centre for European Security Studies in Germany.

<sup>21</sup> V Sheynis, 'Rossiya: ekonomika, politika. Natsional'nyye interesy i vneshnyaya politika Rossii', MEiMO, No 4, 2003.

<sup>22</sup> See as an example Thomas Graham, 'A world without Russia?', Jamestown Foundation Conference, Washington DC, 9 June 1999; <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/3336.html>, 08.08.2002 r. Cited by S Medvedev, op cit.

<sup>23</sup> BBC Monitoring, 22 March 2003, 16 April 2004.

<sup>24</sup> BBC Monitoring, 14 January 2004.

## **Want to Know More ...?**

Many of the articles in *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'* also appear in the English language version of this publication, *International Affairs*. This should not be confused with the Chatham House publication of the same name.

Discussion of contemporary Russian foreign policy can be found at the website of the Carnegie Centre in Moscow, <http://www.carnegie.ru/en/>.

Read: Gabriel Gorodetsky (Ed), *Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century*, Frank Cass & Co, 2003

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ISBN 1-904423-73-6

**Published By:**

**Defence Academy of the**  
**United Kingdom**

**Conflict Studies Research Centre**

Haig Road  
Camberley  
Surrey  
GU15 4PQ  
England

Telephone: (44) 1276 412995  
Fax: (44) 1276 686880  
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<http://www.da.mod.uk/csrc>

**ISBN 1-904423-73-6**