


Conflict Studies Research Centre

Dr Mark A Smith

Russo-Japanese Relations

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Russo-Japanese Relations

Dr Mark A Smith

The Russo-Japanese relationship constitutes one of Russia's major bilateral inter-state relationships, alongside those with the USA, China, the European Union, and with major European powers such as Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Unlike these relationships, however, the Russo-Japanese one is burdened with a significant amount of "unfinished business", namely the failure to resolve the territorial issue of the Kurile Islands (or Northern Territories as they are known in Japan) and so sign a peace treaty marking the end of the Second World War. This problem has so far prevented the full normalisation of relations between Moscow and Tokyo. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi summarised the broad significance of the territorial issue in January 2003 as follows:

Between Japan and Russia, there remains a "negative legacy of the 20th century", in the issue of where the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu belong. I firmly believe there is great potential for development of the relations between Japan and Russia. In reality, however, our two countries have realized only a small portion of such development potential, partly because of the existence of the above-mentioned issue.¹

Japan desires the ultimate return of all four Kurile Islands, and holds to the USSR-Japanese Declaration of October 1956, under which Moscow obligated itself to return the two southernmost islands (Shikotan and Habomai) on the conclusion of a peace treaty.²

The Russian View of Japan

Russia views her relationship with Japan within the context of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. Russia sees herself as an Asian-Pacific, as well as a European (or arguably Euro-Atlantic) power. It is a region containing four major powers (the USA, China, Russia and Japan – the first three being nuclear powers); it contains more than half of the world's population; it is a major economic centre, rivalling the USA and the European Union; it could become a source of several major security problems, such as possible Chinese expansionism, North Korea's potential emergence as a nuclear weapons state, and the mooted US-Japanese development of theatre missile defence systems.

Russia desires to play a full part in the political, economic and security processes taking place in the Asia-Pacific region. She is therefore a member of APEC, and has a close relationship with ASEAN. In the post-Soviet period she has sought to develop close ties with China and South Korea, and has also attempted to normalise her ties with Japan. Russia's main objectives in policy towards Japan can be summarised as follows:

- To resolve the territorial dispute, and finally conclude a peace treaty.

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- To develop a close strategic partnership, cooperating both bilaterally and in multilateral fora such as the UN, G8, APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum.
- To develop a close economic relationship with Japan, particularly in the Russian Far East, where Moscow would like to see greater Japanese investment. Russian energy resources in Siberia and the Far East and Japan's dependence on imported energy potentially constitute a solid basis for the bilateral relationship.
- To prevent the US-Japanese security relationship from developing in directions that could be inimical to Russian interests (eg over regional missile defence).
- To develop a close partnership as a partial counterweight to Chinese power in the Far East. For this reason, Russia probably has no intrinsic hostility to the US-Japanese Security Treaty.

Japanese Foreign Policy Priorities

Japan's most important alliance is with the USA. This has been the foundation of Japanese foreign and security policy since 1951.³ On the basis of this relationship Japan has pursued an omni-directional foreign policy aimed at developing cordial political and economic relations with all powers.⁴ During the Cold War, Japan's main threat to her security was seen as the Soviet Union.⁵ The territorial problem added to this perception. In the post Cold War era, Russia is no longer seen as a threat, although the territorial problem remains unresolved. The biggest threats to Japanese security are now seen as coming from North Korea's possible emergence as a nuclear-armed state. China could also be seen as a threat in the long term. Japanese policy toward Russia has the following major objectives:

- Resolve the territorial problem.
- Develop economic, scientific, technological, cultural and military cooperation.

Japan also desires to see Russia emerge as a stable power in the Asian-Pacific region, presumably as a counterweight to Chinese power and to help deal with the potential threat to regional security posed by North Korea. Tokyo also wishes to help in dismantling the former Soviet nuclear arsenal and in reducing the threat of nuclear pollution in the Russian Far East, which is of direct interest to her.

The Peace Treaty & The Territorial Issue

The November 1998 Russo-Japanese summit in Moscow between President Yel'tsin and Japanese Prime Minister Keito Obuti can be seen as the most important development in Russo-Japanese relations in the 1990s. This summit saw the signing of the Moscow Declaration on a creative partnership between the two powers.⁶ It also confirmed that both sides would continue to work on resolving the territorial issue in order to conclude a peace treaty. This had been agreed when Yel'tsin visited Tokyo in October 1993.⁷ At the Krasnoyarsk summit in November

1997 Yel'tsin and Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hasimoto affirmed their intention to try to conclude a peace treaty by December 2000. The November 1998 Declaration also set up a sub-committee (of the committee set up earlier to work on the peace treaty) to promote joint economic activities in the Islands which would not undermine the legal or political positions of Russia and Japan. A sub-committee on border demarcation was also to be established, and would work in conjunction with the sub-committee on joint economic activity. It was also agreed in principle that former Japanese residents of the islands would be permitted to visit them without a visa (since the early 1990s, about 10,000 Japanese have visited the islands). These agreements constituted a step forward in the attempts to resolve the territorial problem, as measures such as joint economic activity provide a means of increasing Japanese involvement in the islands without compromising sovereignty. It enables Moscow to claim that progress is being made whilst still maintaining full control over the islands.

Article Nine of the October 1956 Soviet-Japanese Declaration that ended the state of war between the USSR and Japan stated that the two southernmost islands would be transferred to Japan when a peace treaty was concluded. However, Moscow's aversion to losing territory would appear to make it impossible for her to conclude a treaty as she would then have to abide by the 1956 Declaration and transfer the islands. It is therefore unsurprising that no agreement on signing a peace treaty was reached by the end of 2000. In 1999 Moscow accused Tokyo of linking the peace treaty to other issues, so preparing opinion for the fact that signing a peace treaty by December 2000 would be unlikely. This was intensified in July 2000, when Vladimir Putin said that he believed that a peace treaty could be concluded with Japan if "the problems that are in the basis of the peace treaty lose their priority and stop irritating our relations".⁸ This was a coded way of attacking the Japanese for continuing to insist on linking the peace treaty with the territorial issue.

By the end of August 2000, sources in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) were warning that concluding a peace treaty before the end of 2000 was no longer on the agenda. Putin visited Japan in September 2000, with no progress being made on the peace treaty. In the same month deputy foreign minister Aleksandr Losyukov suggested that Russian and Japanese experts discuss the issue of "interpreting" the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Declaration.⁹ This would seem to have been an attempt by Moscow to move away from the commitment in this declaration, whilst still claiming to abide by it. In December 2000 Losyukov said that Moscow believed that "the search for ways in which to resolve the territorial problem between Russia and Japan must be based upon the inviolability of Russia's sovereignty over its territory".¹⁰ The deadlock thus remained, although Russo-Japanese relations were otherwise cordial. Japan is unwilling to develop a closer economic relationship whilst the territorial problem remains unresolved. Moscow hopes that the economic cooperation in the Kuriles envisaged in the 1998 Moscow Declaration may make the issue of sovereignty less important, and so reduce its salience in the Russo-Japanese relationship. It has also been speculated in the Russian press that the sub-committee on border demarcation could suggest that the Russo-Japanese maritime border be moved to lie north of the Kurile Islands, with the islands still remaining Russian territory.¹¹

The next major development in Russo-Japanese relations was the summit meeting in Irkutsk in March 2001 between Putin and the outgoing Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori. At that meeting it was agreed that Russia and Japan would continue peace treaty negotiations, along with economic cooperation in and around the

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Kuriles. Putin affirmed that the 1956 Declaration was still valid. He also hinted that his leadership's attitude towards the January 1960 USSR Memorandum to the Government of Japan had changed. This memorandum warned that the Soviet government considered that Japan had violated the 1956 Declaration by signing a new security treaty with the USA. The USSR therefore no longer considered herself obligated to fulfil Article Nine of the 1956 Declaration.¹² Putin's comments implied that his leadership had repudiated the 1960 Memorandum, and was therefore strongly committed to the eventual transfer of Shikotan and Habomai.

Reports emerged after the Irkutsk summit that Moscow had agreed to discuss the transfer of Shikotan and Habomai. This was denied by the Russian MFA. As concern grew, the Sakhalin oblast leadership and legislature expressed their opinion on the issue. In May 2001, the governor of Sakhalin oblast (which includes the Kuriles), Igor Farkhutdinov, accused Japan of disseminating provocative rumours about the future of the Kurile Islands.¹³ In July the Sakhalin regional дума asked Putin to look into statements about an alleged understanding with Japan about the transfer of Shikotan and Habomai from Russia.¹⁴ Pressure from the Sakhalin дума on the federal leadership intensified in August, when the chairman of the Sakhalin Regional legislature's Commission for Legislation, Law and Foreign Affairs Sergey Ponomarev accused federal agencies of disregarding the Sakhalin deputies' proposal on holding local debates on the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Declaration and on Russia's national security problems.¹⁵

An opposing view was expressed by the Khabarovsk governor Viktor Ishayev in May 2001, when he said that Moscow should hand all four islands over to Japan. However, in December he reversed his position when he said that there was no reason for Russia to transfer the disputed South Kurile Islands to Japan at this time, because of Tokyo's reluctance to take reciprocal steps.

Japan underwent a change of leadership in April 2001, when Junichiro Koizumi became Prime Minister. In July 2001, Putin invited him to Russia. Koizumi repeated the standard Japanese line about seeking the ultimate transfer of all four islands. Moscow's position was also unchanged, namely she was ready to continue work on a peace treaty and in the course of this take into account the Moscow Declaration of 1956.

A major stumbling block is the fact that Moscow and Tokyo have differing interpretations of the 1956 Declaration. Deputy foreign minister Anatoly Losyukov commented in June 2001 that there was no common understanding of the 1956 agreement. Tokyo sees the signing of a peace treaty and return of the two southern islands as the prelude to the ultimate return of the two northern islands. Moscow sees the signing of a peace treaty and transfer of the two southern islands as the end of the matter.

... at some stage the question could arise of the practical implementation of the Declaration if the sides agree on a mutual understanding of its provisions. The talk about this went in a general form between our leaders. But such a mutual understanding so far is not there. Therefore before starting any consultations on the fate of some or other territories, we must first arrive at a common understanding: are we ready to apply the Declaration of 1956 or are we not, and on what terms this is going to be done ...

... we regard the 1956 Declaration as an operating document, and its provision on two islands can operate on the condition of its uniform

*understanding by the two sides. There can be no separating these questions and reaching agreement on what the fate of the two islands will be, if we in principle do not have a uniform understanding of that provision of the Declaration. If we agree on such an understanding or find variants of such an approach, then it will be possible to continue the talks on the islands. But it is necessary to begin from the beginning, not from the end.*¹⁶

The positions of both sides over the issue appeared to harden in 2002. Losyukov said in April 2002 that there had been a decline in relations between Russia and Japan, and accused Tokyo of calling “for a tight policy with regard to Moscow, with politicians advocating negativist approaches coming to the fore”.¹⁷ The Duma had issued a statement in March 2002, stating that it was unacceptable for Russia to make territorial concessions to Japan. The role being played by the legislature on this issue underlined the Russian leadership’s lack of manoeuvrability over the Kurile Islands. Even if the Putin leadership was inclined towards making concessions to Japan, pressure from the Duma and the Sakhalin regional leadership made it impossible to pursue a concessionary policy.

In September 2002 Losyukov’s line remained pessimistic, when he noted that serious differences persisted in Russian and Japanese approaches to border delimitation. He outlined the essence of the dispute:

*Japan is laying claims on the Southern Kurile Islands of Iturup, Kunashir and the Smaller Kurile Ridge, saying emphatically that 'four islands' are in question. Russia argues that these islands are part of its territory.*¹⁸

The territorial dispute was thus at an impasse, although Losyukov said that Moscow desired to continue negotiating, and advised “that a positive result can be attained only if the two countries make reciprocal moves, broaden contacts and deepen mutual trust”.¹⁹

Although no progress was made on resolving the territorial question, moves were made towards broadening contact and deepening trust when Japanese foreign minister Yoriko Kawaguchi held talks in Moscow in October 2002 with Igor Ivanov to arrange the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi to Russia in January 2003. Kawaguchi and Ivanov reached agreement on six points of the future Russian-Japanese Action Plan. These were the strengthening of dialogue, efforts to sign a peace treaty, interaction in the international arena, cooperation in the economic and legal fields, and the development of cultural and human contacts. The main idea in this plan was to make it a guide for the further development of bilateral cooperation and to develop relations in a way that will raise them to a new level. In December 2002 Losyukov softened his tone somewhat when he argued that Russia would retain jurisdiction over the four Kurile Islands claimed by Japan but did not rule out a mutually-beneficial compromise in the future.²⁰

January 2003 saw the most significant development to date in the political relationship between Russia and Japan. Prime Minister Koizumi visited Russia, and signed the Action Plan with Putin.²¹ It envisaged closer economic cooperation in the Kurile Islands and advocated continuing visits by former Japanese residents to the islands. But the January 2003 summit did not result in any new developments in relation to the peace treaty. The Action Plan simply repeated what had been stated at earlier summits, namely that negotiations would continue on the basis of the 1956 Declaration and various bilateral statements and declarations

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that have been made since then (the Tokyo Declaration of October 1993, the Krasnoyarsk Declaration of November 1997, the Moscow Declaration of November 1998 and the Irkutsk Statement of March 2001). Statements made by the Russian and Japanese leaderships since the signing of the Action Plan make it clear that there has been no shift in either the Russian or the Japanese positions on the territorial issue, which therefore makes agreement on a peace treaty impossible at present.

The deadlock over the Kurile Islands is therefore likely to remain for the foreseeable future. No Russian or Japanese leader is likely to be politically secure enough to consider making any concessions over sovereignty at any time in the near future. Both sides appear to see the sovereignty dispute as a zero sum game in that either Japan gains the islands and Russia loses them, or Russia keeps them and Japan therefore loses them. It is politically impossible for Moscow to contemplate relinquishing its sovereignty over the Kurile Islands. Transfer of sovereignty would violate the Russian constitution, and would weaken Moscow's case for resisting Chechen separatism. It could therefore encourage the emergence of other separatist movements on the periphery of the Russian Federation (eg Kaliningrad or parts of the Russian Far East). The resultant political furore over the perceived break up of the USSR and loss of great power status would make transfer impossible for a Russian leader to contemplate.

<p>Kurile Islands - Possible Scenarios</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russia retains sovereignty; • Two islands are transferred to Japan; • All four islands are transferred to Japan; • Joint sovereignty; • Independence; • Lease back.
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There was speculation prior to Gorbachev's visit to Japan in April 1991 that he might have been prepared to do a deal over the Kurile Islands in return for large amounts of economic aid. However by the time the visit took place, he was under such severe pressure from hardline elements within the Soviet leadership that all talk of a deal was impossible. It was also strongly speculated that Yel'tsin was prepared to do a deal resulting in a transfer of at least some of the islands before the visit he was scheduled to make in September 1992.²² Elements within the Russian military leadership along with nationalist elements in the Russian parliament began to clamour about the importance of the islands to Russia, and Yel'tsin's visit was mysteriously cancelled. It is a paradox that only a strong Russian leader who presides over a strong Russia is likely to feel confident enough to make a special case of the Kuriles and accept Japan's claims in return for a vastly improved economic relationship, including a generous aid package. It is also unlikely that the Russian leadership would feel confident enough to propose a form of shared sovereignty or lease back. In October 2002, one of the vice-chairmen of the Duma, Vladimir Lukin, who is also a former chairman of the Duma international affairs committee, warned that the resolution of the Kuriles problem would have to be deferred and dealt with by future generations.²³ It seems that this is the most likely outcome. It is possible that Russo-Japanese economic cooperation in the Kuriles may in the long term diminish the importance of the

sovereignty issue, and pave the way towards shared sovereignty, but this would require a dramatic change in attitudes in both Moscow and Tokyo.

Political-Security Cooperation

Apart from the territorial issue, the political relationship between Russia and Japan has been fairly cordial since the Gorbachev period. The Action Plan of January 2003 constitutes an attempt by both sides to increase the degree of contact in order to strengthen the bilateral partnership. In other words, the Action Plan seeks to make progress in all the non-territorial aspects of the relationship and so can be said to be an attempt to achieve a partial de-linkage of the territorial problem from the rest. In May 2003 Koizumi implicitly acknowledged this linkage when he commented that the dispute around the South Kurile Islands should not hinder comprehensive cooperation with Russia.²⁴ Whereas the full potential of the bilateral relationship has not been realised because of the territorial problem, both sides seem increasingly of the opinion that the development of the relationship may make it easier in the future to resolve the territorial problem.

At the bilateral level, it was agreed in January 2003 to set up a Russo-Japanese telephone hot line between the two leaderships. Cooperation between the policy planning sections of both foreign ministries has also been stepped up. Russia has agreed to support Japan as a candidate to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Both sides intend to cooperate closely in maintaining international and regional security. This involves such areas as:

- **Combating international terrorism.** In February 2002 the Russian and Japanese foreign ministers signed a joint statement on combating international terrorism. In November 2002 the first Russo-Japanese Consultation on Counter-Terrorism was held.
- **The elimination of Russian nuclear weapons** within the framework of the Technical Secretariat on Cooperation for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, formed in 1993. Japan helped set up the liquid radioactive waste treatment plant named Suzuran (Lily of the Valley) in the Russian Far East. Japan has also helped Russia in the disposal of surplus weapons-grade plutonium.²⁵
- **North Korea's nuclear programme.** Japan and Russia have cooperated closely in 2002 and 2003 in attempting to counter the challenge posed by North Korea's possible nuclear ambitions. Both states participated in the six sided talks (with the USA, China, North Korea and South Korea) in Beijing in August 2003. In October 2003, Russia rejected North Korea's demand that Japan be excluded from these talks.

The bilateral defence relationship has also become closer over the last few years.²⁶ The first visit by a Japanese defence minister to Russia took place in 1996. The Minister of Defence of Japan visited Russia in August 1999, and signed a Memorandum on the Construction of a Basis for Development of Dialogue and Exchange Between the Japanese Defence Agency (JDA) and the Russian Ministry of Defence with his Russian counterpart. In November 2000, the Russian Defence Minister visited Japan, and in January 2001 the Administrative Vice Minister of Defence of Japan visited Russia. In addition, the Chief of Staff of the Air Self Defence Forces visited Russia in January 2001 and the Chief of Staff of the

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Maritime Self Defence Forces visited Russia in February 2001. Further exchanges between Chiefs of Staff have been facilitated, including the visit to Japan of the Commander of Russian Ground Forces and the Navy in April 2001. In May 2002 the Commander of the Russian Air Force visited Japan, and the first visit of the commander of Japanese Ground Forces to Russia took place in June 2002.

Mutual naval visits have been taking place since 1996 and several search and rescue naval exercises have been held since 1997. Consultations have also been held on a regular basis, such as the Joint Working Groups where the two countries discuss overall procedures for conducting defence exchanges, and annual Japan-Russia Joint meetings to review of the status of implementation of the Japan-Russia Agreement on Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas and the Japan-Russia Staff Talks between the Secretariat for the Joint Staff Council of Japan and the General Staff of the Russian Federation Forces. The National Institute for Defence Studies of Japan has been holding joint meetings for the exchange of defence studies with research institutions affiliated with the Russian Defence Ministry, such as the Military Strategy Research Centre of the General Staff. Young officers from the Russian Federation visited Japan in 1999. In response to this visit, a delegation of 30 middle rank officers from Japan visited Russia in January 2001.

Although the bilateral security relationship is basically cooperative, Russia has expressed opposition to Japan's decision to cooperate with the USA's plans to develop a National Missile Defence system. Russia has proposed to Japan joint action in creating a regional missile defence system in North East Asia, but Japan has reacted cautiously to this idea. Japan is also troubled by the growth of Chinese naval power, and may therefore be concerned about Russian arms sales to China.²⁷

Economic Relations

In September 2000, when Vladimir Putin made his first visit to Japan as Russian president, a programme for deepening cooperation in trade and economics was signed. The Action Plan of January 2003 also outlines various steps for developing economic ties. The degree of economic interaction between Russia and Japan is quite low, and potentially could be much higher. Russia's share in Japan's total foreign trade turnover is just over 1 per cent. She is Japan's 18th most important trade partner, behind countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia.²⁸ By contrast, Japan was in the 1970s the second largest trade partner of the USSR after West Germany.²⁹ Soviet/Russian-Japanese trade then declined steadily throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Investment levels are also low. In 2000, Japanese investment in Russia was worth \$372 million, making her only the tenth largest investor in Russia. Japanese cumulative investment was only 1.1 per cent of all foreign investment in Russia. There is little Japanese involvement in the privatisation of Russian enterprises.

Even though Japan is heavily dependent on the import of raw materials from overseas, imports from Russia are small. Rare earth metals are the only commodity in which Russia is a significant supplier to Japan. Russia is simply not an important economic partner for Japan. The main Japanese exports to Russia are industrial products such as machinery, communications equipment and domestic appliances. The main Russian exports to Japan are fish, timber, coal and aluminium products.

The low level of the economic relationship is not simply because of the impasse caused by the territorial dispute, although its resolution would probably give an impetus to trade and investment. Japanese business is also deterred by the uncertain investment environment in Russia, and therefore looks elsewhere for economic partners. The 1998 financial crisis in Russia also had an adverse effect. However since 2001 there have been moves to improve the relationship. In June 2001 a large delegation (about 200 businessmen) from the Japanese Federation of Economic Organisations (Keidanren) made an extensive tour of Russia, and had talks with Putin. In 2001, Japan lifted a range of restrictions on trade with Russia.

The main focus of Japanese economic interest in Russia unsurprisingly lies in the Russian Far East. The bulk of Japanese investment in Russia is in this region. When Koizumi visited Moscow in January 2003, he went from there to Khabarovsk, where he discussed economic cooperation with governor Viktor Ishayev. Japanese interest in developing the energy resources of the Russian Far East was a major topic during Koizumi's visit. Japan is the world's fourth largest energy consumer and was the second largest energy importer in 2002.³⁰ Japan has almost no domestic oil reserves, and imports more than 80 per cent of its oil from the Middle East (oil tankers take about 28 days to reach Japan from there). Japan's natural gas production is minimal, and she imports about 97 per cent of her natural gas, all in liquefied form. Most of this comes from South East Asia. Japan is interested in diversifying the sources of her energy imports, hence her interest in Russian oil and gas. The Japanese consortium Sodeco is a participant in the Sakhalin-1 project, and Mitsui and Mitsubishi are participating in the Sakhalin-2 project. Exxon has contracted with the Japan Sakhalin Pipeline Study Consortium for a pipeline feasibility study. The group will investigate a land pipeline route to China and an underwater pipeline to Hokkaido.

Japan has shown great interest in 2003 in the proposed oil pipeline from Angarsk to Nakhodka, and has expressed a willingness to help finance it. Japan says she is prepared to purchase 1 million barrels of Siberian oil a day if this pipeline is built. In April 2003, the president of Japan's National Oil Corporation, Yoshiro Kamata, said Japan was prepared to consider granting major long-term, low interest credits for the construction of the Angarsk-Nakhodka oil pipeline. According to the Japanese Ambassador to Russia, Issei Nomura, Russian and Japanese specialists have been discussing since August 2003 the development of energy resources in Siberia, financing and construction of the oil pipeline.³¹ Japanese experts assess that the building of this pipeline could reduce her dependence on Middle Eastern oil by 10 per cent.

However, Japan is facing competition from China, which is lobbying for the pipeline to be built from Angarsk to Daqing. This route is about one thousand kilometres shorter and is about half the cost of the Angarsk-Nakhodka route. The Russian government has yet to decide which route and therefore which customer it prefers. Tokyo is probably also concerned that the Angarsk-Daqing route would enhance Chinese economic penetration of the Russian Far East, which may threaten the security of both Russia and Japan.

Conclusions

The Russo-Japanese relationship seems likely to continue in much the same direction as it has done since the late Gorbachev period. In other words, it is likely to remain cordial, without developing into a close political, economic or military partnership. The economic relationship is meagre, compared with Japan's with the USA, China and the EU, and the level of inter-personal contact between the two states is also low. In 2002, just 70,000 Japanese visited Russia, and 40,000 Russians travelled to Japan. This compares with 2.3 million Japanese visiting South Korea in 2002, with 1.47 million South Koreans visiting Japan. 2.38 million Japanese visited China in 2001, with 530,000 Chinese coming the other way.³²

This is because the linkage with the Kurile Islands dispute is likely to remain despite the attempts of the Action Plan to develop relations in other areas. Whilst greater trust and cordiality as envisaged by the Action Plan are likely to develop, it is unlikely that such a rapprochement will succeed in completely delinking the territorial dispute from other aspects of the relationship. As Vladimir Lukin has said, the resolution of the territorial dispute is something that will have to be tackled by future generations. The fact that Putin is the first leader to openly acknowledge and accept Article Nine of the 1956 Declaration since the January 1960 Soviet Memorandum to the Japanese government does constitute a small step forward. However, the status quo is likely to remain for several decades to come. In these circumstances, the Action Plan is probably the most feasible option for improving Russo-Japanese relations.

ENDNOTES

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- ¹ See the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/pmv0301/speech.html>. This website has a large section containing English translations of Russo-Japanese agreements.
 - ² Pravda, 20 October 1956.
 - ³ See Japanese Defence Agency website, which contains an overview of Japanese defence policy priorities for 2002, <http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index.htm>.
 - ⁴ See the Diplomatic Blue Books for an overview of Japanese foreign policy by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/index.html>. See also Bert Edstrom, Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine: From Yoshida to Miyazawa, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999.
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 - ⁶ For an outline of the November 1998 Moscow Declaration see <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/pmv9811/outline.html>.
 - ⁷ Ibid.
 - ⁸ BBC Monitoring, 11 July 2000.
 - ⁹ BBC Monitoring, 11 September 2000.
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 - ¹¹ Dmitry Gornostayev, 'Primakov attends the Russo-Japanese summit in place of Yel'tsin', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14 November 1998.
 - ¹² Pravda, 29 January 1960.
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 - ¹⁴ BBC Monitoring, 4 July 2001.
 - ¹⁵ BBC Monitoring, 21 August 2001.
 - ¹⁶ Interview with Aleksandr Losyukov by Kyodo Tsushin News Agency, 28 June 2001, [http://www.rus.co.nz/press/2001/july/8\(4\).html](http://www.rus.co.nz/press/2001/july/8(4).html).

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- 18 BBC Monitoring, 25 September 2002.
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- 22 See Harry Gelman, Russo-Japanese Relations and the Future of the US-Japanese Alliance Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, 1993, for an account of the Gorbachev visit to Japan in April 1991, and the Yel'tsin non-visit of September 1992.
- 23 BBC Monitoring, 2 October 2002.
- 24 BBC Monitoring, 29 May 2003.
- 25 See website of the Technical Secretariat on Cooperation for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, <http://www.tecsec.org>.
- 26 See Overview of Japan's Defence Policy 2002 <http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index.htm>.
- 27 See interview with Admiral Judji Koda, head of the department of operational planning of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Agency, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4 September 2003.
- 28 Viktor Pavliatenko, 'A Navigational Chart for Russian-Japanese Relations', Far Eastern Affairs, 2, June 2003, pp1-10.
- 29 See Kunio Okada, "The Japanese Economic Presence in the Russian Far East", in Judith Thornton & Charles E Ziegler, eds, Russia's Far East: a region at risk, Seattle and London, The National Bureau of Asian Research in association with University of Washington Press, 2002, pp419-440.
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- 31 See interview with Japanese Ambassador to the Russian Federation, Issei Nomura, in Nezavisimaya Gazeta Dipkur'yer, 29 September 2003.
- 32 Ibid.

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