

# A Future Security Agenda for Europe

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**Report of the Independent Working Group  
established by the Stockholm International  
Peace Research Institute**

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**October 1996**

## **Stockholm International Peace Research Institute**

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# **A Future Security Agenda for Europe**

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A Future Security Agenda for Europe

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# Preface

This report seeks to make a specific contribution to the ongoing debate in Europe on a future security system. It reflects the deliberations of the participants of the Independent Working Group (IWG) on A Future Security Agenda for Europe established by SIPRI. In all, nearly 60 participants from various regions of Europe, Russia and the United States were engaged in the work of the IWG. The participants of the three meetings often expressed differing views on a number of specific issues under consideration; however, our intention was not to negotiate a single agreed document but to make an intellectual contribution to the ongoing debate.

The issue of a new system of security for Europe is both the subject of numerous studies carried out in various research institutions and the focus of attention of the multilateral intergovernmental security structures, such as NATO, the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe. Participants in the talks and negotiations carried out within these organizations concentrate, naturally, only on the aspects which correspond to their respective mandates. Our intention was to point out the new problems and challenges which are of a multidimensional nature and go beyond the framework of the structures existing in Europe. This found its expression in both the background papers and the discussions of the Independent Working Group. The first, 'brainstorming' session took place in Budapest (2 December 1995), in cooperation with the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs and the Central European University. It involved the participation of about 25 researchers and officials, including Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn and Foreign Minister László Kovacs. The meeting was chaired by Professor Daniel Tarschys, Chairman of the SIPRI Governing Board.

The second IWG meeting was held in Moscow (12–13 April 1996), in cooperation with the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), and involved politicians, representatives of research centres, and experts from Russia and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including Nikolai Afanassevskiy, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, as well as scholars and officials from other European countries and the USA. The meeting was co-chaired by Academician Vladlen Martynov, Director of IMEMO, and myself. In connection with this meeting, the Foreign Minister of Russia, Academician Yevgeniy Primakov, met informally with a group of the participants.

The third meeting was held in Geneva (23–24 May 1996), in cooperation with the Programme for Strategic and International Studies (PSIS) of the Graduate Institute of International Studies. It involved the participation of scholars and officials, including the representative of the Swiss OSCE Chairman-in-Office,

Ambassador Benedikt von Tscharnern, and the OSCE Secretary General, Dr Wilhelm Höynck. This meeting was co-chaired by Professor Curt Gasteyger, Director of the PSIS, and myself.

The findings of the IWG will be presented to the Swiss OSCE Chairman-in-Office in October 1996, with a request to make this report available to all the members of the OSCE.

\* \* \*

There are many people to acknowledge in a collective effort such as this. I wish to thank all the scholars and officials who accepted our invitation and took part in the meetings of the IWG. I reiterate my thanks to the co-organizers and co-host institutes in Budapest, Moscow and Geneva.

The entire group of SIPRI researchers participated actively in the work of the Independent Working Group. I am particularly grateful to those who prepared the appendices to this report: Ian Anthony, on European arms transfers; Olga Hardardóttir, on conflict prevention and peacekeeping missions; Shannon Kile, on the nuclear dimension of European security; Zdzislaw Lachowski, on military activities and conventional arms reductions in Europe; and Evamaria Loose-Weintraub, on the military expenditures of the OSCE states. I would like to express my warm gratitude to Shannon Kile, SIPRI Research Assistant, whose assistance at all stages of the work was invaluable. His summaries of the discussions have been made available, at the request of the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, for the preparation of the draft consolidated document and the catalogue of ideas on the security model under negotiation for the Lisbon Summit Meeting. My special thanks go to Connie Wall, Head of the SIPRI Editorial and Publications Department, for her work on this report, and Carol Barta, my secretary, for her assistance in organizing all the IWG meetings.

Last but not least, I wish to thank the Swedish Foreign Ministry and the Swiss OSCE Chairman-in-Office as well as the Ford Foundation, whose generous grants made the IWG meetings and publication of this report possible.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld  
Director of SIPRI

# Findings of the Independent Working Group

- The most serious threats to security in Europe after the cold war no longer arise from conflicts *between* states but from conflicts *within* states. Therefore, a fundamental change of security principles and procedures is needed.
- The new principle of solidarity should be recognized as an integral part of the set of rules governing security relations among the European states. The international community should have the right to ‘cooperative intervention’ in order to protect populations subjected to large-scale violence in domestic conflicts.
- The right to self-determination cannot be reduced to the right to secession. There is a need to define domestic rules for implementation of the principle of the self-determination of nations.
- The foundation of a new security system should be mutual reassurance rather than mutual deterrence, as was the case in the past. This will require sovereign states to cooperate on decisions about national security.
- Security institutions should follow the problems, and not the other way around. No single organization can handle all the security problems; nor is there a hierarchy among the security organizations.
- Pluralistic democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights, including the rights of minorities, are the basic prerequisites for international security.
- There is an urgent need for Western countries to enter into a dialogue about security-related issues with Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic states. The enlargement of NATO and the European Union must be carried out in a transparent, cooperative, non-threatening and non-provocative way.
- European organizations should be prepared to consider new types of relationship with non-member countries, including association, treaty relationships and other means of outreach to open a dialogue with countries from regions which are adjacent to Europe.

# 1. The European security agenda towards the 21st century

Seven years since the Berlin Wall came down, the process of defining a new agenda for European security remains unfinished business. The new security system now taking shape is not being formed as the result of war, in the wake of which victors impose on the vanquished a new order and new rules of conduct. Rather, it is emerging gradually, through negotiation and agreement on common goals, norms, institutions and procedures.

## **Establishment of the Independent Working Group**

With its long engagement in the study of European security issues, SIPRI was encouraged to contribute to the security-building process now under way by senior political figures from a number of countries and by representatives of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In cooperation with several research organizations, SIPRI established in the autumn of 1995 an Independent Working Group (IWG) on A Future Security Agenda for Europe. (For a list of the IWG participants, see appendix 10.)

In forming the IWG, our aim was not to duplicate the work carried out in Vienna under the auspices of the OSCE. Rather, it was to assess the progress that has been made in developing the multilateral security process in Europe and to discuss how the research community could promote this process.

### *The mandate*

The specific aims of the IWG were defined as:

- to assess the principal changes under way in the European security environment;
- to identify new risks and challenges and ways and means to meet them;
- to define the goals of the emerging security system and to elaborate its guiding principles; and
- to suggest some elements of reforms of existing institutions to enable them to cope with and manage the fundamental changes under way in Europe.

The backdrop to the discussion was the fact that the end of the cold war and the collapse of bipolarity had created conditions in which it became realistic to think about building a more stable and cooperative security system for Europe. Indeed, there has already been a wide range of encouraging developments. Our intention is to contribute to the ongoing debate about the future security system in Europe by offering an alternative, fresh perspective on key issues, unconstrained by official

affiliations. This report is not intended solely for the consideration of government officials and policy makers, but we hope that it will provide them with food for thought about ways to consolidate security in Europe.

### **The new security environment**

The European security environment changed dramatically with the end of the cold war. German unification took place, Czechoslovakia split up, and on the ruins of the two totalitarian federations—the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia—20 new states were formed or re-emerged. The Warsaw Treaty Organization was dissolved, and new institutions, such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (PFP), were created.

Fundamental to the new security environment is the fact that, by the end of 1995, 30 states parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) had reduced their heavy weapons by more than 50 000 items in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area. Along with the Russian troop withdrawals from Central Europe and the Baltic states which were completed in 1994, this created an unprecedented core of military stability and predictability in Europe. The OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation and the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security promoted a new type of relationship among European states based on cooperative approaches to security. The record of implementation of the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures is improving, with more states providing more complete information on different types of military activity; efforts to address regional, subregional and sub-state confidence- and security-building are gaining momentum. In addition, preventive measures, crisis management and other forms of peace mission are supplementing traditional arms control approaches in shaping the new cooperative regime.

These developments have been accompanied by the spread of a system of common values across Europe. The post-communist states are increasingly adhering to the principles of democracy and political pluralism, market economics and the rule of law. Their commitment to respect international standards in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms has paved the way for the admission of most of these states to the Council of Europe. Many of them also aspire to membership of both NATO and the European Union (EU).

Furthermore, they have made considerable strides towards settling problems in their mutual relations in the form of international treaties. A significant step in this process was the March 1995 signing in Paris of the Pact on Stability in Europe, which was then transmitted by the EU to the OSCE for follow-up and implementation in close cooperation with the Council of Europe.

Clearly, the post-cold war security system is emerging as the result of a host of ad hoc and sometimes contradictory practical steps. While this system could simply

be allowed to develop haphazardly, our view is that it is desirable to attempt to shape its framework and to determine its direction. However, it will not evolve according to a single ‘master design’; it will emerge gradually through a process of trial and error rather than through the implementation of model-based approaches. Ultimately, the fundamental task is to effectively manage the risks and meet the challenges of the new security environment in Europe.

## 2. Risks and challenges

Since the cold war, there has been a fundamental change in the character of the threats to peace and stability in Europe. Instead of emanating from conflicts *between* states, the most serious security risks emerging in post-cold war Europe stem from conflicts *within* states.

With this change in the ‘substance’ of security, a broader understanding of the concept of security is needed. The new issues demanding attention include ethnic and religious conflicts as well as environmental degradation, organized crime, terrorism and large-scale population movements. European leaders are addressing these issues. For example, cooperation in preventing and combating international terrorism and crime has become a priority at the regional and subregional level. It is possible to identify an almost endless list of potential or actual security risks and challenges that demand attention. But, if too broadly defined, ‘security’ begins to lose its meaning as a concept, and it becomes impossible to set priorities for action. The key task is therefore to determine which risks and challenges are of a root character and which are derivative in nature, which are long-term and basic, and which are transitional.

This report identifies four principal categories of risk:

- *The resurfacing of ethnic and religious conflicts* accompanied by the absence of democratic and self-government institutions capable of accommodating the new problems of ethnic, national, religious and language groups. For example, separatist movements exist in a number of countries across Europe, but they are more problematic in those new states where political pluralism and democratic institutions are non-existent or at a very early stage of development.

- *Political instabilities* associated with the transformation of a totalitarian, one-party system to a pluralistic democracy based on the rule of law—for example, abuses of power by uncontrolled and unconstrained interest groups and a lack of civil and democratic control of, or limitations on, police powers and the armed forces. Of special concern are the formidable problems facing the newly independent states that have emerged out of the collapse of the old Soviet and Yugoslav multinational federations. These problems are connected with consolidating inde-

pendence and ensuring stability and are particularly acute because there has been little prior state-building in these countries.

- *Social tensions* stemming from the transformation of a centrally planned economy to a market economy—for example, mass unemployment, erosion of the social safety net and uneven development of regions can give rise to nostalgia for an authoritarian regime which would ensure, even at the lowest level, social welfare, health care and other forms of social protection by the state.

- *Environmental hazards* posed by poorly designed, unsafe nuclear-power facilities and obsolete chemical-manufacturing facilities.

This report identifies five central challenges for participants in the European security system:

- *How to prevent the fragmentation of security in Europe and the subsequent renationalization of security policies* in conditions where there is no single existential threat to Europe. The danger of such a development occurring is already inchoately visible. In this connection there is a pressing need to promote cooperative initiatives at the subregional level, which would help to forestall a permanent division of the continent. Despite the disappearance of the bipolar partition of Europe, its division has not been fully overcome. Europe today remains divided by large social and economic gulfs which threaten to become permanent features of the political landscape.

- *How to manage the international security system in Europe.* It is a challenge for international institutions to develop effective strategies for crisis management, conflict prevention and conflict resolution as well as the mechanisms for implementing them.

- Given that the most serious security risks arise from intra-state conflicts, *how to develop mechanisms that can give early warning of future conflict* and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) that can address emerging conflicts within states. Ironically, the former Yugoslavia—one of the principal architects of European CSBMs—has become an object lesson in the need for these new measures.

- *How to maintain military–strategic stability in the period of change.* The ‘classic threat’ associated with armed interstate conflict still figures in the European security equation. Mistrust between neighbouring states can give rise to security anxieties and lead to destabilizing arms races that adversely affect the security environment. A high priority must be given to implementing fully the existing arms control and reduction agreements and confidence-building measures as well as to developing follow-on measures.

- The major reduction in the scale of military expenditure across Europe and North America, combined with the downturn in the volume of global arms acquisitions, has created adjustment problems for defence industries. In some countries—

most notably Russia—these problems have reached crisis proportions. Under these conditions, a fifth challenge is *how to find an effective mechanism for developing a coherent political and strategic approach to managing arms proliferation.*

### 3. Goals and principles

The basis of cold war security was *mutual deterrence*, which reflected the overriding need to prevent any crisis from escalating into general war. The foundation of a new system should be *mutual reassurance*, which requires sovereign states to be able to cooperate on decisions about national security. In other words, the need for a system with the negative goal of preventing a deterioration in security relations has given way to a need for a system which makes a positive and constructive contribution to improving security relations.

A system of cooperative security implies general acceptance of and compliance with binding commitments limiting military capabilities and actions. Instead of mistrust and deterrence, a cooperative system rests on:

- confidence based on openness, transparency and predictability;
- mutual reassurance; and
- legitimacy, which depends on the acceptance by members that the military constraints of the regime substantially ensure their security.

The establishment of a shared ‘rule book’ of fundamental norms and principles governing the domestic and international behaviour of states is a prerequisite for creating a cooperative security system. What should the basic rules of that system be?

This report is not an attempt to suggest a revision of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, which would open a Pandora’s box. However, the time is ripe to go beyond general political declarations, such as those set out in the 1994 Budapest Summit Declaration, that a future security model should be based upon the concepts of common, comprehensive and cooperative security. These adjectives are perhaps better understood as criteria which the new security system should meet rather than as its guiding principles.

The concept of *cooperative* security should, if possible, fulfil the following criteria:

- *Comprehensiveness*, defined as acknowledgement of the link between the maintenance of peace and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as economic, cultural, legal and environmental cooperation;
- *Indivisibility*, which demands a common effort in pursuing security interests, as the security of each state or group of states is inseparably linked to that of all others; and



- *A cooperative approach*, as embodied in existing complementary and mutually reinforcing institutions, including European and transatlantic organizations, multi-lateral and bilateral undertakings, and various forms of regional and subregional cooperation.

There is a need to *supplement* the principles of the Helsinki Final Act with:

- a commitment to democracy in connection with security, as defined in the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, and
- the right to what might be called ‘cooperative intervention’, under the authority of the United Nations Security Council and the OSCE as a European regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

In addition, the interrelationship between the existing principles of sovereignty and non-intervention should be reinterpreted or redefined in the light of a new principle—that of *solidarity*, as reflected in the 1994 Code of Conduct. The international community has a right and an obligation to protect populations deprived of basic human rights or subjected to large-scale violence in domestic conflicts.

A second key interrelationship that needs to be redefined in the light of the fundamental changes that have taken place in Europe is that between the principle of state integrity and the right to self-determination. The right to self-determination cannot merely be reduced to the right to secession or the right to independent statehood. *The internal right to self-determination* should be defined as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the right to build, consolidate and strengthen the rule of law and the pluralistic character of democracy as the only accepted system of government of nations. The right to self-determination has to be balanced by the rights to state sovereignty and territorial integrity with safe and secure borders and the right to international peace and security.

## 4. What kind of institutions and for what?

The basic institutional elements of the post-cold war security system emerging in Europe are already in place (the Council of Europe, the European Union/WEU, NATO and the OSCE). However, these institutions were created under the framework of the old security system and do not work well in the new environment. They have often been conspicuously unequal to the urgent challenges of crisis management, conflict prevention and conflict resolution.

The adaptation of existing institutions to the new security environment will be a gradual process. It is becoming clear that no single institution is likely to acquire competence to deal with all aspects of security. The goal should be to promote synergy and harmony between institutions. Some overlapping of functions between institutions must not be seen as always having a debilitating effect.

A new concept that is gradually taking hold is that the international community should pursue an order without a hierarchy, based on the self-regulation and self-organization of states. The concept of order without hierarchy raises the practical problem of how to respond when one or more states disobey the rules. This will be the responsibility of nation-states working in partnership through international institutions. While the specific response would have to be tailored to the nature of the transgression, the general approach would be for the subset of states with interests directly at stake to accept responsibility.

### **Improving the functions of institutions**

#### *Crisis response*

Two measures would increase the efficiency of decision making in a crisis.

*First*, international institutions should be given the mandate to act not only as a secretariat for meetings, but also as a convenor of meetings. The president, the chairman (depending on the specific institution) or the head of the secretariat should take an initiative to invite member states to address a crisis immediately on its occurrence. However, the invitations should be issued on an ad hoc basis and addressed to the group of interested states rather than to all members. Only those governments which have the specific interest and capacity which are needed in managing the crisis should be invited. This capacity need not be military. It might reflect political or economic factors or it might be a function of geography.

It should be stressed that the obligation would be to arrange a meeting and invite participants. The institution would play no role in deciding the subsequent course of action (if any) to be taken.

*Second*, there should be formal mechanisms through which full information about both the decisions taken and the arguments which were used to support the chosen course of action is made available to legal and recognized opposition parties in member states. At present, there is a danger that international institutions can reduce the efficiency of decision making since governments can use the institution as an ‘alibi’ to avoid taking a decision. International institutions should cease to be a club for *governments* and should become instead a forum for *state policy*.

#### *Military-related export controls*

At present, the effort to find a normative balance between the political, strategic and defence industrial aspects of arms transfers is being undertaken in the newly created Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. While the Wassenaar Arrangement includes many European countries, it is not exclusively European. In this sense Wassenaar is a good example of a flexible and target-oriented policy instrument. However, the

first discussions have underlined how little policy coherence there is among suppliers on the approach to arms transfers and arms transfer control. Neither is it likely that a core of European states could make progress towards a harmonized policy since some of the most fundamental disagreements are between the members of the European Union. On this issue there would therefore be no point in duplicating the activities of the Wassenaar Arrangement in the framework of an exclusively European institution.

This does not mean that there are no useful tasks which European institutions can perform in the area of arms transfers. In fact, this issue is already on the agendas of the European Union and the OSCE. However, these activities—useful as they are—relate to technical and procedural questions. Neither the role of arms transfers in international security nor the proscribed destinations and the criteria by which they should be identified are yet adequately elaborated.

## **Transformation of NATO**

A key challenge now is how to enlarge NATO in a cooperative, non-confrontational way that does not foment new antagonisms and divisions. A compromise needs to be reached with Russia that will reassure it that its interests are considered and that it remains an important international actor.

With regard to the enlargement of NATO, Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic states should concentrate on developing a strategic partnership with the alliance. The special relationships may be based on the 1949 Washington Treaty provisions, adapted to the specific circumstances of each.

At the same time, direct military-to-military cooperation should foster a gradual accommodation that could form the basis for a comprehensive political structure over the long term.

In undertaking new military tasks, NATO's June 1996 decision to establish Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) will go some way towards providing a framework for action by European countries, regardless of their membership in security structures.

## **Transformation of the EU**

The European Union has to assume greater responsibility for its and Europe's security. In spite of the often repeated assertion that the balance between military and non-military factors in European security has changed, the EU has not yet formulated a common foreign and security policy (CFSP). This should be decided by the Intergovernmental Conference and will require Britain, France and Germany to reconcile their competing visions of the future role of the EU in the European security system.

The Western European Union (WEU) has taken concrete organizational steps to improve the performance of tasks identified in the 1992 Petersberg Declaration. However, further steps will be conditional on the decisions on a common foreign and security policy.

Enlargement of the EU by admitting the new democratic states would consolidate security in Europe and help the new members address non-military security risks.

### **The Commonwealth of Independent States**

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) plays an important role as a mechanism for furthering economic cooperation among its member states. It could also make a significant contribution in stabilizing the security situation on the territory of the former Soviet Union, assuming that relations within the CIS are based on respect for the principles of sovereign equality and common democratic values. To avoid the emergence of a new bloc-to-bloc confrontation, Western institutions and governments should interact more energetically with the CIS and draw it into constructive pan-European cooperation.

### **The OSCE**

The OSCE can make a significant contribution to the emerging security system. Its capabilities contribute especially to conflict prevention and crisis management. Promising OSCE instruments, such as the High Commissioner for National Minorities and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, should be developed further and establish joint ventures with the Council of Europe.

The OSCE already provides an opportunity for a focused dialogue, transparency and information exchanges between states that can serve to reassure governments.

The OSCE is, however, structurally incapable of serving as the primary security institution of a future European security system. Given that fact, excessive bureaucratization of the organization to no purpose—for example, by creating a host of new institutions—should be avoided and reliance placed on ad hoc bodies and arrangements instead.

### **The Council of Europe**

The concept of democratic security was launched by the Council of Europe at its 1993 Vienna Summit Meeting. It has two parts: the insistence on pluralistic democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights as fundamental pre-conditions for security; and European cooperation based on these values. Enlargement of membership of the Council of Europe in itself contributed to the establishment of a large space of democratic security. All the new member states

have committed themselves to bring their institutions and legal systems into line with the basic principles and internationally recognized standards of democracy. The solidarity principle is inherent in the concept of democratic security.

## 5. Conclusions

This report leads to the following general conclusions:

- *The indivisibility of security* is a goal to which Europe should aspire. While it may be unrealistic to expect that all states will feel equally secure, nevertheless the aim should be the widest possible acceptance of what has proved to be best practice.

- *Three basic rules* should be included in a security agenda:

- each state must still be responsible for its own security, even if it belongs to an alliance;
- security problems should be addressed according to the principle of subsidiarity, that is, where feasible, be dealt with on the subregional or regional level; and
- there must be solidarity between states with regard to security issues.

- *There is a need to build domestic support for the changes and arrangements that are under way.* Domestic support for extending or deepening the existing institutions is likely to dwindle rather than increase, in part because of the geopolitical changes (the structures existing today derive from the former era) and in part because of generational changes which naturally weaken popular commitment to existing institutions.

- *There is an urgent need for the Western countries to enter into a dialogue about security-related issues with Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic states.* Russia needs to be reassured that its views are being heard and taken seriously, and it should listen attentively to international concerns about its behaviour. The security concerns of Ukraine and the Baltic states should also be duly taken into account. NATO enlargement should not be allowed to lead to new divisions or destabilization, nor should it provoke Russia or compromise the independence of Ukraine and the Baltic states.

- *The geopolitical organization of Europe needs more attention.* Enlargement of NATO and the EU would overcome the historical tendency for Central Europe to be either a region in which armed conflicts erupt and tend to radiate outward or the point of collision between adversaries from east and west. However, if the Atlantic community is extended to the east, based on the concept of inclusiveness, this must be accompanied by an offer to Russia and its western neighbours of a new cooperative arrangement. In this context, the proposal that the nuclear weapon

states commit themselves not to deploy nuclear weapons in Eastern and Central Europe deserves serious consideration.

- *Institutions should follow the problems.* More attention should be paid to the content and volume of cooperation between institutions than to their structures.

- *No single organization can handle all the security problems.* The goal, therefore, is to promote synergy and harmony between institutions. Some overlapping of functions between institutions must not be seen as always having a debilitating effect. The general capabilities of institutions should be assessed to determine where their comparative advantages lie.

- *Europe must engage the countries of its adjacent regions* (North Africa, the Middle East and the Central Asian republics), which are fraught with tensions and which pose potential security problems; it must consider what can be done to structure a meaningful dialogue with the countries in these regions.

## **Recommendations**

The search for comprehensive and cooperative security for the 21st century in Europe should:

- *Go beyond existing frameworks* and suggest directions in which multilateral efforts towards security should be aimed.

- *Define a more systematic approach* to preventing and resolving conflicts. This should be based on a review of the underlying goals and principles; on the study, discussion and consideration of the roles of states and organizations; and on the development of better techniques for conflict prevention; and it should provide stronger support by governments for institutions that are performing work in this field.

- *Allow for the enlargement of Western institutions*, including differentiated types of membership in order to meet the objective of non-threatening and cooperative enlargement.

- *Rebalance and reapportion security responsibilities in the OSCE area* so that each player understands and accepts not only its own role but also the role of the other players.

Organizations and institutions should be prepared to consider new types of relationship with non-member states, including association, treaty relationships and other means of outreach to open a dialogue with countries from the regions which are adjacent to Europe.

## Appendix 10\*

### List of the participants of the Independent Working Group

This list includes the names of all the individuals who participated in at least one of the meetings of the Independent Working Group (IWG). Several members of the IWG participated in more than one meeting.

**Dr Nikolai Afanassievsky** (*Russia*)

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**Mr Vladimir Avertchev, MP** (*Russia*)

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Former head of the Security and Policy  
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