


Conflict Studies Research Centre

Dr Mark A Smith

**Russia &
The Middle East**

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This paper outlined briefly Russia's policies and relationships with most of the countries in the region, and concludes that Russia can still play a significant role in the region, despite the USA's leading role.

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Post Soviet Russia's interest in the Middle East region was well outlined in 1994 by Viktor Posuvalyuk, then presidential envoy to the Middle East. He stated:

Russia is a close neighbour of the Near East and Gulf region. Russia has built major power stations, plants and dams - unique dams - in the region and there are many Russians there - there are 800,000 former Russians and former Soviet citizens in Israel. Over 100,000 families in the Arab world are related to families in Russia. Almost 20 million Russian Muslims regularly visit Mecca in their tens of thousands.¹

Posuvalyuk's comments refer to the legacy of USSR-Middle East ties as a basis for the continuation of Russian interests in the Middle East. The Russian foreign policy community's sentiment that Russia should be recognised as a great power provides a further reason why Russia should play an active independent role in the Middle East. In April 1994, Posuvalyuk outlined Russian policy goals as follows:

Russia, as a great power, has two key roles with regard to the Middle East. Firstly, it is a close neighbour, a major power with very broad interests, economic, political, spiritual, religious, and, of course, military. Its second role is as a permanent member of the Security Council and a co-sponsor alongside the USA in the Middle East peace process.²

These principles remain unchanged. In his book *Novaya Rossiskaya Diplomatiya: desyat' let vneshney politiki strany*, the current foreign minister Igor Ivanov wrote in 2001 that "active participation in the affairs of the Middle East is natural for Russia as a consequences of her geographical position. In an epoch of globalisation, the tension which is maintained in the Middle East more than ever touches the interests of security and stability in a broad region which lies directly on the southern borders of our country. Russia is interested that this region becomes a zone of peace and stability."³ Ivanov notes that the long history of Russia's relations with the region means that "a huge potential for cooperation has been accumulated. From the development of pilgrimages to the Holy Land, the construction in the last century of Russian schools and hospitals, to the training of a large army of qualified specialists, the equipping of large industrial enterprises, contributing to the development of the national economies of a range of Arab countries."⁴

Israel-Palestine

Ivanov underlines Russia's key role in seeking to promote an Arab-Israeli settlement, and argues against any one state trying to monopolise mediation efforts.⁵ He argues that the intensification of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since autumn 2000 demonstrates the need for the interaction of the USA, Russia, the EU and leading Arab countries, such as Egypt and Jordan and also the UN in attempting to mediate a settlement. Russia strongly supports the Quartet (ie the USA, Russia, the EU and the UN) that was formed in March 2002 in order to promote an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. Russia desires a major presence in the region and is concerned that the USA may marginalise her role. Moscow has undertaken active diplomacy alongside the USA in order to stake her claim to this presence and to be an active participant in the search for security in the Middle East. The legacy of close ties with many Arab states in the Soviet period, and the large inflow of former Soviet citizens as immigrants to Israel since the late 1980s gives Moscow a useful basis from which to conduct diplomacy and to develop

economic relations with both Israel and the Arab states. Economic relations with Arab states were disrupted in the early 1990s as a consequence of the break up of the USSR, and Moscow has sought to re-establish these ties.

Iraq

Alongside attempts to be an essential part of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the Russian Federation takes an active interest in the Iraqi question. This is again due to the desire to be fully involved in resolving all Middle East/Persian Gulf security issues, along with an interest in expanding Russia's economic relations in the Persian Gulf region. In addition the legacy of a close Soviet-Iraqi relationship gives her a strong reason to be interested in the future of Iraq, not least because of the significant economic ties that used to exist between Moscow and Baghdad. When sanctions were imposed they froze Russian contracts worth 850m dollars (at December 2001 prices).

The Russian leadership is opposed to any US military action against Iraq, and opposes the US objective of regime change. She fears that a military attack on Iraq would de-stabilise not just the Persian Gulf region, but international security as a whole. Instead Russia argues that the issue of returning weapons inspectors to Iraq should be dealt with by diplomatic means, and models for ending the sanctions regime against Iraq should also be worked out. Igor Ivanov claims that Russia has no evidence that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction.

Deputy foreign minister Aleksandr Saltanov set out the Russian position in July 2002:

Our aim is to prevent a worst-case scenario. We are against a military solution of the crisis, first of all, because we have serious economic interests in Iraq. Russian business has been given the opportunity to pursue this serious opening and one of the Russian government's main tasks is to safeguard these interests.

And secondly, and extremely important to us from the point of view of principle, so that such an approach should not be used in world politics, so that the practice should not take root whereby one or another country could change leaders and the existing order from without ... if we let this happen in one country, then no country or government in the world will be insured against a repeat of this scenario.⁶

Russia would also oppose any use of force that does not have the specific authorisation of a UN Security Council resolution. Russian diplomacy has aimed at trying to persuade Iraq to develop a dialogue with the UN and allow the return of weapons inspectors, arguing that the international community must be confident that no activity is underway that runs counter to the demands of the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council.

If the USA does use force against Iraq, Russia is likely to express verbal opposition, and argue that military action should not take place without a specific UN mandate. It is unlikely that it would leave the anti-terrorist coalition. Andrey Fedorov of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy argues that in the event of a US attack on Iraq, Washington would desire that Moscow pursue a course of passive neutrality.⁷ This is indeed the most likely course Russia would take. Although Russian

criticism of US unipolarity has become muted since September 2001, it probably still exists, particularly in the military-security community, and such US actions would be seen by this community as an argument against Putin's rapprochement with the USA. However, just as Yeltsin in 1999 did not allow his relationship with the West to become hostage to his reservations about the NATO action against Yugoslavia, it is highly unlikely that Putin will allow his relationship with the USA to be sacrificed on the altar of opposition to US military action against Saddam Hussein's regime.

If military action resulted in a serious US-European rift, Russia may be faced with a dilemma of having to choose which course to take. She may perhaps see a Trans-Atlantic rift as an opportunity to exploit differences in the hope of enhancing her ties with Europe, or even perhaps offer to mediate in some form, augmenting her importance in the eyes of both Washington and Europe. Moscow would also be anxious to ensure that the outcome of any attack on Iraq would not further undermine her position in the Middle East. A quick US success against Iraq may give Moscow (and indeed the EU and possibly other powers) the opportunity to become involved in helping to administer a post-Saddam system. The legacy of the USSR's close economic ties with Iraq makes Russia a logical participant in such a process. In July 2002, the Iraqi Ambassador to Moscow, Abbas Khalaf, stated: "all our economic infrastructure, energy industry, defence industry, agriculture and 98 per cent of our military equipment are of Russian origin. If the sanctions are lifted, Iraq would have no choice except close cooperation with Russia."⁸ While Khalaf has in mind cooperation with Saddam's regime, the same logic of cooperation would apply to a post-Saddam leadership.

The exclusion of Russia from this process by the USA would raise doubts within Russia about the value of the new US-Russian partnership, and undermine the legitimacy of Putin's new *détente*. The possibility of a protracted conflict would lead to renewed calls for a diplomatic settlement, and may give Russia the opportunity to play some mediation role and thereby enhance her influence in the region. Any US action against Iraq would probably also strengthen the Russo-Iranian relationship, as Iran would see her arms supplies from Russia as important for her security.

Whatever the future of Iraq, Russia has strong interest in maintaining a presence there due to her economic ties. Iraq owes Russia around \$7 billion in debt, and the sooner the sanctions regime ends, the better position Iraq will be in to pay off her debts. Russia has sought to develop an economic relationship with Iraq in order to take advantage of a post-sanctions environment. This is why Moscow has consistently urged Iraq to permit weapons inspectors to enter Iraq and has also argued for the lifting of sanctions.

In September 2001, Iraqi Trade Minister Muhammad Mahdi Salih said that at the beginning of 2001 the total volume of cooperation between Iraq and Russia amounted to \$24,403,000. This is the largest volume of trade links between Iraq and any other foreign country.⁹ Salih said Russia is in first place in terms of its implementation of the "Oil for Food" programme among the 58 countries participating in the programme. France is in second place and Egypt third. Russian companies sold 70m barrels of Iraqi crude on international markets in the framework of the 11th phase of the UN Oil-for-Food programme. Russian companies will have sold around 1bn barrels of Iraqi crude for approximately 15bn dollars during all 11 phases stipulated in the 1996 Iraq-UN memorandum. This accounts for roughly 40 per cent of Iraq's total oil exports.

In March 2002 the Iraqi oil minister Amir Muhammad Rashid al-Ubaydi visited Russia for a session of the Russian-Iraqi commission for trade, economic and scientific cooperation.¹⁰ During his visit Russia and Iraq agreed on a 10-year economic cooperation programme. Sixty-seven investment projects are encompassed in the programme. Seventeen projects will be accomplished in the oil and gas industry, fourteen in transport, six in health care, petrochemical and other industries. There are plans to cooperate in the development of tractor-building, steel and metalworking industries, and Russian companies are servicing Iraqi railroads. Given Russia's economic interest in Iraq, Russia will seek to be involved in attempts to build a post-Saddam state in Iraq if the USA manages to achieve a regime change in that country.

Syria

Soviet-Syrian ties were very close during the Cold War. Moscow armed Damascus and generally supported her hardline approach towards Israel. Russia has endeavoured to continue to cultivate a friendly relationship with Syria, although she now supports an Israeli-Syrian rapprochement and has encouraged both powers to negotiate. In May 2001, Industry, Science and Technologies Minister Aleksandr Dondukov and Syrian Economics and Foreign Trade Minister Muhammad al-Imadi signed the final document of the second meeting of the bilateral intergovernmental commission on cooperation in industry, economy, science and technology. The document envisages cooperation in sectors such as the construction and operation of irrigation systems, nuclear energy, engineering, transport and communications.

In April 2001, when Syrian foreign minister Faruq al Shar'a visited Moscow, Putin said that contacts between Russia and Syria must be raised to the old level and bilateral relations must be developed further. He said that: "Russia and Syria are linked by bonds of long-standing friendship. Previously, the level of these bonds was very high. I and the Syrian president think it would be correct not only to restore the old contacts, but also to broaden them even further." Putin said that he and Faruq al-Shar'a would discuss preparations for a Russian-Syrian summit. Putin and Syrian President Bashar al-Asad have extended invitations to visit each other's countries, but no dates have yet been fixed.

In August 2001 it was reported that Izhneftemash and Zarubezhneft had signed joint-venture agreements with Syrian partners. Izhneftemash will supply the equipment and provide services worth 5m dollars per year to the Syrian oil industry. Zarubezhneft's project aims at increasing the oil production at Sazaba, Tishrin and Gbeyba oil fields.

However, Russo-Syrian ties are much less close than they were during the Soviet period, and are currently unlikely to develop further. Russia has neither the desire nor the means to arm Syria as heavily as she did during the Soviet period. Moscow appears keen to try to use the legacy of a long-standing friendly relationship with Syria to encourage a breakthrough in Israeli-Syrian relations. This is the most significant aspect of contemporary Russo-Syrian relations, but it has yet to bear fruit. Indeed there have been strains in the relationship because of Syria's \$11 billion debt to the Russian Federation. The late President Hafez Assad postponed his visit to the Russian Federation in 1999 due to these strains. The regime of Assad senior was closely tied to the Soviet Union, but this is less true of the post-Hafez political elite (Hafez's son Bashar succeeded him as president in July 2000),

who may therefore be less inclined to look to Moscow. The Soviet navy enjoyed the use of Syrian port facilities of Tartus and Latakia, and reconnaissance ships from the Black Sea Fleet still make use of Tartus.¹¹

Egypt

Russo-Egyptian relations are friendly, as Russia sees Egypt as an important partner in the search for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. Russia thus supported the Egyptian-Jordan initiative that sought a breakthrough in the peace process.

When President Hosni Mubarak visited Moscow in April 2001, Russian prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov stated that Russia regarded Egypt as its leading partner in the Arab world. Mubarak and Putin signed a declaration on principles of friendly relations and cooperation, and ministers signed a long-term economic, scientific and technical cooperation programme.¹² Trade turnover in 2001 stood at around 500 million dollars. This is much less than trade levels during the Soviet era, and is less than 25 per cent of German-Egyptian trade. There is therefore strong interest in increasing the levels of Russo-Egyptian trade. Russia will help exploit Egyptian gas resources, and Egyptian capital will be invested in a project to build Tupolev 204 airliners in Ulyanovsk. A joint satellite project is also to be undertaken. The current level of military-technical cooperation is also low, estimated at 50 million dollars a year. This may increase if Egypt decides to modernise some of its old Soviet military equipment.

Although Russo-Egyptian relations are drastically different from the Nasser period, when the USSR made a substantial economic and military commitment to Egypt in order to stake a claim to be playing a role in the Arab-Israeli conflict as part of her ideological-strategic competition with the USA, Russia still desires to develop a close relationship with Egypt as a leading Arab and regional power and promote the idea of an Arab-Israeli peace process with Egypt as a key partner in this process. This idea was expressed in a message from Putin to Mubarak in May 2002.

Jordan

As with other Arab states, Moscow has sought to develop a cooperative political and economic relationship with Jordan. King Abdullah II has visited Russia twice since becoming King in 1999, in August 2001 and July 2002. As noted above, Russia supports the Egyptian-Jordanian initiative regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both countries oppose any possible US strike against Iraq. Trade turnover has steadily increased since the mid-1990s, standing at 21.5m dollars in 1996 to 35.4m dollars in 2000. In the first half of 2001, trade turnover with Jordan amounted to 10.3m dollars. Russia does sell some weapons to Jordan, but the amounts are small.

The Gulf States

Russia desires to develop a good political and economic relationship with these states. In April 2001 Igor Ivanov spoke of the desirability of creating a regional stability system in the Persian Gulf.¹³ In his book, *Novaya Rossiskaya Diplomatiya: desyat' let vnesney politiki strany*, Ivanov proposes creating a zone of peace,

security and cooperation in the Persian Gulf; this would consist a whole range of political, economic, military and humanitarian measures, underpinned by a system of treaties and international guarantees. He also suggests the creation of a regional security organisation that could include, in addition to Persian Gulf states, the permanent members of the UN Security Council, and other interested parties.¹⁴

In August 2001, energy minister Igor Yusufov was appointed head of the intergovernmental commissions for trade with various Gulf states. Gulf states may participate in the North-South transport corridor that will operate from Northern Russia to Iran and India, which would bring them into closer economic association with Russia.

In 2002 Russian diplomacy has sought to persuade Gulf States against the idea of using force to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. This was one of the main themes of deputy foreign minister Aleksandr Saltanov's visit to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states in February 2002.¹⁵

Saudi Arabia

Russia's relationship with Saudi Arabia must, like the West's, be full of ambiguities. At the official inter-state level, the relationship is a good one.¹⁶ Moscow is keen on cultivating Riyadh as an economic and political partner. Underneath there must be concern about the Saudi leadership's adherence to Wahhabism, and its tolerance of extremist Islamic groups that operate outside of Saudi borders. An article in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* in early April 2002 claimed that Saudi organisations were supporting extremist Islamic organisations in the North Caucasus.¹⁷ This claim brought forth an angry response from the Saudi Embassy in Moscow.¹⁸ Islamic extremists operating in Tatarstan have also had links with Saudi Arabia. Around 3,000 Russian Moslems visit Saudi Arabia annually on pilgrimage to the holy places. In August 2002 the Saudi Ministry of Pilgrimage Affairs and a delegation of the Russian hajj mission led by State Duma deputy Akhmed Bilalov signed a protocol on the admission of Russian pilgrims to the Moslem Holy Places in Saudi Arabia. It is estimated that as many as 7,000 Moslems from Russia may visit sacred places of Islam in Mecca and Medina in 2003.

The USSR recognised the newly formed Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1926, but relations were broken off in the 1930s. Diplomatic relations were re-established in 1991, and Russian prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin visited Saudi Arabia in 1994, and signed a Russo-Saudi framework cooperation agreement. Russia's relations with Saudi Arabia have assumed greater importance in 2002 due to Russia's increasing prominence as an oil exporter, which has led to a strained relationship with OPEC, of which Saudi Arabia is a key member.

However both Russia and Saudi Arabia are keen to cultivate each other as partners. They both oppose the use of force against Iraq without a UN mandate, and Russia has expressed its support for the Saudi plan proposed in February 2002 for a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.

The most significant development in Russo-Saudi relations in 2002 was the visit of Saudi foreign minister Saud Al Faisal to Moscow in mid April. Improving the trade relationship was high on the agenda, as the current levels of Russo-Saudi trade are almost negligible. Annual trade turnover stands at around \$120 million, but Saudi exports to Russia are virtually non-existent. Al Faisal expressed willingness to set

up a commission to promote bilateral relations. Putin also invited the Saudi King to visit Russia.

Kuwait

Russia has cultivated a friendly relationship with Kuwait and has affirmed its support for Kuwaiti territorial integrity. As Moscow has good relations with both Iraq and Kuwait, she has tried to improve the Iraqi-Kuwaiti relationship.

In August 2002, Russo-Kuwait relations took a major step forward with the first meeting of the Russian-Kuwaiti intergovernmental commission on trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation which was formed in 1994.¹⁹ On the Russian side, the commission is headed by Russian Energy Minister Igor Yusufov. Kuwait's Information Minister Ahmad Fahd al-Sabah attended the meeting and suggested setting up a working group that would ensure "regular cooperation between Russia and Kuwait". Annual trade turnover currently stands at around \$35 million. At the meeting it was announced that Russian firms would participate in developing four oil deposits in Kuwait. The total cost of the project is estimated at 8bn dollars. Sibneft will participate in the project; representatives from Transneft, LUKoil, Rosneft and Sibneft oil companies attended the commission meeting.

At the meeting Yusufov spoke out in favour of involving Russian organizations, together with Kuwaiti firms, in operations in the sphere of the power industry as well as the oil and gas industry, civil engineering, irrigation, agriculture and infrastructure. Yusufov suggested that Russia could export to Kuwait power equipment, rolled stock, fabricated metal products, sawn timber, machine-tools and equipment for the oil and gas as well as petrochemical industries. The Kuwaiti side expressed interest in purchasing air-defence missile systems. Russia is offering the Tor-M1 missile system and the Pantsir missile-cum-gun system to Kuwait, since the Kuwaiti air defence troops have no advanced short-range air defence systems. Kuwaiti military specialists are also studying the possibility of purchasing Russian tanks. They have also displayed interest in buying defensive types of weaponry: anti-tank missile systems, salvo fire systems, BMP-3 armoured personnel carriers as well as artillery systems and ammunition.

Qatar

Russian-Qatari relations took a major step forward in December 2001. The Emir of Qatar Shaykh Hamad Bin-Khalifah Al Thani became the first Qatari leader ever to visit Russia in December 2001. An agreement between the Russian and Qatari chambers of commerce was signed, and there is a desire on both sides to expand the economic relationship. According to Duma chairman Gennady Seleznev, who visited Qatar in January 2002, Qatar would like to see a broader Russian presence in the Persian Gulf region, and proposed setting up "a gas OPEC" to control liquid gas prices in international markets.²⁰

Yemen

Yemenese Foreign Minister Abu-Bakr Abdallah al-Quirbi visited Moscow in April 2001. At that time, deputy prime minister Ilya Klebanov noted that Russia and Yemen have "several unfinished projects" including the energy facility at Hisva. Russia is also ready to build a new waste water treatment plant in Sanaa, the capital of Yemen. Trade turnover in 2000 stood at 5m dollars. In February 2002 it was announced that Rosneftegazstroy (RNGS) and Avirex Concession (United Arab Emirates) have signed a contract to explore oil and gas fields in Yemen. The contract involves geological exploration work in the Al-Mahrah province in east Yemen over a three-year period.

In September 2001 it was announced that MiG had signed a major contract for the supply of fighters to Yemen. The deal is estimated to be worth 300m dollars. The first deliveries took place in July 2002.

Conclusions

Russia clearly desires a presence in the Middle East, and feels that she has a right to be there. This stems from great power aspirations, despite her current inability to translate these aspirations into reality. During the Cold War period, the USSR was able to enjoy a significant presence in the Middle East due to her ability to deliver large supplies of arms to anti-western Arab states. From the 1950s through to the 1980s, the USSR sent over 80,000 military advisers to Middle Eastern states, and trained more than 55,000 officers from these states in its military academies. The USSR also supported economic projects in many of these states. The collapse of the Soviet Union has created a gap that Russia is unable to fill. The arms supplies of the Soviet period were often not made on a commercial basis, but due to the political desire to support anti-western states in order to maintain a presence in the region. Now commercial considerations predominate, but the poor state of the Russian arms industry means that it is unable to compete effectively with other arms exporters. Russia is therefore unlikely to be able to translate arms sales into lasting political influence, with the possible exception of Iran and Iraq (assuming the USA does not replace Saddam Hussein with a pro-Western leadership). There are now only a few hundred Arab officers being trained in Russian military academies, and an equally small number of Russian military specialists in the Middle East. Russia has sold arms to many Middle Eastern states since the break up of the Soviet Union, but on only a small scale. These may use Russia as a small-scale supplier in order to improve their negotiating position vis-à-vis western and other suppliers. The legacy of close ties with some states such as Syria and Yemen in the Soviet period is unlikely to be the basis for a close relationship.

Soviet relations with conservative Arab states on the Arabian peninsula and Persian Gulf were blighted by these states' fear of communism. This fear is obviously no longer an impediment and Russia is therefore able to seek close political and economic relations with Saudi Arabia and the states of the GCC. However, although political relations are good, Moscow has not been able to become a significant economic partner of these states. Moscow currently has a modus vivendi with them over oil exports, but she could risk straining relations with some over this issue in the future. Gennady Seleznev is probably right when he says Qatar would like to see a broader Russian presence in the Persian Gulf. This sentiment is likely to be shared by other states, who would like to see Russia playing a more active role in the Middle East as a whole in order partially to offset

the USA's leading role. Russia is currently unable to be a key actor in the Middle East. However, she is not completely absent from the region, which means that although her role is much diminished, it is not negligible, and could become more significant in the future. The Russian opposition to Islamic extremism is shared by most regimes in the area, which gives Moscow a potential basis for closer security cooperation. The events of "9-11" have also provided Moscow with an opportunity to argue more convincingly to Arab states that its military operation in Chechnya is part of the war on terrorism, and not repression of an Islamic people. It may well have been for this reason that pro-Moscow Chechen leader Akhmad Kadyrov visited several Arab states just after the September 2001 events.

Russia is a member of the Quartet dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and a co-sponsor of the Madrid peace process. The legacy of the Soviet period does give her some basis for ties with important Arab states, and the large ex-Soviet population in Israel also gives her a basis for a close relationship with Israel. These factors, along with her position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, mean that she is likely to have some role to play in any Israeli-Palestinian agreement, or in the formation of a post-Saddam system in Iraq, even if these processes are dominated by the USA. Therefore although the Russian Federation is likely to have to follow in the wake of the US agenda in the Middle East, this is probably the best way for her to achieve any sort of significant presence. Although the US approach towards dealing with security challenges has become strongly unilateralist since September 2001, Washington may find it impossible to go it alone completely, and may see the involvement of other major powers, such as the Russian Federation and EU as necessary in order to legitimise any settlement agreements, whether they concern the Palestinian problem or the Persian Gulf.

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APPENDIX 1

Russian arms sales to the Middle East.

The following chart summarizes Russia's arms sales to the region since 1993:

Russian arms deliveries to the Middle East in the 1990s Iran:

1992 - One Kilo-class attack submarine, 10 Su-24, 8 MiG-29
1993 - 80 armoured combat vehicles, one Kilo-class attack submarine
1994 - Over 200 T-72 delivered up to 1994, 94 air to air missiles
1996 - Two T-72 MBT, two BMP-1 armoured combat vehicles
1997 - One Kilo class attack submarine, aircraft engine licence
(2 An-74T Ukraine)
1998 - 100 T-72 kits, 200 BMP MP-2 Kits (3)

UAE:

1992 - 80 BMP-3 armoured combat vehicles
1993 - 95 BMP-3
1994 - 118 BMP-3
1995 - 122 BMP-3
1996 - 25 BMP-3
1997 - 69 BMP-3
1998 - Four Il-76 aircraft, 82 BMP-3
2000 - 50 96K9 Pantzyr-S11 AAV (G/M)
2000 - SA-19 Grison/57E6YE SAM

Kuwait:

1994 - 30 SA-18 SAM
1994 - 608 AT-10 Bastion Anti tank missile
1994 - 27 BM-23 300mm Smerch MRL
1995 - Nine 9A52 multiple rocket launchers, 100 BMP-3
1996 - 18 9A52 multiple rocket launchers

Egypt:

1996 - SA2/3/6 upgrade
1997 - 20 Mi-17
1999-2000 - SA-3 upgrade

Syria:

1997 - 200 T-55MV from Ukraine
1998 - 1,000 AT-14 anti-tank guided missiles
1999 - 14 MIG 29S/Fulcrum-C
1999 - 8 SU-27SK/Flanker-B

Yemen:

1995 - Four Su-22 from Ukraine
1999-2000 - 31 T-72

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Jordan:

1995 - 126 BMP-3
1999-2000 - 50 BTR94 from Ukraine

Oman:

1992 - Six MBT

Source: Oksana Antonenko, 'Russia's Military Involvement in the Middle East', Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol 5, No 1, March 2001.
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APPENDIX 2

Russian Trade Relations with the Middle East

US\$m	1997		1998		1999	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Middle East	1,811	347	2,013	225	2,141	225
Egypt	439	34	399	16	482	69
Iran	461	72	489	28	416	70
Israel	427	184	487	141	554	71
Jordan	16	4	18	1	34	-
Kuwait	5	-	-	-	2	-
Lebanon	34	3	33	3	77	4
Saudi Arabia	189	1	85	1	88	1
Syria	58	12	160	10	147	6
UAE	170	37	292	24	257	4

US\$m	2000		2001	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Middle East	2,835	208	2,532	201
Egypt	449	5	426	12
Iran	630	54	984	34
Israel	1,045	109	372	128
Jordan	35	1	20	-
Kuwait	6	-	9	-
Lebanon	198	3	228	5
Saudi Arabia	55	2	66	1
Syria	95	11	89	17
UAE	178	23	222	3

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics.

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