


Conflict Studies Research Centre

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Russia & The West

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Russia's alignment with the USA, NATO and the EU has been more marked since Putin became President. However, there are separate reasons for each of these convergences, and an influential current of opinion in Moscow against the relationships becoming too close.

Putin has clearly established himself as a westerniser in the development of Russia's foreign policy orientation. The way seems clear for a rapprochement with major western powers and institutions that transcends even the rapprochement of Soviet/Russo-Western relations of the Gorbachev and early Yel'tsin eras.

This rapprochement did not seem to be inevitable as the Yel'tsin era drew to a close. In 1999 Russo-Western relations were the coolest they had been since 1991, due to Russian disapproval of the NATO intervention in Kosovo. This raised the possibility that a post-Yeltsin leadership might embark on a course inimical to Western interests. When Yel'tsin visited China in December 1999, he said: "Clinton appears to have forgotten that our country has a full arsenal of nuclear weapons and we will not allow America to dictate to the whole world how to live, labour, work and rest".¹ It looked as though Russia would at best simply have a marriage of convenience with the West, rather than one of love.²

In November 1999, Sergey Rogov, director of the Institute of the USA and Canada was accusing the West of launching a new cold war against the Russian Federation and excluding her from Europe.³ Relations soured towards the end of 1999 not only because of Russia's smarting over the NATO operation in Kosovo, but also because of growing western criticism of the Russian military operation in Chechnya. In addition the incoming Bush Administration in the USA gave the impression that it would downgrade Russia as a foreign policy priority.⁴

A change in this state of affairs was not immediately apparent in the opening months of Putin's presidency. In 2000, although Putin spoke even of the possibility of Russia one day becoming a member of NATO and moves towards thawing the Russia-NATO relationship began not long after he became acting president, he also visited North Korea (July 2000) and Cuba (December 2000), states that were considered pariahs by Washington.⁵ During his visit to China in July 2000, Putin made oblique criticisms of US and NATO policy, and both he and the Chinese leadership openly criticised US views on the ABM treaty.⁶ Russia was thus still flirting with multipolarity. At the same time, Putin was of the opinion that Russia needed an extremely close economic relationship with the West. By the latter half of 2000, the Russian leadership saw the EU as its main foreign policy partner and gave renewed emphasis to its perception of Russia as an integral part of Europe.⁷ Along with the renewed emphasis on the EU, there was a desire to see a Europe that was less Atlanticist. The Kosovo operation and the Bush Administration's desire to downgrade Russia as a priority doubtless strengthened this conviction and

helped push Russia towards seeking a more specific European foreign policy orientation.

However, as the relationship with the Bush Administration developed after January 2001, it was clear that Washington had moved away somewhat from its original desire to deprioritise the US-Russian relationship. The Bush-Putin summit in Ljubljana in June 2001 and subsequent meeting at the G8 summit in Genoa in July 2001 made clear that Russia would be somewhat higher up the scale of US foreign policy priorities than had earlier been intended. Issues such as Chechnya, NATO widening and the future of the ABM treaty became less of an irritant in the US-Russian relationship in 2001. Even prior to “9-11” the Russian leadership was making fewer mentions of the term “multipolarity” when discussing the nature of the international system.⁸ It seemed that economic factors were pushing Russia closer to cooperation with the West. One might have argued that Putin’s KGB background, and his ruthless approach to the Chechen conflict could have impelled him to pull Russia’s horns in, and turn away from the West, as Soviet foreign policy did in the early 1980s. However the opposite happened. Putin was able to combine an opening to the West along with a tightening of his leadership’s control over the domestic political system.

A major opening to the West had occurred in the 1970s, under the Brezhnev leadership, but the opening was limited (and ultimately stifled) by the continued ideological struggle with the Western world. Gorbachev’s opening to the West had resulted in significant changes in international relations that went far beyond Brezhnev’s détente, but did not completely remove dividing lines between the West and the USSR/Russian Federation. Dividing lines remained during the Yel’stin era. The Putin era, particularly from the second half of 2000, has seen a new opening-up take place, that seems likely to further diminish what remains of the old East-West dividing lines. Putin’s statement of March 2000 that Russia could one day become a member of NATO may have seen far-fetched and even comical at the time, but in hindsight it could perhaps be seen as an indication of Putin’s ambition to transform completely the nature of Russia’s relations with the West.

The change in the Russian leadership’s relationship with the West was not therefore as a result of “9-11”. It began roughly twelve months earlier, but received a significant boost following the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in September 2001. Putin’s decision to support the USA and give full support to the war on terrorism has intensified the degree of rapprochement, which may in many respects transform the nature of the West by Russia becoming an integral part of it. Putin commented in October 2001 that there were likely to be significant changes in the Russia-EU and Russia-NATO relationship. Such changes are indeed taking place, and alongside these changes, the bilateral US-Russian relationship has also changed significantly.

The initial focus of Putin’s rapprochement with the West was Europe, and this remains the primary focus. The aim is for Russia to become an integral part of Europe – not to be closely linked to it, but to be **in** Europe, just as much as Germany or France is in Europe. At the May 2000 Russia-EU summit, Putin stated:

You know that for Russia relations with Europe, with a united Europe, have always been, are and I am hoping that in the long historic term will continue to be a priority. The fundamental principles which unite Europe are also the basis of policy of the Russian Federation. Russia has

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always been, is and will continue to be a European country in terms of its location, culture and the level of economic integration.⁹

A fortnight after “9-11”, Putin envisaged the future of the Russia-EU relationship as follows:

Nobody doubts the great value of Europe's relations with the United States. However, I simply think that, certainly and in the long-term, Europe will better consolidate its reputation as a powerful and really independent centre of international politics, if it combines its own possibilities with Russia's human, territorial, and natural resources, with Russia's economic, cultural, and defence potential.¹⁰

This may mean eventually becoming a member of the European Union or having an ever-closer relationship, where Russia becomes a virtual member. The EU is already Russia's largest trading partner and source of foreign investment. At the May 2002 summit, President of the European Commission Romano Prodi said that the EU would recognise Russia as a country having a market economy.¹¹ Official EU recognition is likely to come later in 2002.

Russia is likely to become a more important source of energy to the EU in the coming years, and the aim of the Russia-EU energy dialogue is to enhance the energy security of the European continent.¹² The May 2002 Russia-EU summit statement on the energy dialogue stated that:

Work is progressing on the agreed areas of the energy dialogue, including preparations for establishing the EU-Russian Energy Technology Centre in either Moscow or St Petersburg, continual examination of long-term EU and Russian energy policies and relevant energy standards, evaluation of pilot energy saving projects in the Archangelsk and Astrakhan Oblasts, which could then serve as a basis for other regional projects, in particular in the Kaliningrad Oblast, and the facilitating of investment projects in the Russian energy sector would help to progress the achievement of the strategic goal of an energy partnership - enhancing the energy security of the European continent.

We recognise that the EU energy market is now becoming the world's largest and most integrated, and that Russia deserves to gain access to it. We note the importance of enhancing trade in primary energy between the EU and Russia, and therefore will jointly examine those areas, which should strengthen our energy relations.¹³

The development of Russo-EU relations in the security sphere may become one of the most important areas of Russia-EU cooperation over the next few years. Russia supports the development of an EU military capability, as she hopes it will become an alternative to NATO and Atlanticism. The possibility of Russia and EU military structures participating in crisis management operations was mentioned at the Russia-EU summit in Paris in October 2000. The May 2002 Russia-EU summit indicated that the Russia-EU security relationship has become more substantive since 2000. The Joint Statement issued at the summit stated that:

We agreed to deepen significantly our political dialogue and cooperation on crisis management and security matters. The Russian Federation has

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proposed a "Russia-EU Action Plan in the field of European Security and Defence Policy."

The EU has informed the Russian Federation on the decision taken recently by its Foreign Ministers to submit to the upcoming Seville European Council its "Arrangements for Consultation and Cooperation between the European Union and Russia on Crisis Management", with a view to cooperating in crisis management operations led by the European Union.

We will conduct a comparative analysis of our respective crisis response concepts in order to develop common approaches to new political and strategic realities.

We have also taken an important step to promote practical information exchange on military crisis management matters through the assignment of a Russian contact person with the EU Military Staff.

Furthermore, a visit of the Chairman of the EU Military Committee to Moscow to meet the Russian military authorities has taken place on 29 May 2002.

The statement went on to say that:

We have identified the following issues which will be held under regular review in the framework of our frequent political dialogue on foreign policy and security issues at different levels:

- conflict prevention,
- mine clearance,
- possible use by the EU of Russian long-haul air transportation,
- the modalities for possible Russian participation in the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The EU and Russia will inform each other of the results of their key international contacts and negotiations on matters related to security and crisis management.

The EU and Russia will discuss specific aspects of their cooperation in conducting emergency search-and-rescue operations in response to natural disasters and catastrophes, as well as in delivering humanitarian aid to various regions of the world in situations related to crisis management.¹⁴

The content of Moscow's intended "Russia-EU Action Plan in the field of European Security and Defence Policy", and of the EU's planned "Arrangements for Consultation and Cooperation between the European Union and Russia on Crisis Management" are likely to give a strong indication of how the Russia-EU security relationship may evolve when these documents see the light of day.

Dmitry Danilov, the head of the department of European security of the Institute of Europe of the Academy of Sciences has suggested that Russia and EU forces could jointly participate in crisis management operations in the former Soviet Union. He argues that this would be beneficial for both actors as it would enhance the EU as a regional and international actor, and Russia's leadership role in the CIS.¹⁵ It remains to be seen whether such a development occurs, as the Russian Foreign Ministry is currently unlikely to accept such proposals, but it is clear that the Russia-EU security relationship is likely to intensify.

NATO

The Russia-NATO relationship has evolved significantly since September 2001, and appears to be moving towards a more intimate form of cooperation than that envisaged in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. The Declaration "NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality" made by the heads of state and government of NATO member states and the Russian Federation in Rome in May 2002 establishes the NATO-Russia Council.¹⁶ This Council is intended to "identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at twenty ... the Council will provide a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action for the member-states of NATO and Russia on a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region ... it will operate on the principle of consensus." In the 1997 agreement, NATO members tended to discuss issues and then present their position to Russia. Under the 2002 agreement, NATO and Russia will discuss issues together and reach a common position. The degree of interaction between NATO and Russia will be much greater than hitherto, with a Preparatory Committee being established to prepare meetings for the Council. This Preparatory Committee will be established at the level of the NATO Political Committee with Russian representation at the appropriate level. This gives Russia a much closer involvement in NATO structures than existed under the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council created by the 1997 agreement.

The NATO-Russia Council will intensify NATO-Russia cooperation in the following areas: struggle against terrorism; crisis management; non-proliferation; arms control and confidence building measures; theatre missile defence; search and rescue at sea; military-to-military cooperation and defence reform; civil emergencies. In the crisis management area, it is planned to promote cooperation in peacekeeping operations, and further develop a generic concept for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations. Under the heading of military to military cooperation it is intended to enhance military cooperation and interoperability through enhanced joint training and explore the possibility of establishing an integrated NATO-Russia military training centre.

The closeness of this cooperation may well transform the nature of the NATO alliance. Since 1991, the Russian Federation has often argued that as the Cold War was over and the Warsaw Pact had ceased to exist, then NATO too, should be abolished. This argument was then developed, and Moscow later contended that NATO should be transformed from a military alliance into a more political-military organisation. This has hitherto been resisted by NATO members, but the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council may result in the evolution of NATO in this direction, which could see the Alliance move away from its traditional collective defence role towards becoming a collective security organisation. In such an environment, the Russian leadership's hostility to NATO widening should also soften.

It is interesting to note how Putin's views of NATO have developed since he became president, by comparing his assessments of the alliance in the three state of the nation addresses he has given.

July 2000

The cold war remained in the past, but dire consequences are still having to be overcome. These are attempts to infringe on the sovereign rights of states under the pretext of humanitarian operations or, as it is fashionable to say now, humanitarian interventions. There are also difficulties in finding understanding on issues which pose a regional or international threat.

Thus, within the context of the type of external aggression which is new to us - international terrorism and the direct attempt to move this threat inside the country - Russia had to face a systematic challenge to its state sovereignty and territorial integrity, face forces seeking geopolitical reorganization of the world.¹⁷

Although Putin made no direct mention of NATO, his comments clearly indicate that he had the Atlantic Alliance and its 1999 intervention in Kosovo in mind.

April 2001

We remain consistent in our relations with NATO. These relations are governed by the founding act on mutual relations, cooperation and security, signed in 1997. We think the problem is that this organization all too frequently ignores the views of the international community and the provisions of international legal documents when arriving at its decisions. This is the main problem. That is why the future of our relations with the alliance directly depends on the extent of the precision with which the basic provisions of international law are being observed, first and foremost as concerns issues of refraining from using force or threatening to use it.

Our position is clear. The only legitimate organization to authorize the use of force in international relations is the Security Council of the United Nations.¹⁸

April 2002

Our most important foreign policy aim is to secure strategic stability in the world. For this reason we are taking part in the creation of a new security system, maintaining a permanent dialogue with the United States of America and working on changes to the quality of our relations with NATO. As a whole, I would like to note that Russia is integrating actively into the world community, and, despite the stiff competition which I have already mentioned, it is very important for our country to be able to find allies, and to be a reliable ally for others ourselves.¹⁹

At the NATO-Russia summit in Rome in May 2002, Putin commented as follows:

Given its geopolitical position, for Russia the deepening of equal interaction with NATO is a real embodiment of a multi-vector approach to

which there is no alternative and which we intend to observe unswervingly. We do not conceive of ourselves as being outside Europe and we have just been talking about that with some of our colleagues. However, we also regard as inconceivable an underestimation of the role of the approved mechanisms for cooperation in the CIS and Asia.

It is only a harmonious combination of actions in all these directions which opens up broad opportunities to build a single zone of security from Vancouver to Vladivostok.²⁰

The NATO-Russia agreement thus appears to Putin to mark a significant move towards transforming the nature of the alliance, and thus also transforming the structure of European and even global security systems. It may well enhance Russia's role in the management of security in the Euro-Atlantic area, and thereby enable her to overcome the largely marginal role she played in European security management in the 1990s.

The United States

The Bush Administration has developed an important partnership with Moscow since September 2001, which marks a virtually 180 degree shift from its attitude towards the Russian Federation when it came into office in January 2001.

The documents signed at the May 2002 Putin-Bush summit constitute a foundation of what seems likely to be a closer era of cooperation between Moscow and Washington.²¹ Moscow has long craved to be seen by the USA as an equal, and although the reality of the situation is that Washington has not accorded this status to Moscow, the Russian Federation no longer faces the danger of being marginalised as an irrelevance by the USA. She is instead seen as an important partner in the fight against terrorism, and partly as a consequence of that, Washington is prepared to support Russia's desire to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), to encourage closer cooperation with Europe, and to also see her as playing an important role in the Middle East peace process, as part of the Quartet with the USA, EU and UN. Russia may become a more important supplier of energy to the USA as well as to Europe, which would further enhance her importance as a major partner of the West.²² In early June 2002, the USA officially granted the Russian economy market-economy status, which should in theory facilitate the development of a closer economic relationship.

Prior to September 2001, Moscow put her main emphasis on strategic partnership with Europe, with a reduced emphasis on the USA, probably as a response to the Bush Administration's initial downplaying of Russia. However since "9-11," Moscow has put emphasis on strategic partnerships with both the EU and the USA.²³ This is an approach mirrored by the Bush Administration. In his speech to the German Bundestag in May 2002, just before his visit to Moscow, President Bush stated that one of America's missions is "to encourage the Russian people to find their future in Europe, and with America. Russia has its best chance since 1917 to become a part of Europe's family."²⁴ The Bush Administration thus echoes the Putin leadership's aspiration to see Russia as an integral part of Europe, cooperating with the USA. This trend was underway before September 2001, but "9-11" has given Moscow an opportunity to prove her value to the USA, and has thus given Russia an opportunity to define for herself a post-communist foreign policy role, namely as an aspiring integral part of the Greater Europe that is

developing as a result of EU integration, and as a partner of the US “hyperpower”. It is in this way that the Putin leadership believes Russia can be a relevant force in the international system.

The Russian Debate on Her New Foreign Policy

How have the changes in Russian foreign policy been viewed in the Russian Federation? There are a variety of views, most of which tend to be more cautious than the viewpoints presented by the Putin leadership. There is an awareness that Russia can only be a junior partner of the USA, and that this can place a limitation on the development of any alliance, as Washington will act unilaterally when she wishes to do so, ignoring Russian viewpoints and interests. Some analysts argue that the nature of NATO is changing, and that this change will inevitably affect the development of the Russo-Western relationship.

Sergey Markov, head of the Political Research Institute in Moscow, argued that no close US-Russian friendship was forming. He said that the cooperation since September 2001 was of immense benefit to Russia, but that all that existed was a military alliance against a common foe. It was not certain what the fate of this alliance would be once the foe was vanquished.²⁵ Viktor Kremenyuk, deputy director of the Institute of the USA and Canada argued that if Russo-US alliance relations were built solely on the basis of anti-terrorism, then the alliance would have little prospects. He suggested that anti-terrorist cooperation should go beyond the resolution of economic problems, but should lead to the creation of close and mutually advantageous ties of an economic and strategic character. Such a development would enable rapprochement and the formation of an alliance. If this did not occur, then Russia’s relationship with the USA would be subject to the whims of political and economic developments. He argued that it was important for the USA to support reform in Russia if such an alliance was to have a chance of emerging.²⁶

The former head of the Russian MOD’s department for international military cooperation, Leonid Ivashov, took a negative view of post-“9-11” Russo-US relations. He considers that two states can only have a strategic alliance if their basic strategic interests coincide. Ivashov believes that Russian and US strategic interests are diametrically opposed. Their interests only converge at the tactical level. The USA desires to destroy the entire post-1945 system of international security, which Russia has an interest in maintaining. He argues that Russian policy towards the West since September 2001 amounts to geopolitical suicide, as Russia has complied with the development of a US presence in Central Asia. Ivashov argues that the USA will only be able to propose jointly with Russia a new world order that is acceptable to Russia if US power declines and faces the danger of being outstripped by China and other powers.²⁷

Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary Boris Poklad also sees the post-“9-11” geopolitical situation as a threat to Russian interests. He notes that the USA uses Russia when it suits her interests, and ignores her when it does not (eg over Iraq). He is also concerned by the US presence in Central Asia after September 2001. He argues that the USA aims at world leadership and will not allow Russia to occupy the same position. Therefore while Russia and the USA are no longer enemies, they are no more than that.²⁸

Some commentators have argued that NATO widening is no longer of relevance. What is more important is what NATO becomes. Even Leonid Ivashov, who has been traditionally hostile to NATO widening, has suggested that if the USA lowers its role in NATO, and/or if NATO widens to 40 countries, then Europe will have a normal system of collective security, with a decisive contribution from Russia.

Sergey Karaganov of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy calls for such a "normal alliance" with western countries. He notes that if Russia ever joins NATO, then it will become an international security organisation, rather than just being a European or Euro-Atlantic security organisation. He notes, however, that NATO is becoming less important to the USA. Karaganov argues accordingly that Russia should be interested in NATO as it may possibly be a means by which European powers, including Russia, could constrain US unilateralism. He also argues that Russia should seek to build an alliance with the West on the basis of the G8 group of countries, possibly including other powers, such as China and India.²⁹

Karaganov contends that Russia could play an important role as an energy exporter in helping to develop a new post-Cold War relationship with the West. He also believes that there is no point in confrontation with the USA. Sergey Rogov is also of this opinion, in view of the disparity in power between the USA and Russia. He also notes the strong tendency to unilateralism in the Bush Administration, and that some elements in the Bush Administration are not interested in closer cooperation with Russia. He argues that the power disparity need not prevent useful partnership between Russia and the USA, as other powers much weaker than the USA (such as Western Europe, Japan and Israel) cooperate with her to their advantage. He has called for an institutionalisation of the US-Russian relationship in order to create the foundation for a more stable partnership.³⁰

Konstantin Voronov of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations argues that US-Russian rapprochement could create greater opportunities for Russia to develop closer ties with Europe. The decline of Atlanticism could lead to greater competition among France, Germany and Britain in the EU and as the champion of European interests in NATO. Voronov argues that this could enable Russia to develop closer ties with these powers.³¹

Germany - A Special Relationship?

Russia has long seen her relationship with Germany as her key inter-state relationship in Europe. This is unsurprising in view of Germany's size, location, economic and potential military strength. Germany is Russia's most important trading partner, accounting for 10 per cent of Russia's trade turnover in the period January-April 2002. In the last two years Russo-German trade turnover has increased by 80%. In 2001 trade turnover stood at DM 47.5 milliard.³²

Putin's advent to power has seen an attempt to raise the Russo-German relationship to a new level. His knowledge of German, and the fact that he spent a significant part of his KGB career in the GDR may give him strong personal reasons for seeking a close relationship with Germany.³³ In March 2002 in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, deputy foreign minister Aleksey Meshkov discussed the Russo-German relationship on the eve of Putin's visit to Germany in April.³⁴ Meshkov referred to Putin's speech to the Bundestag in September 2001, in which the Russian president outlined the importance of developing close cooperation between Russia and Europe. Meshkov argued that Russia and Germany could play a special role in

this process. He noted that “as the largest powers in Europe, they are capable of, and should make an investment in the unification of our continent, adequate to its politico-economic and scientific-technological potential.” He had earlier stated that it was impossible to imagine the resolution of any substantial problems on the European continent without Russian and German participation.

This is the Russian view, and it is likely that Russia does desire to develop a special relationship with Germany as a key part of her own objective of developing a strategic partnership with the EU. When Putin visited Germany in April 2002, he said that “it is impossible to view the relations between Russia and Germany now beyond the context of Moscow's relations with the European Union. Germany is one of the centres of European integration. Development of cooperation between the European Union and Russia, undoubtedly, opens new possibilities for bilateral contacts. Today, practical interaction between Russia and the European Union helps erase many of the former dividing lines on the continent.”³⁵ Germany for its part is unlikely to allow her relationship with Russia to develop outside the framework of the EU common strategy towards Russia, but is likely to encourage a closer bilateral relationship as part of that strategy.

Putin's visit to Germany in April 2002 appeared to be successful in moving the relationship onto a higher footing. In 2000 a high level working group had been set up to deal with economic cooperation issues. The April 2002 summit was the first time in which Russian and German ministers of science, culture, chiefs of secret services and power-wielding agencies had participated in a summit; Putin considered this a sign of how the format of Russo-German consultations was being broadened. At the summit Putin noted that Russia supplied Germany with a quarter of its oil requirements and about one-third of her gas requirements. He argued that Russia could supply Germany and other EU members with even bigger quantities of oil and gas, and called on the EU to lift its restrictions, which prevent member states from importing no more than 30 per cent of their energy resources from a non-EU member. Germany is the biggest supplier of machinery and equipment to Russia. Moscow is interested in increasing cooperation in high-technology sectors, and Putin referred to the joint production of the An-400 transport aircraft as an example.

The Petersburg Dialogue is another aspect of the closer Russo-German relationship under Putin.³⁶ It was formed in 2001 at the initiative of Putin and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, and is a forum of politicians, businessmen and other public figures that aims to further develop a close Russo-German relationship. Although the Putin leadership desires to develop closer relations with all EU member states, particularly the larger members, such as Britain and France, Putin sees Germany as her key partner in the EU, and will develop Russia's relationship with Berlin with this in mind.

Conclusion

Russia will continue her rapprochement with the West whilst Putin remains president. The development of the Russia-NATO and Russia-EU relationship and also of the Russia-US relationship is likely to see the creation of a more institutionalised relationship, and the Russian leadership may also take up Karaganov's suggestion of arguing in favour of developing the G8 into a more formal alliance. Putin considers that Russia has no alternative other than to develop close political and economic ties with the major western industrialised powers. He had

embarked upon such a course prior to September 2001, and the events of “9-11” gave an impetus to this course. It confirmed to the West the correctness of Moscow’s views on what it calls international terrorism, and thereby showed Russia’s value as a partner in cooperating to counter this threat. In the “least-worst case” scenario for Moscow, the West is now less likely to see Russia as an irrelevance in the international system, which was a danger she faced at the turn of the millennium. The development of closer ties with NATO and the EU means that she is likely to play a greater role in the management of European security than she did in the 1990s. This is likely to be enhanced further if the USA becomes less interested in NATO and Europe. A less Atlanticist Europe may give Russia greater opportunities to develop ties with the EU and the major European powers.

Outside of Europe, improved ties with the USA may give Russia scope to play a greater role than hitherto in attempting to resolve crises in areas such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During the Cold War, the USA sought to minimise the Soviet role in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Washington is now in favour of greater Russian involvement in the Middle East peace process, so enhancing Russia’s importance as a partner of the USA. Russia also has the potential to enhance her importance as an energy supplier to the West, and the energy dialogues she has with both the USA and the EU may help develop her energy sector. The desire to cultivate Russia as a partner may mean that both the USA and Europe may play down their concerns over Chechnya and press freedom in Russia. It is also possible that the Putin leadership may in the long term become more flexible about a greater western role in peace-keeping and other security operations in the former Soviet Union. The Putin leadership is certainly more relaxed about NATO widening, including even the possible accession of the Baltic states.

This is not to say that the new Russo-Western relationship will be without its strains. It is at the moment questionable to what extent the new US-Russian partnership goes beyond cooperation in the struggle against terrorism, or in taking steps to counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction. While it is clear that Russia and the USA have common views on the Taleban and Al Qaeda, the Putin leadership does not share the Bush Administration’s perception that there is an Iraqi-Iranian-North Korean “axis of evil”. It is highly unlikely that Russia would welcome a US attack on Iraq. Russia and the USA also have significantly different views on Iran, which are unlikely to be reconciled. Although the USA’s withdrawal from the 1972 ABM treaty has not seriously damaged the US-Russian relationship, this action is seen by many in Moscow as an indication of how the USA is prepared to ignore Russia when it suits American interests. Despite Putin’s tolerant attitude towards the US presence in Central Asia and Georgia, there are many in the Russian politico-military leadership that do not take this view, and this could become a future source of resentment. Therefore whilst the Russo-US partnership is currently very close, it may face significant problems in the future, irrespective of the extent to which the relationship is institutionalised.

The USA’s greater willingness to use military force since September 2001, and the possibility that Washington may become more willing to undertake pre-emptive military action against certain states and organisations could also intensify US-European differences over global security management, and lead to a less close US-European relationship. If such a situation emerges, then this may create greater opportunities for the development of Russia’s relationship with Europe, which in Moscow’s view of the world will become her key foreign policy relationship. Chairman of the Duma international affairs committee Dmitry Rogozin said in February 2002:

We noticed recently how many European leaders turned to Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin with a request of sorts, a proposal on becoming a defender of European interests in the face of the USA, which means that Russia is gradually turning into an advocate of the European world before this superpower, the USA. This is very interesting because it creates a very interesting game for us in Europe. We are becoming a leading European power, and we are respected in this role of ours.

Commenting on the possibility of US takes military action against Iraq, Iran or North Korea, he said:

However, if there is no proof and if decisions which run counter to the UN Security Council and the opinion of the USA's European partners in NATO, including such leading countries as Germany, Great Britain and France, are taken, Russia's political points will sharply increase and Russia will become not just a mediator but a co-organizer of a new world order.³⁷

Russia as a "co-organiser of new world order" with (or ideally, in) Europe is an optimistic vision, but it may be a vision held by many in the Russian foreign policy leadership and they are likely to pursue their long-term relationship with the EU, particularly with its leading powers, with this in mind.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), 10 December 1999, SU/3714.
- ² See Vladimir Lukin's comments, SWB, 28 April 1999, SU/3520, B/10.
- ³ Sergey Rogov, 'The West gives a rebirth to the Cold War', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 17 November 1999. See also Dmitry Gornostayev, 'A year of attack on Russia', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 31 December 1999.
- ⁴ Thomas Graham, 'Questions from Washington: Does Russia have enough self-confidence to conduct a dialogue with the USA', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21 March 2001.
- ⁵ It should be noted, however, that Putin visited North Korea at a time when US-North Korean relations were improving.
- ⁶ SWB, 19 July 2000, SU/3896; SWB, 20 July 2000, SU/3897.
- ⁷ Mark A Smith, Contemporary Russian Perceptions of Euro-Atlanticism, F74, February 2002, Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC), RMA Sandhurst; *ibid*, Russia and the West since 11 September 2001, OB89, December 2001, CSRC, RMA Sandhurst; *ibid*, Russia and the Far Abroad, F72, December 2000, CSRC, RMA Sandhurst.
- ⁸ Igor Ivanov, 'Innovation and continuity in Russian foreign policy', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15 June 2001, made little mention of multipolarity. The term is still used. Putin used it on 12 June 2002 in his speech on Russia's National Day. See SWB, 13 June 2002, SU/4548. However, little open criticism is now made of US unipolarity.
- ⁹ SWB, SU/3853, 30 May 2000.
- ¹⁰ SWB, SU/4289 27 September 2001. For the text in German see <http://www.russische-botschaft.de>. For the text in Russian, see <http://www.president.kremlin.ru/events/313.html>
- ¹¹ See Ivan Sas, 'In the USA-European Union competition, the USA wins', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10 June 2002.
- ¹² For information on the EU-Russia energy dialogue, see http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/energy_transport/en/lpi_en_3.html
- ¹³ See European Commission Russia website for documents of the May 2002 Russia-EU summit. http://www.eur.ru/eng/neweur/user_eng.php?func=delspec&id=98
- ¹⁴ *Ibid*.

- 15 Dmitry Danilov, 'How stable are our priorities', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 March 2002.
- 16 See <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b020528e.htm>
- 17 SWB, 10 July 2000, SU/3888.
- 18 SWB, 4 April 2001, SU/4113.
- 19 SWB, 19 April 2002, SU/4493.
- 20 SWB, 29 May 2002, SU/4533.
- 21 The documents signed were: The treaty on strategic offensive arms reduction and the declaration on new strategic relations between Russia and the USA. In addition, three joint statements were adopted:
1. Russian-US cooperation in the fight against international terrorism.
 2. Energy dialogue.
 3. A statement on cooperation between peoples.
- The texts of the agreements can be found at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/>; see press releases for 24 May 2002. See also <http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/overseas/> for information on Bush's visit to Russia in May 2002. The texts can also be found at the daily news bulletin for 24 May 2002 at the Russian MFA website: <http://www.ln.mid.ru/website/bl.nsf/eng?OpenView&Start=26.1.4>
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