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

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Rudderless in a Storm: The Russian Navy 1992-2002

Mikhail Tsypkin

This paper traces the decline in Russian naval capability over the last decade. It discusses the extent to which the Navy has succeeded in remaining a "special case" in the reform process and its recent relationship with President Putin.

The Russian navy has been dramatically reduced during the first post-Soviet decade - but not reformed. While the change of Russia's geopolitical position in 1991-1992 was rapid and drastic, the Soviet navy's transformation into the Russian navy has been slow and uncertain. In place of real work to create a naval force fully consistent with Russia's requirements, the navy has all too frequently preferred to wax nostalgic about the grandeur of the Soviet blue water navy, and to try to turn these nostalgic images into hazy plans for the future. The result is that the new Russian state has an increasingly hollow force originally built for a global oceanic struggle.[1]

The Facts

A few years ago the ships and aircraft of the Northern, Pacific, Black Sea and Baltic Fleets, as well as of the Caspian Flotilla, were a naval force second only to that of the United States. On paper this is still true: Russia has an aircraft carrier *Admiral Kuznetsov*, forty nuclear attack submarines, a dozen top-rated Kilo diesel submarines, two nuclear guided missile cruisers and large numbers of smaller ships; naval manpower is 171,500, and Russia continues to be a nuclear superpower at sea.[2] But the navy suffers from a severe malaise: it was cut rapidly and brutally in the 1990s, officers are severely underpaid, there is not enough money for operations, maintenance and training; and future shipbuilding programmes are so much in doubt that Russian and foreign observers are talking about the possible disappearance of the Russian navy.

The facts of a dramatic decline are indisputable. By 1995, the navy had lost half its squadrons and bases; by 1996, half its personnel (compared to the early 1990s) and forty one per cent of its ships and sixty three per cent of its fixed wing and rotary aircraft.[3] By 2001, its order of battle was one third of that in 1992; ninety per cent of its ships were in need of repair.[4] By 2002, according to its Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, it was just over a quarter of the Soviet navy in size.[5]

In 2000, the navy exercised even less than in 1999: 195 missile firing exercises (in 1999 - 315) and 368 anti-submarine warfare (ASW)/minesweeping exercises (1999 - 934).[6] Average annual at-sea time per ship was 6.4 days; of these 4.4 days were

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single ship sea duty, 1.5 days in tactically homogenous groups, and 0.5 days in tactically mixed groups.[7] Out of 584 naval aviation crews only 156 were combat ready, and only 77 were ready for night flying; their average annual flying time was 21.7 hours (in 1999 it was 24 hours). Average annual flying time for the crews of naval missile carrying aircraft was 1.8 hours (in 1999 - 5 hours); for fighter crews - 7 hours (in 1999 - 19).[8] The *Admiral Kuznetsov* made only one distant deployment, and has spent the rest of the time being repaired at Sevmorput shipyard. Only one heavy nuclear missile cruiser, the *Petr Velikiy*, is combat ready.[9] In 2001, one of the last vestiges of Soviet global naval glory was abandoned, when President Putin ordered the Russian naval base at Cam Rahn Bay shut down.

The sea-borne leg of Russia's nuclear triad has also grown smaller. The number of nuclear submarines (SSBNs) declined from 62 in 1990 to 28 in 2000; the number of warheads they carried also declined but not as steeply, from 2,804 to 2,336.[10] According to a Western source, only 15 Russian SSBNs are operational.[11] Reportedly not more than a quarter of the SSBN fleet is on patrol at any given time.[12]

This is not yet a new, smaller navy consciously created in response to post Cold War requirements, simply one reduced by attrition. In fairness, one should note that the drastic reduction was possibly more dramatic because throughout his tenure (1956-1985) the late navy C-in-C Admiral Sergei Gorshkov reportedly resisted decommissioning, so the Russian navy had first of all to retire ships which had been kept in service much longer than necessary.[13] Thus, the overall loss of combat strength may not be as catastrophic as the Russian navy makes it sound. At the same time, ships which had been in service for only ten to twelve years have had to be decommissioned because there is no money to repair them.[14] Even though the navy manages to keep several SSBNs on patrol, conduct exercises, send some ships on foreign visits, and participate in international activities (such as maintaining sanctions against Iraq), the overall decline is obvious.

The navy suffers from serious crime problems, both corruption among the officers and violence among the enlisted men. In September 1998, a seaman killed several of his crewmates and barricaded himself in a submarine. In the same month, conscripts guarding the navy's nuclear test range at Novaya Zemlya mutinied and took schoolchildren and their teachers hostage. In August 1999, two seamen attacked a sentry guarding a radioactive waste store at the Gremikha navy base on the Kola Peninsula; in the ensuing shootout five seamen were killed.[15] Severe hazing of conscripts is taken for granted; so are malnutrition and mistreatment by officers.

Politics & Navy in Russia: An Inconvenient Marriage

Russians tend to view their future though the prism of their history. The navy's top thinkers are well versed in the history of their service - and are not very comfortable with it, despite their claims of past naval glory. Political leaders showered the navy with attention only to neglect it when other needs of state arose. The happy - and only - exception is Peter the Great, whose passionate commitment to the Russian navy and maritime expansion is beyond doubt. Prominent in his efforts to open up the Baltic and Black seas to Russia, important in Russia's campaigns against Turkey under Catherine the Great later in the eighteenth century, the navy made no contribution to the signal achievement of Russian power - the victory over Napoleon in 1812-1815.

Later, the Russian navy was victorious at Sinop over an adversary in decline, the Turkish navy. In the Crimean war of 1854-56, which Russia lost, the Russian command sank its outmoded ships in order to block the entrance of Sevastopol harbour.[16] It took more than twenty years after that defeat for the navy to demonstrate innovative spirit by carrying out the first successful torpedo attack against a Turkish ship in 1877.[17] This was followed by a naval buildup which culminated in one of the worst naval defeats in history, at the hands of the Japanese in the Tsushima Straits in 1904. That disaster was followed by another attempt to build a blue water navy which resulted in some successful designs, such as the *Novik* class destroyer, which could make 37.3 knots in 1913,[18] but was abandoned at the outset of the First World War, in which the navy played a minor role supporting ground operations. An eminent Russian naval historian who had seen action in World War II as a naval officer, Dr Korneliy Shatsillo, believed that Russia's attempt to build a blue water navy in the years preceding World War I wasted resources needed for the army and thus contributed to Russia's poor performance in that war.[19]

This does not mean that the navy made no impact on the political fortunes of the empire in the early twentieth century - quite the contrary. It was not, however, through action on high seas, but through mutinies, such as the one on the battleship *Potemkin*, which slaughtered its officers in 1905 and became a symbol of Russian revolution. In 1917 and 1918, the sailors of Kronstadt descended on the streets of Petrograd to terrorize the democratic Provisional Government, help propel Lenin into power, and disband the first freely elected Russian Constituent Assembly. Once the Bolsheviks removed the capital from the shores of the Baltic to land-locked Moscow, sailors' ability to play politics was reduced, and their desire to do so was extinguished when the Red Army and secret police crushed the sailors of Kronstadt who decided in 1921 that they no longer liked Bolsheviks and rose against them.

The communist revolution and civil war (a strictly land affair) destroyed the Russian navy; its rebuilding began only during the industrialization of the late 1920s-1930s; the initial plans were for a navy primarily equipped with submarines, smaller surface ships and aircraft to protect the Soviet coastline, the longest in the world. Only in 1937 did Stalin order construction of a blue water navy.[20] This programme was curtailed in 1940 as war against Germany looked increasingly inevitable; once Germany attacked in 1941, the programme was cancelled completely in favour of building smaller ships that could help support ground forces' flanks, interdict lines of communication in the Baltic and Black Seas, and conduct short range convoy escorts in the North; all missions performed without particular distinction.[21]

After World War II Stalin again decided to build a blue water navy, but would not open the state coffers to build aircraft carriers. His successor, Nikita Khrushchev, not only did not want to build carriers, but did his best to get rid of surface ships; he wanted the navy to deploy nuclear armed ballistic missiles on as many submarines as possible, and initiated a crash submarine construction programme.

The Soviet navy's golden era began three years after Khrushchev's removal with the appointment of Marshal Andrei Grechko as Minister of Defence in 1967. In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, which painfully exposed the Soviet lack of power projection capability, the navy C-in-C Admiral Gorshkov, with the help of Marshal Grechko, convinced the new team in the Kremlin that a navy with a global reach was the perfect instrument for implementing their imperial ambitions.[22] A massive naval buildup followed, Soviet naval bases appeared throughout the Third

World to the dismay of Western politicians, and debating the intentions of Admiral Gorshkov became a steady occupation for US naval intelligence analysts. Finally, the Soviet navy fulfilled its old dream and built a real carrier, the *Admiral Kuznetsov*, but soon after its launch the USSR fell apart.

The Tale of Two Heroes

What inspiration can today's Russian admiral draw from this history? It is rich in deeds of brilliant, courageous and patriotic officers. What it lacks is a leader who successfully translated the dream of naval glory into the language of political utility, and made a lasting contribution to advancing Russia's interests. Many Russian naval officers would object that Admiral Gorshkov was that kind of leader; indeed, the current C-in-C Kuroyedov has chosen Gorshkov as an object of emulation.[23] But Gorshkov operated within Brezhnev's decadent regime, whose oligarchs he learned to manipulate in order to build a blue-water navy that contributed nothing to the wellbeing of Soviet citizens. And even Gorshkov, according to Georgy Arbatov, complained that government policy did not really correspond to the navy's needs.[24] In his wake, Gorshkov left a disaster: his proud navy did not save the USSR from collapse, and his naval buildup not only helped bankrupt the empire, but led directly to today's parlous condition, since appropriate support facilities were not built. The most glaring outcome is the lack of any serious plan for decommissioning the huge fleet of nuclear submarines: more than 120 are rusting in Russian bases, the fuel in their reactors a threat to the environment and navy families, and an attractive target for terrorists and aspiring nuclear powers.

After the heroes of communism had been discredited, Russians needed a new national hero. The role was given to Marshal Georgy Zhukov, the top Soviet soldier of World War II. This choice, however, was a bitter pill for the navy, since Zhukov, the ultimate army man, viewed the navy as of little importance to a continental power like the USSR, helped Khrushchev resist the admirals' ambitions, and did not disguise his contempt for the navy. So, while the rest of Russia has chosen to idolize Zhukov, the navy has selected Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov.

Kuznetsov served as Stalin's minister of the navy and navy C-in-C from 1939 until 1946, when he fell from favour, was reduced in rank to rear admiral and removed from his job. In 1951, Kuznetsov regained the dictator's favour, and served as navy minister until 1953. Under Khrushchev, who abolished the naval ministry, Kuznetsov served as navy C-in-C from 1953 to 1956, when Khrushchev fired him for stubborn attempts to promote plans for a blue water navy. Zhukov also fell from grace twice, at about the same time as Kuznetsov, but he was feared by politicians because of his popularity. Kuznetsov suffered because he refused to accept the views of civilian authorities on professional matters as final.[25] In contrast, Zhukov was an obedient, if sometimes grumbling and blunt, soldier of the communist party. Kuznetsov's (and the navy's) greatest combat achievement resulted from an act of insubordination. Before the German attack at dawn on 22 June 1941, hours before Stalin finally agreed to put the military on alert, Kuznetsov, at his own risk, put the navy on full combat alert, an order credited by Kuznetsov and his admirers for the small naval losses on the first day of the Great Patriotic War.[26] Thus, Kuznetsov's legacy is one of frequent discord with civilian authorities who did not understand the needs of the navy as the navy saw them. Kuznetsov's navy wanted to serve the nation - but the nation, or those who made the decisions on its behalf, often found the price too steep.

Navy & Politics in 1992-1999: Strategic Escapism

President Boris Yeltsin failed to give a clear sense of direction to the military as a whole. His primary interest in military affairs was in ensuring that the military command would not take part in political intrigue against him, and would support him against opponents if the need arose. This policy was proven to work in October 1993, when the military suppressed, albeit reluctantly, the anti-Yeltsin Supreme Soviet and its armed militants. The navy, far from Moscow in its bases, could not help or harm Yeltsin, and that reduced its clout. Yeltsin was happy to use the navy as a prop for a good photo opportunity, as in August 1998, when he 'supervised' an exercise of the Northern Fleet, and in its course authorized the launch of a submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM).[27]

Yeltsin failed to provide the navy with firm guidance regarding Russia's place in the world, and did not push energetically for reform of the armed forces. Yeltsin started with the notion that the US and Russia were equal, which allowed him to maintain a superpower rhetoric useful for domestic consumption. There was no realistic treatment of how to maintain equality without anything approaching equal resources. By the mid 1990s it was clear that Yeltsin's publicly declared belief that Russia and the US were two global leaders was nothing but an illusion. The Russian political establishment responded with increasingly anti-Western sentiment, culminating in something akin to a war panic during the Kosovo campaign in 1999. While President Yeltsin himself rarely engaged in such rhetoric, he did not forcefully discourage it.

The National Security Concept approved by Yeltsin on December 17, 1997, steered clear of open hostility to the West, but treated NATO's expansion as a threat to Russian security, and American international predominance as something Russia should work to change. The Concept acknowledged that Russia's international influence was diminished, and warned that 'a number of countries' were trying to further weaken Russia 'politically, economically, and militarily', although the threat of direct military attack had decreased.[28] For many officers brought up on the dogmas of Marxism-Leninism and inevitable hostility between the USSR and the West, this was Cold War Lite: politicians seemed to be going back to the good old times. If the military just held out without reform, many seemed to hope, the government would eventually relent and fill the hollow post-Soviet military with men and materiel. Yeltsin's government believed that a weak economy was the main threat to Russia[29] and would not increase defence spending, but their retreat to Cold War Lite phraseology encouraged the military's recalcitrance.

The navy was in a particularly difficult situation because its missions were closely connected to Cold War policies. In addition to its role as one of the legs of the nuclear triad, the navy was supposed to destroy American SSBNs and carrier groups, interdict NATO lines of communications, and assist the ground forces in continental theatre offensives.[30] It was also supposed to promote the Soviet military-political offensive in the Third World by showing the flag and projecting power. The mission of protecting Russia's coasts was moved far offshore, where enemy ships were supposed to be ambushed.

Most of this made little sense after 1991. The nuclear deterrence mission remained, but in an increasingly downscaled version. Other missions were simply too expensive as well as unnecessary. Russia's troubles were in the south, where the Black Sea Fleet was dramatically weakened by the prolonged fight with Ukraine over basing rights and ship ownership, and in Central Asia, where Russia's naval

presence was limited to the Caspian Flotilla. Just as the navy could not help Yeltsin against the Supreme Soviet in 1993, it was not very useful in the wars in Chechnya, only sending some naval infantrymen.

The political leadership, eager to avoid accusations of not supporting the military, did not want to tell the navy directly that its role had been reduced. Instead, together with a Ministry of Defence and General Staff dominated by ground forces and later strategic rocket forces officers, they simply cut the navy's budget share. A knowledgeable correspondent reported that the navy's share of the defence budget declined from 23 per cent in 1993 to 9.2 per cent in 1998, and grew to only 11-12 per cent after 2000.[31]

Without firm political guidance, the navy developed its own interpretation of the pre-revolutionary, Soviet, and current naval developments. According to this, there can be no valid reasons for making Russia do with a relatively small navy primarily meant to defend its coasts. Therefore, Russian naval history is a tale of a struggle between wise blue water navy-loving patriots and navy-haters, unwise and sometimes unpatriotic. In this view, Russia did not build a blue-water navy in the 1920s because the leading military personalities Mikhail Frunze and Mikhail Tukhachevskiy were 'navy-haters', and not because Russia lacked resources or justification for such a major undertaking; Marshal Zhukov (who agreed with Khrushchev's refusal to build a 'balanced' blue water navy) was an 'ignoramus' in naval matters, rather than someone who learned from World War II to be sceptical about the navy's strategic utility for Russia.[32] The navy is proclaimed to be not just a service of the armed forces, but a 'bearer' of Russia's 'wonderful ... cultural and religious traditions'.[33] Thus, the navy becomes a national treasure in and of itself, rather than a rational policy instrument.

Many politicians and the media eagerly embraced this sentimental vision: the worse the conditions of sailors' everyday lives, the more perilous every deployment on poorly maintained ships, the more heated the civilian rhetoric about the historic and future greatness of the Russian navy. The navy understood the game: while maintaining the semblance of subordination to civilian authority and their policy of low funding, its command tolerated and perhaps even organized numerous appeals by navy veterans, warning of the dire consequences of the blue-water navy's decline. Thus, for instance, a group of retired admirals appealed to Yeltsin in the official *Morskoy Sbornik* (Naval Digest), warning of the growing threat from NATO, emphasizing that the navy was 'the only' service capable of repelling Western aggression from the sea, and demanding (and here is the crux of the matter) that the navy be financed separately from the rest of the armed forces. They also demanded that the navy C-in-C report directly to the president, bypassing the Minister of Defence and the General Staff.[34]

Marshal Sergeyev & The Navy

The first serious attempts to reform the navy began in May 1997, when Yeltsin, having finally realized that without reform the military would disintegrate or rebel, or both, appointed General (later Marshal) Igor Sergeyev as Minister of Defence with a mandate to cut and restructure the armed forces. Sergeyev appeared unmoved by the myth of the navy as a national treasure; moreover, he made it clear that it was the navy's (and the military's) refusal to shrink that was at the core of its malaise. In August and September 1997, the minister visited all the fleets; his mission included 'helping' them conduct 'organizational measures' (language

indicating that downsizing was discussed). Visiting the Northern Fleet, Sergeyev put his case bluntly: 'We have a choice: either the structure and quantity of the "sinking navy" and disintegrating army, or combat ready reformed Armed Forces.'[35]

Sergeyev's policy was based on the belief that Russia could secure a breathing space by relying on nuclear deterrence against any major nuclear or conventional threat. Conventional forces would be reduced until funding for new weapons became available; a relatively small number of permanently ready units would be sufficient to deal with the only plausible threat, that of local conflicts along Russia's periphery. For the navy, it meant preservation - at gradually reduced levels - of its SSBN force and assets to protect them, and to take part in local conflicts wherever feasible. This new policy was to be implemented by a new C-in-C, Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, who had had a meteoric career path. In February 1996 he was promoted, after less than three years as chief of staff of the Baltic Fleet, to command the Pacific Fleet; in July 1997, he was made chief of the Main Naval Staff - first deputy C-in-C of the navy, and in November, its C-in-C.[36]

A limited but real structural reform was implemented in 1998-1999 in two sensitive regions: Kaliningrad in the Baltic Sea and the Kamchatka peninsula in the Pacific. In Kamchatka, the navy was to lead a joint command of naval forces (flotillas of mixed forces and attack submarines), air defence and ground forces. A joint logistics system was also established. This grouping is responsible for defending the Kamchatka and Chukotka peninsulas, a huge expanse of territory.[37] In the process, the Pacific Fleet's structure was changed: 'a squadron of ships, several brigades of ground forces, and air supporting units were disbanded or reformed'. 'Ten thousand' servicemen were reassigned or discharged.[38] Instead of separate staffs for each service, the new grouping has a joint staff, commanded by a naval officer, and assisted by three deputies, for naval forces, ground forces and aviation.[39] Similarly, in Kaliningrad the navy received under joint command ground forces and air assets.

The change was controversial. It gave the navy a boost of two joint commands in strategically important regions, at the expense of the ground forces, who traditionally predominated in joint commands. In Kamchatka, the decision caused open disobedience: 'Lieutenant-General Mukhamed Batyrov, commander of the 25th [ground forces] Corps, publicly criticized the reforms prescribed by the General Staff.'[40] It took a visit from Admiral Kuroyedov to end the unprecedented public conflict.

Kuroyedov initially demonstrated considerable political savvy. He abandoned the navy's exaggerated rhetoric in favour of assigning it a realistic mission of creating the 'least favourable' conditions for any maritime attack against Russia,[41] and acknowledged that Russia could not operate in the world oceans since it had neither the necessary forces (with the exception of attack submarines), logistical support, nor command and control systems in distant areas. He softened the blow by suggesting that naval theorists continue to ponder such operations.[42] Kuroyedov also realized that in the economic and political circumstances it made more sense to promote the concept of Russia's general maritime rather than narrowly naval interests.[43]

This moderate course was soon subjected to the severe shock of the war in Kosovo. The main weakness of Sergeyev's policy was that it required a pacific foreign policy. Reliance on nuclear weapons could indeed save Russia from large scale aggression, but left it without a credible conventional option with which to exert pressure on

international politics. The NATO campaign led to an eruption of anti-Western sentiment among the Russian public and elites. The greater the intensity of such feelings, the more heated the rhetoric, the more frustrating the realization that Russia had no instrument for influencing NATO. No one seriously believed that Russia would risk a nuclear war over Yugoslavia, and NATO was not going to take Russia's diminished conventional forces into consideration. Sergeyev's doctrine had already been seriously damaged by the financial meltdown of August 1998, which left the military with little prospect for conventional rearming, and Sergeyev's cherished strategic forces without a hope of keeping up with the US. Sergeyev's doctrine was dead, because Russia did not want a foreign policy that kept it out of global power politics.

The military reacted to this new mood with alacrity, although with little effectiveness. The stunt of sending paratroopers from the peacekeeping contingent in Bosnia to seize the airport in Pristina brought international embarrassment when the subsequent stages of the operation (flying reinforcements from Russia and establishing a strong foothold in Kosovo) failed since no neighbouring nation would give Russia overflight rights. However, the episode played well at home, where the media, in patriotic fervour, took the failure for a triumph, primarily because it angered and frustrated NATO.[44]

Other military actions were less satisfactory, since they caused less visible frustration. Although some pundits in Moscow daydreamed scenarios of a naval war between Russia and NATO in the Mediterranean, the dispatch of an intelligence gathering ship and then of the ill-starred *Kursk* Oscar class cruise missile submarine to the Mediterranean were hardly noticed in the West. Still, Admiral Kuroyedov insisted that the appearance of the *Kursk* in the area had 'a considerable international impact', convinced NATO that Russia's navy 'was highly combat ready', that Russia continued to play 'an important geostrategic role' in the region, and seriously 'disturbed' the NATO ASW forces.[45] The *Zapad 99* exercise in June 1999 purported to demonstrate how Russia would defend against a NATO attack, and ended with two Bear bombers simulating a preemptive nuclear strike against US territory; it was proclaimed by a respectable newspaper to have left the West in a state of 'shock'.[46] The real impact was much more modest, but all these gestures played well domestically. A very few domestic observers quietly noted the crucial fact that the slow and vulnerable bombers, without fighter support, were intercepted by US F-15s from Iceland, which would in real life have made their strike against the mainland impossible.[47]

The navy's performance in *Zapad 99* was less glorious than it wanted the public to believe: it suffered from such a shortage of fuel that it had to keep in port two large ships, and cut short the deployment of the new *Admiral Chabanenko*; an ASW exercise had to be cancelled. But what mattered for the navy was that it legitimized the mission of destroying ships armed with long range land-attack cruise missiles. Navy spokesmen, including the C-in-C, repeatedly stated that the NATO operation in Yugoslavia heavily depended on sea-based cruise missiles, and that the only way to defend Russia against this threat would be for its navy to go far enough into the oceans to stop the US navy before it could deliver a strike against the Russian homeland.

To The Bottom: The *Kursk* Disaster

On July 24, 2000, the recently elected President Putin found time to attend a dissertation defence at the non-governmental Academy of Military Science. A degree of Candidate of Military Science (roughly equivalent to PhD) was sought by Admiral Kuroyedov. The topic of the dissertation was appropriately grand: The State Strategy for the Defence and Realization of Russian National Interests in the World Ocean. The president reportedly took part in a lively debate on the merits of the dissertation, after which the twenty one members of the Academy's dissertation council all voted in favour of awarding the degree. But this was not the end of the affair. Once the President had congratulated Kuroyedov and left, the Council did not disperse. The dissertation's sponsor - the Military Academy of the General Staff - and several reviewers recommended that Kuroyedov be awarded the highest degree of Doctor of Science (there is no Western equivalent), because he had succeeded in solving a great 'scientific problem': he discovered the 'methodology' for protecting Russia's interests. The council's secret ballot was nineteen in favour, two against.[48]

Sixteen days after this exceptional gesture of personal presidential involvement in naval affairs, at 22:30 on August 10, the newest and one of the navy's most powerful submarines, K-141 *Kursk*, left its base at Zapadnaya Litsa. Its mission was to take part in a major Northern Fleet exercise, simulating an attack against a carrier battle group. The *Kursk* was also to test new batteries which powered the torpedoes to be used in the exercise.

The submarine sent its last report at 8:51 on 12 August; after launching a simulated strike by 24 Shipwreck cruise missiles, the *Kursk* was ready for the next phase of the exercise, a torpedo attack. At 11:30 the *Petr Velikiy* registered an unexplained underwater sound, followed by an even stronger one. No action was taken in response. The planned torpedo attack by the *Kursk* was not carried out, and the submarine did not report the reason for this failure. It was only at 16:35 that the fleet attempted - and failed to establish - contact with the *Kursk*. A search-and-rescue mission was finally ordered at 18:14.[49]

The subsequent chain of events is well known: a doomed rescue attempt which demonstrated painful technical and professional failings. All 118 hands were lost. The navy's immediate reaction was to mislead the public and civilian authority about the progress of the rescue mission, and to blame the disaster on a collision with a foreign submarine. It took an investigation more than a year long for the government to acknowledge that the only navy to blame was the Russian one.

President Putin and the Russian navy had been friends for some time: as deputy chief of the presidential administration in 1997, Putin served on the military council of the navy, an advisory body to the navy's command; Putin has reportedly retained his membership even as president. Within months of Putin's appointment in 1997, navy C-in-C Admiral Felix Gromov was replaced by Admiral Kuroyedov; Putin might have been in a position to influence this decision. Judging by the speed with which Putin's relationship with the navy developed upon his selection as Yeltin's successor, Kuroyedov must have impressed Putin early on.

Putin's policy has suffered from a fundamental contradiction. One the one hand, Putin wants to be seen as a leader rebuilding the might of the Russian state, especially its military power. He and his team have correctly calculated that this would appeal to the mass electorate. Perhaps it appealed to the president himself.

On the other hand, Putin has claimed that Russia is poor and has to live according to its means - this view appeared prominently in his election platform. Nowhere did he offer an explanation of how to make Russia mighty again on a shoestring budget.[50] Without clear guidance, the military naturally assumed that the anti-Western atmosphere of 1999 would save them from finally adjusting to the post-Cold War world.

Putin's early actions encouraged this thinking. In November 1999, he chaired a meeting of the Russian Security Council which focused on Russia's maritime problems; Putin reportedly voiced concern about Russia losing its position, saying that Russia became a great power only when it became a great maritime power.[51] Putin had demonstrated his mettle as supreme C–in–C in April 2000, taking part in a Northern Fleet exercise aboard a Delta IV SSBN, and spending the night - the first Russian or Soviet leader to do so. A defence correspondent called this a 'successful tactical move' by the navy's command, which used the occasion to lobby for more funds to restore to operational condition the Typhoon SSBNs, and to plan deployment of a task force to the Mediterranean later that year.[52]

On January 10, 2000, Putin signed a new National Security Concept. Its 'principal point' was 'that military threats to Russia [were] on the increase and the main danger emanate[d] from the West'.[53] On March 3, Putin signed a directive On Russia's Maritime Activity and an associated document ponderously entitled 'The Foundations of Naval Policy of the Russian Federation Until the Year 2010'.[54] This was the product of the navy's struggle throughout the 1990s for greater autonomy from the Ministry of Defence and General Staff. Their motivation, apparently, was - once again - to obtain a separate budget.[55] The 'Foundations' were initially supposed to be the Naval Strategy.[56] A separate naval strategy, however, would have been an open break with the Soviet approach, which emphasized joint strategy and did not allow individual services to claim strategies of their own. The navy did not get its own strategy - the military doctrine signed by Putin on April 21 speaks about 'joint strategic and operational planning of employment of the armed forces'; the high command, when preparing the doctrine's final draft, excluded the section on naval strategy.[57] Nevertheless, the doctrine refers to the 'Foundations' as guiding Russia's actions in defending its maritime interests.[58] No other service received such special mention.

Kuroyedov did not lose all hope of a special place for the navy. Shortly after he defended his dissertation, he published a scholarly essay on maritime strategy (*morskaya strategiya*).[59] This term implies in Russian an approach substantially broader than purely military. Kuroyedov maintained that Russia's maritime strategy should help it achieve practical results in the shortest possible time; language close to Putin's arguments that Russia's first task is to improve its economic situation. Unlike his predecessors, who bombarded President Yeltsin with demands to counter the US navy ship for ship, Kuroyedov offered to counter any naval threat by flexibly adjusting the available Russian naval 'combat systems' to enable them to disrupt enemy operations. The Russian navy should no longer be required to maintain global presence: its regular missions should be limited to the Arctic, North Atlantic, Baltic and Black Seas, and the north western Pacific Ocean.

This progressive message, however, was contradicted by the essay's traditional views. In reality, Kuroyedov had nothing to offer the economy except more government spending on the navy. There was no place for market mechanisms in Kuroyedov's vision: maritime development can help economic growth only if 'the Russian state plays a leading role', while the navy spearheads development and

implementation of maritime policy. Couched in the excessively scholastic terminology of Soviet military science, it is the same old threat assessment: Russia is threatened from the sea. This threat is truly global. Russia naturally needs a 'balanced' navy (ie, blue water, equipped with all classes of ships). Just as President Putin was sending a series of contradictory political messages to the nation and the armed forces (liberal economics in an illiberal state, closer alliance with the West and nostalgia for superpower grandeur, etc), Kuroyedov was responding with a contradictory maritime strategy.

These messages help explain the policy origins of the *Kursk* disaster, and the admirals' subsequent conduct. The decision to send a group of ships, including the *Kursk*, to the Mediterranean, was the direct result of an openly anti-Western orientation after the Kosovo conflict. This orientation seemed to be good public relations for the president, who 'want[ed] to lead a strong ... power, and view[ed] the navy as a symbol of this strength'.[60] The idea that the navy was the best instrument for promoting Russia's international influence without firing a shot was forcefully put forward by Vice-Admiral Mikhail Motsak.[61] Motsak's argument was a slightly updated version of the ideas of Admiral Gorshkov, and was very much in line with other resurrections of Soviet strategic dogmas attempted in the late 1990s. Kuroyedov himself penned an admiring anniversary article about Gorshkov in January 2000.[62]

The navy saw Putin's interest as an opportunity to advance individual and corporate self-interest. After the Pristina adventure had been treated as a heroic deed, the admirals had good reason to believe that the strategically senseless deployment to the Mediterranean would bring them rewards. Had Kuroyedov reported the truth about the disastrous condition of the navy, Putin might not have authorized the deployment, or the preceding exercise, thus foreclosing the navy's first opportunity for higher status and better budget since the mid-1980s. And the terrible condition of the navy was obvious to its C-in-C: Kuroyedov's lead article in the first issue of the *Naval Digest* for 2000 was dedicated specifically to preventing ship accidents.[63]

Once real disaster struck the *Kursk*, the navy's chain of command, led by Kuroyedov, misinformed not only the public (hardly extraordinary in Russia), but the Supreme C-in-C Putin himself. Putin was reportedly told that the Russian navy had all necessary means for rescuing survivors, and that no foreign aid was necessary. While it is unlikely that foreign rescuers could have saved any sailors, the navy's stonewalling and lies helped create an image of a president indifferent to the lives of Russian servicemen. On 15 August, the navy's leaders, including admirals Kuroyedov and Popov, began to blame the disaster on a collision with a US or British submarine.[64] This theory, picked up by the Russian media and some of Putin's political allies,[65] created diplomatic complications: after vigorous denials from abroad, there was nothing Putin could do further, while the continuing accusations made Putin look weak. The navy's behaviour was consistent with their insistence that the West continued to be Russia's main enemy, a mindset encouraged by the National Security Concept and Military Doctrine.

A Recovery?

The *Kursk* tragedy demonstrated that the Russian navy was in no condition to show the flag on the high seas. The planned deployment to the Mediterranean was cancelled, because the navy's condition simply did not permit it; the Northern Fleet

could not even afford the necessary repairs and maintenance for all the ships scheduled to deploy.[66] This was the first step away from the escapism of the 1990s; the subsequent development of Russia's naval policy has been, to paraphrase Lenin, half-a-step forward, one-quarter of a step back. Putin has had to deal with two obvious problems: the first, prevention of another disaster and reestablishing order and responsibility in the naval command; the second - determination of the navy's future shape.

Putin refused to punish anyone until the investigation was complete. Since the *Kursk* was at the bottom of the Barents Sea, this had to wait until October 2001, when the submarine was raised by Dutch and Norwegian companies with participation from the Russian navy. Observers noted that the navy leadership were quite reluctant to raise the submarine, since that would make the day of reckoning closer. As the *Kursk* was raised, Admiral Kuroyedov, followed by other high-ranking officers, again blamed a 'foreign submarine' for the disaster.[67] It did not take investigators long to establish what had *not* happened. On 1 December 2001, the Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov presented a preliminary report to Putin, in the presence of Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin and Kuroyedov. At the meeting Putin stated that there were no indications of a collision between the Kursk and any other ship.[68] Next day, more than a dozen high-ranking Norther Fleet officers, including commander Admiral Vyacheslav Popov and chief of staff Vice-Admiral Motsak, were reprimanded and sent into retirement.[69]

The President's wrath, however, was quite restrained. 'After having been sacked, Vyacheslav Popov became a representative for Murmansk province in the Federation Council ... Mikhail Motsak got a job [as the first deputy] of Victor Cherkesov', the president's representative to the Northwestern Federal District.[70] Kuroyedov was not disciplined at all. None of the three have disavowed their earlier version of the disaster - that the *Kursk* was sunk by a foreign submarine. Moreover, Admiral Popov has been reported as insisting, even after Putin's pronouncement, that the investigators look for the remnants of a US MK-48 torpedo in the wreck, an escalation of his accusation from an accidental collision to that of an attack and premeditated murder![71] The final results of the investigation clearly indicated that the culprit was an explosion of one of the *Kursk's* torpedoes.[72]

Putin's sensitivity to the navy has also been demonstrated by the handling of the results of the investigation: the government has not released a detailed report because it is mostly classified. Still, the crew's relatives were allowed, according to official sources, access to all investigative materials, including classified ones. Excerpts from the materials were leaked in August 2002 by the official Russian Gazette (*Rossiyskaya Gazeta*) - without any protest from the administration - which pinpointed a whole series of violations of regulations by officers and sailors, and by the shipbuilding industry.[73] Crucial safety equipment was not properly maintained; the exercise plan lacked proper orders for organizing search and rescue missions, the Northern Fleet command ignored the instruction of the Main Naval Staff to conduct, in August 2000, a submarine rescue exercise; Popov took too long to declare an emergency; the exercise was very poorly organized; there was a suspicion that signatures to a number of documents had been forged, etc.[74] Despite such serious violations, a decision was reached not to prosecute anybody.

Shaping the future navy has turned out to be no more straightforward than Putin's handling of the disaster. 'There has not been a serious debate on the size and composition of a navy that would be affordable and sustainable in the second decade of the post-Cold war era.'[75] The president appeared to continue with his

pre-disaster naval policy. On 27 May 2001, Putin signed a Maritime Doctrine, evidently based on Kuroyedov's ideas, which emphasizes the economic benefits that Russia should gain from maritime activity, but is quite vague about practical details.[76] This lengthy quasi-scholarly document was aptly characterized by two retired Russian navy officers as nothing more than 'a wish to return Russia to the world ocean before other powers divide its riches'.[77]

The next project reportedly based on Kuroyedov's dissertation was creation of a Maritime Collegium,.[78] Modelled after *Admiralteystv-kollegiya*, a body established by Peter the Great to oversee Russia's maritime affairs, it is supposed to implement the Maritime Doctrine. According to some reports, the navy command saw this as a quasi-ministry of the navy, capable of bypassing the navy-haters in the Ministry of Defence and dealing directly with the navy-friendly president.[80] If Kuroyedov had such dreams, the reality was disappointing. The formation of the collegium was entrusted to Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, who discovered that the new state body was of interest to other players - the fishing industry, shipbuilders, the merchant marine, governors of coastal provinces, and arms exporters. An initial draft presented by Kasyanov to Putin in early September 2001 listed as members representatives of so many interests that the president turned it down.[79] When Putin approved the statutes several days later, the collegium was to be chaired by the prime minister himself; his first deputy there was to be the First Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the defence industry Ilya Klebanov, and his deputies were the Minister of Economic Development German Gref, the Minister of Defence Sergei Ivanov, and Admiral Kuroyedov.[80] The chairman and all his other deputies outranked the navy C-in-C. It seems that Putin chose to take Kuroyedov's thesis of the economic importance of the ocean to heart - and the navy has been left without any special leverage in the new body.

Meanwhile, the future shape of the navy has remained in doubt. The 'Foundations' of March 2000 made a modest effort at defining what types of ships Russia would have to buy, and what kinds of missions they would carry out. The navy is supposed to deter both nuclear and conventional attack on Russia. Nuclear deterrence continues to be all-important, and buying new SSBNs, modernizing and maintaining existing ones, and buying missiles for them are designated as priorities for the navy's weapons acquisition programme. The defence of coastal waters becomes more important, to be achieved by attack submarines and 'multipurpose' surface ships. The 'Foundations' insist that Russia will need aircraft carriers - logical if the navy is to deploy, as proposed, to distant seas if a threat to Russia emerges there, but an impossible demand on Russia's economy.[81]

The economic situation makes most of these plans look unrealistic for the immediate and mid-term future. Even the most clear and well established mission - nuclear deterrence - is in trouble.[82] The navy has not received a single new SSBN since 1992. Only one is being built, the *Yuri Dolgorukiy* of the *Borey* class. Construction began in 1996, and is not likely to be completed before 2005.[83] The Typhoon and Delta III SSBNs were bought between 1976 and 1989; the newer Delta IVs joined the fleet in 1985-1991.[84] The service life of an SSBN is twenty to twenty five years.[85] With no maintenance, it may be as short as ten to fifteen years.[86]

Further, the SSBN fleet is threatened by the lack of replacement SLBMs, whose service life is ten years. The Makeyev Missile Centre, the main SLBM contractor, has experienced significant delays in its attempts to build a new missile to replace the SS-N-20 on the Typhoons and to arm the future *Yuri Dolgorukiy*. While Sergeyev was minister of defence, an attempt was made to modify the *Topol-M* SS-

27 to be used as an SLBM. The attempt, which favoured the strategic rocket forces' contractor, the Institute of Thermal Technology, did not succeed, but disrupted the naval contractor's work. Now the navy may have to abandon its five largest SSBNs, the Typhoons, and rely on the remaining seven Delta-IVs as the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad. This will require eventual replacement of the SS-N-23 SLBM with the new RSM-54 *Sineva*, a 'radical ... modification with 10 instead of 4 warheads, and more sophisticated satellite navigation, command computer, and anti-ABM systems'.[87]

Throughout the 1990s, there were a number of changes in the posture of the strategic nuclear forces. The relative importance of the land based ICBMs and the navy's SLBMs was at the centre of a fierce debate over very scarce resources. Sergeyev's appointment as minister of defence was not as detrimental to the navy's nuclear role as is often imagined. In July 1998, the Security Council decided to emphasize the sea-based leg of the triad, decreeing that its share would increase from thirty to fifty per cent of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal.[88] Still, Sergeyev put most of the acquisition budget into buying land-based ICBMs. With Putin's accession, the navy's budget started growing, albeit slowly, and the navy's argument that its submarines provide for the most secure nuclear posture has been reaffirmed by the General Staff, which announced in January 2001 that the naval deterrent will play the leading role in future.[89]

No one is asking (at least, in public) an obvious question: since Russia is soon likely to have fewer than a dozen SSBNs in its arsenal, and only a quarter of those combat ready at any given time, and since the *Kursk* disaster demonstrated that Russian submarines are not very safe, could an accident to just one SSBN significantly reduce Russia's strategic nuclear forces? The Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), signed by the US and Russia in Moscow in May 2002, which allows Russia considerable leeway in reducing its strategic arsenal, may alleviate the pressure on Russia to keep up the numbers of its sea-based weapons, but the inability to complete construction of even one SSBN in more than ten years makes one wonder about the future of its sea-based systems.

The situation with other classes of ships is not much better. Throughout the 1990s, the navy received only ships ordered by or designed for the Soviet navy to fight NATO on the high seas: nuclear submarines (such as the *Gepard* that joined the navy in 2002 after eleven years at the shipyard), heavy nuclear missile cruisers, large ASW ships, destroyers. The navy also has some newer acquisitions. The keel of the new corvette *Steregushchiy* was laid in 2001; it is expected to join the navy in 2005. It is planned to lay the keel of another ship of the same class in 2003. The frigate *Yaroslav Mudryy* is eighty per cent complete after fourteen years of construction; another frigate, the *Tatarstan*, joined the navy after twelve years of construction.[90] The modest financial boost given to the navy has resulted in some acquisition progress, but much more needs to be done if Russia is not to lose in the not too distant future the capability to defend its coastal waters, not to mention the more distant 'approaches to its shores', a mission that, in the eyes of the navy planners, requires aircraft carriers.[91]

A number of factors have kept the navy command clinging to such Cold War missions as repelling an attack by a US carrier group from the Norwegian Sea. There are the inertia of thinking and self-interested conservatism. There is also the irresistible attraction of focusing the navy's plans on missions that require existing assets - and they are concentrated in the Northern and Pacific Fleets, which have only their old Cold War enemies to worry about. (To be fair, the situation in the

Pacific is more complex, but currently the main threat to Russian interests there is poaching.) These are reasons internal to the navy. There is also a very important reason external to the navy: the Russian government has been unable to devise a foreign policy that could firmly convey a message to the military that their Cold War ideas belong in the archives, not in threat assessments[92] and operational plans. Telling the military that Russia has no enemies is not enough - the political leaders should have filled this ambiguous vacuum with alliances capable of supporting the Russian state in its current weakened condition.

Putin has made some progress in this direction, especially after the September 2001 terrorist attacks. His good relationship with President Bush, and the considerable strategic capital gained from a small investment in Central Asia,apparently encouraged Putin to look towards the threat and opportunities in the south. For several years, while the media, politicians, and retired officers were bemoaning the fate of the great blue water navy, the very unglamorous Caspian Flotilla has actually increased its size, according to some sources, by two and a half times: most of the small patrol craft built in recent years were sent to the flotilla, which has also been reinforced by several small ships transferred from the Black and Baltic Seas. The new frigate *Tatarstan* joined the Caspian Flotilla.[93] A small force consisting of two frigates, twelve major patrol craft and fifty smaller craft can have a serious impact in this sensitive and important area.[94]

This dynamism is obviously linked to the economic importance of the Caspian, the conflicting claims of several states on its energy resources, and its proximity to the volatile Caucasus and Central Asia. After an unsuccessful summit of Caspian basin states in April 2002, Putin ordered Kuroyedov to conduct a major exercise there.[95] (Of course, an exercise of this size had to be planned well beforehand, but Putin used it as a political gesture after the summit had failed to resolve the littoral states' differences.) The naval exercise was conducted on August 8-15, 2002; its main goal was protection of economic facilities against terrorism, and the navy (including naval infantry) was joined by ground and air forces, Interior Ministry troops, etc.[96] Two weeks later, during his visit to the Pacific Fleet, Putin praised the Caspian exercise, with its focus on counter-terrorism and economic security, as the model for other fleets to follow.[97] He named two main missions for the Pacific Fleet: nuclear deterrence and protection of Russia's maritime border,[98] both compatible with a realistic approach to what the navy can do for Russia today.

This naval version of ‘small is beautiful’ is not going to flourish easily in the Main Naval Staff. While preparations for the Caspian exercise were in their last stage, Kuroyedov marked Navy Day by an article entitled 'We Are an Oceanic Power', claiming that the US and NATO were out to weaken Russia militarily, removing it as an economic competitor, and that this disaster could only be prevented by Russia regaining its status as a ‘great naval power’. He named the mission of defending against US aircraft carriers and long-range sea-launched cruise missiles as the navy’s top priority.[99]

How can this backsliding occur, and what does it really mean? Civil-military relations in Russia, after attempts of the first half of the 1990s to bring civilian experts into public debates on military affairs, have become increasingly a private dialogue between the supreme C-in-C, President Putin, and his soldiers and sailors. The navy C-in-C is not responsible to anyone but the president, and Putin's pronouncements are likely to send confusing signals to the navy and the tax-payers. As long as no one owes an explanation to the public, the Russian navy is

likely to continue to be buffeted by capricious winds, rudderless in the stormy seas of post-communist politics.

ENDNOTES

[1] First Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel-General Yuri Baluyevskiy noted in November 2000 that the Russian military was still 'a scaled down version' of the Soviet military; see 'Colonel General Yuri Baluyevskiy: Army Will Divide Up Air, Sea, and Land', *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*, 23 November 2000, translated in FBIS, CEP20001123000337.

[2] United States Naval Institute Database, on line in *Periscope*, www.periscope.icg.com/eurasia/russia/navy/index.html.

[3] Georgiy Kostev, 'Moryaki Nadeyutsya na Luchsheye', *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (NVO)*, 2 June 2000.

[4] Mikhail Khodarenok, 'Chernyy God Rossiyskogo Flota', *NVO*, 23 February 2001.

[5] V I Kuroyedov & M I Moskovenko, 'O Natsionalnoy Morskoy Politike Rossii', *Voyennaya Mysl*, No 1, 2002, p13.

[6] Mikhail Khodarenok, 'Chernyy god Rossiyskogo Flota'.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Admiral V Kravchenko & Rear-Admiral A Ovcharenko, 'Morskiye Sily SYaS Rossii v Usloviyakh Deystvuyushchego Dogovora SNV-2', *Morskoy Sbornik*, 2000, No 8, p4.

[11] *Periscope*, www.periscope.icg.com/eurasia/russia/navy/index.html#overview.

[12] A G Savelyev & F I Novoselov, 'Strategicheskoye Sderzhivaniye i Strategicheskaya Stabilnost. Rol i Mesto Morskikh Strategicheskikh Yadernykh Sil', in V G Baranovskiy, ed, *Mirovoy Okean i Strategicheskaya Stabilnost*, Moscow: 2002, p43. It is not clear whether the authors refer to the total number of SSBNs, or to the number of SSBNs in operational condition.

[13] I must thank George Fedoroff for this observation; he heard that opinion from the then Soviet navy C-in-C Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, during the latter's visit to the US in 1991.

[14] 'Arctic Priorities', *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 7 December 1999, translated in FBIS, CEP19991206000042.

[15] Aleksandr Alf, 'Soldaty "Dyryavyat" Yadernyy Shchit', *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 7 August 1999.

[16] This summary of Russian naval history is based on an outstanding overview of the subject by Robert B Bathurst, *Understanding the Soviet Navy: a HandBook*, Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1979, pp49-94.

[17] Ibid, p68.

[18] Ibid, p70. For a detailed analysis of the Russian shipbuilding programmes in 1907 and 1914, see K F Shatsillo, *Ot Portsmutskogo Mira k Pervoy Mirovoy Voyne. Generaly i Politika*, Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2000, pp83-103, 174-183, 234-242, 274-284.

[19] Ibid, p344.

[20] A A Kokoshin, *Armiya i Politika*, Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1995, pp196-198.

[21] Bathurst, *Understanding*, p92.

[22] Rear-Admiral V Apanasenko, 'Nerealizovannaya Programma Opal'nogo Glavkoma', *Morskoy Sbornik*, 1990, No 8, p10.

[23] Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, 'On Vyvel Flot v Okean', *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 19 January 2000.

[24] G Arbatov, *Zatyanuvsheyesya Vyzdorovleniye* (1953-1985), Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1991, p227.

[25] Apanasenko, 'Nerealizovannaya Programma', pp9, 10.

[26] Aleksandr Kochukov, 'Na Flotakh - Boyevaya Trevoga,' *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 24 July 2002.

[27] Ilya Kedrov, 'Prezident Uprazhnyayetsya v Strategii,' *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 22 August 1998.

[28] 'Kontseptsiya Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii', *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 27 December 1997.
[29] Ibid.
[30] B N Makeyev, *Voyenno-Morskiye Aspekty Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossii*, Moscow: Komitet po Nerasprostraneniya i Kriticheskim Tekhnologiyam, 1997, p25.
[31] Sergei Sokut, 'Trudnoye Preodoleniye Nostalgii', *NVO*, 6 September 2002.
[32] Yuri Teplyakov, 'Okean. Rossiya. Flot', *Moskovskiye Novosti*, No 2, 28 January 1992.
[33] Rear-Admiral V G Lebedko (Retd), 'VMF na Zashchite Natsionalnykh Interesov Rossii', *Voyennaya Mysl*, No 1, 2002, p67.
[34] 'Obrashcheniye Veteranov Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny i Vooruzhennykh Sil', *Morskoy Sbornik*, 1997, No 10, pp24-26.
[35] 'General Armii I Sergeyev: 'Flot Vypolnyayet Svoi Zadachi', *Morskoy Sbornik*, No 10, 1997, pp3, 5.
[36] 'Naznacheniya', *Morskoy Sbornik*, No 11, 1997, p19.
[37] 'Admiral Zakharenko on Pacific Fleet Reorganization', *Oriyentir*, No 9, 1 September 1999, pp20-23, translated in FBIS CEP19991029000008; Vice-Admiral V Fedorov, 'A Single Troop Grouping in the Country's Northeast: the First Experience', *Morskoy Sbornik*, March 1999, No 3, pp33-35, translated in FBIS FTS19990502000593.
[38] 'Admiral Zakharenko on Pacific Fleet Reorganization'.
[39] Sergey Voyeykov, 'Kamchatka: New System of Command and Control', *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 21 March 1998, translated in FBIS UMA-98-082.
[40] Yuriy Golotyuk, 'Navy Commander in Chief Instructed To Sort Out Kamchatka. Generals' "Mutiny" Seems to Have Helped Improve Admiral's Standing', *Russkiy Telegraf*, 19 March 1998, translated in FBIS uma03201998001319.
[41] Admiral V Kuroyedov, 'Nyneshniye Napravleniya Reformirovaniya Nashego VMF', *Morskoy Sbornik*, April 1998, No 4, pp3, 4.
[42] Admiral V Kuroyedov, 'Kompleksnyy Podkhod k Razvitiyu Morskoy Sily Gosudarstva', *Morskoy Sbornik*, August 1999, No 8, p6.
[43] Ibid, p7.
[44] See Mikhail Tsypkin, 'The Russian Military, Politics and Security Policy in the 1990s', in Michael H Crutcher, ed, *The Russian Armed Forces at the Dawn of the Millennium*, US Army War College: Carlisle Barrracks, PA, 2000, pp35-37.
[45] Admiral V Kuroyedov, 'Itogi i Perspektivy', *Morskoy Sbornik*, December 1999, No 12, p3.
[46] Aleksandr Koretskiy, 'Russia Inflicted Nuclear Strike on United States. Only in Training for Now', *Segodnya*, 2 July 1999, translated in FBIS FTS19990702000715.
[47] Sergei Sokut, 'Krug Pocheta Nad Islandiyey', *NVO*, 2 July 1999.
[48] Valeriy Aleksin, 'Prezident Rossii na Zashchite Dissertatsii Glavkoma VMF', *NVO*, 27 July 2000. The ideas of the dissertation were by no means a radical departure from previous programmatic documents: it was mainly 'an adaptation of the World Ocean Federal Targeted Programme published in early 1997', (George Fedoroff, 26 August 2002).
[49] 'Antigosudarstvennaya Tayna', *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 29 August 2002.
[50] Putin did increase defence budgets from 109 billion rubles in 1999 to 284 billion in 2002, while inflation was running at about 20 per cent per year; see Aleksandr Golts, *Yezhenedel'nyy Zhurnal*, 25 January 2002, http://www.ej.ru/003/life/military/index.html_Printed.html. In 2003, the defence budget is projected to grow to 345.7 billion rubles; see Andrei Nikolayev: 'Armii Nedodano 18.8 Milliarda Rublei', *Vremya Novostey*, 26 September 2002. Still, Russian defence spending, estimated in this interview to be less than three per cent of GDP, leaves Russian armed forces quite poor.
[51] Valeriy Aleksin, 'Rossiya Vozrozhdayet Status Velikoy Morskoy Derzhavy', *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 14 March 2000.
[52] Sergei Sokut, 'Putin Osvaivayet Rol Glavkoverkha', *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 7 April 2000.
[53] Alexei G Arbatov, *The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya*, Marshall Center Papers, No 2, p15.
[54] 'Osnovy Politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii v Oblasti Voyenno-Morskoy Deyatelnosti na Period do 2010 Goda', *Morskoy Sbornik*, April 2000, No 4, pp4-10; Sergei Patyrev, 'Podtekst

Morskoy Doktriny', *NVO*, 17 August 2001; Aleksin, 'Rossiya Vozrozhdayet Status Velikoy Morskoy Derzhavy'.

55 Patyrev, 'Podtekst Morskoy Doktriny'.

56 Ibid; Andrei Gavrilenko, 'Zavtra - den' VMF', *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 24 July 1999.

57 Georgiy Kostev & Igor Kostev, 'Vopreki Doktrinam i Programmam', *NVO*, 1 February 2002; 'Generalnyy Kurs v Mirovom Okeane', *NVO*, 19 November 1999.

58 'Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii', *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 12 May 2000.

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60 Yuri Golotyuk, 'Voyenno-Morskaya Gordost Velikorossov', *Vremya Novostey*, 18 August 2000.

61 Mikhail Motsak, 'S Pritselom Na Nepryamyye Strategicheskiye Deystviya', *NVO*, 28 January 2000.

62 Kuroyedov, 'On Vyvel Flot v Okean'.

63 Admiral V Kuroyedov, 'Vazhneyshaya Problema Tekhnicheskoy Ekspluatatsii Flotov', *Morskoy Sbornik*, January 2000, No 1, pp3-6.

64 For the chronology of the disaster and the Russian navy's misinformation, see the report by Bellona Foundation, *It Sank - 2002*, http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/navy/northern_fleet/incidents/25442.html. See also 'Admiral Kuroyedov Nazval 80%-Nuyu Prichinu Gibeli "Kurska"', http://lenta.ru/russia/2000/10/24/submarine_kuroyedov.

65 'Deystviya Putina Byli Zapozdalymi', *Gazeta.ru*, 22 August 2000, http://www.gazeta.ru/pkursk.

66 Vladimir Yermolin, 'Vozvrashchatsya - Plokhaya Primeta', *Izvestiya*, 12 October 2000.

67 Aleksandr Golts, 'Utonuvshiye vo Lzhi', *Itogi*, No 43, 2001.

68 http://president.kremlin.ru/events/393.html.

69 Yuri Golotyuk, 'Admiralskiy Chas', *Vremya Novostey*, 3 December 2001.

70 Bellona Foundation, *It Sank - 2002*; Aleksandr Chebotarev, 'Mikhail Motsak - Doroga k Domu Prolegla Cherez Okean', *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 8 October 2002.

71 'Antigosudarstvennaya Taina'.

72 Vladimir Pasyakin, 'Vstrecha s Sem'yami Pogibshikh Podvodnikov', *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 10 October 2002.

73 'Antigosudarstvennaya Taina'.

74 Pasyakin, 'Vstrecha s Sem'yami'.

75 Pavel Baev, *The Russian Navy after the Kursk: Still Proud but with Poor Navigation*, PONARS Policy Memo No 215, Washington, DC: 25 January 2002.

76 'Morskaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii,' *NVO*, 3 August 2001; Vadim Solovyev, 'Rossiya Obrela Yeshche Odnu Doktrinu - Morskuyu', *NVO*, 3 August 2001.

77 Georgiy Kostev & Igor Kostev, 'Vopreki Doktrinam I Programmam'.

78 Yuri Golotyuk, 'Admiraly Ostalis' za Bortom', *Vremya Novostey*, 6 September 2001.

79 Golotyuk, 'Admiraly Ostalis' za Bortom'.

80 'Kasyanov Vozglavil Morskuyu Kollegiyu', *NVO*, 14 September 2001.

81 'Osnovy Politiki', pp9, 10.

82 It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal, except in passing, with the sea-based leg of the Russian strategic nuclear triad, since this subject requires a study of the Russian strategic nuclear policy in the 1990s.

83 Savelyev & Novoselov, 'Strategicheskoe Sderzhivanie', p48; Sokut, 'Trudnoye Preodoleniye Nostalgii'.

84 Savelyev & Novoselov, 'Strategicheskoe Sderzhivanie', p48.

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