Gordon Bennett

Vladimir Putin & Russia's Special Services

August 2002
Vladimir Putin & Russia’s Special Services

Gordon Bennett

This paper looks at Putin’s relationship with Russia’s special services. It describes his personnel policies, security and intelligence officials promoted in recent years to important and influential positions and outlines the challenges facing them and their subordinates. It explains the immediate tasks of the Russian special services, providing specific examples of their activities in and outside Russia, including their role in Chechnya. It examines the need for quality control of the Russian special services and analyses their reforms and related financial issues. The paper suggests that in the post 9/11 world the Russian special services could become partners in their bilateral and multilateral contacts with old and new enemies and part-time allies in combat against international terrorism and transnational criminal organizations. It will be a process fraught with many difficulties, and whatever are the successes and failures of this partnership, it will run independently from business-as-usual-intelligence operations conducted by individual states.

Contents

List of Acronyms 2
Introduction 4
(Mis)understanding Putin 4
The Elite After All 7
All The President’s Men 8
It Began With Boris Yeltsin 11
Reforming The Special Services 12
The FSB 14
The SVR 16
FAPSI 18
Rolling Up The Lourdes Centre 19
The Information Security Doctrine 21
The Financial Monitoring Committee 21
Enemies, Heroes & Troublemakers 22
It's The Judiciary, Stupid 26
Chechnya 29
Cooperation With The CIS & Bilateral Links 31
After 11 September 2001 36
Conclusion 38
(For the purpose of this paper all organizations which sprang from the KGB are described as “services” irrespective of their actual name or legal status.)

**Russian acronyms used in this paper:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAPSI</td>
<td>Federalnoye Agentstvo Pravitelstvennoy Svyazi I Informatsii</td>
<td>Federal Agency of Governmental Communication and Information. Similar to the British GCHQ or the US NSA, FAPSI also conducts Russian and foreign open sources research and opinion polls for the Russian leadership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPS</td>
<td>Federalnaya Pogranichnaya Sluzhba</td>
<td>Federal Border Guard Service is responsible for guarding Russia’s borders. It has a limited remit and capability to conduct intelligence work in the border areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSB</td>
<td>Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti</td>
<td>Federal Security Service. The main Russian organization responsible for counterintelligence (including in the armed forces), and combating terrorism, drug smuggling, money laundering and human trafficking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSK</td>
<td>Federalnaya Sluzhba Kontrrazvedki</td>
<td>Federal Counterintelligence Service. The predecessor of the FSB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSO</td>
<td>Federalnaya Sluzhba Okhrany</td>
<td>Federal Protection Service, responsible for the protection of high ranking state officials including regional leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRU</td>
<td>Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye</td>
<td>Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Defence Ministry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MVD</td>
<td>Ministerstvo Vnutrennykh Del</td>
<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs, the main crime-fighting body in Russia. Its tasks are often similar to those of the FSB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKVD</td>
<td>Narodnyy Kommissariat Vnutrennykh Del</td>
<td>People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs. One of the predecessors of the KGB. Restructured after WW II.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGU</td>
<td>Pervoye Glavnoye Upravleniye</td>
<td>First Chief Directorate of the KGB, responsible for intelligence operations and analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBP</td>
<td>Sluzhba Bezopasnosti</td>
<td>Presidential Security Service, in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Vladimir Putin & Russia’s Special Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prezidenta</td>
<td>theory subordinated to the FSO but in reality an independent body.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBU</td>
<td>Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Ukrainy</td>
<td>Ukrainian Security Service, contains civilian security and intelligence organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNB ChRI</td>
<td>Sluzhba Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Chechenskoy Respubliki Ichkeriy</td>
<td>The National Security Service of the Chechen Republic. The main special service controlled by the Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVR</td>
<td>Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki</td>
<td>Foreign Intelligence Service.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

There are not many countries in which a person once employed by its highly controversial security and intelligence service which operated in the interest of a dictatorial ruling party with a history of cruelty and incompetence, could, several years after its collapse, run for president in a democratic election, win it and remain a highly popular leader. In the post-Yeltsin Russia Vladimir Putin's KGB past was not an impediment. It was an advantage. The overwhelming majority of Russians wanted quick and positive changes and were not concerned whether their leader was prepared to use the full potential of the special services to achieve them. What the West, the Far East, or any other part of the world thought about the new man in the Kremlin was of little relevance to an average Russian. The world's politicians could only envy Putin's genuine popularity, even if it reflected the paucity of credible politicians in Russia. To begin his reforms the new president had to make many personnel changes. As so many Russian ills were directly linked with corruption, all forms of organized crime and terrorism, Putin had to start with improving the performance of the power structures. Almost all of them had to be modernized and more generously financed. Their role in and outside Russia had to be looked at again and their tasks prioritized in accordance with the real situation and not the global ambitions of politicians or influential officials. The changes in the Russian special services have been noticed among Russia's allies and enemies. Like in many other countries in the post 9/11 world, attempts to modernize and synchronize the special services also became easier in Russia. That however makes Putin's life only slightly less difficult, as he is facing more challenges than his fellow heads of state in other industrialized countries.

(Mis)understanding Putin

Putin's popularity, genuine democratic reforms, the constructive contribution of his former colleagues to their implementation and a flood of books showing the Russian special services of today as well as their predecessors in a positive light, will make an objective examination of the history of the KGB and the career of its most famous son, Vladimir Putin, very difficult for many years to come.

Vladimir Putin's rapid ascendance to power, from an influential but discreet deputy of the St Petersburg mayor to the post of acting Prime Minister in August 1999 was welcomed by many Russians, and by almost all non-Russian analysts with fearful comments about his service in the KGB, and gloomy predictions about his future governing methods, which, considering his past, were expected to be semi-dictatorial. It was assumed that Russia's foreign and security policies would become more coherent but also more confrontational. What else could be expected from a man who spent all his early career working against the West? It was a facile but popular preconception and it allowed Russian and Western commentators and the media not to conduct in-depth analysis of Vladimir Putin and his background. Putin's pre-electoral book-interview, long, authorized leaks in the media and a film-autobiography “Muzhskaya Rabota” were occasionally quoted but not analyzed. Western journalists and commentators preferred to rely on anti-Putin, erudite chattering classes in Moscow and St Petersburg and unattributed translations from the Russian press. Their Russian counterparts prematurely switched on their old Soviet auto-censorship mechanism, avoiding profiling Putin in depth. A better look at Putin at this stage would have shown that his background and his early working years could have been a serious drawback in his political career had they been scrutinized earlier; that he is much more intelligent, flexible and pragmatic than his
Vladimir Putin & Russia's Special Services

unusual but at the same time modest career would suggest. It might also have argued that Russia run by a group of ex-KGB officers could be much better off than Russia run by former CPSU apparatchiks or ideological free-marketers tinkering with the country’s economy, and that the KGB employed intelligent, well trained, highly motivated and competitive people, many of whom would have been successful in any political system. Would the new ex-KGB man be that much worse than the old, alcohol soaked, recycled communist? Was he a threat to the still precarious Russian democracy? Was Putin’s life so mysterious and, if it was, did it really matter?

In Russia, even the section of the media unfavorable to Putin had not asked pointed questions about his background. The western media, who were capable of spending large sums investigating a minor entertainer or a sportsman, could not be bothered to have a close look at the new leader of the largest country in the world. The talking heads on both sides of the Atlantic rehashed already available material in countless TV programmes without looking at other sources.

No questions were asked about Putin’s grandfather’s brief career as one of Stalin’s cooks, or Putin’s father’s service on submarines in the early 1930s, or his war record in a seemingly untraceable NKVD unit. The answers to all these questions, or even their absence, could have indicated that the new president’s security lineage was much longer than his image makers would have us believe.

Historians and analysts failed to ponder the difference between the NKVD reconnaissance (razvedyvatelnnyye) units, in which Putin’s father apparently served - or whether the NKVD had such units and if they did exist, what exactly were they responsible for during WWII - and the NKVD cut-off (zagraditelnyye) units, whose role was to shoot on sight any deserting Red Army soldiers. Russian voters were quite happy to know that their leader’s father served in a mysterious intelligence or reconnaissance formation. More penetrating inquiries about the nature of the unit’s activities might have brought politically embarrassing answers, such as that Putin senior served in a cut-off unit or in the effective but brutal military counterintelligence organization “SMERSH”.

On the other hand Putin’s service in the KGB is not surprising. As a KGB officer he simply lived his childhood dream. His choice may have been unusual to a Westerner but in reality it reflected only the shortage of dreams in the post-war Soviet Union. In a country of shortages and restrictions, teenage career dreams came in black and white, like Putin’s favourite film “Podvig Razvedchika” about a brave, honest and victorious Soviet intelligence officer. For a Soviet boy from a poor blue collar family, not interested in scientific or artistic subjects, and given his father’s service in the security organs, working for the KGB was the most attractive dream he could afford.

Vladimir Putin’s watchers also failed to ask whether there has ever been a case where a man recruited by the KGB has not been sent immediately to one of the KGB schools. According to Putin’s biography he did not receive the training given to every graduate joining the KGB: the best degree from the most prestigious school would not make even the most gifted graduate into an intelligence or a security officer. Even if, after joining the KGB, Vladimir Putin was given a desk job, which was unlikely considering his sporting achievements and psychological profile, almost ideal for an operational man, he would have had to go on a course which would make him familiar with the directorate he was working for and the tasks he was expected to perform. It is inconceivable that his first in-house education was
intelligence training at the beginning of the 1980s, as his biography says. There was very little interest in Putin’s skillfully white washed biography (the only exception was the Italian daily La Repubblica which asked many good questions and never got any answers).

Putin’s career pattern indicates that he must have been sent to one of the counterintelligence schools, most probably in Minsk, the KGB school which catered mainly for the employees of the Second Main Directorate responsible for internal security. His only foreign language, German, would at the beginning of his career in 1975/77 probably not have been good enough to give him a place in the team working against German speaking nationals in Leningrad. He must have started his career against softer targets, i.e., Russian nationals. This would have been a potential political campaign spoiler, even in Yeltsin’s Russia waiting for a strong guiding hand. (Vladimir Putin studied only one year at the intelligence school. Director of the SVR Sergey Lebedev, interviewed on the Red Banner Institute which trained intelligence officers, says that those who knew languages studied one year. Those with a technical or scientific degree studied three years. Although the SVR and its predecessors attach great importance to agents’ knowledge of at least one foreign language Vladimir Putin’s short course was most probably due partly to his knowledge of German and partly to his counterintelligence training and work experience.)

The popular wisdom that Putin was not successful when working in the GDR is contradicted by his better than average rate of promotion. Neither Putin nor his colleagues are naive or vain enough to contradict gossip that he had few professional achievements in the GDR. His single known credible attempt to recruit a GDR national may suggest that intelligence work was not his main task and that his duties were in the counterintelligence department of the PGU of the KGB, or that he was a regional liaison officer to the East German Security Ministry.

Like all his colleagues stationed in the GDR Putin witnessed the disappearance of two countries, the GDR at the end of 1989 and the slower but parallel collapse of his own country, the USSR, culminating in its official disappearance at the end of 1991. The atmosphere in all KGB outposts in the GDR in 1989 must have been dramatic. Closing some files, opening new ones, setting up stay-behind networks, shipping back home everything sensitive, negotiating with GDR Interior Ministry personnel, watching the resentful and fearful Soviet community in the GDR and knowing that things at home were likewise beginning to unravel must have had a profound impact on Vladimir Putin.

The continued dominance in post-Soviet political life of members of the party which after 1953 controlled all the Soviet power structures but whose membership did not exceed 10% of the Soviet population, was taken for granted, but the rise of Vladimir Putin, in spite of his comparatively uncontroversial political past in St Petersburg and clearly democratic aspirations, was originally heralded by many commentators as the end of the democratic experience in Russia. Those accusing Putin of allowing St Petersburg to become the criminal capital of Russia fail to acknowledge that although as the first deputy mayor of the city and the supervisor of the local power structures Putin shares some responsibility for the situation in the city, all the top nominations in the power structures in St Petersburg and in Leningrad Oblast were made in Moscow. If Putin had as much dictatorial power as had been suggested, he and Anatoliy Sobchak would have made sure they won the municipal elections in 1996.
The Elite After All

In the West an objective assessment of the KGB and its personnel was practically impossible. The KGB was the sword and shield of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union whose top ranking officials led the August 1991 coup, and it was difficult to understand that the organization known from countless films, books articles and TV programmes as a sinister tool of oppression employed many educated, highly intelligent, well trained, frequently impressive “soldiers of the invisible front”.

The bad press which the KGB had in the West was due partly to its worldwide aggressive spying operations, partly because it often served as a simple but effective tool in the suppression of dissidents and control of the population and partly because it was successful in doing what it was tasked to do. There were not many organizations in the Soviet Union which functioned well, and only one or two of them were as effective as the KGB. The committee was also one of the few Soviet organizations which had to be operationally flexible all the time. It had to be able to cope with some very enterprising foreign special services at home and abroad. Its opponents had no respect for Soviet red tape, the command economy, Marxism-Leninism or five year plans. They were often well prepared, highly motivated, well funded, well organized and very clever. True, in the Soviet Union the KGB controlled the operational environment in a way that only their colleagues and enemies from other equally strict dictatorships could match, but its operations abroad in societies incomparably more tolerant and democratic than their own were not easy, because even there security services were often very efficient. In a recent interview, for example, the present head of the SVR Sergey Nikolayevich Lebedev describes Norway and the Netherlands as two exceptionally difficult countries to work against because of the professionalism of their security services.²

These high class opponents required equally competent Soviet intelligence and security personnel. The low operational standards of organizations such as the MVD which dealt only with internal problems in which foreigners were not involved show clearly the gap between the KGB and most of their partners in the USSR.³

- In contrast with other power structures the KGB did not accept volunteers and relied on word of mouth and talent spotting. (Col-Gen Lebedev, the present head of the SVR,⁴ said that volunteers were not accepted at all. Vladimir Putin claims that he volunteered to join the KGB after completing secondary education and was then picked up by a talent spotter several years later. His bid to join the organization probably went through his relatives or the parents of his friends and colleagues.)

- The state was the only employer; KGB salaries and incentives were attractive. The pool of potential recruits was very large and the organization could pick and choose.

- The recruitment procedure and vetting were long and of a high standard; a comparatively easy task in a society in which very few dared not to cooperate when background inquiries and psychological profiling were conducted.
Training provided by the KGB was of a high standard and promotions usually on merit. Those serving abroad could move more freely than their diplomatic or commercial colleagues.

As a result, the KGB officers were well informed, well disciplined, able to take difficult decisions and were operationally flexible in just about any situation. They were logical in their actions, usually able to communicate with foreigners and many of them had experience working and living abroad. They were discreet and efficient and Vladimir Putin was no exception. These positive qualities, which also made KGB officers dangerous opponents, are useful in any political system.

All The President’s Men

Putin’s career in Moscow was not long enough to build up a power base before Yeltsin nominated him acting president. It is not surprising therefore that Vladimir Putin has been relying on former officers of the special services to strengthen his position in many federal organs and to implement his reforms. He had no other group of people he could rely on and, after all, much of what has to be done in Russia: the war in Chechnya, combating organized crime and corruption, could only be done by the power structures. Putin’s two main parallel tasks were to improve the Russian economy and to establish law and order.

When he became president, the FSB, the most important organization responsible for the internal security of the country, was already headed by one of his friends Nikolay Platonovich Patrushev. It was with Patrushev and his wife that the Putins spent their first “presidential” New Year, 1999/2000, among the Russian Troops in Chechnya. A year older than Putin, Patrushev joined the KGB in Leningrad in 1974. After several years Putin went to Moscow and then to the GDR and Patrushev became the head of the KGB in Karelia. It was Putin who, in May 1998, brought Patrushev into the presidential administration and later recommended for the leadership of the FSB. In the Kremlin Patrushev has practically unlimited confidence and trust. Whatever the shortcomings of the FSB may be, Putin would have great difficulty finding a more loyal and experienced replacement for Patrushev.

Disappointed with internal bickering within the Russian Ministry of Defence and half-hearted attempts made by the ministry’s leadership to introduce viable reforms, Putin brought into the MOD three outsiders. Two of the newcomers had made their career in the KGB intelligence directorate. Sergey Borisovich Ivanov became Minister of Defence at the end of March 2001. He is the first civilian defence minister in the history of modern Russia and the first ever intelligence officer in this position. Another intelligence officer, a graduate of the prestigious Moscow Institute of International Relations, Mikhail Arkadevich Dmitriyev, was transferred to the Ministry of Defence first as deputy minister, then within weeks as first deputy minister of defence, from the Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology in November 2000, where, as a deputy minister, he supervised military-technical cooperation with foreign countries. Until August 2000, when he was transferred to the Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology, Lieutenant-General Dmitriyev was chief analyst for the SVR, a post in which he replaced Sergey Ivanov, the current defence minister. Dmitriyev’s last foreign intelligence posting was in South Africa. Mikhail Dmitriyev also chairs the new committee of military technical co-operation of the Russian MOD.
The MVD was also in need of radical reforms. Yuriy Andropov tried to saturate the ministry with KGB officers in the early 1980s and the results were encouraging as long as he was in charge. Twenty years later, putting special services officers at the head of the ministry would have been politically risky and likely to have ended in friction and resignations on both sides. Putin gave the job of Interior Minister to Boris Vyacheslavovich Gryzlov, an engineer-politician from St Petersburg. The post of one of his deputies and the head of the Criminal Police Service was given to a former KGB intelligence officer, Major-General Nikolay Leonidovich Bobrovskiy. Bobrovskiy, a lawyer with a knowledge of German, has worked for 25 years in security structures. Before the MVD appointment Bobrovskiy worked, together with Vladimir Putin, in the presidential administration and was later appointed a deputy minister of taxes and levies. In July 2002 General Bobrovskiy was replaced by a former FSB staffer Colonel-General Rashid Nurgaliyev. In the FSB General Nurgaliyev had been responsible for combating drug trafficking. Colonel-General Yevgeniy Solovev, another professional FSB officer, accepted another position as deputy minister of internal affairs. Major-General Konstantin Romodanovskiy, the new head of MVD Internal Security, also served in the FSB. Colonel Boris Shtokolov, a former head of a department in the SVR, was appointed head of the international cooperation department in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in July 2001.

Major-General Yevgeniy Alekseyevich Murov took over the Federal Protection (Bodyguard) Service in May 2000. Murov worked as an intelligence officer between 1974 and 1992, including a three and a half year stint in South East Asia. In 1992 he was assigned to St Petersburg’s FSK/FSB directorate. He was later transferred to Moscow, where he worked in the FSB directorate responsible for economic counterintelligence. Viktor Zolotov, the present head of the Presidential Security Service - SBP, had been guarding Putin when he was prime minister. Zolotov was a bodyguard of the late Anatoliy Sobchak, former mayor of St Petersburg. General Viktor Petrovich Ivanov, another member of the Leningrad KGB Directorate and Putin’s friend, is a deputy head of the Presidential Administration. Two years older than Putin, Viktor Ivanov joined the KGB in 1977 and worked mostly in the Leningrad KGB. He also worked with Putin in the St Petersburg town hall and later moved to Moscow, where with Putin’s help he became the FSB deputy director responsible for personnel. Colonel-General Aleksandr Andreyevich Grigor’ev, Putin’s university friend and former head of the St Petersburg FSB, was transferred to the Presidential Administration and then appointed the head of the Russian Agency for State Reserves. General Grigor’ev was replaced in St Petersburg by another of Putin’s close collaborators, Lieutenant-General Sergey Smirnov. Yet another of Vladimir Putin’s friends brought to Moscow to work for the presidential administration was Igor Ivanovich Sechin. Sechin has a degree in Romance languages and worked in several countries as a military interpreter, which may suggest that he either worked for the GRU or that after graduating from the Ministry of Defence Language School he was “head-hunted” by the KGB.

Two former KGB officers were nominated as presidential regional representatives. Colonel-General Viktor Vasilevich Cherkesov was appointed Presidential Representative in the North-Western Federal District. Born in 1950, Cherkesov, like Putin, joined the KGB in 1975. His past links with Putin are usually downplayed because his early career in the KGB was similar to that of the president, and his work against Leningrad dissidents is well documented. Georgiy Sergeyevich Poltavchenko is the presidential representative in the Central Federal District. Born in 1953, Poltavchenko joined the KGB and worked in the Leningrad KGB directorate for twelve years. Vladimir Putin promoted another St Petersburg
security officer, Lieutenant-General Vladimir Shults, a former lecturer at the Leningrad Higher Political School of the MVD, in which Putin's mentor Anatoliy Sobchak also worked as a lecturer, to deputy director of the FSB and its only state secretary, on 12 July 2000. Shults joined the post-KGB security structures in St Petersburg in 1992 and when several years later he was given the post of Commandant of the FSB Academy this was seen as his pre-retirement job. In his new position Shults is responsible for coordinating FSB contacts with other power structures, including foreign counterparts of the FSB. He also coordinates the FSB PR work.

The nomination of Major-General Yuriy Yevgenevich Zaostrovtev to the post of deputy director of the FSB responsible for combating economic crime in July 2001 was not welcomed by the Russian media. Zaostrovtev was seen as a gamekeeper turned poacher who when the time was right turned gamekeeper again. In 1993, at the age of 37, Colonel Zaostrovtev had resigned from the FSK where he worked as an economic counterintelligence expert to join a bank and several private companies. He returned to the FSB in November 1998 to head the Economic Security Department.

Putin made certain that the important FSB Moscow directorate is run by someone not involved in local politics, as had occasionally happened in the past, but who would be acceptable to the powerful mayor of Moscow and was familiar with the region and its problems. His nominee, appointed on 12 July 2000, was Major-General Viktor Zakharov, a Muscovite who, like Putin, joined the KGB in 1975.

Putin did not leave the Ministry of Foreign affairs unattended. He appointed in June 2000 former director of the SVR, Army General Vyacheslav Ivanovich Trubnikov as first deputy foreign minister with the rank of federal minister. Trubnikov was also appointed special presidential envoy to the CIS countries. After the 11 September 2001 attacks a FSB general, Anatoliy Yefimovich Safonov, became deputy foreign minister and the head of the new Department on Questions of New Challenges and Threats in the ministry. The latter position was almost immediately offered to Aleksander Vladimirovich Zmeyevskiy, a 44 year-old diplomat, with excellent contacts with the special services, a former deputy representative of the Russian Federation in the UN and a deputy director of the Legal Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Safonov retained overall supervision over the ministry’s effort in combating international terrorism.

An organization vital for the Russian economy, the Federal Tax Police, was allocated an ex-KGB officer. Lieutenant-General Sergey Verevkin-Rakhalskiy, former director of the FSB’s Sakhalin Region, was appointed its deputy director.

In November 2000 Putin appointed Andrey Belyaninov, a former KGB intelligence officer who served part of his career in the GDR, head of “Rosobronexport”, the company responsible for exporting Russian weapons. His deputy Sergey Chemezov also served in the KGB in the GDR and stayed in the SVR after the collapse of the USSR. Aleksander Kravchenko from the SVR became financial director of the company.

In November 2000 Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov appointed former first deputy director of the SVR Aleksey Shcherbakov the first deputy Minister of Communication and Information. His predecessor in the chair of first deputy director, Lieutenant-General Grigoriy Alekseyevich Rapota, became the General Secretary of the Eurasian Economic Community at the end of 2001. Lieutenant-
Vladimir Putin & Russia’s Special Services

General Boris Aleksandrovich Mylnikov, a deputy head of the FSB, was appointed in June 2000 the head of the CIS antiterrorist centre. Mylnikov, like Putin, joined the Leningrad KGB in 1975.

Viktor Zubkov, another of Putin’s colleagues and subordinates from St Petersburg and a former Deputy Minister of Taxes, became the head of the Financial Monitoring Committee of the Ministry of Finance. Vladimir Putin also made sure that Russia’s largest foreign currency earner, Gazprom, was controlled by people he could trust. The new Chairman of the company, Aleksey Borisovich Miller, a native of Leningrad, was Putin’s subordinate in the St Petersburg Town Hall between 1991 and 1996. Sergey Lukash, a FSO officer and a member of Putin’s bodyguard team, became the new head of Gazprom’s Personnel and Economic Security Service. Colonel Zhukov, a former deputy director of the FSB’s Economic Security Department, joined Gazprom’s executive board and Boris Miroshnikov, former head of the FSB Computer and Information Security Directorate, became deputy chief of the State Fisheries Committee to supervise his new superior, controversial former Governor of the Primorye region Yevgeniy Nazdratenko.

Putin did not forget one of Yeltsin’s staunch supporters. Colonel-General Sergey Vadimovich Stepashin, Putin’s contemporary, a former MVD colonel from Leningrad, former head of the FSK, former Minister of Justice and former Minister of Internal Affairs, whose honesty and openness contrasted favourably with most of Yeltsin’s entourage and Stepashin’s own lack of efficiency, was appointed the head of the Federal Auditing Chamber.

It Began With Boris Yeltsin

The anti-Putin lobby, vocal but politically weak, speaks of the gradual KGBsation of decisionmaking structures. This mixture of well intended human-rights activists, attention-seeking media organizations and oligarchs who made fortunes in Yeltsin’s chaos ignore the fact that all the above mentioned officials worked for security structures under Yeltsin and when nominating and accepting new state or government officials Yeltsin frequently chose former KGB officers because they were reliable, quick thinking and disciplined. Yeltsin’s nominations to power structures were neither liberal nor democratic. The legal system which allows the president to control the power structures, criticized by Putin’s detractors, was set up by Yeltsin. Yeltsin’s head of the Presidential Security Service, Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Vasilevich Korzhakov, was a law unto himself. Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, a long-term active KGB supporter and an old Communist Party apparatchik, was not made the head of the SVR because of his democratic credentials - he had none - but because Yeltsin trusted him and knew that he was popular in the intelligence community. Primakov was nominated by Yeltsin first as Minister of Foreign Affairs and then Prime Minister. And it was Primakov who brought with him from the old Central Committee of the CPSU to the SVR, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then to the office of Prime Minister, Rear-Admiral Yuriy Antonovich Zubakov, a professional military counterintelligence officer. Nikolay Nikolayevich Bordyuzha, another military counterintelligence officer with extensive experience in electronic and signals intelligence establishments, reached the position of head of the presidential administration. One of his deputies there was Vladimir Viktorovich Makarov, until 1991 a deputy head of the personnel directorate of the USSR KGB. Vladimir Borisovich Osipov, a deputy head of Yeltsin’s personnel department, also served in the KGB signals intelligence structures.
The secretariat of Premier Chernomyrdin was headed by Gennadiy Petelin, a former KGB officer. The former head of the news section in the pro-government RTR TV Eduard Gendelev is a former KGB lieutenant. Major-General Yurij Georgievich Kobaladze, previous chief of the SVR press office, became deputy general director of ITAR-TASS news agency after leaving the SVR. Colonel Lev Sergeyevich Koshyakov, a former KGB rezident in Norway and the head of the Novosti Press Agency in Australia, was appointed head of the All Russia State TV and Radio Company. Lieutenant-Colonel (KGB) Igor Amvrosov became in March 1998 the acting director of the state radio station “Radyostantsiya Rossiya”. It was also Yeltsin who promoted Vladimir Putin. Such appointments were rarely criticized because they strengthened Yeltsin’s position and Yeltsin was a friend of Russian oligarchs and Western statesmen.

Putin’s meteoric rise was seen by many almost as a security community conspiracy: he was about to ruin the chaotic status quo acceptable to many powerful individuals in and outside Russia. One of his most vociferous TV detractors, Yevgeniy Kiselyev, was a former KGB colonel, expert on Iran and Afghanistan. His former boss, the media magnate Vladimir Gusinskiy, the owner of Media Most Security, employed Army General (Retd) Filip Denisovich Bobkov, former KGB Deputy Chairman and the head of the controversial Fifth Directorate which had been responsible for the suppression of dissidents. Bobkov was replaced by Valeriy Vorotnikov, also from the Fifth Directorate. Gusinskiy also employed Valeriy Shiryayev and Aleksandr Ivanov from the same directorate. All these officers were professionals of highest order, who at the end of their careers fought terrorists and the new Russian criminal organizations, but Gusinskiy’s insensitive choice of personnel received surpassingly modest coverage even when Media Most Security methods began to resemble those used by the KGB when the company was caught conducting illegal electronic surveillance. Putin’s most unrelenting critic and democratic crusader, media mogul Boris Abramovich Berezovskiy, employs Andrey Lugovoy, a former officer of the KGB bodyguard, the 9th Directorate, as his head of security. In the recent past Berezovskiy has employed several serving officers of the FSB, an organization against which he has waged a personal war since 1998. The best known of them is Lieutenant-Colonel Litvinenko, who successfully sought political asylum in the UK.

Reforming The Special Services

On Monday, 3 January 2000, immediately after he returned from Chechnya, Vladimir Putin fired the most controversial of the presidential advisers, Boris Yeltsin’s daughter. The real reason has not been made clear, but the message certainly was. Vladimir Putin was prepared to sacrifice anyone standing in the way of his reforms.

For the staff of all Russian special services Putin’s nomination and his overwhelming electoral victory were a dream come true. If Putin’s law and order agenda was ever to succeed, dramatic changes in law enforcement, special services and the judiciary would have to be made. Of the multitude of Russia’s law enforcement organizations and special services the most vulnerable was the bloated and corrupt MVD. On the other end of the performance scale was FAPSI, politically non-controversial, strategically vital, financially secure and physically far away from the objects of its interest. Putin’s openly professed determination to strengthen the state institutions provoked immediate speculation that his intention was to create a new KGB. A very large new security structure, however, would have been out of the
question. Yeltsin’s attempt to merge the MVD and security bodies at the beginning of 1992 failed when the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional. Putin, a lawyer, would not make a similar mistake, although a merger of two or three services would not have been illegal or illogical. The rumours about the merger came from the part of the printed media hostile to Putin. In January 2000, Security Council Secretary Sergey Ivanov described the rumours about a merger of security bodies into a “super KGB” as “absolutely groundless”.\(^7\) He repeated the statement on 3 February 2000.\(^8\) The following month, Director of the FSB Nikolay Patrushev categorically refuted the rumours that the FSB was to be merged with another, now independent, component of the old KGB.\(^9\) In April 2000 Moskovskiy Komsomolets wrote that law enforcement and power structures would be merged under the presidential jurisdiction.\(^10\) At a meeting with the top officials of Russia’s special services on 25 July 2000, Putin repeated that he had no intention of resurrecting the KGB.\(^11\)

The official denials were not helped by an attempt made by a group of Duma deputies which in November 2000 presented a draft proposal on the streamlining of the special services. The proposal was defeated by 123 votes to 81 with six abstentions.\(^12\) The unfounded rumours were kept alive by the anti-Putin media. Aware of the Duma draft proposal, one of the newspapers belonging to Boris Berezovskiy, Putin’s richest and most influential detractor, printed an article about the impending creation of a Security Ministry.\(^13\) Another of Berezovskiy’s papers was still warning about the revival of the KGB in January 2001.\(^14\)

Those speculating about the resurrection of the KGB tried to second-guess the Russian leaders which two or three out of FSB, FAPSI, SVR, GRU or the FPS could be merged. The most popular was the FSB with FAPSI variant, with the FPS becoming a possible third partner. The proponents of the merger and the scaremongers ignored the profound changes in all the organizations which once made up the KGB. These organizations grew into major security and intelligence players because of the political, economic and technological changes in Russia and around the world. FAPSI, for example, not only grew into an intelligence and security giant but served many “clients” in Russia. Some of its non-technical departments responsible for monitoring internal events may still be transferred to the FSB, but this can be done quietly without weakening FAPSI’s main capabilities or causing political controversy. The FPS has evolved into an independent body struggling to cope with leaky borders, floods of tourists and migrants, facing new economic and legal tasks and would hardly be a suitable partner for the FSB. All three organizations may want to improve their cooperation, exchange of information or their tasking priorities but wholesale merger at this stage would be counterproductive and extremely costly. Rumours that the SVR and the GRU were to merge surfaced in mid 2001 but were immediately dismissed by the Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov.\(^15\) The Soviet experiment with a similar merger at the end of Stalin’s life was not successful and must have been very expensive. Yet streamlining and synchronizing intelligence collection could be accomplished without a costly merger. The reforms of special services were not dictated by the need to control them. This had already been accomplished by Yeltsin. Putin inherited a security control mechanism of which he is the sole legal master. He has no political or legal restrictions which could stop him, for example, from enlarging the Security Council and make it a new security coordinator.
The FSB

One of the first edicts issued by the new president confirmed and reinforced the FSB position in all armed formations. On 7 February 2000, acting president Vladimir Putin signed Edict 316 confirming the Statute on Russian Federation Federal Security Services (FSB) Directorates (Sections) in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, Other Troops, Military Formations and Organs (Organs of Security in the Forces). The principal objectives of the FSB presence in other power structures are the same. These are: combating espionage, obtaining intelligence information on threats to the security of the Russian Federation and the Armed Forces, exposing, preventing and suppressing terrorist activity directed against the Armed Forces, other troops and military formations and organs, and protecting state secrets in the armed forces.

The new elements in the statute were “Preventing, within the limits of their powers, unauthorized actions with weapons of mass destruction” and combating illegal associations aiming at forcible seizure of power. The FSB is now better able to control foreign journalists attempting to operate in “delicate areas” such as Chechnya. The decree forced commanders to take action to eliminate “reasons and conditions conducive to the realization of security threats”. In the past commanders had only to inform their own command about the problem. The decree also allows the FSB to investigate the finances of other power structures.

Whatever law and order and security measures Putin was planning to introduce when he came to power, it was clear that he would have to rely on the FSB more than any other power structure. Badly in need of reforms and modernization, the FSB was still more effective than other law enforcement bodies. The FSB had been weakened by an insecure and badly advised Yeltsin. In December 2000, Major-General Viktor Zakharov, the chief of the FSB Directorate for Moscow and Moscow Oblast, described the past weakening of the service as a senseless demolition of the backbone of the special services. With the new president, one of their own, in charge things could only get better, and they have.

The FSB director Nikolay Patrushev announced in June 2000 that the widespread reforms planned by Putin would also affect the FSB. The reforms would be evolutionary and no “drastic moves” would be made, he added.

A Presidential decree of 17 June 2000 made new readjustments in the FSB structure. The FSB Director has now one first deputy, one deputy - state secretary and six deputy directors, each responsible for a department. Vladimir Putin also made several changes in the leadership of the service. He wanted to put in charge people he could trust but he could not afford to make too many radical changes within the organization because the FSB was already overburdened and constant reforms in the 1990s had resulted in mass resignations which reduced its efficiency. In spite of its patchy track record the FSB functions better than other Russian organizations facing similar tasks. The performance of its main crime-fighting partner, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, has been so bad, in spite of many changes introduced recently, that in May 2002 Putin humiliated it publicly at a special meeting with MVD officials and the presidential regional representatives. Putin strengthened the position of the FSB in the regions by introducing regional councils of the heads of security organs. The councils actively cooperate with presidential representatives in the regions.
Its new responsibilities in Chechnya and the 11 September 2001 events made the FSB reassess its priorities. In 2000, Nikolay Patrushev, the FSB director, described its main tasks as counterintelligence work. Antiterrorism came second and economic security third. Major-General Zdanovich confirmed these priorities six months later. In January 2002, Patrushev described counterterrorism as the FSB’s most important task. The FSB also fights organized crime, drugs, fraud, money laundering and corruption within organs of power and administration. In 2001, more than 100 officials stood trial on charges supported by evidence supplied by the FSB. All these tasks are handled by the FSB staff, assessed in mid 2000 at 92,000 people.

In spite of Putin’s popularity the number of applicants for every place in the FSB academy fell from 10 in 1997 to 6 in 2001. Because of personnel shortages the FSB began to accept back its former officers who left the service in the 1990s to work for commercial companies or other government organizations. The FSB academy even had to restructure some of its six-months Higher Courses For Senior Personnel aimed at those already serving in the FSB. Nowadays they also aim at retraining those who have returned after spending several years in commercial structures. The young graduates from the academy should not expect to be comfortable financially when they join the FSB. A young lieutenant starting with the FSB at the end of 2000 was paid slightly more than 2,000 roubles a month. The salaries of junior officers at the end of 2001 were still very low, 2,000-3,000 roubles a month ($75-100). In some cases low salaries had bonuses for tasks performed and additional perks. The salaries of the military and security personnel have been gradually improving but still cannot compete with even modest commercial enterprises. Financial problems appear to be the main reason why some FSB employees look for additional sources of income. Major-General Smirnov, the head of the Internal Security Directorate of the FSB, acknowledged in June 2000 that there are people in the FSB who earn money on the side and that there is a stream of leaks of classified information. Nikolay Patrushev even admitted that an increasing number of “representatives of Russian power institutions and law enforcement departments” are ready to work for foreign intelligence services.

According to a former FSB officer, deputy chairman of the Duma Security Committee Mikhail Grishankov, there is never enough money for the FSB and the shortage of qualified operational personnel working “in the field” is considerable. The experienced veterans retire, gradually leaving difficult tasks to inexperienced officers. In some areas the shortage of FSB personnel reached critical proportions. In the city of Magnitogorsk the shortage of operational personnel in 2000 was 50%.

Like all other power structures, the FSB has “interest groups” in the largest Russian companies. Alfa-Group and Sibneft have very good contacts with the FSB, Lukoil and Gazprom with the SVR. Gazprom has also close links with FAPSI. The contacts are either at the top level, between the special services’ top managers and the owners or directors of large companies, or there is medium level “operational” manager and rank-and-file connection. They result in commercial links and the not always legal transfer of information. The companies provide undercover positions, jobs for special services personnel and ex-security associates; the special services on the other hand offer access to commercial secrets, provide security warning and protection of specific companies, and so on. The FSB has a special consultative council which includes the largest asset protection companies in Russia. A
commercial member company must have at least 20 offices in various cities of Russia. The council meets once a month.  

FSB finances have become slightly more transparent in recent years. Colonel-General Vladimir Shults, deputy director of the FSB, described at the end of 2000 the budget allocated for 2001 as exceptionally high but declined to provide any figures. In 2002 the FSB was to receive 17,914,100,000 roubles (about $6,000,000), 3.5bn roubles less than in 2001. These figures probably refer to the funding of the FSB before the 11 September 2001 events and as in most developed countries they must have been revised upwards. Yet it will take years of generous funding before the Russian special services, except FAPSI, are once again an attractive employer able to compete on the job market with private companies and to buy modern equipment. Former FSB director Army General Nikolay Dmitrevich Kovalev said that the FSB had been receiving enough funds to pay personnel but not enough to develop the technical equipment required or to conduct scientific research to produce equipment necessary for combating terrorism.  

The FSB is still highly popular in Russia. In a nationwide opinion poll conducted by the Monitoring.ru Group on 22 February 2001, with 1,600 respondents in 100 populated areas in all seven federal districts, 42% had positive opinions about the work of the FSB, 19% had a negative view and the remaining 39% was unable or unwilling to answer the question; 72% of those polled said that the FSB was necessary and 6% thought Russia could do without it. 48% of respondents said that the FSB should focus on combating terrorism, 44% that it must focus on corruption, 42% that it should combat organized crime. With another set of questions 27% of those polled said that the FSB should work to protect state secrets and 24% thought that it should work against foreign intelligence services.  

The SVR  

Russian intelligence priorities are similar to those of all powerful developed countries with world-wide interests and large intelligence organizations. Moscow’s ideology-driven foreign and intelligence policies are gone, its scientific community has lost some of its capacity to process scientific information from foreign sources, the SVR lost many stations around the world and many talented employees but the number of problems they are expected to address has hardly changed. The threat of a nuclear war or a military confrontation between two military blocs is gone but the number of small problems around the world is not decreasing. After years of reforms and personnel changes the SVR needs only small readjustments, fine tuning, more money and a new recruitment drive. On 20 May 2001 Vladimir Putin signed a decree appointing Lieutenant-General Sergey Nikolayevich Lebedev the new head of the SVR. Lebedev was recommended by his predecessor Army General Vyacheslav Ivanovich Trubnikov. Trubnikov was moved sideways to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as First Deputy Minister with special responsibilities for Central Asia. An expert on Indian, Pakistan and the USA, Trubnikov became a valuable member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a bridge between the ministry and the intelligence and security community. For the first time the man occupying the top position in Yasenevo, the SVR HQ, has operational experience of work in Western Europe and the USA. General Lebedev was stationed in Germany and the USA, the countries most important to Russia’s interests on each continent. He was born in 1948 in Dzhizak in Uzbekistan, graduated from the Chernigov branch of the Kiev Technical Institute in 1970 and
the KGB School in Kiev. He joined the KGB in 1973 and after graduating from the Intelligence Institute was given his first assignment in the GDR. In 1978 probably with the rank of major Lebedev graduated from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Academy. He served in both Germanies for several years but claims that he never met Vladimir Putin in the GDR (no one asked him whether they ever met elsewhere). In 1998 he was sent to the USA as the SVR’s official liaison officer. Lieutenant-General Lebedev was promoted to Colonel-General on 20 December 2000 on the anniversary of the SVR’s founding.

In Vladimir Putin, Lebedev has not only a very knowledgeable leader but also a difficult and experienced task master. Putin is an ex-intelligence officer and foreign policy is his hobby. Between the first day of his nomination as acting president and his election, a time when he was legally forbidden to travel abroad, Putin received 23 world statesmen, foreign ministers and heads and high ranking officials of international organizations, some of them more than once. He understands the role played by the special services. In December 2000, General Lebedev defined the most important tasks of the Russian intelligence service as ensuring “the political and economic stability of Russia and its external security”, and combating international terrorism. He described finance for the intelligence services as adequate “on the whole” for “tackling today’s tasks”.

After 11 September 2001 the number of potential targets for future intelligence operations, not only for the SVR, suddenly multiplied. Small “irrelevant” countries from which the big intelligence powers pulled out their personnel in the early 1990s suddenly became important again. This time their political leanings or their raw materials are not of primary importance. Many third world countries are now looked on as a potential target of international terrorism, as a potential springboard for terrorists’ actions or as their silent partners. In the new post 9/11 world, the SVR will be a partner and at the same time an opponent of many of the world’s intelligence services. They will have to learn to cooperate when fighting international terrorism, drug dealers and other criminal organizations, but at the same time carefully protect their secrets. SVR help in combating international terrorism will be useful, but also selective and very narrowly focused. The SVR will show interest in scientific and technological achievements of foreign countries, proportionate to the ability of Russian scientists and producers to use the information acquired. Political information has never lost its value, although the ideological factor and the threat of a global nuclear confrontation are not primary motivators in the Russian intelligence drive. The market economy in Russia is changing SVR economic intelligence, increasingly driven by the interests of strategically important Russian companies. In the world of the technical intelligence arms-race, which the SVR can hardly afford, Yasenevo has to rely on the old Soviet technical resources, foreign, commercially available equipment and its strongest card, human intelligence resources and high-grade area studies expertise. The transfer from FAPSI to the SVR of the communication station in Balashikha was a sign that Moscow had begun to treat their civilian intelligence service seriously once more.

In the new world of disappearing or transparent borders, globalization of markets, mass migration and the atrophy of patriotism and its symbols, money is the main motivator for the present and future collaborators of the SVR and the GRU, with bruised egos and anti-Americanism following close behind. Lieutenant-General (KGB/SVR) Aleksandr Titovich Golubev, asked about the motivation of foreign collaborators of the SVR, said that now that communism is dead “people are frightened by the American supremacy over Russia” and that “they want Russia to
be a strong nation and to counter the Americans and the Westerners”. Golubev said that adherents of “old positions of socialism and fraternity” not only still exist but their number is increasing.\textsuperscript{44}

Like many of its counterparts and opponents around the world the SVR will continue to encounter problems with recruitment of new personnel, partly because of its uncompetitive salaries and partly because it refuses to employ women in operational positions. In two separate interviews General Lebedev said that intelligence work is too tough for women and that this is why there are virtually no women in operational work in the SVR.\textsuperscript{45} The SVR cannot afford to be as secretive as its predecessors if it hopes to attract university level graduates. In a recruitment drive SVR officers began to give lectures in several higher educational institutions in Moscow in the expectation of attracting the attention of potential candidates.\textsuperscript{46}

\section*{FAPSI}

The world IT revolution and political changes in Russia made FAPSI the most important Russian organization conducting technical intelligence and counterintelligence. FAPSI also advises large commercial structures and banks, supervises Russian internet links, supports and runs similar operations in several CIS countries and is increasingly active in the commercial market. General V S Gorbachev, a deputy head of FAPSI’s main directorate, announced at a conference in Moscow in February 2001 that his organization is responsible for the security of information in the Ministry of Finance and that the ministry’s central administration and its 12 regional representations have had a secure information system since February 2001. The information security of the Russian Central Bank is also assured by FAPSI.\textsuperscript{47} General Gorbachev mentioned at the same conference the existence of a protection system against the US space surveillance system “Echelon”, implying that FAPSI is responsible for running it. His statement was a confirmation of a remark made by Secretary of the Security Council Sergey Ivanov, in mid 2000, that FAPSI, together with the MOD, the FSB, the State Technology Commission and other organizations, was to be involved in counter-measures against the “Echelon” system.\textsuperscript{48}

The main player in the Chechen signals intelligence operations, FAPSI has to share Russia’s depleted space assets with the GRU, still the main user of the intelligence satellites. After many delays and unsuccessful launches - in one faulty launch on 27 December 2000, Russia lost three “Kosmos” military intelligence satellites\textsuperscript{49} - Russia was able to launch successfully a number of satellites especially useful in the Chechen conflict. On 3 May 2000 Russia launched a Soyuz-U rocket with an optical electronic satellite Kosmos 2370 (Neman) to survey Chechnya. Neman is able to observe Chechnya for 29 minutes a day and then moves to another targets. Kosmos-2369 (Tselina) launched in February 2000 intercepts Chechen radio communications.\textsuperscript{50} The Kosmos 2372 (Yenisey) GRU photo reconnaissance satellite was launched in September 2000. Yenisey was expected to stay in orbit for about a year and to photograph almost the whole earth. Its predecessors’ working life was 2-3 months. The GRU (Kosmos 2369) Tselina-2 satellite was to conduct radioelectronic reconnaissance.\textsuperscript{51} It is the main player when it comes to interception of international electronic traffic, communications between the Russian power structures operating in Chechnya and tracking, monitoring, decrypting and occasionally jamming Chechen communications.\textsuperscript{52}
FAPSI is also responsible for the maintenance of security of regional telecommunication and information systems. A new secure communication system is planned in Moscow region, which will facilitate the exchange of information between executive bodies in the region and the local law enforcement organizations. The other regions are bound to follow. Sergey Ivanov, then Secretary of the Russian Security Council, declared in November 2000 that the role of FAPSI in safeguarding Russia’s information security would grow. The government has plans for a special information and telecommunication system which would serve the organs of the state power. The creation and development of the programme was planned for 2001-2007. Undoubtedly, FAPSI will be the main executor of the project, but there is very little doubt that the regions and individual organizations will have to contribute financially to it. FAPSI will be involved in setting up and maintaining communication systems and related security work in all important state organizations and strategically important enterprises. In November 2001 FAPSI unified its logistic support bodies with the railway troops and the special construction committee. The new system has been joined by units of the FPS in several regions.

By contrast with its partner organizations such as FSB or SVR, FAPSI has a privileged position in the CIS countries where it plays a dominant role among its smaller counterparts. This position was clearly reflected in a joint exercise of the governmental communications bodies and signals troops “Commonwealth 2001”, held in 11 CIS countries on 6-9 April 2001. The exercise was headed by FAPSI director Vladimir Matyukhin in his capacity as chairman of the CIS Coordination Council of Government Communications Organizations. The organizations taking part in the exercise tested their systems for joint antiterrorist operations, establishing co-operation between the bodies controlling governmental communications organizations, establishing back-up lines and restoring communications networks in case of natural calamities and man-made emergencies.

FAPSI is also responsible for conducting opinion polls for the government. The results of its poll in October 2001 showed a decline in Putin’s popularity although he was still by far the most popular Russian politician. Vladimir Putin’s satisfaction with FAPSI’s performance was evident when he reappointed the general director of FAPSI General Matyukhin, one of the top three survivors from the Yeltsin era in the Russian power structures.

Rolling Up The Lourdes Centre

On 17 October 2001, at a meeting at the Ministry of Defence, Putin announced that “it has been deemed expedient to withdraw the [Lourdes] radioelectronic centre from Cuba” and to withdraw the military contingent from the Cam Ranh base in Vietnam. Less well known than Lourdes, the Cam Ranh base used to be run by 10,000 Soviet, mainly naval, personnel. The base began to shrink in the 1980s and the last 556 Russians left Cam Ranh on 15 May 2002. The base had few defenders in Russia. The run down Russian Navy had other more important problems and the intelligence value of Cam Ranh was debatable. The Lourdes base, however, had a powerful supporting lobby of veterans of the Cold War who spent in Cuba some of their best years and those who thought that the base could still provide high grade intelligence, although the times when the Soviet Union was getting 75% of “all strategic intelligence” from the Lourdes station were over. The economic intelligence obtained by Lourdes could not justify the expenditure on it,
although its importance was emphasised by Lieutenant-General Patrick Hughes, director of the US DIA at congressional hearings in 1996.61

All arguments for and against must have been presented to Putin and his final decision was to shut the base down. He visited Lourdes on 15 December 2000, on the first day of his visit to Cuba.62 He was accompanied by the heads of FAPSI and the GRU. It was a fact finding trip and the possibility of closing the centre must have already been discussed in the Russian signals intelligence community and among security decisionmakers. Fidel Castro was informed about the Russian decision in advance, probably by the head of Putin’s administration, Aleksandr Voloshin, during his visit to Cuba in mid August 2001.63 In Russia a discreet but powerful opposition was led by politicians in several parties and retired officers. The opponents of the closure had very few counter arguments, mainly because of the extremely secretive nature of the centre and their limited access to information which would help their case. The decision was so controversial among the die-hards in the military and security community and in similar groups in the state Duma that Putin felt obliged to repeat the message at a meeting with Duma leaders. After the meeting with Putin, Duma Speaker Gennadiy Seleznev explained that the Cubans had demanded an annual rent of $200m. This, said Seleznev, was too much. Russian specialists, he added, thought that information they received from Lourdes was no longer useful.64 A year later the defence minister Sergey Ivanov still argued that the money spent on the Lourdes centre and a smaller centre in Vietnam could be better spent elsewhere.65

The centre had become operational in 1967 and its attention was practically exclusively focused on the USA. It is not difficult to guess that for more than 30 years the US government had made a considerable effort to find countermeasures to Russian electronic snooping. New technologies and political changes would have made at least some parts of the Lourdes centre technologically and politically obsolete. Another factor which could have contributed to Moscow’s decision to close the Lourdes centre was Fidel Castro’s age and deteriorating health. Castro’s death could result in the instant collapse of the present political system and state organizations. The centre in Lourdes would immediately become a focus of attention of a section of the Cuban population and the US special services. In the immediate post-Castro period, attempts to penetrate the centre and the Russian reaction would not look pretty on TV and the possible Russian intelligence losses could be substantial. An early withdrawal would be safer for all concerned.

On 29 December 2001, the intelligence centre in Lourdes was officially closed and most of the equipment dismantled. However, at the beginning of February 2002, there were still 1,500 personnel in Cuba and “only about 20 Russian servicemen” who were preparing to leave Cuba in the very near future.66 The reason for the delayed departure appeared to be the shortage of money to pay the pilots of the long distance transport planes of the Russian Air Force.67 It is possible that the Russian MOD and FAPSI, authorized by the Cubans, have left discreet listening posts to monitor maritime traffic, selected targets in the USA, the Guantanamo base and their Cuban allies. In the meantime the Russian Foreign Ministry suggested that the closure of the radar centre in Cuba should be reciprocated by the USA closing the radar station in Vardoe (Norway).68 It is likely that of the old Soviet listening centres only the signals intelligence base in Andreyevka in the Far East will continue to operate at full strength.
The Information Security Doctrine

The Russian concept of information security is much wider than in most other countries because it addresses the role of the media, aspects of misinformation and disinformation and the possible collusion of foreign media and foreign political, economic and intelligence structures. To cope with Russia’s own shortcomings and alleged information threats, decisionmakers and lawyers drafted an Information Security Doctrine, ratified by President Putin on 12 September 2000, allowing Russia’s leadership to watch and interfere with the Russian media and telecommunications system.

Colonel-General Vladislav Petrovich Sherstyuk, First Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council and former head of FAPSI, said that there are three reasons why Russia needs an information security doctrine.

- new economic, intellectual and other activities “enhance the need in society for information interaction” in Russia and beyond its borders,
- Russia depends on “the information environment” as a result of its integration into the world information network,
- information and telecommunication developments can be very profitable and Russia has to protect its interests.

The Doctrine emphasizes the strengthening of the state mass media by favouring the role of the state to the detriment of the Russian private or foreign media. The doctrine speaks about the threat “in the information sphere” coming from “the activity of foreign political, economic, military, intelligence and information structures”. The threats include an attempt “to dominate and harm Russia’s interests in the world information space”. Another main threat is “the desire of developed foreign countries to gain illegal access to Russia’s scientific and technical resources”. This and many other points give the hard-line section in Russian society and the special services a very wide margin of interpretation of any threat.

Because of this wide interpretation of information security the organization responsible for its implementation is the FSB with the assistance of other power structures. The FSB together with the Ministry of Communication monitors telephone lines and communication operators. The technical aspects of the new System of Operational Intelligence Measures (SORM-2), the Internet surveillance and information filtering system, installed by the Russian Internet providers at their own cost after energetic prompting from the FSB, are apparently solved. However, after losing a court case in September 2000, the security services and the Ministry of Communication now require a court order to install monitoring equipment on individual telephone/email lines or large communications operators. The special services are obliged to provide operators with information about subscribers they want to have under surveillance. The security services appealed. Yet with the Chechen conflict continuing and the post 9/11 security campaign there will be very few Russian judges and computer operators prepared to contest requests from special services.

The Financial Monitoring Committee

At the end of 2000 rumours began to circulate in Moscow that Vladimir Putin intended to set up a new independent financial intelligence service. The creation of the Russian Financial Intelligence Service, as it was originally planned to be named,
was the initiative of Vyacheslav Soltaganov, Director of the Federal Tax Police, after he studied the subject of tax collection in France. The new service was expected to gather, process and analyse financial and other relevant information to assist “law enforcement, tax and monitoring bodies” such as the MVD, FSB, GRU, State Customs Committee and the Federal Tax Police. A plan to set up the new service under the Federal Tax Police was approved by President Putin in December 2000. It soon transpired that the new organization could become a separate federal structure.

Putin made an announcement about the impending signature of the decree on the new Financial Intelligence Service, on 30 October 2001, when addressing a group of foreign and Russian businessmen. However the new body had many powerful enemies before it was even created. The very rich were the most afraid because not much of what they had was honestly acquired. After the chaotic and crime-ridden 1990s there were not many companies in Russia with an unblemished balance sheet. The opponents of the new scheme argued that the new organization would become a political tool of the leadership and that the powers it would have to be given would impinge on democratic rights. Some worried that the new service could become a political Frankenstein, powerful but uncontrollable. There were also questions about financing, staffing, the legal status of the new organization and its position in relation to other power structures. Prime Minister Kasyanov wanted to control the new body, as did the MVD which until then had investigated financial irregularities.

In the end, the new organization was called the Financial Monitoring Committee and was subordinated to the Ministry of Finance. Viktor Zubkov, another of Putin’s colleagues and subordinates from St Petersburg, formerly Deputy Minister of Taxes, became the head of the committee. The new committee was to show special interest in money laundering and would be authorized to investigate suspicious transactions involving amounts bigger than 600,000 roubles (just over $20,000). It expected to employ more than 200 staff and another 100 people in its seven territorial subsections, one for each federal district.

**Enemies, Heroes & Troublemakers**

According to FSB officials, Russia more than ever is a target of foreign intelligence services, organized criminal groups and religious fanatics. The antiterrorist struggle, the main task of the FSB, is mainly linked to the conflict in Chechnya. However, as many large and small ethnic and religious groups are scattered all over Russia, some of them as a result of Stalin’s purges, others as a result of the Soviet and post-Soviet economic migration processes, the challenges facing the leadership in Lubyanka-2 are not limited to Chechnya. The FSB claims that there are 50 organizations preaching militant Islam in Russia and the CIS. However, the number of militant Islamic organizations operating in Russia must be very small by now. Their number in some CIS countries may still be significant but the FSB’s attempt to lump them all together borders on scaremongering and raises many legal and diplomatic questions. The conclusion of the Chechen campaign will reduce, but not entirely eliminate, the terrorist threat in Russia. The Russian input in combating Islamic extremism in the CIS countries is limited by bilateral and multilateral agreements, mainly with Central Asian countries, and their willingness and ability to combat what they regard as militant Islam.

Twenty-seven members of international terrorist groups, 16 members of the Aum Shinrikyo sect and 17 missionaries suspected of working for foreign intelligence
services were prevented from entering Russia in 2001, and the FSB identified 160 authors of threatening letters of “terrorist or extremist nature”\textsuperscript{80}.

When focusing on their second most important task, counterintelligence, the FSB has a much better defined target. The FSB claims that foreign intelligence services in Russia focus mainly on reforms in Russia, new foreign and military policy and scientific research, technical experiments, the latest military technology and hardware. The FSB sees foreign intelligence services as active as ever in their attempt to recruit Russian citizens.\textsuperscript{81}

In 2000, as in 1996, the FSB claimed to have unmasked and expelled more than 30 foreign secret agents and kept under surveillance 400 foreign agents.\textsuperscript{82} The following year, either the FSB efforts were particularly successful or its statistics were readjusted. In December 2001 at the customary end of year conference with the Russian media, the director of the FSB said that his service had identified 130 foreign career intelligence officers. They had been put under “close scrutiny” and more than 30 of them were prevented from carrying out their activities. The FSB put a stop to the activities of almost 50 foreign agents, six of whom were Russian nationals, 4 alleged foreign intelligence agents were expelled and 12 were denied visas. Patrushev mentioned Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia as the countries who “lost” their agents in Russia.\textsuperscript{83} These figures were changed five months later when Lieutenant-General Nikolay Volobuyev, the head of the Counterintelligence Operational Directorate of the FSB, said that in 2001 his organization neutralized 45 foreign agents, controlled more than 80 foreign intelligence services’ professionals and 18 foreign correspondents had their visa annulled. Volobuyev complained that the FSB could not keep up with the opposition because its equipment was old.\textsuperscript{84} Colonel-General Oleg Syromolotov, deputy director of the FSB, the head of the Counterintelligence Department and General Volobuyev’s boss, gave another set of figures when he said that 14 foreign agents had been caught by the FSB during the last two years and 260 staff members of foreign intelligence services had been identified and watched in the same period.\textsuperscript{85}

The FSB and the Russian procuracy are increasingly willing to release to the media information about espionage cases, even before they reach the courts. This is because the accused, their lawyers and their families have adopted Western methods of publicising their cases as a form of defence, and because the FSB wants to make the population more aware of how dangerous foreigners could be. The recent Tobin and Pope cases, whose details are well known, illustrate this.\textsuperscript{86}

The CIA is still regarded as the main enemy. After the arrest of Robert Hanssen on 18 February 2001 an unnamed high-ranking official in the SVR was quoted then as saying that his organization “which fights terrorism, drug-trafficking and weapons smuggling - the cornerstone of its activities - has no time for a spying fuss”.\textsuperscript{87} In return four US diplomats were made persona non grata in March 2001.\textsuperscript{88} Sergey Ivanov, the Secretary of the Security Council at the time, announced that a further 44 diplomats “most valuable to the Americans” would follow. The statement was made after the US government took a decision to expel 56 Russian diplomats from the USA, six of whom were given their marching orders immediately. Among them was the alleged SVR link man with Hanssen Vladimir Frolov, working in the US as an aide to the head of the press service and later as the press attaché, with the rank of first secretary, in the Russian embassy in Washington.\textsuperscript{89} Vladimir Putin played down the whole affair during a visit to Stockholm, in March 2001.\textsuperscript{90}
Several other cases of Russian nationals allegedly spying for the USA were also reported by the Russian media. The two best known cases are those of Viktor Kalyadin, general director of the Elers Elektron Closed Joint Stock Company, who was charged with selling to a US company the technical specification of the Arena tank protection system and missile technology information and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment - his two collaborators received lighter sentences - and that of a man identified by the FSB as Oleg Sabayev.

Traditionally the FSB has regarded the British SIS, Secret Intelligence Service, MI6 as its second most important opponent. The only current case of a Russian national allegedly spying for the UK is that of Platon Obukhov, arrested in 1996 and declared fit to stand trial in May 2002.

If the relations between the FSB and their counterparts in former Soviet republics oscillates from cordial to quite good, those with the Baltic special services are as hostile as those with NATO members. Russia has accepted, albeit with no enthusiasm, the next stage of NATO enlargement. This may mean less political tension and less confrontational troop deployments, but the activity of the Russian organizations collecting intelligence in the new member states is bound to go up. The German Federal Intelligence Service BND, accused by the FSB of training the Estonian special services, have a special relationship with Russia because of a large Russian criminal community in Germany which requires attention and a degree of cooperation by the special services of both countries. The chief of the BND, August Hanning, was even given a guided tour of Chechnya by the FSB in March 2000.

The FSB regards the Turkish special services as amongst the most active in Russia. In 2000 the FSB “neutralized” six Turkish intelligence agents in Russia. In April 2001 the FSB arrested two Turkish nationals in the North Caucasus and accused them of collecting intelligence information. Moscow is much less willing to comment on allowing Abdullah Ocalan to live briefly in Moscow’s Odintsovo region.

In the Far East Russia is particularly worried about the Chinese intelligence services who can operate in the increasing tide of Chinese traders and illegal immigrants entering Russia. A Chinese career intelligence officer was caught spying in the Irkutsk region and sentenced in May 2001 to 10 years in prison. Two Chinese nationals were arrested in Ulan-Ude in the summer of 2001, buying models of secret military hardware. Both were expelled.

Many Russian production enterprises and scientific research companies based in the Far East are targeted by regional intelligence services. The head of the FSB Directorate for Khabarovsk Territory, Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Marenkov, claims that foreign intelligence services are increasingly active in the region. In 2002 three foreigners had their visas cancelled but the FSB did not issue a statement on the reason for the cancellation or their nationality. The FSB recently identified twenty foreign intelligence officers in the foreign delegations visiting the Russian Far East. The efforts of intelligence officers of an unnamed Asia-Pacific country were thwarted by the FSB in the second half of 2001 when they showed too much interest in defence enterprises in Krasnoyarsk. They were arrested and expelled. An unnamed foreign “Arab” was caught by the FSB trying to buy information about S-300 and S-400 air defence systems. He was also expelled. In April 2002, Aleksey Nikolayevich Vetrov, a company director and former air force
captain, was sentenced to four years imprisonment for trying to sell a fighter weapon system to an unspecified country.\textsuperscript{105}

The case of a diplomat, Valentin Moyseyev, charged with spying for the South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS) is one of the most interesting among the recently reported cases. Moyseyev worked as a staff member of the Asian department of the Russian Foreign Ministry until his arrest in summer 1998. He was accused of having, from 1992 until his arrest, about 80 clandestine meetings and 60 telephone conversations with members of the South Korean intelligence service.\textsuperscript{106} In August 2001, Moyseyev was sentenced to four-and-a-half years in a strict regime colony.\textsuperscript{107} The unusual element of this case is Moyseyev’s early career, when he worked for a Russian daily newspaper in North Korea, an unusual job for a diplomat and a cover more often used by the KGB/SVR officers. The material which Moyseyev allegedly sold to the South Koreans was said to contain information on the Soviet secret radar base code named “Ramona” in North Korea, near Ansan in the Hwanghae Province. The base was built in the 1980s and was manned by 80 Russian specialists until it was closed down in 1996.\textsuperscript{108} The Russians were most probably sharing with the North Koreans some of the intelligence “production” of the base and what remains of it is probably still used by Pyongyang.

The Russians should not feel too self-righteous. Most of their intelligence successes will remain secret but their recent failures indicate the scope of their intelligence efforts. In spite of staff reductions and financial problems in the 1990s, the SVR and the GRU have been as active as ever in conducting their operations abroad.

**Individuals spying for Russia, 1992-2002\textsuperscript{109}**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No Charged</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>No Charged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 (June)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Russian intelligence officers caught abroad have usually been working under diplomatic cover. Even if they are briefly arrested they are usually immediately released and expelled. The list of countries which have made their dissatisfaction with the activities of the Russian intelligence services public is quite long.\textsuperscript{110}

After a relatively calm period in the early and mid 1990s, the number of Russian intelligence officers and other officials defecting, mainly to the USA has increased. The reasons for defections are usually financial and family problems, hatred of their immediate bosses, chaos and corruption.\textsuperscript{111}
Several statements made by Putin in the earlier stages of his presidential career were not encouraging for the Russian democrats and human rights activists. Strong and crude language used by Putin when addressing the Chechen issue, when he was still only acting president were very popular in Russia. His semi-public warning to the foreign minister, delivered in the Duma on 14 April 2000, about unauthorized contacts with foreigners sounded like a return to the old communist methods. The professionals in the post-KGB structures and the judiciary could only interpret Putin’s pronouncements as permission to get tough.

In recent years the FSB has been criticized for sloppy or illegal procedures and operational rules in several well publicized cases in which Russian nationals were accused of espionage. Bound by old internal rules, the FSB doggedly pursued individuals in several cases which in most democratic countries would have been thrown out of court due to lack of evidence or inadmissible procedural mistakes. The Russian lawmakers are reluctant to look more closely at the FSB regulations and procedures to which counterintelligence officers have to adhere. The prosecutors accept sloppily presented cases and the courts bend over backwards to accommodate the accusers. In terrorist trials, judges on occasion have given even longer sentences to terrorist suspects than those demanded by prosecutors. The indignation of the victims and human rights activists is practically always directed against the FSB, not against the creaking judiciary machinery. Vladimir Putin himself did not help democracy when he declared that an accused Russian diplomat was a foreign agent, before the final judicial decision was taken.

The old Soviet mentality so rightly criticized by Vladimir Putin in his “municipal electoral manifesto” film “Muzhskaya Rabota” in 1996 is alive and well in the FSB and in a large section of the Russian judiciary. After the final acquittal of Captain 1st Rank Aleksandr Nikitin, accused of passing secret materials to a Norwegian environmentalist group, by the Supreme Court Presidium in April 2000, Leonid Troshin, chief of the Prosecutor-General’s Office public relations centre announced, “We are still sure that Nikitin gave away state secrets; it is just that they were not classed as such at the time.”

Another naval journalist, Grigoriy Pasko, was stopped by the FSB on his officially sanctioned trip to Japan in autumn 1997 and several papers in his possession were confiscated. None of the confiscated documents was classified. He was arrested on his return and accused of espionage. The Russian Supreme Court declared the charge against him was not legal because clause 70 of the internal order of the Soviet Ministry of Defence, last confirmed in 1990, forbidding servicemen to have contact with foreigners was not legally valid. The charge of transmitting secrets was dropped but the charge of gathering and holding secret information for the purpose of transmission to foreigners in accordance with Article 275 of the Russian Criminal Code, which deals with information handed knowingly to a representative of a foreign state, was not. He was found guilty in a second trial of passing secret information to foreign nationals and sentenced to four years imprisonment in a strict-regime prison. The Russian Navy made it clear that the material offered by Grigoriy Pasko should not, in their view, have been sold to a Japanese journalist; their wish, however, does not make Pasko’s actions illegal.

Elisabeth Sweet, a US national and an economics lecturer at Omsk State University was investigated by the local FSB directorate when she asked students to provide her with information about the largest enterprises in Omsk. Ms Sweet was summoned for an interview by the FSB and told that her educational activities
might be harmful to some local enterprises. She was told that as most companies in Omsk are in the defence industry, students would not be able to collect the required information. The information they would be able to collect would not reflect the real economic situation in the region, and could have been presented “in a distorted way by foreign media” with resulting negative effects. She was not accused of any illegal activities, arrested or deported and was allowed to go on a business trip to Sakhalin Islands. But why could her “lesson” on local sensitivities not have been delivered by her immediate superior at the university?

Valeriy Danilov, a Russian scientist from Krasnoyarsk specializing in radiation shielding of communication satellites, asked the FSB for the permission before he signed a contract with a Chinese engineering export-import company to sell them an open sources declassified monograph. The FSB insisted in his subsequent trial that the appendix to the papers “contained information of state secrecy grading”. Academician Kirill Aleksandrov said in Danilov’s defence that the technology in question was not secret. The outside pressure on the court became evident when two lay magistrates in Danilov’s case were dismissed as too soft. The original charges were changed from espionage to gathering and holding restricted information with intention to sell and fraud.

Vladimir Soyfer, an oceanologist and nuclear scientist, was investigated for two years, arrested, charged with espionage, subjected to numerous illegal searches and several trials and then released in July 2001, because of lack of evidence. Several newspapers published articles, evidently as a result of FSB briefings, accusing Soyfer of espionage before the case was closed.

Igor Sutyagin, a naval and antimissile defence expert at the prestigious US and Canada Institute was detained in autumn 1999 and charged with treason, after working with the London consulting firm Alternative Futures. In December 2001 the court in Kaluga sent the case back for further investigation but kept the custody order in force. The head of the Institute Sergey Rogov had said at the end of December 2000 that Sutyagin could not have received classified information in the institute, which handles only open sources material. The case is probably a warning to other members of the institute and to those who have earnings from lectures given abroad.

Vladimir Schurov, a physicist from Vladivostok, has been accused of illicit exports of weapons production technologies to China. Schurov denied the accusation and described it as political because the alleged secret equipment was described in detail by a US scientific journal in 1990. Many accusations against scientists legally working with their foreign colleagues appear to be the result of simple envy.

Even the Russian Academy of Sciences took the alleged information drain seriously and introduced a set of new tough rules concerning professional links of its members with foreign contacts. The members of the Academy are now expected to report their contacts with foreigners to the appropriate authorities.

Those FSB officers involved in well publicized espionage cases have done rather well out of them, irrespective of their outcome. The late Rear Admiral German Ugaryumov, who supervised Pasko’s investigation, was promoted twice. The head of the FSB Directorate in Primorye, General Sergey Verevkin-Rakhalskiy, became deputy minister for taxes and levies. Aleksander Yegorkin, the chief investigator in the Pasko case, became the head of the Investigation Department of the Pacific Fleet FSB Department. Several other FSB officials involved in well publicized cases have
been promoted even if their investigative methods left much to be desired and the end results were not always successful.\textsuperscript{133}

In the future, the FSB’s work will be made easier by the decision of the Appeals Board of the Russian Supreme Court legalizing anonymous statements “containing the description of an offence which is being prepared or in progress or has already been committed.”\textsuperscript{134} The FSB instruction of 4 December 2000 “On the Procedure Governing the Consideration of Proposals, Statements and Complaints made by Citizens to the Federal Security Service Organs” has been challenged in court by human rights activists because it allowed investigation of persons included in anonymous reports. The lawyers representing the FSB argued that criminal proceedings cannot be instituted directly on the basis of anonymous reports and have to be supported by evidence obtained through operational methods. The Supreme Soviet confirmed the legality of the instruction.\textsuperscript{135}

Russia has many brave and honest individuals among its judicial community but the community as a whole is not motivated enough, powerful enough, independent enough or skilled enough to fight for democratic reforms of the Russian judicial system. Until it happens underpaid, underequipped and under constant pressure from above, the FSB will have very few incentives to clean up its act.

The Putin factor appears to be slowly influencing the judiciary. The decision to stop the farcical trial of Colonel Budanov, accused of murdering a young Chechen woman (a charge of rape was dropped earlier for no apparent reason), who was a day away from acquittal, suggests a judicial intervention at the highest level. The investigation of the \textit{Kursk} catastrophe conducted by the General Prosecutor’s Office was, in contrast with the behaviour of many senior Northern Fleet officers and politicians, professionally conducted, fair and a step in the right direction. Yet the decision of the same office not to instigate charges of criminal negligence shows that many other steps will have to be made. Stopping politicians from interfering with the judiciary will take many years and a new generation of lawyers, and will be resisted by many politicians and a section of the judiciary who are afraid that the loss of political patronage would make them responsible for their actions.

Putin, a trained lawyer, cannot afford to temporarily dismantle the judiciary, or the special services for that matter, because it would amount to stopping Russia for a while. The critics blaming him for slow reforms of the judiciary cannot answer the question of who would perform their duties whilst they are being “repaired”. As with many Russian state bodies it will take time to reform the judiciary, and only with constant, unrelenting pressure from above if the reforms are to succeed. Vladimir Putin is determined to make Russia a “dictatorship of law” and yet he cannot afford to introduce too many sweeping changes too fast. The recent liberalisation of the administrative laws and certain police operational procedures suggests that Putin’s legal reforms will continue. Taking into account the amount of work facing the special services and the judiciary, he will have to be careful not to restrict their operational capabilities by introducing impressive-looking legal reforms still unworkable in the present political, economic and social climate of Russia.
Chechnya

It is still debated whether the second Chechen conflict was a direct result of the terrorist bomb explosions in Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buynaksk in autumn 1999. If they were not the reason, they were certainly a convenient excuse. The decision to send troops to Chechnya was taken by Boris Yeltsin, a fact occasionally forgotten by Putin’s critics, with probably the whole hearted support of all power structures.

The Chechen conflict is the most important problem facing the Russian special services. For them the conflict is about preserving Russia’s territory and its interests in the region, combating international terrorism and Chechen criminal organizations. Vladimir Putin is the worst Russian leader his Chechen opponents could imagine. A professional special services officer who worked in Russia and abroad, persistent, hard, determined to strengthen Russia, with the Chechen conflict at the top of his agenda and refusing to announce the date of its end. His closest colleagues echo his views. Sergey Ivanov told the Russian weekly Argumenty i Fakty that the Chechen war “will be dragging on for several years”. Nikolay Patrushev, Director of the FSB told a group of editors in May 2001 that no specific date could be given as to the cessation of hostilities in Chechnya.

Presidential Decree No 61, signed on 22 January 2001, put the FSB in charge of all anti-terrorist operations in Chechnya. The decree set up the Operational Headquarters for the Command and Control of Counterterrorist Operations on the Territory of the Russian Federation’s North Caucasus Region. All power structures operating in the North Caucasus were to be subordinated to the new HQ. The head of the new HQ, responsible for the overall leadership, has the position of a deputy director of the FSB with almost unlimited control over the Operational Investigations Directorate, the Directorate for Combating Terrorism and Political Extremism and the Special Forces Centre. His official title is the head of the anti-terrorist centre in Chechnya. The HQ includes representatives from all large power organizations operating in Chechnya. The MOD is represented by a first deputy minister and the chief of the GRU.

The first FSB coordinator in Chechnya, Vice-Admiral German Alekseyevich Ugryumov, died of a heart attack on 31 May 2001 and was awarded posthumously the Order of Hero of the Russian Federation. He was replaced by his deputy, 55 year-old Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Yezhkov. The FSB Chechen directorate is headed by General Sergey Babkin, answerable only to General Yezhkov. In November 2001, Said Peshkhoyev, Babkin’s former deputy in the FSB, was appointed head of the Chechen MVD. He is assisted by one of his former FSB colleagues, Colonel Yuriy Orlenko, in charge of the management team of the MVD in Chechnya. Former KGB Colonel Rudnik Dudayev was appointed deputy head of the Chechen administration in charge of relations with federal forces deployed in Chechnya. Nominated in July 2001 as the new mayor of Groznyy, Oleg Zhidkov was selected for his new post because he worked in the KGB regional office in Groznyy, after graduating from the KGB counter-intelligence school in Minsk.

Major-General Aleksandr Zdanovich is the head of the FSB cooperation directorate in Chechnya. The directorate is responsible for coordination of information and propaganda of all power structures operating on Chechen territory. The FSB’s coordinating role in Chechnya means closer scrutiny by the Kremlin and occasionally expanded internal meetings attended by VIPs from other power structures and high ranking members of the Russian administration, who report...
directly to the president about the situation in the region. The participants of the
Kremlin meetings include the President, the head of the presidential administration,
the secretary of the Security Council, director of the FSB, director of the SVR,
minister of defence, minister of internal affairs, prosecutor general and other
officials, depending on the main theme of the meeting.148 The Russians have
succeeded in destroying the Chechen National Security Service (SNB ChRI), the
Ministry of Sharia State Security and several smaller security organizations.149

The Russian forces in Chechnya seem to have closed a considerable technology gap
which separated them from the efficient and intelligent communication systems. The federal forces set up a regional Radio Electronic
Combat grouping for surveillance and interception of Chechen radio communication
and are able to pinpoint potential targets.150 FAPSI launched a large-scale
operation in the North Caucasus code-named “Experiment 99” permanently
monitoring the radio airwaves of Chechnya and the adjoining republics.151 The
Chechens also accuse the Russian special services of hacking into their websites.
One such was the Kavkazkiy Vestnik, broken into on 26 March 2001.152

The FSB coordination of the federal steam-roller in Chechnya has been to a large
degree successful. The Russians control practically the whole territory of the
region. By June 2002 the number of Chechen fighters killed by the federal forces
reached 13,140.153 Russian losses in Chechnya from October 1999 to November
2001 were 3,438 killed, of which 106 were from “other power departments” ie other
than MOD organizations.154 According to the FSB, in 2001 - until 18 December -
the Russians have killed 1,689 Chechen rebels and foreign mercenaries, including
six top and nine mid-ranking commanders. Between January and October 2001, in

During the Security Services’ Day celebrations, FSB director Nikolay Patrushev said
that in 2001 the FSB conducted 43 special operations in Chechnya, losing 15
employees. Sixty-eight FSB employees were wounded. They also destroyed 76
Chechen bases, 76 dugouts and 648 caches. The FSB sweeps took out of
circulation 5,000 firearms, 4 million cartridges, more than 3,000 grenade
launchers, 19,000 grenades, slightly less than 8,000 artillery shells and 4 tonnes of
explosives. In one sweeping operation alone between 27 May and 2 June 2002
the federal forces uncovered and destroyed 70 ammunition depots.158 The Russians
killed and imprisoned several Chechen security officials. Ibragim Khultygov, who in
1998 took over as the head of the Ichkeria National Security Service, allegedly
humiliated by Maskhadov, surrendered to the federal forces on 7 August 2000.159
In October 2000 the FSB arrested former chief of the Chechen special services
Turpal Atgeriyev. The information about his capture was made public in

In June 2001 the Russians announced the arrest of Maghomedali Bagiyev, Shamil
Basayev’s intelligence chief, though this was denied by the Chechens. Abu
Movsayev, the first head of the first Chechen security body, the Department of State
Security (DGB) was killed by the Russian special forces.162

The death of the Jordanian fighter Khattab in Chechnya was confirmed by the FSB
on 25 April 2002, several weeks after his death. Khattab died opening a poisoned
letter delivered by a double agent Magomedali Magomedov, 26, a Wahhabite from
Dagestan, also known as Ibragim or Al-Guri. It is not known if he knew that the
letter which killed Khattab and delivered by him contained poison. Magomedov was
later found dead on a rubbish tip.164
In February 2001 the FSB assessed the number of Chechen militants at 5,000, of whom 1,500 were regarded as hard-liners. By October, Ilya Shabalkin, the spokesman for the FSB, announced that there were 1,500 Chechen rebels but gave the number of helpers still active in Chechnya as 1,000. In March 2002, Colonel Shabalkin assessed the number of rebels in Chechnya at 1,000. The deputy representative of the Russian president in the Southern Federal District quoted the same figure in January 2002.

The official reason for this sudden reduction is deaths, detentions and desertions, but it may also mean that many Chechens counted as missing are regrouping abroad and will continue their actions later. The number of Chechen fighters based in Georgia is assessed at 2,000. Major-General Aleksandr Zdanovich, the head of the FSB cooperation directorate, in April 2001 ruled out talks with Aslan Maskhadov, because he had “no longer authority in Chechnya, even if he issues decrees and orders”. He added that the Chechens rebels were running out of money.

The FSB tasks in Chechnya include close monitoring of charities and aid agencies operating in the region. Lieutenant-General Vladimir Bezugly, the head of the FSB in North Osetia, said in May 2001 that among the 40 international humanitarian organizations operating in the North Caucasus there were people engaged in espionage against Russia. In 2000 five aid workers were expelled from the Northern Caucasus for espionage. General Bezugly accused the CIA of planting officers in a number of humanitarian organizations operating from Georgia. More recently the FSB blamed several officials working in the 18 international humanitarian organizations running 40 programmes in Chechnya for aiding Chechen armed opposition. General Sergey Babkin, head of a FSB Chechen directorate, singled out the Danish Refugee Council for criticism, accusing it of spying and supporting Chechen fighters. The members of several charities, including Médecins Sans Frontières have been driven out of Chechnya by the Russian special services and the local administration.

Speaking at a meeting of the FSB collegium, Putin described the main tasks of the organizations involved in the Chechen operation: to ensure the state’s economic and financial security, protection of scientific and technological secrets – referring probably to the increasingly sophisticated weapons used by the federal forces - combating drug trafficking and illegal arms trading. Because of the less than satisfactory performance of the MVD, Vladimir Putin has also said that the control of the Chechen operation should stay with the FSB, adding that it would be premature to move on “to a new phase of the operation”. With Putin in charge the Chechens cannot hope to stop the Russian campaign. The price ($2.5m) put on his head by the Chechens before Putin became president must have gone up considerably. According to Chechenpress the general staff of the Chechen Armed Forces offered “a brand new batch of grenade launchers for arresting the FSB head, Nikolay Patrushev”.

Cooperation With The CIS & Bilateral Links

Two months after Putin’s sudden appointment to acting President, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said that relations with CIS states are and will be the top priority of Russia’s foreign policy. His statement was followed by an unprecedented number of CIS security meetings. Speaking at a session of the
Council of the CIS Interior Ministries held in Moscow on 10 March 2000, Putin called for “national security bodies, special services and the Interior Ministry to act like a single fist”.\textsuperscript{180}

A meeting of the council of the CIS security and special services heads was held in Moscow from 18\textsuperscript{th} to 20\textsuperscript{th} April 2000;\textsuperscript{181} the participants agreed to accept FSB general Mylnikov as head of the future CIS antiterrorist centre.\textsuperscript{182} President Putin took part in the meeting which, for the first time in the council’s existence, was attended by all the heads of the special services of the member states. Yuriy Yarov, CIS Executive Secretary, said in May 2000 that the CIS anti-terrorist centre was to open after a session of the CIS Heads of State to be held in Moscow on 21 June.\textsuperscript{183} The centre opened, as planned, on 21 June 2000 and General Mylnikov was confirmed as its director. The centre’s operational team, set up on the basis of a decision of the Council of Directors of Security Authorities and Special Services of the CIS, is located in Bishkek. Russia pays 50% of the budget of the centre, which for 2002 is approximately 30m roubles.\textsuperscript{184}

At the 9\textsuperscript{th} meeting of the council of the leaders of security and special services of the CIS, which took place in Kiev on 8-9 September 2000, the delegates announced that at the beginning the CIS antiterrorist centre was to concentrate on analytical work and would not be engaged in any “direct operations”.\textsuperscript{185} Representatives of the 11 countries taking part in the meeting also discussed the situation in Central Asia, the main reason why the centre was set up.\textsuperscript{186} The infiltration of Islamic radicals into the region was worrying its members, but not enough to set up a Warsaw Pact type organization. Joint “direct operations” would mean that Moscow would be able to influence security policies and the leaders of the Central Asian states were not ready for that. The CIS antiterrorist centre in Bishkek has since taken a more active role than was originally planned and organized between 14-20 April 2002 antiterrorist exercises in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. The exercises involved representatives from Armenia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. Georgia sent a telegram in support of CIS antiterrorist cooperation but did not send a delegation.\textsuperscript{187}

The meetings of the CIS security bodies allow the heads and experts of individual special services of the CIS countries to discuss bilateral problems and challenges with their counterparts. In May 2000, at the 8\textsuperscript{th} meeting of the Council of Heads of the CIS Security Services, the Kyrgyz national security minister Miroslav Niyazov said that talks were underway with Uzbek and Tajik security agencies on taking joint action against attacks by Islamic radicals.\textsuperscript{188} In March 2002 the secretaries of the Security Councils of Azerbaijan, Russia, Armenia and Georgia discussed possible cooperation in the Caucasus region.\textsuperscript{189}

The relations of the Russian special services with the special services of the former republics differ considerably: from friendly with Belarus, Ukraine, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan to hostile with the three Baltic republics. On one hand Russia is an attractive security partner for many former Soviet republics, on the other hand the wide scope of Russian security interests, the size of its special services, their experience and competence make very close relations with them a dangerous affair if their interests do not correspond completely with those of their smaller partners. The head of the SVR, General Sergey Lebedev, insists that the SVR does not work against its CIS partners.\textsuperscript{190} This is not the way some of the CIS leaders see it. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev accused the Russian special services of trying to divide the Kazakhs into clans and hordes by handing out money.\textsuperscript{191} The Georgians accuse Russian special services of interfering in their internal affairs,
especially of giving support to the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and North Ossetia. The Russians accuse the Georgians of harbouring Chechens wanted in Russia and allowing them to train and prepare on Georgian soil for attacks on Russia.

As a member of the world’s intelligence and security premier league, Russia operates from the position of a senior partner when talking to its CIS counterparts. The CIS countries, especially those which retained old KGB personnel, were able to maintain their basic security and law and order bodies. Their intelligence organizations had to be in many cases built from the beginning. Islamic radicalism has brought the Russian and the CIS special services closer. The links established between the member states on security issues are comprehensive and complicated.

- Bilateral or multilateral meetings at the heads of state level. All decisions taken by the participants are usually acted upon quickly, unless they have to be ratified by not always cooperative parliaments.

- Meetings of the Committee of the Security Council Secretaries of the CIS Collective Security Treaty. The council officially meets twice a year. The delegations may include the Chiefs of the General Staff of the member countries and military heads of intelligence and security bodies.

- The CIS council of the heads of the security bodies and special services meets to implement agreed lines of cooperation and to present the national leaders with further suggestions. The council was formed in 1991 at a meeting in Viskuli (Brest Region) as a by-product of the creation of the CIS. The Council met seven times between 1991 and 1999. Bilateral or multilateral meetings between the heads of security or intelligence services. This may occasionally be complicated when one of the participants has clearly legally defined status and the other wields more power as a confidant and messenger of his undemocratic leader.

- Meetings between the heads of states of the CIS and the heads of the Russian special services. The meetings usually take the form of a briefing of the head of state. In some cases the heads of state do not trust their own security or intelligence officials and decide to conduct talks with Russian officials personally. In May 2002, Turkmen President Niyazov received Director of the SVR Sergey Lebedev to discuss further cooperation between the intelligence services of Russia and Turkmenistan. The two organizations signed a cooperation agreement in 1994. President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan received General Lebedev on 4 February 2000 and a year later, in mid April 2001. The two men discussed security and cooperation between the special services of the two countries. General Lebedev also briefed Belorussian president Lukashenka during his visit to Minsk in November 2000.

The involvement of the individual member states in the workings of specific CIS security substructures depends on the internal policies of their semi-democratic leaders, their international plans and commitments, financial resources and legal differences with other members. Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the most steadfast members of the CIS security coalition. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan had been in the past reluctant to participate fully in the CIS meetings. However the representatives of both countries
took part in the first meeting of the CIS special services heads after 11 September 2001, on 1 October in Dushanbe. The meeting was attended by representatives from 10 countries. Ukraine maintains its independent position on security issues, sending observers to some of the CIS meetings and ignoring others. Georgia’s increasing differences with Russia make its participation in the Moscow-dominated CIS security structures difficult. However, in May 2002, the 12th meeting of the coordinating board of the leaders of the CIS security and special services took place in Borzhomi, in Georgia. The Russian delegation was led by Nikolay Patrushev, Director of the FSB, and Sergey Lebedev, Director of the SVR. The participants discussed the problems of blocking funds of terrorist organizations and illegal armed groups, and illegal drug trafficking. They also decided to create a Central Asian department of the CIS anti-terrorist centre.

Among the old Soviet republics the Belorussian KGB is the closest ally and partner of the Russian special services. Having retained their strong security element the Belorussians are still working on their intelligence service, relying in the meantime on SVR support. (Minsk was the home of the KGB USSR’s main counterintelligence school.) During his first visit to Minsk, in November 2000, SVR director General Lebedev was thanked publicly by President Lukashenka for “invaluable” analytical materials received from the SVR and for “retraining” Belorussian intelligence service personnel. Many Belorussian KGB cadets study in Russian security and intelligence schools. They even have their own company sized unit at the FSB academy. According to President Lukashenka the Belorussian KGB and the Russian special services had already concluded a cooperation agreement by 1992. The legal aspects of the SVR briefings of President Lukashenka are not clear. The two countries have a very close relationship in a Union State, but Belorussia is still a foreign country and any dissemination of classified information would have to be settled legally and ratified by both parliaments. The Security Committee of the Ruso-Belorussian Union, set up in August 1998 and chaired until recently by Anatoliy Safonov, may be the right place to coordinate this one sided exchange but its legal powers are not clear. In April 2001, the top officials of the FSB and the Belorussian KGB met in Navapolatsk, to discuss joint action “to provide security for the integration processes of Belarus and Russia”. Heads of the FSB directorates from Pskov, Kaliningrad, Smolensk, Yaroslav regions of Russia and their Belorussian counterparts from the areas adjacent to the common border took part in the meeting.

The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) is the second largest security structure in the former FSU area, just as Ukrainians were the second largest and the second most powerful ethnic group in the KGB USSR. Because of its size, political importance, geographic location, “independent” seat in the UN and a large well organized diaspora in several NATO countries, the Ukrainian Republican KGB have always had a strong intelligence department, a special services school and an intelligence faculty in one of the military colleges. The relationship between the SBU and its Russian partners has always been good, although for political reasons both sides have played it down. After Putin took over, the two countries signed several important security agreements. At a meeting in Moscow at the end of January 2000, the heads of the FSB and the Ukrainian SBU signed agreements on cooperation in the area of economic defence, computer technology, combating international criminal groups and other undisclosed issues. A draft agreement on reciprocal protection of classified information between Russia and Ukraine was endorsed by the Russian government in October 2000. The agreement is to be implemented by the FSB and the SBU. The cooperation agreement between the Russian and Ukrainian military intelligence services was signed by both countries.
on 26 August 1997 in Kiev. It was ratified by the Ukrainian parliament almost five years later, on 7 February 2002 and approved by the Ukrainian President on 3 March 2002.\textsuperscript{206}

The Russian special services also keep in close contact with their Armenian counterparts. Yerevan is Russia’s only natural ally in the region. The services of both countries are united against their opponents in Turkey and Azerbaijan. During a visit to Yerevan in May 2002, Secretary of the Security Council Vladimir Rushaylo described Armenia as a strategic partner of Russia. He thanked the Armenians for “detailed information that is often provided to Russian law-enforcement agencies and secret services ...”\textsuperscript{207} Russia is gradually improving its security contacts with Moldova, with which it still has differences of opinion on Transdnestriya. FSB director Patrushev visited Moldova and Transdnestriya in February 2001, where he met local heads of security organizations. In Chisinau he was received by the then Moldovan President, Petru Lucinschi. The two men discussed co-operation between the FSB and the Moldovan Information and Security Service. Nikolay Patrushev and Valeriu Pasat, his Moldovan counterpart, signed a protocol of co-operation on protecting the economic security of both countries.\textsuperscript{208}

The relations between the special services of Russia and Azerbaijan have not been particularly cordial in the last decade. Azerbaijan is one of Turkey’s closest allies and its unfinished conflict with Armenia over Nagorno Karabakh complicates its relations with Moscow. However the Azeri leader, Geydar Aliyev, like Vladimir Putin is an experienced KGB officer and both men get on well together. In January 2001 the Azeris publicized widely the arrest of an Iraqi national, Kayanan Rostam, who was apprehended by the Azeri security service and charged with planning to kill Putin - the Russian leader visited Azerbaijan on 9 January 2001. Kayanan Rostam was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.\textsuperscript{209} That the news about the arrest was released several months later and so little information has been provided by the Azeris and the Russians may suggest that the special services of the two countries used the arrest as a propaganda campaign against radical Islamic elements in Azerbaijan and Chechnya, hoping that in the post 9/11 atmosphere no embarrassing questions would be asked. At the beginning of April 2002 the Azeris arrested 5 Russians who claimed to be FSB employees. In fact the group worked for a private company and decided to run an operation in Azerbaijan without informing the local authorities. Several days later the arrested were handed over to the Russian embassy in Baku.\textsuperscript{210}

The Russian special services have their most difficult relationship with their Georgian colleagues. The Georgians disapprove strongly of the Russian support for the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and North Osetia. Russia in turn insists that Georgia is harbouring large numbers of Chechen fighters. However, the Georgians are ready to exchange with the FSB information on mutually acceptable subjects. An FSB delegation led by Deputy Director Viktor Komogorov visited Tbilisi in October 2000 to discuss setting up a joint working group to exchange information and to coordinate mutual efforts in fighting terrorism and organized crime.\textsuperscript{211} The most recent meeting between the Georgian State Security Minister and the FSB Director Patrushev took place in Moscow in mid January 2002.\textsuperscript{212}

Georgian and Russian security officials met in Tbilisi on 5 March to discuss a possible anti-terrorist operation in the Pankisi gorge. The FSB delegation was led by its chief antiterrorist expert, deputy director of the service, General Vladimir Pronichev.\textsuperscript{213} The head of the Georgian State Security Ministry Valeriy Khaburzania
appears to partly agree with the Russians, whereas Lieutenant-General Avtandil Ioseliani, chairman of the Georgian State Intelligence Department, retorted that his service “has had and has no information about the existence of any bases in the Pankisi gorge – training bases, military bases, or any other kind of bases”.  

**After 11 September 2001**

Facing determined and radical opponents in Chechnya supported by Islamic groups and wealthy individuals, Russia began to develop its anti-terrorist international diplomacy long before the attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. At a meeting with unnamed Indian defence and security officials in February 2000, Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council Chernov described terrorism as one of the most dangerous problems of the modern era.  

Not many countries were willing to cooperate with Russia then, but most were ready to listen. The CIA director George Tenet visited Moscow in mid August 2000, met his counterpart General Sergey Lebedev and an unnamed representative of the Russian Security Council.  

He was followed by his FBI colleague Louis Freeh who went to Russia on 13 September 2000 for talks with Colonel-General Vladimir Rushaylo, Minister of Internal Affairs, and Director of the FSB Patrushev.  

The Russian-US working group on countering the terrorist threats in Afghanistan met in Moscow on 17th and 18th October 2000. The Russian delegation was led by Vyacheslav Trubnikov, First Deputy Foreign Minister and former head of the SVR.  

The Russians set up an anti-terrorist group which included personnel from the FSB, the SVR, the FPS and the MOD and was ready to work with foreign anti-terrorist teams. The members of the group took part in the Russo-American antiterrorist group meetings in May 2001. The relationship between the special services of the two countries was still bordering on adversarial. All the senior participants in the talks were soldiers of the Cold War. Both countries kept accusing each other of continuing espionage. Russia was also not terribly impressed by the statements made by politicians and commentators criticizing it for the Chechen campaign.  

Anti-terrorist experts from the USA, Russia and India met in April 2001, to discuss co-operation in combating terrorism exported from Afghanistan. With another meeting of the Russian-Indian anti-terrorist group scheduled for mid-2001, India was fast becoming Russia’s major security partner. Another natural ally in the antiterrorist coalition was Israel, which has been fighting the Islamic extremist for more than three decades. Nor did the Russians neglect their other Middle Eastern contacts. Secretary of the Security Council Sergey Ivanov visited Iran in mid October 2000 and met several top Iranian officials including President Khatami and the chiefs of all Iranian special services. The FSB has contacts at a senior level in Lebanon.  

Aleksandr Gurov, Chairman of the State Duma Security Committee, had proposed the formation of a joint Russia-NATO international strategic counter-terrorist centre during his visit to the NATO HQ in May 2001. The centre would also fight drug trade, organized crime and illegal immigration. Nothing came of the suggestions at that time as the political, legal, financial and organizational hurdles facing NATO were too numerous and too high for NATO even to begin to talk to Russia about the viability of such a centre.
After the 9/11 attack the official reaction from Moscow was a condemnation of the perpetrators but also I-told-you-so, and hope that the world would understand better when looking at the Chechen conflict.

Immediately after the attacks the FSB condemned them, called for citizens’ vigilance and for joining forces in an international anti-terrorist campaign. The FSB propaganda experts tried to capitalize on a political climate now favourable for them. General Aleksandr Zdanovich, the FSB’s chief PR man, said on 13 September that whole groups currently operating in Chechnya had undergone training on Afghan territory effectively controlled by bin Laden. The FSB director claimed that the Russian special services had warned their US counterparts about the possibility of Islamic extremists’ terrorist acts in the USA. On 17 September the FSB announced that it had found two CDs containing a technical description of the Boeing 737 and operating instruction in the home of a woman living in the village of Tsotsin-Yurt in Kurchaloy District of Chechnya. No further details were given. A week later the FSB public relations centre announced that the service had proof that the Arab terrorist Khattab fighting in Chechnya was financed by bin Laden. Dimitriy Rogozin, the Chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, called for more money to be allocated for the Russian special services. Vladimir Putin held several meetings with ministers and heads of the power structures. Two days after one of these, Putin addressed the nation on the ORT TV channel stating the official Russian position on the US anti-terrorist campaign and offering the USA support of intelligence information and airspace for humanitarian aid flights. Appearing as an unofficial representative of the CIS member states, Putin said that the CIS Central Asian countries would share Russia’s position.

On 17 October the FSB raided the Moscow branch of a Kuwaiti charity, the Social Reform Society, associated with the extreme branch of the Moslem Brotherhood. FSB officials were included in the Russian operational group which again established contacts with the Northern Alliance leadership at the beginning of October 2001. At the end of December 2001, Russian Security Council Secretary Vladimir Rushaylo remarked with satisfaction that after 11 September Russia’s uncompromising position when dealing with terrorism “is meeting with response in many countries of the world”. On 17 April 2002, Putin issued Decree No 393, in connection with UN Security Council Resolutions 1388 of January 2002 and 1390 of 16 January 2002, freezing terrorist assets and blocking funds and assistance to all terrorists. The attacks on the USA were very useful for Vladimir Putin and the Russian special services. At a minimum, the world began to link Islamic extremists with the Chechen armed groups; Russia became a partner in the international anti-terrorist coalition; foreign politicians and human rights activists ceased to criticize the behaviour of the Russian troops in Chechnya and those who continue to do so are ignored. No one in Russia would now think of opposing budget increases on security and intelligence bodies. The Central Asian states accept closer security cooperation with Russia and the world is now ready to listen to Russian views about the conflict in Chechnya.
Conclusion

The Russian special services may consider themselves very lucky. They have legally only one master and supervisor. Their master, President Putin, is still proud of once being one of them and acknowledges the role they have to play in internal and foreign policies. Neither the Prime Minister nor the parliament have any rights to task, supervise, scrutinize or interfere with the working of the Russian special services. Parliament has the right to look at individual items of the annual budget and that prerogative covers also intelligence and security matters. Individual members of parliament may occasionally ask questions about specific alleged activities of the FSB but with Putin's popularity, the continuing conflict in Chechnya and the campaign against organized crime, attempts to limit the powers of the special services or reduce their budget would be political suicide.

The Russian special services will continue to fight real and imaginary enemies on many invisible fronts. Combating terrorism will remain top of their agenda. The Chechens will lose the war in the end but in the meantime they may still win many battles. Displaced Chechens, scattered al-Qaeda fighters, resentful and abandoned Palestinians and radical Muslim groups may set up the terrorist international the world has never yet seen. The globalization of terror and crime will require from all special services a major effort. The Russian special services enjoy the high esteem in which they are still held. A poll conducted in March 2000 by the Russian independent opinion research centre (ROMIR) showed that 72% of those polled place trust the Army and FSB, 58% trust the Russian Church and 34% trust the judiciary. However a recent poll conducted by Izvestiya shows that the popularity of the special services fell from 46% in 2000 to 38% in 2002.

Russian special services have been much more popular with the average Russian than many critical articles written in the 1990s in the liberal section of the Russian press would suggest. This is because of the lawless last decade when the special services were seen as the only organization capable of stopping the crime tide, given the dramatic loss of credibility of other power structures, and a discreet but skilful propaganda campaign, including high quality books, TV programmes and websites, which have succeeded in improving their image. Step by step reforms of the special services will continue, depending on the situation in the international arena and internal needs. In both cases special services' personnel are front line troops and cannot be replaced at this stage.

The unlikely and loose new antiterrorist coalition consists of most NATO members, several European states, Russia, Israel, India and any other country threatened by Islamic extremists. In March 2002, Russia hosted over 100 representatives of the special services of 39 countries in St Petersburg to discuss how to combat international terrorism.

The Russians know that they will have to increasingly rely on international cooperation, irrespective of how well they succeed in modernising and strengthening their own special services. They have practically won the Chechen war, although they will still lose many small battles in Russia and abroad. The Chechens and their extremist allies may soon target Russian interests abroad. Russian efforts to combat organized crime and drug trafficking will also need foreign input because of the rapid globalization of such crime. For the same reason foreign special services need Russia's cooperation. The problems which all sides will experience when working against a common threat, in addition to the usual security restrictions, occasional attempts at recruitment and interdepartmental
infighting, are likely to be cultural differences and legal restrictions, still a thorny issue even among NATO and the EU members. The Russians, and not only them, will react with suspicion to delays and legal wrangling, so different from their own decisionmaking system. Colonel-General Viktor Komogorov, FSB deputy director, said in April 2002 that the Russian special services were dissatisfied with the "quantity and quality of information" which they received from their US counterparts. "For instance," said Komogorov, "we sent over 100 reports to the CIA in February and received only 50". He accused the Americans of not answering specific Russian questions, adding, "This is not cooperation in combating international terrorism".238

Even if some of the 'misunderstandings' are deliberate, for security and political reasons, all sides would do well by trying to understand each other's bureaucracies and administrative regulations.

All Russia’s special services will be paying particular attention to Central Asia. Security Council Secretary Vladimir Rushaylo in April 2001 described international terrorism and militant extremism as particularly dangerous for that region.239 Some Islamic charities operating in Russia and investigated by the FSB are based in the CIS countries. The FSB is especially interested in the extreme branch of the Muslim Brothers which had its outposts in 49 regions of Russia and in the CIS.240 The Russians may end up by helping to fight terrorism in Central Asia while at the same time subverting other helpers.

The probability that Vladimir Putin had become a priority target for the Chechen terrorist was the most likely reason for the re-creation, in April 2000, of the Presidential Security Service as a subdivision of the Federal Bodyguard Service.241 Russia must accept that sooner or later Russian diplomatic outposts and commercial companies abroad will become targets of terrorists finding it difficult to hit targets inside Russia.

The FSB is still the main combatant against organized crime. In December 2001 Patrushev warned against organized criminal groups trying to gain control over Russian strategic industries.242 In 1999 in Moscow alone the FSB and the MVD confiscated 9 tonnes of explosives243 and about 40 tons of Colombian cocaine is being shipped each year to the FSU ports.244

The other area to which the Russian special services will pay particular attention, in view of the impending NATO enlargement, is Kaliningrad Oblast. A FSB conference in Kaliningrad which took place at the beginning of November 2001 addressed the internal problems of the region. The meeting was attended by most of Russia’s power structures with the notable exception of the MOD. One of the issues addressed by Nikolay Patrushev who chaired the conference was NATO expansion.245

The next stage of NATO enlargement will not put the Russian and NATO special services on a collision course, and may not even disrupt limited cooperation in combating common enemies. It will, however, make the Russian intelligence bodies, the SVR, GRU and FAPSI more "inquisitive" in the new member states. Russia may have reluctantly accepted the inevitability of the enlargement but has never agreed with the NATO rationale for the move and can be expected to "distrust and verify" using all legal and illegal means. The scale of the Russian "verification" will depend on its success in the renegotiation of the CFE agreement, the development of the armed forces of the new NATO members and the deployment of NATO troops, technical and administrative personnel in the new member states as
well as the construction and deployment of technical intelligence and early warning systems on their territory.

This is where Vladimir Putin’s position as uncontested master and supervisor of all Russian special services may become slightly embarrassing in the international forum. He has no reason to worry about challenges to his position coming from within the special services; he may dismiss or discipline officials whose actions embarrass him or damage Russia’s reputation, but his de facto patronage over the special services makes him directly responsible for their actions. Having changed just about everyone at the top of almost every power structure, he could hardly blame his predecessor for any major mistakes made by them. The combination of older security and intelligence officials rushing to redress the old losses, younger officers tested in some of the hottest spots of the FSU and open season on international terrorism could provoke Russian planners and operators to reach for radical and brutal solutions. He should have no problems in controlling them although they can still embarrass him occasionally at home and abroad by misusing old operational methods, evidently still in force, or occasionally filibustering his orders when told to work with, as opposed to against, their old enemies in the West. The drawback of being in full control of all power structures, without exception, is that ultimately only he will be blamed of anything goes wrong.

Even with Vladimir Putin’s full support, a bigger budget and public approval the Russian special services will have to excise many bad habits. The older bosses of the present special services have never forgotten the old bad operational practices and the new ones have had very few opportunities to learn new methods as they all have to work with only slightly updated internal regulations. The present generation of security personnel, brutalized by the Chechen conflict, may be inclined to take too strong remedies to solve small problems and that may slow down the already slowly developing Russian democracy. The FSB’s second most important task, counterintelligence work, would be made easier if the service concentrated on real issues, dropping cases like those of Nikitin, Pasko, Soyfer or Sutyagin and passing others to the MVD or the tax police.

The Russian special services will have to learn to cooperate and synchronize their operations. This will require new guidelines, new training, new improved methods of processing and dissemination of information. It is not enough to tell the special services to cooperate with each other. Those implementing the orders have to be taught how to do it and how not to do it, and that the secrets and problems of one organization are the secrets and problems of all special services. A glaring example of how things should not be done happened in Moscow immediately after the 9/11 events. At the beginning of November 2001, Moscow’s Orthodox churches and synagogues were warned by the FSB about planned suicide attacks. Photographs of the alleged planners of the attack were distributed around churches in Moscow, revealing their features but also potentially the photographers. This made the SVR, the original suppliers of the photos, very unhappy with the way the FSB handled highly sensitive material.246

In the post 9/11 world the SVR will expand the breadth and depth of its activities around the world. To its usual areas of interest it will have to add many regions and subjects which it had to abandon at the beginning of the 1990s. Like the FSB, the SVR will require several years of generous financing to compensate for the lean last decade, or to invest in a new generation of officers and new technologies. Recruitment and retention will remain one of the main challenges for the personnel managers of the Russian special services. These problems will be solved only when
the Russian state begins to pay the personnel of its special services salaries and bonuses which would allow them to have a modest but survivable standard of living, when it begins to recruit women for positions which do not require physical strength or combat training and starts recruiting a new generation of candidates from financially secure families; all these in addition to a whole set of new laws and operational rules which would prevent the younger officers from becoming a sword and shield for ambitious politicians, keepers of bad traditions or unscrupulous bosses. But then, would the new, efficient and modern Russian special services be good news for the rest of the world?

ENDNOTES

1 Kommersant Vlast, 23 April 2002, p59.
2 Ibid, p62.
6 Putin signed a decree discharging Sergey Ivanov from military service on 9 November 2000, Interfax, 9 November 2000.
7 Ibid, 22 January 2000.
9 RIA, 13 March 2000.
10 Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 6 April 2000, BBC Monitoring Service.
11 RTR TV, 25 July 2000 FBIS.
12 ITAR-TASS, 15 November 2000.
13 Novyje Izvestiya, 4 November 2000, FBIS.
16 Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 17 February 2000, FBIS. A similar statute had existed since 19 February 1993.
17 Ibid.
19 ITAR-TASS, 9 June 2000.
20 Izvestiya, 26 July 2000, Internet version.
21 ORT TV, 30 May 2002.
23 ITAR-TASS, 9 June 2000.
24 ORT TV, 20 December 2000.
27 Interfax, 8 June 2000.
29 ORT TV, 20 December 2000.
30 Moscow Centre TV, 20 December 2001, FBIS.
31 Segodnya, 1 June 2000, p1.
33 Izvestiya, 12 October 2000, FBIS.
35 Ibid.
36 Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 20 December 2000, FBIS.
37 Gran.ru, 1 October 2001, FBIS.
Interfax, 22 February 2001. The probable reason why the percentages do not add up is that the respondents were not asked to prioritize their answers.

ITAR-TASS, 22 December 2000.


Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 6 September 2000, Internet version.

Krasnaya Zvezda, 20 December 2000, FBIS.

Izvestiya, 20 December 2000; RTR TV, 20 December 2000, FBIS.

Krasnaya Zvezda, 20 December 2000, FBIS.


RIA, 29 December 2000.

Kommersant, 4 May 2000, p3.


For background information on FAPSI see CSRC, C105, 'The Federal Agency of Government Communications & Information', Gordon Bennett, August 2000.

RIA, 6 February 2001.

Versiya, 10 November 2000, BBC Monitoring Service.


Russia TV, Moscow, 17 October 2001, BBC Monitoring Service. The decision to close the base was made at a defence ministry meeting and FAPSI was not publicly mentioned. The Russian officials spoke about the military pull-out only.

ORT TV, 16 May 2000.

Izvestiya, 16 December 2000. The percentage of strategic intelligence obtained by the centre has been attributed to Fidel Castro's brother, Raul, who many years ago boasted that the USSR got 75% of "all strategic intelligence" from the Lourdes station. The Cubans would not be able to assess the value of the highly-graded, restricted information. Raul Castro must have been told about the intelligence value of Lourdes by his Soviet partners or he simply quoted a US assessment which appeared in the open press.

Moskovskie Novosti, 12 February 2002.


ITAR-TASS, 14 August 2001; Segodnya, 16 December 2000, FBIS.


Kommersant, 6 November 2001, p2.

Moskovskie Novosti, 12 February 2002, FBIS. It seems that for security and administrative reasons the Russians were vague when describing the personnel at Lourdes. Most of the Russian intelligence community, including the clerical staff, have military ranks whether they belong to the GRU, FAPSI, FSB or the SVR. The small number of "servicemen" could have meant a group of soldiers responsible for guarding the perimeter fence, drivers or quartering personnel. The 1,500 were probably cadre signals intelligence officers and their families.


Interfax, 18 October 2001.

Segodnya, 13 September 2000, FBIS. A rejected proposal on "information space" by several Duma members was far less democratic.

ITAR-TASS, 23 June 2000.

Kommersant, 13 September 2000, p1.

ITAR-TASS, 12 September 2000.


Centre TV, Moscow, 25 November 2001, BBC Monitoring Service.

Interfax, 18 December 2001.


Interfax, 18 December 2001 and 20 December 2001, The Russian term “agent” translates as a collaborator or an outsider drawn into secret cooperation, not an agent as it is understood in the UK and the USA.

John Tobin was arrested in a café when he allegedly attracted police attention when “drinking Coca-Cola and swearing loudly at the same time”. Tobin was charged with possession of drugs but the charge of espionage was added later (Kommersant, 28 February 2001, FBIS; NTV, 27 March 2001). He was originally sentenced to three years and one month in prison - later reduced to one year (Kommersant, 27 June 2001, p3). Edmond Pope, a retired intelligence officer, was accused of trying to obtain a super secret and super fast Russian torpedo “Shkvall”. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, mysteriously pardoned by Putin in mid-December 2000 and immediately whisked out of Russia (RTR TV, 14 December 2000, FBIS).

In January 2000 Poland expelled 9 Russian diplomats, accusing them of espionage. In February 2000 the Czechs expelled several suspected spies. The Russians retaliated with an expulsion of Czech diplomats from Moscow (RIA, 18 February 2000).

Captain 1st Rank Viktor Bogatenko, the Russian military attaché, left Japan on 9 September 2000 as a result of the arrest the day before of Lieutenant Commander Hagisaki (Kyoto, 8 & 9 September 2000, BBC Monitoring Service).

Two Russian diplomats, Yuriy Yatsenko and Vladimir Telegin, were expelled from Estonia after showing too much interest in Estonia’s Eastern border (Tallin, Radio 1, 3 September 2000, BBC Monitoring Service).

A former GDR citizen who moved to Sweden in 1966 was arrested by the Swedish Security Service on 20 February 2001. The unnamed employee of ABB Power Systems was suspected of working for the SVR. He was released two days later because of lack of evidence (Kommersant, 23 February 2001, p3).

According to Oleg Gordievski, 35 SVR and GRU officers worked in the UK under diplomatic cover in the UK at the beginning of 2001, an increase of 10 in recent years (Kommersant, 27 March 2001, p10).
An alleged Russian spy was arrested by the Finnish authorities in the spring of 2001 (NTV, 10 May 2001, FBIS).
Three Russian diplomats were asked to leave Bulgaria in March 2001, after Bulgarian counterintelligence arrested the retired deputy head of military intelligence and the head of the military intelligence services archives, for collaboration with the Russian GRU (Trud, Sofia, 18 March 2001, FBIS).
US Army Colonel George Trofimoff was charged with spying for the USSR and Russia (Interfax, 20 June 2001).
Department 11/7 of Group C of the Austrian state police responsible for counterintelligence notified its government that in their opinion, 100 out of 443 Russian nationals officially accredited in Austria worked for the Russian intelligence services. Out of 59 Russian diplomats stationed in Austria 32 were intelligence officers. The report stated that the Russian intelligence organizations were as active as their Soviet predecessors (Format, Vienna, 1 October 2001, pp60-64, BBC Monitoring Service). When the police allegations were leaked to the Austrian media, the SVR chief of station Valeriy Rozanov telephoned the police HQ to protest (Vienna Format, 8 October 2001 p66, FBIS).
Colonel SVR Sergey Tretyakov defected from the Russian UN mission in New York on 18 October 2000. Tretyakov was listed as a first secretary of the Russian UN mission but was also the SVR deputy chief of station in charge of political intelligence (Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 7 March 2001, p1; ibid, 4 June 2002, p1).
Yevgeniy Toporov, a security officer in the Russian embassy in Ottawa, disappeared on 25 December 2000. Before he came to Canada, he was the head of the American section of the SVR Counterintelligence Directorate (Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 7 March 2001, p1; ibid, 4 June 2002, p1).
Vladislav Potapov, the head of the department of bilateral relations with the USA in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, disappeared in January 2001. Potapov was previously in charge of the foreign minister’s personnel secretariat. His letter of resignation arrived several months later from the USA. There was very little that he did not know about the ministry (Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 4 June 2002, p1).
Igor Dereychuk, a 32-year-old cultural attaché in the Russian embassy in Panama, disappeared in February 2000. His diplomatic visa expired on 23 February and he went missing officially on 27 February (ITAR-TASS, 15 March 2001; El Siglo web site Panama City, 20 March 2001, BBC Monitoring Service).
Major-General Kalugin, a long time US resident, asked for political asylum in the USA after appearing as a witness for prosecution in the court case of US Army Colonel (Retd) George Trofimoff, accused of working for the KGB/SVR since 1970. Trofimoff was sentenced to life imprisonment (ITAR-TASS, 26 March 2002).
Kalugin and Litvinenko were subpoenaed to come to Russia. The main military prosecutor accused Litvinenko of abuse of office and stealing explosives (Interfax, 23 April 2002). Kalugin was accused of espionage. Both refused to go to Russia to testify. At the beginning of 2000, General Kalugin wrote an open letter to acting president Putin saying that he, Kalugin, was going to ask for political asylum abroad after an interview given by Putin in which he called Kalugin a traitor (Ekho Moskvy, 23 March 2000, FBIS). Both men were given custodial sentences in absentia. The Russian prosecutors wanted to do this as quickly as possible because the new Russian Criminal Procedural Code which came into effect on 1 July 2002 allows trials in absentia only with the consent of the defendant, which very few Russians wanted back home are likely to give (Vremya Novostey, 29 March 2002 p3). Colonel Litvinenko, subsidized by Boris Berezovskiy, will live in comfort and relative peace as long as he publicly supports Berezovskiy’s theory that Putin knew about the terrorist explosions in Russia in autumn 1999. Kalugin’s future may be complicated if he has not so far fully cooperated with the FBI and they decide that he should.
Speaking in the Duma on 14 April 2000 Vladimir Putin said, “If it is found that the foreign minister has contacts with representatives of foreign states outside the framework of his official duties, he, like all other government members, State Duma deputies and faction leaders, like all other citizens of the Russian Federation, will be subject to certain procedures in accordance with criminal law”. Putin’s remark was made after the closed part of the session in which the left-wingers in the Duma accused government members of unnecessary contacts with foreigners during the which they may have betrayed state secrets. The main target of the attack was Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. Putin supported Ivanov in the closed part of the session but to placate the accusers he issued a warning statement in the open part of the session using unfortunate “professional” KGB language.

Segodnya, 15 April 2000, BBC Monitoring Service.

A remark made by Lieutenant-General Ivan Mironov, the head of the FSB Investigative Operation Directorate, Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 22 December 2000, p3.


Segodnya, 14 September 2000; RTR TV, 17 April 2000, BBC Monitoring Service.

Delo Nr 10, Grigoriy Pasko Protiv FSB, Galeriya, Moskva 2000, p25.

ITAR-TASS, 7 May 2002.


The Chairman of the Russian Federation Council, Sergey Mironov, publicly declared his support for the sentenced officer, Interfax, 26 December 2002, BBC Monitoring Service.

Izvestiya, 14 June 2001, FBIS.

Radio Russia, Moscow, 13 June 2001, BBC Monitoring Service.

NTV, 14 June 2001, BBC Monitoring Service.


NTV Russia, 30 October 2001, FBIS.


TV 6, Moscow, 27 December 2001, BBC Monitoring Service.

Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 28 February 2001, p2. Further information on the Sutyagin case can be found in Interfax, 8 August 2001, ibid, 27 December 2001, BBC Monitoring Service.

ITAR-TASS, 12 October 2000; Segodnya, 12 October 2000, FBIS.


ORT TV, 16 March 2000. According to the FSB, at least six Moscow explosions were averted in 1999.

The conspiracy theory that the FSB was behind the three explosions is kept alive by one of the most prominent Russian oligarchs, Boris Berezovskiy. Neither his accusations nor a video produced by him, commercial quantities of which two Duma deputies attempted to import to Russia (APN, www.apn.ru, 23 November 2001) contained a shred of evidence that the FSB was involved in the explosions. In the BBC World “Hard Talk” interview on 8 May 2002 Berezovskiy was not able to present any evidence in support of his theory. He did not suggest that he was in possession of evidence which he would be ready to present in court.

Argumenty I Fakty, 26 April 2000, FBIS.

RTR TV, 15 May 2001, FBIS.


ORT TV, 29 December 2000.
Aslan Maskhadov issued a decree on 14 March 1999 establishing a Ministry of National Security. The decree was rescinded by the Chechen Parliament on 20 April 1999.

In April 2000, Movsayev had criticized the US, British and German intelligence services for helping Russia in its war against the Chechen rebels.
Vladimir Putin & Russia’s Special Services

Interfax-Kazakhstan, 19 May 2000, BBC Monitoring Service.

ITAR-TASS, 14 May 2002.

Khabar TV, 4 February 2000, BBC Monitoring Service.

Ibid, 16 April 2001, FBIS.


Asia-Plus, Dushanbe, 1 October 2001, BBC Monitoring Service.


TV 6, 1 September 2001, FBIS.


Belorussian TV, 20 April 2001, FBIS.

UNIAN, 26 January 2000, FBIS.

ITAR-TASS, 16 October 2000.

Interfax, 3 March 2002.

AVN, 29 May 2002.


Komsomolskaya Pravda, 18 October 2001 p3.

ANS-ChTV, 9 April 2002, FBIS. It is possible that the arrested team was working on a contract from the FSB.

Iprinda, Tbilisi, 19 October 2000, BBC Monitoring Service.


NTV, 5 March 2002, BBC Monitoring Service.


Interfax, 22 August 2000.

ITAR-TASS, 14 September 2000; Interfax, 14 September 2000; RTS TV, FBIS.

Interfax, 18 October 2000.


RIA, 16 October 2000.

ITAR-TASS, 6 March 2001.


TV 6, 13 September 2001, BBC Monitoring Service.

Russia TV, 15 September 2001, BBC Monitoring Service.


Izvestiya, 10 January 2002, Internet version.


Rossiya, 24 April 2002.


Interfax, 6 June 2000.

ITAR-TASS, 18 December 2001.

Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 26 January 2000, p2.

El Pais, Colombia, 29 November 2001, BBC Monitoring Service.


Versiya, 6 November 2001.
Disclaimer

The views expressed are those of the Author and not necessarily those of the UK Ministry of Defence

ISBN 1-904423-02-7