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The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation

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The Survival of the Weakest

The 1990s witnessed an unprecedented growth of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). The decade-long transformation of the ministry had its roots in the mid 1960s when the new leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, offered Nikolay Anisimovich Shchelokov, one of his friends, the position of Minister of Internal Affairs. The two men knew each other before WWII when they worked as communist party activists in Dnetropetrovsk. During the war both served in the Red Army as political officers and later worked together as communist apparatchiks in Moldova. Shchelokov became Minister of Internal Affairs in 1966 and was dismissed immediately after Brezhnev's death in 1982. He was corrupt, narrow minded and dogmatic - the embodiment of what later became known as “the period of stagnation”. In the mid 1970s Brezhnev promoted Yuri Churbanov, his own son-in-law, first to Deputy Minister then to First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. Under the leadership of this uneducated, inefficient and corrupt duo the Ministry, the least important of the Soviet power structures, remained reassuringly powerless, uncontroversial and unthreatening to the political leadership.

Since the break up of Stalin's NKVD and its derivatives, the Ministry of Internal Affairs had been reduced to catching criminals, regulating road traffic, guarding special facilities, and serving as a supporting body of the KGB. The most difficult criminal cases, regarded as a potential threat to the stability of the country or individual regions, were handled by the KGB or by both organisations, with the MVD playing second fiddle. The KGB would take control of anti-hijacking operations because the crime involved an illegal attempt to leave the territory of the USSR, terrorism and hostage taking because these were almost always regarded as politically motivated and because the MVD personnel were neither trained nor equipped to deal with them. In spite of the anti-corruption campaign and the purges within the ministry which began immediately after Brezhnev's death the Soviet leadership saw no reason to modernise the MVD because in comparison with the developed Western countries the level of crime in the USSR was insignificant. The problem facing Soviet criminals was not only how to steal, rob or embezzle without being caught. Those who succeeded in accumulating money, and occasionally goods, by illegal means had to spend it cautiously:

- The Soviet border was quite successfully sealed by the KGB border guards,
- Unauthorised possession of foreign currency was punishable by custodial sentences,
- Russian-made products were unattractive and their range limited,
- Foreign travel was out of the question for most Soviet citizens,
- Any unauthorised contacts with foreigners could automatically mean 15 days imprisonment,
- Investing in property was not an option in the USSR,
- Buying a Soviet made car was not difficult but they were of inferior quality and performed poorly. Those few who were able to buy foreign cars stood out in the
ocean of Zhigulis, Moskvichs, Volgas and Ladas. Potential Soviet Bonnies and Clydes could not even lay their hands on fast get-away cars as the only such car produced in the USSR, a Volga with a V-8 engine, was made for the KGB for escort and surveillance duties.

- Money laundering and illegal workshops existed only on a minute scale.
- Successful criminals could eat well without queuing, take long holidays in Sochi, equip their apartments with western electronic goods and buy gold and precious stones. This by the standards of any criminal underworld was not much.

The MVD equipment was modest because so were the tools of crime in the USSR. Firearms controls were strict and penalties for their illegal possession and use were draconian. Public transport and road traffic were strictly controlled and ID papers frequently checked. All crimes committed either in the Soviet Union or by Soviet nationals abroad, or involving even a small amount of foreign convertible currency were investigated by the KGB. The MVD was kept away from KGB investigations. Criminal organisations existed but in most cases with enough political pressure from the centre they were usually neutralised reasonably quickly. The failures of the law enforcement bodies and especially the MVD were evident outside large cities where the incidence of drink related crimes and assaults was high, considering the general control of the population and the unlimited power of the law enforcement bodies.

The MVD officers were not the most talented and motivated in the Soviet power structures and young men who planned to spend their working lives in uniform were interested in a career in the Armed Forces or the KGB rather than the MVD. The recruitment of militiamen was simple and even less selective than that of their officers. On the eve of demobilisation in the Moscow Military District conscripts from distant parts of the USSR were “head-hunted” by the MVD recruiters, offering them residence permits and housing in Moscow. For most, this was the only way to stay legally in Moscow. Many new recruits tried to leave the militia once they got the residence permit and accommodation by behaving unprofessionally, hoping that they would be dismissed. The MVD recruiters in other parts of the USSR usually had less to offer but accommodation, a salary and a position of power were attractive for many young men with secondary or incomplete secondary education and no future.

Leonid Brezhnev’s friendship with Minister Shchelokov, and his son-in-law’s position in the ministry, made investigation of corruption and inefficiency in the MVD impossible. Brezhnev’s death in 1982 brought about the downfall of both men. Shchelokov was replaced by the KGB Chairman Vitaly Vasilevich Fedorchuk, transferred to the MVD to clean it up. He was assisted by another KGB official, Vasily Yakovlevich Lezhepekov, put in charge of MVD personnel. The Central Committee of the CPSU decided that 150 KGB officials were to reinforce the ministry but the implementation of the decision was difficult as the “volunteered” officers resisted the transfer. Brutal and narrow minded, Fedorchuk fired 160,000 MVD employees, intimidated the rest but failed to conduct the necessary fundamental reforms. The purges resulted in severe staff shortages. In the early 1980s, 25,000 people graduated annually from all the MVD schools. The MVD officials assessed that the schools would have to train the same number of people for six years to fill the gap, and that without counting retirements, natural attrition and the experience of those dismissed.
Another wave of reforms came in 1988 with the arrival at the helm of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Vadim Bakatin, one of Mikhail Gorbachev’s closest allies. Gorbachev’s policies resulted in gradual and general liberalisation but also unleashed violent ethnic clashes. On 28 July 1988 the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet issued a decree “On duties and rights of the Internal Troops of the USSR MVD when safeguarding public order”, clarifying its role in the cracking USSR11. However, the Internal Troops were still a part of the Armed Forces and this state of affairs pleased no one. The Armed Forces did not want to be seen as a force of internal suppression, especially after the disastrous Afghan war. The MVD was finding itself having to extinguish increasingly frequent and violent hot spots and to cope with growing and increasingly well organised and equipped criminals. For this the MVD needed more fire power. On 21 March 1989 The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decided to take the Internal Troops out of the Armed Forces12 and give them to the Interior Ministry. This would keep the Armed Forces out of internal conflicts but would invariably reduce their claim to the rapidly shrinking budget. The MVD found itself in a position in which it had more responsibilities but could expect more funds and yet had to compete for a shrinking pool of conscripts. Today, the MVD is thus divided into two principal parts: one responsible for crime fighting and the Internal Troops, which are expected to deal with any large scale violent or potentially violent, internal disturbances.

On 6 October 1989, before Boris Yeltsin began to play a pivotal role in Russia, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a decree “On establishing The Union-Republican Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR”. It was to be the first purely Russian power structure. In December 1990 Mikhail Gorbachev decided to take the chaotic and corrupt USSR MVD in hand and nominated Boris Karlovich Pugo, a party apparatchik and a professional KGB officer, as Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Also in December, Colonel-General Boris Vsevlodovich Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army in Afghanistan, became First Deputy Interior Minister. On 29 December 1990, already with Boris Yeltsin as the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, the MVD RSFSR approved its own new structure. Like Gorbachev, Yeltsin was purging “his” MVD. In May 1991 10,000 people were dismissed from the RSFSR MVD and 11,000 left the ministry in July.

The coup of August 1991 was far less traumatic for the MVD than it was for other power structures. The MVD insiders were able to argue after the end of the failed coup that they were led by two outsiders transplanted from the KGB (Pugo) and the MOD (Gromov) and that the ministry’s Special Purpose Militia Detachments included in the plan to storm the anti-coup White House were never used. The purges of the RSFSR MVD continued and in September 1991 another 15,000 employees left its ranks. On 19 December 1991 Yeltsin issued a decree establishing the Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs of the RSFSR, merging the MVD and the KGB, knowing that within a week the union power structures would be at his command. Less than a month later the Russian Constitutional Court declared the new Ministry to be illegal, forcing Yeltsin to divide it into the MVD and the Federal Counterintelligence Service. Yeltsin reacted to the court’s decision instantly and on 29 January 1992 the Russian Government decided to increase the number of MVD personnel in the central apparatus from 1500 to 3400. This was the beginning of the great growth of the whole apparatus of the MVD. On 12 February 1993 Yeltsin issued a decree “On Public Order Militia (Local Militia) in the Russian Federation” increasing the number of local militia by 84,500. At the beginning of 1994 the local militia had 442,000 people, 27% short of their full complement. Other militia structures, including the 33 republican and regional
forces, were 70% complemented. The ambitious development programme for the ministry was not matched by budgetary allocations. In June 1993 the Minister of Internal Affairs complained personally to Yel’tsin that his subordinates were not paid in full the previous month. The salary shortfall amounted to 29bn roubles and 127bn roubles was yet to be paid for food allowances and other services. The MVD assessed its needs for 1993 at a minimum of 149.9bn roubles. It was given by the Ministry of Finance 57bn roubles.

The Second Coup

Yel’tsin’s early purges of the MVD paid dividends in October 1993 when in spite of many “defections” to the opposition, the two most important people in the ministry, Minister of Internal Affairs Viktor Fedeorovich Yerin and the Commander of Internal Troops Anatoliy Sergeyevich Kulikov, stood by him to the victorious end of his stand-off with the Duma. Yerin began his career in 1960 in Tatarstan but in the early 1980s volunteered for service in Afghanistan where he was one of the organisers of the MVD special forces team “Kobalt”. He was a Deputy Minister of Interior in Armenia during the difficult years 1988-1992.

The 1993 events were a major test for the Moscow MVD bodies. On 1 September 1993 Yel’tsin promoted Yerin to Army General, a rank equal to that of the Minister of Defence Grachev. On 23 September, about 20,000 people in 27 Russian cities took part in anti-Yel’tsin demonstrations. Two days later there were 14 meetings in 11 cities, though the average number of participants in each meeting did not exceed 100. Yerin allocated 10,000-12,000 militiamen and 2,000-3,000 internal troops to keep the situation under control. The next day he brought into Moscow 4,000 militiamen in addition to the 3,300 already on the streets of the city. By 30 September the White House was surrounded by 4,000 militiamen, 1,700 soldiers and 500 cadets. The number of people defending the parliament reached about 2,000. They were facing a force of 5,000 people from various law enforcement bodies. Four days later, in Moscow, there were 10,000 militiamen operating against the pro-White House demonstrators. They were supported by 1,000 cadets from the MVD schools, 2446 internal troops, 1,730 reservists and 500 employees of the central apparatus. During the most difficult moments of the coup, at the beginning of October, Minister Yerin, in contrast with Minister of Defence Pavel Grachev, acted decisively and was awarded the highest Russian Military Order, Hero of Russia. Had it not been for the first Chechen war he would have kept his position for a very long time.

After the 1993 events, the Internal Troops were strengthened as much as Russia’s precarious financial situation allowed. The losers were other power ministries, especially the MOD. The chairman of the Duma Security Committee Viktor Ilyukhin expressed his concern about the strengthening of the Internal Troops when he said at the at the all-army conference on 18 February 1995 that numerically they were stronger than their Soviet predecessors, they were approaching the number of troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and that they were being equipped with the latest weapons, including heavy weapons.
From Kulikov to Rushaylo

At the beginning of 1993, the Internal Troops command suggested to the MVD Collegium a plan for the development of the Internal Troops until the year 2005. The plan envisaged an increase in the number of operational troops from the existing 60,000 to 100,000. This was to be achieved by shifting troops from guarding and escorting units. The total number of internal troops was to be cut from 318,000 to 237,000. Boris Yel'tsin demanded further cuts to 220,000 troops. The 25 divisions of Internal Troops sounded menacing. The reality looked less impressive. The divisions were in fact regiments spread across several regions of the Russian Federation. When Duma members accused Yel'tsin and the MVD of forming their own army, Gen Kulikov answered that the Internal Troops units were equipped only with tracked and wheeled armoured and unarmoured combat and transport vehicles and all types of firearms. The cost of one Air Defence regiment equipped with S-300 systems equalled the cost of five MVD divisions.

At the beginning of July 1995, the hero of the 1993 coup, Minister Viktor Yerin was transferred to the Foreign Intelligence Service, after the bungled anti-terrorist operation in Budennovsk. He was replaced by Colonel-General Anatoliy Sergeyevich Kulikov, Commander of the MVD Internal Troops. General Kulikov graduated from two military academies (Frunze and Voroshilov) with distinction, commanded Internal Troops at various levels and served in several hot spots in the 1990s. Kulikov was expected to clean up corruption in the MVD and improve discipline in the ministry.

With the appointment of Kulikov as Minister the rest of the ministry was rapidly militarised. The aims of this reform were to make it capable of protecting the political leadership more effectively, improving their capabilities as a combat force able to fight well organised and well armed groups in the Russian Federation and purging corrupt officers, NCOs and contract soldiers. The losers were the crime fighting elements of the ministry. The top militia officials were not invited to some of the Ministerial meetings and only the voices of discontent from the Presidential security service stopped Kulikov from militarising of the Russian traffic police (GUBDD). General Kulikov lost his position in March 1998 when Boris Yel'tsin dismissed the Government of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. Kulikov was not offered another high profile, important job because his reforms of the MVD were not successful.

Determined to tackle corruption and other forms of economic crime, Yel'tsin nominated Sergey Vadimovich Stepashin Minister of the Interior. Stepashin, a former political officer in the MVD specialising in communist party cells in fire brigades, had been Yel'tsin’s staunch supporter since the early 90s. He remained one of Yel'tsin’s closest co-workers because of his honesty, integrity, political courage, and parliamentary contacts. His track record shows that he has been better at purging than reforming and that in 1995 he lost his position as FSB director for management failures. During 13 months at the helm of the MVD, Stepashin partly demilitarised the ministry by replacing the Main Staff of the MVD with the organisation-inspectorate directorate, cut the number of internal troops and reduced corruption in the militia across the country but did not make them more efficient. He was appointed acting prime minister on 12 May 1999, leaving behind him the Ministry of Internal Affairs still unable to stem the crime wave. During the first four months of 1999 serious crime in Moscow increased by 21% compared with the same period of the previous year.
Stepashin was replaced by Colonel-General Vladimir Borisovich Rushaylo. General Rushaylo spent twenty years of his career, 1976-1996, combating crime in Moscow. His nomination was acceptable to the Parliament, where between 1996 and 1998 Rushaylo worked as a legal adviser to the speaker of the lower chamber. If minister Rushaylo had the support of the Moscow mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, he lost it when in September 1999 he appointed his own candidate to the post of the Moscow Oblast chief of police. Governor Tazhlov countersigned the nomination, which was allegedly not co-ordinated with the presidential representative or the Oblast Duma. Colonel Yakhman, the new regional chief of police, was accused immediately by his detractors of inefficiency and links with the criminal underworld in the Lyubertsy region of Moscow. Rushaylo was accused in a noisy media campaign of violating the law. He ignored his critics.

The press sniping at General Rushaylo continued when he began to introduce reforms in the MVD. The killing of Colonel Dzhurayev of the Tambov Internal Affairs Directorate, who accused one of General Rushaylo’s first deputies of criminal contacts, was hushed up. And so was the case of the Russian journalist Andrey Babitskiy, handed over by the MVD to the Chechen “terrorists”. OMON crowd control units subordinate to Rushaylo performed poorly in Chechnya, killing innocent civilians and losing their own soldiers due to the incompetence of their commanders. President Putin may reassess his views of the Minister of Internal Affairs once the role of the Army in Chechnya is reduced to a minimum and the burden of dealing with the Chechen resistance is shifted on to the MVD and the FSB.

The MVD and Russian Military Doctrine

The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation approved by the Russian Federation Security Council on 2 November 1993 and adopted by presidential edict the same day reserved a special place for the Internal Troops. They and other organs of internal affairs were assigned the following tasks:

- the ensuring of the protection of public order and the maintenance of the legal regime during the state of emergency in the conflict zone;
- the localisation and blockading of the conflict area;
- the implementation of measures to disarm and eliminate illegal armed forces and confiscate weapons from the population in the conflict area;
- the strengthening of the protection of public order and security in areas adjoining the conflict area;
- the implementation of investigative and enquiry measures in the interests of eliminating the threat to internal security.

The Doctrine also envisaged a possible temporary enlistment of the Russian Armed Forces and other troops to aid the Internal Troops and other internal affairs bodies.

The latest Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation reduces drastically the importance of the Internal Troops but it allows the President to modify their role and tasks in accordance with the situation. The Internal Troops are included in the military organisation of the state. The MVD is responsible, together with the Armed Forces and other military formations, for the organisation of territorial defence of the Russian Federation. The basing of the Internal Troops on the
territory of the Russian Federation has to be agreed with the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and has to be in accordance with international treaties. The MVD is also responsible for its own rail transport. It is responsible for the protection of judges, court assessors, prosecutors and other court personnel. The ministry is allowed to have its own database systems relevant to its activities. The message, in the latest Military Doctrine, for the leadership of the MVD is that its leading role among Russia’s power structures is over and that the President can do with its Internal Troops whatever he wishes. The new doctrine spells this out for the first time. The second Chechen conflict probably saved the MVD and especially its Internal Troops from immediate and radical reforms. Once the major resistance points in Chechnya are suppressed the MVD can expect major reforms.

The Structure of the Central Apparatus

The Ministry of Internal Affairs is headed by a minister with three first-deputies and six deputies. All ten are nominated to and released from their posts by the president after consultations with the Prime Minister. The MVD has a Collegium of 19 members. The number of members can be changed only by the President. The Minister of the Interior presides over the Collegium, which includes all his first-deputies and deputies and other officials and military personnel of the ministry. 3,500 people work for the central apparatus of the ministry.

In addition to his other duties as Minister, the Minister of Interior Vladimir Rushaylo has personal charge of two separate directorates.

• The Internal Security Directorate, given its independent and important status in 1995. In 1997 its importance grew even further when it became the leading body in the ministry. This was the result of the MVD’s inability to cope with crime and the involvement of many officers in criminal organisations. At the moment there are 105 internal security subunits in republican MVDs and regional Main Directorates and Directorates of Internal Affairs. The Internal Security Directorate’s sole task is to tackle crime among serving personnel of the MVD.

• The Control-Auditing Directorate is the administrative and financial watchdog of the ministry answerable only to the minister. Established in 1992, the directorate can investigate any part of the Ministry. However, the murky waters of Russian politics limit its effectiveness and cleansing endeavour.

The Minister of Internal Affairs has three First Deputy Ministers.

1. The First Deputy Minister responsible for:

   1.1 The Main Directorate of Criminal Investigation which was set up in October 1989 within the newly established Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR. The directorate works on all aspects of solving crime, planning, forecasting future criminal trends and studies foreign experience of crime fighting.

   1.2 The Directorate Responsible for Combating Drug Trafficking. This was set up in 1992 to deal with all drug trafficking on the territory of the Russian Federation and co-operation with corresponding law enforcement bodies in foreign countries.
These two directorates have at their disposal:

- an **Operational-Search Directorate** which is, among other tasks, in charge of the data base of wanted suspects and criminals.
- an **Operational-Technical Directorate** responsible for equipment and technical support for the Operational-Search Directorate.

2. The First Deputy Minister - Head of the Investigation Committee of the Russian Federation is in charge of:

   2.1 **An Investigative Committee** - the MVD internal watchdog created by Boris Yel’tsin on 23 November 1998. The committee is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations within the ministry to make sure that it acts in accordance with its own rules and regulations.

   2.2 **An Organisational Directorate**.

   2.3 **An Information-Analytical Directorate**.

   2.4 **A Control and Procedural Directorate** with its own investigative section.

   2.5 The **Centre of Criminological Expertise** which controls, co-ordinates and advises MVD experts around the country. Together with several other bodies the centre also works on legal and organisational issues relevant to criminal expertise and is responsible for the introduction of new methods and technologies in criminal investigations. The centre co-ordinates the MVD’s scientific work, and assesses its crime fighting capabilities.

3. First Deputy Minister with responsibility for:

   3.1 **The Main Organisational-Inspection Directorate** which replaced in 1998 the Main Staff of the MVD but retained most of its functions. The directorate is responsible for organisation, planning, communication, legal and international co-operation and supervision of other MVD structures. The directorate controls

   - The Directorate of Organisational and Staff Planning and of Development of the Russian MVD system,
   - An Organisational and Planning Directorate,
   - An Information-Analytical Directorate,
   - Inspection Directorate,
   - A Duty Service Directorate,
   - An Emergency Situation Centre.

   3.2 **The Mobilisation Training Directorate**.

   3.3 **The Main Information Centre** originally established in 1970. The centre serves as the ministry’s own data base and information distributor to the MVD bodies around the country for the law enforcement bodies.

   3.4 **The MVD Property Protection Directorate**.

   3.5 **A Scientific Research Institute**.

4. A Deputy Minister is responsible for:
4.1 The **Main Directorate for Legal Work and External Relations** set up in 1998, the successor of the Legal Directorate of the MVD established in 1992 and the Legal Directorate of the Main Directorate of the Internal Troops. The directorate is responsible for legal work in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Interior Troops, their links with other federal ministries and services and co-operation with other countries. The directorate controls:

- A Legal Directorate,
- A Directorate for Liaising with Federal Organs,
- A Legal Section,
- A Personnel Section,
- A Secretariat,
- An International Co-operation Directorate. This has its own Protocol Service.
- An Information Directorate established in 1998 which has gradually become an independent body serving as an overblown PR office answerable only to the Minister of Internal Affairs. Its head serves as the ministry’s press secretary. The directorate includes:
  - The Press Centre,
  - An Organisational Department,
  - An Editorial and Publishing Department,
  - An Administrative Department.

4.2 The **Main Directorate of Supply**. The Directorate is responsible for the supply of tanks, APCs, aircraft, vehicles, individual weapons, ammunition, communications equipment, computers, fuel, food, medical equipment and furniture. The directorate is authorised to buy foreign equipment if necessary. It contains:

- A Logistical Support and Military Supplies Directorate,
- A Technical Policy, Planning and Analysis Directorate,
- A Construction Directorate,
- A Special Transport Directorate.

4.3 The **Main Financial-Economic Directorate** was created as the Financial-Economic Directorate during the fundamental reforms of the MVD USSR in 1989. The directorate is responsible for all financial affairs of the ministry, including financial planning.

4.4 The **Medical Directorate** was renamed in February 1992 with the removal of the word “USSR”. With the involvement of the Internal Troops in the two Chechen wars the medical resources of the MVD must have been stretched to breaking point.

4.5 A **Directorate of Logistics** appeared as a result of the 1998 reforms in the MVD. It is responsible for procurement of accommodation and property for the MVD across the Russian Federation. It also controls the use of the property and defends the MVD property interests in the regions.

5. A Deputy Minister is responsible for:

5.1 The **Maintenance of Public Order Main Directorate**. The Directorate was established in 1989 with the creation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR. In 1992, after three readjustments of its name, the directorate was given its present title. The directorate controls:

- The Directorate of Safeguarding of Public Order,
The Directorate of Licensing and Certification,
The Directorate of Preventive Measures in Safeguarding Public Order,
The Operational-Information Department,
A Department for Implementing the Experiment with Establishing
Municipal Organs of Safeguarding Public Order,
A Department of Organisation and Methodical Support for
Investigations.

The Main Directorate of Maintenance of Public Order is to co-ordinate police
work at all levels and regions of the Russian Federation and controls the
Militia’s Patrol-Guarding Service and Special Purpose Militia Detachments
(OMON). The first OMON unit was established in November 1978 as a special
secret detachment for the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. The Moscow based
detachment was cut by 30% after the games and little was known about it until
the end of the 1980s when it resurfaced as a much bigger all-union substructure
of the MVD with a role similar to that of the French CRS transplanted to the by
then violent Soviet soil. Because of its countrywide role in the suppression of
increasingly violent ethnic resistance, OMON became something between a
national guard and gendarmerie. These additional demands and increasing
specialisations forced the MVD and the local authorities to set up new special
forces units. The Moscow OMON became in 1989 OMSN, with the Russian word
osobogo (special) replaced by another word meaning the same thing spetsialnogo. With
Moscow’s approval federal republican and regional bodies create also other
special purpose units to combat drug trafficking or economic crime. In 1995 the
Moscow Main Internal Affairs Directorate decided to have its own detachments to
combat drug trafficking (ONON). The directorate acquired also units fighting
economic crime, OESP.

5.2 The **Main Directorate State Inspectorate of Road Traffic Safety** with its:
- Scientific Research Centre,
- Special Battalion,
- Interregional Vehicle Search Department.

The directorate became a substructure of the central apparatus in the MVD
in 1998 after the reforms in the State Vehicle Inspectorate. The directorate
is responsible for road safety and policing road traffic, for driving tests, for
issuing driving licences and the search for stolen vehicles, vehicle
registration and issuing of number plates. The unified system of the MVD
organs for transport was set up in 1980. The directorate co-ordinates 19
regional directorates and other structures with their 550 militia subunits.
It also works with organisations and enterprises belonging to 17 federal
railway lines and 19 interregional and territorial directorates of the federal
aviation service and 10 shipping joint stock companies and privates
enterprises.

5.3 The **Passport-Visa Directorate** began its existence in 1990, as an
independent department within the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the
RSFSR. The MVD RSFSR took over all functions of the MVD USSR in
Russia, including issuing passports and registering foreigners. Until 1993
the bodies responsible for issuing passport and visas were part of the
Passport-Visa Service of the Russian MVD, since reorganised and renamed.
In addition to issuing passports to Russian passport holders, the directorate
is responsible for all legal and administrative issues pertaining to problems
of citizenship, residence permits and registration of foreigners and stateless
persons on Russian territory. The directorate has a Passport and Visa Information and Statistical Centre which gathers relevant information and distributes it to the MVD central and regional organisations as well as other special services-type organisations. With Putin’s most recent cuts in the number of agencies, the Passport-Visa Directorate will have more responsibilities for the old and new migrants in Russia. The directorate has a direct link with.

5.4 The **Main Directorate of Internal Affairs for Transport** and its:
   - Operational Search Directorate.

5.5 A **Restricted Access Facilities Directorate**, responsible for security of warehousing and transport of special cargo, was once known as the super-secret 8th Main Directorate of the USSR MVD. The Directorate protects establishments listed by the Russian government. It also guards and is responsible for law and order in the enterprises producing arms and ammunition.

5.6 The **Main Directorate of External Protection** is one of the largest MVD structures. It guards and protects property not belonging to the ministry. The directorate is in charge of para-military guards, militia guards, a scientific-research centre “Okhrana” and licensing fire alarms and security electronic systems. The Main Directorate of External Protection controls 367,000 guards of which 147,000 are militiamen. The substructures under the directorate’s control are self-financing. They guard more than one million properties, enterprises, commercial establishments and habitations.

6. A Deputy Minister is in charge of:

6.1 The **Main Directorate for Combating Organised Crime** and its investigative section. The first such organisation was set up in the USSR on 15 November 1988. It was known then as the 6th Directorate. A similar 6th Directorate was organised by the MVD of the RSFSR in 1990. The directorate changed its name twice. In 1993 it was given its present name and put in charge of 12 regional directorates:
   - The Central Directorate,
   - The Moscow Oblast Directorate,
   - The Northern Directorate,
   - The North-West Directorate,
   - The Central-Chernozemnoye Directorate,
   - The Southern Directorate,
   - The Northern Caucasus Directorate,
   - The Volga-Vyatka Directorate,
   - The Volga Directorate,
   - The Ural Directorate,
   - The Eastern Siberian Directorate,
   - The Western Siberian Directorate.

Each subject of the Russian Federation has its own directorates or departments for combating organised crime. The bodies responsible for combating organised crime are allowed to investigate corruption among state officials, combating crimes such as kidnapping, hostage taking, protection rackets, illegal trade in firearms, explosives and ammunition.
Several regions have set up their own rapid deployment militia (SOBR) units which are occasionally referred to by their locally adopted pet names.

6.2. The Main Directorate for Combating Economic Crime was established in 1998 and replaced the rather unfortunately named Main Directorate for Economic Crime of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. The latter took over the Main Directorate for Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation, a corrupt and inefficient substructure of the MVD USSR. The Main Directorate for Combating Economic Crime, like its predecessors, has faced impossible odds. It was not staffed, trained or equipped to stop or break the crime wave in Russia.

6.3. The Directorate Combating High Technology Crime. The directorate can only serve as a supporting arm for other more qualified bodies such as the FSB or FAPSI, especially as this type of crime almost always involves foreign products, foreign nationals and foreign currency, which imposes limits on the MVD operational area. The “R” Directorate, as the organisation is known, deals with illegal electronic money transfers, computer crimes, mobile phone crimes.

6.4 The Interpol Bureau in the Russian Federation. The USSR joined Interpol in 1990 and the Russian Federation took over its hosting after the disappearance of the All-Union MVD. In 1996 the Bureau became a part of the Russian MVD and has been responsible for bilateral links with foreign law enforcement bodies. It is responsible for information exchange with foreign partners and execution of international warrants in accordance with agreements signed by the Russian Federation.

6.5 The Office of Co-ordinating Combating Organised Crime and other forms of crime in the CIS countries.

7. A Deputy Minister is responsible for:

7.1 The Main Personnel Directorate, which comprises:
- A Recruitment and Service Record Directorate,
- A Work with Personnel Directorate,
- A Professional Education Directorate.

7.2. The Directorate of Regional and Public Relations appeared as a result of the 1998 reforms with the word “regional” replacing “information” to please the regional politicians. The directorate liaises with regional politicians, political parties, social movements, religious organisations and charities around Russia. It deals with political extremism, investigates technical and material needs of internal affairs organs and provides their employees and their families with social assistance.

7.3 The Main Directorate of the State Fire Services. The directorate has the power of a federal Inspectorate in matters pertaining to fire safety. It is responsible for purchases of fire equipment for the firemen, and since 1995 for the fire certification of products and services in the Russian Federation.

7.4 The MVD Museum.
7.5 **Educational centres** and establishments.

8. A Deputy Minister is responsible for the **North Caucasus**.

9. A Deputy Minister is **Commander of the Interior Troops**. Subordinated to him is
   
   The Main Command of the Internal Troops

The Internal Troops of the Russian Federation are located in seven Internal Troops Districts. These are:

- The North-Western District - HQ St Petersburg,
- The Moscow District - HQ Moscow,
- The North-Caucasus District - HQ Rostov on Don,
- The Volga District - HQ Nizhny Novgorod,
- The Ural District - HQ Yekaterinburg,
- The Siberian District - HQ Novosibirsk,
- The Eastern District - HQ Khabarovsk.

The Internal Troops of the Russian Federation have the following tasks:

- Taking part, together with other internal affairs organs of the Russian Federation, in preserving public order, assuring public safety and security of emergency situations,
- Protection of important state sites and special shipments,
- Guarding convicts and detainees,
- Taking part in territorial defence of the Russian Federation,
- Assisting Border Troops in protection of the state borders.

The internal troops are equipped for mopping up operations in Russia's hot spots. Their tanks, APCs and artillery are usually older models and its minute aviation has no fixed wing aircraft and is represented by a small helicopter force serving mainly as transport and fire support. The MVD communications equipment is of a lower standard than that of their MOD and FSB partners. Their reconnaissance capabilities are practically non-existent although their units include experienced veterans of the Afghan and the first Chechen conflict.

The central apparatus of the MVD is “represented” in the entities of the Russian Federation by Republican Ministries in the republics, by Main Directorates of Internal Affairs (GUVD) in the largest cities and more important regions (oblasts) and by Internal Affairs Directorates (UVD) in other regions (also at oblast level). There are 20 republican ministries; 5 GUVDs in Novosibirsk, Perm, Samara, Tyumen, St Petersburg and Leningrad oblasts and in the City of Moscow; and 55 UVDs in other regions. The MVD’s main directorates, directorates and departments are present in kray, oblast, cities of federal importance, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, rayon, city rayon, closed administrative regions, and in railway, air and water transport directorates of the Ministry of Communications. There are also MVD directorates and departments in special and restricted facilities, special production enterprises, regional military supply-technical directorates, special educational and research establishments and the State Firefighting Service. The MVD is also in charge of the Independent Special Purpose Division (the former Dzerzhinsky division) responsible for protecting Russian leaders. By the end of the 1990s the number of the MVD Internal Troops had been cut from 318,000 to 220,000. The main aim of the cuts was to spend the available money on fewer people and invest in “professional”, ie contract soldiers. The financial resources
have never been looked at realistically. The money which the ministry’s leadership was able to save was available only on paper and bad management and lack of clearly defined goals persist to this day.

Co-Operation with Other Organisations

The MVD’s artificial growth throughout the 1990s was fuelled by Yel’tsin’s insecurities, conflict in Chechnya and mushrooming crime. Its dual role of keeping public order around the country and at the same time fighting the Chechens stretched the MVD’s resources and manpower. The second Chechen conflict was run by the military. The Internal Troops played an important but secondary role in the conflict. This situation will continue in any operation involving the troops of the Ministry of Defence. In its crime fighting role the MVD is the principal player but it has to rely on other organisations, the FSB, FAPSI, SVR or Tax Police, depending on the nature of the task. Other organisations involved in crime fighting often have little respect for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the only body which, by law, has to be involved in any crime-busting operation on Russian territory. Crime involving foreign nationals, currency, imported goods or high technology always means the involvement of one or more other organisations, but the MVD has the upper hand when it comes to combating all forms of organised crime. It has a network of local policemen with information at street level which cannot be matched even by the FSB. It controls road traffic around Russia, and issues passports and visas. The recent decision to abolish visa-free travel to Russia for the citizens of the former Soviet republics will increase the work load but also the importance of the MVD.

The ministry is also the most important Russian power structure when it comes to international co-operation among crime fighting organisation. It may not be allowed to co-operate with its foreign partners without the approval and supervision of the FSB and the SVR, but as a major Russian “thief catcher” the MVD, in spite of all its weaknesses, is the most appropriate partner among the Russian law enforcement bodies. Foreign law enforcement bodies are interested in co-operation with the MVD to combat terrorism, drug trafficking, international crime, organised Russian crime and economic crime. To date, these relationships have achieved very little.

The MVD in the Chechen Conflicts

On 17 December 1994, the Security Council of the Russian Federation chaired by Boris Yel’tsin tasked the MOD, the MVD and the Main Command of the Border Guards to provide all necessary assets to fulfil the task of disarming and destroying illegal armed formations in Chechnya. Russia treated the first Chechen conflict as an internal matter and the MVD played the co-ordinating role for the Russian forces in the area. The Internal Troops on Chechen territory were reinforced but the MVD was not ready. Its commanders had no experience or training which would prepare them for the conflict. The MVD forces were expected to:

- follow army groups, assure communication and transport lines,
- together with the Federal Security Service (FSK) to identify and isolate Chechen leaders,
- in co-operation with the MVD and the FSK to take over important points in Grozny.
Minister of Defence Pavel Grachev tried to distance himself and his ministry from the fiasco by claiming, 'I am not even very interested what is going on there. The Armed Forces don't take part in that. Although I watch television and hear that prisoners have been taken there...' The conflict was nothing short of disaster for the Russian formation. An assessment of the early stage of the first Chechen operation which appeared in the Russian media does not mention the role played by the MVD top commander and mentions the ministry's shortcoming once, directly, by criticising the lack of preparedness of the MVD, MOD and the GRU special units and indirectly by describing, but not commenting on, the intelligence collection. Further inquiries showed critical views expressed by non-MVD combat troops about the MVD, accusing them of incompetence, marauding and beating up civilians. First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets had to order Anatoliy Sergeyevich Kulikov, the Commander of the Russian Troops in Chechnya, to take all necessary steps to strengthen discipline in the Special Purpose Militia Detachments (OMON). The deputy commander of the Internal Troops General Kavun attempted to justify the less than satisfactory performance of his troops by saying that they had only 39% of the BTR and BMP vehicles they were allocated on paper. The Internal Troops were underfunded and received only 30% of necessary resources, claimed the MVD.

On 6 January 1995, the Security Council tasked the ministry with co-ordinating the disarming of Dudayev's supporters. The Russian subunits on Chechen territory were moved under the MVD's operational control. The haste with which Yeltsin decided to put the MVD in charge of disarming and storage of the confiscated weapons can be explained by his own insecurity and by the ministry's determination to lay hands on weapons which were often more modern and in a better state than their own. The first Chechen conflict was a failure. Badly planned, badly co-ordinated and badly executed, a “blitzkrieg” turned into fiasco, forcing Moscow to involve in it substantial MOD assets.

The second Chechen conflict was run and co-ordinated by the Ministry of Defence with the MVD playing an important but secondary role. The first conflict was regarded as an internal matter, which allowed Moscow to reject foreign inquiries or criticism, but made the explanation of the Armed Forces' involvement in it legally unattainable. The participation in the second conflict of groups of foreigners fighting on the Chechen side and foreign financial support provided Russia with a legal loophole to declare it an international conflict and thus make the Ministry of Defence its principal executor. Both ministries were able to train for the second conflict in several joint manoeuvres but the MVD was still the weaker partner in the campaign.

Made to look like a small army, the MVD is not able to fight a war, which is what the Chechen conflicts amount to. The multitude of MVD bodies set up to maintain public order, combat large, well organised and equipped criminal groups and to contain occasionally violent demonstrations are not trained, equipped or co-ordinated for low intensity conflicts. The MVD divisions were trained to contain lightly armed crowds, the Special Purpose Militia Detachments (OMON) are essentially crowd control units and the elite Special Rapid Reaction Detachments (SOBR) are the equivalent of the US SWAT teams. The first two contain an important percentage of conscripts. None of the units are trained for a Chechen type of conflict. The command personnel of the MVD, with few exceptions, is not trained and has no experience in conducting a Chechen type of operation. The unit commanders, with the exception of those who fought in either Afghanistan or the first Chechen conflict, have even less experience. The information gathered by the
Internal Troops Intelligence Directorate, based on grass roots reports, may be very valuable, however the whole process of gathering and processing information appears to be badly co-ordinated. The smooth running collection, analysis and distribution of information in the ministry and among its partners in the FSB, Military Intelligence (GRU), FAPSI is difficult to achieve with the present lack of co-ordination between the power structures, administrative tribalism and the contempt with which special services treat the MVD.

In the second conflict the co-operation between the MVD and army and naval infantry units appears to be better than during the first conflict, but is still not smooth. The MVD units are spread around the country and do not conduct exercises on the scale demanded by the events in Chechnya. In their everyday work they do not need and very rarely have equipment which would allow them to communicate with each other and even less with the army or air force units. Some MVD units were provided with communications equipment linking them with army units but the problem of incompatibility among the commanding officers serving in the power structures in Chechnya remains. Some of the MVD casualties in Chechnya appear to be the result of the attitude of MVD officers who did not ask relevant questions of their counterparts in other power structures and they in turn did not think about providing the MVD units with information to reinforce their security.

According to the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel General Valeriy Manilov, the military part of the operation in Chechnya was completed on 15 April 2000. This is when the Russian Ministry of Defence finished the destruction of all large Chechen groups (1,500 to 2,000 fighters) equipped with heavy weapons. The next stage has been run by the MVD and the FSB. The MVD is responsible for the mopping-up of the remaining Chechen groups and the FSB is to provide information about planned terrorist attacks, movements of Chechen groups and the whereabouts of wanted individuals. The MVD is in charge of “filtration” camps with the FSB and to a lesser extent the GRU having access to the camps and individual prisoners. General Manilov publicly criticised the work of the MVD and the FSB in Chechnya, pointing at specific weaknesses in their security work. This may be a political manoeuvre to put the blame for the Russian forces’ failures mainly at the door of the MVD and the beginning of a campaign for the General Staff to gradually take control over the Internal Troops.

Nevertheless, this move will be resisted by the Internal Troops, though they are to become Federal Guards by 2005. Deputy commander of the Internal Troops General Stanislav Kavun emphasised that reforms will be carried out within the MVD and unnamed senior officers pointed out that the changes are to be made because Chief of the General Staff General Kvashnin does not like the term “troops” used by other ministries and may then leave them alone. These reforms transfer the responsibility for guarding detention centres from the Internal Troops to the Ministry of Justice. The Internal Troops are not be used at peaceful rallies. They are, however, allowed to carry out reconnaissance in their areas of responsibility during military operations and they have been granted the right to detain suspects which they then have to pass to other MVD structures.

The changes, if they are carried out, are bound to create several problems for the MVD. The Ministry of Justice will either have to start a recruitment drive for new guards and ask for more money to take over detention centres, or take over the centres, their personnel and all the burden with the appropriate part of the MVD budget. The detention powers given to the Internal Troops are only a legal nicety
because they have already been conducting searches and detaining suspects and criminals. These powers may however be misused in standard criminal cases, creating conflicts with local militia forces. The permission to conduct recce operations would require funding, training and good links with the Armed Forces. At this stage this can only be an optimistic wish.

Unless President Putin decides to make the Armed Forces responsible for what Moscow describes as anti-terrorist operations in Chechnya, not much can be achieved by reforming the Internal Troops. A mixture of financial incentives and the imposition of stricter discipline among the troops would be a step in the right direction but the creaking and rusty Russian steamroller in Chechnya will continue to perform its cruel functions. Only after it finishes its immediate tasks may it be sent for a major overhaul. Left, with the FSB, to suppress the remaining Chechen resistance, the MVD will be vulnerable to the Chechen snipers and bomb makers and to critics from Moscow.

The Future of the MVD

The links with other Russian power structures will be one of many problems the MVD leadership will have to face. In the second Chechen conflict several military commanders publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with the performance of the MVD troops. Now that the MVD has taken over responsibility for the suppression of the Chechen resistance, its mistakes will be more visible. The Internal Troops should be cut, restructured and modernised but this may be possible only after the battle for Chechnya is won decisively by the federal forces. But then there may be questions whether Russia needs its internal troops at all, or should the enlarged and better equipped OMON and SDBR units be able to do the job required.

The MVD crime fighting bodies are top heavy and corrupt but unlike some of Russia’s smaller power structures the ministry cannot be either abolished or merged with another organisation. All attempts to change the ministry in the 1990s failed. The administration grew bigger, the substructures multiplied, the number of generals increased, only the corruption permeating all ranks remains. In the second half of the last decade there were 453 generals’ posts in the MVD. However, like his mentor Yuriy Andropov, Vladimir Putin may after all decide that the ministry should undergo an immediate and radical overhaul. According to reports appearing in the Russian press Putin is reviewing two projects for reforming the ministry although they only gave details of one.

This envisages the Main Directorate for Combating Organised Crime becoming a federal organisation. The new organisation would be an independent body with its own administration, investigative section and substructures responsible for combating economic crime, drug trafficking and operational surveillance. It is difficult to imagine that the new organisation would not take from the MVD the “R” directorate responsible for combating high technology crime. This would be another special organisation among many other Russian special organisations. It would be very expensive, it would poach people from all other special bodies and it would guarantee a hostile reception from other power structures. The new organisation would take some of the most important substructures and personnel from the MVD. Its existence and budgetary allocations would reduce interest in the shortcomings of the ministry and make further reforms almost impossible. And all this when the MVD has begun to record some success in attracting some of its former employees back from other organisations. Between 1998 and 1999, 670 of
them have come back to work in law enforcement bodies and almost 4,000 investigators joined the MVD.

Moscow is also trying to abolish all local control over the local MVD structures. This may mean that the Federal Government will be forced to fund all regional MVD bodies, which, until recently, have had dual subordination to the Moscow HQ and to the local administration. The main argument for this change is that many of the local decisionmakers have established close contacts with local criminal structures they are supposed to fight. The MVD will not be able to begin to fight any form of serious crime with its own internal corruption spinning out of control. What it can achieve almost immediately, with appropriate pressure from above, is to improve its fight against street and petty crime.

A reform of the crime fighting bodies within the MVD is vital and it is bound to be controversial, but is not politically sensitive. Any reform of the Internal Troops is, and will be opposed, either by the parliament or by some regions. According to the information yet to be officially confirmed, the Russian government plans to provide R60m (US$216,294) by the end of 2000, for the establishment of MVD troops in the federal districts. They are to be subordinate to the presidential representatives in the regions. Their commanders and their deputy commanders are to be appointed by the president. The new units will be monitored and supplied by the secretary of the Security Council. Like every undertaking of this kind the new regional MVD forces will most probably overspend money allocated and poach the best personnel from other MVD bodies and other power structures, weakening other law enforcement organisations, even at the federal level. This also means the death of the plans envisaging reform of the Internal Troops in accordance with "Principles of Russian Federation state policy in military organisational development up to 2005" signed by Boris Yeltsin at the beginning of 1999. The only elements of the principle to remain will be their partial reassignment to crime fighting units of the MVD. Colonel-General Pavel Maslov, in charge of the Internal Troops, announced in May 1999 that their strength would be reduced from 257,000 to 140,000 persons. Maslov's announcement suggests that either the original plan to reduce the number of the Internal Troops to 220,000 has never been fully implemented or that he is counting all MVD personnel in any way linked with the Internal Troops. In the latter case the shift of civilian personnel working for the Internal Troops to other MVD structures would be presented as a cut. Those officers and NCOs whose units will be disbanded are to be transferred to other MVD units, when possible; the others will be transferred to other MVD bodies, Tax Police, Customs and other federal agencies. The cuts and shifts in the MVD appear to be yet another half-hearted attempt to readjust rather than reform the existing inefficient, ineffective and corrupt law enforcement organisation. The top officials in the ministry are mainly preoccupied with building their own empire or hanging on to what they command. To be effective, profound changes in the MVD would have to be accompanied by a new and intelligent firing and hiring campaign at the top.

In the present economic situation no successful reforms of the law enforcement bodies and special services can be accomplished without:

- Reducing political interference in their activities,
- Reducing the number of law enforcement bodies and special services,
- Streamlining the existing law enforcement organs,
- Reallocating the necessary staff to crime fighting duties,
- Providing them with better training,
• Removing all the law enforcement bodies from any commercial undertaking, including guarding private properties, transport of people,
• Abolishing, or sharply reducing, some of the internal law enforcement bodies in other organisations,
• Forcing by law improved co-operation between all the existing power organisations,
• Increasing salaries of law enforcement personnel.

Only then will the MVD be able to recruit high quality personnel and to protect the public from the crime deluge. It would be impossible to make law enforcement bodies efficient without a chorus of well meaning civil rights activists and bribed journalists pointing out the dictatorial potential of such a reformed organisation. This may be true in Russia’s present difficult situation, but it is probably less damaging than leaving them in their present state.

ENDNOTES

1 The Ministry of Internal Affairs was given its name on 26 November 1968. Its previous title was the Ministry of Protection of Public Order.
2 Shechelokov committed suicide and Churbanov was fired, arrested and imprisoned in 1987.
3 Certain types of crime such as violence or drunk driving were not insignificant but they were either downplayed by the MVD or disregarded by Soviet politicians.
4 Crime grew during the later years of the Brezhnev era but even at its height it was still minute in comparison with large industrialised democracies.
6 There were occasionally unusual cases when known criminals were able to hide in spite of a long term joint effort by the MVD and the KGB. A known criminal Khasukha was able to operate in Checheno-Ingushetiya between 1939-1973. He was wanted for killing 44 people, rapes and robberies. Khasukha was killed in 1973 after a joint KGB-MVD operation. (MVD v Litsakh, Vladimir Nekrasov, Molodaya Gvardiya, 2000, p217-218.)
7 The Russian term "Militsiya" is the Soviet/Russian equivalent of police. It does not include the Internal Troops but it does include the regional organised crime fighting special purpose units where these exist.
8 Rasskazhu Vsyo Kak Bylo, Yuriy Churbanov, Lyana-NG, 1993, p115. Churbanov’s explanation is partly true but also a convenient excuse for a man who was once in charge of MVD personnel. Many militiamen acted unprofessionally because that behaviour was tolerated by the ministry’s leadership.
9 MVD v Litsakh, Vladimir Nekrasov, Molodaya Gvardiya, 2000, p225.
10 MVD v Litsakh, Vladimir Nekrasov, Molodaya Gvardiya, 2000, p225.
12 Organy I Voyska MVD Rossiï, MVD Moskva 1996, p332. The Internal Troops began to play an important role in the new hot spots inside the USSR: in the Transcaucuses, Central Asia, Moldova, North Osetia and others. The removal of the Internal Troops, the Railway Troops and the Border Troops from the Armed Forces served the Soviet leadership of the day as an argument that the USSR was reducing its military potential.
14 MVD v Litsakh, Vladimir Nekrasov, Molodaya Gvardiya, 2000, p225.
15 MVD v Litsakh, Vladimir Nekrasov, Molodaya Gvardiya, 2000, p225. Many MVD employees left to take jobs in private security companies and to work as guards in commercial enterprises. The changes in the MVD USSR and RSFSR were of little interest to Russian and foreign commentators preoccupied with the turmoil in the MOD and the KGB.
17 MVD v Litsakh, Vladimir Nekrasov, Molodaya Gvardiya, 2000, p260.
18 MVD v Litsakh, Vladimir Nekrasov, Molodaya Gvardiya, 2000, p263. The sums quoted are in the old pre-1998 roubles. The total state debt to all power structures and their subcontractors was 2,300bn roubles by 27 August 1993.

19 MVD v Litsakh, Vladimir Nekrasov, Molodaya Gvardiya, 2000, p270-272. Of the 1,202 White House security personnel 635 asked for a transfer to the MVD on 30 September 1993.

20 MVD v Litsakh, Vladimir Nekrasov, Molodaya Gvardiya, 2000, p274.


22 MVD v Litsakh, Vladimir Nekrasov, Molodaya Gvardiya, 2000, p274.

23 MVD v Litsakh, Vladimir Nekrasov, Molodaya Gvardiya, 2000, p311. Instead of comparing units subordinated to him to the Army Motorised-Rifle Division General Kulikov chose one of the more expensive tactical units in the Russian Armed Forces.

24 MVD v Litsakh, Vladimir Nekrasov, Molodaya Gvardiya, 2000, p331. Kulikov acknowledges his failure in fighting corruption but blames the executive and judicial bodies for failing to organise a top-level anti-corruption campaign. He adds, “Nowadays, the extent of corruption is difficult to imagine. Thank God, most of the country’s citizens are not aware of its scale. If they knew what is going on, they would be horrified”.

25 MVD v Litsakh, Vladimir Nekrasov, Molodaya Gvardiya, 2000, p337, quoting Korzhakov’s “Boris Yel’tsin, ot rassveta do zakata”. The efficiency of the Russian VIP protection teams (GUO/FSO) depends largely on the co-operation of the traffic police. After the announcement of its militarisation, the traffic police threatened a mass resignation, forcing Kulikov to reconsider his decision.

26 MVD v Litsakh, Vladimir Nekrasov, Molodaya Gvardiya, 2000, p350-351. General Kulikov suggests, in his interview with General Nekrasov, that Yel’tsin wanted to dismiss him when on 18 March 1996, Kulikov, together with general prosecutor Skuratov and the chairman of the Constitutional court Tumanov persuaded Yel’tsin not to dissolve the Parliament. His dismissal two years later, suggests Kulikov, could be linked with the events of March 1996.

27 Dr M A Smith, A Russian Chronology, CSRC - J20, p8. The increase of serious recorded crime may also be the result of a more realistic approach to crime statistics introduced by Sergey Stepashin.


29 Moskovskiy Komsonolets, 6 October 1999, p1-2.

30 Moskovskiy Komsonolets, 27 April 2000, internet.

31 An announcement of reduction of the role played by the Army units in Chechnya has already been made. ORT, 30 September 2000, 18.00 Moscow time.

32 Rossiskiya Vestsi, 18 November 1993, p1, 2. FBIS-SOV-93-222-S.

33 Rossiskiya Vestsi, 18 November 1993, p1, 2. FBIS-SOV-93-222-S.

34 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 21 April 2000, Point 12. The author would like to thank Dr Steven Main for his assistance.


37 Irrespective of the number of casualties and the methods used by both sides in the conflict Vladimir Putin will not give in as long as he is alive and in charge. Barring his premature and unlikely death or political demise he will destroy the Chechen resistance with any necessary force whether it will take one or five years. Putin will not attempt to reform the Internal Troops as long as they are fully involved in the conflict.


41 Organy i Voyska MVD Rossii, MVD Moscow 1996, p462. The structure of the MVD RSFSR was confirmed on 29 December 1990.


The issuing of passports and visas were only nominally under the MVD control. The final decisions and permanent supervision over the whole process was the responsibility of the KGB and later the security bodies which replaced it.

The MVD Press Office.

Many militia and internal troops served in Afghanistan assisting the local police (Tsarandoy) and guarding important facilities. This would not prepare them for events in Chechnya.

The co-operation between the FSB and MVD has never been smooth. The FSB and its predecessors regarded themselves, not without reason, as elite structures and have been responsible for the counterintelligence work in the Internal Troops of the MVD. The FSB position in Chechnya is complex because the MVD with its fire power, troops and bases is in fact a senior partner and treats it as a “lodger” organisation.

Saddled with new responsibilities in Chechnya, the MVD will count on the new restrictive information policy of the Russian government. The new policy may bring about in the near future media policies resembling those of the USSR.

For some examples of the corruption within the MVD see Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 19 May 2000 p3 and 12 May 2000 (internet version).

The number of murders and attempted murders, for example, “stabilised” at about 30,000 a year. In 1999 there were 31,140 murders and attempted murders in Russia, an...
increase of 5.4% in comparison with 1998. Some types of crime such as rape, theft of cargo and extortion decreased during 1999. Most other crimes went up and serious and very serious crimes increased by 18.4% (MVD Press Office).

76 AVN, 29 August 2000, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB).
77 Krasnaya Zvezda, 21 May 1999, p1.
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