


Conflict Studies Research Centre

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The "Brain" of the Russian Army -
The Centre for Military-Strategic Research,
General Staff 1985-2000

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The “Brain” of the Russian Army The Centre for Military-Strategic Research, General Staff, 1985-2000

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In an article analysing one of the most prestigious research/teaching organisations in Russia, one commentator dubbed the Centre for Military-Strategic Research, General Staff (*Tsentr Voyenno-Strategicheskikh Issledovaniy Generalnogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil' Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, more simply known by its Russian abbreviation, TsSVI GSh) “the brain of the Russian Army”, no doubt more than a passing allusion to one of the most prominent military-theoretical works written in the 1920s, namely B M Shaposhnikov’s classic work, “The Brain of the Army” (M.1927, 1929). In many respects, the title is apt, at least in the sense that TsSVI GSh is both attached to the Russian Army’s General Staff and, in terms of its research and known published output, has contributed widely both to the theoretical, as well as the practical, formulation of Russian defence policy, the structure of the country’s Armed Forces, strategic thought and operational art. Outside of the fSU/Russia, however, it has lurked in the shadows somewhat; very few people, even amongst professional military analysts of the Russian state, being aware either of its existence or its importance. This is unusual, especially in light of the fact that, in the words of many Russian commentators TsSVI GSh “occupies one of the leading positions in the scientific formulation of decisions in the area of military security, structure and application of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.”¹ It has published openly in the Russian military press (more so now than in the past, admittedly) and, for instance, is acknowledged to have made an important contribution to Russia’s national security concept, its military doctrine and, indeed, even the military doctrine of the Union state of Belarus’ and Russia.² In short, it is long overdue an evaluation for a predominantly English-speaking audience and, relying on a range of Russian sources, this is what the present article will attempt to redress.

TsSVI GSh was created in January 1985 (26th January to be precise), unfortunately before the days of *glasnost* had enveloped the USSR, so it has not yet been possible to track down the decree creating the Centre itself. It was known then as the Centre for Operational-Strategic Research, General Staff (*Tsentr Operativno-Strategicheskikh Issledovaniy Generalnogo Shtaba*, TsOSI GSh) and was initially headed by Colonel-General V Korobushin, Doctor of Military Science and a winner of the Lenin Prize.³

As will become evident, tracking down biographical details of a number of the individuals identified with the work of the Centre on the whole is difficult although, thankfully not as regards the career of the Centre’s first Director. Furthermore, it is even possible to gauge some idea of what has happened to Korobushin since he left from the Centre in 1991 (not the case with many other Directors of the Centre). At the end of 1995, in an article analysing the successes and problems of the country’s Space-Defence Troops, Korobushin was listed as being the representative of the Main Military Inspectorate on the expanded Military Council of the Space-Defence Troops.⁴ A couple of years later, Korobushin had moved to working in the Academy. General M Gareyev noted (in an article commemorating the second anniversary of the creation of the Academy of Military Science) that Korobushin was “a talented

organiser of science” and was in charge of “the department” occupying “the premier position” in “the overall system of the Academy.”⁵ (What that department was exactly, Gareyev did not detail). In February 1999, an article appeared in the military supplement to *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, outlining basic research to be carried out in the general field of defence-related subjects penned by, amongst others, Korobushin, in his official capacity as first vice-president of the Academy of Military Science.⁶ By June 1999 Korobushin was listed as being one of the main authors of a technical article detailing the disposal of nuclear waste.⁷ Both his practical and theoretical knowledge have also gained him a position on the Security Council’s Academic board (as of September 1999).⁸ Despite these details, however, at present it is still impossible to say what input, if any, Korobushin had in the actual creation of the Centre; why he himself was chosen to be the Centre’s first director; the number of staff involved, etc.

In examining the background to the creation of the Centre in 1985, the sources agree on a number of salient points, not least being the importance of the influence of Marshal of the Soviet Union (MSU) S Akhromeyev and his deputy, General M Gareyev, and the changing security environment that the Soviet Armed Forces were beginning to operate under:

“The creation of the new scientific-research organisation was dictated by a number of objective factors. From the middle of the 1980s, the Armed Forces of the country had entered a formative period [brought about] by the stage by stage reduction in their size. An analysis of the problems posed by this process would not have been possible without a clear understanding of the laws behind the development of the military, questions of military construction and reform of the Armed Forces. The ending of the severe bloc to bloc confrontation and the increase in international trust demanded a re-thinking of approaches to solving issues of maintaining military security and organising the defence of the country...all this served as the basis for the decision, taken by the country’s state and military leadership, to create within the General Staff the Centre for Operational-Strategic Research, General Staff (TsOSI GSh). An important role in its creation and establishment belonged to the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev and his deputy, now General Makhmut Gareyev, president of the Academy of Military Science.”⁹

The “primary tasks” of the Centre were “the coordination and conduct of future critical and applied research to the most important questions of military strategy, operational art and the structure of the Armed Forces.”¹⁰ Although information is very scarce on this early period of the Centre’s existence, the sources agree that the Centre was composed “of the most experienced Generals and officers of the General Staff,” (particularly its Operations Directorate) as well as leading military academics, including men like Lieutenant-Generals M Golovanov, M Vinogradov, V Shtepa, Major-General V Susoyev.¹¹ By the middle of 1990, Major-General V Medvedev, was the Centre’s Deputy-Director.¹²

In 1991, along with a new name – it was renamed the Centre for Military-Strategic Research, General Staff (TsVSI GSh) – came a new Director, namely Lieutenant-General Professor S Bogdanov. Little has been published about his background. According to one source, he is a graduate of the General Staff Academy.¹³ Certainly, by May 1991, Bogdanov was identified as the Director of the Centre.¹⁴ He held on to this post until 1994. The change of title, also the appointment of a new Director,

were more than mere cosmetic changes, but were a response to “the growing range of questions that had to be addressed, as well as the increase in the level of complexity of problems to be solved.”¹⁵ It now became identified as the leading scientific-research organisation of the Armed Forces *at the strategic level*, tasked with elaborating military-political decisions with the aim “of improving military security, the structure and use of the Armed Forces, solving other problems competent to the organs of military administration at the strategic-level, as well as co-ordinating research in this overall sphere.”¹⁶

During this period, organisationally, it would appear to have consisted of three main directorates: military security; structure of the military apparatus and, finally, the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.¹⁷ Judging by subsequent comment and analysis of the work that it has published, it would appear that, in essence, it is still largely working on these three main areas of scientific-research work. The work undertaken for this small article has succeeded in highlighting a number of articles written by members of the Centre, published in the military press during 1991-1994. One article, already alluded to in passing, was published in *Krasnaya Zvezda* in July 1990 and examined the role of military science in the reform process.¹⁸ Other articles, written by the then Director of the Centre, Lieutenant-General S Bogdanov, also appeared throughout 1991-1993, covering a wide range of topics, including an early examination of the lessons of Operation “Desert Storm” and a analysis of the theory of military conflict and conflict prevention.¹⁹

The present Director of the Centre, Major-General A F Klimenko, also began publishing during this period, as head of a department of TsOSI. In January 1992, he published an article in *Military News Bulletin*, outlining what he considered to be the main tenets of a military doctrine for the CIS, (it should be remembered that, at the time of publication, the Russian Armed Forces did not formally exist and would not do so until May 1992). In outline, he urged that the: “Commonwealth of Independent States’ military doctrine should preserve the continuity of time-tested provision of USSR doctrine, such as its anti-war nature, defensive focus, the principles of sufficiency for defence and a number of others.” However, he also pointed out that “far from all the states have committed themselves not to use military force to achieve their aims. In this situation political and diplomatic efforts to prevent war can be effective only if they rely on military power sufficient for defence.” Given the fact that not all countries had committed themselves to a “national multi-service force”, Klimenko argued for the creation of “structurally unified commonwealth armed forces” including “a federal (allied) regular army and the national armed forces (formations) of republics.”²⁰

Given the uncertainty of the nature of the threat facing the CIS, Klimenko also argued for “defence along all azimuths” and pointed out that it would be “necessary to prepare the army and navy for every type of warfare in equal measure, to teach them what is needed in war.” He also called for a “centralisation of commonwealth defence and a unified command of nuclear and strategic forces and arsenals.”²¹ At the time, this would appear to have been a logical argument to make, assuming, of course, that everyone else shared similar aspirations about the need for a collective defence. He did recognise that, even then, this would possibly not be the case and, as events have unfolded, he was correct to sound a note of caution. Militarily, with the exception of the joint air defence system, the CIS has not evolved into a proper, collective security structure and all the republics now have their own military forces, irrespective of Moscow’s wishes, and although there is a Collective Security Agreement and regular meetings are held of the CIS Member-States Ministers of

Defence, other than Collective Peace-Support, or Peace-Keeping Forces, there is no joint CIS Army, or Navy, or Strategic Rocket Forces. Klimenko was to return to this theme later in 1992, when he published a major article in the main military-theoretical journal of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, *Voyennaya Mysl'*, examining "the role and place of military doctrine in the security system of the Commonwealth of Independent States."²² It is very likely that, given the nature of the article, and the fact that Russia's draft military doctrine appeared in November 1993, not all that long after the appearance of Klimenko's article on the military doctrine for the CIS, that he and the Centre were probably heavily involved in the drafting of Russia's first military doctrine.

Certainly, there would appear to be a strong indication that the Centre played a not insignificant part in the organisation and work of the special Military-Scientific Conference, held in the Military Academy of the General Staff on 27th-30th May 1992, concerning the creation of both the Russian Ministry of Defence and the Russian Armed Forces. According to the extraordinary supplement of *Voyennaya Mysl'*, there were 55 speakers at the Conference, including the then Minister of Defence, General P Grachev, the Commandant of the General Staff Military Academy (future Minister of Defence) Colonel-General I Rodionov and the Russian Vice-President, A V Ruts koy. In fact, many, if not all, of the most senior Russian military personnel of the period attended the conference. Of the 55 presentations, the journal published 24: two were by members of the Centre, namely Bogdanov's speech on the management of military conflict and another by Major-General V I Chepurnoy, on the make-up and structure of the Russian Armed Forces.²³ Interestingly enough, Chepurnoy's article argued that, during peace time, the Russian Army should not number more than 1.2-1.5 million men and he emphasised the importance of "maintaining the leading role of Strategic Rocket Forces as the main component of the [country's] strategic force."²⁴

Given that, by the time of the Conference in 1992, the Centre had only been in existence for 7 years, it is an indication of how important its work was valued that not only were its members invited to address the conference, but that their conference speeches were deemed worthy of publication.

What is also known about the activities of TsSVI during this period is that Lieutenant-General A V Politsyn, its First Deputy Director, took part in a round-table discussion, organised by *Krasnaya Zvezda*, held in October 1992, entitled "the interests of Russia: security, politics and the economy."²⁵ In his remarks (remember that the Russian Armed Forces were still very much in their infancy), Politsyn stated that "clear answers were needed to the questions: what are the present day threats to Russia's security, their level [of seriousness] and the nature and sphere of conflict." He was also under little illusion concerning the benign nature of the USA and the West:

*"the main aim of the USA and its allies is to ensure the reduction of the influence of the CIS and Russia on world events... consequently, the potential sources of military threat remain. But there exist a number of others: territorial pretensions, religious-national extremism and others. In connection with this, a detailed study and legislative formulation of the following question is demanded: when and at what level do we use political, diplomatic and economic means and when do we use military. For the time being, we have no detailed elaboration on these matters for the present circumstances."*²⁶

In terms of the immediate security situation for Russia and the CIS, Politsyn was more concerned by internal, rather than external factors:

“Internal instability in Russia and the CIS – this is a factor which is more dangerous now than the outside threat. We need a programme of conflict prevention, a programme of political and economic stabilisation, which we must work out with the participation of everyone. In relation to the Army proper, it has no complexes. It not only sees itself as being Russia’s Army, but it is also being constructed as such. A concept for the construction of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is being elaborated, the Ministry of Defence of Russia is being created and is functioning. Other measures are also being taken. As a result of this reform, approximately by the year 2000, there will have been created, although small in number, modern Armed Forces answering the level of the real military threat, the new political and economic situation, capable of meeting the demands placed before them in any set of circumstances.”²⁷

In his final published remark to the round table, he warned that it would be unwise to force the Army back into the political arena, “a policy whose aim is well-known.” He was certain, however, that the Army would “not follow that path” again.²⁸

Within the context of the period, there is a degree of perspicacity in what Politsyn had to say, especially in emphasising the internal, rather than the external threats, as well as pointing out the danger facing the CIS of what he dubbed “religious-national extremism”. (Putting the word, “religious” first, rather than “national” is interesting. After all, one of the main factors that was still uppermost in most people’s minds at the time was the way that nationalism had made such a significant contribution to the downfall of the USSR, the religious card not being all that evident, for instance, in the break-away of the Baltic republics from the USSR in 1990-1991, or in Russia’s, Ukraine’s, Belarus’ decision effectively to bring down the curtain on the USSR in December 1991). Of course, his views on the future development of the Russian Armed Forces do seem now somewhat overly optimistic, but then he could not foresee exactly the ruinous state of the Russian economy, nor how quickly the close economic links which had been built up between the Union republics over 60 years were to be so swiftly rent asunder. His own views on the development of the country’s Armed Forces were simply based on an understandable false premise: an economy that would, more or less, retain its shape over the period he envisaged, thereby allowing a more gradualist transformation of the country’s military structure. This was not to be.

Within less than two weeks of Politsyn’s presentation, Bogdanov – listed as the Director of the *Tactical-Strategic* Research Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation – addressed various representatives of the diplomatic community in Moscow on the basic principles then guiding Russian defence policy. In his address, according to the press release issued by ITAR-TASS after the meeting, Bogdanov noted that:

“The internal situation in Russia and the CIS is the most unfavourable since the civil war period. Some 30 armed conflicts and about 70 disputes flared in the territory of the former Soviet Union in 1991-1992. The analysis of the current political situation in the CIS and the world shows that local conflicts of various degrees of intensity may become an alternative to a world war in the next 10-15 years.”

In response to this, Bogdanov emphasised that the country's military doctrine had changed, moving away from preparing the Armed Forces for an all-out nuclear attack to preparing "for repulsing a possible local aggression." He then discussed the possibility of reducing the size of the Armed Forces in three stages until, by 1995, they would number 1,500,000 men. In response to a question from a Latvian diplomat about Russia's "defence" of its citizens abroad, Bogdanov replied that their interests would be protected by "economic and political, rather than military means."²⁹

Since 1994, the Centre has witnessed a further two changes at the top of its structure. In 1995, Lieutenant-General V Potemkin took over as the Centre's Director and, in turn, was replaced by Major-General A Klimenko in 1999.³⁰ Certainly with the appointment of Potemkin to the post, the Centre would appear to have significantly increased its published output, culminating in an article, written by Potemkin himself, accompanied both by a photograph and a biographical piece on the author! From the biographical piece, it transpires that V K Potemkin was born in 1949 so, on being appointed to the post of Head of TsVSI, he was only 45 years old. He has served in the Armed Forces since 1967, completing the Frunze Military Academy in 1979 and the General Staff Academy in 1990. He began working in the Centre in 1990 and, after becoming its Head, took a special course in the Russian Academy of State Administration, attached to the Office of the President of the Russian Federation, in 1997, specialising in national security.³¹ What has happened to him since his replacement in 1999 is not yet known.

Whilst he was Director of the Centre, more of the Centre's work was published and it would appear that under his leadership greater attention was paid both to analysing the strategic perspective, as well as the structure of the Armed Forces. To this end, according to one commentator, at TsSVI GSh, "new scientific collectives" were formed in the particular area of strategic analysis, "leading to the elaboration of a conceptual approach in defining the nature and character of future war, as well as examining the prerequisites for preventing future military conflict."³² In his detailed article examining the work of the Centre, published in September 1997, Solov'yev listed its main tasks as follows:

- 1) assessing the military-political and military-strategic position in the world; elaborating recommendations for the leadership of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence;*
- 2) co-ordinating research work, the scientific basis for decisions in the Concept for the Construction of the Armed Forces;*
- 3) examining the issues in maintaining Russia's military security and preventing the outbreak of war;*
- 4) elaborating nuclear strategy and the development of [the country's] nuclear forces;*
- 5) working out problems in relation to the defence of the country's air-space;*
- 6) working out a series of unified operational-strategic demands ("trebovaniy") and fundamental propositions on questions concerning the development and use of the Armed Forces;*
- 7) operational-strategic and military-economic foundation of the stages of reform of the Armed Forces, all Services and branches;*
- 8) elaborating fundamental questions concerning the organisation of scientific-research and design work in the Armed Forces;*

- 9) *accumulating the results of the command-staff, operational and other measures, conducted under the leadership of the Minister of Defence, Chief of the General Staff and their deputies;*
- 10) *preparing and conducting scientific conferences and meetings, held by the Minister of Defence, the Chief of the General Staff and their deputies.*"³³

Thus, the Centre has an extremely broad remit and has been heavily involved both in helping to formulate Russia's new military doctrine (approved by the Security Council in February 2000), as well as the country's National Security concept (October 1999). Indeed, the involvement of the Centre was more than just glorified intellectual back-up to the efforts of Colonel-General V Manilov, the man largely credited with the task of bringing forward the new military doctrine: according to Solov'yev, "the Defence Council of the Russian Federation instructed TsSVI GSh to work out the new military doctrine of the Russian Federation."³⁴

In the most recent article examining the current role of the Centre, Ostankov pointed out that the Centre's work is still largely concentrated on three main areas:

"Working out a series of steps to secure Russia's military security, as well as a complex of measures aimed at preventing military conflict, [measures] which have formed the basis of Russia's National Security Concept, as well as the draft military doctrine and the military doctrine of the Union of Belarus' and Russia; the second scientific direction [of the work of the Centre] is carrying out research into questions of maintaining strategic stability... the basic research work carried out here has led to the elaboration of practical measures for strategic containment, preventing the outbreak of war against the Russian Federation and developing further the individual components of the Armed Forces; the third scientific direction [of the work of the Centre] is researching problems [associated] with the structure of the Armed Forces."

In particular, this last group of specialists is charged with working out both a methodology and a "complex model" designed to evaluate what Russia needs to maintain its security now and what Russia will need, in terms of numbers of men and equipment, during war. It is headed by Colonel Doctor of Military Science B Ostankov.³⁵

It is the case that those attached to the Centre have written widely and intensively on a series of topics, ranging from discussing manning levels for the Russian Armed Forces, the formation of military doctrine, military-strategic stability in the 21st century to Russia's national interests and joint peace-keeping operations in the Balkans. According to the "open" literature, the Centre has written and published a number of "scientific-theoretical" works, including analyses of the USSR's military assistance to Afghanistan and the war in the Persian Gulf.³⁶ In many respects, it was and still is the "base" scientific-research institute of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and, as such, works with the other main directorates of the MoD and the General Staff, the Military Academy of the General Staff, the other scientific-research institutes of the MoD, institutes of the Academy of Sciences, etc. Being, in essence, the *fundamental* research wing of the General Staff, it has also been instrumental in assisting a number of senior military personnel improve their academic qualifications and, through that, has increased its influence still further. Most notable amongst its graduates are men like General V Prudnikov (Anti-Aircraft Defence Troops); Colonel-General B Korol'kov (Yu A Gagarin Air Force Academy); General S Dikov, Colonel-General V Bab'yev. As Solov'yev pointed out:

"The Centre trains a group of [aspirant] candidates and doctors of sciences from a number of leading staff of the Armed Forces, departments of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defence and General Staff. Dissertations are defended here."³⁷

In short, although the Centre is heavily involved in research activity, it is also very much involved in teaching and, consequently, is a lot more than simply a "think-tank" either for the General Staff or the MoD. In one of his two articles commemorating the work of the Centre, Ostankov states that "the [teaching and research] personnel of the Centre include 10 Doctors of Science and 30 Candidate Members of Science", as well as a number of "veterans", including men who have served in Afghanistan, North Osetia, the Former Yugoslavia, and Bosnia.³⁸ A caption attached to a photograph accompanying an article examining the work of the Centre reads "the flower of Russian military thought is assembled in this scientific-research institution"; the photograph portrays a very large group of senior Russian military and civilian personnel attending a lecture.³⁹

A number of former colleagues have maintained their links with the Centre, including the former Head of the Centre, Lieutenant-General S Bogdanov (now in charge of the Centre for Operational-Border Research, Federal Border Guard Service); General M Gareyev (now Commandant of the Academy of Military Science); Yu Brazhnikov (in charge of the Department of International Co-operation, Ministry of Emergency Situations).⁴⁰

One other significant development which has taken place in the last few years of the Centre's existence is that it has begun to branch out and seek co-operation with other similar organisations from abroad, most notably with the American-based Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO). In 1997, a joint research project was conducted examining the experience of joint peace-keeping operations undertaken in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Russian team was headed by Major-General Yu Luzhkov, a departmental head at TsSVI GSh, and included at least two other members of the Centre, Colonels Yu Dubov and Yu Morozov. The American team consisted of such noted specialists as J Kipp, T Thomas, L Grau and C Finch. The outcome of their joint work was published in a report, entitled: Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of IFOR Operations and Prospects for a Future Combined Security System: the Peace and Stability of Europe after IFOR (FMSO, Kansas, 1998). Further favourable comment on the joint co-operation of the US and Russian research teams was recorded in a subsequent Russian article, written by both Dubov and Morozov which appeared in *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*. At the beginning of the article, the authors simply stated that:

"The past year of 1997 was marked by an event which did not receive the attention that it deserved but which, it seems to us, will have no little significance for Russian and American relations. We are talking about the first joint Russian-American project, elaborated by the scientific-research organisations of the military departments of the Russian Federation and the United States of America."⁴¹

Although this joint Russian-American initiative may have produced the most obvious results of the Centre's "foreign" activity to date, in January 1996, ITAR-TASS carried a report concerning a "planned exchange" between the Centre and Japan's National Defence Agency – though whether such an exchange actually took place is not known.⁴² A report was also published in 1999 stating that Klimenko himself had spent a week in Beijing in April, at the invitation of the Chinese

Institute of Strategic Research, discussing “the development of the world’s political and military situation, the situation in Yugoslavia and Russo-Chinese military cooperation.”⁴³ This would seem to indicate that, unlike in the past, the Centre is now ready and able to establish working contact with foreign institutions and organisations and, given both the quality of its personnel and the work that it has produced over the years, such cooperation must be beneficial to all concerned.

In conclusion, it would appear that the Centre is the fundamental research organisation of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and, as such, is worthy of the praise heaped upon it as being “the brain” of the Russian Army. Judging by expert comment, it has played a not inconsiderable role over the years in formulating military doctrine, national security policy, the structure of the Armed Forces. Certainly, looking at its known publications – see appendix – its authors have touched on a wide range of issues affecting all areas of defence construction, strategic analysis, threats to the security of the Russian Federation, both internal and external. It would have to be said that its overall influence on the formation of doctrine and policy can, at this stage, only be guessed at. Staffed by senior General Staff officers, as well as aiding other senior officers to improve their own academic qualifications, it can be assumed that its overall influence extends further than the pages of *Krasnaya Zvezda* or *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*. As is evidenced by the research carried out for this article, we know that, for instance in drafting Russia’s military doctrine, the personnel of the Centre played a very important part in drafting both the 1993 and 2000 versions. Having one ex-Director (Korobushin) and the present Director (Klimenko) on the staff of the Security Council’s Academic Board is further testament to the influence and standing of the Centre as a whole. However, there is also the intangible nature of the work that the Centre carries out on behalf of both the General Staff and the Russian Ministry of Defence which is not open to public scrutiny. It could well be the case that its published output reflects only a fraction of what it actually produces. Its recent “foreign” activity is also an area worth watching: having established relations with the USA and China, can Western Europe be far behind (if it has not already happened?) There can be little doubt that it does play an important role in helping the senior Russian military and political leadership define the nature of the security agenda (internal and external) - especially in the light of its very broad remit – and it can also be safely asserted that its role is likely to become more important, rather than less, as Russia continues to examine its future geo-strategic position and the challenges ahead.

Endnotes

¹ Colonel V Ostankov, “Na ostriye voyennoy strategii”, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 25/1/2000.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid. Born in 1924, Col-Gen V V Korobushin belongs to the old Soviet Army, having taken part, for instance, in the storming of Berlin in 1945, serving in both GSFG and the Transbaykal MD immediately after the war. Interestingly enough, he also took part in the Soviet nuclear test carried out in September 1954, under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union (MSU) G K Zhukov, involving live nuclear weapons. In 1960-1963, he was transferred to the newly-created Strategic Rocket Forces, then on to the General Staff Academy, 1963-1965. Afterwards, he served on the Main Staff of Strategic Rocket Forces, 1965-1979. Between 1979-1986, promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General, when he became “deputy chief of a department of the General Staff”, becoming “chief of department” a year later. It is possible that the “department” in question was the Centre itself, even given the anomaly in the dates between him becoming dept. chief and the creation of the Centre in 1985 (R Woff, *Soviet High Command*, London, 1990, H93).

⁴ Lt-Gen A Yermak, “Uspekhi i problemy”, *Armeyskiy sbornik*, No 1, 1986, 19-21; 19.

⁵ Gen M Gareyev, "Status - obshchestvennyy, interes - gosudarstvennyy", *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 5/4/1997.

⁶ "Perechen' osnovnykh napravleniy fundamental'nykh issledovaniy v oblasti oboronnoy bezopasnosti", *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No 5 (128), 12/18-2/1999.

⁷ "Klin klinom vyshibayut", *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No 23, 18-24 June 1999, 4.

⁸ See list of membership of the Security Council's Academic board on the official website of the Security Council, at <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/1999/1317-2.html>. Interestingly enough, the present Director of the Centre, Major-General A F Klimenko is also listed as being a member of the Security Council's Academic board.

⁹ Ostankov, *ibid*.

¹⁰ *Ibid*.

¹¹ Ostankov, *ibid*; Vadim Solov'yev, "Mozg russkoy armii", *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No 35, 19/25-9-1997, 3.

¹² Maj-Gen V Medvedev, "Rol' voyennoy nauki v reforme", *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 21/7/1990. Born circa 1945, he is a graduate of both a military school and a military academy. Appointed Colonel to the General Staff, 1985-1990, becoming Major-General in 1989. (R Woff, *The Armed Forces of the Former Soviet Union. Evolution, structure and personalities*, Vol 3, Biographies, London, 1996, M-20.

¹³ Woff, *ibid*, B-32.

¹⁴ *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 17/5/1991. In 1992, an article appeared in one of the central Russian newspapers, which detailed comments about Russia's relationship with Ukraine, from "a representative" of "TsOSI of the General Staff of the CIS" (Yu Leonov, "Rossiya i Ukraina - posle gibeli SNG", *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 18/4/1992, 2).

¹⁵ Ostankov, *ibid*.

¹⁶ *Ibid*.

¹⁷ Solovy'ev, *ibid*.

¹⁸ Medvedev, *ibid*.

¹⁹ Lt-Gen S Bogdanov, "Uroki 'Buri v Pustyne'", *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 17/5/1991; Bogdanov, "Podkhod k otsenke vozniknoveniya i upravleniya voyennym konfliktom", *Voennaya Mysl'*, No 7, July 1992, 24-29.

²⁰ Col A Klimenko, "CIS Military Doctrine: what should it be?" *Military News Bulletin*, No 1, January 1992, 1-2. It is difficult to find any biographical information even on the present Director. What is known is that Klimenko graduated from the Armour and Tank Troops Academy and the Military Academy of the General Staff (although dates of graduation are not known). He has served in various troop and command positions and, since 1986, has served in the General Staff. He is a Candidate of Military Science (*Vooruzheniye Politika Konversiya*, No 2, April 1999, 14-17).

²¹ *Ibid*, 2.

²² Col A Klimenko, "O roli i meste voyennoy doktriny v sisteme bezopasnosti Sodruzhestva nezavisimyykh gosudarstv", *Voyennaya Mysl'*, No 8-9, 1992, 11-21.

²³ Bogdanov, "Podkhod...", *ibid*; Maj-Gen V I Chepurnoy, "Obosnovaniye sostava i struktury Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossii", *Voyennaya Mysl'*, No 7, 1992, 54-57. (Another curious anomaly is the fact that even though the Conference took place in May 1992 and the papers were published in July 1992, Bogdanov is still described in the preamble to his article as the Head of the Centre for Operational -Strategic Research, ie the old designation for his Centre, not the new. It could simply have been an oversight on the part of the editorial board of the journal, although unlikely. After all, Bogdanov is noted for being in charge of the "extraordinary" supplement of the journal and it would be a safe assumption to make that he would get the title of his own post correct. So, did TsOSI become TsVSI in 1991, after all?)

²⁴ Chepurnoy, *ibid*, 56.

²⁵ *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 10/10/1992. "A V Politsyn: born circa 1940. Graduate of a military school, military academy and the General Staff Academy (dates unknown). Held various troop and command positions. 1987-1989, Major-Gen. Attached to the General Staff, USSR/Russia since 1989." (Woff, *ibid*, P-16).

²⁶ *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 10/10/1992.

²⁷ *Ibid*.

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- 28 Ibid.
- 29 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/1520 C3/1, 24 October 1992.
- 30 Ostankov, *ibid.*
- 31 Lt-Gen V Potemkin, "Kosmos i informatsiya – novyye izmereniya voyennoy strategii", *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 10/9/1998. The biographical piece accompanying the article clearly states 1994, but Ostankov, for his part, clearly states 1995 as being Potemkin's strating date as Director.
- 32 Solov'yev, *ibid.*
- 33 Solov'yev, *ibid.*
- 34 *Ibid.*
- 35 Ostankov, *ibid.*
- 36 Col V Ostankov, "Voyennaya nauka na pod'yeme", *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No 2 (175), 21 January 2000. The exact titles of the two workds mentioned are "Primeneniye organichennogo kontingenta Sovetskikh voisk dlya okazaniya voyennoy pomoshchi pravitel'stvu Respubliki Afganistana" and "Voyna v Persidskom zalive".
- 37 Solov'yev, *ibid.*
- 38 Ostankov, "Voyennaya ...", *ibid.*
- 39 *Ibid.*
- 40 Ostankov, "Na ostriye ...".
- 41 Yu Dubov, Yu Morozov, "Mirotvortsy smotryat v budushcheye", *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No 6, 13-19 February 1998.
- 42 FBIS-SOV-96-014, 19 January 1996.
- 43 FBIS, MS1704111199 Moscow Radio Rossii, 17 April 1999.

Appendix – list of known published articles by members of TsSVI GSh (1996-2000)

1996 – Colonel V Milovanov, “Yest’ li vykhod is tupika”, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 23rd June. (Translation: “There is a way out of the cul-de-sac”. Article examines the importance of methodology in the context of Russian military reform).

1997 – Lieutenant-General V K Potemkin, Colonel Yu V Morozov, “‘Silovoy karkas’ Evropy”, *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No 22 (49), 21st-27th June. (Translation: “‘The power frame’ of Europe.” Examines the creation of a collective security system for the whole of Europe by combining the military potential of both Russia and the NATO-member states).

“ – Lieutenant-General V K Potemkin, Colonel Yu V Morozov, “Voyenno-politicheskaya stabil’nost’ XXI veka”, *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No 27 (54), 26th July-1st August. (Translation: “Military-political stability in the 21st century.” Argues that strategic stability can only be constructed on the fundamental principle of equal security for all and not just for one power, or bloc of powers).

“ – Major-General A F Klimenko, “Voyny dlya Rossii”, *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No.44, 28th November-4th December. (Translation: “Wars for Russia”. Very interesting article on how best Russia should develop its armed forces in relation to the changing military threat, concluding that “the basis for the organisation of the country’s defence should be in accordance with the principle of strategic mobility, relying on nuclear deterrence”).

1998 – Major-General A F Klimenko, Colonel A A Kol’tyukov, “Osnovnoy dokument voyennogo stroitel’sstva”, *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No 6 (80), 13th-19th February. (Translation: “The fundamental document for the construction of the military.” Early results of the work of an inter-departmental commission detailed to draft Russia’s new military doctrine).

“ – Colonels Yu N Dubov, Yu V Morozov, “Mirotvortsy smotryat v budushcheye”, *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No 6 (80), 13th-19th February. (Translation: “Peace-keepers look towards the future.” Details the work of the peace-keeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with particular reference to the Russian and US experience).

“ – Colonels Yu N Dubov, Yu V Morozov, “‘Grom v pustynye’ predveshchaet koroye vozobnovleniye ‘buri’”, *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No 7, (81), 20th-26th February. (Translation: “‘Desert Lightning’ foretells a swift resumption of the ‘Storm’.” Analyses the contemporary military-political situation in the Gulf).

“ – Colonel Yu N Dubov, Colonel-General L P Shevtsov, “Partnerstvo, dalekoye ot ideal’nogo”, *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No 10 (84), 13th-19th March. (Translation: “A partnership, but far from ideal.” Examines the distinct lack of operational cooperation between the NATO and Russian peace-keepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina).

“ – Lieutenant-General V K Potemkin, “Kosmos i informatsiya – novyye izmereniya voyennoy strategii”, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 10th September. (Translation: “Space and information: new dimensions of military strategy.” Mainly concerned with examining the work of the Centre and the future organisational development of the Russian Armed Forces. Argues that the minimum strength of the Russian Armed Forces should be 1.2 million, with a GDP allocation for defence of 3.5%. Also critical of “the time gap” between working out proposals and their implementation and the “poor interaction” between the Centre, other scientific-research institutes of the MoD and the Russian Academy of Sciences.)

“ - Colonel Yu N Dubov, “My ne dolzny poteryat’ samobytnost’”, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 25th September. (Translation: “We must not lose [our] distinctiveness.” Examines the wider issue of Russia’s national interests).

“ - Colonels Yu N Dubov, Yu V Morozov, “Russia between centres of power”, *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, 9th October, electronic version. (Examines the necessity for the creation of a multi-polar world; Russia’s relationship with Europe; Russo-American relations, etc).

“ - Lieutenant-General V K Potemkin, “Nuclear terrorism will not be the main threat in the 21st century”, *Interfax-AiF*, 16th-22nd October. (Is not convinced that nuclear blackmail by one state against another will be a feature of the politics of the new century; nuclear weapons still being viewed as a weapon “of last resort.” Also examines future developmental trends in the Russian Armed Forces, especially in the light of possible continued NATO expansion eastwards.)

“ - Colonel Yu V Morozov, I A Nekipeliy, “Mirotvorcheskaya agressiya NATO”, *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No 42 (116), 6th-12th November. (Translation: “Peace-creating aggression of NATO.” A detailed examination of contemporary events in Kosovo and what this could hold in store for Russia, with particular reference to the situation in the Caucasus: “the enlargement of NATO eastwards is being undertaken with the [following] main aim: to weaken Russia’s influence in Europe and in the world. As a result, the following variant for the development of events is possible: when our country has sorted out its difficulties, around it will be the tight ring of NATO, which will allow the West to apply telling economic, political and, possibly, military pressure on Moscow.”)

1999 – Colonels Yu N Dubov, Yu V Morozov, “S NATO ili bez nego?”, *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No 4 (127), 5th-11th February. (Translation: “With NATO or without it?” Article explores the future security system for the WHOLE of Europe: “in the context of taking decisions concerning the formation of a European security system, the question of Russia’s role in the fate of Europe is self-evident. Thinking deeply about it... attempts to solve European issues without the participation of Russia is not [only] pointless, but very dangerous. Difficulties in co-ordinating policies in regulating the conflict in former Yugoslavia, when the OSCE and NATO clashed should serve as a first warning that agreeing conflicting interests in modern Europe will be significantly more complicated than during the period of bloc confrontation.”)

“ - Major-General A F Klimenko, “Chislennost’ Vooruzhennykh Sil’ kak zerkalo rossiyskoy ekonomiki”, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 12th February. (Translation: “The size of the Armed Forces as a mirror of the Russian economy.” Detailed interview of Klimenko, in which he points out that the size of the Russian Armed Forces has been an object of debate in Russia throughout the 1990s. Despite calls that the reduction in numbers should mirror the reduction in the military threat – even to as low as 500,000 men – Klimenko argues that there are objective criteria for determining the optimal number of troops, including economic, demographic trends, as well as a qualitative improvement in military technology).

“ - Lieutenant-General V K Potemkin, “Tak kak zhe postroit’ sovremennuyu armiyu”, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 27th March. (Translation: “So, just how is a modern army to be built?” Looks at the development of the Armed Forces beyond 2005, based on the likely premise that the world’s geopolitical situation will look very different compared to now).

“ - Major-General A F Klimenko, “Reforming military doctrine – theory and practice”, *Vooruzheniya Politika Konversiya*, No 2, April 1999. (Further examination of the importance of methodology in drafting a new military doctrine. The 1993 Military doctrine, in the words of the author, was “the first time in domestic practice [that] an attempt was made to introduce the concept of Russian national interests.”

Looks at the overall importance of defining terms properly, so as to leave no room for doubt as regards what Russia considers to be her “national interests.”)

“ – Major-General A F Klimenko, “Metodologicheskiye osnovy formirovaniya voyennoy doktriny Rossii,” *Voyennyy Parad*, No 6 (36), November-December. (Translation: “Methodological basis for the formation of Russia’s military doctrine.” Produces working definitions of “military security”, “military force” and “vital national interests”).

2000 – Major-General A F Klimenko, “O sozdanii voyennoy doktriny Rossii”, *Voyennyy Parad*, No 1 (37), January-February. (Translation: “On the content of Russia’s military doctrine.” Defines, within the terms of the doctrine, both the internal and the external threats to Russia, as well as reiterating the importance of Russia relying on a combination of strategic mobility and nuclear deterrence in order to ensure its own security.)

Disclaimer

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