


Conflict Studies Research Centre

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**Russia and
The Far Abroad 2000**

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Russia and The Far Abroad 2000

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RUSSIA AND THE FAR ABROAD 2000

Dr M A Smith

Russia is aware of its limited abilities in the international sphere. To counter unipolarity (American preeminence), Russia is cultivating relationships with, among others, the EU, China, India and Iran. In particular, Russia sees herself as needing to play an important role in Europe and in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as economically and diplomatically in the Middle East.

RUSSIA'S PERCEPTION OF THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

In 2000, two official documents have been released, setting forth the basic features of official Russian foreign policy doctrine. These are the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, approved in a presidential decree in January 2000, and the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, approved in a presidential decree in June 2000.¹

As I noted in my companion paper, "Russian Foreign Policy 2000: The Near Abroad":

The most significant feature of the Foreign Policy Concept is the emphasis it places on Russia's limited foreign policy capabilities. It notes "the limited resource support for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, making it difficult to uphold its foreign economic interests and narrowing down the framework of its information and cultural influence abroad." Elsewhere, the concept argues that a "successful foreign policy ... must be based on maintaining a reasonable balance between its objectives and possibilities for attaining these objectives. Concentration of politico-diplomatic, military, economic, financial and other means on resolving foreign political tasks must be commensurate with their real significance for Russia's national interests."

*The concept appears to be noting the danger of Russia, in her current weak state, assuming too many foreign policy commitments and becoming overstretched. It would appear to be arguing for a modest and restrained foreign policy. In both his essay *Russia on the threshold of the new millennium*, published on the Internet in December 1999, and his first state of the nation address, delivered to the Federal Assembly in July 2000, Putin underlined Russia's economic backwardness in relation to the advanced western states.² In his address to the Federal Assembly, he warned that "the growing rift between the leading states and Russia is pushing us towards becoming a third world country." This weakness, which is evidently recognised by the Russian leadership, appears to have*

*compelled the Putin leadership to accept that its foreign policy objectives must be correspondingly modest.*³

What is the nature of the international system in which this relatively weak Russia finds herself? The Putin leadership shares the perception of the international system held by the Yel'tsin leadership in its latter years. It argues that there are two mutually exclusive trends in the international system, namely the striving towards the creation of a unipolar international system by the USA and its leading allies, and the opposed striving towards the creation of a multipolar international system with several different centres of power, including Russia.

Unipolarity is seen as a threat to international security and international law, as it seeks to usurp the United Nations as the principal international security organisation. It sees the intervention of NATO against Yugoslavia over Kosovo in Operation Allied Force in 1999 as an example of the dangers of unipolarity, as NATO did not seek specific UN approval for this action. The use of concepts such as "humanitarian intervention" and "limited sovereignty" to justify such actions is considered by Moscow to be unacceptable.

Multipolarity is supported by Russia, as it denotes a system of several power centres, with no one power dominating, as in the unipolar system, where the USA dominates. A multipolar system places the UN and other major security organisations such as the OSCE at the core of the system, with the UN Security Council being the sole organisation able to legitimise the use of force in international relations, rather than western collective defence organisations such as NATO taking such decisions.

Moscow's opposition to unipolarity is unsurprising. National pride prevents the Russian Federation from accepting the legitimacy of an international system dominated by Moscow's erstwhile Cold War rival. Furthermore, a US dominated system runs the risk that Russia's international security and economic interests will not be fully taken into account. A multipolar system, with Russia as one of several equal power centres, gives Russia more room for manoeuvre and is therefore the system most likely to enable Russia to maintain significant international influence and protect her international security and economic interests.

As an article in *International Affairs* in 1997 put it:

*For Russia, the transition to a multi-polar world will create the possibility of diversifying the directions of foreign policy and of developing constructive strategic relations immediately with some influential partners. This increases the possibility of a manoeuvre necessary for ensuring the country's security under the conditions of a resource deficit and of the transition period in the development of our country which is attended by difficulties.*⁴

A harsh interpretation of multipolarity is that the concept is a polite code word for an anti-US foreign policy orientation that offers the most practicable means for a weakened Russia to reverse the geopolitical losses of the post-Cold War era.⁵

As Russia is one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, with the right of veto, an enhanced UN role is one means whereby Russia can continue to play a significant international role. The decline of Russia's military and economic power mean that her seat on the UN Security Council is one of her few remaining

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superpower attributes. Russia is particularly interested in strengthening the peacekeeping role of the UN, and Russian participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Moscow opposes any attempts to bypass the UN as the principal international security organisation, as implied by the NATO 1999 Strategic Concept. Moscow has a fear that the West, particularly the USA, is trying to freeze her out of attempts to settle major international crises, such as in the Balkans or the Arab-Israeli dispute, and favours using the UN to play the lead role in seeking a settlement of these disputes, as a means of ensuring Russian involvement. The Foreign Policy Concept calls for enhancing the ability of the UN to respond rapidly to crises. Any enhancement of the UN role enhances Russia's role in the international arena, and in Russia's current weakened state, constitutes one of the few means she has of countering US unipolarity.

These views have been held by the Russian leadership since at least 1996, when Yevgeny Primakov became foreign minister. They have been intensified, however, since the NATO intervention against Yugoslavia in 1999, which has been a turning point in Russian perceptions of the West. The use of force by NATO without UN sanction and without consultation with Russia has convinced Moscow that partnership with the West can only be limited in nature. In the early 1990s Moscow spoke of partnership with the West. In the 2000 National Security Concept, "partnership" with the West is replaced by the looser term "cooperation," implying a less close relationship.⁶

Whilst Russia seeks cooperation with the West in fora such as the G8, the OSCE, and in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, full partnership with the West is no longer on the agenda, as Moscow believes that the West will not accept equal partnership. Russia's aim is to endeavour to cooperate in these fora to the maximum extent compatible with her own national interests, while endeavouring to develop close ties (strategic partnerships) with other states that share her desire for a multipolar international system. China, India and to a lesser extent Iran are the states which most commonly fall into this category.

THE WEST

As noted above, Russia's relations with the West have become cooler as a result of the Kosovo crisis, and have accordingly moved away from notions of close partnership. However, Russia desires to develop closer economic ties with Western nations as part of the process of reforming the Russian economy. Putin makes clear his interest in encouraging western investment into Russia in his December 1999 Internet essay, and the development strategy for Russia up to 2010, developed by the minister for trade and economic development, German Gref.⁷

THE USA⁸

Relations with the USA remain important for several reasons:

- US power is the biggest single obstacle to Russia's aim of bringing about a multipolar international system.
- The continuing importance of strategic arms control, including the START process and the increasingly thorny question of national missile defence and the 1972 ABM treaty.

- The importance of the US in international financial organisations such as the IMF.
- The US role as the leader of NATO and the part she plays in many regional security issues, such as the Balkans, the Middle East, the Korean peninsula, in which Russia also perceives herself as having a legitimate role.

The USA As The Main Impediment To A Multipolar International System

The USA is the core of the unipolar system that Moscow opposes. The USA dominates the NATO and US-Japanese and US-South Korean alliance systems and no other power is able to match the combination of nuclear and conventional power and power projection capabilities that the USA possesses. During the Cold War a rough strategic parity existed between the USA and the USSR. The Russian Federation, whose defence spending is around 2% of US defence spending, is not capable of mounting a challenge to the USA's military predominance. Economically, the USA's GDP accounts for about 21% of global GDP, whereas Russia accounts for just 1.6%. China is also unable to challenge effectively the USA's position in the international system. The European Union and Japan have currently no desire to mount a strategic challenge to the USA. Washington's predominant position in the post-Cold War international system is the principal obstacle to the Russian ambition to encourage the emergence of a multipolar international system in which US power is constrained.

Strategic Arms Control

Strategic arms control remains a matter of major importance, and may assume even greater importance over the next few years, due to US-Russian differences over ballistic missile defence and the future of the 1972 ABM treaty. The START process stands at the centre of strategic arms control. START-2 had been signed by Boris Yel'tsin and George Bush in January 1993, and was ratified by the US Senate in January 1996. Ratification took much longer in the Russian Federation, as the legislature was hostile to its terms. The elections of December 1999 resulted in a Duma that was more supportive of the Kremlin, and removed the obstacles to ratification. It took place only in April 2000, and the Treaty was signed into law by Putin in May 2000. The START process can now move on to START-3. Consultations have been taking place between Washington and Moscow, but official negotiations have yet to begin. However some differences have already emerged. Moscow has argued in favour of reducing warhead levels under START-3 to 1,500 instead of the ceiling favoured by Washington of 2,000-2,500, which was agreed at the Yel'tsin-Clinton summit in Helsinki in March 1997. Putin repeated this offer in November 2000, stating that a level of 1,500 warheads was attainable by 2008, and that further reductions were possible after that date.⁹

National Missile Defence (NMD)

The USA desires to develop a national missile defence system to counter any possible missile threat that may emerge from "rogue states" such as Iran or North Korea. The ABM treaty of 1972 signed between the USA and the USSR limited the signatories to two ABM sites, with each able to have no more than 100 interceptors. A 1974 protocol reduced the number of sites from two to one. The Clinton Administration sought to negotiate an amendment to the ABM treaty that would permit the deployment of a NMD system. The Russian Federation has opposed these efforts, arguing that the 1972 treaty is the cornerstone of strategic stability

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and cannot therefore be amended. Russia has threatened to withdraw from the entire arms control process if the USA tries to amend or abandon the ABM treaty. Although the Russo-US joint statement on strategic stability issued during the Clinton-Putin summit in Moscow in June 2000 affirmed both sides' adherence to the treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability, along with their commitment to strengthening the treaty, they remain far apart in their attitudes towards the treaty.¹⁰

The ABM Issue – Russia's Response

Moscow refuses to accept that any US NMD system is intended solely to counter a missile threat from any so-called "rogue state." Russian defence minister Igor Sergeev argued in March 2000 that NMD was directed at countering the Russian and Chinese strategic nuclear arsenals.¹¹ The Russian leadership also disputes US claims that it could face a missile threat in the near future from "rogue states."

Russia has developed a variety of responses to the possibility of the US altering or abandoning the ABM treaty. Moscow has, for example, threatened to place multiple warheads on its Topol ICBMs as a response to US withdrawal from the ABM treaty.¹² Multiple warheads on Topol ICBMs would violate START-2. In an interview in *Vesti* in April 2000¹³, foreign minister Igor Ivanov made a link between future progress in arms control and ABM renegotiation.

On the eve of the Clinton-Putin summit in June 2000, Vladimir Putin proposed to the USA a joint Russo-US non-strategic missile defence system, along with a global control system on the proliferation of missiles and missile technologies.¹⁴ The head of the Russian MOD department for international military cooperation, Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, had already suggested in April 2000 that Russia and the USA work together in setting up a non-strategic ABM system.¹⁵ During the June summit Clinton effectively rejected Putin's proposal by arguing that it would take ten years to develop a Russo-American system, whereas the USA felt that a missile threat could emerge within five years.¹⁶

Russia has also proposed developing a non-strategic ABM system with Western Europe. Both Germany and France have expressed reservations about US plans, and the Putin leadership clearly hopes that they may be amenable to the idea of a Russo-West European ABM system. In June 2000, a few days before Putin visited Germany, foreign minister Igor Ivanov outlined a proposal for a non-strategic antiballistic missile defence system in Europe.¹⁷ He suggested that it could:

- jointly assess the character and scale of missile proliferation and possible missile threats;
- jointly develop the concept of an all-European system of non-strategic ABM, the order of its creation and deployment;
- jointly create an all-European multilateral centre for warnings about missile launchings;
- conduct joint staff exercises, research and experiments;
- jointly develop systems of non-strategic antimissile defence.

He said that Russia proposed conducting corresponding consultations with the countries of Western Europe on these problems. He also accepted that the USA could be involved in this process. When Putin visited Germany in mid-June he argued it was possible to adopt a decision to develop a project to create a non-strategic antimissile defence system together with NATO.¹⁸ If US policy on the ABM issue causes significant differences between Washington and its allies in Western

Europe, then it is possible that Moscow may put forward its proposed Russo-West European system as a mean of exploiting these differences and attempting to encourage a loosening of US-West European ties. The commander-in-chief of the Russian Strategic Missile Troops, Vladimir Yakovlev, indicated in May 2000 that this was part of Russian thinking, when he said that disagreements between Russia and the US on the ABM Treaty "are also being transformed now into a problem of relations between the USA and NATO member-states, for the principle of equal security between the allies is being violated."¹⁹

It is unlikely that Moscow will for the moment abandon negotiating with the USA over ABM. In June 2000 deputy prime minister Ilya Klebanov foresaw long negotiations with the USA on the ABM treaty, which possibly implies that Moscow may be willing to show some flexibility over the treaty.²⁰ However, much will depend on the attitude of the Bush Administration that will take power in January 2001, and if the new Administration decides to withdraw from the treaty, then Russia will be faced with a major challenge to its arms control policy. In such circumstances, she may seek to lobby European NATO members who share Moscow's perspective on the ABM issue, with the possible aim of encouraging the decoupling of the USA from its European NATO partners.

Economic Issues In US-Russian Relations²¹

US dominance of the global economy and the position the US enjoys in key international financial institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and World Trade Organisation mean that Washington is able to influence strongly the conditions of Russia's integration into the global economy, the granting of IMF and World Bank credits, potential Russian membership of these organisations, and the restructuring of Russia's foreign debt, which now stands at \$165 billion. The Russian economy has undergone significant dollarisation. 65% of the currency reserves of the Russian Central Bank, 80% of foreign trade contacts and 90% of convertible currency bank deposits in Russia are in dollars. 75% of the Russian foreign debt is denominated in dollars. The US has been unwilling to argue for the writing off of some of Russia's debts to the Paris Club of creditors (Russia's debts to the Paris Club total \$42 billion). This places Russia in a very weak position vis-à-vis the USA in her attempts to integrate fully with the global economy. The US continues to place restrictions on the export of certain Russian goods into the USA, and US legislation seeks to penalise Russian companies that export certain sensitive technologies to rogue states such as Iran.

Concern over the misappropriation of loans and credits to Russia has assumed greater importance in 1999-2000, with the Bank of New York money laundering scandal, and allegations made by George W Bush during the presidential election campaign that Viktor Chernomyrdin had embezzled funds from the IMF.

Regional Security Issues

These will also be discussed in further sections in this paper. Since the end of the Cold War, the West, particularly the USA have dominated the international system, and have played the leading role in seeking to control and resolve major regional security threats. This has led to Russian fears that Moscow may be frozen out of diplomatic efforts to reach settlements in regional conflicts where she believes she has legitimate interests and a right to be involved. There is a particular Russian concern of being frozen out of the Middle East peace process. A typical reflection of this attitude is the claim made by the Russian MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) that it received no invitation to take part in the Arab-Israeli conference at Sharm-al-

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Shaykh in October 2000.²² Moscow is also concerned at being frozen out of the Balkans, and is also opposed at US policy towards rogue states such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea, as it fears that US policy towards these states is being imposed on the international community, which means that Russian interests may be ignored. The only regional trouble spot where there appears to be complete harmony between Moscow and Washington is over Afghanistan, where both states see the Taliban as a serious security threat.

RUSSIA AND EUROPE

Russia feels herself to be a European power. This was a constant feature of Soviet foreign policy and has also been a constant feature of post-1991 Russian foreign policy. In May 2000, on the visit of an EU delegation to Moscow, Putin stated:

*You know that for Russia relations with Europe, with a united Europe, have always been, are and I am hoping that in the long historic term will continue to be a priority. The fundamental principles which unite Europe are also the basis of policy of the Russian Federation. Russia has always been, is and will continue to be a European country in terms of its location, culture and the level of economic integration.*²³

This stance may be regarded as the logical continuation of the concept of the "common European home" developed by Gorbachev in the 1980s. In October 2000, Putin welcomed the idea of a Greater Europe, and said that, "I think that in this context we shall develop our relations with everybody, both with Europe and with the USA."²⁴

Russia therefore desires to participate fully in the integration processes taking place in Europe and to be a full part of any European security system. The 2000 Foreign Policy Concept states that "the main aim of Russian foreign policy in Europe is the creation of a stable and democratic system of European security and cooperation." In his internet essay *Russia's' Foreign Policy at the Contemporary Stage*, foreign minister Igor Ivanov states that Europe is the traditional priority of Russia's foreign policy, and Russian foreign policy has two basic tasks in Europe. The first is the creation of a stable, non-discriminatory and all-embracing system of European security, and the second is to give an impulse to broad cooperation between Russia and the European Union.²⁵

One of Russia's main concerns is that of being excluded from European integration processes and thereby being marginalised on the periphery of Europe. On 20 April 2000, security council secretary Sergey Ivanov said that attempts were being made [presumably by the USA - MAS] to exclude Russia from the European political-military space.²⁶ Russia therefore seeks to be an active member of all pan-European organisations such as the Council of Europe and OSCE, plus various regional organisations such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone and Council of Baltic Sea states in order to promote further European integration.

Russia's relations with the West have suffered only slightly as a result of Chechnya.²⁷ The EU and NATO, along with individual western states, have been only slightly critical of Russian actions in Chechnya since October 1999. The severest action to date has been the decision of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to suspend the Russian delegation's voting rights. By and large, however, the West has been reluctant to allow Chechnya to become a major irritation in Russo-Western relations, although Moscow has expressed displeasure

at the US State Department's and the German Foreign Ministry's willingness to receive officials from the Maskhadov leadership.

Bilateral Relationships

Russia's relationships with the principal states of Western Europe (four are specifically mentioned in the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept, Britain, Germany, Italy and France) are currently good. Putin has had successful visits to Britain (April 2000), Germany (June 2000), France (October 2000) and Italy (June 2000), and appears to be developing a close personal rapport with the leaders of these states. In 1998 the Russian leadership favoured the idea of a troika of Russia, Germany and France. Only one such summit was held in Moscow in March 1998, and the aim of developing a close Russo-German-French triangle has not been realised.²⁸

Russia And NATO

1999 can safely be regarded as the worst year in Russia-NATO relations since the end of the Cold War, due to Operation Allied Force, NATO's taking of military action against Yugoslavia following Belgrade's rejection of the draft agreement on Kosovo at the Rambouillet summit in March 1999. Russia broke off virtually all contact with NATO after March 1999, and considered that by taking military action against Yugoslavia without consulting Russia, NATO had made a mockery of the NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997. Military action against Yugoslavia ended in July 1999, but in December 1999 Russia was still unwilling to "unfreeze" relations with NATO. On 22 December 1999, Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov said that "there are no new conditions for resuming cooperation with NATO. We do not see such conditions today."²⁹ The Russian leadership was also concerned about further NATO widening and the possibility of NATO using force within the territory of the former Soviet Union. Russian CGS Anatoly Kvashnin expressed these fears when addressing the MFA Diplomatic Academy in November 1999.³⁰

The only positive note in 1999 after the end of Operation Allied Force was the statement made in October by the deputy chief of the General Staff, Col-Gen Valery Manilov, who said a revival of NATO-Russia relations was possible provided no decision related to European security could be adopted, considered or implemented without Russia's participation. Manilov said that this position must take the form of a legally binding document before Russia would consider resuming relations with NATO on a wide range of issues.³¹

The NATO-Russia relationship began to thaw in February 2000, with the visit of the new NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson to Moscow. On 31 January 2000, Leonid Ivashov said "there is no alternative to Russia-NATO cooperation, and Moscow is ready to restore relations with the alliance."³² In February Leonid Ivashov said, "Russia is interested in cooperation with all European structures, including NATO. But we understand reciprocal process under this cooperation". He subtly indicated that Russia was now prepared for a gradual thaw in Russia-NATO relations. He said that "defreezing should be gradual and should be conducted only under certain conditions, the main of which is NATO's readiness for constructive and serious cooperation ... we do not want to pretend that nothing happened in our relations after the aggression of the North Atlantic alliance against Yugoslavia."³³

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On 15 February, the day Robertson arrived in Moscow, Ivashov said that "Russia is interested in cooperation with all European structures, NATO included, but we view cooperation as a two-way process ... the full unfreezing of bilateral relations is not the point of the matter ... we believe the unfreezing should be gradual and achieved on certain terms, the main of them being NATO readiness for constructive and serious cooperation."³⁴

Moscow's decision to undertake a gradual restoration of relations was an acknowledgement of reality. The fact of NATO's existence as the main security organisation in Europe was not going to go away. A probable second wave of NATO widening over the next few years would further increase the importance of NATO and make ignoring it all the more illogical. Russia remains hostile to NATO widening and the broadening of NATO's role as envisaged in the 1999 Strategic Concept, but accepts that to ignore NATO would enhance the danger of Russia becoming marginalised in the creation of a post-Cold War European security system.

As part of the process of "unfreezing" relations with NATO, Russia has sought to improve the process of Russia-NATO consultations over security crises in order to prevent Russia being ignored as she was over Kosovo in 1999. Colonel-General Valery Manilov said that this was being discussed in connection with the February 2000 visit of George Robertson to Moscow.

*The new quality of cooperation should consist of three components, and we have informed our partners from NATO of this ... Firstly, the issue is Russian participation on equal terms in evaluating situations in crisis areas and joint formulation of conclusions proceeding from that evaluation. The second condition is Russian participation on equal terms in working out resolutions for responding to crisis situations. The third item is Russian participation on equal terms in implementing decisions taken jointly on responding to and preventing crisis situations.*³⁵

The Russian concern is to prevent any repetition of the events of 1999, where NATO decided to take military action against Yugoslavia without consulting Russia. In reality it is highly unlikely that NATO would consult with Russia in the event of a similar crisis, if NATO believed that consultation with Moscow would delay or prevent it from acting effectively, as was the case over Kosovo in 1999. In some ways therefore the process of discussion between NATO and Russia in 2000 over improving consultation mechanisms may be regarded as a way of soothing wounded Russian pride in order to thaw out a frozen relationship. Some progress has been made in this area. Russian CGS Anatoly Kvashnin attended a meeting of the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in Brussels in May 2000, and Igor Ivanov attended a PJC meeting at foreign minister level in Florence also in May. In June 2000 defence minister Igor Sergeyev attended a PJC meeting in Brussels at defence minister level. All these contacts had been suspended in 1999 by Moscow in protest at Operation Allied Force.

Although relations have improved, Moscow believes that NATO sees Russia as an enemy. Moscow would also like to see NATO transformed into a political organisation. In March 2000, defence minister Igor Sergeyev said, "NATO could evolve from a military-political organisation into a political-military one ... and could integrate into the OSCE".³⁶

Russia would also like to try and find ways of bypassing NATO, in order to reduce its relevance as a security organisation. For this reason she has cautiously welcomed the emergence of an EU security dimension, presumably as it may be a means of loosening trans-Atlantic ties between the USA and Western Europe.

There is probably also an interest in cultivating ties with individual NATO states in order to try and loosen NATO cohesion where possible. Russia may try to use the various friendship and partnership treaties she has signed with individual states to this end. In February 2000, Roman Semenovich Popkovich, an adviser to the Russian prime minister and former head of the State Duma Defence Committee, said that "Russia's relations with NATO are not just with the NATO bloc, but relations with the countries in the bloc."³⁷ Popkovich's remarks indicate the possibility that Russia may attempt to cultivate ties with individual NATO members in order to play one off against the other in order to weaken alliance cohesion.

In November 1999, Yel'tsin welcomed a suggestion made by Italian prime minister Massimo d'Alema to use the G8 in preventing global conflicts.³⁸ This may again be seen as an attempt to bypass NATO as a security organisation and reduce its relevance.

Russia has accepted the uncongenial reality that she cannot ignore NATO, and so has returned to dialogue with it, but accompanies this dialogue with attempts to encourage trends and developments that may in the long term reduce NATO's relevance and/or weaken its commitment to its traditional collective defence role.

Russia And The European Union

Moscow's view of the EU is in stark contrast to her views on NATO. She views the EU positively, welcomes the EU's eastward widening, and would like one day to enter the EU, although she accepts that membership is not currently possible. On 26 October 2000, Putin said that Russia could not yet be a member of the EU, but affirmed that Moscow would "work to unify our legislation, to harmonize it with European legislation" and to "promote our cooperation in all areas".³⁹

The EU is an important economic partner for Russia. The EU is Russia's largest trading partner, accounting for around 35% of Russia's foreign trade. If the EU expands, then the EU will account for an even bigger share of Russia's trade turnover. Putin observed that "if you add to this the potential of new members of the European Community, then it will be a controlling share - 51 per cent of Russia's trade turnover will be with a united Europe."⁴⁰

Russia-EU relations are based on the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which came into force in December 1997.⁴¹ Since then the main developments in Russia-EU relations have been the adoption of an EU Common Strategy on Russia by the EU in June 1999, to which Russia responded with her Medium Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000-2010).⁴²

In the Medium Term Strategy, Russia views the EU as a strategic partner, and in her relationship with the EU, the Medium Term Strategy's primary aims are as follows:

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The Strategy is primarily aimed at insuring national interests and enhancing the role and image of Russia in Europe and in the world through establishing the reliable pan-European system of collective security, and at mobilizing the economic potential and managerial experience of the European Union to promote the development of a socially oriented market economy of Russia based on the fair competition principles and further construction of a democratic rule-of law State. In the transition period of reform, however, the protection of national production in certain sectors of economy is justified, subject to international law and experience.

The Strategy is aimed at development and strengthening of strategic partnership between Russia and the EU in European and world affairs and prevention and settlement, through common efforts, of local conflicts in Europe with an emphasis on supremacy of international law and non-use of force. It provides for the construction of a united Europe without dividing lines and the interrelated and balanced strengthening of the positions of Russia and the EU within an international community of the 21st century.

The Strategy affirms that the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement remains the legal and institutional basis for the EU-Russia relationship. The Strategy considers that "partnership with the EU can manifest itself in joint efforts to establish an effective system of collective security in Europe on the basis of equality without dividing lines, including through the development and implementation of the Charter on European Security, in progress towards the creation of the Russia - European Union free trade zone, as well as in a high level of mutual confidence and cooperation in politics and economy."

The Strategy then outlines ways in which economic and political cooperation can be developed. Russia clearly sees the EU as potentially an extremely close partner with whom she can cooperate as part of the Greater Europe whose emergence she welcomes. In some ways this contrasts with the more limited view of partnership with the West as envisaged in the National Security Concept of January 2000, and may reflect Russian thinking that the development of a united Europe could change the nature of the western community of states, in particular the links between Europe and the USA.

In 1999, the EU began making some moves towards developing its own military capability, following the decision to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy after the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty in June 1999. At the European Council summit in Helsinki in December 1999, it was decided to have by 2003, a 60,000 strong armed force, capable of humanitarian and rescue work, crisis management, peace-keeping, and even peace-making.⁴³

Russia has welcomed this development, seeing it an opportunity to encourage the dilution of Atlanticism within Europe.⁴⁴ In December 1999, the Russian Defence Ministry stated that it hoped that the European armed force which the European Union plans to set up would be independent of NATO, whilst in November 1999 CGS Anatoly Kvashnin hoped to try and play on possible US-EU tensions by accusing the USA of seeking to weaken the EU, in order to prevent it from becoming an economic and political rival.⁴⁵

The Russian Medium Term Strategy also sees the potential for the EU's fledgling defence identity possibly to diminish NATO's importance. The Medium Term Strategy suggests as possible policy steps the following:

- to ensure pan-European security by the Europeans themselves without both isolation of the United States and NATO and their dominance on the continent;
- to work out Russia's position on the "defence identity" of the European Union with the Western European Union to be included in it, as well as to develop political and military contacts with the WEU as an integral part of the EU, and to promote practical cooperation in the area of security (peacemaking, crisis settlement, various aspects of arms limitation and reduction, etc.) which could counterbalance, inter alia, the NATO-centrism in Europe

Russia intends to follow closely the EU's development of a defence capability and clearly wishes to encourage any potential it may have for diminishing NATO-centrism. One major concern Moscow clearly has is to ensure that any EU defence policy will operate within the provisions of the UN Charter.⁴⁶ Clearly Russia does not wish to see future EU armed forces doing as NATO did in 1999, namely undertake military action without the specific approval of the UN Security Council. At the Russia-EU summit in France in October 2000, it was agreed that the EU would associate Russia with future EU crisis management operations and that Russia and the EU would develop a strategic dialogue on security issues and hold specific consultations on security matters, enlarge the scope of regular consultations on disarmament, weapons control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.⁴⁷ In November 2000, Igor Ivanov said the possibilities of a Russian contribution to future EU crisis management operations would be studied.⁴⁸

The OSCE

Russia continues to argue that the OSCE should become the principal security organisation for Europe, with all other organisations, such as NATO, the EU and WEU operating under its aegis. In April 2000, foreign minister Igor Ivanov repeated the long-standing Russian belief that the OSCE should remain at the centre of Europe's developing security architecture.⁴⁹ Russia has long argued for a European Security Charter to provide the legal basis for determining security arrangements in Europe, and therefore achieved some success when this document was adopted at the OSCE Istanbul summit in November 1999. Russia appears to envisage the OSCE as a form of United Nations Organisation for Europe, with this organisation (along with the UN Security Council) being the sole organisation to sanction the use of military force in Europe. If Moscow succeeds in this objective, she would succeed in reducing NATO's importance as a security organisation and increasing Russia's relevance in managing Europe's security affairs. Whereas Moscow has no voice in NATO, she has an equal voice in the OSCE with all other members, hence her interest in promoting the OSCE. So far however, Moscow has not succeeded in enhancing the OSCE at the expense of NATO.⁵⁰

The 2000 foreign policy concept expresses concern at the tendency for the OSCE to focus on the former Soviet Union and the Balkans. It presumably regards this tendency as western inspired. The concept does not give any examples of security problems elsewhere in Europe where the OSCE could become involved.

The CFE treaty was amended at the OSCE summit in Istanbul in November 1999, and will be reviewed in May 2001. In November 2000, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the signing of the original CFE treaty in Paris in November 1990, Putin called for the amended version to be quickly ratified.⁵¹

RUSSIA'S ASIAN DIMENSION

Russia's sees the Asia-Pacific region as an important area of interest, and as economically important for the development of the Russian Far East. There is also a security concern. This is posed by the US military presence in the region, in particular the US alliances with Japan and South Korea. The possibility of a US-Japanese theatre missile defence system concerns Moscow, and the Kurile Islands territorial dispute remains a bone of contention in Russo-Japanese relations. There is a clear desire to see US power and influence in the region reduced. Security Council secretary Sergey Ivanov outlined the Russian perspective on the Asia-Pacific region in April 2000:

In the situation where there are attempts to squeeze out our country from the European military-political space, Russia intends to develop cooperation with Asian countries. In the short and medium term, regional security will continue to depend directly upon the balance of power between the main poles, ie the USA, China, Japan, Russia, ASEAN countries and India. From this organically follows that the natural vector of development of international relations in the Asia-Pacific region is multipolarity. None of the states, and that includes the USA, have the right of deciding vote here.⁵²

In November 2000, Putin described the Asia Pacific region as the "common home" of Russia and her Asia Pacific neighbours, so repeating the concept that was used by Gorbachev in relation to Europe to develop a rapprochement with that continent. By applying the concept to the Asia-Pacific region, Putin makes clear Russia's desire for a close relationship with the states of this region.⁵³

The 2000 Foreign Policy Concept sees China and India as Russia's two main partners in Asia. In December 1998, then Russian prime minister Yevgenny Primakov spoke out in favour of the formation of a Russo-Chinese-Indian strategic triangle.⁵⁴ This would not be a full-fledged alliance, but would presumably act as some counter to US unipolarity. No strategic triangle has yet formed between these three states, but the idea still finds favour with the Russian leadership. In November 2000, when visiting Beijing, Russian prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov said in reply to a journalist that Russia was prepared to back the creation of a strategic Moscow-Beijing-Delhi axis "should China and India express the desire for one."⁵⁵

CHINA

Russia's relationship with China improved steadily throughout the 1990s, and looks set to continue. Although a formal alliance between the two states is currently unlikely, they both share similar perspectives on the current international system. The 2000 Foreign Policy Concept states:

The concurrence of the fundamental approaches of Russia and the People's Republic of China to the key issues of world politics is one of the basic mainstays of regional and global stability. Russia seeks to develop mutually advantageous cooperation with China in all areas. The main task is, as before, bringing the scale of economic interaction in conformity with the level of political relations.

Moscow and Beijing consider each other to be strategic partners, and this strategic partnership opposes a unipolar and advocates a multipolar international system. An agreement to this effect was signed when Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Russia in April 1997.⁵⁶ Russo-Chinese strategic partnership is therefore largely an attempt to counter the post-Cold War foreign policy role assumed by the USA, and so can be regarded as having an anti-US direction. Russia and China share identical views on NATO widening, and the more ambitious role envisaged for NATO in its 1999 Strategic Concept. In February 2000, when Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan visited Moscow, his Russian counterpart Igor Ivanov stated that both Russia and China opposed the concept of humanitarian intervention used to justify NATO's Operation Allied Force against Yugoslavia in 1999.⁵⁷ They both oppose the US desire to amend the 1972 ABM treaty and to develop a National Missile Defence system. Both states oppose the US use of force against Iraq. They have developed a cooperative relationship in Central Asia through the Shanghai Five (an association of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan), where both sides have a common interest in opposing Islamic extremism. China has supported Russia's stance on Chechnya, whilst Russia has supported China's view on the Taiwan question. In February 2000, the MFA criticised the US Congress' support for strengthening Taiwan's military potential.

Russo-Chinese Strategic Partnership

What does strategic partnership signify in reality? The clearest manifestation can be seen in what Russia calls military-technical cooperation, in other words arms sales. Russia sees China as one of its largest markets for arms. In January 2000, deputy prime minister Ilya Klebanov said that China and India are Russia's main partners in military technical cooperation, and would account in 2000 for over 50% of its volume.⁵⁸

Since 1998, Russia has become increasingly willing to sell China high-tech weapons systems. Russia has agreed to sell China SU-30 fighters and SS-N-22 anti-ship missiles. Russia has earlier sold China control and guidance systems for its nuclear Dong Feng missiles (DF-31 and DF-41). Russia is also helping China develop a new generation of Chinese SSNs and SSBNs. There are also reports of Russia selling China parts for its mobile SS-24 and SS-25 TELs (transporter, erector, launchers for nuclear missiles). These arms sales enhance Chinese military power vis-à-vis the USA, a fact of which Moscow is well aware. In addition the Russian and Chinese navies held joint exercises in 1999.⁵⁹

As noted above, both Moscow and Beijing are firmly opposed to US plans to develop a missile defence system and to seek an amendment of the 1972 ABM treaty. They are also critical of US attempts to develop an anti-missile system in Asia. Moscow and Beijing have been holding consultations on this problem since at least March 1999. During Putin's visit to China in July 2000, he and his Chinese counterpart President Jiang Zemin issued a joint statement on the ABM treaty, affirming their belief in the importance of this treaty and expressing opposition to US attitudes about amending the treaty or establishing a theatre anti-missile system in Asia. During the visit Putin stated that:

If that treaty [ie the ABM treaty] is broken, if any of the sides unilaterally opts out of that treaty then this balance will be upset. Of course, some kind of reaction will ensue. I think both Russia and such a large and powerful state as China will not remain on the sidelines in this situation, and they

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*will strive to make sure that this balance is restored. We are still working with the People's Republic of China today in the area of military-technical cooperation. How far this cooperation will go will depend on the circumstances. Therefore, it is now premature to talk about this. It is clear, however, that a reaction will ensue.*⁶⁰

In October 2000, Leonid Ivashov said that Russia believed that the establishment in Asia of a US-Japanese system for antimissile defence of the theatre of military action would promote destabilization of the situation in the Asia-Pacific Region and would lead to regional "bloc confrontation". He went to say that Russia's more vigorous military cooperation with China, which has the purpose of creating a regional balance of forces, could act as a "certain counterbalance" to the Japanese-US plans to develop such a system of theatre antimissile defence.⁶¹

Putin's Visit - July 2000

Putin visited China in mid-July 2000 just before attending the G8 summit in Okinawa. By all accounts the visit was successful.⁶² A total of nine agreements were signed concerning banking, education and energy cooperation. In the sphere of energy, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on approving certain designated companies from Republic of Korea to participate in the feasibility study of a gas pipeline project in Russia's Irkutsk was signed by the natural petroleum gas working groups of China and Russia. Another MOU was signed by the China National Petroleum Corporation (group), the Russian Energy Ministry, a Russian pipeline company and the YUKOS Oil Corporation of Russia on the feasibility study of an oil pipeline project between China and Russia. In addition to the agreement and the two MOUs, a Sales and Purchases Contract on 300,000 tonnes of West Siberia Light Oil between the China United Oil Corporation and YUKOS Oil Corporation was also signed. A fast-neutron cycle reactor will be built in the Beijing nuclear power institute with Russia's assistance.

Putin's visit underlined the success of a strategic partnership that has been developing since the mid-1990s. After the visit it was announced that Russia and China plan to conclude a friendship and cooperation treaty, that would presumably symbolise the close relationship between the two states.

Following on from Putin's visit, prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov visited China in November 2000. Fourteen agreements were signed, including a commercial agreement for 2001-2005.⁶³ During his visit, Kasyanov said that Moscow and Beijing were discussing the possibility of agreements on the construction of two gas pipelines from Russia to China. The first pipeline would start in western Siberia and end in China's western provinces. The second would carry gas from the Kovykta field in Irkutsk Region of Russia to China and onwards to South Korea.

It should be noted, however, that China is very much the stronger partner in this relationship and for all her serious disagreements with the USA, her economic ties with the USA are more important for her than her economic ties with Russia. In 1999, China-US trade turnover was \$69,455,000,000. China's trade turnover with Russia was \$5,333,000,000.⁶⁴ China's economic penetration of Central Asia is arguably a potential threat to Russian interests in the region, and illegal Chinese immigration into the Russian Far East is also arguably a security threat. In July 2000, Putin warned of the danger of the Russian Far East ending up speaking Chinese, Korean and Japanese, suggesting a possible concern over Chinese

penetration. Russia's increasing willingness to arm China may backfire in the long-term, as China could become a possible future security threat to Russia.

Nevertheless, a close Russo-Chinese strategic partnership is one the principal features of the international system in the opening decade of the 21st century. This partnership has a distinct anti-US direction. Any future US or NATO military intervention on lines similar to Operation Allied Force or an abandonment of the ABM treaty could intensify Russo-Chinese strategic cooperation further and push it towards a quasi-alliance that could challenge the USA over issues relating to strategic stability and arms control, US interests in the Asia-Pacific region and intervention in regional conflicts.

INDIA

India is Russia's other major partner in Asia. A close cooperative relationship developed during the 1990s, which followed on from the cordial Soviet-Indian relationship, and has continued since Putin's accession to power. In April 2000, Security Council secretary Sergey Ivanov visited India and signed a document on security cooperation with the head of the Indian prime minister's office, Bradjesh Mishra.⁶⁵ The agreement envisages the broadening of Russian-Indian interaction in the area of international security, combating international terrorism and religious fundamentalism. The document stipulates the creation of bilateral working groups which are to exchange information on strategic stability, plans of military development in Russia and India, and to help coordinate the actions of the two states in the international arena in combating terrorism and religious extremism. From Ivanov's visit, it was apparent that both states have similar perspectives on the ABM issue, Chechnya, Kashmir and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The similarity in geopolitical perspective is complemented by both states' desire to develop their economic relationship. In January 2000 Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko visited India for the sixth session of the Russo-Indian intergovernmental commission for trade, economic, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation.⁶⁶ Trade in 1999 increased by nearly 30 per cent and, according to preliminary estimates, amounted to 1.4bn dollars. In September 2000, it was reported that Russo-Indian trade for the first six months of 2000 made up 732m dollars, a 20% increase on the second six months of 1999. Trade has declined drastically since the early 1990s, but it has shown signs of beginning to expand.

Khristenko noted that tenders were won by Russian companies to develop gas deposits on the Indian shelf in the Bay of Bengal and by Russian companies to deliver coal-extraction equipment to India. Khristenko signed a protocol with Indian finance minister Yashwant Sinha on cooperation in civil aviation and, in particular, agreed to set up a joint working group. The Russian side suggested that its aircraft be used in the Indian transport market, including the Il-114, Tu-204, Il-214 and all kinds of helicopters.

In March 2000 Russian minister of Atomic Energy Yevgenny Adamov said that contracts would be signed with India at the end of 2000 or beginning of 2001 for the construction of five more nuclear energy blocks. In September 2000, a delegation of the Confederation of Indian Industrialists visited Russia. The delegation discussed with deputy prime minister Ilya Klebanov developing cooperation in the area of software. Klebanov said that Russia and India may shortly set up an intergovernmental commission on this subject.

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Another major development in Russo-Indian relations occurred in September 2000, with the conclusion in St Petersburg of a 10 year Russo-Indian-Iranian agreement to create a North-South transport corridor involving Russia, India, Iran and Oman. The agreement was signed by Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, Indian Surface Transport Minister Rajnath Singh and Iranian Roads and Transport Minister Mahmud Hojjati. An expert from the Russian Ministry of Transport said that the creation of the North-South transport corridor involving Russia, India, Iran and Oman would reduce the time needed for the transport of goods from India to Moscow or Helsinki to 21-23 days (transport via the Suez canal currently takes 35-40 days). The main goal of the agreement is to increase the efficiency of passenger and goods transport via international transport corridors. It also ensures that the countries involved will have access to markets in railway, highway, river and air transport services. It is expected that the corridor will link the littoral countries of the Indian Ocean with northwestern Europe via Iran, the Caspian region and Russia.⁶⁷

Putin's visit to India in October has been the highpoint of the Russo-Indian relationship in 2000.⁶⁸ During this visit a Declaration of Strategic Partnership was signed, in which both parties affirmed their support for a multipolar international system. It is also intended to have annual summit meetings. The agreement emphasises that the Strategic Partnership is not an alliance, and is not directed against any third country. Putin promised to support India becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council. A total of sixteen agreements were signed during Putin's visit. They include:

- a long-term programme of scientific and technical links between the years 2001 and 2010;
- an agreement on cooperation in agriculture;
- an agreement on legal aid and legal relations in civil and commercial dealings;
- an agreement on post office mail communications;
- a programme of contacts in culture, science and education;
- a production-sharing agreement on the project "Prospecting for, and development of, block 26 in the Bay of Bengal";
- an intergovernmental agreement on mutual guarantees of safety for secret documents;
- a protocol of intent to cooperate in the fields of trade, diamond cutting and deals connected with precious metals.

It was also decided to set up a Russian-Indian commission on military-technical cooperation "to raise the level of interaction in the defence sphere". Several arms deals, worth \$3 billion, were concluded during the Putin visit. The agreements envisage a contract for the purchase and assembly of 310 T-90 tanks, acquisition of the aircraft carrier *Admiral Gorshkov*, transfer of technology and licensed production of 140 Sukhoi-30 MKI multi-role fighters. In addition, the two sides have reached an agreement on the lease of four Tu-22 Backfire Bombers. India is likely to sign a contract for five more Kamov-31 airborne early warning helicopters for its Navy.⁶⁹

Putin is likely to continue and even intensify the strategic partnership with India that began in the Yel'tsin era. Whilst the relationship is not as close as with China, and lacks the strong anti-US undertone that characterises the Russo-Chinese partnership, India's non-aligned stance benefits a Russia opposed to US dominance of the international system. It is not surprising that Russia is interested in seeing

India become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, as this would mean there would be three powers (Russia, China, and India) that could counter the presence of the three Western permanent members, the USA, Britain and France. However, hopes for a close Russo-Chinese-Indian axis appear premature. Instead Russia has two important bilateral relationships which are likely to remain significant.

JAPAN⁷⁰

Russo-Japanese relations remain bedevilled by the territorial issue between the two states (the Kurile Islands), which in turn means that a peace treaty (ie a treaty to mark the end of World War Two between Moscow and Tokyo) has yet to be concluded. In November 1997 Yel'tsin met then Japanese prime minister Ryutaro Hashimoto at an informal summit in Krasnoyarsk, where they agreed that they would endeavour to resolve the territorial dispute and conclude a peace treaty by December 2000. An agreement on economic cooperation was also reached. In April 1998 Yel'tsin met Hashimoto at Kawana in Japan, where Hashimoto proposed to grant Russia temporary administration over the Kurile Islands as long as Russia agreed to draw a demarcation line between Etorofu, the northernmost island, and Urup, the Russian island.

In November 1998, Japanese prime minister Keizo Obuchi visited Moscow, where he and Yel'tsin signed a declaration confirming the November 1997 Krasnoyarsk agreement. Moscow rejected the Kawana proposal, and instead proposed that Russia and Japan should sign a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation and leave the territorial dispute to future negotiations.

During the G8 summit in Okinawa in July 2000, Putin told prime minister Yoshiro Mori that it would be difficult to conclude a peace treaty by December 2000 if it meant resolving the territorial dispute. He instead proposed postponing a resolution to the dispute.

In September 2000, Putin visited Japan for a bilateral summit with Mori. No real progress was made on concluding a peace treaty due to the impasse over the territorial issue. Putin stated that Russia would abide by all past agreements with Japan, including the 1956 Soviet-Japanese agreement, which stated that Moscow would return the two southern islands of Habomia and Shikotan. Japan repeated the offer made at Kawana in April 1998 of drawing a demarcation line north of the Kurile Islands. This was rejected by Putin who repeated the proposal made in Moscow in November 1998, that Russia and Japan should sign an interim treaty of peace and friendship and continue to negotiate on the territorial issue. This was again rejected by Mori.

It was agreed to try and develop economic cooperation, and the two leaders signed a new cooperation programme to advance the 1997 Hashimoto-Yel'tsin Plan and to stimulate the basic direction of cooperation between Japan and Russia in the trade and economic fields.⁷¹ The main items of the programme are as follows:

- The promotion of trade and establishment of a good investment climate
- The promotion of economic reform in Russia
- The integration of Russia into the international economic system
- The preservation and use of energy, environmental, and biological resources
- Science and technology and space

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- Peaceful use of nuclear energy and support for the destruction of nuclear weapons
- Transport
- Regional-level cooperation (especially between Japan and the Russian Far East and Siberia).

It was agreed to sign a programme for cooperation on the development of joint economic activities on the Kurile Islands.

However the level of economic cooperation between the two states remains low, due largely to the territorial problem and also because the Japanese business community sees the Russian market as unattractive. In 1999, Japan was the tenth largest foreign investor (\$347.2 million) in Russia after Germany, the USA, Britain, France, Cyprus, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden.⁷² In May 2000, the Russian Ambassador to Japan, Aleksandr Panov, stated that there was practically no economic cooperation between Russia and Japan, with the exception of Sakhalin.⁷³ Putin expressed interest in developing natural gas resources in Sakhalin and in building pipelines from Sakhalin to Japan. During the visit, the chairman of the Russian company United Energy Systems, Anatoly Chubays, signed a protocol with the Marubeni corporation and the Sakhalin regional administration on the construction of a power bridge to Japan.

Geopolitically the two sides are in broad agreement, with the exception of the Kurile Islands and over Russian fears that Japan may participate in US plans to set up an antimissile defence system of the Northeast Asia theatre.⁷⁴ Russia supports Japan becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council and Japan supports Russia's attempts to join the World Trade Organisation.

Military contacts do exist between the two states, but they are limited. The Chief of Staff of the Naval Forces Admiral Kosei Fujita visited Russia for talks in February 2000. In September 2000 the Japanese Defence Agency cancelled a visit by a Russian military delegation following the arrest of a Japanese navy officer accused of spying for Russia. However the head of the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency Shogo Arai had successful talks in Moscow in September 2000 with the Director of the Russian Federal Border Guard Service Konstantin Totskiy.

Although relations are cordial, they require a major breakthrough of a peace treaty that will make it possible to speak of a full normalisation. However this would appear to require more flexibility by Moscow on the Kurile Islands issue, which is unlikely, as no Russian leader can afford to be seen as willing to surrender Russian territory. This is a self-inflicted handicap, as Moscow's inflexibility on this issue makes it unlikely that will be able to influence significantly Japan's attitudes on possible cooperation with the USA on developing a theatre missile defence system for Northeastern Asia. Such intransigence is also likely to convince Japan of the continued value of its security treaty with the USA.

THE KOREAS

Russia continues to maintain good political relations with South Korea, seeing her as a valuable economic partner. In October 2000 South Korean prime minister Lee Han-dong visited Russia and had talks with his Russian counterpart Mikhail Kasyanov on economic ties and discussed the construction of the Russian-Korean industrial centre in Nakhodka and cooperation in the development of the Kovyktinskoye gas condensate field.

Security ties have also developed. In February 2000 Russia and South Korea held security talks and in April Valery Manilov and the director general of the South Korea Defence Ministry's military policy directorate, Lt-Gen Cha Young-ku held talks in Moscow to discuss peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. A hotline between the Russian and South Korean defence ministries was set up in May 2000.

Russia's relations with North Korea improved significantly in 2000. They had stagnated since 1990, when Moscow established diplomatic relations with South Korea. However a Russo-North Korean treaty on friendship, good-neighbourliness and cooperation was signed in February 2000 when foreign minister Igor Ivanov visited North Korea, which was ratified and signed into law in the summer. Vladimir Putin visited North Korea in July 2000, which indicated a major improvement in relations between Pyongyang and Moscow.

The improvement in relations is indicative of Russia's desire to become involved in any final settlement of the Korean Question. North Korea's foreign policy is moving towards a détente with both South Korea and the USA, as evidenced by the presidential summit between the two Koreas in June 2000, and the visit of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to North Korea in October 2000, and Russia does not wish to be a bystander if or when there is a final settlement. Moscow is engaged in bilateral talks with the USA on Korea and is also working in the four-party format with North Korea, South Korea, China and the USA. Moscow has welcomed the thaw in relations between the two Koreas and between North Korea and the USA, and has used the thaw to argue that this deprives the USA of a formal pretext for deploying a national antimissile defence system.⁷⁵

Moscow is also interested in possible cooperation with North Korea in the development of nuclear power. In August 2000, Bulat Nigmatulin, Russian vice-minister for atomic energy, said Russia-North Korea cooperation in the field of nuclear power was "possible" with Russia's participation in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Nigmatulin proposed that two Russian nuclear reactors be built in North Korea.

ASEAN & APEC

Russia has continued her previous policy of seeking to develop closer political and economic ties with ASEAN. A Russian delegation headed by deputy prime minister Ilya Klebanov attended the Russia-ASEAN business forum in Malaysia in April 2000, and the Russia-ASEAN joint cooperation committee met in June 2000 in Indonesia to discuss means of developing relations with ASEAN. However, Russia may face problems in her relations with ASEAN due to Russia's non-payment of the fee for the ASEAN-Russia cooperation fund. In July 2000, Igor Ivanov attended the seventh session of the ASEAN regional forum in Bangkok, where he outlined several proposals for developing regional security and expressed opposition to US plans to develop theatre missile defence systems.⁷⁶ Russia is participating in the development of a Charter of Pacific Accord with ASEAN states in order to further develop ties with ASEAN.

Russia also fully participates in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum as part of her policy aim of developing closer economic and political ties with the states of the region, in order to project herself as an Asian power. Russia often

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sees herself as a transport corridor, able to link Europe with Asia and North America. On the eve of the APEC Forum in Brunei in November 2000, Putin wrote:

Russia is a kind of an integration junction, linking Asia, Europe and America. For example, we can offer more than one argument in favour of Asia Pacific using Russian transport routes. They are much shorter and no less safe than the bypass sea routes, in particular one from Yokohama to Rotterdam. Sea containers dispatched to Europe by the Trans-Siberian Railroad would reach their destination in less than half the time... We have favourable conditions for a global communications breakthrough, which would bring the Euro-Atlantic and the Asia-Pacific regions much closer. Few people know that the shortest air route from many Asian countries to North America lies across the Russian air space and on over the North Pole. The time saving per flight is 2-3 hours. This is a vast reserve for making air communications more effective. Our air corridors, and even the Northern Sea Route, can reduce the distance between Asia Pacific and Europe considerably, too. A large part of electronic commodities produced in Asia comes to Russia via Europe. The producers are well aware of corresponding financial outlays and time spent on the customs clearance of cargoes.⁷⁷

Putin also outlined Russia's interest in attracting the states of the Asia-Pacific region to develop Siberia's natural resources:

Siberia has mind-boggling natural resources, and Russia is only beginning to tap them. We invite our Asia Pacific neighbours to actively join in this undertaking. Already now the Russian producers are thinking about new markets for their commodities, while its mining companies are pondering ways to raise the effectiveness of deposits. One proof of this is the elaboration of sweeping plans, such as the creation of an energy bridge from Russia to Japan via Sakhalin, the construction of gas pipelines from the Tomsk Region to Western China and from Irkutsk to Eastern China and on to North and South Korea.⁷⁸

THE MIDDLE EAST⁷⁹

The Middle East had been a priority area for Soviet Union since the mid-1950s. In the early 1990s Russia, due to her internal difficulties, paid relatively little attention to this area. Since the mid 1990s, however, Moscow has begun to pay renewed attention to the Middle East, which is often referred to in Russia as the Near East (*Blizhnyy Vostok*). There are a number of reasons why Russia is likely to regard the Middle East as an important foreign policy priority. One Russian analyst of Middle Eastern affairs has suggested the following Russian interests in the Middle East:

- Stability and predictability of the political and military-political situation in the region and in other regions which border on the Russian Federation and CIS.
- Freedom of passage through straits and guaranteed exits for Russian shipping into the world oceans via the Mediterranean Sea. These freedoms could be jeopardised if a situation arose like that with Iraq, or if littoral states imposed restrictions on freedom of passage for ecological reasons.

- The non-entry of states in the region into alliances which could hypothetically threaten Russia's security and state interests.
- To play a politically significant role in the process of determining the parameters of the security systems in the Middle East and Mediterranean.
- The opportunity to participate in economic development projects of countries of the region, both bilateral and multilateral.
- Access for Russian goods, including military goods, in the markets of the region.
- The active participation of Russia in the formulation of regimes of the open seas and sea bed in the Mediterranean.⁸⁰

The Middle East peace process was given a substantial impetus in October-November 1991, following the conference in Madrid of all Middle Eastern states. At this conference the USA and the USSR were made co-sponsors of the peace process, which proceeded in two basic directions: bilateral and multilateral. The bilateral directions consisted of a number of tracks: Israeli-Palestinian; Israeli-Syrian; Israeli-Lebanese. The multilateral direction consisted of five working groups: arms control; refugees; water resources; economic development; ecological problems.

The two cosponsors (Russia replaced the USSR as cosponsor) offered their good offices to the Middle Eastern states to facilitate progress along both directions. Russia has sought to be even handed between Israel and the Arab states in the search for peace, and like the USA and the rest of the international community, seeks to promote a peace settlement on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Russia has thus acted as a sponsor since 1991, although she took little real interest in the early 1990s. Since the mid-1990s she has taken greater interest. This has been partly prompted by the fear that she may be sidelined by other outside powers active in the region, particularly the USA. This was seen by Yevgeny Primakov's remarks in October 2000, when he warned that the USA could not monopolise mediation attempts in the Middle East, and would have to ask for Russia's assistance.⁸¹ Russia expressed irritation at what she saw as attempts by the USA to sideline her from involvement in attempts to mediate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 2000. She claimed that she was not invited by the USA to the summit at Sharm-al-Shaykh in October 2000 to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.⁸²

The experience of involvement in the region since the mid-1950s has also given Moscow the sense that she has a right to be involved. The close relations she developed with several Arab states during the Cold War arguably gives Moscow a basis for acting as a mediator, and the ending of the hostile relationship with Israel during much of the Soviet period has given Moscow greater opportunities to be acceptable to Israel as a mediator. The increase in emigration of Russian Jews to Israel since the end of the Cold War has probably facilitated the development of closer ties between Russia and Israel. Russia has sought particularly to use the close ties developed with Syria and the PLO during the Soviet era to help promote the normalisation of Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Palestinian relations.

Concern that the USA may be sidelining Russia has pushed Moscow towards revamping its Middle Eastern policy. Russia aims at enhancing her role as a mediator and cosponsor of the Middle East peace process.⁸³ In late October 2000,

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Igor Ivanov proposed a greater role for Russia and the EU as well as the USA in the attempts to promote a settlement. Ivanov stated in November 2000 that he opposed the introduction of any international peacekeeping force into Israel. It should be noted that Russia supports an independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital, and has a strong interest in the future status of Jerusalem, because of the Russian Orthodox Church's role as a protector of the holy places there.⁸⁴

THE GULF

Russia is interested in developing political and economic relations with the Gulf States. Deputy foreign minister and presidential representative on the Middle East Vasily Sredin visited several Gulf states in October-November 2000 to step up Russia's relations there. Moscow continues to argue for Iraq's rehabilitation into the international community, although Russia is careful not to defy the UN line on Iraq. Moscow desires good relations with all Gulf states, and would not risk antagonising them by disregarding their concerns over Iraq. It is possible that she could use her relationship with Iraq to extend her influence with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. If Russia uses her ties with Iraq to persuade Baghdad to reduce tension in her relations with her Gulf neighbours, this would raise Russia's standing in the region, and give credence to her claim to participate in any future Middle Eastern regional security system. In August 2000 Igor Ivanov said Russia was prepared to try to improve Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations.⁸⁵ Moscow continues to criticise US and British air strikes against Iraq. In April 2000 US forces temporarily seized a Russian tanker which it suspected of carrying Iraqi oil.

Igor Ivanov visited Iraq in November 2000 and called for the lifting of sanctions and an improved relationship between the UN and Iraq. However Putin called on Iraq to cooperate with the UN, indicating that Moscow is aware that Iraqi intransigence over its weapons programmes does give the international community cause for concern.

Russia has been critical of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission for Iraq, and said in July 2000 that the new UN monitoring body for Iraq should be accountable to the UN Security Council and not used for protracting sanctions. Russia has been critical of sanctions as they have prevented the development of Russo-Iraqi economic ties. Russian oil companies have signed contracts in Iraq but have been unable to become active there because of the sanctions. Ivanov said in November 2000 that Russia's inability to develop economic relations with Iraq could have cost Moscow \$30 billion.⁸⁶ In September 2000 Aeroflot said it planned to resume flights to Baghdad, which indicates that Russia and Iraq may be moving towards a closer relationship. A large Russian delegation also attended the Baghdad international trade fair in November 2000. Once sanctions are lifted, Russian oil companies will become active in Iraq, and Baghdad is likely to be interested in purchasing Russian arms.

A MIDDLE EAST SECURITY SYSTEM

Russia would ideally like to see an OSCE type regional security system in the Middle East, with Russia playing a full part in such a system. In October 1997, then foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov outlined a codex of behaviour in the sphere of security that could form the basis of a regional security system.⁸⁷ He proposed:

- The need for peaceful negotiations in all the directions of the Middle East peace process.
- The national security of any state in the region cannot be secured by purely military-technical means.
- The security of one state or states cannot be secured at the expense of the security of others, including the settlement of territorial disputes.
- The following countries and regions must be included in the Middle Eastern security zone: Iran, Turkey, North Africa, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, Iraq.
- The security of the countries of the Middle East cannot be based on rival strategic alliances, which rely on external forces and structures.
- International legality is the basis of security and stability: bilateral and international treaties and agreements relating to the Middle East peace process must be observed.
- Decisive opposition to all forms and types of terrorism and extremism, including religious.
- Rejection by the countries of the region of the creation and storing of weapons of mass destruction.
- The mutual reduction of defence budgets of countries of the region with the redistribution of means to the goals of development, including multilateral regional economic cooperation.
- The unconditional mutual respect for the unique cultural and religious heritage of every people, freedom of religious belief for all confessions and the securing of unhindered access to the holy places in Jerusalem and other parts of the region.
- The just resolution of humanitarian problems in the region, including refugee problems.
- The development of regional economic cooperation, in the creation of an integrated economic system for the Middle East.

Russia's dilemma is that she currently lacks sufficient levers to influence significantly the peace process in the Middle East, and therefore to challenge the leading role taken by the USA in the region. Ivanov's revamping of Middle Eastern policy, with its call for a greater role to be played by Russia and the EU in the search for a peace settlement is unlikely to have much impact, as neither the EU nor Russia can offer anything that is likely to boost the prospects for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Neither can Russia successfully challenge the US line on Iraq. She also lacks the economic and military strength to pursue an anti-US policy in the Middle East as she did during the Cold War, even if she wished to do so. If current US attempts to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute fail completely, then this may create opportunities for Russia in the region, although it is difficult to see how Russia could succeed where the US has failed, or to see Russia creating any lasting spheres of influence in the region such as the USSR enjoyed during the Cold War.

IRAN

Russia has developed a cordial relationship with Iran since 1991.⁸⁸ Both Tehran and Moscow have a common interest in opposing US unipolarity. They both oppose the dominant role played by the USA in the post-Cold War international system. Since the early 1990s, Russia has found Iran to be a promising market for arms and certain high technologies, including civil nuclear technology. This has led to concern in the USA, which fears that this could assist Iran in the development of nuclear weapons. These claims are rejected by Moscow, who condemned the US law "On non-proliferation with regard to Iran" signed into law by President Clinton in March 2000. This law enables the USA to impose sanctions against countries suspected of transferring nuclear and rocket technologies to Iran.

Moscow affirmed her determination to continue supplying civil nuclear technologies to Iran. In March 2000 Atomic Energy Minister Yevgenny Adamov said Iran was prepared to sign a deal with Russia for the construction of three more reactors in the nuclear power station in Bushehr. However there have been some signs that Russia has been prepared partly to accommodate the USA's concerns. In September 2000 Yury Bepalko, head of the press service of the Russian ministry of atomic energy, said Russia had agreed to freeze a contract with Iran for the supply of laser equipment for medical and scientific purposes.⁸⁹

Despite these problems Russia will probably continue to supply Iran with various forms of high technology. In October 2000 Security Council Secretary Sergey Ivanov visited Iran. He said that Russian-Iranian cooperation in nuclear energy was fully in keeping with the international norms and requirements of the IAEA. He also said that Russia would supply Iran with defensive arms.⁹⁰ In June 2000 a Russian military delegation visited Iran.⁹¹ This was the first visit by a military delegation since 1991. In November 2000, Russia decided to resume arms sales to Iran, following her decision no longer to continue with the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement under which Russia agreed not to conclude further arms deals with Tehran. This decision indicates Moscow's increasing determination not to comply automatically with US objectives.⁹²

Iran has been mildly critical of Russian policy in Chechnya, but has not permitted the Chechen conflict to sour Russo-Iranian relations. There are also differences on the status of the Caspian Sea, but the Russo-Iranian relationship is overall a good one, and is likely to remain so as both sides have a common perspective on the US role in the international system. Iran has been careful not to offend Russian sensibilities in Central Asia. In June 2000 the Russian MFA stated that Russia and Iran had begun work on drafting a bilateral friendship treaty.⁹³ As noted above, in September 2000 a Russo-Indian-Iranian agreement to create a North-South transport corridor involving Russia, India, Iran and Oman was signed.

AFGHANISTAN

Russia remains deeply hostile to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan due to its recognition of Chechen independence and support for Islamic forces in Tajikistan. Moscow fears that the Taliban wish to export their revolution throughout Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus. Moscow has called for the UN to take a tougher line towards the Taliban, and has sought to cooperate closely with the USA in discussing measures against the Taliban. In June 2000 Igor Ivanov said that a

Russo-US working group had been set up to work out measure to counter the Taliban threat.⁹⁴ Moscow has rendered diplomatic support to the internationally recognised Afghan government and the anti-Taliban northern alliance. There was some discussion in May 2000 of the possibility of Russian airstrikes against Taliban bases in Afghanistan.⁹⁵ Some politicians in Russia have argued that Moscow should develop a dialogue with the Taliban, but this has been rejected by the Putin leadership.⁹⁶ Pakistan's good relations with the Taliban and the Maskhadov leadership in Chechnya have also strained Russo-Pakistani relations.⁹⁷ Recent overtures by Moscow towards Pakistan may be aimed at trying to find a means of developing a dialogue with the Taliban.

AFRICA & LATIN AMERICA

Both these regions remain areas of very low priority for Moscow. Russia has committed forces to the peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone. Trade ties have declined drastically since the collapse of the USSR, as have military ties, although military technical ties have been established between Russia and 15 African states, and about 200 Africans are studying in Russian military academies.⁹⁸

Trade ties with Latin America declined following the collapse of the USSR, although they have been rising since 1994.⁹⁹ In 1999 trade turnover was about \$3 billion, whereas in 1994 it stood at \$1.4 billion. Russia maintains intelligence gathering facilities in Cuba, despite the US Congress passing a bill in July 2000 linking the restructuring of Russia's debt to the Paris Club with the use of Cuban radar facilities. In November 2000 the MFA issued a statement calling on the USA to lift its economic embargo against Cuba, as called for by the UN General Assembly.

CONCLUSIONS

The collapse of the USSR in 1991 resulted in a newly emerged Russia in a state of uncertainty regarding her foreign policy role. Although much has changed since then, Russia still faces much uncertainty over what role and foreign policy ambitions she can realistically pursue.

The new leadership appears to be very much aware of Russia's limited foreign policy resource base. It appears to be mindful of the dangers of overstretch and of excessive geopolitical competition. This argument is conveyed strongly in the new foreign policy concept. There is a strong desire to avoid isolation and the Putin leadership, like its predecessor, considers Russia's full integration into the global economy to be a major priority. The dangers of avoiding globalisation are considered to be greater than the dangers of embracing it.

Full economic and political interaction with the post-Cold War international system does raise several dilemmas for the Russian Federation. This international system is one which is very much dominated by the West, particularly by the USA. As Russia terms it, it is in many ways a unipolar international system. Russia faces the dilemma of becoming integrated into a US dominated system, with possibly only a small degree of influence, or off standing aloof from it, which is likely to be even more detrimental to her, as her views on international and regional security and the international economic system would then be even more likely to be ignored. Russian national pride makes it difficult for Russia to accept her loss of great power

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status, even though she is aware of the limitations of her foreign policy instruments.

Multipolarity has become the concept behind Russia's post-Cold War foreign policy strategy. It offers the best means for an enfeebled Russia to enhance her influence and so partly satisfy great power aspirations. An enhancement of the role of the UN, particularly of the UN Security Council, would also signify an enhancement of Russia's importance in the international system.

A multipolar world signifies a reduction in US power, and thereby a relative increase in Russian power. However, Russia faces the problem of finding the means to bring about the emergence of a multipolar international system. Closer political, economic and military ties with China, India and Iran are significant developments, but have done little to alter fundamentally the structure of the international system. Neither China nor India are currently inclined to form an anti-US axis with Moscow, and a Russo-Iranian alliance would currently be of little benefit to a Russia which does desire a cooperative relationship with Washington on many issues. Such axes would only arguably be of significance if Moscow assumed an aggressive posture towards the West and if China, India and Iran assumed similar postures and decided to cooperate with Moscow, arguably in the same way that Germany, Italy and Japan cooperated in anti-Western pact in the 1930s.

For the moment, however, Russia is not interested in confrontation with the USA. However her desire to strike an independent posture by supplying civil nuclear technology to Iran, along with her decision in November 2000 to lift the embargo on signing new arms contracts with Iran risks aggravating relations with the USA. Furthermore in May 2000 Putin decided to relax the conditions of Yel'tsin's 1992 decree on the supply of nuclear technology to other countries, which allows sales of nuclear technologies and materials to countries whose nuclear programs are not fully monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency, including countries such as Iran and North Korea.¹⁰⁰ This also runs the risk of alienating the USA, as does Putin's acceptance of an invitation to visit Libya.¹⁰¹

Putin appears interested in developing ties with pariah states (he visited both North Korea and Cuba in 2000) as a means of demonstrating to the West (particularly the USA) that Russia will pursue an independent foreign policy. If Russia is to pursue a policy of close relations with pariah states, then she risks marginalising herself internationally. She is aware of this danger, and currently seeks to assure the West that her commercial dealings with such states do not threaten international security. She thus hopes to avoid antagonising the West and deriving commercial benefit from these deals. This so far appears to have worked, but always carries the danger that it may cause friction with the USA. It is however unlikely that the Putin leadership would risk major conflict with the West over such pariah states.

However Russia is still left with the dilemma of what her foreign policy orientation should be. A quasi-alliance with the West (particularly the USA) favoured by the Russian leadership in the early 1990s is not feasible. An overt anti-western foreign policy is also not feasible. One possible orientation may be to pursue a foreign policy akin to that of China, ie a foreign policy that is neither pro nor anti-western, nor seeks any form of close "strategic partnership", but which cooperates with the West where desirable and refuses cooperation where it is felt not to be in Beijing's interest.¹⁰² However the emulation of the Chinese model would be difficult, as it would entail a willingness to stand aloof from the rest of Europe, an option which Moscow does not wish to pursue. It may well be that the Chinese model is suitable

only for an authoritarian state that does not desire close political integration with its neighbours.

However, it should be noted that the structure of what may be termed the Western community of states may be changing. The development of the EU over the next few decades towards a form of either federation or confederation may alter the whole structure of Transatlantic relations, and result in a Europe less closely tied with the USA. If this tendency develops, Russia will exploit it. She strongly desires the decline of Atlanticism. Igor Ivanov has stated that the main mass of her external interests lies in Europe, and that Russia's aim is a stable, long-term and equal relationship with the EU.¹⁰³ If this goal is achieved, then Russia may have achieved a major success and perhaps finally defined for herself a post-communist foreign policy role. From this fundamental orientation of being a strategic partner or even quasi-confederal partner of the EU, other things could follow: cooperation with the USA on certain areas such as strategic arms control and managing regional conflicts (possibly with the EU as a third partner in these processes); becoming a major transport corridor between Europe and Asia (and the corresponding development of a common home in both Europe and the Asia Pacific region); the development of strategic partnership with the China and India, and the development of economic relations with the Asia-Pacific region.

Russia's development of the European option and becoming part of a Greater Europe with the EU is only in its early stages. The Russia-EU PCA has only been in force since 1997, and the EU's strategy towards Russia was only proclaimed in June 1999. There is therefore a long way to go before one can speak of Russia being an integral part of a united Europe. However if this scenario is eventually realised, then Russia may have found herself a post-Soviet foreign policy role that suits her self-perception as a major power. A close Russia-EU partnership could even significantly enhance her ambition of bringing about a multipolar international system. Failure to develop a close equal partnership with Europe would be a major blow for Russian policy. It would leave Russia in her current state, frustrated at US led western unipolarity which reduces Russian relevance as a major shaper of the international system, and seeking strategic partnerships (or quasi-alliances) in Asia that have so far proved to be of limited value.

ENDNOTES

¹ Both documents can be found in Russian on the website of the Russian Federation Security Council. The National Security Concept:

<http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/24-1.html>

The Foreign Policy Concept: <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/07-10.html>

² *Russia on the threshold of a new millennium*, is reprinted in Vladimir Putin, *First Person*, London, Hutchinson, 2000, p209-219.

³ See the essay by foreign minister Igor Ivanov, *Vneshnyaya politika Rossii na sovremennom etape*, http://www.mid.ru/mid/iv_policy.htm, where he argues the need for Russia to pursue a pragmatic foreign policy with limited objectives due to the limited nature of her foreign policy resources.

⁴ V Lukov, 'Russia's security challenges,' *International Affairs*, 1, 1997, p14-15. This is the English language version of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs periodical *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*.

⁵ This view appears in Chapter Nine of the report of the US House of Representatives Report entitled *Russia's Road to Corruption: How the Clinton Administration Exported Government instead of Free Enterprise and failed the Russian People*, September 2000. <http://www.house.gov/republican-policy/russia> Note this report was produced by the

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Republican Party in the US House of Representatives and is therefore partisan. This report will henceforward be referred to as The Cox Report, after the chairman of the US House of Representatives' Speaker's Advisory Group on Russia, the Hon. Christopher Cox.

⁶ See Vadim Solov'yev, 'The Russian Federation strategy concerns the West,' Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 January 2000.

⁷ Russia's Development Strategy to 2010 can be found at <http://www.russianembassy.org>

⁸ See Sergey Rogov's two articles on US-Russian relations, '*Sopernichestvo ili sotrudnichestvo*', Svobodnaya Mysl, Nos 9 & 10, 2000.

⁹ See BBC Summary of World Broadcasts Former Soviet Union (SWB), SU 3997, 14 November 2000.

¹⁰ For the US-Russian statement on strategic stability, see SWB, SU3859, 6 June 2000.
¹¹ SWB, SU3803, 31 March 2000.

¹² See The Cox Report fn 5, Chapter 10.

¹³ See the reference in SWB, SU3824, 26 April 2000.

¹⁴ SWB, SU3857, 3 June 2000.

¹⁵ SWB, SU3828, 1 May 2000.

¹⁶ ITAR-TASS, 4 June 2000.

¹⁷ SWB, SU3864, 12 June 2000.

¹⁸ SWB, SU3869, 17 June 2000

¹⁹ SWB, SU3852, 29 May 2000.

²⁰ SWB, SU3860, 7 June 2000.

²¹ See Sergey Rogov Svobodnaya Mysl op cit. The article in issue No 9 discusses economic relations.

²² Marianna Belenkaya, Andrey Pravov, 'There would have been no reason to go, but it is an insult not to get an invitation', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 17 October 2000.

²³ SWB, SU3853, 30 May 2000.

²⁴ SWB, SU3983 28 October 2000.

²⁵ See Igor Ivanov, *Vneshnyaya politika Rossii na sovremennom etape*, http://www.mid.ru/mid/Iv_policy.htm

²⁶ SWB, SU3822, 24 April 2000.

²⁷ See M A Smith 'The Second Chechen War: Foreign Reaction and Russian Counter-
Reaction,' in The Second Chechen War, edited by Anne Aldis, Conflict Studies Research
Centre, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, The Occasional, No 40, September 2000,
p129-141.

²⁸ See Boris Yel'tsin Midnight Diaries, London, Weidenfield and Nicholson, 2000, p147-
150 on the formation of the Russo-German-French triangle. He said that this triangle was
not intended to threaten Atlantic solidarity, but that it was also "needed to oppose the
American pressure."

²⁹ SWB, SU3726, 24 December 1999.

³⁰ SWB, SU3694, 17 November 1999.

³¹ SWB, SU3680, 1 November 1999.

³² SWB, SU3752, 1 February 2000.

³³ SWB, SU3762, 12 February 2000.

³⁴ SWB, SU3766, 17 February 2000.

³⁵ SWB, SU3763, 14 February 2000.

³⁶ SWB, SU3783, 8 March 2000.

³⁷ SWB, SU3766, 17 February 2000.

³⁸ SWB, SU3694, 17 November 1999.

³⁹ SWB, SU3983, 28 October 2000.

⁴⁰ SWB, SU3985, 31 October 2000.

⁴¹ http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/pca_legal/index.htm

⁴² These documents can be found at:

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/common_strategy/index.htm

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/russian_medium_term_strategy/index.htm

⁴³ See <http://presidency.finland.fi> for text of the conclusions of the summit outlining the details of the planned rapid reaction force.

⁴⁴ The hostility of a significant part of the Russian foreign policy elite to Atlanticism should not be underestimated. Note the apocalyptic comments by Vladimir Sokolenko, a head of a department of the General Secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1999. He wrote: The monopoly on global dominance enjoyed by the Atlantic civilisation with the United States at its pinnacle spawns a mentality of infallibility and permissiveness, and creates an illusion of absolute power, which in itself is a prelude to degradation and ultimate collapse. See V Sokolenko, 'The civilised expansion of Atlanticism', *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, 5, 1999, p28.

⁴⁵ For the MOD's comments see SWB SU3712, 8 December 1999. Note also that on 22 December 1999 the head of the Defence Ministry's Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation, Col-Gen Leonid Ivashov said that Russia would consider different forms of cooperation with the European corps if this military-political structure seeks to reduce NATO's role and does not add to its potential. See SWB SU3726, 24 December 1999. For Kvashnin's comments, see SWB, SU3694, 17 November 1999.

⁴⁶ See the comments to this effect by Russian envoy to the EU, Vasily Likachev in SWB, SU3853, 30 May 2000.

⁴⁷ Peter Norman, 'EU, Russia move to strengthen energy and security ties', *Financial Times*, 31 October 2000.

⁴⁸ See the speech by Igor Ivanov at the European Forum in Berlin 25 November 2000 on the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, <http://www.mid.ru> See also Haig Simonian, 'Russia seeks stronger ties with EU', *Financial Times*, 27 November 2000.

⁴⁹ SWB, SU3816, 15 April 2000.

⁵⁰ For a discussion of Russian attitudes towards European Security, see Mark Webber, 'A Tale of a Decade: European Security Governance and Russia,' *European Security*, 9, 2 (Summer 2000), p31-60.

⁵¹ SWB, SU4003, 20 November 2000.

⁵² SWB, SU3822, 24 April 2000.

⁵³ Vladimir Putin, 'Russia: New eastern prospects,' *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 14 November 2000.

⁵⁴ See Dmitry Gornostayev, Sergey Sokut, 'The new punitive action against Iraq culminates in a crisis of international relations,' *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 22 December 1998.

⁵⁵ SWB, SU3989, 4 November 2000.

⁵⁶ SWB, SU2901, 24 April 1997.

⁵⁷ SWB, SU3778, 2 March 2000.

⁵⁸ SWB, SU3753, 2 February 2000.

⁵⁹ For details of arms sales see Stephen Blank, 'The Strategic Consequences of Russo-Chinese relations,' Conflict Studies Research Centre, RMA Sandhurst, F68, September 1999, p9-11. Blank refers to the naval exercises on p10.

⁶⁰ NTV International, 18 July 2000

⁶¹ SWB, SU3975, 19 October 2000.

⁶² For coverage of the trip and details of agreements, see SWB, SU3896, 18 July 2000 and SWB, SU3897, 19 July 2000.

⁶³ SWB, SU3989, 4 November 2000.

⁶⁴ IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Quarterly, June 2000, p77.

⁶⁵ SWB, SU3828, 1 May 2000.

⁶⁶ SWB, SU3739, 17 January 2000.

⁶⁷ SWB, SU3945, 14 September 2000.

⁶⁸ For the Declaration of Strategic Partnership and details of economic agreements signed during Putin's visit, see the Indian Ministry of External Affairs website <http://w3.meadev.gov.in/russianpresident-visit.htm>

⁶⁹ See Dinesh Kumar, 'India, Russia ink \$3 billion defence deals,' *Times of India*, 5 October 2000 <http://www.timesofindia.com>

⁷⁰ See Japanese foreign ministry website

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/index.html> for an overview of contemporary Russo-Japanese relations, and for statements issued during the visit of Vladimir Putin to Japan in September 2000.

⁷¹ See 'Mori-Putin talks stay at impasse,' *Japan Times*, 5 September 2000, and 'Mori, Putin make little progress', *ibid*, 6 September 2000.

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- 72 See Andrey Maksimov and Andrey Rodionov, 'The drifting continents,' Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4 May 2000, Dip'kur'yer No 8.
- 73 See Aleksandr Panov, 'Success or deadend?' Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 May 2000, Dip'kur'yer No 9.
- 74 ITAR-TASS, 8 September 2000.
- 75 See Igor Ivanov's comments SWB, SU3815, 14 April 2000.
- 76 ITAR-TASS, 27 July 2000.
- 77 Vladimir Putin Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14 November 2000.
- 78 Ibid.
- 79 For a useful overview of Russian policy towards the Middle East since 1991, see Talal Nizameddin, Russia and the Middle East: Towards a new foreign policy, London, Hurst & Co, 1999.
- 80 A Baklanov, Blizhnyy Vostok: regional'naya bezopastnost' i interesy Rossii, Tsentr Mezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniy MGIMO, No 15, 1999, p7-8.
- 81 SWB, SU3983, 28 October 2000.
- 82 See fn 22.
- 83 SWB, SU3979, 24 October 2000.
- 84 See T Nosenko, 'Radelenny gorod Ierusalim', Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', 5, 1999, p38-39 for a discussion of Russian interests in Jerusalem relative to the holy places. Note the comments of former foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov in Gody v bolshoy politiki, Moscow, Sovershenno Sekretno, 2000, p.383. During Primakov's second visit to Israel as foreign minister, the Israeli government presented him with documents concerning the transfer to the Russian state of the cathedral of the Holy Trinity, which previously belonged to the Russian spiritual mission in Palestine.
- 85 SWB, SU3933, 31 August 2000.
- 86 SWB, SU4004, 22 November 2000.
- 87 Diplomaticheskii Vestnik, No 11, 1997, p27-28.
- 88 Galia Golan, 'Russia and Iran: A Strategic Partnership?', Discussion Paper No 75, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998.
- 89 SWB, SU3953, 23 September 2000.
- 90 SWB, SU3977, 21 October 2000.
- 91 SWB, SU3881, 1 July 2000.
- 92 SWB, 27 November 2000.
- 93 SWB, SU3882, 3 July 2000.
- 94 SWB, SU3863, 10 June 2000.
- 95 Igor Ivanov confirmed that air strikes may be launched against the Taliban. See SWB, SU3849, 25 May 2000. Sergey Ivanov also said strikes were possible. See SWB, SU3851, 27 May 2000.
- 96 Former chairman of the Duma International Affairs Committee Vladimir Lukin argued in September 2000 (SWB, SU3958, 29 September 2000) that Moscow should develop a dialogue with the Taliban, and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy called for recognising the Taliban regime also in September (SWB, SU3958, 29 September 2000). However deputy foreign minister Aleksandr Losyukov ruled out any recognition of the Taliban. See SWB, SU3957, 28 September 2000. Sergey Ivanov said in November 2000 he opposed any negotiations with the Taliban (SWB, SU3994, 10 November 2000).
- 97 See the comments by deputy foreign minister Aleksandr Losyukov SWB, SU3960, 2 October 2000.
- 98 V Lopatov, 'Vozmozhnosti Rossii v Afrike', Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', 5, 2000, p57-65.
- 99 See the round table discussion on Russo-Latin American relations in the Dipkur'yer supplement No 10 in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1 June 2000.
- 100 The Cox Report, Chapter 9.
- 101 SWB, SU3908, 2 August 2000.
- 102 See A Torkunov, rektor of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 'Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya posle Kosovskogo krizisa', Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', 1, 2000, p47. Torkunov advocates a foreign policy which is neither anti-western (he opposes forming alliances with anti-western pariah states) nor pro-western, but one instead based on a hardheaded view of Russian national interests. He says that China's recent foreign policy experience could be of especial interest

to Russia, so strongly implying that Russia's relationship with the West should resemble that of China.

¹⁰³ See I S Ivanov, 'Vneshnyaya Politika Rossii na sovremennom etape,' http://www.mid.ru/mid/Iv_policy.htm See also his speech at the European Forum in Berlin, fn 48.

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