THE VOICE OF SOUTH AFRICA

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	5
INTERNATIONAL RADIO COMMUNICATION	6
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Shortwave Technique	10
VOICE OF SOUTH AFRICA: A MEANS TO INFLUENCE THE OUTSIDE WORLD	15
Background	15
The Establishing of a Station	17
Multifarious Operation	20
Target Areas And Programme Time	22
From Six to Nine Languages	28
Radio Programming	29
Active Contacts with the Audience	32
Afrikaans On the Air	35
Radio "Export"	36
THE SOUTH AFRICAN VOICE	40
Changed Policy	43
NOTES	47
SOURCES AND LITERATURE	54

FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure	1.	Some Important Shortwave Nations. 1960 and 1970	8
Figure	2.	Possession of Radio Receivers. 1969	11
Figure	3.	Advantages And Disadvantages of the Shortwave Technique	13
Figure	4.	South African Panorama. 1962-1972	16
Figure	5.	South Africa's External Shortwave Services. 1953-1971	21
Figure	6.	The External Service of SABC	23
Figure	7.	Shares of Various Languages in Transmission Time. 1967 and 1971	30
Figure	8.	Number of Screenings On American TV of RSA Department of Information Films	45
Figure	9.	Number of Screenings of RSA Films in USA (Not On TV)	46
Table 1	r	Target Areas. 1967 and 1971	26
Table 2		Types of Programmes. 1970	33
Table 3		Contacts With Listeners	34
Table 4	1.	Attendants To Radio Course in Afrikaans	37
Table 5	5.	Transcription Service. 1968-1972	39
Table 6	5.	The Ranking of the Voice of South Africa in Some Popularity Polls	42

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this report is briefly to make a survey of one of the techniques which the government of South Africa is employing in order to project abroad its own image of the prevailing conditions in the country. The Voice of South Africa, the South African shortwave station, has so far been the object of very little systematic research. In fact the information about the station has never been put together to any form of a general picture.

The space of time primarily analysed is 1967-1971. In principle the findings as reported should be relevant also today. In 1974 it is however said that the authorities have decided partly to reduce the operation of the Voice of South Africa. Some possible explanations of this decision are given in the concluding chapter of the report.

This survey has been undertaken within a research project on Southern Africa at the Institute of Political Science, University of Göteborg.

The aim of the analysis is to make clear the political motives of the South African propagandist. In that connection the very contents of the transmissions have been of minor interest. Instead, the ambition has been to give a general picture of the methods, the motives, the target groups, and the programme contents of the station.

The manuscript has been read by several people who have made useful comments. I should like to mention especially Rutger Lindahl, Lennart Weibull and Jörgen Westerståhl. No one of the persons mentioned, however, are responsible for the contents or the conclusions of the report. A hard work has indeed been done by Jaak Talvend, the translator.

INTERNATIONAL RADIO COMMUNICATION

The broadcasting media are supplying large groups of listeners not only with news and entertainment. To a great extent they have also come to work for the cause of different kinds of propaganda. There the aim is ultimately to influence listeners in a certain direction. The propaganda department of the Vatican, established at the beginning of the 17th century, is now for instance using shortwave transmissions as one among several techniques for carrying out the missionary command of St. Matthew. To a still greater extent political agitation is making use of the broadcasting medium. Through systematic indoctrination and other techniques the population of one's own country can be made to approve of the ruling ideology. However, the broadcasting medium also plays a positive role in several countries. In the materially poor states the radio may be an important way of mobilizing the population in Nation Building.

During the post-war period many states, and by no means only those belonging to the powerful parts of the world, have been trying to reach people outside the borders of their own countries, too, through the broadcast medium. Through it they want to reach out with a propaganda message of some sort. The motives of the transmissions differ. In some cases the aim is primarily to disseminate knowledge about one's own country which one considers to be too little known in the outside world. Sometimes the transmissions aim at neutralizing and correcting the image of the broadcasting country which has been projected by another state. Then again the shortwave broadcasts are used in order to disseminate a certain political ideology through the ether lanes to the citizens of other nations.

During World War II systematic shortwave transmissions were put to the test in an international context.¹⁾ It was the Fascist propagandists who first used the broadcast medium for duping people in the countries already enslaved and the areas not yet "liberated".²⁾ As is well known the post-war period has meant neither peace nor settlements of the ideological confrontations in the world. Numerous

states, new ones as well as old ones, have procured well oiled propaganda machineries where the shortwave transmissions aimed at an international audience constitute one cog. At bottom the development within the ether communication field is a token of the frictions among the nations of the world.

Between 1950 and 1970, twenty-seven countries - originators of nearly all international shortwave communication - increased their total transmissions from 3 222 hours per week to 12 313 hours. 3 During the nineteen fifties, the decade of the "cold war", the total transmission time of shortwave radio increased by 131 %. The growth was slower, or 65 %, in the sixties.

Not quite unexpectedly the Soviet Union and its satellite states, the People's Republic of China, and the USA with its more or less closely allied countries are the parties who dominate the ether lanes. The two super powers justify their own policy and try to discredit that of their antagonist through the broadcast medium, too. Intermittently there is relaxation in the relations between the blocs and during such periods, today named detente, the tone of the propaganda disseminated through the ether lanes is rather often changed.

But international shortwave transmissions are by no means reserved for a few states only. Many other countries have acquired substantial resources within that field. Thus in the nineteen sixties the People's Republic of China and Albania expanded their shortwave transmissions considerably. Of course this is connected with the aspirations of the two countries of being the sole and true representative of international socialism.

During the first half of the nineteen sixties Ghana tried to assume the responsibility for and the leadership of Panafricanism. (4) The external propaganda activities of the country were the target of a notable expansion, and among other things a shortwave station was constructed. When Dr. Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966 the ambitions of standing out as the leading state of the continent abated.

Figure 1 SOME IMPORTANT SHORTWAVE NATIONS 1960 AND 1970

NUMBER OF	INCREASE OF TRANS-	COUNTRY	TRANSMISSION TIME (hours/week)
LANGUAGES 1970	MISSION TIME 1960-70 (%)		200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
65	88	SOVIET UNION	
34	26	USA	
33	132	PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA	
13	25	EAST-EUROPEAN COMMUNIST STATES	
33	147	WEST GERMANY	
40	23	GREAT BRITAIN	
34	79	EGYPT	
18	673	ALBANIA	
8	1	CUBA	O WASHINGTON TO THE STATE OF TH
7	122	PORTUGAL	
23	28	JAPAN	Language Control of the Control of t
13	-39	FRANCE	No. of the Control of
9	1	GHANA	NATION CONTROL OF THE PROPERTY
7	48	SWEDEN	
6	141	SOUTH AFRICA	

Source: The Right to Know, p. 13 and Sveriges Radios Arsbok 1971, p. 46.

Consequently the extent of shortwave transmission by Ghana carrying propaganda was reduced during the latter part of the decade. On the other hand Egypt, being deeply involved in the Middle East conflict, has gradually acquired ever more resources for broadcasting. Through international shortwave transmissions the elite of the country want to market their viewpoints. Foreign commentators and news agency journalists rather often pick up the Egyptian viewpoints through the shortwave broadcasts of the country.

Of course the motives of states for shortwave broadcasting are not always identical. On the other hand, at the bottom of the broadcasts there often is a wish to give prominence to one's own country or to the social principles one claims to represent. Many younger states among the developing countries are thus using the broadcast medium to strengthen their international position:

"In addition to the giants of the shortwave world, the emergent and newly independent nations have great interest in shortwave broadcasting. They wish to tell their story internationally because they are in a hurry to achieve some sort of status in the world community. Short wave broadcasting provides a quick path." 5)

In the confrontation between Great Powers a small country may consider it its task to bring the world to better order. Sweden is an example of such states. The shortwave transmissions of this country are said to be neutral, but still have a political motive, and they fulfil a vital function:

"It is through its character of a radio voice from a non-aligned state that Radio Sweden has reached a unique position as a radio station... The attitude of the listeners towards Radio Sweden is characterized by confiding expectation; one more or less automatically takes it for granted so to speak that the ether message from neutral Sweden shall also be characterized by a striving for unbiassed thinking...

In our world, so dominated by ideological antagonism and by control over the flow of information, Radio Sweden and other independent radio stations are indispensable." 6)

Even though the motives and the substance of the international shortwave broadcasts differ somewhat, there is a clear picture of the development. The number of transmitters and the total transmission time is increasing quickly. Twenty-five years ago there existed an estimated number of 385 shortwave stations. Today the number is as least 1 400. The power of the transmitters is increasing. Nowadays transmitters with 200 kilowatts of power and more are not unusual. A regular ether war, a power game, is on and at present there is no general evidence of a de-escalation. The struggle is about the listeners of today and tomorrow in the countries of the world.

In a recent report to the president of the USA it was thus estimated that there are around 800 million receiving sets in the world. $^{8)}$ One third of the receivers, still according to this report, are able to tune in to shortwave broadcasts. In 1980 there will be twice as many wireless sets as today. The shortwave audience will thereby double at least in ten years. Much of the future growth will take place in the so called developing countries. In the Third World the new and, due to the advances of transistor technology, cheap receivers create entirely new possibilities for the elite of communicating with the masses of people. This is probably the future prospect which attracts above all the already rich countries and makes them expand their shortwave transmissions further.

Advantages and Disadvantages of the Shortwave Technique

The strong points of the shortwave technique are that ether waves do not need visa, that they have to be declared for customs only in exceptional cases and that they are difficult to deport. 9) So the message of the sender generally reaches the receivers without being restrained by earthly boundaries. The radio also offers a quick and direct contact to the propagandist. As early as one or two hours after a certain event it is possible for the sender to give his version of and to comment on what has occurred. One can

Figure 2
POSSESSION OF RADIO RECEIVERS 1969
(Filled part of bar shows the number able to receive shortwave transmissions)

REGION	NUMBER OF RADIO RECEIVERS (millions)	
LATIN AMERICA/CANADA		24 60
USA	\}	2 275
WESTERN EUROPE		36 112
EASTERN EUROPE		34 110
AFRICA		6,5 12
NEAR EAST/SOUTH EAST ASIA		9,5 17
EAST ASIA (with CHINA)		10 52
OCEANIA		2 7

Source: Material from Shortwave Broadcasting in the 1970's, p. 7.


also address people across the globe almost as easily as people in the very neighbouring country.

For propagandists the new and relatively cheap receiving sets mean attractive prospects of the future. New groups of people can be reached, not least the great and quickly growing masses of the Third World. For several reasons these people may be difficult to reach with the propaganda of the printed word (non-urban living and illiteracy are two circumstances which diminish the service-ableness of the printed word in the developing countries).

From the sender point of view the shortwave technique is relatively cheap to use. Other forms of propaganda demand considerably more resources, the size of the audience being constant. Moreover the radio transmissions make a dialogue with the listeners possible. By reading individual letters from the mail response of the audience the sender can carry on a pseudo-dialogue and thereby among other things strenghten the confidence in his transmissions.

However, there are weak points, too, connected with the shortwave technique, the most important of which are stated in figure 3. Compared to printed propaganda the ether message has a short time of exposure. Printed text can be reread several times, but the radio voice exposes its message only during a very short space of time. A great disadvantage in the shortwave technique is the fact that it is difficult for the audience to find the frequency of the broadcast unless there is exact knowledge about it beforehand. To these weak points one should be added which has been touched upon already, the raging ether war. One effect of it is that the frequency bands contain interference; other stations break into the transmissions. Moreover, in the nature of the broadcast medium lies the difficulty of delimiting fixed target groups. The senders have to take into consideration that in most cases the audience has a disparate composition. Thereby very likely the propagandist's possibilities of influencing certain target groups with one technique and others with another are impaired.

Figure 3
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE SHORTWAVE TECHNIQUE (From the sender point of view)



However, a general summing up of the advantages and disadvantages of shortwave transmissions will indeed give as a result that the former predominate so far. Such an estimation is founded on a "relativistic angle of approach", in other words the shortwave technique is weighed in relation to other existing techniques of disseminating propaganda extensively. Thus the value of the shortwave technique is on several levels. The most important reasons for frequent employment of the technique are summed up by an American shortwave specialist in this way:

"In the field of international relations, high frequency broadcasting plays an important and a unique role. It is the only broadcasting medium capable of direct, universal, personal and immediate communications between the people of the world." 10)

VOICE OF SOUTH AFRICA:
A MEANS TO INFLUENCE THE OUTSIDE WORLD


Background

The Republic of South Africa is one of the states which have added foreign broadcasting to their arsenal of propaganda techniques. Especially in the nineteen sixties conditions were created for such transmissions. The capacity for transmissions was strengthened considerably. The number of target groups and countries to which the broadcasts were beamed was enlarged further. The motive force of these measures was the wish to neutralize the growing negative attitude of the outside world towards the apartheid policy.

Since the National Party came into power in 1948 there has been an aspiration to strengthen the resources for information and propaganda of the government. At the beginning of the nineteen sixties a Department of Information was established, which was independent from an organization point of view. Thereby the government had at its disposal an important and in cource of time ever more powerful instrument for bringing to market the doctrine of "separate development" in front of a domestic as well as a foreign audience. As is well known the criticism of the apartheid policy increased very much in the nineteen sixties. As an important part of its counter-offensive the South African government has employed information and propaganda.

A great number of publications are published today by the South African Department of Information. They are widely circulated and more and more material is made available for interesting and interested people abroad as well as in South Africa. In its simplicity figure 4 shows a more general feature of the propaganda offensive. The Panorama, the costly four-colour periodical, is widely circulated, as appears. During the years 1962 to 1973 the circulation increased from 63 000 copies to 265 000 at each publishing occasion (usually each month). At the beginning of the nineteen seventies the magazine had six language editions, compared to three one decade earlier.





The English edition has been the leading one during the whole period. USA, Great Britain and some other English-speaking countries, so important to South Africa, constitute the main market for the Panorama. However, in absolute as well as in relative figures the French and German editions have considerably extended their markets during the decade. This of course reflects the increasingly important part economically and politically played by France and Western Germany in The South African context. The Panorama example thus illustrates in brief the South African propaganda offensive especially in connection with those countries which are important to South Africa if she is to maintain her present economic position.

The establishing of a shortwave station in the sixties should be seen within the context of a general South African propaganda offensive. Thus the Voice of South Africa is a concrete example amongst others of the ambitions and techniques employed by Pretoria to counter the ever growing criticism of the country's internal policies.

The Establishing of a Station

When, late in the spring of 1963, the South African Parliament discussed the voting of supply for international shortwave broadcasts this was by no means an entirely new item. The country had been using radio transmissions for a considerable time in order to give news from and programmes about South Africa. But till then the broadcasts had been almost entirely concentrated to the African continent. In fact the Africa Service, a section within the South Africa Broadcasting Corporation, produced an abundant supply of programmes and the number of transmitted hours was proportionately large.

For several years the authorities had been considering starting more shortwave broadcast directed at an international audience. They looked upon such broadcasts as a way of disseminating information about South Africa. The broadcast medium was meant to add another technique to

those which were already employed by the authorities to furnish the outside world with particulars about the politics of the country and the conditions of life of the various ethnic groups. For South Africa the international climate had greatly deteriorated, they observed. Around the world, to a growing extent in the western countries as well, the policy of apartheid was being criticized. Several "radical" transmitting stations, foremost among them Radio Cairo, Radio Moscow and Peking Radio, had intensified their attacks on South Africa. This state of affairs underlined the importance of the broadcast medium as a political weapon. Thus the feeling was that a substantial increase in the resources for shortwave broadcasts formed an integral part of a necessary South African counter-offensive.

In the government programme which in all essentials was accepted by the parties in the white Parliament the corner-stone was a new shortwave station composed of four transmitters with a capacity of 250 kilowatts each. 13) The existing 20 kilowatt transmitter would thus be replaced by a station of considerable capacity. 14) Only a few states in the world had such a powerful shortwave station at their disposal at the time. 15) The cost of investment amounted to some 9 million Swedish Crowns (1,5 million US dollars) for the new station, to which amount the annual operating costs are to be added. 16)

The motives behind the support to shortwave broadcasts were shared by the White Government as well as the official Opposition in Parliament. The National Party spokesman described the underlying intentions in the following words:

"The content of those broadcasts will be directed positively at the outside world. It will not be positive propaganda 17) because it is of no avail to try to refute propaganda with propaganda. The SABC will give a positive picture of South Africa as a civilized country...

We shall make the outside world acquainted in a positive way with the fact that we are not, for example, a police state; that we are not, for example, still living in the dark ages ... (and) that there is no slavery here and that one can worship God here in South Africa ...

We shall give the world a positive picture of the fact that we in South Africa are a civilized and highly developed nation. That will be our image ...

The radio is a mighty weapon in one's hands in order to give the outside world a picture of one's country, a picture of our economic might, our country's inherent cultural force, its composition in the cultural sphere, our country's policy. I should not blame the SABC at all if they were, for example, to tell the outside world that every race group in this country receives what is its due, and that it receives this as far as possible. I should not regard that as being propaganda. Nor would I blame the SABC if it were to say that the race groups in our country are living in peace and in orderly communities which are unequalled and incomparable with the rest of the world ..." 18)

Among the white opposition parties the shortwave broadcasts were considered an important way of disseminating the South African propaganda. In fact the broadcast medium was also to become a direct instrument of the country's foreign policy:

"These transmitters will in fact become instruments of our foreign policy; they will be the mirrors in which many people in the emergent countries in Africa will have their first glimpse of South African conditions and of the peoples of South Africa. We know that as far as the African Continent is concerned we are faced with considerable animosity as a result of a great deal of unjustified propaganda about our country ...

It is no use saying that this will not be a propaganda service. Talks will be presented on those services. There will not only be music but talks as well because without talks the service, as a propaganda service to tell the truth about South Africa, is worthless ... 19)

In October 1965 the head of the Government of that time, mr. Hendrik Verwoerd, inaugurated the recently established radio station. In his address the Prime Minister expressed his hope that great numbers of listeners around the world would prove willing to acquaint themselves with the messages of the South African voice. The purpose of the shortwave broadcasts he worded in this way:

"... the primary aim of the External Service would be to present to the world a faithful picture of the South African way of life, and the traditions, growth and ideals of the people of South Africa. The Voice of South Africa - as the service is known -

would not be used as a weapon against any country or people, but would be an instrument for promoting good-will, understanding and co-operation between nation and nation, and a medium to disseminate factual and objective knowledge and information about the Republic of South Africa." 20)

"The Voice of South Africa will beam truth and goodwill to all parts of the globe ... it will counter that which is so harmful to the welfare of this continent and to civilisation as a whole." 21)

Six months later, in May 1966, the truly up-to-date shortwave radio station started its operations. Thereby South Africa had at its disposal another technique for disseminating propaganda, or rather partially tinged information. The criticism passed abroad on South Africa's policy of apartheid had been the most important incentive to the construction of a new and expensive shortwave station.

The earlier concentration upon services directed at their own continent was now abandoned. As appears from figure 5 they also started working on other continents through broadcasts. The programme time was gradually extended. Thus between 1966 and 1971 the total amount of transmitted hours doubled. New languages were employed to enable the message of the voice to reach ever more listeners.

Multifarious Operation

A propaganda orientated shortwave station seeks to influence its listeners mainly through the programme contents of the services. Through the choice of themes and the character of the broadcasts it strives to establish a positive attitude towards the transmitting country, a certain ideology or certain recommendations of action. However, propaganda stations of today also have other closely related activities as a complement to the actual programmes. The motive power behind the former is the wish to establish a "co-operation" with the audience. Through two-way communication they aim at creating a wider and more profound interest and confidence in the sender. At

Figure 5
SOUTH AFRICA'S EXTERNAL SHORTWAVE SERVICES 1953-1971
(Total transmission time, in minutes per week)

	0006											
(min/week)	7000											
TRANSMISSION TIME (min/week)	5000	· ·										
TRANS	3000											
	1000											
YEAR		1953	1960	1962	1964	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	
		1	ı	1		•	1997	3465	4098	4308	5076	
		4025	2940	3240	5010	5460	2999	6295	5820	5394	5892	

OUTSIDE AFRICA

AFRICA

Source: Material from World Radio TV Handbook 1953-1972

the same time an active contact with the audience offers a basis for appraising the programme policy of the sender, for instance.

In these respects the Voice of South Africa is a well developed propaganda station. In figure 6 a schematic survey is given of the channels which the South African station is using to facilitate the contact with people beyond the own borders.

A closer description of and a discussion about the shortwave services of South Africa may well be structured with figure 6 as a basis:

- Services as regards target areas, languages and programme contents
- Contacts between sender and audience in the form of a programme magazine and correspondence
- Radio tuition in Afrikaans, one of the two "white languages" in South Africa
- Transcription service or Radio "Export"


The presentation is concluded by a short discussion about the importance of the South African shortwave broadcasts.

Target Areas And Programme Time

The South African shortwave broadcasts, like those of other stations generally, are internationally directed. Services are specially beamed to one or more geographically fixed areas. The listeners in the "target areas" in question thereby have rather favourable reception conditions.

The shortage of spectrum space and the atmospherics of course are circumstances which may impair the technical quality of the broadcasts. However, the fact that the propagandist directs his transmissions at geographically remote areas does not exclude their being monitored in other countries. The circumstance that the sender states the

Figure 6
THE EXTERNAL SERVICE OF SABC



target area makes it possible to conduct a study of a central aspect of these broadcasts, that is for which receivers they are intended.

The Voice of South Africa covers widely spread and large target areas. The audience - potential and factual listeners in the target areas - is living in different cultures, is speaking different languages and has varying political viewpoints. It is to this background that the South African services are adapted and then they are beamed to different target areas.

Until the autumn of 1966 South Africa mainly addressed Africa in its broadcasts, as appears from figure 5 (p. 19). A few years earlier, however, they had started a fairly small daily service for Europe in English. Although the earlier programmes were meant for Africa this did not at all mean that they covered the whole continent. East Africa and Southern Africa were primarily reached by the South African services. North Africa, West Africa and the Middle East were not included in the catalogue of target areas.

When the new transmitter came into use a considerable raising of the level of ambition took place as concerns for instance the number of target areas. Radio South Africa changed the character from a regional African transmitter to a world station. The first step into the wider international areas involved the starting of services for North America (four target areas and 55 minutes of daily broadcasts to each target area). The Middle East and North Africa were also incorporated in the schedules for services.Not until the next year, i.e. 1967, were the broadcasts extended to Europe on a larger scale. The estimate made was evidently that the two North American states from a propaganda point of view were more urgent than the European homelands of the forefathers. ²²)

The target areas stated by the Voice of South Africa, here grouped into regions, and the total transmission time to each target area in 1967 and 1971 are shown by table 1. In 1967 (beginning of the year, see note 23) Africa still dominated very much, as appears.

Of the total time 74 % was devoted to African services. The shares of Europe and North America were 5 % and 20 % respectively.

Between 1967 and 1971 the total programme time was increased from 7 665 minutes per week to 10 968 minutes, or by 43 %. This widened space for radio communication was given to Europe (start during the latter part of 1967), North America (extension of transmission time) and New Zealand/Australia (each with one broadcast a day from May 1968). A new programme, the "South Africa Bulletin", started in 1968 with a view to furnishing South Africans abroad and the diplomatic representatives of the country with news about the course of events in Southern Africa.

As appears from table 1 Africa, Rest and the Middle East had about the same transmission time in 1967 as in 1971 in absolute terms. As the total transmission time increased during that period this meant that those two regions reduced their relative share of the total programme time. Thus Africa had as much as 74 % of the sender attention in 1967 but the share of the region had been reduced to 54 % in 1971.

In 1971 nearly 45 % of the programme time was devoted to working on and disseminating information to the politically important states in North America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand. These nations are South Africa's interchange partners. Trade, investments and immigrants form South Africa's umbilical cord to the outside world and the placenta was, and still is, formed by several "western" countries. The Third World and the Communist states had begotten and were still actively nourishing the strategy of isolating South Africa from the outside world. In order to prevent this strategy from being put into political practice South Africa is working on the Western Powers energetically. An element in this work is made out by shortwave broadcasts to the countries mentioned.

South Africa is broadcasting to Europe in no less than five languages: English, German, Portuguese, French and Dutch. Through

Table 1 TARGET AREAS. 1967¹⁾ AND 1971 (minutes per week)

	1961	1967 ¹⁾	1971	
Target area	minutes per week	% of total time	minutes per week	% of total time
Africa	5 668	74	5 892	54
Southern and East	2 616	34	3 246	30
General	2 066	27	1 638	15
Rest	986	13	1 008	6
Middle East	72	1	84	_
Europe	385	2	2 100	19
North America	1 540	20	2 016	18
New Zealand/Australia	ı	1	756	7
Southern Africa Bulletin	1	1	120	_
Total	7 665	% 001	10 968	100 %

1) During the latter part of the year several new services started, see note 23. Source: Based on World Radio TV Handbook 1967 and 1972.

these services those countries of the continent are reached which are the most important to South Africa. Through English services the American continent gets to know the White South African version of the apartheid policy. In 1972 a French-speaking radio service was started as well, beamed to the French-speaking part of Canada.

The Africa services can be divided, as is done in table 1, into three main groups. East and Southern Africa comprise South Africa's neighbours Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Rhodesia, Angola, Mocambique and the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar). Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Malawi, Zambia, and Zaire also belong to this group. Programmes beamed to these 13 states filled 55 % of the total "Africa time" in 1971. Between 1967 and 1971 East and Southern Africa have received a growing share of the "African" transmission time. Mayby the most marked change on that point was that broadcasts in French to the Malagasy Republic started in 1971. As early as the starting year more than 550 minutes per week were allocated to this state. That meant that a considerable proportion of the total programme time of the region was reserved for this purpose. But at that time South Africa's efforts to improve its relations to black Africa had become an essential feature in the country's foreign policy. Shortwave broadcasts, which are to be seen as one tool in the foreign political arsenal of techniques, were thus employed with the aim of throwing a bridge from South Africa over to its neighbouring countries.

North and West Africa form a second target area for the Voice of South Africa. Broadcasts are specially beamed to Ghana/Nigeria, to French-speaking West Africa and North Africa. More regular and co-ordinated broadcasts to French-speaking West Africa started in 1972. However, the total radio time alloted to "the rest of Africa" has not changed during the latter half of the 1960's.

A third target area is "Africa General". As the name implies the programmes are here directed at the whole continent. The services are in English and, though to a minor extent now, in Afrikaans. But the all-embracing target area of Africa has been given less space in the South African broadcasts. It is probably considered to be less

effective to try to include all Africa at one and the same time. Instead of that a relatively strict special destination of the radio communications would mean better utilization of the shortwave resources.

Latin America and, with a few exceptions, Asia are missing as target areas for the Voice of South Africa. As early as 1968 the SABC stated in its annual report:

"All that remains to be added are broadcasts to Latin America and the Far East. These transmissions have already been planned but it will be some time before they are put into effect." 24)

At the coming into being of the station in 1965 it was also declared that there was a design to have services in Spanish, although the minister did not state directly that the target area was Latin America. But so far no transmissions to the two continents have been put into effect. The reason for this probably is a general lack of resources combined with a gradation of urgency. Politically as well as economically Europe and North America are more important to South Africa at short sight than for instance Latin America and the Asian states.

From Six to Nine Languages

The number of languages in the services increased from six to nine between 1967 and 1971. The English Service occupied a good 58 % of the programme time on both of these occasions. The major part of the African transmissions and those to North America as well as the rest of the industrialized countries are in English.

Afrikaans, which is the mother tongue of some 60 % of the South African white population, has been losing its significance as a radio language. During the years 1967 to 1971 the share of Afrikaans in the total transmission time, as shown in figure 7, decreased from 16.9 % to 3.5 % (or from 1 292 minutes per week to 378 minutes).

As very few people outside the borders of South Africa speak this language the propagandist has gradually come to prefer broadcasting in other and more current languages.

German, Dutch, French as well as Portuguese and English are being used in order to gain understanding and sympathy for the present social order of South Africa, through broadcasts to Europe. French is also an important language in the African services, foremost in connection with West Africa and the Malagasy Republic. As for the colonies (up to the summer of 1974) of Angola and Mocambique Portuguese is employed, of course, but also Tsonga. The latter language is spoken by a considerable part of the Africans in Mocambique which is the area which furnishes the mines of Transvaal with African "guest workers". Swahili and ChiChewa are likewise languages which are mother tongues of Africans in different states in East and Southern Africa.


Radio Programming

An important component in the South African radio programming is, in the words of the responsible parties themselves:

"As in the case of other Services, the Portuguese Service orientated its programmes to points of contact between South Africa and its target areas. One example was a series entitled Relacoes Bilaterais (mutual Relations), depicting events of interest to both South Africa and Portugal, with particular attention to the evergrowing co-operation between the two countries." 26)

This line of action, that is to give prominence to the shared values and interests, historic as well as present, of the sender and the receivers is frequently found in connection with propaganda. Thus a series of South African programmes have been constructed around the "theme of mutual relations". Examples of this are the series "South Africa and her Neighbours" ²⁷⁾, "Een Rijke Erfenis" (about the Dutch and their role in the building of the South African nation)

Figure 7 SHARES OF VARIOUS LANGUAGES IN TRANSMISSION TIME 1967 AND 1971 (Relative percentages of total transmission time each year)



Source: Material from World Radio TV Handbook 1967 and 1971.

and the one in French about "contributions to South African history and culture by personalities with names like De Villiers, Du Toit, Fouché, Malan etc" 29).

A closely related theme is South Africa's supposedly vital importance for the free world (meaning Western Europe, North America and other non-communist states, Programmes supporting this idea can be indicated by the example of "'Southern Bastion', which emphasizes the stability in many fields of this strategically placed southern country". 30) In a series of features South Africa's economic, political and military value to the Western world is illustrated. Another favourite subject is the country's rich mineral deposits and the strategic role of the Simonstown naval base in the protection of navigation. The Soviet concentration in the Indian Ocean and the agressive war of the terrorists on the mainland do not escape the South African radio voice.

To "Portuguese soldiers fighting the terrorists in Angola and Mocambique" ³¹⁾ several programmes were beamed (up to the summer of 1974). Their purpose was to divert and morally support soldiers from a poor mother country situated many long days at sea away. Thus now to mention a concrete example, a recurrent programme sent every week was started in 1970, directed at the troups of the colonial army and "it included messages to them from friends and relatives in South Africa or Portugal, as well as messages from them to their families at home" ³²⁾.

A very prominent theme in the South African broadcasts is the putting up for sale of the country's unique internal politics. Efforts are made through broadcasts to gain the outside world's sympathetic appreciation of the doctrine of separate development for the different races, or at least to achieve that this "social philosophy" is not so harshly criticized. By featuring the history of the country, the prosperity of the present and the harmonious relations of the race groups a legitimacy is indirectly aimed at for the apartheid policy.

The South African broadcasts, especially those directed at Europe, from time to time take up the theme of immigration. That this is done is not to be wondered at. The country is said to need an annual immigration of the magnitude 34-40 000 white people if the present economic growth rate is to last. The shortwave station is trying to do its part as regards the growth of population. This is done for instance through programmes about the careers of immigrants and the great future prospects which are associated with immigration to South Africa.

For DX:ers and others with a special interest there are programmes where received letters are read and answers are given to questions put. ³³⁾ This technique for two-way communication is often used by most shortwave stations in the world.

The characterization as regards themes which has been made here, though more impressionist than systematic, may be made more complete by the little general information which is available. In table 2 are shown the data about the programme structure which, according to statements, are publicly accessible. As is shown, news and commentaries have totally 1/4 of the transmission time (1970). The topical programmes and those dealing with the Bantu people, at least this is the case with several services, account for together 1/3 of the programme output. Thus a good half of all programmes are such as directly or indirectly exhibit what traditionally is looked upon as political issues.

Active Contacts with the Audience

The relation between the shortwave station and the actual audience is difficult to map out more in detail. The number, composition and reaction of the actual listeners are chiefly unknown factors. 34) The quantity of mail response from the listeners gives an indication, however faint, of the sender-receiver relation.

Table 2
TYPES OF PROGRAMMES. 1970

	Percentage of transmis	sion time
Туре	Portuguese, French, German and Dutch services	English services
New reports	20	1
Commentaries	7	24
Music	11	19
Topical/Features	26	1
Programmes about 1) the Bantu people	7	57
0ther	29	
	100 %	100 %

Programmes about the different ethnic groups of the African majority in South Africa

Source: Based on SABC Annual Report 1970, p. 35-36

In 1967 the Voice of South Africa registered nearly 15 000 letters from listeners. Five years later, as shown by the data in table 3, they could open more than 44 500 letters from their audience. The increase during that period is most considerable, probably even compared to that of other stations. (The foreign broadcasts of Radio Sweden each year receive some 30 000 letters 35).

In 1971 the South African shortwave station arranged and broadcast a prize competition. 42 000 people joined it, hoping to be awarded the desirable first price. The glory and prize were won by an Englishwoman with a striking slogan: "Even the sun sings in South Africa". This achievement was rewarded with a free travel to and a fortnight's stay in South Africa. 36

Table 3
CONTACTS WITH LISTENERS

	number of letters received	number of receivers of "RSA Calling"
1967	14 849	-
1968	19 471	30 000
1969	23 970	40 000
1970	33 461	60 000
1971	89 000 ¹⁾	70 000
1972	44 542	•••

1) Thereof prize competition 42 000 Source: SABC Annual Report 1967-1972

Mail response from listeners fulfil three vital functions, seen from a sender point of view:

They provide an opportunity to open a direct, personal communication with active people in foreign countries. As far as the Voice of South Africa is concerned, one is:

"conscious of the fact that by paying close attention to letters from listeners, important public relations work can be done on behalf of South Africa. For this reason every one of the 19 471 letters received during 1968 was acknowledged and answered. Letters criticizing Radio RSA or South Africa were sympathetically and patiently answered" 37)

In accordance with the South African estimation the letters from listeners play an important part in the propaganda work, for a personal and convincing treatment is effective:

"and in many cases correspondents revealed a change in attitude in later letters" 38)

- They make it possible to set up an address register file of active and probably socially fairly interested people. As far as South Africa is concerned this file is chiefly being used for sending out the programme magazine RSA Calling (see below)
- The technical information received through correspondence, mainly with DX:ers, is of value in the efforts to improve the quality of the broadcasts.

In 1968 the Voice of South Africa started publishing a programme magazine with six issues annually. The chief part of the information in the magazine directly or indirectly deals with the programming carried by the station. But "RSA Calling" also to a great extent contains summings up of central programmes. They usually recapitulate radio talks showing South Africa's economic strength, the conditions of separate development and the country's good relations to the outside world. In 1971 the magazine distributed 70 000 copies on an average, which is 40 000 more than during the first year of edition.

Afrikaans On the Air

Shortly after the new shortwave station started its activity a manifest form of contact with a part of the audience was initiated. In 1967 the broadcast medium was made use of in order to convey knowledge of Afrikaans, that is one of the two official languages in the country, spoken by a majority of the whites. The radio course was started:

"Because of the interest in the youngest European language, and because these language lessons present the opportunity to convey information about our country.". 39)

Thus the motive force was not only the wish to teach the language as such. The tuition was also looked upon as a way to "foster understanding of this country". 40

The course is a combination of lessons via radio and a mere correspondence course. The pupils listen to lessons through shortwave broadcasts and then send by mail their solutions of different tasks. A special staff on the radio station corrects the answers of the attendants and returns them to the pupils.

The number of pupils increased very much between the years 1967 to 1972. In 1972, 3 400 people attended the course. This was, as shown by table 4, substantially more than at the start of the course. The tuition is in English, Portuguese, French, German and Dutch. The Afrikaans pupils mostly belong in the USA, Great Britain, West Germany and Holland.

Radio "Export"

A sophisticated shortwave station seeks to "export" its programmes, to have a transcription service. In this way it can distribute its programmes through other transmitters, as well. This procedure has two evident advantages. Mr. Bengt Gustafsson, head of the foreign programmes of Radio Sweden, words these advantages in this way:

"We do not have to take bad reception and wearisome listening conditions into consideration. There are possibilities of presenting Swedish music, even such as is advanced. Disseminating information about Sweden through the domestic broadcasts of other nations can of course lend special weight to the credibility." 41)

So increased credibility and better conditions of reception are two circumstances which justify a transcription service. Generally special programmes are produced by the "exporter" which are then offered the foreign prospective buyers.

The South African transmitter, the Voice of South Africa, has a transcription service as one sphere of activity. This is valued and given a motive for in the SABC annual report:

(Number of active pupils and their respective mother tongue) ATTENDANTS TO RADIO COURSE IN AFRIKAANS Table 4

			2	2000			
Year	English	German	French	Portuguese Dutch	Dutch	0ther	Total number of attendants
1961	100	12	30	9/	1	,	218
1968	313	532	17	126	ı	1	1 042
1969	ı	1	1	1	ı		1 782 ¹⁾
1970	943	851	176	232	1	155	2 357
1971	1 100	1 000	200	300	230	70	2 900
1972	1 400	1 100	240	280	380	ı	3 400

1) No more detailed information is available but "North America and Western Germany remain the main centres of interest in Afrikaans."

Source: SABC Annual Report 1967-1972

"Judging by the very favourable comments from foreign broadcastings organisations, the Overseas Transcription Service programmes are extremely popular and are helping to project a positive image of South Africa" 42)

In 1972, 454 foreign stations, the great majority of them broadcasting in English, ordered programmes from South Africa. In table 5 information is given which shows that the transcription service has been extended substantially during the years from 1968 onwards.

A weekly programme in Portuguese which is sent regularly by some fifteen stations is included in the transcription service material. Another example is a programme with news and commentaries which is distributed to some American radio corporations every month. This programme is broadcast by stations with 7 million potential listeners. In 1971 the Voice of South Africa supplied foreign radio stations with 2 000 records and 750 taped recordings. 43)

Table 5

TRANSCRIPTION SERVICE. 1968-1972

1. Number of ordering stations with transmission language stated 2. Number of home countries of the stations as in (1)

				Radi	o stat	Radio stations which have ordered the RSA programmes	ch ha	ve or	dered	the R	SA pr	ograr	mmes
Year	Engl 1	ish 2	Gerr 1	nan 2	Port	English German Portuguese French Spanish Dutch	Fre	nch 2	Spar 1	nish 2	Dut	sch 2	Total number of ordering stations
1968	192	59	6	က	52	∞	9	5	42	15	4	2	305
1969	209	59	6	က	22	8	7	2	47	15	4	2	333
1970	238	30	œ	က	9	10	7	2	48	13	4	2	366
1971 1972					d)	particulars missing)	irs mi	ssing	~				405 454

Source: SABC Annual Report 1968-1972.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN VOICE

The South African external services on shortwave are to be seen against the background of the "international isolation" experienced by the élite of the country in the nineteen sixties. The motives for the considerable expansion of the Voice of South Africa were, according to the government, to spread the truth, but not propaganda:

"... the external radio service will also not be a propaganda service and it will merely reflect the true image of South Africa and its peoples ..." 44)

The radio programming and other indicators touched upon in this report show that the aim of the "South African voice" was, and still is, to contribute in creating a positive image of South Africa in the outside world. The start of the new transmitter was made at a time when the repudiation - at least from a moral point of view - of the apartheid policy had met with broad international support, although not always so deeply felt.

The Voice of South Africa is employing several techniques for influencing its listeners. As the foremost among those we probably find the radio programming, which is well adjusted in its contents and skilfully modelled. The harmonious relations between the different racial groups and their increasingly good conditions of life is a central theme of the radio propaganda. Another theme is South Africa's good relations to "Western countries" and certain African states and the dependence of especially the former upon South Africa's natural resources and strategic position.

During the nineteen sixties the transmissions gradually became more sophisticated. There were introduced a programme magazine, an Afrikaans course and a transcription service. To a growing degree they became important instruments for supplying propaganda about South Africa.

The two aspects of motive and technique thus give us important knowledge about the South African counter-offensive. However, a third aspect should be touched upon in this context. What are the real effects of the radio propaganda? It is indeed difficult to find an adequate answer to that question. 45

From the point of view of the South African propagandist a relatively positive estimate of the effects seems to be plausible. The increasing extent of the mail response from listeners and pupils of the Afrikaans courses and the growing transcription service indicate immediate results of the activity. The fact that the operations of the Voice of South Africa have been extended during the sixties is in itself an expression, though only indirect, of the propagandist's own positive estimation of the activity. 46)

Of course, the real effects must be measured on a social psychological level, for the ultimate intention of the propagandist is to influence the attitudes of individuals in a certain respect and, hopefully, their behaviour as well. However, no such studies have been made on the audience of the South African radio transmitter, and they are to be found extremely marginally in other cases.

Every now and then DX clubs arrange so called popularity polls where the transmissions of the shortwave stations of the world are given each their points. The participants and criteria vary very much. So from a strictly scientific point of view it is risky, for this reason and others, to use the results of these popularity polls. In spite of these circumstances we have chosen to present some selected data from polls from the last few years. Even if the discussions around these are fenced about with obvious reservations as to validity and reliability, it should be interesting to try to see the Voice of South Africa in a comparative perspective.

In table 6 are shown the rankings of South Africa in the popularity polls to which we have obtained access. 47) As can be seen the

THE RANKING OF THE VOICE OF SOUTH AFRICA IN SOME POPULARITY POLLS

Table 6

Year	Poll arranged by	Participants ¹⁾ Ra	Ranking of South Africa	Source
1968	ISWC, England	"National panel"	6	Eter-Aktuellt, 2/68
1971	Assoziation Deutsch- sprachiger DX-er in West Germany		2 ²)	Eter-Aktuellt, 3/71
1972	"Panorama X", french magazine	Belgium, France and Algeria	2	Sweden Calling DX:ers, Bulletin 1205, 1972
1972	Mittelwellen-Arbeitskreis International, West Germany	ı	വ	Eter-Aktuellt, 3/73
1973	Triangle DX-Club of Philadelphia, USA	"National panel", DX:ers 10 in eight other countries	10	Letter from arranger 1973-12-04
1973	American Shortwave Listeners Club	"40 countries"	∞	Sweden Calling DX:ers, Bulletin 1234, 1973
1973	Universal DX-Club of India	250 DX:ers in India	7	Sweden Calling DX:ers, Bulletin 1241, 1973
1973	Assoziation Deutsch ^{::} sprachiger DX-er in West Germany	many	32)	Sweden Calling DX:ers, Bulletin 1253, 1973
1973	Soviet DX-Clubs	Soviet DX:ers	33	Sweden Calling DX:ers, Bulletin 1256, 1973

1) By "national panel" is meant DX:ers in the home country of the arranger 2) Regarding best transmission in German

Voice of South Africa holds a prominent position. It is estimated that some 40 of the 250 radio stations in the world with foreign broadcasts are "internationally known". 48) The shortwave radio station of South Africa belongs to this exclusive group. The Voice of South Africa even seems to be one of the leading members of the club. In several polls its position is very prominent.

Changed Policy

In 1974 it was reported in South African newspapers that the broadcasting policy was going to be rather drastically changed. Transmissions to Europe, Australia and Frenchspeaking Canada were to be closed down. 49) The other target areas, on the other hand, were to be kept intact. The motive for this change was stated vaguely, but one general reason was said to be the small audience that actually listened to the transmissions.

A great many radio stations in the world have recently considered reducing or even breaking off their services to certain areas. Generally this has been due to the increasing expenses. The number of listeners is too small compared to the costs of the transmissions.


The possible South African reductions <u>may be</u> one expression of a basic change in the foreign policy of the country. There is a wish, and this has been stated explicitly by the SABC, to use the great, although limited, resources in order to "conquer" the African continent. As Angola and Mocambique have recently turned into independent <u>black</u> states, and as Rhodesia is likely to follow suite in a few years time, South Africa must face the consequences of the new situation. Friendly, or at least not hostile, relations to black Africa is becoming an increasingly urgent task in the management of the country's foreign affairs. One way, though certainly only one of many, would be to concentrate the propaganda offensive on Africa. Should this be the argumentation in Pretoria, the new policy as regards the external transmissions is a dynamic adjustment to the general foreign political situation of the country.

Another motive, which does not necessarily contradict the former, may have to do with a valuation of the technique as such. In the arsenal of existing propaganda techniques there are several which have been tried, not without success, by South Africa, especially during the last fifteen years. Printed information and film material are among these. In for instance the USA the number of screenings of South African propaganda films have increased, on TV as well as publicly. (Figures 8 and 9.) The same development is to be found in several other countries which are politically and economically important to South Africa. A comparison between the shortwave technique and the film technique may thus turn out to the advantage of the latter in the considerations of those in power. The limited resources being constant will in that case lead to new priorities being given. The transmissions to those target areas which, from a general foreign policy point of view, are not looked upon as belonging to the politically most important ones will be reduced.

A changed policy as regards radio transmissions does not at all mean, however, that the shortwave technique has lost its importance. It will be employed in the future, too, but the priority target areas are likely to be ranked differently. At bottom this expresses how well established this technique is as an instrument for the foreign policy of South Africa.


Figure 8

NUMBER OF SCREENINGS ON AMERICAN TV OF RSA DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION FILMS



Source: Annual Reports, Department of Information, Pretoria

Figure 9 NUMBER OF SCREENINGS OF RSA FILMS IN USA (NOT ON TV)



Source: Annual Reports, Department of Information, Pretoria

NOTES

- In a manner which is easy to understand and matter-of-fact Lars-Eric Wänstrand deals with the broadcasting policy of Nazi Germany in his book "<u>Kallt krig i Etern</u>" ("Cold War Through the Ether"), Folk och Försvars skriftserie, No. 3, 1970, p. 17 onwards.
- 2) Thus Germany is the typical example from history of how the broadcasting medium was subordinated to narrow political purposes. When the National Socialists had usurped power the national propaganda leader Joseph Goebbels made the radio his own special pet. The so called people's radio set, which was cheap and which was forced upon all homes by law, had its frequencies blocked, for the German people was only to listen to the German national broadcasts. When Hitler started his blood-stained war of conquest, three out of four German homes could quickly learn about heroic military success, the general decadence of the enemy and the essence of the jewish race through the people's radio. But the propaganda was brought outside the frontiers of "Aryan" Germany, too. Through shortwave transmissions the message of Nazism was trumpeted forth to peoples already enslaved and not yet "liberated". So between 1933 and 1939 the shortwave transmissions increased from 2 hours a day to 70 hours. Towards the end of the 1930's the transmissions were managed by 300 radio people (compared to seven earlier) and they were beamed to all parts of the world.

The shortwave broadcasts of the British BBC also increased quickly from the outbreak of war. The struggle against Nazism was extended to the ether field, too. When the German leaders broke their word to the population of the country, this was made full use of in the BBC counter-offensive through the ether lanes.

- 3) The Right to know, pp. 12-13.
- 4) Magnusson, p. 11 onwards.
- 5) Duke, p. 49.

- 6) Hansson, p. 57.
- 7) The efforts to handle the planning of spectrum space is dealt with in Owe Nordin's series of articles, "25 års frekvensplanering" (Twenty-Five Years of Frequency Planning) which was published in Eter-Aktuellt during 1972 and 1973.
- 8) Report of the Presidential Study Commission on International Radio Broadcasting: The Right to know, Washington, 1973.
- 9) Jamming, that is electronic disturbance of transmissions, is an existing technique of prohibiting the transmissions of foreign stations from reaching the citizens of a country. Today efforts to prohibit free radio communications are made almost exclusively by the communist states.
- 10) Jacobs, p. 59.
- 11) During the debate there were strong doubts among the Opposition as to the suitability of politically placing the extended activity planned under the heading of the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications. Mr. Albert Hertzog, the Minister in question, had made himself known as belonging to the extreme right wing of the National Party. Instead of that the spokesman of the opposition wanted the responsibility for the transmissions to be directly incumbent upon the Office of the Prime Minister. Moreover there was criticism during the debate directed at the fact that neither the Minister of Foreign Affairs not the Minister of Information had been consulted in this matter. The opposition wished that the expanded transmissions which were intended should take place within the scope of the general foreign political aims of the country.
- 12) Area Handbook for the Republic of South Africa, pp. 448-449.
- 13) Radio RSA: Our shortwave station. A presentation of the Voice of South-Africa (no dating), obtained from the SABC in February 1974.

- 14) World Radio TV Handbook 1965, p. 162.
- 15) Hansard, Assembly Debates, 21.5 1965, col. 6478.
- 16) Ibid., col. 6484.
 Information about the annual costs of the External Service and the number of employees is not available separately, but is included in the SABC Annual Report without being accounted for separately.
- 17) By "negative propaganda" here is meant propaganda which contains a direct criticism of conditions in other countries, e g in the African states. "Positive propaganda" means that one stresses the representation of one's own country as being successful, harmonious, etc. So "positive propaganda" contains no essential comparisons between South Africa and e g the states in Africa which have a critical attitude.
- 18) Hansard, Assembly Debates, 21.5 1965, cols. 6484-6485.
- 19) Ibid., cols. 6476-6477.
- 20) AR 1966, p. 29.
- 21) Laurence, p. 78.
- 22) An alternative explanation, but to me not a convincing one, could indeed be that the South African authorities regarded the existing propaganda machinery as sufficient with regard to Europe. In relative terms the need to cover North America was consequently perceived as more urgent a task.
- 23) Data about transmission time, languages and target areas have been obtained by systematically penetrating World Radio TV Handbook 1953-1972. Sometimes shortwave radio stations change e g their transmissions during the calendar year. As a basis for this table and for some other combinations of facts in this section we have the following periods within the calendar years:

 1953 whole year
 1967 Nov. 66-March 67

 1960 " 1968 Nov. 67-March 68

 1962 " 1969 Nov. 68-March 69

 1964 " 1970 March 70-May 70

 1966 March/April
 1971 Nov. 71-May 72

- 24) AR 1968, p. 33.
- 25) Hansard, Assembly Debates, 21.5 1963, col. 6526.
- 26) AR 1970, p. 36.
- 27) AR 1969, p. 32.
- 28) Ibid.
- 29) AR 1970, p. 35.
- 30) AR 1972, p. 40.
- 31) Ibid., p. 41.
- 32) AR 1970, p. 36.
- 33) The foremost programme for listeners is called "P.O. Box 4559". In this so called Mailbag programme it was announced on February 5, 1974: "... Mr. Ake Magnusson of the Institute of Political Science at Göteborg's University. We have written to you, giving the details you wanted on Radio RSA." Along with a brief stencilled description of a technical nature of the Voice of South Africa, this was the station's answer to a letter from me concerning four vital questions about the South African shortwave station. Another letter from me has not led to any reactions at all. This example, though it may be a unique case, shows how the letters from listeners are sometimes used in dubious ways.
- 34) There are few more important studies which analyse the relation between the audience and the sender. Some of the minor analyses

which have been made are dealt with here as an introduction. In a report Rutger Lindahl (Lindahl 1971) describes how the analyser is to grasp the propaganda intentions and the target groups of the sender by studying the audience. With empirical material as a starting point, made out of letters from listeners read in the different broadcasts, Lindahl analyses the structure of the Swedish audience of three shortwave stations situated in communists states. But, and the author emphasizes this very much, the study shows the difficulty of answering particularly interesting and relevant questions through the technique chosen.

In his study <u>Kurt Törnqvist</u> of Beredskapsnämnden för psykologiskt försvar (the Swedish Board of Psychological Defence) recapitulates an opinion poll in Sweden in 1969, where there is certain information about the Swedish audience and its listening in to foreign broadcasts in foreign languages and in Swedish (Törnqvist 1970). According to this poll 2,4 % of the Swedish population was said to have listened in to the Swedish broadcasts of the Soviet shortwave station on some occasion during the year in question. The shares of the corresponding transmissions of other countries were: West Germany 1,7 %, Poland 0,9 % and East Germany 0,4 %. There was a possibility for the people interviewed to state more than one alternative. Törnqvist makes several reservations to these results. One of his main results is that on some occasion 1/5 of the population listened in to transmissions to Sweden from foreign stations.

In a minor report <u>Kurt Törnqvist</u> and <u>Kjell Aggefors</u> supply some principal features of studies published in Radio Free Europe's Situation Report (Törnqvist 1973). The analyses in question concern the conditions in shortwave stations in Poland, Rumania and Hungary. Here the interesting thing is that the very quantity of mail from listeners is pointed out as one central technique for analysing the sender-receiver relation: "The effects of the transmissions in foreign languages are best reflected through the letters which are sent to the different departments of the foreign programme" (p. 6).

In his article in the Public Opinion Quarterly <u>Donald Smith</u> describes an experiment where one tried to measure the effects of the Soviet shortwave transmissions to North America. One experiment group consisting of 122 students and two control groups consisting of some 90 students together were exposed to totally 15 hours of Soviet propaganda broadcasts during two months. Three hypotheses were tried in this experiment. In different ways they were related to expected reactions, depending on the attitude beforehand of the participants towards the Soviet transmissions. Through his experiment Smith shows that there are effects of influence which are measurable.

- 35) Gustafsson, p. 19.
- 36) AR 1962, p. 40.
- 37) AR 1968, p. 36.
- 38) AR 1967, p. 50.
- 39) Ibid., p. 40.
- 40) AR 1970, p. 37.
- 41) Gustafsson, p. 20.
- 42) AR 1970, p. 37.
- 43) AR 1971, p. 47.
- 44) Hansard, Assembly Debates, 23.3 1965, col. 3239.
- 45) See p. 48 and note 34.
- 46) It does not necessarily take <u>only</u>, or even <u>principally</u>, a positive estimate of the direct effects of the transmissions to make the government grant considerable amounts of money for radio propaganda. Another kind of explanation has to do with the shortage of spectrum space, the "ether war" of today. It is in the interest of each

country which has once started transmitting to keep its allotted transmission frequencies, due to this "frequency war". The frequencies of the shortwave stations are registered through international collaboration and this partly means a protection against competing stations using your own frequency (or frequencies). In order to prohibit other stations from taking over your allotted frequency, which may be needed in the future, you have to carry on with your broadcasts, no matter what your present estimate may be of their real effects.

- 47) Through contacts with Riksförbundet DX-alliansen (an institution for Swedish DX:ers) and the Foreign Programmes of Radio Sweden we have been able to penetrate the popularity polls in question. Doing so we have concentrated on reports from the last five years, generally found in DX bulletins.
- 48) By "internationally known" here is meant that chiefly these very transmitters are of interest in a global DX context. From an analytical point of view the appellation is less satisfactory, for
 - (1) DX:ers are likely to use relatively specific criteria for their judgements. So, not unlikely, DX:ers "approve of stations which are difficult to catch". On the other hand, the general audiences of such stations are very limited, and therefore the effect of the propagandist's message is exceedingly small (it is difficult to tune in and to monitor the transmissions with a technically satisfactory result).
 - (2) A station in a certain country may have a great propaganda effect elsewhere, e g in neighbouring states, without being known (or even meant to be!) in an international context.
- 49) Information, but no conclusions drawn here, as regards the changed policy has been received from South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg.

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