BETWEEN RISING NAVAL POWERS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA OF THE RISE OF CHINESE AND INDIAN NAVAL POWER

18-19 NOVEMBER 2008
SINGAPORE
BETWEEN RISING NAVAL POWERS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA OF THE RISE OF CHINESE AND INDIAN NAVAL POWER

CONFERENCE REPORT

A CONFERENCE ORGANISED BY
THE S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
THE NATIONAL MARITIME FOUNDATION (NMF), NEW DELHI

Rapporteurs:
Jane Chan, Nicholas Lee

Edited by:
Joshua Ho

18-19 NOVEMBER 2008
SINGAPORE

S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY
2009
## Table of Contents

Executive Summary ............................................. 3  
Opening Address ............................................... 4  
**Session 1: REGIONAL STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT—BETWEEN RISING POWERS**  
1.1 Between Rising Powers—A Broad Strategic Overview ........ 5  
1.2 China and Southeast Asia .................................. 6  
1.3 India and Southeast Asia .................................... 7  
1.4 U.S. Engagement with China, India and Southeast Asia ...... 8  
Discussion 1 ..................................................... 8  
**SESSION 2: REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY ENVIRONMENT**  
2.1 Regional Maritime Security—Threats and Risk Assessments .. 9  
2.2 Maritime Security and the Cooperative Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore .................... 10  
2.3 The Japanese Perspective ................................... 11  
2.4 The Chinese Perspective .................................... 11  
2.5 The Indian Perspective ...................................... 12  
2.6 The Korean Perspective ..................................... 13  
2.7 The Malaysian Perspective ................................. 14  
Discussion 2 ..................................................... 14  
**SESSION 3: NAVAL DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT**  
3.1 Naval Developments and Deployments—Shaping Naval Power: Implications of the Naval Build-up in Asia .................. 15  
3.2 Naval Developments and Deployments—Indian Navy ........ 16  
3.3 Naval Developments and Deployments—Chinese Navy ....... 17  
3.4 Naval Developments and Deployments—Australian Navy ... 18  
3.5 Naval Developments and Deployments—Japanese Navy ...... 19  
3.6 Naval Developments and Deployments—U.S. Perspective .... 20  
Discussion 3 ..................................................... 21  
**SESSION 4: COOPERATION AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING**  
4.1 Cooperation and Confidence Building—Scope for Maritime Cooperation and Confidence Building ....................... 22  
4.2 Cooperation and Confidence Building—China and Maritime Cooperation in East Asia: Recent Developments and Future Prospect ...... 23  
4.3 Cooperation and Confidence Building—U.S. Perspective .... 24  
4.4 Cooperation and Confidence Building—Japanese Perspective .. 25  
4.5 Cooperation and Confidence Building—Southeast Asian Perspective .......................... 26  
Discussion 4 ..................................................... 27  
**SESSION 5: WAY FORWARD**  
5.1 Panel Discussion ............................................ 27  
Discussion 5 ..................................................... 29  
Conference Agenda ............................................. 30  
List Of Presenters / Moderators / Discussants .................. 34  
List Of Participants ............................................ 37  

This report summarizes the proceedings of the conference as interpreted by the assigned rapporteurs and editor appointed by the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report.

The conference adheres to a variation of the Chatham House Rule. Accordingly, beyond the paper presenters cited, no other attributions have been included in this conference report.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

From 18-19 November 2008, the Maritime Security Programme of RSIS and the National Maritime Foundation (NMF) of India organized a maritime conference at Traders Hotel, Singapore. The conference examined the implications of the rise Chinese and Indian naval powers, in particular the impact on Southeast Asia.

The first session provided a broad overview of the regional strategic environment. The opening speaker Raja Mohan set the stage for the conference by providing an overview of the regional security environment within which the rising powers were operating. The second speaker Huang Jing established the fact that the People’s Liberation Army Navy is the fastest growing force in China’s military by giving a brief overview of China’s naval capability and its projected expansion in the near future. The third speaker Ravi Vohra sought to tease out the trends and nuances of the India–Southeast Asia relationship in strategic terms. The fourth speaker Bronson Percival reassured the conference that the U.S. commitment in Asia will likely remain unchanged in spite of the current financial crisis.

The second session assessed the threats and risks impacting the regional maritime security environment. First, Sam Bateman reviewed a spectrum of threats in the Indo-Pacific region that have an impact on the maritime security of Southeast Asia. Second, Robert Beckman provided an overview of the Cooperative Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore that encouraged user states and other stakeholders to voluntarily cooperate with littoral states to enhance safety, security and environmental protection in the Straits. Third, Masahi Nishihara provided the Japanese perspective by noting that although Japan enjoyed cordial relationships with emerging powers China and India, it is wary of the possibility of conflict between the powers. Fourth, Cai Penghong reassured the conference that China is a stakeholder in maintaining stable, safe and secure oceans, particularly in the East and Southeast Asia. Fifth, Devbrat Chakraborty remarked that the strategic priorities of India and Southeast Asian nations were generally converging since the end of the Cold War. Next, Chang Kwoun Park identified some of the major risks and challenges to regional maritime security, and provided an overview of South Korea’s policy and strategy in the maritime domain. Finally, Mohd Nizam Basiron commented on Malaysia’s perspective of the rise of India and China in light of past, current and emerging maritime security issues and discussed Malaysia’s actions and options in resolving its conundrum over these issues.

The third session examined naval developments and deployments in Asia, as well as the implications of a naval build-up in the region. The first speaker, Norman Friedman raised the important questions of why navies matter, and why a small number of ships have a huge impact on the world. The second speaker, Nalin Dewan provided an overview of the Indian navy’s on-going development plans, as well as recent and planned deployments. The third speaker, Zhang Junshe outlined the three-step development strategy that China pursued in modernizing its national defence and armed forces. The fourth speaker, Rory Medcalf provided an Australian perspective by explaining the context of Australia’s defence requirements. The fifth speaker, Tetsuo Kotani explained the continued relevance of Japan’s Cold War maritime strategy and examined the implications of the Chinese and Indian naval build-up on Southeast Asia. Finally, Michael McDevitt reinforced the leading role of the U.S. navy in preserving stability in regions.

The fourth session explored opportunities for maritime cooperation and confidence building. First, Pradeep Chauhan highlighted the major factors shaping India’s “geo-strategic maritime-security environment”. Second, Li Mingjiang suggested that the future East Asian international order is likely to be shaped by regional maritime strategies and policies, in which China would feature prominently. Third, Stanley Weeks recognized the convergence of U.S. and Indian perspectives on many of the issues raised, such as the importance of geo-strategic concerns, and the shift towards non-traditional security issues, like climate change. Fourth, Takeshi Kohn discuss the different approaches Japan adopted in its treatment of traditional and non-traditional security issues. Finally, Kwa Chong Guan
reiterated the importance of cooperation and confidence building measures, especially for non-traditional security issues.

The fifth session concluded with a discussion on the way forward for maritime security in the region. The moderator Sam Bateman reiterated that the purpose of the conference was to examine the implications of the rise Chinese and Indian naval powers, in particular the impact on Southeast Asia. He noted that there was indeed overlapping interests of the two powers in Southeast Asia as illustrated during the course of the conference. In particular, there were lessons to be learnt from their contrasting approaches. Finally, Bateman emphasized on the importance of finding common interests in maritime security that would bring states together.

**OPENING ADDRESS**

![Image](image_url)

**Kwa Chong Guan, Head (External Programmes), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies**

In his opening address, Mr. Kwa Chong Guan spoke on the role of maritime security forces in the region. The idea of maritime security revolved around the use of navies and defence forces in protecting the nation and its national maritime interests against threats arising primarily of a military nature. There was the notion of the promotion of national maritime interests through naval diplomacy. The levels of naval activities in Southeast Asia are currently high.

Southeast Asia is much aware of the geo-strategic significance of its position astride major shipping routes between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. These routes carry the energy that is vital to Northeast Asian countries, particularly Japan and China. They are also critical to naval mobility both for the United States, as the sole global super sea power, and for the aspirant major regional sea powers, China and India.

The security of regional shipping routes, particularly the Malacca and Singapore Straits, is now the focus of considerable international and regional attention. All indications show that shipping traffic through Southeast Asian waters will increase significantly over the years to come. China, India and Southeast Asia have a strong common interest in the safety and security of that traffic, and this offers scope for cooperation and confidence-building between these potential partners.

In broader strategic terms, there is also the element of competition between the strategic intentions of the major Asian naval powers, i.e. China, India and Japan. China’s and India’s strategic interests clearly overlap in Southeast Asia. There are significant implications of these developments for Southeast Asian countries, particularly for Singapore, and for other major maritime players in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, especially Australia, the Republic of Korea and Japan, as well as the United States. The conference should take the opportunity to review how these other players perceive the new maritime dynamics of Southeast Asia.

In conclusion, as the conference seeks to identify the implications of the naval development plans and deployment patterns of our neighbours, he hoped that the conference will also highlight common interests and the prospects of cooperation and potential maritime confidence and security-building measures and that this meeting would be able to contribute to the existing maritime security literature and policies; and broaden our network of scholars and analysts engaged in the study of maritime security issues.
Admiral Prakash applauded RSIS for bringing about a timely discussion of a sensitive issue at the track II level. The choice of theme was most appropriate because to examine growing maritime power will naturally bring into focus the larger issue of the rise per se of China and India—two large, aspiring and possibly competing maritime powers, which happen to be in the same region. Before the global financial crisis, Asia was projected to host some of the largest economies of the world in the next half of the century. Hence the question would have been: how will these power traverse without too much conflict?

Drawing from history, Adm. Prakash highlighted the differences between the two powers in their journey to past glory. In giving a short brief of both their traditional roles, he also elaborated on the current endeavours and potential ambitions in the future. Despite the difference, he was of the opinion that Asians are generally polite and will do much to avoid confrontation, hence major conflict was unlikely though not entirely impossible. When that happens, aggression will only be constrained by opposing power.

Therefore, he wonders if the acquisition of maritime capability by the two rising powers has to be a zero-sum game? Although there will be overlapping strategic aspirations between the two powers, will it necessarily lead to conflict? Alternatively, should the quest for maritime superiority between the two powers be a cause for concern for Southeast Asian countries? With reference to the growing demand to deal with non-traditional security issues at sea, he was of the opinion that there will be adequate space for both maritime powers to grow simultaneously as there are enough tasks on the high seas for both to attend to, albeit jointly in some cases. However, to adequately address such concerns requires states to work jointly which assume a certain degree of bilateral trust and mutual understanding and rapport which is currently lacking.

1.1 Between Rising Powers—A Broad Strategic Overview

Raja Mohan’s presentation set the stage for the conference in which he gave an overview of the regional security environment within which rising powers are operating. Some saw it through traditional lens where there was contemplation of a balance of power versus cooperative security. Others questioned if the rise of these powers has in fact created the current security dilemma, hence there is rising doubt if cooperative security will ever work. Looking beyond, some has already raised the issue of whether Asia will ever rise to confront the West or will the power struggle always remain with the region. He believed that no matter how one tried to conceptualize and explained the current security concerns within the region, Asia as an emerging community is unique.
Hence, new regional security architecture in Asia might not necessarily need to be structured according to the Westphalia model of institution building. After all, the process of institution building is not without its problem, and at this stage, it is difficult to draw parallels to type-cast these emerging powers and to prescribe a suitable institutional model.

Although the achievement of ASEAN as a regional institution has been significant since its inception, it was argued that such achievements were underpinned by a benign U.S. which has not attracted much resentment until quite recently. With the impending rise of China and progressive normalization of Japan, the question was will ASEAN as an entity of small powers still have leverage over bigger powers in the region?

As the U.S. has long underwritten the security of Asia, the current expansion and creation of new alliance between the U.S. and other regional powers, and between these regional powers to the exclusion of the United States, has created much uncertainty. More importantly as both China and India often assumes an exclusive sphere of influence, which overlapped in reality, it was important to have a full and frank discussion during the course of the conference to mitigate some doubts.

1.2 China and Southeast Asia

By giving a brief overview of China’s naval capability and its projected expansion in the near future, Huang Jing established the fact that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is the fastest growing force in China’s military. By way of progressive expansion, China is expected to acquire naval capabilities not only for use in active defence but one capable of pre-emptive response. However, this rapid expansion has created a dilemma for China.

Huang traced the development of the PLAN’s strategies since the 1980’s. Back then, the strategy was one of active defence. Its main aim was to achieve credible deterrence against potential enemies in green water. By 2005, the PLAN saw itself in transition by enhancing its fast response capability and to ensure sustainability in blue water missions. Huang predicted that from 2020 and beyond, the PLAN’s strategy will be one of pre-emptive response, where it will be capable of fighting massive wars in blue water and provide effective support for land operations.

At this point, Huang was of the opinion that China’s strategic planning was falling behind its rate of expansion. He argued that this was a result of China not having to construct a regional or global strategy as it has been free riding the international security system created and maintained by the United States. However, with its expanding capabilities, will China still continue to align itself to the U.S. or will it scramble to create its own strategy?

Huang believed that the expansion of the PLAN will bring about enormous opportunity and with that, a new set of challenges to Southeast Asia. China has been actively courting enhanced engagement in the region. It has been rather successful in adopting the “ASEAN way” of non-intervention and non-confrontation. However, one cannot help but wonder, would China’s
impending expansion, bringing about increasing stakes and responsibility in the maintenance of peace and stability in the region, see China moving away from those newly adopted principles?

As China is party to various unresolved territorial disputes in the region, it was reasonable for its opponent to feel somewhat nervous of the PLAN’s rapid expansion. Many have started questioning if the “peaceful rise” as proclaimed by China was an assurance that the region will remain peaceful after rise.

Both China and India are touted to be the rising powers in the region. It was still highly questionable if there will be sufficient trust and understanding as to allow for long term cooperation in ensuring regional peace and stability. If that fails, there may be a real risk that the competition and rivalry between the two states would be the source of instability and insecurity in the region.

1.3 India and Southeast Asia

In his commentary, Ravi Vohra seeks to tease out the trends and nuances of the India–Southeast Asia relationship in strategic terms. India and Southeast Asia share an important global common i.e. the Indian Ocean which hosts vital strategic sea lines essential for the economies of both India and countries further east. The strategic environment in the Indian Ocean in his opinion was likely to undergo changes both in the short and medium terms, and he believed that the process will be largely influenced by the United States, China and India.

Despite much speculation of the possible dwindling of U.S. attention to the East, he does not foresee a withdrawal or removal of any strategic arrangements in the short or medium term. The United States, in his opinion, will continue to protect its interests within the region. In doing so, it may seek to balance the security aspect in the Indian Ocean vis-à-vis China, and may, under certain circumstances, deter upcoming new powers from upsetting the prevailing balance.

India is committed to ensure security and stability in the Indian Ocean and has on a number of occasions, expressed its willingness to share responsibility for the same. The pace of India’s defence cooperation with Southeast Asian countries has accelerated in recent years. Vohra was of the opinion that this is largely due to the increased confidence wherein India’s naval and military power is no longer viewed as a threat. He drew examples from the closely guarded relationships India now enjoys with some of the Southeast Asian countries, each with a different focus.

India saw the need of building a close relationship with Myanmar as of great strategic importance. Myanmar is the only Southeast Asian country that shares both a land and maritime border with India. India saw this as the opportunity for greater engagement in the promotion of trade and commerce with the hope of reviving the old silk trade route. On top of that, Myanmar’s domestic politic and China’s strategic moves into Myanmar were of much concern to India from the security point of view.

There is no doubt that the security of this region will continue to be largely determined by the great powers in the maritime domain and therefore there is a need for Southeast Asian nations and India to remain engaged not only with each other but also with the powers that are likely to influence and maintain the peace, stability and security in the region.
1.4 U.S. Engagement with China, India and Southeast Asia

Bronson Percival’s general overview of U.S. policy in Asia was that despite its current domestic turmoil, Asia will receive little more attention from the U.S. than it has during the second Bush administration. He spoke of the U.S. global maritime strategy and force adjustments in the region, and then review U.S. relations with China, India and Southeast Asia.

The U.S. Navy’s “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” pledged continued commitment to regional security, and to deter and dissuade potential adversaries and peer competitors. This new strategy also includes a new emphasis on non-traditional security issues. It also emphasized that expanded cooperative relationships with other nations will contribute to the security and stability of the maritime domain. More broadly, the U.S. recognized that it could not unilaterally deter potential adversaries and mitigate threats short of declaring war.

Although U.S. defence relationships in Asia are mostly an inheritance from the Cold War, the U.S. has been steadily adapting its security footprint under the Bush administration. These adjustments include reductions in U.S. forces in South Korea, revised basing arrangements in Japan, increased reliance on Guam as a major base, more complex and intensive patterns of defence cooperation in Southeast Asia, and the evolution of a strategic partnership with India. Concern has been expressed about a decline in the numbers of U.S. forces stationed in Asia, though “real capabilities” have been maintained. In Southeast Asia, the partnership with Singapore has come to overshadow formal alliances with the Philippines and Thailand.

The Sino-U.S. relationship is inherently complex and a challenge for both governments. The Chinese military build-up targeted at Taiwan and the possible U.S. intervention in the Taiwan Strait has maintained U.S. suspicions of Chinese intentions. The consequences are potentially profound because China is beginning, albeit largely for defensive purposes from China’s perspective, to alter a key element in the balance of power between continental and maritime powers that has been so successful in preserving stability in Asia.

The U.S. views India as a natural partner. But that speculation about an evolving strategic triangle of the United States, China and India has as yet concrete implications for Southeast Asia. India is seldom factored into U.S. policies in Southeast Asia. The rapid expansion of Indian-U.S. bilateral defence cooperation is one element of the new U.S.-Indian “Strategic Partnership” that may have implications for Southeast Asia. The naval component of shared security objectives and growing defence cooperation has attracted considerable attention. Thus just as U.S. naval concerns about Chinese naval capabilities are focused on Taiwan, U.S. naval cooperation with India is focused on the Indian Ocean sea lines of communication.

Southeast Asia is often referred to as strategically important to the United States. Most of it is not. The U.S. does have a permanent strategic interest to retain naval dominance of the SLOCs. From the U.S. perspective, none of the enhanced U.S. cooperation with Southeast Asian states to improve maritime security, has either a Chinese or an Indian security policy angle.

Discussion 1

There is always a general assumption and genuine hope that when one plans, it will follow through. Reality on the other hand dictates that not all strategies will pull through as planned. Many drew parallels on the rise of China to that of the U.S. in the last few centuries; as with those who predicted that the Britain was to fight the U.S. back then, it did not happen.
The issue on the potential of overlapping spheres of influence between China and India was raised with the concerns of possible reaction when that happens. As the obvious assumption was that expanding spheres will eventually clash, it is important to identify how China and India see themselves as great powers rather than speculating and comparing their potential vis-à-vis previous empires, hence try to predict how these emerging powers will eventually behave.

On the issue of institution building, one commented that although power politics is known to be a constraining factor to institution building in the region, should that be reason enough to dismiss the process as a whole? The immediate reaction to this concern was that there are both positive and negative ways to look at issues at hand. Arguably, institution building is only useful when there is no conflict. Hypothetically, one should not be overly confident on what ASEAN as a regional institution might be able to do when faced with the concurrent rise and potential conflict of both China and India.

With reference to the commentary on China, a key observation was that navies do not grow by accident. Its capabilities usually reflect intention although it may not necessarily be based on a clear strategy. Also, there seems to be conflicting literature which suggest that China’s capabilities are perhaps much weaker and less ambitious than was presented in the conference. In reply, the commentator suggested that the stipulated capabilities as presented were in fact a conservative estimate. China has never seen itself as a naval power (it has always been inward looking), and choose to free ride the U.S. grand strategy when it comes to international affairs.

S E S S I O N  2

Regional Maritime Security Environment

2.1 Regional Maritime Security—Threats and Risk Assessments

Sam Bateman reviewed a spectrum of threats in the Indo-Pacific region that might have some impact on the maritime security of Southeast Asia. He gave an assessment of the risks of these threats in terms of their likelihood and the economic, political and strategic consequences for Southeast Asia. Likely developments and trends, as well as lead-times for the emergence of particular threats, were also considered.

The maritime security of Southeast Asia reflects a range of enduring and dynamic factors. Enduring factors are mainly the geography of the region with its complex pattern of archipelagos, islands, bays and gulfs and narrow shipping channels; its heavy dependence on shipping for both domestic and intra-regional trade; and the importance of regional seas and their resources to the well-being of regional peoples. The dynamic factors include sovereignty disputes, the increasing levels and density of shipping traffic in the region, increased exploitation of marine resources, deteriorating fish stocks and marine habitats, growing naval budgets and higher levels of naval activity. The combination and complexity of these enduring and dynamic factors suggest the challenges in promoting maritime security in the region. Meeting these challenges is exacerbated by both the rate of change and the lack of truly effective regional forums in which to develop appropriate cooperative and coordinated measures to deal with them.

While there are numerous minor threats to maritime security in the region, mainly of a non-traditional nature, the most serious threats in terms of their impact on Southeast Asia would be conflict between China and
India (perhaps in coalition with other regional powers), and conflict between ASEAN countries and China in the South China Sea. While the likelihood of these scenarios is very low, the dangers of these threats are increasing and lead-times for their development are shortening as defence budgets grow, naval capabilities were enhanced and the level of naval activity increased in the region. Increased regional expenditure on defence should be of serious concern.

The waters of Southeast Asia are likely to see increased number of surface warships, submarines and maritime aircraft in the years ahead. While these developments may be in response to a feeling of increased maritime insecurity that seems to justify higher defence spending, the developments themselves also have the potential to add to the insecurity in the region. Bateman concluded that the mitigation of these risks requires more attention to preventive diplomacy and maritime confidence and security building measures, including greater transparency with regard to naval operations and exercises, and possible limitations to the acquisition and employment of particular naval capabilities.

2.2 Maritime Security and the Cooperative Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore

Robert Beckman started his presentation by providing an overview of the Cooperative Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (Straits) that was formally launched in September 2007 to encourage user states and other stakeholders to voluntarily cooperate with Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (the littoral states) to enhance safety, security and environmental protection in the Straits.

As the key stakeholders of the Straits, the littoral states agreed earlier on, that the mechanism would be based on the following principles that clearly stipulate that the littoral states have sovereignty and sovereign rights in the Straits; that they have primary responsibility over the safety, environment protection and security of the Straits; and that any measures adopted or taken on these matters must be in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS.

Beckman was of the opinion that this initiative will work for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it is established on the notion that parties to it participated on a purely voluntary basis. As the scheme is inclusive and consistent in nature, each stakeholder will have an equal voice.

The Cooperative Mechanism for the Straits is thus far limited to enhance safety and environmental protection. It does not include any measures to enhance maritime security in the Straits. Beckman gave a detail analysis on some of the possible reasons as to why the littoral states were reluctant to include maritime security cooperation in the Cooperative Mechanism. However, he was of the opinion that the Cooperative Mechanism can be extended to include cooperation to enhance security in the Straits under two specific conditions. First of all, it must be consistent with the set of principles agreed upon by the parties to ensure that such cooperation does not undermine or infringe the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the littoral states. The second condition is that such cooperative arrangements should be limited to issues under the purview of the IMO and national agencies responsible for maritime administration and IMO matters.

The Cooperative Mechanism has received support from major maritime powers as well as non-government organizations with special interest in the safety and security of commercial shipping. Therefore, it is likely to serve as a confidence-building measure which will enhance the possibility of cooperation on maritime security issues in other forums. There is scope to extend the Cooperative Mechanism to include such issues of maritime security.

Associate Professor Robert Beckman, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore
2.3 The Japanese Perspective

Japan has always paid close attention to its maritime security environment. Apart from its keen interest in the sea lanes of communications, China recent increase of defence budget and naval build-up were of particular concern. As their naval capabilities grew, Masahi Nishihara was of the opinion that the possibility of conflict between the Chinese and Indian navies, and between the Chinese and U.S. navies, also became larger. Although Japan enjoys cordial relationships with these emerging powers, it is still wary of such possibilities leading to conflict.

![Dr. Masahi Nishihara, President, Research Institute for Peace and Security](image)

With its current capabilities, China’s naval activities around the Japanese islands have raised much concern in Tokyo. Japanese security specialists perceived those activities as a deliberate posture to demonstrate its blue-water naval capability, although it may not necessarily be targeted at Japan. Hence, when the U.S. decided to reinforce its naval capabilities in the Pacific in 2006, Japan believed that this strategy will not only maintain the naval balance in the Pacific, it was greatly beneficial to Japanese security to say the least.

As Japan does have a vital interest in the main sea lines of communication within the region, it has dedicated much effort to cooperate and assist the littoral states in enhancing the safety and security of these waterways. However, the littoral states and user states should work on contingency plans for the Straits in case of a large-scale disaster such as the tsunami in December 2004. Perhaps Singapore can serve as a coordinating office for this purpose. This kind of cooperative mechanism between interested states and parties will help improve the security environment of the Straits of Malacca and will further help enhance the security of Southeast Asia.

2.4 The Chinese Perspective

China is among the stakeholders in maintaining stable, safe and secure oceans, particularly in East and Southeast Asia. With its rapid economic growth, China’s demand for oil and raw materials and its increasing trade exchanges lead to debates on China’s rise as a sea power and its implications on Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Hence, Cai Penghong not only commented on China’s growth arising from Asian dynamism and globalization, he also discussed the demand for energy and other existing problems, and concluded by analysing the implications of China’s domestic policy settings on its quest for engaging Southeast Asian approaches to the Cooperative Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

![Dr. Cai Penghong, Research Professor, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences](image)

Cai believed that much of China’s growth can be attributed to trade regionalization as well as globalization. To sustain that growth, China is heavily dependant on shipping transportation and is actively expanding old ports and building new ones. The fact that regionalization, as well as globalization processes link China to its neighboring region and almost all corners of the world, proves that China has been very much interdependent on East Asia and other regions.

Both Northeast and Southeast Asia put more effort in economic construction, and energy consumption has been up-surging. Energy security cannot be separate from the issue of potential or possible disruption of
energy-import supplies, which is directly related to the issue of the security of the sea lines. Of course these are not the only set of problems China is currently facing. The issues of non-traditional threats, maritime boundaries delimitation, and environment degradation are all contributing to the insecurity in the maritime domain within the region.

Cai ventured to suggest that conflict may be averted for the following reasons. Firstly, the awareness of common interests might prevent conflict and mitigate rivalries. Secondly, China is concentrating its efforts on economic development internally and seeking a harmonious periphery as a part of its new diplomacy. Thirdly, it is important to recognize that the U.S. is a factor in East Asia, playing the role of a “balancer”.

China does not have an exact maritime strategy but was concerned about the maritime security issues, particularly about the stability and security of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. In the meantime, China seeks to improve military cooperation within the region, starting with expanding military dialogue and exchanges, and further conducting and institutionalizing defense cooperation.

2.5 The Indian Perspective

Since the end of the Cold War, the strategic priorities of India and Southeast Asian nations in general were converging. Devbrat Chakraborty was of the opinion that there has been a shift from ambiguity to a much greater acceptance of India’s role as a stabilizing and balancing force in the region’s evolving security and economic equations. A number of confidence building measures that India undertook, and a greater appreciation of Indian maritime threats by the Southeast Asian countries, has created a new era of cooperation. Based on the maritime security environment and indeed the overall security situation, India continues to modernize its defence capabilities for which scarce resources have been devoted to varying extents but never more than India could afford.

India and China have, though slowly, expanded their defence exchanges. There are also possibilities that India and China will cooperate on issues relating to energy security and trans-border pipelines. The former is already a reality with Indian and Chinese petroleum companies bidding jointly for oil equity in other countries.

A “security dilemma”, is thus apparent. Expanding Indian and Chinese maritime profiles in the region are to some extent a natural consequence of their growing economies, among other factors. Yet, mutual trust is hard to establish. Hence, Chakraborty was of the opinion that the best way forward is to recognize the destabilizing potential of the security dilemma and take steps to intensify mutual security dialogue and cooperation. The U.S.-China engagement which varies from extensive cooperation in some areas, to completely different positions in other areas is particularly demonstrative.

No discussion on regional security can be complete without considering China. In so far as the India-China interaction is concerned, few doubt that China’s most likely strategic Asian competitor is India. Within the region, the maritime domain is where this competition is likely to be dominant. As such, Chakraborty believed that both China and India ought to seriously consider putting more effort in strong confidence-building measures. He commented that the attempt to ensure security by maintaining large and expensive weapon inventories is not the problem—it is merely a symptom of the problem. If armament levels are genuinely maintained as a defensive posture, then the underlying problem, to which arms control is a partial solution, is a lack of mutual trust or confidence.
Although he did not foresee any impending conflict in the near future, much need to be done within the maritime domain to ensure good order at sea and the safety of navigation and security of the sea lanes. The need of the hour is to accord greater political impetus to information sharing, compatibility of laws, interagency coordination, cooperative capacity building and improving interoperability. All sides are working towards this end with a positive frame of mind and the future, by and large, bodes well.

2.6 The Korean Perspective

In his commentary, Park Chang Kwoun identified some of the major risks and challenges to regional maritime security, and he gave a brief review of naval development in the region. He concluded with an overview of South Korea’s policy and strategy in the maritime domain.

In his opinion, maritime security in the region showed three common characteristics: First, regional countries take dual positions on cooperation and aggression. Parties to opposing territorial claims had agreed on peaceful settlement of the matter and some had gone so far as negotiating joint development endeavours. Yet, all countries firmly maintain their territorial claims of the offshore islets and are constantly trying to strengthen their rights. Second, regional countries take on aggressive postures and strategies to build a favourable environment that is in line with their interests. Therefore the strengthening of naval arms by regional powers turns on a warning bell for maritime security. Third, maritime disputes will be the greatest barrier for the development of security cooperation among regional countries.

Naval build-up of regional powers increases the uncertainty of maritime security. China, India and Japan are strengthening their naval powers to expand their maritime interests and play a more positive international role suited to their new status. Under the current security conditions that lack mutual trust and credibility, the new security demands can impel regional powers to build stronger naval forces. The rapid naval development of potential great powers even suggests the possibility of new power competition within the region. The increase in naval strengths of East Asian countries displays a kind of security dilemma. In order to resolve this dilemma, a practical cooperation plan must be devised to enhance the transparency of naval strengths and mutual trust.

South Korea maintained security arrangements that mainly focus on North Korea. In this globalized world, South Korea recognized the importance of maritime security and is developing a new maritime strategy to positively protect its interests. However, South Korea is concerned about the rise in naval strengths of regional powers and the impact that conflict between these powers will have on South Korea. In South Korea’s perspective, developing a multilateral security cooperation system is very important to peacefully resolve various maritime security issues in the region.

South Korea pursues the following policies and strategies for its maritime security. First, it seeks to actively protect and maintain its interest concerning maritime rights. Second, South Korea is willing to actively participate in supporting international activities and cooperation systems for the safety of sea lanes. Third, South Korea will expand its international peacekeeping activities and humanitarian assistance. South Korea is in discussion with regional countries to develop cooperative mechanism to properly counter natural disasters which would be an important step for the enhancement of mutual respect.
2.7 The Malaysian Perspective

Bearing in mind the complexity of the maritime domain in Malaysia, Mohd Nizam Basiron commented on Malaysia’s perspective of the rise of India and China in light of past, current and emerging maritime security issues and discussed Malaysia’s actions and options in resolving these issues.

Both India and China have articulated their visions through a set of policy and strategy: India via its “Look East Policy” and China through its “String of Pearls” strategy. Both approaches envisage certain roles and positions for the two countries in the economy and presumably the geopolitics, and both met in Southeast Asia which could be considered as the confluence of India-China strategic interests. It was clear that India and China appeared to have adopted somewhat different approaches in their engagement with regional states.

There are other “players” in the regional maritime security equation besides India and China. The two most active ones are Japan and the United States. Like China, Japan has a strategic and economic interest in ensuring the safety of navigation and security in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea as most of its oil supply passes through these areas. U.S. interest however, has less to do with its own energy security and more with security in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea, the war on terror and presumably the need to counter China’s growing maritime influence in the region.

Malaysia and its neighbours face an interesting conundrum in trying to balance national interests with long running superpower rivalries and the emerging influence of regional naval powers. Over time, Malaysia has taken different approaches in managing external pressures on its maritime domain. From Malaysia’s perspective, its maritime security environment is a complex and convoluted mix of national and bilateral issues, layered against geopolitical and strategic interests of the world’s remaining superpower and the region’s emerging powers.

It is an interesting dilemma for a country like Malaysia in terms of the approaches it needs to adopt in reconciling the interests and sometimes demands of the many interested parties. It has been suggested that Malaysia and other countries in the region were “hedging” presumably out of political pragmatism and economic expediency. The approach has worked so far for Malaysia in the absence of any major conflict between the powers.

Discussion 2

With reference to the newly established cooperative mechanism in the Malacca Straits and on the issue of not making it compulsory for ships to pay a toll, it was explained that Article 26 of UNCLOS clearly stipulates that coastal states can only charge for services actually rendered to ships within their territorial waters e.g. pilotage. The equivalent provision on the Straits, i.e. Article 43, might be used as a substitute although it is provided for user and littoral states to cooperate to enhance safety. One would foresee strong reactions from the United States, other user states and also private shipping companies, as they will see it as the first of many of such charges in other waterways. The littoral states, in negotiating the current mechanism, deliberately avoided the issue although they did consider the possibility (of the need to revive the whole debate of having a toll should this mechanism for cooperation fail.) On the same topic of cooperative mechanism and more specifically on its ranking matrix of user states, it was explained that the littoral states deliberately avoided the need to define who a user state would be. Essentially, the mechanism seeks to appeal to those who benefitted from the use of the Straits to come forward and contribute.
A concern was raised to the effect that India may not be comfortable being told that China does not see it as a threat. Nevertheless such threat perception may very well be interpreted in many ways. It could draw a positive connotation that projects positive engagements and partnership. The key reaction to this concern raised was that China has always viewed the U.S. as its main threat. India on the other hand has been seen in the light of a friendly neighbour; hence it was surprising to China that such sentiments were not reciprocated.

On issues regarding China’s expanding interests in Indian ports, it was commented that perhaps one should not conflate commercial interest and strategic interests. One ought to recognize that like any other states with an expanding economy, over time, China’s global outreach will also be extended. Similar to other maritime powers, the PLA navy in its normal operation would be present at certain ports regardless of China’s having an interest in that port.

With regard to the potential danger of a submarine incident happening in the seas of Asia, participants were generally content that the current protocols and code of conduct in place to ensure safe submarine operations would be sufficient. More importantly they have faith that the tacit agreement since the Cold War implying that submarines should not be destroyed will be a constraining factor in the event of a standoff.

SESSION 3
Naval Development And Deployment

3.1 Naval Developments and Deployments—Shaping Naval Power: Implications of the Naval Build-up in Asia

Norman Friedman began his presentation by raising the important questions of why navies matter, and why a small number of ships have a huge impact on the world. This is because it is easier to move military assets over water than land. For instance, while it was difficult for the Soviets to transport troops to Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan war, it was relatively easier for the U.S. to move troops to Afghanistan during its recent war on terrorism. In sum, the essence of sea power is a combination of mobility, staying power, and the tracklessness of the sea.

He proceeded to elaborate that one of the key ways of evaluating navies is assessing how well they play the “away game”, i.e. how good their expeditionary capabilities were and how well they conduct long range ocean surveillance. He emphasized that a big navy is only useful if it is accompanied by significant surveillance capabilities. Friedman noted that during the Cold War, only the U.S. and the Soviet Union possessed ocean surveillance capabilities.

Friedman also explained the importance of ocean surveillance capabilities for navies. For instance, he assessed that the Chinese submarine was able to “pop up” undetected near a U.S. carrier because of pre-established ocean surveillance systems. However, he noted that while it may possible to establish ocean surveillance systems near home, having the capability to bring it along for an “away game” was another challenge.

In addition, command and control for most naval forces is largely a matter of creating a usable tactical picture showing what is happening, preferably beyond the horizon. Officers fight their ships and formations on the basis of that picture. The system may include
commands, but picture-keeping is its key function. Fighting on the basis of a shared picture is the essence of what some now call network-centric warfare.

Friedman proceeded to explain the importance of endurance. Generally, size is important not only for seakeeping but also for habitability. Weapons must also be replenished at sea. It is rarely appreciated how difficult it is to bring reload missiles aboard surface combatants. Without aircraft carriers, the weapons of most warships cannot be replenished, thus limiting the endurance of expeditionary forces. As such, carriers offer a unique capability for sustained combat, while a non-carrier navy has much more limited endurance once it begins an attack. Hence, it is not the size of ships that matters the most. For instance, the British Royal Navy is considered a “blue water” navy because it can be replenished at sea, but it continues to be limited by its inability to replenish missiles at sea.

He proceeded to stress that navies are essentially built for contingencies, hence it is difficult to differentiate offensive from defensive capabilities. To an unappreciated degree, a navy depends on wide-area sensing for support. If it has no such system, then it is far less effective than a navy of similar size and configuration which enjoys wide-area support. It is also possible that a navy derives much of its strength from a wide-area sensing and command system which cannot be moved far from home—the navy looks offensive, but it is really a kind of mobile coastal defence.

Friedman concluded by stressing that military hardware is often less important than other intangibles like personnel, doctrine and training. For instance, navies that looked good on paper have performed badly in practice. In addition, navies can afford to have fewer ships, as long as they enjoy good coordination through well-established command and control systems. He also suggested that the future of land warfare would look more naval-like with the introduction of datalink systems.

3.2 Naval Developments and Deployments—Indian Navy

Nalin Dewan began his presentation by providing an overview of the development of the Indian Navy since India’s independence in 1947. He mentioned that the Indian Navy of the future will lean towards greater blue water tasks as it acknowledges the growing role that the Indian Coast Guard will play in brown water tasks.

Dewan provided a glimpse of the on-going development plans of the Indian Navy including new aircraft carriers, guided-missile frigates and destroyers, large amphibious craft and submarines. He emphasized that the Indian Navy’s current planning perspective in terms of force levels is driven by a conceptional shift from “numbers” to “capabilities”.

Next, he explained the factors driving the direction and rate of growth of the Indian Navy—primarily the need to ensure stability in India’s maritime neighbourhood amidst its overarching maritime interests. India has a long coastline that faces many security challenges, many ports that stud its coastline, a sizable exclusive economic zone, a modest but rapidly-growing merchant-shipping fleet; as well as trade imperatives that drive its efforts on the eastern flank of the Indian Ocean.

Dewan emphasized the importance of the Straits of Malacca and highlighted that although concerted action
by the littoral states have caused incidences of piracy to dwindle quite significantly, the Straits remains vulnerable to terrorist attack. He mentioned that India is not only a “user-state” but is also a “funnel-state” and its concerns are high on both counts. However, India recognizes the sensitivities of Malaysia and Indonesia and is quite unwilling to force its way into the security paradigm within the Straits.

He proceeded to cover the Indian Navy’s recent and planned deployments. The Indian Navy actively pursues various initiatives towards developing partnerships in the maritime arena for maintaining freedom of navigation at sea, prevention of piracy and support for sea-borne trade and commerce. Over the past year, the Indian Navy has put into place a new deployment philosophy in keeping with its operational and cooperation imperatives—showing regular presence in the Indian Ocean region and avoiding operational over-stretch.

Dewan explained that the Indian Navy is keen to conduct exercises with navies of the region because they provide opportunities to enhance cooperation, foster mutual understanding and advance interoperability. He emphasized that such mutually beneficial interaction is instrumental in developing relationships that would equip them with the capability to respond to a variety of crises such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions.

He also mentioned that unlike 2007, wherein most of the pre-planned exercises were conducted off the shores overseas, in 2008, the Indian Navy conducted pre-planned exercises on the Indian seabords. As 2009’s deployments are planned to balance India’s ties with friends in other regions, it would see the Indian Navy exercising beyond Indian shores.

The Indian Navy also actively participates in the creation of security interdependencies with both regional and extra-regional states for technology sharing and development, exchange of information related to piracy and illicit trafficking, synergistic employment of forces to counter terrorism, and, enhancing maritime security in the region. Initiatives include “MILAN” and coordinated patrols with Indonesia and Thailand to check poaching, smuggling, drug trafficking and other illegal activities in the region.

Dewan concluded that India is the geographical fulcrum of the Indian Ocean and its interests are linked to the seas around it. India realizes that its security, development, trade and prosperity are dependent on regional security. Thus promoting a favourable maritime security situation in its neighbourhood is a major concern of India. India aims to be a catalyst for peace and harmony through the maintenance of a robust presence, a strong deterrent posture, and, cooperative engagement with both regional and extra-regional maritime powers.

### 3.3 Naval Developments and Deployments—Chinese Navy

Zhang Junshe commenced his presentation by highlighting the three-step development strategy China pursues in modernizing its national defence and armed forces. The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010. The second is to make major progress around 2020. The third is to reach the strategic goal of building informationized armed forces capable of winning informationized warfare by the mid-21st century.

![Senior Captain Zhang Junshe, Naval Institute of Military Science, PLA Navy, China](image)

In accordance with the three-step development strategy in modernizing its national defence and armed forces, the PLA Navy will continue to implement the military strategy of active defence in the future. It is working to build itself into a modern maritime force consisting of combined arms with both nuclear and conventional means of operations. The PLA Navy will give high priority to the development of maritime information systems, as well as new-generation weaponry and
equipment. The PLA Navy is also endeavouring to build mobile maritime troops capable of conducting operations under conditions of informationization, and strengthen its overall capabilities of operations in offshore waters, joint operations and integrated maritime support.

Next, he elaborated on the main drives of the modernization process of the PLA Navy. First, the PLA Navy is following the trends of worldwide revolution in military affairs, especially in the development of informationized weaponry, which poses both challenges and opportunities for the PLA Navy. Second, it is adapting to the demands of the development of China’s reforms and opening-up, especially in terms of human resource management, professional development and logistical support. Third, the new international security environment requires the PLA Navy to improve its capabilities of countering various security threats and accomplishing diversified military tasks, and to ensure that it can, not only deter and win wars but also effectively respond to crises and maintain peace. At present, the PLA Navy is still in the phase of mechanization and at the initial stage of informationization.

Zhang proceeded to emphasize that China’s peaceful development is not intended to pose any threat to other countries. China is committed to fostering a cooperative relationship of mutual benefit with other countries and working with them to promote common security. He stressed that China pursues a national defence policy which is purely defensive in nature and would not carry out an arms race with any other nation. The main missions of the PLA Navy are to maintain state sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, to safeguard national development interests, to respond to various security threats and to maintain world peace.

He subsequently highlighted the PLA Navy’s participation in various international conferences such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), as well as bilateral maritime exercises with navies from Pakistan, India, Republic of Korea, France, United Kingdom, Australia, Thailand, U.S. and Russia.

Zhang concluded by proposing suggestions for strengthening maritime security cooperation between the PLA Navy and navies of other countries. They included maritime information sharing and security dialogues, setting up maritime military communication channels, fighting against maritime crimes, as well as holding joint military exercises in the non-traditional fields such as maritime search and rescue, and humanitarian relief.

3.4 Naval Developments and Deployments—Australian Navy

Rory Medcalf began his presentation by explaining the context of Australia’s defence requirements—an island continent with no immediate conventional military threat to its territory. However, anxiety permeates Australian strategic culture. This draws on a historic sense of isolation, and feeds into a corresponding perceived need for a powerful friend. Australia’s interests do extend far beyond its territory, and this is a major rationale for its armed forces. It is acutely dependent on seaborne trade and the security of sea lines for communication.

Mr. Rory Medcalf, Programme Director, International Security, Lowy Institute

He elaborated that Australia’s unique strategic circumstances and history have given rise to an apparent polarization in its national defence debate: recurring differences over whether Australia’s limited military resources should be focused on expeditionary operations in partnership with others (primarily the United States) or on the defence of Australia and its maritime approaches. In the post-Cold War era, the
missions and roles of the Australian Navy have been constabulary and diplomatic far more often than they have been of a war fighting nature.

Medcalf pointed out that Australia presently has a mid-sized navy designed for a wide variety of roles across a very large area of ocean. Its key combatants comprise frigates and conventional submarines. However, platforms alone are not an accurate measure of capability. While Australia is currently less than formidable in area air defence and anti-submarine warfare, it has a surveillance and networking advantage over most regional navies, due both to its alliance relationship with the U.S. and to some far-sighted national capabilities such as the Jindalee over-the-horizon radar network.

He proceeded to provide an assessment of the prospective roles and missions of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) in the years ahead. For instance, Australia will continue to need to fulfil a wide variety of non-combat maritime security tasks, covering a very large area, from the South Pacific to the vicinity of the Persian Gulf. As a U.S. ally, Australia will need to have some capabilities that would be useful to and relatively interoperable within U.S.-led coalitions, including potential high-end war fighting. The defence of Australian territory will remain a core function of the Navy. Concerns about rising capabilities of other navies in the wider region will be prominent in Australian defence thinking—even when there are no signs of hostile intent from rising powers. Medcalf also introduced several possible trajectories of development for the RAN, varying in their degree of likelihood and ambition.

Medcalf explained that even as Australia moves to improve its own naval capabilities, it will continue to place emphasis on partnership with others in maritime security. Australia has a good track record of utilizing naval diplomacy not only for broad objectives of confidence-building but also to form habits of co-operation, communication and common procedures with partners—such as Singapore and Japan—as well as to assist smaller navies in building their capacity. One net effect of this is to improve the region’s overall capacity to contribute to regional and indeed global “public goods” in maritime security. Engagement with India, and to some degree with China, is now a priority for the RAN, in line with Australia’s broader positive ties with these giants.

Medcalf concluded by providing a summary of the RAN’s forthcoming challenges. First, it needs to develop greater strategic weight while retaining the flexibility required for Australia’s exceptionally diverse security needs. Second, it needs to engage India without feeding the myth of a China containment strategy. Finally, it needs to help engage China as a genuine contributor of public goods in maritime security, but without compromising either the commitment to the U.S. alliance or the wider regional interest in ensuring that China’s rising naval strength—while constructively accommodated—does not become a destabilizing factor.

3.5 Naval Developments and Deployments—Japanese Navy

Tetsuo Kotani commenced his presentation by sharing the lessons Japan learnt from its Pacific War experience. The history of the Pacific War is valuable to examine how geography affected naval warfare in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean and how Japan developed its post war maritime strategy. It is also valuable to consider the implications of the Chinese and Indian naval build-up today on Southeast Asia.

Mr. Tetsuo Kotani, Research Fellow, Ocean Policy Research Foundation

He proceeded to trace the development of Japan’s maritime strategy during the Cold War and post Cold War periods. Japan’s maritime strategy is essentially aimed at preventing armed attack against Japanese territory from hostile states across the narrow strip of waters separating it from the continent. At the same time, it is meant to restrict power projection of hostile
states into the Pacific and Indian Oceans, through which Japan’s vital sea lanes run. In other words, Japan’s maritime strategy envisions sea control in Japanese marginal seas—the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea, and the Philippines Sea.

In order to implement this strategy during the Cold War, Japan developed an effective, high-technology anti-submarine and air-defence network along the Japanese archipelago. Japan’s naval power reached up to only 1,000 miles from home, but, augmented by the U.S. carrier strike group based at Yokosuka, Japan, virtually contained within the Sea of Japan the Soviet Far Eastern fleet, based at Vladivostok.

Kotani elaborated that given the diversified threats after the Cold War, Japanese naval power now assumes a wide variety of roles—from missile defence and counter-proliferation to disaster relief/humanitarian assistance—while promoting partnerships with nations along its vital sea lanes, including China and India, through confidence building and capacity building. In addition, North Korea and cross-Taiwan Strait relations continue to be Japan’s security concerns in the Far East.

He subsequently discussed the implications of the rise of Chinese and Indian naval powers. For instance, he cautioned that China’s growing maritime ambition raises grave concerns for Japan’s sea lane security. While encircling the South China Sea, China, becoming a net importer of oil in 1993, began to develop footholds (or “pearls”) along its sea lanes like the ones in Myanmar and Pakistan, to ensure sea lane and energy security. He acknowledged that while the “string of pearls” strategy of bases and diplomatic ties may not be guided by Beijing, the strategy, pressing on both sides of the Malacca Straits, is against the strategic interests of Tokyo and Washington.

As for the implication of the rise of Indian naval power, Kotani noted that India is the only nation which has a reliable naval power in the Indian Ocean with experience of actual carrier operation in war. In October 2008, Tokyo and New Delhi made a joint security announcement to further facilitate bilateral security cooperation. He recognized that such a security partnership would serve to counterbalance the Chinese “string of pearls” strategy.

Kotani concluded by highlighting the continued relevance of Japan’s Cold War maritime strategy. For example, Japan’s naval power, augmented by U.S. naval power, could still be used to prevent Chinese naval power from reaching the Indian Ocean by restraining the Chinese fleet in the north-western Pacific.

3.6 Naval Developments and Deployments—U.S. Perspective

Michael McDevitt began his presentation by reinforcing the leading role of the U.S. Navy in preserving stability in regions of vital importance to U.S. national interest. In particular, the U.S. would not permit conditions under which its maritime forces would be impeded from freedom of manoeuvre and freedom of access, nor will it permit an adversary to disrupt the global supply chain by attempting to block vital sealines of communication and commerce.

In the western Pacific, the U.S. Seventh Fleet has been performing the missions of forward presence and sea control since the Korean War era. Its successful execution of these missions has been an important contributor to Asia’s stable and relatively predictable security environment since the end of the Vietnam War. The sustained presence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet effectively checks the ability of continental powers to exercise “boots on the ground” military influence. Today, as it has for decades, China dominates the continent while the U.S. and its island and archipelagic allies are, for the time being, militarily predominant in maritime Asia.
He elaborated that it is an implied mission of the all the U.S. forces in the Pacific area, including the Seventh Fleet, to make certain that as China’s power grows, it is not able to militarily coerce Asian nations into agreements they would not otherwise have been willing to accept. In other words, to prevent China from brandishing its growing capabilities to settle the Taiwan question or resolve other outstanding maritime claims by force majeure alone.

McDevitt noted that the PLA Navy has grown over the past 15 years. This clearly implies that China’s leaders, military and civilian, found the need to address strategic interests or vulnerabilities in the maritime domain compelling. China’s leaders believe that the strategic interests of the state can only be secured with a robust naval force.

He assessed that the PLA had adopted the Soviet template—employ a very effective open-ocean surveillance system to detect approaching naval forces and then use this information to muster attacks by land-based aircraft and submarines. The PLA has also apparently determined that the area within the so-called “first island chain”, or about 200 nautical miles from its mainland, is the sea control area, whereas the region further to sea would be considered the “sea denial” area—a place where one contests for sea control. Specifically, China aims to have the ability to deny the U.S. military access to the region so it could not interfere with a PLA use of force to resolve many of its outstanding maritime strategic issues.

McDevitt next discussed the implications of the competing strategic concepts of China and the United States. First, any Chinese maritime strategy that is effective in denying support to Taiwan, is almost by definition equally as effective in denying U.S. assistance to Japan and South Korea because of the maritime geography of the western Pacific. Second, until Beijing renounces the use of force in dealing with the issue of reunification with Taiwan this factor is going inhibit the development of a truly cordial and trusting military to military relationship between China and the United States. Third, there is the need for the U.S. to dispel the perception that China has the ability to trump U.S. presence in the region if it chooses to.

In conclusion, McDevitt remarked that while the U.S. has been “transforming”, China is improving its anti-access capabilities for strategically defensive purposes. By doing this, however, it is beginning to “intrude” into the maritime region that has been the preserve of the U.S. and its allies for the past decades. Left unaddressed, this will have the effect of upsetting the decades-old balance of power that has been so successful in preserving stability in the region. It is unlikely that Washington will allow its strategic position in Asia, which depends upon the ability to use the seas to guarantee the security of our East Asian allies, and pursue American national interests, to be undermined.

Discussion 3

It was reiterated that China was not adopting a “string of pearls” strategy and that any assessments should be based on evidence rather than hypothetic assumptions. It was a reality that the Chinese Navy was developing fast. However, the pre-emptive response capability could be a defensive posture and not necessarily offensive. In addition, U.S.-China relations do not have to be a zero-sum game, as there were many avenues of cooperation for the two countries. In fact, it was noted that both China and the U.S. do agree on the maintenance of the status quo on Taiwan, as long as Taiwan does not unilaterally declare independence.

A member of the audience raised a question on the Indian Navy’s sealift capabilities, especially with regards to humanitarian operations, as well as the deployment of marine commandos in counter-terrorist operations. The Indian Navy had a number of LSTs that could be used for humanitarian operations, and generally the Indian Navy is sufficiently equipped to handle any humanitarian and disaster efforts in the foreseeable future. While counter-terrorist operations are not the primary task of the marine commandoes, they could perform the function if required.

A question was raised on whether U.S. response to the Chinese naval build-up was a question of Taiwan or an issue of Chinese threat to U.S. dominance.
The reply to that query was that it is not an issue of Taiwan per se but rather a question of U.S. credibility as the security guarantor in the region. Therefore, if China renounced the use of force, it would dramatically change the strategic environment of the region. In the meantime, Taiwan remained the only likely flashpoint between the U.S. and China.

On the issue on how it would be possible to insulate military to military relations from the political ups and downs in China, it was suggested that frequent dialogues can be helpful to build stronger ties and to promote a better understanding of strategies and intentions.

### SESSION 4

**Cooperation And Confidence Building**

#### 4.1 Cooperation and Confidence Building—Scope for Maritime Cooperation and Confidence Building

**Pradeep Chauhan** began his presentation by highlighting the three major factors shaping India’s geo-strategic maritime-security environment. First, the geographical conformation of the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific regions; second, by India’s own national maritime interests; and third, by the interplay of the geo-strategies of other maritime powers with that of India.

Next, he explained the significance of geo-strategy before emphasizing its essence—*where one stands on any given security issue depends upon where one sits*. As far as India is concerned, she “sits” at the natural junction of the busy international shipping lanes that criss-crosses the Indian Ocean, and this determines much of its security viewpoint. As such, the Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard view themselves as major stabilizing forces in this great movement of trade and resources across the Indian Ocean, not just for themselves, but for the world at large.

Chauhan noted that the concept of security has changed steadily over the years—from a narrowly defined notion of military security, to the incorporation of many aspects of “human security”. While “military” maritime security continues to enjoy primacy for the Indian Navy, India’s thinking about maritime security is now also firmly established within a new construct that incorporates military, political, economic, societal and environmental dimensions, and recognizes the many linkages between them.
He proceeded to provide an elaboration on several significant threats to human-security, including wars, international terrorism, drugs and arms smuggling, human trafficking, environmental degradation, as well as energy, food and water shortages—which are becoming inseparable from military threats. He also illustrated the security implications of environmental issues—a potential refugee issue resulting from the disappearance of low-lying areas like the Maldives due to rising sea-levels caused by global warming.

Chauhan explained that the Indian Navy firmly believes that these challenges can be met only through a regionally inclusive process of cooperative security. It continues to view “Constructive Engagement” as the primary means of achieving and assuring mutually beneficial maritime security, stability, safety and consequent collective prosperity among all littoral nation-states of the Asia Pacific. An important aspect of this “constructive engagement” includes cooperative mechanisms for regional humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

He also noted that there are many overlapping bilateral and multilateral security constructs, forums and groupings in the Asia-Pacific region such as the ASEAN, ASEAN+3, APEC, ARF, the 6-Party Talks, and the East Asia Summit. At the naval level, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) is clearly the most important multilateral security construct. Chauhan explained that all these overlapping bilateral and multilateral security constructs are manifestations of the regional drive towards cooperative security through “constructive engagement”.

Likewise, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), was also founded upon these “non-traditional” security-concepts, involving “cooperative” rather than “competitive” security and “comprehensive” rather than narrowly “military” security. For instance, IONS seeks to provide a regional forum through which the “Chiefs-of-Navy” of all the littoral states of the IONS can periodically meet to constructively engage one another through the creation and promotion of regionally relevant mechanisms, events and activities.

Chauhan concluded by suggesting the possibility of future cooperation between the IONS and other security arrangements like the WPNS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. He also believed that the IONS movement would represent the key to many of the maritime security challenges encountered by states located in the Indian Ocean.

4.2 Cooperation and Confidence Building—China and Maritime Cooperation in East Asia: Recent Developments and Future Prospect

Li Mingjiang commenced his presentation by suggesting that the future East Asian international order is likely to be significantly shaped by regional states’ maritime strategies and policies. China features prominently in this process given its immense material power, national aspirations, geographical location, and entangling geostrategic and territorial contentions with many other players. China’s role and its position in the new regional maritime order will be shaped by four major factors: the growth of its blue water navy, the development of maritime cooperative regimes, Chinese intentions, and ultimately, the resultant structure of interactions among major players in the East Asian seas region.

Assistant Professor Li Mingjiang, RSIS

He noted that many analysts who focus on the growth of China’s naval power tend to develop negative views, predicting that its growing naval power will destabilize the region in the future. Li emphasized that while it is important to watch closely the development of China’s hard military power, attention to Chinese intentions and current policy on East Asian maritime issues is necessary to arrive at a more balanced, arguably more accurate understanding of the trajectory of China’s maritime strategy and policy in the years to come.
Li elaborated that the PLA has made notable progress in engaging the militaries of many other countries. These include growing military transparency as evidenced in the five defence white papers, more active participation in joint exercises, widening bilateral and multilateral defence consultations, participation in international disaster relief activities, and international peacekeeping operations.

He explained that the primary objective for China’s military diplomacy is to ensure a stable international environment, especially in its neighbourhood, to allow China to concentrate on its domestic developmental programmes. Specifically, China intends to strengthen military cooperation with other countries in Asia to enhance mutual confidence, reduce the “China threat” misconception, and prevent “Taiwan independence” from happening. China believes its military diplomacy within the international community in recent years has helped build trust and reduce misgivings towards China.

Li proceeded to explain that the growing Chinese military openness and the gradual change of mindset are also reflected in China’s new policy in the South China Sea. Abandoning its hitherto rigid position and adamant pursuit of sovereign and territorial interests, Beijing has recently adopted a policy of balancing between sovereignty, development, and security in the South China Sea. The new posture is characterized as a strategy of “relative restraint” in the past decade.

China’s new posture in the South China Sea resulted from its shrewd calculation of national interests. China’s own need of economic development, the collective pressures from ASEAN, and the strategic presence of other major powers, particularly the United States, effectively restrained Beijing from assertively pushing for its interests in the SCS.

He next highlighted some of China’s major concerns for further maritime cooperation in East Asia. Some of the biggest obstacles to China-U.S. military exchanges include U.S. perceptions of the “Chinese military threat”, as well as the Chinese belief of the U.S. intention to establish a strategic encirclement against China. Other issues reflecting a lack of strategic mistrust include contentions over Chinese military transparency, and the Taiwan issue. At the regional level, there are other Chinese concerns about the strategic intentions of other major powers. There remains insufficient strategic trust between China and other major powers in the East Asian region, such as Japan.

Li concluded by suggesting that while a grand cooperative regime is still not possible from a Chinese perspective, China is likely to agree to more extensive and substantive maritime cooperation in many functional areas, most notably in the non-traditional security arena, as long as two conditions are met: non-U.S. dominance, and separation from hardcore security matters such as sovereign territorial claims.

### 4.3 Cooperation and Confidence Building—U.S. Perspective

**Stanley Weeks** began his commentary by highlighting the U.S. views on some key points of RADM Pradeep Chauhan’s presentation. He recognized the convergence of U.S. perspectives on many of the issues raised by Chauhan, such as the importance of geo-strategic concerns, the shift towards non-traditional security issues, as well as renewed attention to the potential impact of climate change, as in the case of the Maldives.

![Dr. Stanley Weeks, The Spectrum Group](image-url)
He also agreed with Chauhan’s conclusion regarding prospects for future maritime cooperation is that a “regionally inclusive process of cooperative security” implemented through “constructive engagement” between navies as well as the need to engage and assist smaller littoral states in building their own capacity and enhancing their own capability.

Weeks noted that much of Chauhan’s emphasis on multilateral cooperation was on the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). He mentioned that the U.S. view of IONS is positive as it coincided with the recent U.S. Navy “Thousand Ship Navy/Global Maritime Partnership” concept that emphasized building global partnership on regional and sub-regional maritime groupings. While concurring on the possibility of an IONS-WPNS cooperation in future, Weeks maintained U.S. scepticism of any move toward connectivity with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

On Li Mingjiang’s presentation, Weeks mentioned that the U.S. views China’s increased participation in joint military exercises positively, particularly that of China with India and the U.S. in the area of naval search and rescue. Likewise, the U.S. appreciated the increased Chinese role in East Asia bilateral and multilateral oceanic and environmental research and cooperation, as well as the enhanced U.S.-China Coast Guard agencies cooperation, both multilaterally through the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum and bilaterally in the six areas of U.S.-China maritime cooperation.

While Weeks stressed that there was no U.S. “containment” policy for China as asserted in Li’s paper, he acknowledged that there has been official mention of a U.S. strategy of “hedging” (particularly in the maritime domain) against a future turn towards a more confrontational military posture by China.

Regarding China-India relations, he agreed with Li’s assessment that it would continue to be the low level of overall strategic trust, that limits bilateral and multilateral maritime cooperation. He also agreed with Li that China is likely to be willing to participate in more non-traditional maritime security cooperative activities.

Weeks next highlighted some of the criteria for maritime confidence and security-building measures between India and China. They include the prevention of conflict by clearly communicating resolve to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as an increased understanding of each others’ military capabilities and intentions though the adoption of greater openness and transparency.

In his conclusion, Weeks mentioned that from a U.S. perspective, India-China maritime cooperation is in general a positive development, as it may help avoid the risk of future conflicts at sea. It will also enhance broader efforts for maritime security cooperation, and help ensure the security of the vital sea lanes in the Indo-Pacific region. Globally and regionally, advances in maritime cooperation will require U.S. sensitivity in dealing with rising regional powers—and also somewhat less sensitivity on the part of rising regional powers, to cooperation on external proposals of intrinsic merit (such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Thousand Ship Navy/Global Maritime Partnership).

4.4 Cooperation and Confidence Building—Japanese Perspective

Takeshi Kohno commenced his presentation by discussing the different approaches Japan adopts in its treatment of traditional and non-traditional security issues. For instance, Japan has been active in areas of non-traditional security such as piracy, terrorism, and transnational criminal activities. On the other hand, Japan is constitutionally-restricted in its efforts to act internationally on traditional security issues like war and defence.
He explained that because the island nation of Japan is aware of the importance of the sea as a lifeline in maintaining peace and prosperity, it is increasingly active in pursuing international cooperation. Japanese cooperation has been, and likely will be, consistent with the code of conduct defined in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), and this attitude is well reflected in the 2007 Basic Act on Ocean Policy and subsequent action plan (the 2008 Basic Plan).

Kohno highlighted five factors which do not change rapidly, and thus, shaped Japan’s policy options to secure seas in the region. First, the economic importance of sea lanes via the Malacca Straits—of which Japan is a major beneficiary. Second, the disputes on the South China Sea and its resources increases risks for potential conflict—Japan is and will be sidelined in the effort to resolve this dispute. Third, U.S. sea power acts as an overwhelming deterrence factor in the region—of which Japan’s status is shaped by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the 1997 Guidelines.

The fourth pertained to the restrictions in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution which “renounces war” and the maintenance of armed forces. To this, the Japanese administrations have so far interpreted that arms can be maintained if they are not for war, but for self-defence purposes. Finally, the preamble in the constitution allows for international activism—which Japan responds through the sending of soldiers for UN-sponsored peace-keeping operations. He proceeded to describe some of Japan’s maritime cooperation activities. Key among which is the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (ReCAAP). As part of the arrangement, an Information Sharing Centre was also established in Singapore to gather information on piracy incidents in Asia. In addition to ReCAAP, the Japan Coast Guard, since 2000, has been pursuing bilateral training exercises with the region at least twice a year. Bilateral technical assistance projects with Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia are also underway. All projects are aimed at upgrading the operational capacity of maritime security personnel of the three nations.

Kohno went on to introduce Japan’s 2007 Basic Act on Ocean Policy, which defined the government’s responsibilities in all aspects of the sea, including conservation, environmental protection, use of exclusive economic zones, maritime security and defence, international cooperation, and the enforcement of international treaties and regimes. He highlighted that this is the first comprehensive maritime-related law which enables other specific laws to be enacted. For example, the Japan Coast Guard is now equipped with a new law to aggressively pursue a suspicious ship with force, which was not at all possible before with the old law.

Kohno concluded by remarking that the U.S.-Japan security alliance continues to be the muscle in terms of traditional security issues. However, Japan still needs to tackle constitutional issues, and the political momentum for revision has since passed. In terms of non-traditional security issues, Japan can do much more, but it first needs to formulate and assert more decisively what kind of a nation its wants to become.

### 4.5 Cooperation and Confidence Building—Southeast Asian Perspective

Kwa Chong Guan focused on three key points during his commentary. First, cooperation and confidence building measures are necessary, especially for non-traditional security issues. Second, it is important to examine the implications of the build-up of naval powers in the Asia Pacific, not only China and India, but also Australia and Japan. Some of its implications include the risks of naval stand-offs and confrontations among these emerging navies. He mentioned that we should look towards confidence building measures to prevent these standoffs. Third, Kwa raised the issue of what would happen should these confidence measures fail—resulting in a move towards crisis management. He also asked the question of how to manage a crisis when there was a naval standoff between two navies, as illustrated by the U.S. EP3 incident.

He proceeded to suggest some possible frameworks for managing naval stand-offs. The first is a legal framework, in which he asked for elaboration on the prospects of an international legal framework to help resolve a crisis when a naval stand-off occurs. The other approach is to look at the issue of Incidents at
Sea Reporting. He requested the U.S. commentators to assess the relevance of the 1972 agreement for prevention of incidents at sea, signed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He also asked for comments on the effectiveness of the Malindo prevention of incidents at sea cooperative guidelines signed by Malaysia and Indonesia in 2001.

Kwa concluded by stressing the need for contingency plans for crisis management when a naval crisis occurs. This is because Southeast Asia does not want to find itself in the unfortunate predicament of being sandwiched between the great powers when such an incident occurs.

**Discussion 4**

It was suggested that for cooperation in non-traditional maritime security issues, which are mainly law-enforcement issues, Coast Guards could be more relevant than navies as lead agencies. The commentator also recommended a Coast Guard forum along the lines of WPNS and IONS, and highlighted the relevance of ReCAAP as a model for maritime security cooperation, as it had both information sharing functions as well as a capacity building forum.

In response to an earlier question of the issues and relevance of “Malindo” between Malaysia and Indonesia, it was explained that the arrangement encountered numerous problems because of a lack of institution building—the arrangement was largely built on personalized agreements, hence a lack of continuity once the original personnel familiar with the agreement left their appointments. Both countries were also faced with the issue of having multiple agencies in charge of maritime enforcement functions.

One query was whether the Incidents at Sea Reporting System put in place by the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War would be helpful in the prevention of potential naval stand-offs at sea. One response raised the point that the reporting system was successful largely because the superpowers recognized the freedom of the high seas and both adhered to the Rules of the Road governing navigation at sea. Another suggested that it was because there is a lack of effective crisis management mechanisms, states continue to remain at the level of “Incidents at Sea Reporting”. Nevertheless, issues such as the exclusion of submarines in the arrangement remain.

**SESSION 5**

**Way Forward**

**5.1 Panel Discussion**

The panel discussion essentially brought together some of the key ideas raised during the conference. The moderator Sam Bateman began by reiterating that the purpose of the conference was to examine the implications of the rise of Chinese and Indian naval powers, in particular the impact on Southeast Asia. He noted that there was indeed evidence suggesting the overlapping interests of the two powers in SEA, as illustrated during the course of the conference. In particular, there were lessons to be learnt from their contrasting approaches. Bateman also raised queries over the implications of the current global financial crisis and whether the potential impact is fully appreciated by regional states.

He also emphasized the importance of finding common interests in maritime security that would bring states together. Bateman remarked that the civilian dimension of maritime security tended to be overlooked even though they do play an integral part in inter-agency cooperation on maritime security matters.

Arun Prakash remarked that the conference had merely scratched the surface of many complex issues. He acknowledged that although there were frank discussions, there was a tendency for the speakers and commentators to speak from entrenched positions, and often with cultural baggage—which highlighted the need to acquire a better understanding of each other’s concerns.
He also noted that as the full impact of the economic downturn remained unknown, U.S.-China relations is likely to grow more interdependent. Moreover, there is also the question of whether the U.S. would be able to continue spending as much on defence.

Prakash emphasized that neither China nor India have malign intentions in SEA. He also stressed that there was a need for Chinese diplomats to reassure India, as the common Indian perceives China as a threat. He asserted that the threat from China was real, and not an Indian obsession. Prakash suggested that the way forward was for India and China to create conditions and space for their respective peaceful rise. For that matter, cooperation at sea has the most potential.

Both countries should also learn from Japan's positive contribution towards maritime security abroad.

Norman Friedman reiterated his earlier discussion on capability versus intent and explained that it is difficult to assess the real intent of each state. He acknowledged that while the growing prosperity of China had made it more open, there was need for further transparency on Chinese military capabilities, and this openness will ultimately pay off for China as it will dispel all unnecessary exaggeration of the threat perception against China. Essentially, it is difficult to judge if a particular naval hardware is offensive or defensive in nature unless it was read with its owners' strategic policies.

Cai Peng Hong acknowledged that China as a rising power should learn to listen and accept others' perception of itself in order to gauge their expectation of China as a superpower of the future. He proceeded to explain that China had a long coastline to defend and generally follows a path of peaceful development.

He also stressed that China had no intention of challenging the existing international system or the maritime order. Cai asked for China to be allowed a “learning period” for it to learn how to bear its new global responsibilities.

He saw the potential for China to be actively engaged in military cooperation with other states, although he did emphasize that the institutionalization of defence cooperation should occur at a comfortable pace for all parties. He also explained that China did not regard India as a rival. India had considerable cultural influences on China and there was a need for both countries to further enhance their relations.

Cai conceded that considerable transparency on China’s strategic policy will definitely contribute to positive perception, although he did not see the need for any transparency in terms of tactical strategies, especially when other states have no intention of doing so. More importantly, he was of the opinion that such information should be traded with partners who would reciprocate.

On the effectiveness and usefulness of regional institutions, Masashi Nishihara remarked that while there was much discussion on the strengthening of the ARF as a whole, it seems that members are better able to work together outside that bureaucratic framework. He highlighted the Malacca Straits cooperative mechanisms as an example of the relative success achieved outside the framework of ARF. He believed that ASEAN on the other hand has seen some success in bringing together regional countries, e.g. the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea saw much restraint of military activities and provocative acts between the parties involved.
Discussion 5

China recognized the importance of military to military exchanges in reducing misunderstandings and in providing a better assessment of each other’s strategic intentions. China is also taking positive steps towards increasing transparency e.g. publishing its national defence reports and disseminating its military expenditure. Be that as it may, it will be an incremental process. More importantly, while transparency over intentions is important, intentions may change overnight with regime change. With the rise of China and India, the issue of transparency may be secondary to the potential structural transformation of the international system.

As was mentioned during the course of the conference, China’s strategic intention was defensive in nature. With the improved China-Taiwan relations, the potential for armed conflict between the two is slowly fading away. Only if Taiwan unilaterally declares independence would there be a real danger. One comment acknowledged that with its long coastline, there are genuine maritime concerns for China, and it has thus far adopted a fairly logical and strategic approach to solving those issues.

Washington understands that China is not interested in picking a fight over Taiwan. Neither is the United States, and that stand is unlikely to change in the near future. The commentator stressed that the U.S. has been transparent on its Taiwan policy—it is not concerned with the solution to the problem, as long as it is achieved by mutual agreement in a peaceful manner. Although the conference generally agreed that it was imperative to abide by the rules of international law, it would help that the United States, being the largest power at sea, be a party to UNCLOS. Others argued that even if all major sea powers were party to UNCLOS, there may still be a problem in terms of interpretation.

A comment was made to the effect that the good idea of investing in confidence building measures may also be problematic. It is only easy to achieve when there is no existing conflict. It was also noted that the current financial crisis will likely have an adverse impact on the U.S. defence expenditure.
Monday, 17 November 2008

All Day
Arrival and check in for foreign participants

1600 - 1900
Registration for speakers and commentators
(Venue: Outside Temasek I, Level 2, Traders Hotel)

1900 - 2100
Welcome Reception for speakers and commentators only
(Venue: Temasek I, Level 2, Traders Hotel)

Tuesday, 18 November 2008

0830 - 0900
Registration @ The Gallery, Level 2, Traders Hotel

0900 - 0930
Opening Remarks:
Kwa Chong Guan
Head (External Programmes), RSIS

Admiral (Retd) Arun Prakash
Former Chief of Naval Staff, Indian Navy & Chairman, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi

Session 1 –
Regional Strategic Environment – Between Rising Powers

Moderator:
Admiral (Retd) Arun Prakash
Former Chief of Naval Staff, Indian Navy & Chairman, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi

Paper:
Between Rising Powers – A Broad Strategic Overview
C. Raja Mohan
Professor, RSIS

Commentaries:
China and Southeast Asia
Huang Jing
Visiting Professor, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

India and Southeast Asia
RAdm (Retd) Ravi Vohra
Director, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi

US Engagement with China, India and Southeast Asia
Bronson Percival
Senior Advisor, Center for Naval Analysis, United States
1200 – 1300  
**Lunch @ CafeBiz, Lobby, Traders Hotel**

1300 – 1530  
**Session 2 –**  
*Regional Maritime Security Environment*  
**Moderator:**  
Emrys Chew  
Assistant Professor, RSIS

**Papers:**  
*Regional Maritime Security – Threats and Risk Assessments*  
Sam Bateman  
Senior Fellow, RSIS

**Cooperative Mechanisms for Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits**  
Robert Beckman  
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore

**Commentaries:**  
*The Japanese Perspective*  
Masashi Nishihara  
President, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo

**The Chinese Perspective**  
Cai Peng Hong  
Research Professor and Senior Fellow, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences

**The Indian Perspective**  
Cdr D. Chakraborty  
Research Fellow, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi

The Korean Perspective  
Park Chang Kwoun  
Korea Institute for Defense Analysis

The Malaysian Perspective  
Mohd Nizam Basiron  
Head, Centre for Maritime Security and Environment, Maritime Institute of Malaysia

Tuesday, 18 November 2008

1530 – 1545  
**Break**

1545 – 1800  
**Session 3 –**  
*Naval Developments and Deployments*  
**Moderator:**  
Joshua Ho  
Senior Fellow, RSIS

**Papers:**  
*Shaping Naval Power – Implications of the Naval Buildup in Asia*  
Norman Friedman  
Columnist, Proceedings

**Commentaries:**  
*Indian Navy*  
Cmde Nalin Dewan  
Executive Director, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi

**Chinese Navy**  
Zhang Junshe  
Sr Captain and Deputy Director, Naval Institute of Military Science, People’s Republic of China
**Australian Navy**  
Rory Medcalf  
Lowy Institute, Australia

**Japanese Navy**  
Tetsuo Kotani  
Research Fellow, Ocean Policy  
Research Foundation, Tokyo

**US Navy**  
RADM (Retd) Michael McDevitt  
Vice President and Director, CNA  
Strategic Studies Center for Naval Analyses

1800  
**Conference Adjourns**

1900  
**Conference Dinner for speakers and commentators only**  
(Venue: The Straits Kitchen, Grand Hyatt Hotel)

**Wednesday, 19 November 2008**

0900 – 1100  
**Break**

1545 – 1800  
**Session 4 –**  
Cooperation and Confidence-Building

1100 – 1115  
**Break**

**Moderator:**  
RADM (Retd) Ravi Vohra  
Director, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi

**Papers:**  
Scope for Maritime Cooperation and Confidence Building  
RADM Pradeep Chauhan  
Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Foreign Cooperation), Indian Navy

Towards a Cooperative Maritime Regime in Southeast Asian Seas – Contemporary Issues, including in the South China Sea  
Li Mingjiang  
Assistant Professor, RSIS

**Commentaries:**  
US Perspective  
Stanley Weeks  
Senior Naval Advisor, Science Applications International Corporation, United States

Japanese Perspective  
Takeshi Kohno  
Associate Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies

South East Asian Perspective  
Kwa Chong Guan  
Head External Programme, RSIS
1115-1300  **Session 5 –**  
Way Forward

**Moderator:**  
Sam Bateman  
Senior Fellow, RSIS

**Panellists:**  
Norman Friedman  
Columnist, Proceedings

Admiral (Retd) Arun Prakash  
Former Chief of Naval Staff, Indian  
Navy & Chairman, National Maritime  
Foundation, New Delhi

Cai Peng Hong  
Research Professor and Senior  
Fellow, Shanghai Academy of  
Social Sciences

Masashi Nishihara  
President, Research Institute for  
Peace and Security, Japan

1300-1400  
**Lunch @ Ah Hoi’s Kitchen, Poolside,**  
Level 4, Traders Hotel

1400  
**Conference Ends**
1. Mr Mohd Nizam Basiron  
Research Fellow  
Maritime Institute of Malaysia  
Unit B-06-08, Megan Avenue II.,  
12 Jalan Yap Kwan Seng,  
50450 Kuala Lumpur  
Malaysia  
Tel: 603 21612960 / Fax: 603 2161 7045

2. Dr Sam Bateman  
Senior Research Fellow  
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies  
Nanyang Technological University,  
Block S4, B4, Nanyang Avenue  
Singapore 639798  
Tel: (61) 412 801 340

3. Dr Robert Beckman  
Associate Professor,  
Faculty of Law  
National University of Singapore  
496G Bukit Timah Road,  
En Tong Sen Building  
Singapore 259776  
Tel: (65) 65164190 / Fax : 6779 0979

4. Dr Cai Penghong  
Research Professor  
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences  
622/7 Huai Hai Zhong Lu,  
Shanghai,  
The People’s Republic of China  
Tel: (86) 21 530606060 ext 2448 /  
Fax: (86) 21 53063841

5. Commander Devbrat Chakraborty  
Research Fellow  
National Maritime Foundation  
Varuna Complex, Nh-8  
New Delhi -110 010, India  
Tel: (91) 11 26154901 / Fax: (81) 3 3713 2723

6. Rear Admiral Pradeep Chauhan  
Assist. Chief Of Naval Staff [Foreign Cooperation & Intelligence]– Acns (Fci)  
Integrated Headquarters, Ministry  
Room No. 24  
South Block, New Delhi – 110 011  
Tel: (91) 11 23014615 / Fax: (91) 11 23792144

7. Dr Emrys Chew  
Assistant Professor  
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies  
Nanyang Technological University  
Tel: (65) 6514 1905 / Fax: (65) 6793 2991

8. Commodore Nalin Dewan  
Commodore, Executive Director  
National Maritime Foundation  
Varuna Complex, Nh-8  
New Delhi -110 010, India  
Tel: (91) 11 26154901 / Fax: (81) 3 3713 2723

9. Dr Norman Friedman  
Author and columnist; also naval analyst  
U.S. Naval Institute,  
139 East 33rd Street, New York, NY  
10016 Unit States  
Tel: (212) 679-6836 / Fax: (61) 2 6268 8450
10. LTC Joshua Ho  
   Senior Fellow and Coordinator Maritime Security Programme  
   S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies  
   Nanyang Technological University  
   Tel: (65) 6790 6624 / Fax: (65) 6793 2991

11. Prof Huang Jing  
   Visiting Professor  
   Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy  
   469C Bukit Timah Road  
   Singapore 259772  
   Tel: (65) 6516 5250 / Fax: (65) 6516 1020

12. Dr Takeshi Kohno  
   Associate Professor  
   National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies  
   7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106-8677, Japan  
   Tel: (81) 3 6439 6234 / Fax: (81) 3 6439-6234

13. Mr Tetsuo Kotani  
   Research Fellow  
   Ocean Policy Research Foundation  
   1-15-16 Toranomon, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan 105-0001, Japan  
   Tel: (81) 3 3502 1948 / Fax: (81) 3 3502 2127

14. Mr Kwa Chong Guan  
   Head (External Programmes)  
   S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies  
   Nanyang Technological University  
   Tel: (65) 6790 6975 / Fax: (65) 6793 2991

15. Dr Li Mingjiang  
   Assistant Professor  
   S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies  
   Nanyang Technological University  
   Tel: (65) 6790 6836 / Fax: (65) 6793 2991

16. RADM (ret.) Michael Mcdevitt  
   VP/Director  
   Senior Advisor  
   CNA  
   4825 Mark Center Drive  
   Alexandria, VA 22311, USA  
   Tel: 703 824 2614 / Fax: 703 824 2942

17. Mr Rory Medcalf  
   Program Director, International Security  
   Lowy Institute  
   31 Bligh St, Sydney, NSW 2000, Australia  
   Tel: (61 2) 82138 9130 / Fax: (61 2) 8238 9005

18. Prof C Raja Mohan  
   Professor  
   S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies  
   Nanyang Technological University  
   Tel: (65) 6790 4909 / Fax: (65) 6793 2991

19. Dr Masashi Nishihara  
   President  
   Research Institute for Peace and Security  
   Akasaka HKN Bldg.2F, 1-8-6 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan 107-0052, Japan  
   Tel: (81) 3 3560 3288 / Fax: (81) 3 3560 3289
20. Dr Park Chang Kwoun  
Chief, US study division rand corp  
Korea Institutes for Defense Analyses,  
Cheong Ryang P.O. Box 250,  
Seoul, Republic of Korea  
Tel: 822-961-1863 / Fax: 822-961-1160

21. Mr Bronson Percival  
Senior Advisor  
CNA  
4825 Mark Center Drive  
Alexandria, VA 2311-1850,  
USA  
Tel: 703 824 2330 / Fax: 703 824 2330

22. Admiral[retd] Arun Prakash  
Chairman  
National Maritime Foundation  
Varuna Complex, Nh-8  
New Delhi -110 010, India  
Tel: (91) 11 26154901 / Fax: (81) 3 3713 2723

23. RADM [Retd] Ravi Vohra  
Director  
National Maritime Foundation  
Varuna Complex, Nh-8  
New Delhi -110 010, India  
Tel: (91) 11 26154901 / Fax: (81) 3 3713 2723

24. Dr Stanley Byron Weeks  
The Spectrum Group  
6221 Rockhurst Road,  
Bethesda, Maryland,  
20817-1755,  
USA  
Tel: 301-542-7814 / Fax: 703-845-6810

25. Sr. Captain Zhang Junshe  
Sr. Captain  
Naval Institute of Military Science, PLA Navy, China  
19 Xisanhuan Zhonglu,  
Beijing,China,100841  
Tel: (65) 6790 4919 / Fax: (65) 6793 2991
PARTICIPANTS

26. Mr Richard Bitzinger
   Senior Fellow
   S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
   Nanyang Technological University

27. Ms Jane Chan
   Associate Research Fellow / Rapportuer
   S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
   Nanyang Technological University
   Tel: (65) 6790 6484 / Fax: (65) 6793 2991

28. Ms Nicole Chang
   Research Assistant
   National Tsing Hua University (HsinChu, R.O.C)
   122, Chungking S.Rd
   Sec1, Taipei,
   Taiwan, 10048
   Tel: (+86) 2 2371 8580 / Fax: (+86) 2 2371-8581

29. Mr Cheng Tee Yeow
   General Manager
   Unicorn International Pte Ltd
   249 Jalan Boon Lay
   Tel: (65) 6898 1188 / Fax: (65) 6266 6971

30. Mrs Evangeline Cheong
    Assistant Director (Maritime Security)
    Maritime & Port Authority of Singapore
    460 Alexandra Road
    PSA Building #19-00,
    Singapore 119963
    Tel: (65) 637 51634 / Fax: (65) 6375 1685

31. LTC Frederick Chew,
    Head Naval Intelligence
    Republic of Singapore Navy
    AFPN 6051, 303 Gombak Drive,
    Singapore 669645
    Tel: (65) 6768 2080 / Fax: (65) 6768 4469

32. Ms Iris Chen
    Assistant Director
    Ministry of Foreign Affairs
    Tanglin, Singapore 248163
    Tel: (65) 6379 8138 / Fax: (65) 6379 8128

33. Ms Anne Marie Doherty
    Policy Officer
    Delegation of the European Commission
    250 North Bridge Road,
    #38-30/04 Raffles City Tower
    Singapore 179101
    Tel: (65) 6336 7919 / Fax: (65) 6336 3394

34. Mr Ossi Eräkivi
    Embassy of Finland

35. Grp Capt Stephan James Goodman
    Defence Advisor
    New Zealand High Commission
    391A Orchard Road
    Ngee Ann City, Tower A, #15-06
    Singapore 238873
    Tel: (65) 6839 3112 / Fax: (65)6737 8897

36. Mr Ho Weizan
    Senior Officer
    MINDEF
    Block 303, #01-52
    Gombak Drive
    Singapore 669645
    Tel: (65) 6424 1648 / Fax: (65) 6471 5038

37. Capt Sutheeppong Kaewtab,
    Defence and Naval Attache,
    Royal Thai Embassy
    53 Branksome Road,
    Singapore 439586
    Tel: (65) 6346 6372 / Fax : (65) 6346 6385
38. Mr Kalyan Kemburi  
Research Analyst  
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies  
Nanyang Technological University

39. Mr Koh Swee Lean, Collin  
Research Analyst  
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies  
Nanyang Technological University  
Tel: (65) 98204735 / Fax: (65) 6793 2991

40. Ms Lily Law  
Project Officer  
IISS-Asia  
9 Raffles Place,  
#53-02 Republic Plaza  
Singapore 048619  
Tel: (65) 6499 0052 / Fax: (65) 6499 0059

41. Mr Nicholas Lee  
Rapporteur  
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies  
Nanyang Technological University

42. Ms Wenda Lew  
Assistant Manager  
Unicorn International Pte Ltd  
249 Jalan Boon Lay  
Tel: (65) 6898 1188 / Fax: (65) 6266 6971

43. Dr Lim Choo Hoon  
Senior Lecturer  
SAFTI MI  
500, Upper Jurong Road  
#01-07, Singapore  
Tel: (65) 6799 7753 / Fax: (65) 6799 7758

44. LTC Irvin Lim  
Branch Head, HQ RSN  
AFPN 6054, 303 Gombak Drive  
#B2-47  
Singapore 669645  
Tel: (65) 67 68 2054 / Fax: (65) 6768 4469

45. Mr Lui SF, Alvin  
Chairman  
AustralAsia Global  
2A Boscombe Road  
Singapore 439734  
Tel: (65) 96886668 / Fax: 6346 7688

46. Mr Martin Marini  
General Counsel  
Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore  
Legal Dept, PSA Building,  
#19-00, 4600 Alexandra Road  
Singapore 119963  
Tel: (65) 6375 1606 / Fax: (65) 6375 1615

47. Mr J. Orstrom Moller  
Professor  
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

48. LT. Jeffery Munns  
Flag Lieutenant  
United States Navy  
PSA Sembawang Terminal  
Deptford Road, Building 7-4, 759657  
Tel: (65) 6750 2441 / Fax: (65) 6750 2469

49. Mr Premjith Sadasivsan  
Director, South Asia & Sub-Saharan  
Africa Directorate  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Tanglin, Singapore 248163  
Tel: (65) 6379 8520 / Fax: (65) 6479 4280

50. Mr See Chak Mun  
Senior Advisor  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Tanglin, Singapore 248163  
Tel: (65) 8233 8026 / Fax: (65) 6379 8970
51. HE Sin Serey
   Ambassador
   Royal Embassy of Cambodia
   400 Orchard Road
   #10-03/04 Orchard Towers
   Singapore 238875
   Tel: (65) 6341 9785 / Fax: (65) 6341 9201

52. Mr Robin Stienberg
   Chief Executive Officer & Chairman
   The Policy Maker – A Stienberg Company
   Block 205, #02-73,
   Clementi Ave 6,
   Singapore 120205
   Tel: (65) 8198 9301 / Fax: (65) 6774 8810

53. Ms Deanne Tan
   Branch Head
   MINDEF

54. Mr Tan Seng Chye
   Senior Fellow
   S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
   Nanyang Technological University
   Tel: (65) 6790 4009 / Fax: (65) 6793 2991

55. Mr Toh Keng Hoe
   Tel: (65) 6768 3358 5780 / Fax: (65) 6768 4426

56. RDMl Nora Tyson
   Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific
   United States Navy
   PSA Sembawang Terminal
   Deptford Road, Building 7-4, 759657
   Tel: (65) 6750 2442 / Fax: (65) 6750 2469

57. Mr Wong Jiahui
   Senior Officer
   MINDEF
   Block 303, #01-52
   Gombak Drive
   Singapore 669645
   Tel: (65) 6424 1648 / Fax: (65) 6471 5038

58. Mr Yang Yew Chong
   Staff Officer, HQ RSN
   AFPN 6054, 303 Gombak Drive
   #B2-47
   Singapore 669645
   Tel: (65) 6768 2054 / Fax: (65) 6768 4469
The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) was inaugurated on 1 January 2007 as an autonomous School within the Nanyang Technological University (NTU), upgraded from its previous incarnation as the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), which was established in 1996.

The School exists to develop a community of scholars and policy analysts at the forefront of Asia-Pacific security studies and international affairs. Its three core functions are research, graduate teaching and networking activities in the Asia-Pacific region. It produces cutting-edge security related research in Asia-Pacific Security, Conflict and Non-Traditional Security, International Political Economy, and Country and Area Studies.

The School's activities are aimed at assisting policymakers to develop comprehensive approaches to strategic thinking on issues related to security and stability in the Asia-Pacific and their implications for Singapore.

For more information on the School, visit www.rsis.edu.sg