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
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Civil Military Relations, Western Assistance & Democracy In South Eastern Europe

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This paper deals with the evolution of civil-military relations in Eastern Europe after 1990. It first reassesses the old soviet-type of civil-military relations and it explores the new pattern. It notes that the main issue of civil-military relations in post-communist Eastern Europe has not been military praetorianism, as in the case of most post-totalitarian countries (Latin American, South European), but effective civilian leadership for building democratic civil-military relations and an effective military. The paper analyses the impact of the assistance delivered by Western (NATO) countries and of the "models" exported to Eastern Europe and it finds that assistance has been instrumental for the reform of the military and for establishing new forms of civil-military relations. At the same time, some side effects have been reported, for example insufficient substance in the new forms of civil-military relations (diminished civilian responsibility, role ambiguity of the new military). Consequently, this paper tries to assess the characteristics of the new civil-military relationship, in a democratic context.

"… [T]he magnitude of the difficulties faced by armed forces in transition, and the problems of Central and Eastern European countries in establishing effective management of defence and security policies, is only just being recognized."

Chris Donnelly, NATO Review, *No 6, November 1996*

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Introduction

The progress of democratic civilian control of the military is quite remarkable in South Eastern European countries. In the early 1990s both civilians and the military realized what they had to do, but few knew how to do it. In a reasonably short term, there has been put in place the basic constitutional procedures and the primary institutional capacities for democratic civil-military relations. Now, both civilians and military understand better the roles, the functions and the procedures of democratic relationships. The invitation in Prague on 21 November 2002 for Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia to join NATO represents a recognition of their progress in fulfilling the Alliance's membership criteria in general, and in developing democratic civil-military relations in particular.

Three general points need to be made at this juncture. First, in the late 1990s, according to NATO/PfP criteria, Romania moved ahead from an inconsistent policy in reform of the military to a more coherent and responsible one. For Bulgaria the prospect of entering NATO created the incentives to undertake a real reform of the military, while for Slovenia the prospects for NATO membership eventually created the conditions for building a real military at all. In all three countries there is a clear legal framework for democratic control, civilian leadership on defence is uncontested and parliamentary oversight is a current practice. Furthermore, changing the attitudes of the officer corps is underway, while an emerging civil society and extended public education on security are set to produce a new strategic culture in South Eastern European countries.

Second, Western (NATO/PfP) assistance has been instrumental in building democratic civil-military relations in South Eastern European countries. Nowadays it seems obvious that none of the countries invited in Prague would have performed better in the absence of the NATO/PfP assistance programmes. On the contrary: programmes and funds specifically designed to assist democratic civil-military relations have generated "models" and "practices" to be assimilated by the new democracies. A large number of civilians and military people have been educated abroad. Almost half of Slovenia's officers have been educated in NATO countries. More than 250 civilians and military from Romania and Bulgaria benefit from Western education and training on a yearly basis. On-site, domestic programmes on democratic civil-military relations were designed with NATO/PfP assistance. Western institutions such as the Marshall Center in Germany and DCAF in Geneva have developed specific assistance programmes for building democratic civil-military relations. Training centres in South Eastern European countries, such as the one in Brasov, Romania, have enlarged and complemented assistance programmes in the "spirit of PfP".

Third, as some of the most dedicated Western students of East European civil-military relations have pointed out (see Bibliography) there are certain things still to be done to achieve full democratic civil-military relations in Eastern Europe. These relate mainly to insufficient civilian political responsibility on security and defence issues, inefficient executive management and incomplete professionalization of the military.

On the one hand, admission into NATO will most probably make these deficiencies more visible, but, at the same time, it will create conditions for the proper solutions. Broadly defined, democratic civil-military relations means effective democratic management of the security sector and of the related government agencies and hence effective participation in NATO. Membership is the prerogative of countries

and the issues raised are not about the military or the government only. With the post-Cold War Alliance transformation, the civilian side is as important as the military one.

On the other hand, admission into NATO of the South Eastern European countries would have to take into account a presumably increased need for assistance. It is the history of the Transatlantic relationship before 1989 and the experience of the first wave of NATO enlargement in 1997 that the new members cannot do it alone. Mutual security assistance remains a major policy for integrating new members into the Alliance. That assistance is not primarily about money, but about involvement and participation. It means providing expertise, policy transfers, better coordination and comprehensive programmes. This author recommends that an office for the newly admitted countries be created within NATO HQ in Brussels to assist and coordinate the new members' efforts in achieving full membership. Of course, it must also be acknowledged that in the long term the prevailing resources for sound democratic civil-military relations Eastern Europe lie with the domestic society. NATO membership is about burden sharing among allies, and the new members will have to take full responsibility for their obligations. The sooner the better.

Significant Aspects of Recent Experience

1. The Important Role of Western (NATO/PfP) Assistance
In the early 1990s, few people in the West envisaged the magnitude of the transformation in the former Eastern bloc. Even fewer people in the East thought how much the Western strategists would become involved in the transformation process. In that environment of hope and uncertainty NATO was one of the few institutions to take the lead in shaping a new course for the East-West relationship. The political and military dimensions of a transformed Alliance made the new East-West relationship possible. NATO itself has become a vehicle for changing Europe in general and Eastern Europe in particular. In 1994, the Partnership for Peace initiated a complex process of security and defence cooperation in Europe on an unprecedented scale, with military and security assistance playing a significant role. One should notice a new form of military and security assistance that emerged with the PfP - assistance for reform and integration.

2. Adapt Assistance to the Needs
In the early 1990s there were observed difficulties in matching Western expertise with Eastern needs and the lack, at that moment, of a proper infrastructure for both delivering and receiving assistance. Since 1994, NATO's PfP has become a vehicle to deliver assistance and to develop the infrastructure to receive it in the partner countries. In the late 1990s, the PARP (planning and review process) and Membership Action Plan (MAP) further developed these capacities. However, due to the "supremacy" of PfP, much assistance went through military channels and less through civilian ones. There remains a need to design and implement specific assistance programmes for the civilian side as well. Organizations such as USAID might develop programmes designed to improve civil education and increase public participation formulating defence and security policy. After 1997 assistance programmes multiplied by countries and by sectors and a certain lack of coordination was observed. At the same time it was realized that significant sectors of civil-military relations such as the secret services remained outside the assistance mainstream.

3. Better Understanding of Transitional Societies

Assistance is a form of real-help that works best where self-help exists. Recent works on post-communist countries depict the uneven evolution and country differentiation within the former Eastern bloc. Capitalism is still in the making in Eastern Europe. After more than a decade of transition there are competitive democracies and concentrated political regimes alongside war-torn societies and non-competitive political regimes. Such differentiation has generated different patterns of civil-military relations. The chance of democratic civil-military relations is higher in the countries with a strong civil society (developed networks of deliberative associations) and responsible civilian political leadership. Otherwise, "transition is not from plan to market, but from plan to clan". Therefore, the role of civilian political leadership in transitional societies is essential: it is about vision, determination and democratic political action. Assistance needs to strengthen the societal infrastructure that strengthens democracy as a whole and not the groups (clans) that benefit from it. As a matter of fact, corruption is a current issue in most Eastern European countries. It plagues political action and public administration. The invitation to join NATO puts more pressure on the administrative infrastructure of Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia in general, and on the political establishment in particular. The obligations that are to be fulfilled will test the political leadership in these countries while full membership of NATO is being achieved. One could call this a process of increasing the responsiveness of the civilians and of professionalization of the military.

4. Reconceptualization of Civil-Military Relations in Eastern Europe

It is only partially right to characterise "subjective civilian control" over the military as being in existence before 1990. Actually, it meant a strong civilian political control, even civilian abuse of the military, combined with some degree of military effectiveness. After 1990, the civilian leadership has not been contested, as there has been no tentative praetorianism. On the contrary, there have been reported civilian misunderstandings in the field. Such aspects demand a reconceptualization of civil-military relations in Eastern Europe before and after 1989. Comparisons with previous democratization experience (Latin America, Southern Europe) show civil-military relations in Eastern Europe to be a particular case that this paper defines as *limited professionalization*. Communism swelled the military's muscles, but dropped its brain; it created a large military with little ability to adapt to rapidly changing environments, nationally and internationally. I call this civil-military relations type *the pampered soldier*. In Eastern Europe, unlike in other authoritarian regimes, the military was not ruling but ruled. This paper highlights the concept of *tentative professionalization* of the military as being specific to the current civil-military relationships.

5. Rethink Armed Forces Reform

The Cold War fixation on the large Soviet-type military made analysts perceive it as a potential danger for the young democracies in Eastern Europe, more by its dimensions than by its social and political role. In such a context, most East European countries drafted plans for downsizing the mass armies and for professionalizing the new military. However, some side-effects occurred with this process. In the early 1990s, the lack of clear personnel management criteria delayed downsizing and later transformed it into a rushed and rather unproductive way of reform. A top-down approach encouraged the military to be inactive, conservative and complacent. It also limited initiative at the middle and ground levels. Today, instead of leaving, the professionals with a less bureaucratic orientation, greater flexibility and adaptability should be encouraged to stay in the

military. Rethinking personnel management in the military is currently a need for South Eastern European countries.

6. Increase Competence & Responsibility of the Civilian Masters

To a certain extent, the focus on the military side of civil-military relations in the early 1990s neglected the civilian side. By focusing almost exclusively on the military, civilian deficiencies such as lack of expertise and responsibility, superficiality and corruption escaped attention. It was not realized from the very beginning that for the civilians being "chiefs" also meant being responsible. Consequently, in the early 1990s civil-military relations moved from a situation of *pampered military* to one of *pampered civilians*. The result was that, paradoxically, civilians themselves undermined the process of building democratic civil-military relations. Partial knowledge on defence and security issues, limited responsibility, inefficient management and corruption of the civilian masters have impeded building democratic civil-military relations.

7. Redesign the Domestic Role of the Military

The assumption of "objective control" as opposed to "subjective control" dominated the approach to the new role of the military in South Eastern European countries. Accordingly, the domestic role of the military had to be changed. Reference was made to the "best available model" from Western literature in the field. This revealed a lack of creative solutions that encouraged an imitational attitude over time. In the early 1990s, for some, nominating a civilian defence minister was necessary in order to be "like the West", not because of domestic democratic needs. In the late 1990s the traditionally important societal role the military institution plays in South Eastern European countries was rediscovered. The military confirmed its role as a pillar of domestic stability and as the main vehicle for integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. This role is similar to the nation-building concept of the modern era. However, the Western model designs completely new roles for the post-Cold War military. Further inquiry is needed to determine whether the "post-modern" paradigm, that requires smaller, more professional and state-of-the-art equipped armed forces, or the "late-modern" posture, that means a classic posture with increased capacities for rapid reaction, better fits the (South) Eastern European case. At the moment it seems that the post-modern paradigm of civil-military relations is not to be found in the Eastern European countries yet.

8. Extend the Concept & Practice of Democratic Civil-Military Relations to Security Services

The experience in democratization in other regions of the world and the current situation in most of the Eastern European countries shows the need to extend democratic civil-military relations to all aspects of security and defence policy. The current understanding refers mainly to the armed forces and less to other government agencies. It is recognized that the secret services played a positive role in the process of undermining the authoritarian communist regimes and of paving the road to democracy. However, the role and functions of the intelligence services in the new democracies should be reevaluated. It should be realized that the failure of the civilian leadership to decide the role and functions of security services is a failure of democracy. This is more true for the South Eastern European countries such as Romania and Bulgaria where the secret communist police was an instrument of repression. Current public debates on the role and functions of the intelligence services reveal important steps that still need to be taken in this field. It is therefore a question both about justice for the past and about democracy in the present.

9. Increase Deliberation Within the Political Body & Extend Education to Civil Society

Public support for NATO membership is one of the highest in South Eastern Europe. There is even a public enthusiasm in countries such as Romania (over 100,000 people welcomed President George W Bush in Bucharest on 23 November 2002). However, the enthusiasm of the moment should be complemented with education in the long term. The *associative* and the *deliberative* functions of the civil society (NGOs, think tanks, professional associations, business, free press) need to be developed. For democratic civil-military relations it is also necessary that the public be informed and educated. In South Eastern European countries, strategic education is still done only as a part of military education. For instance, no south Eastern European country yet has a course on defence economics or intelligence to be taught to civilians. Therefore, public education and civil universities need to include security and defence studies in their curricula. A public culture of being a NATO ally, a culture that shares common values of democracy, human rights and capitalism and one that highlights national responsibilities as well should be consolidated in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia. Public support should be translated into public education, as it suggests a certain interest of the ordinary citizen in the new security and defence issues.

Previous Experience: The Latin American & South European Cases

Most sociologists agree on the relevance of the Southern European and Latin American transitions to democracy to the new case study of civil-military relationship in Central and Eastern Europe.[1] This previous experience can be coupled with a reassessment of civil-military relations in Eastern Europe to provide important insights into the similarities and differences between the cases.

The main lesson from the transition to democracy in South Europe (Greece, Portugal, Spain) and Latin America (Brazil, Argentina, Chile) is that no young democracy will survive in the absence of democratic civil-military relations and of democratic civilian control. If civilians fail in their task of controlling the military, democracy is being jeopardized. Alfred Stepan rightly stated that "Since a monopoly of the use of force is required for a modern democracy, failure to develop capacities to control the military represents an abdication of democratic power".[2] Similarities and differences between the two cases will reveal the particularities in Eastern Europe.

As Table 1 suggests, before the regime change there is a strong similarity in the role of the internal security services which are at the core of the coercive state apparatus. A second similarity relates to the sequence of transition. In Latin America "liberalization began within the state apparatus owing to the contradictions generated by the increasing autonomy of the security apparatus".[3] This means that liberalization and democratization were initiated not by the civil society but from within the coercive apparatus by the bureaucratic liberal factions (the so-called "wise guys" that became aware of the urgent reforms the system needed). For that reason, the influence of the security services continues to be quite high during transition due to the simple fact that they were among its initiators. This influence tends to be strengthened in new forms in the national security sectors but also to be expanded to the emerging civilian sectors (business, intellectual, press and others). For Eastern Europe, Ivan Szelényi confirms the managerial elite is the

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initiator of the political change. (For Szelenyi, the Central European "dissidents" are the challengers but not the decision-makers.)

Table 1: A Comparison of Civilian & Military Roles in Authoritarian Regimes Before 1989

	Political Leadership	Core of Coercive State Apparatus	Military Type	Military Mission Definition	Transition Type	Main Task of Civil-Military Relations
South European & Latin American	Praetorian (Military Dictator and/or Military *Junta*)	Security Services & Military	Soldier-Statesman	Internal	Liberalization (Regime Concession)	Extrication (*Depoliticization*)
East European	Civilian (Civilian Secretary General & *Politburo*)	Security Services	The Pampered Soldier	External	Tentative Democratization (Regime Collapse)	Reintegration (*Civilianization*)

A third similarity relates to the contradictions between democratization and legacies in the forms of continuing prerogatives of the security services and the definition of military and security services' missions that are inconsistent with democratization. And fourth, there is a clear lack of civilian expertise in both cases on defence and security matters after the regime change. That means there is a certain dependence on the part of the civilian leadership in security and defence matters. The issue is that the people in uniform will almost always tend to preserve their influence. For that to happen, less prepared and less educated civilians in defence and security matters are preferred and dominated as dependent political masters. The sooner a pool of civilian expertise emerges the better for democracy.

As for the differences that make Eastern Europe a particular case, one should first think of the supremacy of civilian communist leadership over all state institutions, the military included. In most Latin American dictatorships, the military had a dominant role. On the contrary, in Eastern Europe the military did not have a dominant role in politics and internal repression.[4] Repression was a function of the security services and it was directed to civilians and military alike. The second difference is related to the orientation of the military mission. Specific to the East European military is the definition of its mission chiefly to respond to external threats. A third difference is the main task of post-authoritarian regimes, ie establishing democratic civilian control over the military which implies depoliticization (returning to barracks) in Latin America and "civilianization" (opening the barracks to the values of the civil society) in Eastern Europe.

In a Rand paper of 1995, Szayna & Larabee wrote: "The Communist regimes in Eastern Europe maintained a firm control over their militaries. In this sense, the political transition in Eastern Europe did not entail the 'return of the military to the barracks'. The military was already in the barracks, and it respected the principle of civilian control as a fundamental tenet of civil-military relations."[5] At first sight Szayna and Larabee are right. However, what Szayna and Larabee missed is that, in the early 1990s, not having the military in the barracks, but opening the barracks to civilian values was the real issue. At that time, both civilians and military people were satisfied with the new relationship: the civilians that the

military were in the barracks, the military that the civilians would no longer enter the barracks. The regime change just revealed the gap between the civilians and the military.

The similarities and differences in the South European and Latin American cases highlight the particularities of East European civil-military relations before 1989, ie the supremacy of the civilian political elite and the use of security services for internal repression. Liberalization was due to internal contradictions within the coercive political and security state apparatus. During transition, democratization is difficult without redrafting the role and missions of the security services and of the military, a job that the civilians lack the proper expertise to do. Therefore, for Eastern Europe the main tasks of civil-military relations were to increase civilian expertise and responsibility on security and military matters, on the one hand, and the "civilianization" of the military, on the other.

The experience of democratization in South Europe and Latin America was to a certain extent neglected in reforming civil-military relations in Eastern Europe. In the early 1990s, the common first supposition was that in the communist countries civil-military relations were satisfactorily explained by Huntington's theory on subjective civilian control. This assumes that politics and the military are inseparable in communist countries (ie the military was a "mirror" of the communist politics), that the party functions could not be pursued without military support (ie communism would not last without being backed up by the military) and for that support the military enjoyed a special status in society (the "brave man" that protects the country, the party and its supreme leader). Accordingly, the main task of post-communist military reform would be depoliticising and professionalising the military and establishing objective civilian control.

A second supposition was that Eastern European countries had the opportunity to adapt to one of "the best" or "most advanced" armed forces models that emerged after the Cold War. This is the so-called "post-modern" model (Moskos et al) which comprises all-volunteer forces, smaller armed formations, flexible, fully interoperable, highly mobile and state-of-the-art equipped.

While not attempting to challenge such strong suppositions, this paper only tries to reassess those aspects that are relevant for the post-communist evolution of civil-military relations in Eastern Europe in general, and South Eastern Europe in particular. Most of the military reform policies initiated in the 1990s were built on such prerequisites as reestablishing objective "civilian control" and professionalising the military according to the "best" available model. Western assistance also went in line with such perceptions. Was this a good assessment? To answer this question, one should reassess civil-military relations before 1989.

Before 1989: Subjective Control & Limited Professionalization - The "Pampered Soldier"

Before 1989, the political regime in Eastern Europe was based on the subordination of state institutions to the communist party, the so-called authoritarian party-state system. Consequently, civilian control over the military was a party (political) prerogative rather than a state (administrative) function. Despite variations over time due to the internal dynamics of communist politics, there was firm civilian control over the military. (For a comparative outline see Appendix 1.) At first sight, making the military an instrument of the political party is indeed a case of

subjective civil-military relations. However, the political apparatus in the military was meant for control and not for political participation. In East European communism, the military was not ruling but ruled.

Timothy Colton's patterns of Soviet military involvement in politics study[6] details the characteristics of such a situation. Colton conceives military participation in politics along two distinct dimensions: the scope of issues involved (ie internal, institutional, intermediate, and societal) and the political means employed to achieve the goals (ie official positions, expert advice, political bargaining and force). Colton shows that political participation by military people was restricted to military and security matters for internal, institutional and intermediate (both civilian and military) issues. The means were limited to official prerogatives (otherwise strictly restricted by the constitution) and expert advice (not always taken by the civilian communist leaders). Political bargaining was used only occasionally, while force was never attempted. From this point of view, civilian control was never contested. Military participation in politics was reduced to expert advice not always taken. East European civil-military relations meant high civilian political control, moderate effectiveness and low political participation by the military.

In comparison with, for instance, the People's Liberation Army of China, East European military personnel were less involved in party politics (military people were not nominated governors, mayors or chairmen in the revolutionary committees of the communist party). Therefore, before 1989, the East European military was separated from high politics and enjoyed relative professional autonomy. Few military people were members of the highest political organs and, when nominated to such bodies, they did not merely represent the armed forces, but the party *nomenklatura*, even if they continued to wear uniforms and to deal with military affairs. They barely were professionals, but ideologues. Few East European officers were assigned to administrative jobs in the party or in the government apparatus, as these were characteristics of the subjective civilian control. Apart from the few *nomenklatura* officers and the political apparatus within the army, the core of the military remained professional. This means that Huntington's difference between objective and subjective civilian control over the military is only partially true in the case of East European militaries before 1989.

To quote Huntington: "Subjective civilian control achieves its ends by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state. Objective civilian control achieves its ends by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state."[7] Accordingly, some of the complicated features of the East European military could not be explained solely by the theory of subjective civilian control and there are professional features that also fit the theory of objective control. For such considerations, I call the communist-type civil-military relationship *limited professionalism*. On the one hand, there is a high level of political control and a strong party apparatus in the military, as features of close subjective control. On the other hand, there are certain aspects of professional autonomy and therefore separation from politics that made some East European military effective. Political indoctrination was meant to keep the military away from real society, while relative autonomy of profession was meant to achieve a certain level of effectiveness. One could call this mixture, specific to East European authoritarian regimes, the *pampered soldier*. Before 1989, the fearless child of socialism, the East European soldier, trained his muscles to fight when and how the father-party would decide. His mind belonged to the civilian political leadership.

However, to form a complete picture of civil-military relations in Eastern Europe, it is necessary to extend the analysis beyond the political relationship between the civilian leadership and the military establishment. This is to see the military as part of a larger society, ie as a bureaucratic professional organization. Then the social and professional profile of the East European soldier could be better traced by taking into account the integration of the military and the broader societal values, the patterns of recruitment and retention of personnel, professional ethos, officership, education and training, norms of political influence, prestige and public relations.[8]

Morris Janowitz argued that the changes in technology, society and military missions are meant to inevitably increase the political influence of the military and that, over time, there is the risk that, if not continuously adapted to and integrated with the civilian society, the military could develop alienated characteristics that, on the one hand, would increase the military's temptation to interfere in politics or, on the other hand, would raise a gap between it and society. By contrast to Huntington, Janowitz argued that by professionalization the military not only becomes more militarized, but acquires political skills, and that only integration within society creates conditions for self-restraint and therefore prevents the uniformed people attempting to enter politics or being alienated from the larger society. Therefore, by studying the military organization and its degree of integration with society, one could get a better picture of the communist militaries. More recent studies, such as that by Marybeth Ulrich, also point to the productivity of such an approach.[9]

As Appendix 2 shows, Eastern European military effectiveness was a result of harsh internal conditions (conscript system, authoritarian leadership, patronage networks, low public accountability, little access of civilians to military affairs, limited or no media access). Being extensive rather than intensive, bureaucratic rather than corporate, more hierarchical and "heroic" and less managerial, over time such a system consumed increased resources to preserve its capabilities. The gap between its practices and values and those of civil society was even larger than in the case of other communist state-bureaucracies. Sociologists call such a process *organizational sclerosis*.[10] Over time, organizations that fail to adapt and integrate into society become sclerotic and alienated. Such organizations develop features alien to the broader society. Moreover, communist political ideology and indoctrination contributed to an increased cultural and political gap between the civil society and the military, isolated the military and, ultimately, increased its organizational sclerosis and societal alienation. Communism swelled the military's muscles, but dropped its brain, created a large military with little ability to adapt to rapidly changing environments, nationally and internationally. Such an approach seems to confirm the pampered soldier thesis. The military elite was the first to be surprised by the deep political changes of 1989.

Therefore, before 1989 the militaries in Eastern Europe were not only the guardians of the communist political regime, but its victims too. This ambivalent position was certainly reflected in public actions at the end of 1989 (the ousting of Todor Zhivkov in November 1989 in Bulgaria, of Nicolae Ceausescu in December 1989 in Romania). Democracy in Eastern Europe would not have been established without the support of the military. However, in the early 1990s the mass armies of Eastern Europe were seen rather as a danger to democracy. Domestic reforms and Western assistance were designed accordingly.

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The Post-Modern Military & Tentative Professionalization

With little variation, in the early 1990s most of the former socialist countries adopted reform policies to establish "objective" democratic control and to professionalize the military. Western advice contributed significantly to such a reform imperative. I call this reform policy *tentative professionalization* as it was meant to redefine civil-military relations and the role of the military within a democratic society. It is *tentative* because there are different pathways toward this goal and not all countries are expected to reach the end. It is *professionalization* because it aims at creating a modern professional military.

Appendix 1 shows the characteristics of the transitional military as compared to the democratic and the former Soviet models. At both levels – democratic civilian control and integration within the larger society – the transitional model exhibits improvements as well as new deficiencies. On the political side, in most cases there is a limited political interaction with oversight institutions and ineffective civilian management of the security establishment. On the societal side, internal operations reflect improved features, but also new deficiencies, such as corruption.

Alongside domestic imperatives, the armed forces in the countries of the Euro-Atlantic area have been shaped by a foreign one. This imperative, stemming from the changes of the external strategic context (the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new East-West relationship, the Partnership for Peace) created the conditions for a major redefinition of security and military missions, mainly towards the internationalization of missions and a police-type role for the military.

Theoretically, the changes of armed forces missions and roles are specific to the trend of "post-modern military". Christopher Donnelly considers that this trend has created pressures for smaller, more professional and eventually more expensive armed forces. It is a trend specific to Western advanced capitalist societies, but adopted by Eastern European countries, as Tim Edmunds points out: "The way in which defence reform has been promoted in C&EE has been strongly influenced by the 'post-modern' changes perceived to be occurring in the West".[11]

However, Moskos himself doubts that the post-modern military model fits all countries and all armed forces. Countries such as Greece and Turkey, he considers to be "late-modern", which means rather a classic posture of the armed forces for national (territorial) defence and traditional societal roles, with increased capacities for rapid reaction and participation within allied power projection multinational forces.[12] For the late-modern model, Moskos does not envisage, for instance, an all-volunteer force, but professional forces with mixed formats, ie both conscript and volunteer.

Presumably, the situation in Eastern European countries is closer to the pattern of "territorial defence" and therefore fits the late-modern paradigm. Internal conditions, national traditions and current economic resources limit the extent to which the East European military might use different models to build new armed forces. Hence, it is worth mentioning here the need to adapt the existing model to domestic conditions, to the extent that, as Tim Edmunds rightly points out, a farfetched model would rather consume resources and eventually generate unexpected results.[13]

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From this point of view, in the early and mid 1990s, the pressure for reform and the assistance to accomplish it tended to deliver unrealistic models. The process of East European transformation of the military certainly points to a different pattern, which seemingly is a professional one, but not necessarily a post-modern model for all countries. Understandably, it would not generate democratic patterns for all former communist countries. Moreover, integration into NATO and the NATO/PfP assistance offer a better framework for this adaptation, although not the solution itself. The solution is to be found on the domestic scene.

One could conclude that the assumption of subjective civilian control that characterized the Soviet-type civil-military relations needs a reassessment. Reform policies and Western assistance that were shaped according to such an assumption also need to be reassessed. Limited professionalization before 1989 meant a strong civilian political control, even civilian abuse of the military. Tentative professionalization is specific for the transitional period and extends beyond the political process of controlling the military. Tentative professionalization does not refer only to an all-volunteer force, but to changing procedures, new officership, changing professional ethos and modernizing education within the military. The proper model for the East European military is the "late-modern" one, that combines elements of "territorial defence" and participation in international force projection. To accomplish these goals, civilian leadership is critical. However, are the civilians prepared for such an important job?

The New Ruling Elite in Eastern Europe

Tentative professionalization of the military is linked to the tentative democratization of the Eastern European countries. There are currently two prevailing standpoints to be used for a better understanding of the Eastern European democratization process and hence of civil-military relations. The first one is known as the *path-dependency approach* while the second one is called *neo-classic sociology*.[14] A short theoretical review of East European post-communist evolution helps us understand the role of the civilian elite in Eastern Europe.

The path-dependency approach considers that in Eastern Europe a new society has taken shape by designing completely new democratic institutions. Alongside state institutions comes the corresponding development of the societal infrastructure in a network that helps society work on the horizontal level and prevents it being manipulated from above. Societal infrastructure is then redesigned by new state institutions and new private organizations. Thus, governmental and non-governmental organizations complement each other. On the one hand, if making democratic institutions work fails, then "transition is not from plan to market, but from plan to clan".[15] On the other, in countries with expanded and active public life (ie deliberative and associative social networks, free press, independent think-tanks) there are good chances for democracy. This approach explains the differences between such countries as the Czech Republic and Russia.

With the neo-classical theory, Eyal et al consider that the market and democratic institutions in Eastern Europe are built in two rather different ways. The first one is *capitalism without capitalists* and it is specific to Central European countries, where the market institutions are created by the former socialist technocrats and dissident intellectuals before a well-formed class of capitalists has taken shape. *Capitalists without capitalism* is built in East Europe, in Russia for example, and it exhibits a lack of proper market and democratic institutions while new oligarchic

capitalists (clans) interfere with politics. The leading role is played by the former Soviet-type bureaucracy. The state and the new oligarchs are the main players.

There are, of course, situations in between. What is relevant is the similarity between the two viewpoints that relates to the great role civil society (new parliaments, professional and corporate organizations, civil rights activists, intellectual groups, think-tanks, free press and so on) plays in reforming and building the state institutions. The difference consists in the meaning attached to these institutions. Stark & Bruszt put their emphasis on the non-governmental associations as the watchdogs of the functioning of the governmental institutions, while Eyal et al stress the importance of the civil-society vision and of its leadership during the transition period. Table 2 encapsulates the European experience.

Table 2: A Comparison of Two Ideal-Type Evolutions of the Eastern European Society

	The New Ruling Elite	Dominant Political Ideology	Capitalist Institutions	Property	Civil Society	Foreign Investments	Foreign Assistance
Central Europe	Technocrats & Former Dissident *Intelligentsia*	Managerialism & Civism	Capitalism From Top Down	Diffuse (Corporate)	Active & Expanded	Large & Diversified	Large & Well Used
Eastern Europe	Former *Nomenklatura*	Nationalism & Statism	Capitalism From Bottom Up (State Capture)	Concentrated (Oligarchs)	Reduced & Fragmented	Small & Concentrated	Small & Misused

For the subject of this paper, the role of the civilian political leadership during transition is essential: it is about vision, determination and democratic political action. In Eastern Europe the state is too weak while the market is not strong enough to regulate the functions of a nascent democracy. If this is the case, then leadership is essential. The countries with a strong network of deliberative associations and powerful intellectual leadership are more advanced on the way to democracy and integration with the West. By contrast, in the countries where civil society is weak and underrepresented, vested interest groups take over state institutions. Foreign assistance tends to increase its contribution and to generate better results in countries with larger "civil society networks" and with improved government accountability, less corruption and state capture.

One should notice that East-West relationships after 1989 have developed better for countries with a stronger tradition of civil society, responsible parliaments and accountable governments. It should also be taken into account that foreign assistance functions better in countries with proper societal infrastructure, larger social participation, free press and active NGOs. For want of transparency and of active and expanded civil society and NGO networks, assistance might go to support already dominant cliques (clans). Janine Wedel's example of Russia seems to be true. In the countries where "clans" still fight the battle for capitalism, it could be the case that assistance offers a better position to those that benefit from it.[16] If one acknowledges the new capitalist patterns in Eastern Europe, then the fabric of civil-military relations is easier to see. However, Western assistance has operated in a rather nondiscriminatory way. As Plamen Pantev pointed out, "It would be unfair to judge the Western support as differentiated: it has produced differentiated results, depending on the different national social, political and economic processes".[17]

14

Western Assistance For Civil-Military Relations: Programmes, Institutions & Funds

NATO and the member countries have developed a large variety of programmes and institutions to address the issues of civil-military relations in Eastern Europe. An overview of these programmes shows that most of them have been focused on military contacts, education of military and civilian personnel, NATO/PfP activities (exercises, conferences, round tables, seminars, visits, etc) as well as information, research and assistance centres.

The military-to-military (mil-to-mil) initiative was the first assistance programme for East European countries to be launched, as early as 1991. The US gained good experience in this field in the aftermath of WWII in its efforts to build a new German military and demilitarize and democratize Japan. At the end of the Cold War, the programme was designed to manage similar goals in Eastern Europe: to provide military liaison teams of qualified US specialists to assist a transition to democracy by encouraging former communist militaries to head toward "positive, constructive elements of democratic societies that are apolitical, respect human rights, and adhere to the rule of law".[18] It stressed the military should follow the "objective control" model. By the mid 1990s, with the progress of other assistance programmes, mil-to-mil diminished in importance but remains the first institutionalized military cooperation and assistance programme for Eastern Europe. Its mission statement is still at the core of post-Cold War East-West military cooperation:

> "[T]o assist the governments of Central and East European countries, the republics of the former Soviet Union in developing civilian controlled military forces which foster peace and stability in a democratic society".[19]

Mil-to-mil opened the gates for cooperation on both sides of the former divide. It stimulated not only military cooperation, but also political cooperation. In the early 1990s, mil-to-mil challenged the still reticent East-West diplomacy. In Washington, reactions from the State Department, the institution in charge of foreign policy, prompted the DoD not to take the initiative in the field.[20] However, the US military did take the initiative.

The next step in developing assistance related to education. Educating military and civilian personnel from foreign countries was a well developed practice before the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s, the US offered more than 2,000 courses a year in 150 US military schools in the US and abroad. An IMET review (1995) concluded that the programme had well defined functions such as: assist foreign countries in developing effective management of their defence establishments, provide an alternative to Soviet-type military training, promote military cooperation and promote a better understanding of the United States, of its people, political system and culture. The US IMET (international military education and training programme) provides an important opportunity for educating East European military and civilians in security and defence related matters.[21]

Other NATO countries offer similar access to their educational programmes for partner countries in Eastern Europe. For example, civilians and military take part on an annual basis in education at King's College London and Sandhurst Military Academy in UK, the Dutch National Defence College in Breda, the Netherlands, the Bundeswehr Militarische Academy in Hamburg, Germany and L'Ecole Militaire Superieure and Saint-Cyr military academies in France.

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Within Western mainstream assistance, specifically designed educational institutions were created in order to address current issues of civil-military relations. Established in summer 1994 as a US-German led institution, the George C Marshall European Center for Security Studies was designed to play a long-term role in assisting Eastern European militaries to develop democratic practices. The Marshall Center's commitment is "to create a more stable security environment by advancing democratic defence institutions and relationships; promoting active, peaceful engagement; and enhancing enduring partnerships among the nations of North America, Europe, and Eurasia".[22] After 1997, education on civilian aspects of security and defence was much extended. A number of conferences are intended to complement the College courses.[23] Given a budget of roughly $28m a year, 2,717 people from 48 countries graduated and 8,569 others took part in conferences and research programmes developed by the Marshall Center from 1994 to 2003.

The PfP Consortium is "dedicated to strengthening defence and military education and research through enhanced institutional and national cooperation".[24] There are currently 263 defence academies, institutes, NGOs, think-tanks, universities and research centres affiliated to the Consortium. It was formed in 1998 as a US-German initiative and has grown to become an umbrella for generic cooperation on academic and education matters "in the spirit of PfP". Given the number of participants, the Consortium's conferences are rather PfP conventions, but the opportunity given to so many participants to meet and discuss defence and security matters at least once a year provides a useful point of reference for European military educators and academies.

Established in the 1950s, the NATO School in Oberammergau (Germany) and the NATO Defence College in Rome (since 1966) were the key training and educational centres during the Cold War. After the Alliance Summit in Rome in 1991, the NATO School expanded its curriculum to address the non-Article 5 procedures and operations. The first course for East Europeans, called "European Security Cooperation", was initiated in 1991. In 2001, 20 courses out of 54 were offered to the East European partners. One of these courses specifically addresses civil-military relations.

As part of the Swiss participation within the Partnership for Peace, on 27 October 2000 was established the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). This includes representatives from 24 other PfP countries. Broadly, the Centre is designed to promote democratic control over the armed forces in the NATO/PfP countries. Its specific activities include analysis and evaluation, developing standards and procedures for the assessment of democratization and reform of the defence and security sector as well as cooperation with other partners on a case-by-case basis.

With even fewer staff and resources and within a three-year limited undertaking, the TCMR Project (The Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in a Comparative Context, 1999-2002) has managed to comprehensively approach and analyse the evolution of civil-military relation in Eastern Europe, and to offer policy recommendations to governments both in the East and the West. Formally, the TCMR intended to identify patterns in the development of civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe, to explore the factors that shape these patterns and to assess the impact of western policies on civil-military relations. Informally, the British team managed to create a network of experts from most of the countries involved to periodically meet, discuss and exchange knowledge on civil-military relations. TCMR focused on three important fields: democratic control, professionalisation and the military and society. It forms an integral part of the

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UK's defence diplomacy, intended for practitioners and policy makers. As a successful programme on civil-military relations, the TCMR model might be extended to other areas, such as the defence industry or retraining of redundant military personnel. It implies small but highly specialized research groups that focus on certain issues and deliver professional reports.

One could conclude that a large amount of military assistance has been employed for building democratic civil-military relations in Eastern Europe. Military-to-military contacts, military education and the other assistance programmes (research centres, conferences, round tables, visits) stressed the importance of the military side in building democratic civil-military relations. However, has the civilian side received less attention?

From the "Pampered Soldier" to the "Pampered Civilian"

In the early 1990s, for the West it was mainly a question of designing assistance programmes for the new East European governments to help them establish an objective civilian control over the military. As Edmunds, Foster & Cottey pointed out: " … the debate on democracy and civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe … has been distorted, narrowed and sometimes confused by a conceptual focus on 'democratic control' of armed forces which assumes that the primary problems are the threat of praetorian military intervention in domestic politics and the resultant need to enforce civilian executive control of the military".[25]

In fact, the civilian supremacy was challenged neither before nor after 1989. The Cold War fixation on the Soviet military seemingly induced a misperception of civil-military relations in Eastern Europe. The Westerners still perceived the huge Soviet-type military as a danger for the fragile new civilian political leadership. To a certain extent, the foreign advisers and analysts were not able to exactly match Western expertise to Eastern needs. Meanwhile the Easterners were not able to properly define what they needed from the Western experts, as they had not experienced democratic civil-military relations for about 50 years. This is why in the early 1990s assistance was somehow poorly defined as "all contacts are good". If few knew what to do, fewer knew how to do it. By focusing almost exclusively on the military people, civilian deficiencies such as lack of expertise and responsibility escaped attention. These aspects began to be taken into account at an institutional level only in the late 1990s. This is why assistance institutions such as the Marshall Center, that were built with the task of educating the military on the importance of subordination to civilian leadership, later on realized the need to also teach the responsibilities civilians have in defence.

As a case in point, in 1993 in Romania – one of the first countries to have civilians at the top of defence – the first civilian appointed deputy defence minister considered civil-military relations as being a matter of "shared responsibility". This is proof of the difficulties civilians faced in exerting their leadership: civilians tended to pass over new responsibilities by "sharing" them with the military people. Larry Watts considers "consensus-building" and "shared responsibility" to have had a positive influence on civil-military relations.[26] Jelušič & Malešič came to a different conclusion. They consider that in Slovenia, "The military side is in fact out of control, because the civilian side is lacking the knowledge of how to control it".[27] To a certain extent, "sharing responsibility" meant the civilians' abdication of their duties.

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What are the consequences of such a limited civilian policy objective as "shared responsibility" instead of "full responsibility"? It seems that the reform agenda of the early 1990s to restrain the military and to enforce civil control was unrealistic because the lack of qualified civilians created a kind of "facade discourse" by which imitation was the prevailing way of doing things. For some people, nominating a civilian defence minister was necessary in order to be "like the West", not because of domestic democratic requirements. The lack of proper creative solutions for a new defence and security policy in their countries made civilians consider the Western model as "the only one" available and "the best". This was a bad imitation and therefore an artificial process. It also involved less domestic effort. The "copy and paste" mentality dominated the early 1990s. Such an approach continued with the nomination of other civilians that were good on the rhetoric of democratic civilian control but with poor expertise in defence and military affairs. To a certain degree, one could say that from a situation of pampered military in late 1980s, the East Europeans moved to a situation of pampered civilians in the early 1990s.

Civilians' imitational attitude and military conservatism postponed a realistic assessment of the security sector reform needs. Almost everyone wanted its military to be "like in the West", but no civilian authority was able to develop a draft programme. Bulgaria and Romania are examples. In these countries, there were successive attempts to draft basic documents on national security. Because of such hesitations, up to 1996 in Romania and 1997 in Bulgaria deep military reforms lacked some of the basic documents. Hence, neither the legislature nor the executive were able to draft a policy paper. Inconsistency adjourned attempts to draw up comprehensive legislation on defence before the end of the 1990s.[28]

As one might assume, this period of time consumed a good deal of assistance in the form of conferences, round tables, visits and other activities. "All contacts are good", the assistance philosophy in the early 1990s, was resource consuming for both parties. Many Easterners spent much of their time out of their office by participating in so many conferences abroad. Civilians that had just started working in the military spent more time abroad than in their defence ministries at home. This contributed to the perception of civilians as "strangers" in the MoDs.

Moreover, as the Westerners stressed the importance of civilian control, at home democratic control was sometimes undermined by nominating purely civilian political appointees. By the mid 1990s, as a side-effect, the superficial discourse ("keep it louder") on civil-military relations discouraged civilians from taking full responsibility on defence and security issues and motivated military people to adopt a self-defence and conservative posture ("keep it quiet") that eventually discouraged them from being more active in the reform process.

Therefore, Western assistance for democratic civilian control indeed created incentives for solving important points on the military reform agenda (ie a new model of political control over the military, an increased number of civilians in defence, military awareness of the importance of international cooperation, etc). However, due to an improper definition of civil-military relations in the early 1990s, some effects of this prevented the military being more active and professionally responsible and impeded the civilians realizing the important mission democracy entrusted them to perform. Before the mid 1990s a good part of the discourse was still ideological, resembling a pattern from the communist past called "the wooden language" – promise everything and do (almost) nothing.

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As Societies Transform, Do Their Armies Lag Behind?

In 1999, the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO exposed their militaries to Alliance standards. It became clear that the Central and Eastern European militaries not only lagged behind Western militaries, but, in some aspects, even behind their own societies. Chris Donnelly considered that "… no post-communist country has yet achieved a totally satisfactory degree of democratic control and good civil-military relations. In all cases, as societies transform, their armies lag behind."[29]

The 1997 Summit in Madrid was a "cool shower" for the governments of all the candidate countries, admitted or not yet admitted. It made Central and Eastern European countries understand that Alliance membership is a demanding position. On this basis, for the candidate countries the second-generation reforms started approximately in 1998 as Easterners and Westerners alike became more aware not only of the progress made, but also of the work ahead. In practical terms, the second generation reforms have meant downsizing and professionalising the military.

The number of redundant personnel was somewhere between 30-45 percent of the 1997 level in most of the East European militaries. In such conditions, the people in uniform started a second professional activity in the local environment (teaching, small businesses, self-employment, weekend or afternoon jobs). An open, growing labour market offered these people a second professional opportunity. The Westerners offered professional resettlement programmes, funds and experts. Those with less bureaucratic orientation, greater flexibility and the most skilled have managed to adapt to the changing social environment (mostly captains and majors as well as NCO technicians).

In terms of institutional capacity for change, much of the energy was associated with the middle-level and technical personnel. However, the second generation reforms encouraged a good many of these people to leave the military at the first opportunity, in their thousands per year. In Romania, the annual release from the military ranges from 4,000 to 7,000. In Bulgaria the average is 3,500 per year. Even though the potential for real change was placed within this group, some of them were even paid to leave. One could say that, to a certain extent, the military organization dismissed some of its most valuable people a few years before being admitted into NATO.

Characteristic of most East European countries, some aspects of this situation could also be encountered in South Eastern European countries. With the first generation reforms (1992-1996), Romania and Bulgaria adopted the "imitation-type" with a large military that received little reform, while Slovenia also adopted a kind of imitation, but without having a real military. With the second generation reforms, Romania and Bulgaria have started downsizing their military in a rather unproductive way, while Slovenia has moved to build a military, but in a non-supportive social environment characterized by the lack of interest in the military profession.

To sum up, the main trend of building democratic civil-military relations is counterbalanced by some side-effects that are generated less by the communist past but by current transition inconsistencies. What needs to be done? If one considers that the forms of democratic civil-military relations are already in place, then some real substance should be put into these forms.

A New Approach to Civil-Military Relations in South Eastern Europe

In 1996 Chris Donnelly warned that "... there is no Central and East European country that has the effective army it needs and no government that can evaluate what kind of defence it requires, nor what size, nor evaluate the proposals of its generals".[30] Of course things have improved since then. But to what extent? More recently, M Ulrich considers that "deficiencies in the depth of the transformation of the national security systems go virtually unnoticed".[31] D Nelson confirms that "the democratic transformation of post-communist militaries, defence ministries, and related organs is far from finished".[32]

Therefore, there are still important steps to be accomplished and they relate to a working democracy, effective management, demilitarization of the strategic culture and improving civilian education on security and defence. A new approach suggests that, if there have been created the *forms* of democratic civil-military relations, the issue now is to put *substance* into these forms.[33] The lesson learned is that institutional relationships and arrangements alone, as inspired by the "Western model", cannot make civil-military relations work. Several conclusions can be drawn from this experience.

First, in all three South Eastern European countries parliamentary oversight formally functions, but is currently restricted to main legislation on defence with a small margin of debate. The insufficient debate in the Defence Committees reflects the insufficient knowledge, interest and education on defence and security within the society at large. In mature democracies, national security policy deliberations involve the participation of civilian and military professionals, think-tanks and NGOs and are properly covered by the media. Political decisions are made after transparent and democratic public deliberations with the parliament as the politically institutionalized deliberating body. Certainly, the parliaments have scope to improve their activities.

As Neil Grayston, UK defence advisor to the MOD in Slovenia pointed out: "In theory, ... parliament has very close oversight of defence expenditure. In practice, the level of parliamentary scrutiny is constrained by the limited knowledge of defence issues among parliamentarians."[34] Such a situation seems to be common to all South Eastern European countries. The defence committee staffers that are supposed to supply professional knowledge on security and defence to the parliamentarians have themselves a limited competence. The practice of using the expertise of independent institutes and scholars is not yet fully employed by the defence establishments and parliaments. In Bulgaria, despite one of the strongest pools of independent expertise, as Plamen Pantev points out, there are few occasions when it is used either by the legislature or the executive.[35] In Romania, current legislation limits the ability of the government to pay independent NGOs to work on public issues, defence and security included. Moreover, the government uses the practice of the so-called GONGO to simulate but not stimulate the contribution of civil society.[36] In Slovenia, a good body of expertise was created within the Defence Studies Department of Ljubljana University, but its capacities are not yet properly used. Currently, there is a good deal of experience of using foreign experts, but no matter how valuable this contribution might be, it is always limited and in the long term it should in turn encourage developing domestic expertise. In practice, in spite of being called for "assistance", foreign advisors sometimes ought to take over responsibilities of the domestic civilian and military

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establishments. An example is the PBES planning and budgetary team that offers expertise on personnel management to South Eastern European countries.

Second, the current issues of civil-military relations are related to civilian expertise. To a certain degree, political appointees plague civil-military relations in South Eastern European countries. The practice of "It's who you know, not what you know" sometimes tends to become prevalent, especially soon after elections.[37] On the one hand, the lack of educated civilians on defence and security matters encourages the practice of political appointees. On the other hand, political patronage within the ruling party or political coalition in office usually gives way to arbitrary civilian nominations within the MOD and to other national security agencies. In Romania, this situation was widespread between 1996-2000 with the Democratic Convention coalition. In Bulgaria, a similar practice was associated with the Socialist Party before the 2000 elections. If it gets out of control, the practice of political appointees might itself undermine democratic civil-military relations. This time it might be the civilians, not the military, who jeopardize democratic civil-military relations. Frequent changes of middle-level civilian officials with affiliations to successive political waves certainly impedes good civil-military relations as it affects the stability and continuity of people and policies. From this point of view, a clearer delimitation between political and public service positions within the defence and security agencies is necessary.

Third, the issue of good governance and effective management is actually one of the most pressing ones in the South Eastern European defence and security establishments. In spite of democratic-like conduct for more than a decade after the end of the Cold War and in spite of the experience achieved in more than 8 years within the NATO/PfP framework, there is still a deficiency in management of the defence and security sectors. On the political level, evolutions in these countries have successively replaced politicians, public servants and military officials and the newcomers do not always exhibit increased competence on defence and security issues. Developing mature mechanisms and people for effective defence and security management seems to require a longer time than expected. In the societal realm, the characteristics of transitional society reveal the need for responsible parliaments and accountable governments. That is to say developing responsibility and improving accountability of parliaments and governments is a process still in the making. Democratic and effective management of security and defence policy cannot be isolated from the other legislative and executive functions.

Fourth, legislation on security policy is a civilian responsibility that all South Eastern European countries should work on so as to become responsible NATO members. Because of legal ambiguities on the role and functions of the president and the prime minister and ad hoc current practices on defence, further measures are necessary in Romania and Slovenia. In Slovenia the frequent change of ministers (four in four years) has induced a sense of instability, as changing ministers means changing down the chain (state secretaries, other high officials). In Romania, the political game of minister Victor Babiuc in early 2000 generated strains within the ruling coalition and his resignation threatened to lead to a political crisis. Again in Romania, the initiative of Minister Pascu in June 2002 to pass legislation that was intended to limit the freedom of the press generated a political crisis that inflamed civil-military relations. Such "minor accidents" are actually showing improper functioning of civil-military relations and the potential that, if not addressed, they might turn into real crises. Soon after the invitation in Prague the press warned against government actions in South Eastern European countries that called into question democratic principles.

Fifth, the issue of improving public education on defence and security matters in South Eastern European countries reflects the current changing strategic culture. Subjected to Soviet propaganda and used to thinking in terms of military threats during the Cold War, after 1991 the public in South Eastern Europe is now more attentive to notions such as security risks, terrorism, regional trafficking and the like. Ethnic conflicts and political turmoil in the Balkans have contributed to a better understanding of the non-military aspects of security and the importance of integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures.

Democratic civil-military relations primarily mean civilian responsibility in defining the role, functions and missions as well as controlling all ministries and agencies in the security sector, intelligence services included. Therefore, civilian education on defence economics, security management, terrorism and even intelligence has to be initiated. No South Eastern European country yet has a course on defence economics or intelligence in a civilian university. Consequently, the finance ministries, for instance, face management difficulties in financing procurement, while civil bureaucracies experience shortcomings in cooperating with the intelligence services. Public education on defence and security is fundamental for democratic civil-military relations in South Eastern European countries. Strengthening democratic civil-military relations will not be possible in the absence of a public culture on the relationship between democracy and security, as there is no security without democracy and no democracy without security.

Sixth, foreign assistance for building democratic civil-military relations is a form of real-help that functions where self-help exists. Western military assistance needs to be "civilianized", that is to assist the fragile nature of civil society in South Eastern Europe to be acknowledged on current national and international security and defence issues. It is necessary to enlarge public deliberation and civil education on security and to sustain the changing strategic culture in these countries. It seems clear that medium and long term public education on security would in turn provide a sound basis for democratic civil-military relations. This means that new forms and programmes of foreign assistance for democratic civil-military relations in the Eastern European countries would have to be taken into account. The USAID experience of civil education in South American countries could be used for South Eastern European countries. It envisages, for instance, support for independent NGOs and think-tanks to draft alternative security and defence policy papers, sustenance of public education on security within the civilian education system, encouraging journalists to improve their knowledge on security and the like.

ENDNOTES

[1] For a comparative analysis of authoritarian regimes, see for instance Amos Perlmutter, *Modern authoritarianism: a comparative institutional analysis*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981.

[2] Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics, Brazil and the Southern Cone*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988, pXV.

[3] Ibid, p13.

[4] Using the military for internal repression was defined by the Soviet leadership within the Warsaw Treaty in the aftermath of the Budapest (1956) and Prague (1968) uprisings as being necessary "to protect socialism, unity and brotherhood relations among all communist countries". However, the 1968 intervention in Prague was for the Soviet military a response to a "foreign threat" even if it occurred within the socialist bloc. In 1981, Poland was to repeat the 1968 Czech experience if the military did not intervene. Notwithstanding this,

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most analysts agree that the Polish military was not directly involved in politics. Even if under martial law General Jaruzelski took over the government, the military "remained in the barracks".

5   Szayna, S, Thomas, F Stephen Larabee, *East European Military Reform after the Cold War. Implications for the United States*, Santa Monica, RAND, 1995, p5.

6   Timothy Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1979.

7   Samuel P Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957, p83.

8   Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Military. A Social and Political Portrait*, Boulder Westview Press, 1960.

9   Marybeth Ulrich, *Democratizing Communist Militaries. The Cases of the Czech Republic and Russian Armed Forces*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1999.

10   The concept of sclerosis was proposed by Mancur Olson in such works as *The rise and decline of nations: economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1982. It refers mainly to those societies whose political system and institutional basis are not development supportive.

11   Tim Edmunds, "Promoting Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe: The Inevitability of 'Post-Modern' Reform?", paper presented at the Biannual Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, 19-21 October 2001.

12   Foster, Cottey & Edmunds make a typology of professional armed forces by which are identified four distinct 'ideal-types': power projection, territorial defence, post-neutral and neutral. See for details, Foster, Cottey & Edmunds, "Professionalisation of Armed Forces in CEE. A Background Paper", *TCMR paper 1.5*, September 2002.

13   T Edmunds, op cit.

14   The two major works in the field are: David Stark & Laszlo Bruszt, *Postsocialist Pathways. Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe*, Cambridge University Press, 1998 and Gil Eyal, Ivan Szelenyi & Eleanor Townsley, *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists, The New Ruling Elite in Eastern Europe*, Verso, London, 1999. For Stark & Bruszt, "The transition is not from plan to market, but from plan to clan". For Eyal et al, Central Europe is a model of working capitalism in the absence of a proper capitalist class while Eastern Europe (Russia mainly) is a model of fighting capitalist clans in the absence of capitalist institutions.

15   David Stark & Laszlo Bruszt, *Postsocialist Pathways. Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe*, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

16   Wedel, Janine, *Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe*, New York, St Martin's Press, updated edition, 2001.

17   Plamen Pantev, "The New National Security Environment and its Impact on the Civil-Military Relations in Bulgaria", *Research Study # 5*, Institute for Security and International Studies, Sofia, 1997.

18   The initiative was outlined by the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell and sent to the then SACEUR General John Shalikashvili to create a programme similar to a military peace corps for the transitional East European militaries. The US teams were to provide the right contacts and expertise for Eastern European needs. The first US team was sent to Hungary in July 1992 as a trial. By the next year ten other Mil-to-Mil US teams were sent to Central and Eastern Europe. A large exchange visits programme has developed since 1993. In the first year, the programme was funded with $6m. In 1994 it received $10m and in 1995 $16.3m. After 1996 the programme was funded by the Commander in Chief (CINC) European budget with some $15m.

19   Joint Contact Team Programme mission statement as presented in 1995, apud M P Ulrich, *Democratizing Communist Militaries. The Cases of the Czech Republic and Russian Armed Forces*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1999, p55.

20   M P Ulrich points out the State Department idiosyncrasy on DoD self-appointed foreign policy posture. See M P Ulrich, op cit, p56-7.

21   US, as the largest Western education provider, began to train and educate foreign servicemen in 1947 within IMET. Since its inception it has had two broad missions: first, to provide professional military education and military training for allied or friendly armed forces and second, to expose foreign military personnel to democratic values, respect for human rights and belief in the rule of law. IMET means professional military education in

the context of a democratic society. As Clarke et al suggest, the programme "is not designed to change behavior, but it may have affected the attitudes of some participants". See for details, Duncan L Clarke, Daniel B Oconnor & Jason D Ellis, *Send guns and money. Security assistance and US foreign policy*, Westport Praeger, 1997, p21.

22   Excerpts from the Marshall Center Mission Statement, Marshall Center web site at http://www.marshallcenter.org/committment.htm.

23   I should mention here the great work done by the Marshall Center Research Branch over the years and the dedication of Jurgen Külman and Mathias Schönburn, assisted by Jeannie Callaghan, to developing research on civil-military relations, in general and on sociology of the military, in particular.

24   For details on the PfP Consortium, see http://www.pfpconsortium.org.

25   Edmunds, Foster & Cottey, *The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe*, TCMR1.7.b, 2001, p1.

26   For more details on the idea of "shared responsibility", see Larry Watts, "Democratic Control of the Military in Romania: An Assessment as of October 2001", in Graeme P Herd (ed), *Civil-Military Relations in Post-Cold War Europe*, December 2001, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst, UK, p24. The first top-level civilian to be nominated in the Romanian military was Dr Ioan Mircea Pascu as early as 1993. However, being moved from Presidency to the MoD, State Secretary Pascu was perceived as looking for a "quieter" office rather than as willing to become involved and taking responsibilities within the MOD. As State Secretary (1993-1996), his actions confirmed his limited involvement and leadership and, as Defence Minister after 2000, even gave evidence of some non-democratic attitudes.

27   L Jelušič & M Malešič, "Legal Aspects and Controversies of Democratic Control over the Armed Forces. Slovenia in Transition", paper presented at the DCAF Seminar *Legal Framing of Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Security Sector: Norms and Realities*, Geneva, 4-5 May 2001.

28   For Bulgaria, Jeffrey Simon considers the years 1990-1997 as being "seven lost years". See for details, *Strategic Forum*, 142, May 1998, "Bulgaria and NATO: 7 Lost Years", Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington DC.

29   Donnelly, "Defence Transformation in the New Democracies: A Framework for Tackling the Problem", in *NATO Review*, No 1/1997.

30   Donnelly, in *NATO Review*, No 6/1996.

31   Marybeth Ulrich, "Developing Mature National Security Systems in Post-Communist States: The Czech Republic and Slovakia", in *Armed Forces and Society*, Spring 2002, Vol 28, No 3, p404.

32   Daniel Nelson, "Armies, Security, and Democracy in Southeastern Europe", in *Armed Forces and Society*, Spring 2002, Vol 28, No 3, p449.

33   One of the modernization issues in Eastern Europe has been the persistence of "forms without substance", as defined at the end of the 19th century by the Romanian sociologist Titu Maiorescu, resembling the functional deficiencies (lack of substance) of Western-like institutions (the forms).

34   "Democratic Control of the Armed Forces of Slovenia – A Progress Report", by Neil Grayston, UK Defence Advisor to the MOD of Slovenia, in Graeme P Herd (Ed), *Civil Military Relations in Post Cold War Europe*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst, UK, 2001.

35   Plamen Pantev, "Analysis and Conclusions", in Plamen Pantev (ed), *Civil-Military Relations in South Eastern Europe*, p206, 2000.

36   The practice of GONGO (government non-govermental organizations) means NGOs are created by officials in the government in order to make them available for public funding or for foreign assistance.

37   Quite significant, this practice is mentioned by a foreign adviser to the MoD in Slovenia. See Neil Grayston, op cit, p9.

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Appendix 1: A Comparison of Democratic, Soviet & Transitional Models of Political Control

Elements of Civilian Control	Democratic Features	Soviet Features	
Constitutional & Legal Provisions	Mechanism for civilian control sufficient and clearly codified.	Communist party vested with supreme authority.	Formally approved and relatively clear provisions, partially functioning mechanisms.
Executive Oversight & Control	Clear chain of command from military leaders to the civilian executive.	Clear chain of command from military leaders to party leaders.	Ambivalence.
	Civilian national security staff.	General Secretary is Communist Party leader and directs party apparatus that carries out party policies.	Lack of qualified civilian staff. Military still overrepresented.
	Effective civilian management within the MOD.	Military exerted influences over military policy and issues of professionalism but accepted the Party as the sovereign authority.	Ineffective civilian management within MOD.
	Transparent and responsive MOD and military.	Opaque.	Ambivalence.
	Expert confidence between civilian and military leaders.		
	Mutual confidence between civilian and military leaders.		Ambivalence.
	Corruption not tolerated.	Military relatively free of corruption in Soviet era.	Corruption spreads as transition begins.
	Executive actively educates public on national security policies and priorities.	Political manipulation of security and military issues.	Executive not fully aware of its responsibilities yet.
Legislative Oversight & Control	Sufficient expertise to oversee budgetary and other oversight issues.	Legislature is no counterweight to the party leadership.	Lack of expertise and of civilian staff.

	Broad control over policy issues and ability to conduct hearings.	No real oversight role.	Limited oversight role.
	Transparent MOD and military that allow unrestricted access to information to legislatures.	Loyal ratifiers of party policies.	Military resistant to parliamentarian oversight.
	Military responsive to legislative inquiries.		Partial and superficial.
	Legislators motivated to ensure accountability of the military institution.		Lack of real political motivation.
Relationship Between Military Institution & Society	No serious tensions between military and society.	Party was source of military's prestige and status.	Social reintegration of the military.
	Respect for the military as the guardians of societal freedoms.	Party controlled all levels of socialisation and instilled militarism and respect for the military through official ideology.	Increase of respect for the military as compared with other state institutions.
	Limits on the military's access to influence and to public participation.	The degree of prestige varied across the Soviet bloc.	Political limits on the military's access to public participation.
	Well developed public relations and positive relationship with NGOs.	Lack of public relations and of free press.	Public relations deficient, tensions with the NGOs and the press.

Source: Adapted from Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, *Democratizing Communist Militaries*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.

Appendix 2: A Comparison of Democratic, Soviet & Transitional Models of Military Professionalism

Elements of Military Professionalism	Democratic Features	Soviet Features	Transitional Features
Recruitment & Retention	Cross-societal, variety of sources.	Conscripts system led to universal service.	Conscript system alongside with some professionalisation.
	Entry based on merit.	Entry into the officer corps related to merit and factors others than merit (social origin).	Entry based on merit.
	Prestige of commissioning sources high.	Bureaucratic treatment of personnel.	
	Democratic values reflected in treatment of personnel.		
Promotion & Advancement	Merit-based promotion system.*	Political influence interferes with merit-based system.	Political influence interferes with merit-based system.
	Affirmative action based advancement may be used to fulfil democratic norms of inclusion.	Patronage network compromises bureaucratic norms of promotion.	Seniority predominates.
	Performance and seniority balanced.	Seniority predominates.	
	Officers promoted who support democratic values.	Officers promoted who support party ideology.	
Officership & Leadership	Styles of officership and leadership reflect democratic principles and respect for individual human rights.	Individual rights sacrificed beyond the constraints necessary for military competence.	Professionalisation in due course.
	Professional ethos.	Preference for authoritartianism style of leadership.	Changing leadership style.

	Preference for non-authoritarian style of leadership.	Professional ethos imbibed with political ideology.	Professional ethos to be crystallised.
	Respect for private lives of subordinates.	Abuse of soldiers common.	Respect for private life of subordinates.
Education & Training	Principles of democracy and the role of military professionals in the state taught throughout the military system.	Extensive and in-depth education and training network.	Principles of democracy taught throughout the military system.
	Loyalty to democratic institutions taught.	Professional knowledge stressed.	Loyalty to democratic institutions formally taught.
	Qualified civilian and military instructions with some participation of civilian students at some levels.	Marxist-Leninist ideological training emphasised, loyalty to the party taught.	Lack of qualified military and civilian instructors.
	Professional ethics emphasised along with military competence.*	Limited appreciation of civilian expertise acquired in training.	
		Professional military competence appreciated.	
Norms of Political Influence	Military fully accepts role in the political order.*	Accepted junior partner role to Soviet sovereign Communist Party.	Military accepts de jure its role in political order.
	No involvement of military in political feuds.	Limited political influence in some areas of military affairs.	Limited political influence.
	Recognition that some limited degree of political interaction with oversight institutions is necessary.	Favoured role in society and centralised economy reduced need to lobby for resources.	Limited political interaction with oversight institutions.
	Direct participation in politics is not accepted.	Competed for resources within "the rule of the game".	Compete for resources within new "rules of the game".

	Attempts to influence the political process are nonpartisan.		
Prestige & Public Relations	High public accountability.	Low public accountability.	Moderate public accountability.
	Full disclosure of information.	Controlled release of all information to outside inquiries.	Limited disclosure of information.
	Responsiveness to outside inquiries.		Limited media access.
	Media has full access.	Limited media access.	Unsatisfactory relationship with the public.
	Military actively manages relationship with the public.	Militarist socialisation methods continually connected military to society.	
Compatibility of Military & Societal Values	Accepts legitimacy of democratic institutions.	Military and social values high compatible.	Military values to adapt to societal values.
	Conceptualisation of democracy is similar to society's.	Military used as primary instrument of political socialisation.	
	Adapts internal operations to reflect democratic societal values.	Internal operations reflected corrupted Soviet bureaucratic values (mediocrity, patronage).	Internal operations reflect social deficiencies during transition (instability, corruption, patronage).

* Indicates characteristics that could be appropriate for military professionals in either system.

Source: Adapted from Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, *Democratizing Communist Militaries*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, p12.

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