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Dr Graeme P Herd

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

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Variable Geometry & Dual Enlargement: From The Baltic to The Black Sea

Dr Graeme P Herd

This paper assesses the changing relationship between the USA and the enlarging EU and NATO. It also examines the asymmetric security policy implications of dual enlargement: between existing EU and NATO member states; between old and 'first echelon' new members; between security policies that stress competitive or cooperative functional division of labour (that is, in terms of roles, missions and duties) between these organizations; between EU and NATO member states and those that will integrate by May 2004; and, between those that have the ability to integrate and those states that either do not or in which their current elites and publics perceive integration as a distant long-term strategic objective.

Introduction

In the post-Cold war era the EU, NATO and other multilateral institutions have found it very difficult to articulate in an agreed way their roles and compatibility, even in areas where they cooperate effectively. The transatlantic differences and tensions that have steadily arisen through the 1990s in the Balkans, evidenced by a major cleavage in transatlantic unity over conflict management in Kosovo, culminated in the 'transatlantic trauma' associated with the Iraq war in 2003. Although the US and European states share many common threat assessments, they disagree over how best to manage these threats, and in particular how, when and why to deploy coercive force. This strategic-conceptual gap is exacerbated by military-technological capability asymmetries amongst states within the region. At its extreme, this has been presented as a dichotomy between European unilateral passivism and US unilateral activism. As a result, policy-makers and analysts alike have suggested that we face one of three possible futures: an amiable separation (Daalder, 2003); strategic divorce (Kagan, 2003); or, strategic realignment and renewal (Asmus and Pollack, 2002).

As these strategic disputes, tensions and ambiguities have arisen the transatlantic security community is set to enlarge. The political will within NATO and the EU, expressed at the 21-22 November 2002 Prague NATO Summit and 12-13 December 2002 EU Copenhagen Summit, to integrate new members in May 2004 will have an impact on institutions, security policies in the Euro-Atlantic region. However, NATO at 26 and the EU at 25 will be profoundly different entities from NATO at 19 and the EU at 15 (particularly as 19 out of the 25 EU states will also be NATO allies). The EU will increase its collective population by 20% and its GDP by between 5-9% and small member EU states will increase from 10 to 19 of the 25 members (Batt et al, 2003: 17).

Although it could be argued that the 'variable geometry' between NATO and the EU will be reduced, it should also be noted that as there will be less diversity outside

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the EU and NATO so there will be greater diversity within it. Relations of newly integrated states with neighbours that are not yet integrated will be changed as these institutions further enlarge: the EU-Balkans Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003 endorsed the belief and aspiration that the entire region be integrated into the EU over the next decade, whilst both Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina look to integrate into PfP by 2004. Dual enlargement has the potential to generate a number of asymmetric impacts within the Euro-Atlantic security region: between existing EU and NATO member states; between old and 'first echelon' new members; between security policies within these organizations that stress competitive or cooperative functional division of labour (that is, in terms of roles, missions and duties) between these organizations; between EU and NATO member states and those that will integrate by May 2004; and, between those that have the ability to integrate and those states that either do not or in which their current elites and publics perceive integration as a distant long-term generational strategic objective. Let us examine some of the issues that arise in relation to the asymmetric impact of dual enlargement in greater detail.

Euro-Atlantic Strategic Divorce or Strategic Renewal?

The 1999 Kosovo campaign highlighted the dangers in the eyes of some NATO members of conducting a war by committee. The US administration saw NATO's cumbersome decision-making structures as detrimental to the achievement of 'closure' or victory in the campaign, whilst the UK argued that the US' lack of political will to rule in the possible use of ground troops at the beginning of the air campaign undermined the deterrent effect of NATO. The Kosovo campaign also served to reopen the discussion of the capabilities, technology, and power projection disparities between the US and other NATO member states. (Clark, 2001: 427.) The low defence expenditures of the European NATO member states and the largely static nature of their force structures were exposed, raising again ongoing debates over optimal burden sharing and division of labour within NATO. Moreover, some old NATO member states, as well as new members, were perceived to have performed poorly, with political elites not spending political capital to persuade their publics about the necessity and virtue of NATO intervention.

The shocking impact of 11 September 2001 determined that the Bush administration 'would seek to dominate the international system to such an extent that no strategic challenge would ever again be posed'. (Lyndley-French, 2002: 802) The 'lessons learned' from Kosovo impacted heavily on the transatlantic response to 11 September 2001. The diplomatic failure of the US to engage European NATO allies post 11 September 2001 – even as they offered 'unlimited solidarity' - undermined NATO's relevance. Although NATO's support proved politically useful, the US rejected European NATO offers for the alliance to engage as NATO in war fighting in Afghanistan: 'The Bush administration viewed NATO's historic decision to aid the United States under Article 5 less as a boon than a booby trap'. (Kagan, 2003: 102) In the words of the US Secretary of State for Defence: 'the mission defined the coalition, not the coalition the mission'. The implications of the global war on terrorism (GWOT) and US-led and -inspired 'coalitions of the willing' - *à la carte* multilateralism - for NATO were apparent.

A third dynamic occurred with the November 2002 NATO Prague Summit. The debates that preceded it were shaped by lessons learned from Kosovo, but also the imperatives that flowed from 11 September 2001. As a result, NATO focused attention on three new issues. Firstly, the capabilities of NATO allies had to be

improved and the 'Prague Capabilities Commitment' (PCC) tackled this issue. In the context of GWOT, new NATO members were strongly encouraged to reform their internal security structures – the civil-military focus of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process was extended to include more explicitly civil security sector reform in which security and intelligence services, Ministries of Interior, border guards, etc could all perform a role within the GWOT paradigm. NATO's Response Force (NRF) was to be the catalyst and most visible and useful objective of PCC. The NRF was to be a 21,000 strong force, technologically advanced, deployable, interoperable and sustainable by 2006, with 2000 troops to be sustainable for operating in the field for 14-30 days by October 2003. It was understood to be a means of improving the NATO capabilities of European states. At no additional spending, it would help to keep NATO interoperable through intense periods of training and missions and would be deployed to Afghanistan under German-Dutch leadership.

Secondly, a decision to integrate seven new members in second echelon enlargement was taken – and this included the three Baltic States. However, second echelon enlargement was shaped by the first echelon post-integration performance. A number of 'lessons learned' have been identified, which suggest security policy implications for second echelon integration states. Following the experience of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, it is likely that what ever the force structure of current prospective NATO member states is now, that structure will change in the future after accession. All new members will face budgetary constraints as they attempt to restructure their military; constitutional and legal system inadequacies will persist and have to be addressed, along with changes to national security doctrines and military concepts. Incompatibilities between national and NATO defence planning will appear and will have to be addressed and it appears questionable whether the publics and elites will continue to support NATO membership to the same extent post-accession as in the pre-accession period. The lack of support for the Kosovo campaign in the public and elites of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, the poor rate of defence reform and force restructuring these states had undertaken since integration and low rates of defence expenditure were compounded by the fact that it was 'more difficult to gain compromise once the new allies were members'. (Simon, 2003) 'Once bitten twice shy' was the watchword – and with it the realization that NATO could only exert reform pressure on new members through exclusion; once integrated, leverage was lost.

Thirdly, NATO-Russian relations were placed on a firmer footing by the creation of the NATO-Russia Council. (Kay, 2003) Russia-NATO relations were becoming routinised under the Russia-NATO Council, as a practical content of activities was developed, and an administrative capacity and a shared institutionalized culture gained root. Russia continued to promote security co-operation with the US in GWOT despite Putin's objections to the Iraq war – the issue was not discussed within the Russia-NATO Council forum, but rather through bilateral discussions between Washington and Moscow. The framework of Russian-US strategic partnership rather than the institution of NATO was favoured and this trend further underscores NATO's increasingly limited relevance to transatlantic relations.

However, the latent tensions exposed by Kosovo transformed into simmering disagreement and discontent not so much by the US' declaration of a GWOT and intervention into Afghanistan, but by the way in which the 'coalition of the willing' intervened and the implications that held for US security policy in the Bush administration. Open cleavages within the transatlantic security community continued to surface, particularly in a France preoccupied with the exercise of US

'hyper-power' and Germany, where the Chancellor was caught in a close political election and politicized his party's (SPD) opposition to US 'adventurism' to capture critical floating voters and bolster his Green Party coalition allies. The 'Bush Doctrine' of pre-emption (US National Security Strategy of September 2002) against states that currently threaten the US or that might conceivably threaten US primacy was understood by some alliance members in terms of neo-imperial 'adventures', to be opposed or counter-balanced through a greater emphasis on NATO or other multilateral institutions such as the UN. (Stelzenmueller, 2002)
Although many pre-emptive wars have occurred in history, the US-led invasion of Iraq – 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' - on 20 March 2003 represented the first pre-emptive war in accordance with the US September 2002 Strategic Doctrine. 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' can be understood as the fourth dynamic, as it ushered in 'an era in which the US has thrown off the constraints and balances of the multilateral system and exercised its enormous political and military supremacy on its own terms'. (Baker et al, 2003: 17) UN Security Council Resolution 1441 brought fully into the open cleavages between 18 European states and France, Germany, Russia, Belgium and Luxemburg, and between the US and Turkey (where the US strategic partnership with Turkey was deemed to be 'in tatters'). Current European NATO members signed 'Letter of Eight'[1] in support of the US position on Iraq, and days later a further 10 European states – the 'Vilnius 10' – added to this majority. The so-called 'Chocolate Summit' held in Brussels by the 'Gang of Four' (Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg) was grist to the mill of those that pointed to 'strategic divorce'. These splits now appeared fundamental in nature and constituted a crisis for NATO, only comparable in NATO history to the Suez Crisis of 1956, when the US opposed a French-UK led 'coalition of the willing' occupation of the Suez canal, to the point of forcing a humiliating retreat on its erstwhile allies.

These dynamics both generated and illustrated tensions and cleavages that were cumulative in nature, but driven over the immediate short-term by French, German and Russian opposition to US intervention in Iraq without a second UN resolution. This opposition, whilst reflecting the overwhelming popular sentiment, also served to highlight European inability to stop it through political diplomatic means. It merely underscored the realization that Europe lacked sufficient military power coupled with a political determination to become a global strategic power through the exercise of military force ('hard power').

The Iraq crisis also demonstrated that the US was prepared to deal with like-minded EU states individually, rather than to attempt to deal with the EU as a unified whole. The widely reported statement attributed to Condoleezza Rice underscored this perception: US post-Iraq policy towards Europe was to 'Punish the French, ignore the Germans, forgive the Russians' and presumably reward the Spanish and the British? Such disaggregating or 'cherry-picking' isolates opponents on any given issue and undermines the European project, and this may further undermine the rose-tinted vision of transatlantic renaissance. It also undermines any attempts to generate 'credibility, cohesion, convergence, commitment and candour', the prerequisites for transatlantic re-coupling. (Lyndley-French, Chaillot Paper, 2002) Solana, for example, has argued that 'such an approach would not only contradict generations of American wisdom, it would also be profoundly misguided. Different voices must be heard and respected, not ostracized or punished.' (Solana, 2003)

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[1] The eight NATO members were Britain, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary.

Security & Defence Policy Implications

This ambiguous and unsettled strategic environment, coupled with the process of dual enlargement, will have an number of asymmetric impacts on the defence and security policies of states in the Euro-Atlantic region, particularly the new entrants to NATO and the EU. Firstly, it brings with it the need to effectively fulfil the duties and responsibilities of membership. The US in particular asks two key questions of the new allies. Will the candidates' commitment to democracy strengthen the alliance's ability to protect and promote its security, value and interests? Can NATO be confident that a candidate's commitment to democracy and the alliances values be enduring? In military terms these questions translate more practically into the challenge of EU and NATO membership in balancing a need to both develop high intensity niche capabilities and specialized roles in NATO's NRF and to promote peacekeepers to support the middle and lower end Petersberg tasks, which the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) is likely to undertake. Can the Baltic and southeast European states advance on two fronts at once or do they have to choose one, due to finance, personnel and administrative and institutional capacity shortfalls and limitations? Both tasks have the potential to unbalance their militaries and create tensions in defence planning, contingencies and tasking arenas.

On the one hand role specialization for the NRF increases 'strategic partnership' with the US and opens up the possibility of integration into 'coalitions of the willing'. But such participation would be symbolic at best – their contribution is not needed militarily - and could be potentially unpopular at home depending on war-fighting casualties and the gap between the perceived necessity for pre-emption against the perceived imminence of the threat. On the other hand peace support operation preparation with the ERRF would be more popular domestically, but it is far from clear that the ERRF has the decision-making capacity, finance and political will to operate in a meaningful manner and the doubts can only increase as the EU moves to 25. Thus, whilst it might have been argued – half in jest - that the best interests of the southeast European and Baltic States within a transatlantic security alliance would be to 'join any emerging consensus' in order to maximize their influence, the dynamic events of the last few years argue that such a policy is now untenable. The US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld has noted: 'The distinction between old and new Europe today is not really a matter of age or size or even geography. It is a matter of attitude, of the vision that countries bring to the trans-Atlantic relationship.' (Rumsfeld 2003) French President Jacques Chirac also exacerbated splits through his undiplomatic comments in February 2003 in response to the V10 letter of support for the US: 'If they had wanted to diminish the chances of joining Europe, they could not have found a better way.' In October 2003 he further noted: 'There cannot be a Europe without its own defence system.' At the same time British Prime Minister Tony Blair stressed his commitment to European defence, arguing Europe needed the capability to act in peacekeeping, humanitarian and crisis management roles under circumstances where the US was not engaged. Bluntly put: which is more important for Baltic and southeast European States – European or American priorities, French or British?

This prospect has arguably become more of a reality following the French, German and UK Naples agreement over the EU's defence plans in early December 2003. It appears that the EU's constitution (to be finalized by the end of 2003) would include a mutual defence clause, albeit one that will state: 'commitments in this area shall be consistent with commitments under NATO, which, for those states

which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence'.[2] The military 'headquarters' now will constitute a 'planning and operational capacity' - a 'cell' situated within SHAPE, NATO's military headquarters near Mons. However, the EU's small strategic planning headquarters, situated in the heart of the 'EU district' of Brussels, would be augmented and given an operational dimension. (Roxburgh, 2003) Given that NATO provides a mutual defence clause and its own military planning structures, it is unclear why or what might be the implications of the EU's desire to replicate both. Although Javier Solana has described the transatlantic link as 'irreplaceable' (Solana 2003b), might the process whereby the EU augments roles and capabilities become more comprehensive, and so undermine NATO's primacy in defending Europe, just as dual enlargement becomes a reality?

Secondly, it places a stress on relations with both traditional regional partners and near neighbours. The attitudes of Baltic elites, for example, and the choices they make will place a pressure on the ability of their foreign and defence establishments to maintain cohesion in foreign and security policy formation and implementation once accession to NATO and the EU has been achieved. It is highly likely that – just as after the Benelux bloc or Iberian Peninsula integration – the constituent parts follow their own on occasion divergent interests, and accession will lead to a greater fragmentation of the Baltic States in foreign and security matters. This in turn will reduce the collective geopolitical weight of the Baltic bloc, but increase the bargaining power and influence of individual states in new informal alliances and partnerships within the EU and NATO. This has implications for civil-military relations in the region and the process has already begun. The jewel in the crown of intra-Baltic co-operation – the most active, interoperable (personnel, materiel, infrastructure) and effective example of practical and meaningful co-operation – is perceived to lie in the military-security sector. BALTBAT was hitherto *primus inter pares* within this sector. However, in May 2003 the three Baltic Ministers of Defence decided to conclude the BALTBAT project on 26 September 2003 (following the last 'Baltic Eagle' exercise), because it had fulfilled its objectives and missions. In its place will emerge three national battalions - ESTBAT, for example, will be have full operational capability by the end of 2005.

The relationship between the three Baltic states and their Nordic neighbours – states which had extended 'sovereignty support' and played the critical role of strategic partners through the 1990s – channelling military materiel and advice to guide democratic security building efforts and strategic reorientation westwards – is also placed under stress by this changing strategic environment. Some analysts have argued that Nordic unity is 'in tatters', as the US-led coalition in Iraq has received symbolic support from the Poles and Danes, whilst Sweden has called it 'illegal' and a 'breach of international law'. (Northern European Security Forum, 2003) Baltic integration into NATO may increase the perception that Finnish and Swedish non-alignment represents a redundant security strategy – indeed, Finland currently participates in all NATO activities but the collective defence role. Lastly, as with Poland and Romania, the Baltic States are ahead of the Nordic states in offering aid to the post-conflict rehabilitation phase of the Iraq operation – contributing on a per capita basis as much as the UK. Such a realignment of power and support in the Baltic region will impact on the ability and willingness of the Nordic states to continue to offer such close co-operative military assistance and

[2] The draft wording of the clause states: 'If a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall give it aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military or other, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.'

collaboration with their Baltic neighbours. Although it is impossible to quantify, this emergent process will have an impact on the nature and quality of civil-military relations within and between the Baltic States.

In southeast Europe similar dynamics are at work. Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria, states that will integrate into NATO in 2004, have argued that the extension of NATO membership to all states in the Western Balkans is critical to stability in the region and praised the role of the southeast European Stability Pact (Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Albania joined the Pact in 1999). The Adriatic Charter, modelled on the Baltic Charter developed in 1997 as a compensatory alternative to first echelon NATO membership, has been offered to Albania, Croatia and Macedonia as compensation for their failure to gain second echelon integration offered to the 'privileged'. It plays much the same function as the Baltic Charter: it encourages new and intensifies existing security consultations and co-operation between these states, as well as demonstrating a co-operative capacity, thereby strengthening the possibility of third echelon NATO membership. The Adriatic Charter states clearly perceived the US to be the engine of second echelon NATO enlargement and the motor of possible third echelon integration. Slovenia, though, has suggested that it can shoulder responsibilities Greece and Italy currently undertake as strategic partners offering 'sovereignty support' and promoting democratic security building in the Western Balkans – particularly the former Yugoslavia. Slovenia has peacekeepers in BiH, Macedonia and Kosovo, active economic investments in the region and has stressed the importance of EU integration of theses states. Despite such offers, it is clear that Albanian foreign policy will continue to prioritise strategic relationships with the key regional hegemons – US, Italy, Greece and Turkey – even if it upgrades relations with Slovenia.

The EU-Balkan Summit of June 2003 has reaffirmed the EU's desire to eventually integrate all Balkan states into the Union, characterising the EU and western Balkans relationship as 'privileged'. As Slovene Prime Minister Anton Rop stated: 'The EU has shown that the integration of the Balkan states is one of the priority tasks.' (*STA news agency*, Ljubljana, 21 June 2003) The necessity of integration was underlined by Lord Robertson, who has argued that border controls need to be strengthened in order to fight organised crime – a key threat to regional stability: 'either the region takes control of its borders or the criminals will take control of the region'. (*Agence France Press*, 22 May 2003)

However, there are a number of challenges to stability and security that must be overcome before integration into EU and NATO can be realised. Some are relatively straightforward. Although in Albania 90% of the population support NATO membership, it has low democratic standards – but this can be enhanced by continued EU integration and the support of near neighbours. It is not entirely clear whether the Bulgarian and Romanian experience is relevant and could be transferred to the South Caucasus or the Balkan region. The Croatian elections of November 2003 reflected the strengthening of nationalist parties at the expense of the moderate democratic forces. The motivating influence of NATO membership, its normative power to encourage accession candidates to consolidate their arrangements for the democratic, civilian control of armed forces, remains only as powerful as the prospect of membership. If NATO membership is not offered to Croatia in 2007, it will place Croatia's strategic realignment westwards under severe strain. This and the destabilising dynamic of continued war crimes trials at The Hague will further marginalise the power and electoral appeal of moderates. However, if NATO membership is offered to Croatia in 2007, then it is highly

unlikely that both Macedonia and Albania would also be integrated as one echelon, thereby fracturing the consolidation of any co-operative efforts within the Adriatic Charter.

BiH represents another challenge, which poses far harder policy questions for the EU and neighbouring states. Firstly, the state has little internal cohesion, with 13 prime ministers, 180 ministers and 760 legislators within three entities led by nationalist leaders with a zero sum mentality. BiH can only be supervised through the international supervisory administration and central to its success will be the policies of neighbouring states and the unity of the international community forcing reforms – including the non-toleration of anti-Dayton factions – in a comprehensive and unified manner.

In addition, near neighbours do not have comprehensive policies towards BiH. Two-thirds of BiH's borders are shared with Croatia: 'It is the primary transit country for international forces and supplies to this totally landlocked country, and Croatia's many ports and roads along the Adriatic are BiH's lifelines to the world.' (Raguz, 2003) Whilst the new Croatian government has withdrawn outright support for Croats in BiH to be integrated into Croatia, it is not yet apparent what will replace the 'BiH-breakup' policy. The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro has a huge reform process to implement, and difficulties are compounded by the possible independence of Montenegro, following the election in early 2003 of a pro-independence president. The status of Kosovo also has yet to be decided and this has the potential to impact on relations with the West, although it is being at least discussed within the context of KFOR-Belgrade dialogue and with the EU's Stability and Association Tracking Mechanism. The current Belgrade government has stopped military ties between Belgrade and Banja Luka in Respublica Srpska, but has continued economic ties – though leading generals in the VS army are no longer paid by Belgrade nor do they continue to receive former JNA military equipment. This abandonment of the Respublika Srpska national leadership has generated a backlash in the entity, with politicians in Banja Luka calling those in Belgrade 'traitors'.

Moreover, the power and credibility of the international community is weak. The Bush administration is progressively turning over Balkan responsibilities to the EU, including the long-term development of the region and short-term crisis management, reducing both US funding and troops in and for the region. The EU is utilising a number of instruments to this end: a region wide Stability Pact providing a framework for concrete projects; a Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) which maps steps towards association then membership of the EU; and Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development, Stabilization (CARDS). Although the EU is the most powerful force for reform and the prospect of membership makes policies more effective and reliable, it has been undermined by the failure of its past engagement with the region. EU security promises and action have little credibility in BiH after the massacres at Srebrenica on 11 July 1995. This trust will be hard to replace. (Abramovitz & Hurbunt, 2003)

Current EU member state policies appear split, with coherence losing out to the national policies of national governments. When policy reform issues are brought to the table EU unity is on occasion lacking and this damages the prospect for BiH state consolidation. Two examples will illustrate this. Some European NATO (and EU) member states argue that despite the lack of a pan-Federation MoD, BiH with its Standing Committee on Military Matters might still be integrated into PfP in 2004, whilst others insist that such a double standard cannot be tolerated. The EU

and US also do not provide a united front. The day the US suspended international aid to BiH in response for the lack of action against war criminals (having published its Black List of suspected criminals), particularly Radovan Karadic and Ratko Mladic, the EU made available a loan of $100 m. and proceeded to remove key individuals from a list it had created after intensive lobbying from some European capitals.[3]

A further consideration – in the Balkans more than the Baltic States - is the extent to which the changing US military footprint or military presence in Europe will impact on security politics in the region. The changing US military presence is ongoing and responds to the necessity of policing the 'new American perimeter'. (Donnelly, 2003) It is governed by four principles that will ensure that US interests and those of its allies are upheld. Firstly the reconfiguration must advance US strategic interests; it should allow the US to respond more effectively to the asymmetric challenges of the 21st century. The potential for sources of insecurity spilling over from the Middle East to Central Asia, Caspian, Caucasus, Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean regions to the Balkans is real and must be addressed. Africa, as a possible location of al-Qa'idah and an area of rising strategic importance to the US (it is forecast that West Africa could supply 25% of US oil imports) could also be an area of future deployments. Secondly, it should have an operational impact by increasing American ability to respond to current threats, and facilitate and enhance ongoing transformation from the industrial to the digital age. As NATO moves east then so does its centre of gravity and US reconfiguration reflects this reality. At the same time a balance between 'lightness' and 'lethality' must be maintained. Thirdly and fourthly, it has a political and economic component in that the maintenance of old bases or creation of new ones should not be driven wholly by political or economic considerations, though economic prudence and political ties can and do enter the equation. (Spence & Hulsman, 2003)

These principles entail a switch from building large, heavily staffed garrisons, towards a more modern basing paradigm. General Jones has spoken of the creation of 'bare bones bases' or 'lily pads', noting that a Pentagon study in 2002 found that 20% of the 499 bases in Germany are no longer 'terribly usable'. (Graham, 2003) Instead, he supports smaller, lighter, more scattered bases in which prepositioned equipment and a skeleton 6-month rotating staff (without dependents) can respond with greater speed and flexibility to deployments out of area. It is thought that while some 'enduring value' bases will be maintained, such as the airbase at Ramstein in Germany or Aviano in Italy, and the overall number of US troops in Europe will continue unchanged (approx 112,000 with 84% in Germany), the location of these troops will change. For example, the two US divisions (each division has 15,000 troops) in Germany, the 1st Armoured Division attached to the Vth Corps near Heidelberg and the 1st Infantry Division, currently in Iraq, will only have a brigade (between 3-5000 troops) redeployed to Germany after the Iraq operation. The balance will be sent back to the US or deployed to the 'lily pads'.

Discussions are ongoing as to where these 'lily pads' might be located, and those assets which have been used for operations over the Balkans or in Iraq are the most likely contenders. In Poland the Krzesinsky air base near Poznan has been

[3] US Secretary of State Powell certified its compliance on 15 June. Serbia and Montenegro did however lose $278K of IMET funds because it has not yet signed a waiver on the International Criminal Court (along with many other states).

mentioned, in Hungary the Taszar airbase. In Romania the Mihail Kogalniceanu air base near Constanta, the Babadag training ground and Mangalia port are all under consideration. In Bulgaria, the airfields of Dobritch in the northeast and Kroumovo in the south and Graf Ignatievo near Plovdiv are all discussed, as are the ports of Burgas and Varna and training grounds of Koren and Novo Selo.

The experience of the Iraq war has impacted on the necessity of reconfiguration. The lack of political support amongst some allies – a lack that contrasted sharply with Vilnius 10 support - had operational consequences for US military effectiveness. It took several days delay before the Pentagon could get permission to deploy the US 173rd Airborne Brigade to parachute into Northern Iraq. Austria did not make its rail network available for US forces and German, French and Turkish opposition to the war provides a reason to decrease future dependence. Public support for US military presence, aims and objectives within Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Hungary is greater than within 'Old Europe' and this lessens threats to deny access to such infrastructure located on their territory. Moreover, the economic benefits of the location of such bases – even the lower cost 'lily pads' – will likely maintain or increase public support. EUCOM HQ at Stuttgart puts $150-$175 m into the local economy and after 3 months of US use of Constanta port in Romania, $30 m was inserted into the local economy. (Fuller, 3003)

The military benefits are clear: as well as greater geo-strategic flexibility that location closer to conflict brings (for example, less mid-air refuelling for tactical range F-16s), the less restrictive environmental legislation allows more live fire exercises, training manoeuvres in heavily tracked vehicles, helicopter night flights. This will contribute to an ability to maintain a higher level of military readiness. Joint exercises with host nation militaries will help increase the interoperability of new NATO member states. At the same time as consolidating political ties with these states, basing the US military in both Bulgaria and Turkey will shift the basing burden from Turkey and provide diplomatic cover to Turkish politicians when actions become regional initiatives rather than solely US-Turkish efforts.

The US and Europe face the same threats of WMD proliferation and terrorism and NATO is the anchor of US security relations with Europe. (Brezinski, 2003) However, the eastwards and southwards tread of the lighter US footprint does raise security policy implications that will have to be managed. Will Germany feel snubbed and resent the economic (and cultural) impact of the move? Certainly, radical basing changes would have economic and political consequences in the three Lander where the majority of US bases are. Will political contact between the US and Germany suffer; will a 'strategic seam' be broken and might this not then be exploited?

Alternatively, will 'New Europe' generate unrealistic expectations of the military, economic and political benefits that will accrue from bases on their territory? Will the Russia-NATO Council allow the issue of new bases on former Soviet borders from Central Asia to the South Caucasus to be managed, or might Russia begin to object to this increased US presence, as American trainers are replaced by a more permanent physical presence in the shape of 'lily pads'? After all, this very scenario is identified as a threat in Russia's National Security Concept of 2000. Armenia, with US bases already in Turkey, is unlikely to argue that it is concerned by the proximity of new NATO bases, but it would be concerned if the arrival of these bases negatively impacted on Russia-NATO relations. It might also be argued that the nature of the 'lily pads' – jump off points for pre-positioned equipment rather

than Okinawa-style mini-American garrisons – helps immunise them from negative perceptions of overbearing US presence.

Recent events have refocused attention on this issue and may allow us to draw a less sanguine conclusion. Georgia and Azerbaijain have joined the 'coalition of the willing' against Iraq and are critical to Euro-Atlantic global energy strategy. Regime change in Georgia (the so-called 'revolution of roses') and the institutionalization of a dynasty in Azerbaijain in November 2003 will reshape Russia's perception of the role and legitimacy of the US' footprint in the region. Whereas the US has reiterated its support for Georgian territorial integrity, representatives from the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Osetia, as well as the autonomous region of Ajaria, met in Moscow and discussed the importance of closer ties. Moscow aims to maintain its military bases in Georgia for at least ten years. No final decision on the realignment of the global posture of US forces has yet been made, but is clear that the South Caucasus makes the issue of 'lily pads' a more sensitive one than its proposers may have realised. (Feith, 2003)

It may well be that two latent processes might be realised that further undermine this generally positive understanding of the relocation. Firstly, bureaucratic, institutional and political considerations might see the 'lily pads' grow in size, thereby negating the benefits of the lighter footprint and increasing antagonisms with Russia. Secondly, a realization of the hidden costs of such a move might also undermine the US DoD's determination to carry it through. The morale, retention and re-enlistment problem is expected to grow, as rotation without families increases in a period of high operational tempo. Two sets of equipment are needed – one forward and one rear, to carry out training; and transport costs and additional capital costs must be considered. Moreover, it can be noted that there is an air of unreality attached to the notion of forward basing troops and especially equipment in 'New' rather than 'Old' Europe. The time difference of deployment from Romania to the Middle East as opposed to Germany is hardly great.

Conclusions

Current dynamics do not allow for a complete breakdown in transatlantic relations, but they are disruptive enough not to promote a reconciliation and renewal. Instead we are faced with strategic disequilibrium or strategic dissonance, an environment with three key features. Firstly, the constancies of US 'hard' military power and EU 'soft' economic and political power will increase over the next few years. Secondly the US, although maintaining a broadly unilateral proactive and pre-emptive foreign policy, will work harder at securing allies as the costs – military, political, economic – of sustaining GWOT at its current operational tempo become apparent to the Bush administration. Thirdly, and paradoxically, the stronger the EU becomes as a 'soft' power (the greater its ability to integrate first and then second echelon members), the larger the membership, the harder it becomes to generate strategic consensus within the EU for common foreign policy and possible military intervention in all but the lowest common denominator (ie 'sub-Zimbabwe') actions: the accumulation of EU 'soft' power precludes its ability to generate 'hard' power. As a result of disagreement over threat perception, attempts to formulate a coherent, symmetric Euro-Atlantic response to manage these asymmetric threats is at present lacking. The Euro-Atlantic security community may attempt to manage the threats by strengthening global institutions; increasing Euro-Atlantic institutional co-operation; or adopting a compartmentalized and differentiated

approach over a range of issues that combines institutional co-operation, competition, and ad hoc coalitions. Time will tell.

'New Europe' bandwagoning as a security strategy may well prove to be the most effective in the context of current transatlantic relations. This will allow the new entrants to maximise gains – particularly strategic partnership with the US that will be underpinned by greater US military assistance. However, the role of 'balancer' might well recommend itself to the larger of the CEE states. Poland - accounting for roughly half the population and GDP of central Europe - has a geopolitical weight that can shape the strategic balance (it represents that oft quoted 'tipping point') between NATO European member states and the US. This was evidenced by the Polish Division in Iraq, a move which highlighted the differences in support for the US on issues of critical strategic concern between Old Europe (Germany and France) and New Europe. Thus, whilst NATO's eastward enlargement illustrates that its political goals have increasingly outpaced traditional military priorities, and 'the military contribution that the new members can make to the Alliance will inevitably be limited' (Edmunds, 2003), the political power and influence of at least some of the accession states within NATO and the EU should not be underestimated. Within the EU, Polish and Spanish opposition to a proposed change in the voting system in the draft EU constitution agreed at the Nice Summit in December 2000 (the Nice formula)[4] has also undermined the strength of the Franco-German strategic axis.

However, the dual enlargement in 2004 will render 'New' Europe less amenable to supporting US foreign and security policy when it is at variance with elites and publics in Europe and the necessity of securing EU integration. This tendency to downgrade transatlantic ties against the desire to focus on economic security issues associated with the EU may well be balanced by GWOT and the necessity of counter-terrorist cooperation. Whilst it is true that the US over-militarizes foreign and security policy and the EU over civilianizes it, the realization that transnational terrorists can be best countered through a combination of 90% non-military (political, diplomatic, economic and financial strategies) and only 10% military efforts will bring the focus back to combining and consolidating the 'soft-hard' power nexus. An acceptance of this calculation by political elites – particularly the US, French and British governments – may help realign and rebalance US with European power.

Baltic and southeast European relations have their part to play in consolidating transatlantic security in the 21st century. Will these regions join 'Atlantic Europe' alongside the UK and the Netherlands, or 'Core Europe' alongside France and Germany? Or will their contribution to international security be primarily non-military in nature; will they become part of 'Non-aligned Europe', and a useful bridge to 'Periphery Europe'? That these questions can still be asked indicates the extent to which dual enlargement has the potential to both undermine and underpin existing trends in transatlantic relations. More importantly, their imminent or actual membership of NATO and the EU will put these countries in the position of being able to adjust the balance of power in the security equation. In the dialogue currently underway redefining the relationship between all these groupings, 'New Europe' brings to both sides the advantage of flexibility. However, 'Old Europe' as well as 'Old NATO' are becoming slowly aware that their clubs will not offer the same cosy certainties after enlargement; that the new members'

[4] In the words of the Polish Foreign Minister: 'We have a population half the size of Germany's and an economy about a tenth of the size, and yet we get 27 votes to their 29. We would be crazy to turn down a deal like that.' (*The Economist*, 2003)

priorities and agendas may differ, in some cases significantly, from those of the members a decade ago. As the new relationships settle down and their complexities develop further, the onus is on the new members to show a maturity in negotiation which they have not had to exhibit in the accession phase. The future of Europe and the Transatlantic relationship are in the hands of the elites in the Vilnius 10 capitals as much as Brussels and Washington.

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Dr Graeme P Herd [herdg@marshallcenter.org] is Associate Director, Senior Executive Seminar and Professor of Civil-Military Relations, College of International Security Studies, George C Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. He is also a Research Associate of CSRC, an Associate Fellow of the 'New Security Issues Programme', Royal Institute for International Affairs, and an Honorary Research Fellow at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Aberdeen, Scotland. An earlier and shorter variant of this article will appear as 'Asymmetries of Dual Enlargement: from the Baltics to the Balkans', *Croatian International Relations Review*, Vol IX, No 32 (2003), pp99-108.

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E-mail: csrc@defenceacademy.mod.uk
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