


Conflict Studies Research Centre

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**Climbing Down From The Summit:
Estonia's Road Towards NATO**

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Climbing Down from the Summit: Estonia's Road Towards NATO

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This article chronicles Estonia's path to NATO membership in foreign policy terms, and outlines continuing foreign policy challenges.

On 21 November 2002 Estonia achieved one of its major foreign policy goals – receiving an invitation to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the most successful collective defence organisation in history. Estonia's long search for security has come close to a climax, as the issuing of an invitation is tantamount to the acceptance of Estonia as a full partner in security.

Though membership, barring unforeseen events, would not come until full ratification by all 19 NATO member states, estimated to be in 2004, the greatest battle – the battle of conception and perception – has been won. Through hard work by both its foreign policy establishment and its defence sector reformers, NATO member states now believe Estonia to be ready to become a fellow member. That is a remarkable change in conception, in how the post-post-Cold War Europe takes shape, as well as in perception, in how the image of Estonia has changed so remarkably fast from a post-Soviet republic to a full partner within the North-Atlantic space. The rapidity of this change is most significant, as Estonia has reclaimed its independence only eleven short years ago.

One analogy that can be employed in Estonia's journey to join NATO is a climb to Mount Everest. The road to gaining the invitation is the most difficult part, the climb to the summit.¹ The higher the climber goes, the more difficult the trek – but always inspired by visualising the target. The process of convincing the West of Estonia's readiness to be a full partner, as well as creating the basis at home to justify such arguments, was that difficult upward climb. Once reaching the summit, the easier – but similarly hazardous – final part of the endeavour is the climb back down to the ground. This is Estonia's path from invitation to full membership – it is easier than the earlier stage, but still requires much attention and finesse, and is fraught with danger. One misstep at this late stage could bring the climber – and Estonia's NATO bid – crashing down to a disastrous and unfortunate dénouement.

The focus of this article will be the challenges for Estonia's foreign policy establishment on the security front since Estonia received that coveted invitation. Until the climber's foot reaches the ground, and Estonia's flag is flying over NATO HQ with all other members, the challenges remain to keep focus until the final goal is reached.

Nearing The Summit

As the climber nears the summit, the trek becomes increasingly more difficult: fatigue is intense, oxygen deficiency punishing, and the feeling is one of a never-ending journey. As Estonia neared the Prague NATO 2002 summit, it faced similar problems. Reform fatigue set in as many pondered what more needed to be done. Instead of oxygen, the funding deficiency caused by increased defence spending had strained the ability to deal with other problematic sectors, such as social welfare, education and health care. And much like that climb to the summit, the target is plainly visible, but the journey feels increasingly never-ending.

Estonia had committed with full intensity to gaining the coveted NATO invitation since the disappointment of the previous enlargement, which included several high-profile statements of the Baltic countries being not ready for the responsibilities of membership; one editorial considered their candidacy “unattainable” at that point.² All three countries invested heavily in the defence sector, making public pledges of rising defence spending to two per cent of gross domestic product; Estonia established a gradual increase to that spending target, reaching it in fiscal 2002. Though the amount is modest in real terms, insufficient to allow Estonia to purchase much of the high-tech equipment needed in the modern military age, it nevertheless demonstrated a firm commitment to the defence sector; the per capita spending is higher in Estonia than many NATO members, in fact.³ The defence establishment, both military and civilian, continued the reform programme to further demonstrate this commitment.

For the Estonian foreign policy establishment, their job was to sell this commitment to NATO member states, especially the most influential (United States), the least interested (Germany), those seeking further Balkan enlargement (France, Greece), and those with much less contact in the past (Canada, Turkey), being non-EU members. The successful policy of opening embassies in member states, which helped the same foreign policy establishment make a convincing case in the EU debate, was embarked upon at heavy financial cost. For those non-EU members of NATO, Estonia opened embassies at nearly each of them within two years.⁴ Despite the continuous fears of the need to close some embassies due to lack of funds, the on-the-spot presence of diplomats working furiously to keep the issue alive in all the NATO capitals paid dividends.

The task for such lobbying efforts proved difficult in different ways. Some of the “one-man embassies” like those in Athens and Lisbon possessed the most minimal resources to lobby on behalf of Estonia in such areas that had few other ties to Estonia (unlike closer partners such as Denmark). Many of them also had to keep the EU brief at full effort, making their jobs doubly difficult. The difficulty in lobbying was seen most intensively in Washington, a topic that will be addressed further below.

The Estonian foreign policy establishment during this period successfully sold two ideas to NATO members. First, they demonstrated that Estonia could be a contributing member to both the Alliance and to security.⁵ Estonian forces took part in major exercises under the “Partnership for Peace” programme with NATO member states, and also deployed peacekeepers to various hotspots under NATO and other commands. Secondly, Estonian diplomats sought to convince detractors that having a “Baltic dimension” to the next NATO enlargement would not damage regional security and would not pose a threat to Russia. This proved to be the more

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difficult task, as Russian officials continued their vocal onslaught against NATO in the Baltics.

The shocking terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 became the symbolic reference point for many analysts. For Washington, as an editorial in the *International Herald Tribune* suggested, “A second round of expansion to extend NATO into the Baltic states has moved from bitter controversy to broad consensus in an eye’s blink,” adding that invitations to join could be “banked”.⁶ A *Washington Post* article even suggested that the debate on the Baltic NATO candidacies was now “irrelevant” after the 11 September terrorist attacks.⁷ Russia had also softened its stance with this symbolic point, answering the question ‘when’ as well as ‘whether’.

By early 2002 many NATO member governments had gone on record in support of the three Baltic countries – far beyond their traditional allies like Denmark and Poland. Even Germany, seen as a reluctant friend on a good day, came “unambiguously on record,” according to analyst Vladimir Socor, during a visit to Riga by Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in February.⁸ This was a marked change from even two years earlier when accusations of Russo-German collusion still permeated the air.⁹

The issuing of invitations to seven NATO candidates, including Estonia, at the Prague summit was the worst kept secret in Europe and North America through most of the year. For the most part, Estonia and its neighbours had won the battle of ideas, helped by the unfortunate events of 11 September. Some, such as *The Times* (London) defence editor Michael Evans, suggested that the “real battle for Nato membership was now between the six other applicant nations because of the perceived guaranteed inclusion of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania”.¹⁰ Analyst Socor continued that theme by suggesting that the Baltic candidacies were based on them meeting ANP (Annual National Programme) progress, while other candidates were judged on geographic (and not progress) terms.¹¹ The question by early 2002 was no longer the Baltic countries, but whether to include the Balkan countries of Bulgaria and Romania.

The first signs of this came from the 17 October 2001 meeting between then Prime Minister Mart Laar and the powerful US Vice-President Richard Cheney, which Laar called a “very strong signal,”¹² and which was seen by analysts as a major affirmation of US commitment to NATO enlargement so soon after the worst terrorist act on American soil. The flood of newspaper opinion columns, even editorials, supporting NATO enlargement – especially to the Baltic countries – continued in 2002, seemingly setting the mood in Washington and the all-important constituencies. With Washington won over, the most uncertain point of the uphill climb was attained – the oxygen tank was found for the final climb to the summit.

Clearly, in addition to the accomplishments of the defence sector, the Estonian foreign policy community played a significant role in Estonia reaching this summit at Prague. The intense selling of the idea that Estonia can be a contributing partner at no risk or threat to regional stability succeeded in transforming the perception of Estonia immensely among policy makers in the nineteen capitals of NATO member states. This effort should not be diminished when looking back at the entire process, though the celebration on the summit needs to be quickly tempered with a re-commitment to the easier but hazardous way back down to reap the final rewards.

Russia's Grudging Acceptance

Over the years, the position of the Russian government – both official and unofficial – on the subject of NATO enlargement has tempered. The failure of the Yeltsin administration to prevent the first post-Cold War enlargement, that to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, showed Moscow its inability to determine the fate of its former empire; nevertheless, by playing on the three Baltic countries' more contentious candidacy as "territories of the former Soviet Union", Russia managed to derail the three countries' NATO aspiration for a length of time.

Officially the Russian government voiced anger and disapproval at NATO enlargement to the Baltic region, which would create the longest NATO-Russia border area (adding also Lithuania's borders with the Kaliningrad exclave). The verbal attacks continued over the years, with some rather harsh and belligerent words coming especially from members of the Duma not allied to President Putin. The entire *raison d'être* of NATO was also called in question by many officials; for instance, Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznev called NATO an "archaic train from the Cold War days".¹³

Though the Russo-American relationship soured in 2001, due more to the contentious issue of the US National Missile Defence – the so-called "Son of Star Wars" – than to NATO enlargement, the mood in the Kremlin over the latter softened as the 'grudging acceptance' argument slowly took hold. For President Putin's home of St Petersburg, the bettering of relations with the Baltic countries would be felt more distinctly than in far-away Moscow; after all Tallinn is closer to St Petersburg than fellow Baltic capital Riga. The Leningrad oblast is a key part of the EU's Northern Dimension, and the further engagement of the region as a solidly-working unit would be an added bonus to the region. Therefore it is no surprise that the Petersburg-centric view prevailed over that of the Muscovite.

The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 was a symbolic point for the NATO issue in Washington, as argued above. However, it also served as a symbolic point for Moscow, as the so-called 'post-post-Cold War' period allowed relations with Russia to develop in a new way. NATO seemed less contentious when both Washington and Moscow saw each other as partners in dealing with a more pressing threat, that of Islamic fundamentalism. As early as October 2001, Putin told visiting NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson that although he was opposed to NATO enlargement, they would not 'waste political capital' to oppose it.¹⁴

Though hints came out earlier from Russia on a softening of stance over the Baltic NATO issue, the biggest example of the change came during a US radio interview by Robert Siegel with President Putin on 15 November 2001. Putin said that he was "not opposed" to NATO enlargement to the Baltics, adding, "I actually don't think it makes any sense."¹⁵ He continued by stressing that Russia is "not in a position to tell people what to do ... we cannot forbid people to make certain choices if they want to increase the security of their nations in a particular way."

Nevertheless, for domestic consumption the rhetoric often remained confrontational. For instance, Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov told reporters in Rostov-na-Donu in December 2001 that "Russia has opposed plans to enlarge NATO and is opposing them now," adding, "even if relations between Russia and NATO expand in terms of the format, this will hardly contribute to settling these contradictions".¹⁶ However, later in the month, Ivanov – now speaking at the

Belgian Royal Higher Military Institute – re-iterated the Putin line of not being able to dictate security arrangements to sovereign states.¹⁷

In the meantime, with inevitability setting in on the NATO issue, the focus for Russia turned to EU enlargement – especially the fate of its exclave, Kaliningrad. Russia also began to campaign seriously for the Baltic countries' accession to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), pushing for maximum concessions out of the inevitable. There were also fears that NATO's growing rapprochement with Russia would dilute the worth of NATO for new members like Estonia; the earlier enlargement members Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland voiced such fears of NATO being relegated into a 'less reliable talking shop' during the Blair-Putin discussions in November 2001.¹⁸ These will be the more contentious issues in the future, which will be addressed below.

Before the Prague summit US President George W Bush, talking to Lithuania's main daily *Lietuvos Rytas*, said, "I want Russia and President Vladimir Putin to understand that there is no reason to be afraid of NATO enlargement. NATO membership for the Baltic countries is beneficial to Russia."¹⁹ However, Deputy Chairman of the Duma International Relations Committee Sergei Shishkarov said Baltic membership of NATO would "not improve security for anyone," while Alexander Savelyov of the Institute of International Relations and World Economy stressed that Russia "cannot be indifferent to what's happening on its borders" and called for "a Russian response."²⁰ It was, nevertheless, a surprise that during the time of the Prague summit there were relatively few vocal responses from top officials to the invitation issued to Estonia and six other candidates.

The largest surprise came the week before the Prague summit, as the Kremlin came as close to 'endorsing' the Baltic States' NATO bid as possible. Sergei Yastrzhembskiy, the Kremlin's powerful information guru and trusted advisor, told the daily *Postimees* that "the accession of the Baltic states into NATO will free Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from fears of the past, which will favourably influence their relations," adding that "from what I understand, NATO membership to you is a question of psychological security."²¹ Lithuanian Foreign Ministry official Vaidotas Urbalis noted, "a society is secure if it feels secure," which was seconded by Latvian Defence Ministry permanent state-secretary Edgars Rinkēvičs, noting that "it's about perception."²² Whether this will be the catalyst in fostering better Estonia-Russian ties, as Yastrzhembskiy suggested, remaining to be seen, but it certainly taken as a positive sign by everyone involved.

The Slippery Slope Down

The receiving of the invitation in Prague was a major triumph for Estonia's foreign policy – the first of two 'celebratory' events at the end of the year, the second coming in Copenhagen a few weeks after. Though it marked a major achievement, the reaching of the summit, it does not represent the finale. The path down the peak remains dangerous and requires the climber to be attentive and cautious.

The efforts by the defence sector reformers must continue through the ratification process – and even after full membership. A lack of effort near the end could spell disaster for the invitation-wielding candidates. For instance, a week before the Prague summit, a sour note emanated from the Pentagon on some of the candidates being below par. A ranking Defense Department official warned that there was pressure in his department to keep three candidates from receiving invitations to

join NATO: Slovenia (lack of preparation efforts), Latvia and Bulgaria (security concerns).²³ Though the political decision was already made by then higher up in Washington and elsewhere, this demonstrated that the climber could still fall off even a few steps away from the summit – and also on the long way down.

The ratification process in the nineteen NATO member and seven invitee capitals will now be the major challenge for Estonia's diplomats (it would be unthinkable for one candidate to veto another candidate). With the EU accession ratification process occurring also in eleven capitals (Athens, Berlin, Brussels, Copenhagen, Den Haag, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Paris and Rome), some of the smallest Estonian diplomatic presences will be under intense pressure to keep both processes on track, to keep the issue in the minds of the legislators, preventing delays and unforeseen problems during the processes. And, as in all democracies, the entire ratification process could be seriously delayed by elections – due in several of the members in 2003 and 2004. Washington will prove to be a special challenge, which will be addressed below.

Some of the questions that will face the Estonian foreign policy community during this ratification period will come from opposing interests, such as the Russian Federation. Russia will lobby heavily for the three Baltic countries to accede to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). This could be a viable concession, as CFE is designed to enforce transparency; also, other NATO members were party to its formulation. So far the Baltic governments have decided against this path, thus diplomats face a major task, especially in Washington, Brussels and Berlin, to deflect this issue until the ratification process is complete.

The Unique Challenge of Washington

The difficulty in lobbying is seen most intensely in Washington, as the United States, among the 19 NATO members, has the most influential and independent legislature. The US Senate – which decides on treaty obligations such as this – could be controlled fully by an opposing political force from the executive government, and is heavily influenced by constituency opinions. With a small team in Washington, Estonian diplomats have rather successfully faced the challenge of this environment with the small but vocal American-Estonian community working in conjunction. The Baltic States' 'cause' had remained popular in Washington over the years, with widespread support for their membership in NATO among its most powerful members – old 'Cold Warriors' and freshmen alike.

The November 2002 elections marked a small but dramatic shift of power back to the Republicans in the Senate. Though holding only a slim majority of 51 (out of 100) seats, this allowed the party to take control of all key committees – including Foreign Relations and Armed Services. Nevertheless support remains very strong: Ratification requires a majority of 67 votes in the Senate, but is clearly supported by both parties.

Nevertheless, problems remain. Enlargement has some ardent supporters in the Senate, but they also have many other pressing issues – mostly domestic – to monopolise their limited time. Therefore, lobbying efforts must continue to keep the ratification issue in the spotlight. Though the treaty ratification will be processed by the Foreign Relations Committee, now chaired by Baltic-friendly Richard Lugar (Indiana), the Armed Forces Committee, chaired by ardent expansion foe John Warner (Virginia), could cause a hiccup in the process. Senator Warner, during the

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week of the Prague summit, warned: "I'm going to raise the yellow caution flag; we've got to think this thing through."²⁴

Though Senator Warner has softened his opposition in recent times, allowing the process to go forward even in his own committee, he has frequently voiced his desire to have his committee seriously debate all the pros and cons of this enlargement.

Washington's preoccupation with Jewish-related issues, for instance, is likely to play a major role in the debates in the Foreign Relations Committee. Though Estonia is the most removed from this topic among all the candidate countries, it will nevertheless be exposed to the problems. Hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee turned sour in the late 1990s on this issue, including a very vocal session involving academics of Baltic extraction and several senators, including the powerful ranking Democrat Joseph Biden (Delaware). The biggest challenge for Estonia will be to complete the committee hearings without being dragged into the problems facing some of its fellow candidates.

Lithuania, following the strategy pursued by Poland during its own NATO bid, has embarked on an ambitious project to drum up support for its membership throughout the US. Despite its energetic activities, the Estonian diplomatic presence is severely limited by numbers. Thus, the active co-operation of the three Baltic embassies, alongside the embassies of other candidates, is needed to keep the issue topical in faraway places like Helena, Oklahoma City, and Tallahassee.

The Coming Challenges

The invitation to join NATO (as well as the EU) brings Estonia many new foreign policy challenges, albeit in a stealthier form. The questions become more difficult to address, not the black-and-white, in-or-out issues like NATO and EU membership. Some issues could be effectively out of Estonia's hands; some issues previously with little relevance to Estonia could suddenly be dropped in Estonia's lap. And even after NATO membership, the Russian Federation remains its gigantic neighbour, which requires finesse in forging a continuing rapprochement. The invitations are by no means an 'end of Estonian history' – far from it.

In addition, many commentaries focus on the future of NATO, including its very existence. Many analysts, though supportive of the enlargement, fear the emasculation of the defence organisation – due to its cumbersome size and increasing US unilateralism. Therefore, the question is beyond Estonia's role in NATO – it is also of NATO's role in the 'post-post-Cold War' world. It is important for Estonia to play a role in the debate to keep NATO a relevant force, in both its material and intellectual contributions to the ageing alliance.

Some of the major challenges for Estonia's foreign policy establishment are the following:

- One of the arguments against Estonia's NATO membership, by its few vocal opponents, is the loss of sovereignty. True, Estonia could be called on to take part in operations that it has little interest in – such as an attack on Iraq. Such decisions could be effectively out of Estonia's hands, despite having a seat at the 'table of 26'. Estonian forces could also be called on, hypothetically, to help defend Los Angeles or Naples.

Though NATO membership is modestly popular, would it remain so when the first Estonian peacekeeper is killed in action? Or what if a NATO-related war is 'brought home' with a terrorist attack on Estonian soil? Estonians must be prepared to continue the intellectual debate with this bleak scenario in mind.

- One criticism of Estonia's NATO membership is the perceived lack of contribution to the alliance. NATO officials have stressed the importance of specialisation in the development of new members' defence sector and in the future rapid-reaction force. As many members find their own 'niche' in airspace surveillance and clearance – ranging from mines to chemical and biological agents – Estonia again will be at risk of falling into anonymity. Should Estonia choose to explore other areas of specialisation?²⁵
- During the run-up to Prague, one of the most important parts of Estonia's foreign policy was co-operation with its Baltic neighbours, Latvia and Lithuania. The many co-operative projects in defence, such as BALTBAT and BALTNET, are among the most heavily touted assets the countries would bring to NATO. However, there have been limits in some of the other projects, such as the joint acquisition of expensive military equipment. The foreign policy community would need to continue to stress increased co-operation to enable the region to have a stronger voice in Brussels, as well as to be able to purchase modern weaponry.
- Estonia's third major foreign policy challenge up to 2002 had been to improve relations with the Russian Federation. Following the invitations in Prague and Copenhagen, the lack of success in this third priority becomes much more evident. Although the fault of this failure falls mostly on the eastern side of the border, the Estonian foreign policy establishment must take the initiative at this opportune time to normalise relations. Pressing issues like the border treaty must be concluded, and Estonia must also press Russia into normalising trade relations – using the World Trade Organisation, if necessary. The initiative must come from Estonia; if not, Brussels may exert pressure for Estonian concessions.
- As Estonia's bilateral relations become de facto a part of relations between the West (NATO and the EU) and Russia, the foreign policy establishment must also remain steadfast on issues of vital importance to Estonia. Issues such as citizenship/language and CFE Treaty accession will inevitably come up again.

Even after the full acceptance of Estonia into NATO and the EU, therefore, the challenges for Estonia's foreign policy establishment will remain.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Sadly, this double use of the English word “summit” does not quite work the same way in Estonian, as the literal summit of the peak is “mäetipp” and events like Prague being a “tippkohtumine” – though the word “tipp” remains its linkage.
- ² See the editorial “NATO’s Expanding Waist Line”, *The Washington Times*, 28 March 2002.
- ³ For example in 2001, GDP per capita spending on defence in the following NATO countries is under 2%: Belgium (1.3%), Canada (1.1%), Denmark (1.5%), Germany (1.5%), Italy (1.9%), Netherlands (1.6%), Spain (1.2%), according to the editorial “Unmighty Europe”, *Wall Street Journal*, 20 May 2002.
- ⁴ Estonia had by 2000 opened embassies in 17 of 19 NATO member states; only Luxembourg (served by Brussels) and Iceland (served by Copenhagen) remained without on-site Estonian representation.
- ⁵ For a full treatment of this theme see Mel Huang, “Contributing to Regional & European Stability and Security”, *Defensor-Pacis* (Athens: Defense Analyses Institute), No 12, September 2002: 65-72.
- ⁶ See the editorial “Europe is Keen and Should Be Welcomed Aboard”, *International Herald Tribune*, 22 October 2001.
- ⁷ Peter Finn “Black Sea: New Focus of NATO Expansion”, *Washington Post*, 26 March 2002.
- ⁸ Vladimir Socor, “Germany Endorses Baltic States for NATO Membership”, *Jamestown Monitor*, Vol 8, No 32, 14 February 2002.
- ⁹ For example see Mel Huang, “Echoes of Joachim and Vyacheslav”, *Central Europe Review*, Vol 2, No 5, 26 June 2000, <http://www.ce-review.org/00/25/amber25.html>
- ¹⁰ Michael Evans, “Baltic States ‘are US Favourites’ in Race to Join NATO”, *The Times* (London), 25 February 2000.
- ¹¹ Vladimir Socor, “The Post-Sept 11 Impetus for NATO Enlargement”, *Wall Street Journal Europe*, 23 March 2002.
- ¹² “See on väga tugev signaal.” Mart Laar interviewed by Argo Ideon, “Laar koges Valges Maja toetust”, *Postimees*, 19 October 2001.
- ¹³ Itar-Tass, “Duma Speaker Calls for New Structure Instead of NATO”, 23 November 2001.
- ¹⁴ Timothy Garten Ash, “A New War Reshapes Old Alliances”, *New York Times*, 12 October 2001.
- ¹⁵ US National Public Radio interview (New York), 15 November 2001.
- ¹⁶ Interfax, “Russia Opposes NATO Expansion Plans”, 11 December 2001.
- ¹⁷ Interfax, “As NATO Expands Eastward, Russia Will Consolidate Its Security: Ivanov”, 19 December 2001.
- ¹⁸ Martin Walker, “Russia’s ‘Big Step’ to NATO Worry Poles”, UPI, 25 November 2002.
- ¹⁹ “Noriu, jog Rusija ir prezidentas Vladimiras Putinas suprastu, kad nera jokios priezasties baimintis NATO plėtros. Baltijos šalių narystė NATO yra naudinga Rusijai”, taken from interview by Marius Laurinavičius, “JAV prezidentas tiki Lietuvos dvasia”, *Lietuvos Rytas*, 20 November 2002.
- ²⁰ Fred Weir, “Baltics Step from Russia’s Shadows into Western Club”, *Christian Science Monitor*, 20 November 2002.
- ²¹ “Balti riikide pääs NATOsse vabastab Eesti, Läti ja Leedu minevikuhirmudest, mis mõjub soodsalt nende suhetele. Nagu ma aru saan, on NATO liikmelisus teile psühholoogilise julgeoleku küsimus”, taken from Toomas Sildam, “Venemaa astus lõplikult Eesti NATO-teelt korvale,” *Postimees*, 29 October 2002.
- ²² Sarah Means, “The Russian Face in Riga”, *Washington Times*, 11 December 2001.
- ²³ Judy Dempsey, “Pentagon Voiced Doubts on NATO Candidates”, *Financial Times*, 12 November 2002.
- ²⁴ Greg Hitt & Philip Shishkin, “Bush to Gain Allies as NATO Expands: Eastern Europe Additions Bring Pro-U.S. Mind-Set, But Also Complications”, *Wall Street Journal Europe*, 18 November 2002.
- ²⁵ For instance, could Estonia develop a useful special forces unit – with specific linguistic and terrain operational abilities – as a contribution?

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