


Conflict Studies Research Centre

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**Managing The Challenge
Of Illegal Arms Transfers**

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Managing The Challenge Of Illegal Arms Transfers

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Taking the example of Ukraine, this paper outlines the characteristics in post-soviet states which facilitate the illegal arms trade, in particular the lack of accountability and transparency.

Introduction

Several factors characterise the security environment in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in terms of soft security threats in general and individual challenges in particular – like terrorism, illegal migration, illegal drug trade, illegal arms trade, money laundering, smuggling of automobiles, smuggling of cigarettes and alcohol, etc. It should be noted that soft security threats though distinctive, in reality cannot be easily singled out one from the other – they are closely intertwined and probably just represent special cases of the larger phenomena – cross border organised crime in its overarching sense. We also have to agree on a definition of what can be called "soft security threats" – because I personally know three variations of labelling this same phenomenon – the other two are "new security threats" and "non-military security threats".

This paper will concentrate on only one aspect of the subject - illegal arms transfers. In analysing the illegal arms trade as a practical example of a soft security threat, I will primarily use the example of my country, Ukraine, which I consider illustrative enough, but I will certainly have to touch on Russia and other countries in the CIS. Of course there are some examples of cooperative arrangements within the CIS against organised crime, against terrorism, even against natural and technological disasters. But all of them basically reflect the nature of the CIS, which is fundamentally about Russia's political domination, a lack of resources and a lack of multilateral commitment.

Characteristics

It is important to begin by indicating the most influential regional factors precipitating the growing emphasis on soft security threats, which in turn demonstrate some of the CIS regional specifics of the challenge posed by the phenomenon.

1. The Post Cold War "Security Vacuum"

The relaxation of security pressure in the region after the Cold War freed many suppressed historical rivalries and grievances, which are abundant in the

region, it opened the previously sealed borders, and it created new opportunities in economic and cultural exchange, for all of which the countries of the CIS region were not well prepared. In terms of soft security threats, this security vacuum of state actors' involvement was immediately filled by non-state actors, which basically included separatists and criminals.

2. Ethnic Conflicts & Separatism

All of these conflicts in the region have something in common – they are unresolved, and prospects for their resolution are bleak. To a significant extent, the failure to resolve these conflicts is explained by their connection to profitable criminal activities – in particular, illegal trade in drugs, as one of the fastest and easiest ways to raise money and to obtain weapons through illegal arms deals. It is common knowledge that armed conflicts, or the unrecognised, often authoritarian, *de facto* states appearing after them, serve as a source of terrorist activities, illegal migration and illegal arms trade.

3. Transit Nature Of The Region

With Cold War barriers removed, the region has found itself once again on the intersection of different cross-border activities, both in a positive sense, like commerce, tourism and energy transportation, but also in a negative sense, as a natural juncture between places of criminal demand and criminal supply. The lack of well protected national borders in the region naturally makes it very attractive for illegal shipments of migrants, drugs and weapons.

4. Weak Democracy In Most Countries Of The Region

To a greater or lesser extent all the countries in the region have problems with the accountability of authorities and democratic oversight over security structures. Taken together with the weaknesses of local market economies, huge economic disparities between the rich and poor, and low official salaries of governmental employees, such a situation produces a high level of corruption. It is not at all unusual for corrupt politicians and representatives of security structures in the region to be routinely involved in unlawful activities together with criminals and rich, criminalised businessmen. It certainly does not help in responding to soft security challenges – just the opposite. Such a corrupt criminal environment is a fertile ground for their aggravation.

5. Outside Security Interests

The current role of the CIS region in international politics in general, as well as current attention to the region's role in the global anti-terrorist campaign and other security arrangements, has brought particular attention to soft security threats from international organisations like NATO, the EU and the OSCE. It should also be noted that growing attention to the region displayed by the global superpower – the USA – is one of the most important dimensions of outsiders' security interest in the region. Taken together, these outsiders play a significant and sometimes decisive role in the consolidation of efforts to respond to the soft security threats in the CIS region.

In terms of the criminal arms transfers during the period from the early nineties and the collapse of the Soviet Union till now, the greatest threat on the territory of the CIS was posed by the armaments left unaccounted for after the break up and consequent collapse of centralised control over many peripheral regions and arms depots and military bases located there. In Russia the criminal arms transfers were also facilitated by speedy privatisation of the arms industry. Collapse of the military-industrial complex, regional conflicts and simple theft from production

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facilities, storage sites and troops contributed to this challenge too. According to Russian experts, imposition of stricter laws, prosecution and punishment helped to improve the situation to almost normal with regard to the criminal arms trade on the territory of Russia, and now a new phenomenon is noticed, when the illegal spread of explosives is sometimes viewed as posing more danger than arms transfers. This is attributed mainly to theft of explosives from industrial sites and from the military ammunition depots for later use in criminal activities.

A general collapse of the systems of state financing and state social support provoked a strong incentive to seek profit from risky businesses like illegal arms trade, and general lack of accountability of executive authorities on the part of the legislature and civil society. Weak mechanisms of ensuring the reliability of end-users, and little monitoring of the financial transactions of arms brokers made the situation worse. Besides, examples of Western businessmen violating international and national export control norms were considered as proof of double standards, with consequent negative effects in the CIS countries.

Illegal trade in arms in many regions of the world is a specific kind of business, where it is extremely difficult to distinguish between official activity and criminal activity. The CIS region offers plenty of examples to prove this. The illegal arms trade in the region has three basic currents – through "official diversion", when an illegal supply operation is conducted by a legal entity; through stateless trade, when armaments are produced on and supplied from the territory of an "unrecognised state"; and through classic criminal trade by criminal organisations or individuals.

Official diversion This means that the supply of military products or military technologies is conducted by a legal entity either on its own, or with the tacit approval of the authorities, or even in cooperation with the authorities. This is believed in the West to be the most significant share of the illegal arms trade originating in the CIS region.

Russia and Ukraine were often accused of this in the past and continue to receive such "compliments". However, there are specific differences with regard to the transparency of export control systems in these countries, and with the nature of the accusations. About 18 Russian defence industrial companies in the course of the last five years have been strongly criticised or sometimes even had sanctions imposed by the USA for illegally supplying countries like Iran with military products.¹ In March 2003, the USA also accused Russia of supplying weapons and military devices to Iraq – GPS jamming systems, night vision goggles and anti-tank guided missiles. Several months before that, in October 2002, the USA charged the Ukrainian President with allegedly giving orders for the delivery to Iraq of a passive air defence radar system "Kolchuga", which permits the undetected surveillance of the sky for approaching stealth aircraft.

Stateless trade The fact that there are several uncontrolled *de facto* states in the CIS region certainly aggravates the threat of illegal arms trading. There is almost no way so far to install viable export control regimes on the territories of such states. For instance, recently Azerbaijani Defence Minister Colonel General Safar Abiev accused Armenia of both storing unregistered armaments on occupied Azerbaijani territory (Nagornyy Karabakh) and of supplying arms to Kurdish militants. However, there is no realistic way either to check this particular information, or to establish permanent verification and enforcement regimes.

Similarly, according to a senior Moldovan military official, the separatist Transdnistrian region has successfully developed a range of small arms weapons and their spare parts: mortars of assorted calibres, antipersonnel mines, various types of grenade launchers, pistols, BM-21 "Grad" multiple rocket launchers, etc.²

Criminal trade As far as criminal activities are concerned, such names as Victor Bout (a Russian, born in Kazakhstan) or Leonid Minin (an Israeli, born in Ukraine) became notorious in the region and in the world for their alleged involvement in the illegal arms trade from Eastern Europe to the Balkans, to Africa and to South America. It is noteworthy that to bring them to justice appeared to be difficult, despite the best efforts of the international community. Whilst Leonid Minin was ultimately indicted on illegal arms trafficking charges and put in jail in Monza, Italy,³ Victor Bout remained at large despite the Belgian-issued international arrest warrant.

Conflict zones like Chechnya and especially unrecognised states of the CIS like Abkhazia, Nagornyy Karabakh, South Osetia and Transdnistria, with their widespread intermingling of criminal businesses and authorities, represent a major challenge to preventing illegal spread of arms. To cope with this latter challenge three major approaches have been suggested:

- continue step-by-step slow evolution with a combination of containment and low-level pressure;
- find and invite new impartial mediators capable of making a difference;
- increase the role of the OSCE in the region, which according to some experts has in the past devoted the bulk of its attention to human rights violations rather than to the spread of arms.

Transparency & Accountability

Politics is the art of the possible. Is it possible today not to produce arms, and, if your country is called Ukraine, not to sell them? The answer is no. Having inherited from the USSR a great deal of its military-industrial complex with millions of jobs, technologies and scientific schools, with established markets – to give up trading? The difficulties of how to do just that, and the technicalities of how to measure the trade are two further pertinent issues.

The truth is that exact data on the recipients, quantities, prices, routes and techniques of arms exports remain sealed, competitors are on the alert, and customers are not always talkative. An ostensibly authoritative source could be the United Nations, where Ukraine annually reports on the main export items. And yet the UN Register of Conventional Arms record of arms transfers (see Table below) is evidence not so much of transparency in arms trade, but of controversy. For instance, according to official declarations and unofficial estimates, Russia is the main partner of Ukraine in military-technical cooperation, but this is hardly evident from the list of categories included in the UN register.

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The UN Register of Conventional Arms Transfers, Ukraine

Category (I-VII)	Final importer State(s)	Number of items	State of origin (if not exporter)	Intermediate location (if any)	Description of item
1993					
I. Battle tanks	Azerbaijan	100	USSR		
II. Armoured combat vehicles	Russia	144	USSR		
III. Combat aircraft	Azerbaijan	10	USSR		
1994					
I. Battle tanks	Azerbaijan	50			T-55
II. Armoured combat vehicles	Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Sri Lanka	4 4 7 1			BMP-1 BMP-2 BMP-1 "Baryer" BMP-1 without arms
VII. Missiles and missile launchers	USA USA USA China	9 9 2 56			Surface to air missiles: SV55R Surface to air missiles: SV55K Surface to air missiles: V55RUD Surface to air missiles: R27R1
1995					
I. Battle tanks	Poland USA Uganda	2 2 60			T-72B, T-72BK T-55AD T-55
II. Armoured combat vehicles	Slovak Republic Uganda	6 2			BMP-2K Tractor BTC-4
IV. Combat aircraft	Yemen	4		Russia	SU-22
VII. Missiles and missile launchers	Malaysia Vietnam Slovakia	131 14 14		Russia Russia Russia	Air to air missiles: R27R1 (470-1) R27R1(470-1) R27R1(470-1)
1996					
II. Armoured combat vehicles	Sudan	6			BMP-2
IV. Combat aircraft	Vietnam	6			MiG-21UM
V. Attack helicopters	Angola Sri Lanka Sri Lanka	2 2 1			Mi-24B Mi-24B Mi-24R
1997					
I. Battle tanks	Pakistan	105			T-80UD
II. Armoured	Indonesia Indonesia	9 3			BTR-90PK BREM-2

combat vehicles					
IV. Combat aircraft	India Cambodia	5 4			MiG-21UP L-39
V. Attack helicopters	Yugoslavia	2			Mi-24B
VII. Missiles and missile launchers	India India Canada Algeria	90 24 4 10		Russia Russia	
1998					
I. Battle tanks	Algeria Pakistan	27 110			T-72M1 T-90UD
II. Armoured combat vehicles	T-72M1 T-90UD	32 4			BMP-2 BRDM-2
V. Attack helicopters	Sri Lanka SAR Algeria Guinea Mexico	1 1 14 1 6 2	Russia		Mi-24B Mi-24B Mi-24B Mi-24B Mi-17 Mi-17
VII. Missiles and missile launchers	Canada Peru	7 4 10 9			
1999					
I. Battle tanks	Algeria Pakistan	27 105			T-72M1 T-72M1, KT-90UD
II. Armoured combat vehicles	Algeria Jordan Indonesia Angola	32 25 25 31			BMD-2, 2K BTR-94 BTR-50 PK BMP-2
IV. Combat aircraft	Russia	2 2			Tu-160 Tu-95Ms
V. Attack helicopters	Algeria Sierra Leone Angola	14 2 3			Mi-24B Mi-23B Mi-35 P (Mi-24)
VI. Warships	Georgia	1			"Konotop" missile boat
VII. Missiles and missile launchers	Algeria USA Kazakhstan India	289 4 11 76			R-23 R-73, R-23, R-24 R-73 X-29, R-27
2000					
I. Battle tanks	Algeria	13			T-72M1, T-72M1K
II. Armoured combat vehicles	USA Jordan China Congo	9 26 5 30 6			BMP-2 BTR-94 BTR-70 BTR-60 MT-LB
III. Large calibre artillery systems	USA China Congo	3 3 6			2S3 2S9 2S1
IV. Combat aircraft	Russia	6 1			TU-160 TU-95MS

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	India	3			MIG-21UM
	Algeria	5			MIG-29
	Estonia	21			L-39, L-39S
	UK	1			L-39S
	USA	27			L-39, L-39S
	Sri Lanka	6			MIG-27M
		1			MIG-23UB
V. Attack helicopters	Sri Lanka	2			Mi-24V-1
		3			Mi-24P
	Israel	1			Mi-8MT
	Guinea	3			Mi-24V
	Congo	2			Mi-24V
		2			Mi-24K
VII. Missiles and missile launchers	Algeria	42			R-27T,R
	India	40			R-27RE, TE
	Russia	581			X-55MS
	China	124			R-27RE, TE, R-73
	Slovakia	3			R-77
2001					
I. Battle tanks	FYRoM	31			T-72
II. Armoured combat vehicles	UAE	1			BTR-94 K
	FYRoM	22			BTP-80
		11			BMP-2
	Chad	24			BTR-80
	USA	1			BMP-2
	Burundi	10			BTR-80
III. Large calibre artillery systems	USA	1			2S1
	FYRoM	6			BM-21
IV. Combat aircraft	Russia	1			L-39
	Estonia	16			L-39
	USA	6			L-39
	UK	1			SU-27P
	Lithuania	1			SU-15TM
		1			MIG-21SM
		1			MIG-23 MLD
	FYRoM	3			SU-25
		1			SU-25UB
V. Attack helicopters	Angola	2			Mi-24
	Sri Lanka	4			Mi-24
	Guinea	2			Mi-8MT
	Equatorial Guinea	2			Mi-24
	Guinea	12			Mi-24
	FYRoM	4			Mi-8MT
	Algeria	12			Mi-24
	Chad	2			Mi-24
VII. Missiles and missile launchers	Russia	6			X-55
	USA	5			X-31
	China	200			R-27

In addition, the Table gives only a general outline – it does not deal with exports of small arms presently so closely monitored by champions of peace, of technologies (including dual use technologies) and services. Besides, the data is presented on a web site of the UN, not on web sites of Ukrainian ministries and agencies.

Lack of transparency in arms export control regimes, particularly those of the former communist states and the largest arms producers in the region – Russia and Ukraine – routinely provoke media outbursts about alleged illegal arms transfers. The recent accusations about Ukraine prove that the attitude outside the country in export control issues has not changed. The *Washington Post* wrote in an article “Ukraine’s Arms Deals” referring to a UN source: “Ukraine demonstrates neither restraint nor due care or diligence in its arms trade operations, which leads to situations where Ukraine serves as the starting point for illegal arms trade”.⁴ Two weeks later the *Guardian* of Great Britain carried an article, “The International Dealers in Death”, about the adventures of Leonid Minin allegedly making good money using his ties in Ukraine. According to Italian magistrates, reads the *Guardian*, “Minin chartered an Antonov-124 transport aircraft in Moscow, had it flown to Kyiv in Ukraine where it was loaded with 113 tons of Kalashnikovs, RPGs, and ammunition, and then directed it to Abidjan, the capital of Ivory Coast in west Africa”.⁵

In the community of civilised nations Ukraine and Russia are set to join, the situation with transparency of arms exports looks different, but the steady trend towards greater transparency clearly prevails. This is attributable not only to the principles of democracy and prevention of abuses but also to globalisation, an aspect not yet fully comprehended by CIS countries. As the British Ambassador to Ukraine Robert Brinkley suggested: “The security of each of our countries is no longer just a national, nor even a regional issue. It is global as well. It is in all our interests to regulate arms sales so that military hardware contributes to maintaining peace and stability, not war and instability... The national export control system is a tool to achieve this. Put simply, Ukraine's arms export control problem is also our export control problem. We want to help you solve it.”⁶

Experts explain the thirst for secrecy on the part of government officials and sometimes politicians by attempts to conceal information from the public in order to obtain exceptional control over policy-making. And the greatest efforts are made when some dubious actions fraught with public disapproval need to be concealed.

According to experts of British NGO *Saferworld*, the search for immediate commercial benefits from the sale of arms leads to negligence of human rights, regional security and steady development. Hence, the EU countries are raising the erstwhile curtain of secrecy over their actions in sensitive spheres of international relations. At least three effective forms of implementation of the principles of transparency in arms export have been worked out: publication of annual governmental reports of activity in that sphere; parliamentary debate on arms exports; analysis and publication of summarised data of regional and global arms markets.

Belgium, Italy and Sweden have published annual reports of arms exports for years. Some EU countries have just implemented such a practice: over the past several years, public accounting mechanisms have been established in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Great Britain and Denmark. In particular, the arms export report of the German government is to be found on the Internet on the web site of its Ministry of Economics; the Ministry of Defence of Finland placed on the Internet two annual reports in the Finnish and English languages. The EU Council of Ministers publishes annually a Summary Report of observance of the EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports.

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The British government report contains both general information about its export control policy and detailed data on licensing decisions. For each country which is a recipient of British arms, the quantity, types and cost of licences granted, the number of licences granted and denied arranged by category of materiel, and figures on the basic systems of conventional weapons and small arms are cited.

A high level of transparency is also provided by the Irish system: on a monthly basis its Internet site publishes statistical data on the issue of dual-use produce export licences, specifying quantities, dates and countries of destination. The Netherlands' annual report is distinguished by a detailed explanation of denial of licences: it contains a full description of goods for which a licence was denied, the country of destination, recipient, end user, the reason for, date and number of each denial.

Parliamentary debate Discussion of specific issues in parliaments of the EU member states traditionally presents an important instrument of control and analysis of government policy. Certainly, there are limitations in arms export control. At the same time, there are mechanisms for ensuring a balance between the requirements of transparency and confidentiality. In particular, in Great Britain, a parliamentary committee has been established to review the annual government report on strategic exports; the committee involves members of the defence, foreign affairs, international development, trade and industry committees. In the Netherlands, the government confidentially informs the parliamentary defence committee of all planned sales of excess stocks of arms. Upon notification, the committee presents to the government its comments regarding such sales. Sweden's government consults a special body on export control issues – the Export Control Council - made up of present and former parliament members. Although the Council's opinion is not binding, in practice a unanimous disagreement by the Council always leads to the denial of a licence.

And so far, unfortunately, foreign experts point to Ukraine (along with Russia, Belarus and some other CIS countries) as a state opposing greater parliamentary and public oversight and thus transparency in the arms trade.

Despite the official position in Ukraine, that quite an effective system of export control of goods designed for military purposes has been established, independent experts consider this system unstable and argue for the establishment of effective parliamentary oversight. To be sure, all experts are well aware that in this sensitive sphere, some information must be confidential for the sake of national security, but confidentiality and transparency requirements should be balanced. Unfortunately, such a balance is not observed in Ukraine – the sphere is almost totally closed, which damages the image of the state and its interests. So far, the executive branch holds an exclusive right to determine the expediency of publication of data in this sphere, at a time of its choosing.

In 2001 the Razumkov Centre conducted an expert opinion poll on export control issues⁷ and 96% of experts supported the establishment of mechanisms of parliamentary control in arms trading, but were divided as to the forms of such control. Almost a third (29%) suggested that the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine's parliament) should be entitled to obtain from the government full information and hold public hearings on export control issues. Another 34.7% agreed that the Verkhovna Rada should have the right to obtain from the government full information on export control issues but believed that this should be done confidentially. 32% of experts believed that the government should give confidential information only to the Verkhovna Rada Committees on National Security and

Defence and on International Relations. Only 4% of those polled were not supportive of the idea of parliamentary control and believed that this would lead to leakage of information and political speculations.

Prospects

There are three general approaches already in operation in response to the illegal arms trade in the CIS region. First is EU and US encouragement of and support in establishing stricter export control procedures in concert with better transparency in the arms business. Second, encouragement of effective conversion of the arms industry in the region to the production of other goods in order to break the vicious circle created by the dictum that arms production and weapons demand will eventually find each other and establish an (illegal) transit arrangement. Third, encouragement and support in the destruction of small arms and light weapons (SALW) funding provided by the UN, OSCE, NATO and various NGOs like Saferworld, Fund for Peace, etc.

All three of the above approaches have had somewhat mixed, but generally positive developments as observed in Ukraine. The Ukraine-NATO arrangement – the PfP Trust Fund Project – has a particularly positive potential for the safe destruction of 133,000 tonnes of surplus munitions and 1.5 million SALW in Ukraine, which is to commence in 2003. Three NATO member countries: Germany, Greece and Turkey, expressed interest in bearing the cost of this project. So far it is difficult to judge Russian progress in the field, but positive developments are also possible there.

Still, many experts argue that over the years of independence, a system of export control has been established in Ukraine, and today we may already speak about reliable control of the executive branch over that sphere. However, it must be noted that the numerous management and control bodies in the sphere of arms trade belong exclusively to the executive branch. Meanwhile, public oversight of this sensitive sphere is actually absent. Even the summarised information which the Ukrainian government transfers to international organisations within the framework of international control regimes is hardly accessible for Ukrainian experts. In such a situation one cannot rule out violations and abuses involving grave consequences for the country. And no one can investigate them, since the Verkhovna Rada has no realistic mechanism to do so.

Many experts are convinced that the absence of transparency in arms export decisions against a background of regular accusations that Ukraine is violating international rules of the arms trade is enough to make any outsider suspect that such violations indeed take place. This, in turn, affects the image and competitiveness of the state. For example, Valeriy Shmarov, Director General of Ukraine's state arms trade company "Ukrspetsexport" admitted that due to political constraints the number of contracts signed to sell Ukraine's arms and services in early 2003 had halved compared with same period of 2002.⁸

In a situation where the existing system of arms trade in general and control of exports in particular (even if it suits the present actors) does not promise a substantial increase in revenues in the near future and less and less meets the demands of democratic Europe so dreamed of by Ukraine, elementary logic prompts the following deduction: since the main problems are not so much the effectiveness of the system in the technical sense as its secrecy, which provokes substantial

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external and internal problems, one should primarily think about a more civilised framework for access to information by parliament and societal institutions.

It should be noted that the governmental bill “On State Control of International Transfers of Goods Designated for Military Purposes and Dual-Use Goods” was adopted on 20 February 2003 after years of deliberations. Proceeding from the experience of the previous years, today attention should be focussed on the search for an optimal balance between the secrecy of the sensitive sector of arms exports and its transparency for legislators, experts, public organisations, mass media, and the public at large.

Given the experience of informing the public about export of arms in other countries, it may be predicted with certainty that in the event of continued secrecy in that sphere, accusations about Ukraine will continue. Ukraine’s authorities have become accustomed to denying reports and making excuses, but those efforts are proving not very effective – accusations continue, and one of the reasons for that lies precisely in the atmosphere of secrecy. It would be better to follow the advice of many independent experts and entrust the task of supporting the national image, under conditions of proper transparency, to domestic journalists and public organisations. After all, excessive difficulty in media access to information not only arouses suspicion but facilitates the conduct of special information operations against Ukraine.

The problem of the illegal arms trade and other soft security threats in a Ukrainian and in a wider regional context is very complex. It involves many national and international actors. Solution of this problem is possible only through a multi-faceted approach. Law enforcement bodies must attack the criminal operational capabilities by striking at key nodes of transnational criminal networks. Equally important, anti-corruption efforts must work to break the links between these criminal networks and legal political and economic life. These efforts should aim not so much at discovering and punishing corruption as at seeking to eliminate its root causes through administrative, political and security sector reform. Increased transparency and democratic oversight of government functions, particularly in the security sector, is vital to ensure that government operates efficiently, effectively, and honestly.

Most important, it is the regional countries themselves that will have the greatest impact on their ability to confront soft security threats. It will require considerable skill and resources to develop effective institutions in the face of still-continuing societal transformations, and the political will to implement the necessary actions. It will also require a change in attitude from the political and economic elite, who will need to find the courage and belief in the future to give up short-term profit and power, turn down the criminal cash, and tie themselves firmly to their country’s future.

ENDNOTES

¹ See: 'The former Soviet republics are accused of supplying weapons to rogue states in defiance of the United Nation or US embargoes', by Robert Anderson, Stephen Fidler, Andrew Jack, Stefan Wagstyl & Tom Warner, *Financial Times*, 21 October 2002.

² Presentation by the Chief of the Main Staff of the National Army of Republic of Moldova. Defense-Express, 2 October 2002, <http://www.defence-ua.com>.

³ See: Al-Qaeda And African Diamonds, <http://rferl.org/corruptionwatch/2003/01/2-160103.asp>.

⁴ *The Washington Post*, 22 June 2001.

⁵ *The Guardian*, 9 July 2001.

⁶ Robert Brinkley. Welcoming address at the International Conference: "Export Control in the Context of Security Sector Reform", Kyiv, 26 March 2003.

⁷ Poll of 75 experts during the Round-table "The Development of Export Control System in Ukraine in the Context of Regional Security" held by Razumkov Centre on 20 June 2001.

⁸ Ukraine's arms export in numbers. Defense-Express, 1 April 2003, <http://www.defense-ua.com>.

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