

ZIMBABWE - A COUNTRY STUDY

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Howard Simson

ZIMBABWE - A COUNTRY STUDY

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This study of Zimbabwe aims to present an overview of the country on the basis of presently available material. On account of the prevailing political situation obvious difficulties exist in the collection of reliable information on the various social sectors. Despite this shortcoming, it is our hope that the study will give the reader a clearer picture of the economic, political and social conditions which characterize Zimbabwe today. The study is also intended to be of use in the planning of future Swedish support for social development in a free Zimbabwe.

This study is part of SIDA's series of country studies, and a Swedish version will be published in the autumn of 1979. Howard Simson was engaged by SIDA to write the study. He was born in South Africa, and is now a researcher at the Economic History Institute, Uppsala University.

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## PREFACE

The transition from colonial rule to independence in Zimbabwe has been marked by a violent struggle between the upholders of the colonial order and the African liberation forces. Since UDI was declared in 1965 a state of civil war has reigned and strategic statistical information has been concealed. This is especially true of economic data which relate to sanctions busting, for in 1968 the Security Council of the United Nations imposed mandatory and comprehensive sanctions on the break-away colony. All recent statistical data used in this study are taken from the official publications of the Central Statistical Office in Salisbury. The accuracy of these statistics cannot be determined.


The official name of the colony is "Southern Rhodesia". The Africans, however, refer to it as "Zimbabwe" and the whites call it "Rhodesia". In this paper the name Zimbabwe is generally used, though occasionally Rhodesia is used when reference is made to the white point of view. According to the latest Constitution of the rebel regime, the country is called "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia".

The currency of the country is dollars, but should not be confused with the United States dollar. Throughout this study Rhodesian dollars are symbolized by a simple \$ sign. On the rare occasion that US\$ are referred to, they will be so indicated.

The official reports published by the Salisbury government divide the population into four racial groups: Europeans, Asians, Coloureds and Africans. Occasionally we use the terms black and white to refer to the African and European. Coloureds and Asians, who comprise a tiny percent of the overall population, are in many cases included statistically in the European group.

The Zimbabwean economy and society are extremely dualistic, in all spheres of social life a sharp dividing line exists between whites and blacks. Economic dualism is particularly distinctive, for a modern capitalist economy is interlinked with a subsistence peasant economy. The former produces more than 90% of the Gross National Product while housing only 35% of the population. The latter produces less than 10% of the GNP while housing 65% of the population. This division can be misleading for migrant labour forms a bridge between the two sectors of the economy, and in reality 50% to 60% of the "peasant" households are wholly or partly dependent on incomes derived from the modern sector. (Appendix -1-). During the first nine years of UDI - 1965 to 1974 - the Rhodesian economy grew substantially, since 1974 the economy has been in decline due to war and sanctions.

From 1972 to 1978 at least 16,000 people have been killed in the civil war. Throughout 1979 the war has been escalating and it is estimated that at present 27 people are dying daily. Since January 1979 a further 5,000 people have been killed. In addition to death and destruction another major social cost of the war is the creation of a huge refugee population - 120,000 to 130,000 Zimbabweans have fled to Mozambique, 60,000 to Zambia and 20,000 to Botswana. Cattle, the basis of the African rural economy, numbering between 600,000 and 1,000,000 have died as a result of the decline in disease control due to the war.





BASIC DATA

## POPULATION

Total Population: 7 million (1978)

		Total Pop.
Africans	6,600,000	95.6 %
Europeans	254,000	3.6 %
Coloureds	24,000	0.5 %
Asians	11,000	0.3 %

## African Ethnic Groups as a Percentage of the Population:

Shona: 77 %  
 Ndebele: 18 %  
 Others: 5 %

## African Population:

Age Structure: % under 15 years - 50 %; % under 5 years - 20 %.

Crude Birth Rate: 47/1,000

Crude Death Rate: 13/1,000

Population Growth Rate: 3.5 %

Number of Years for the Population to Double: 20 years

Infant Mortality Rate: Rural Africans: 120-220/1,000

Urban Africans: 30/1,000

Europeans: 16/1,000

Life Expectancy: Africans: 50 years

Europeans: 72 years

African Population Distribution (1975): Rural: 83 % Urban: 17 %

European Population Distribution (1975): Rural: 17 % Urban: 83 %

SIZE: 389,000 square km. (725 km. long and 835 km. wide)  
 Population/square km. in 1978: 18

## GEOGRAPHY

Zimbabwe is a land-locked country surrounded by Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and South-Africa. It contains three major natural regions (Figure -1-). The highveld runs approximately from south-west to north-east through the middle of the country. The middleveld is a lower region surrounding the highveld and the lowveld lies along the major river basins, the Zambezi, the Limpopo and the Sabi. High mountains run along the eastern border, though generally speaking the landscape is characterized by flat grasslands with outcrops of granite and steep hills. The main industrial and farming region is on the highveld. Here the capital and major city Salisbury, Harare is its African name, (pop. 570,000) and the second city Bulawayo (pop. 340,000) are found. Together these two cities contain 75 % of the urban population.

## CLIMATE

Sub-tropical, with a rainy summer season, November to March, and dry winter from May to August. On the highveld the elevation moderates the summer heat where the average temperature is 22 degrees C. in October and 13 degrees C. in July. At lower altitudes the average temperature is between 20 and 30 degrees C.

## CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS AND GOVERNMENT

According to the United Nations, Southern Rhodesia is a British colony in revolt against the British government. On November 11, 1965 the white settler minority unilaterally declared independence (UDI) from Britain, more than 13 years later there has been no official change in the colonial status of the country. There have been many internal constitutional changes implemented by the minority government over the years. In 1979, the rebellious settlers conceded formal authority to the African majority while retaining the real positions of power in the society. After a few months of "black majority rule" the new regime has not been officially recognized by any major power. The country is presently torn by a civil war and the African nationalist liberation movements which are struggling against the settler regime are totally committed to the destruction of the colonial state.

## LANGUAGES

Shona, Ndebele and English.

## RELIGION

No accurate statistics were available on African religious affiliation. There are a wide variety of Christian communities operating in Zimbabwe. It is estimated that in 1970 a total of one million people were members of Christian Churches. Of these, African Roman Catholics numbered 387,000; Methodists 160,000 and Calvinists 100,000. The majority of the African population is not Christian. They believe either in traditional religion or independent African sects which combine Christian and traditional spiritual beliefs and practices. The white population adheres to Christianity and is predominantly Protestant.

## AFRICAN EDUCATION

Adult Literacy: in the vernaculars: 40 %  
                   in English: 20 %  
 Primary School Enrollment: 39 %  
 Secondary School Enrollment: 3 %

## HEALTH

Doctors: 855 (58 Africans) in 1977  
 Nurses and Midwives: 6,475 (half Africans) in 1977  
 Population/Doctor: 5,700  
 Population/Nurse: 1,944  
 Population/Hospital bed: 412

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

CURRENCY: Rhodesian Dollar = 1.5 US Dollars (January 1979)  
                                   0.75 British Sterling  
                                   6.4 Swedish Kronor

Exchange rates for Rhodesian Dollars are not very meaningful under present circumstances and are restricted to internal use, trade is carried out using Swiss francs or other foreign currencies.

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT: 1977 - \$ 2,200 million

GDP indicator: 1965 = 100

<u>Year</u>	<u>GDP</u>	<u>GDP/capita</u>
1974	183	136
1978	156	100

Average Real Growth Rate: 1965 - 1974: + 7 % p.a.  
 1974 - 1978: - 4 % p.a.

## COMPARISON OF GNP/CAPITA: 1975 in US Dollars

Zimbabwe	480
Zambia	480
Nigeria	240
Kenya	200
South Africa	1,200
Sweden	8,900

## RACIAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN 1968/1974

Whites: Richest 5 % of population received 57 % of total income  
 Africans: Poorest 95 % of population received 43 % of total income  
 Estimated: White per capita income: \$ 3,000  
 1974 : African per capita income: \$ 100

## SHARE OF MAJOR INDUSTRIAL SECTORS IN GDP - 1974

Agriculture:	18 %	Industry:	45 %	Service:	37 %
Employment: x)	77 %		11 %		12 %
where A includes:	Agriculture and Forestry				
I includes:	Mining and quarrying; Manufacturing; Construction; Electricity, Gas and Water				
S includes:	Trade; Banking; Insurance and Real Estate; Ownership of Dwellings; Public Administration and Other Services				

## BREAKDOWN OF MAJOR PRODUCTIVE SECTORS CONTRIBUTION TO GDP AND EMPLOYMENT in 1974

	% of GDP	% Share of Total Wage Employment	
		European	African
European Agriculture	12	5	38
Mining	8	3	6
Manufacturing	24	19	14
Total Number Employed		118,000=100 %	923,000=100 %

African Agriculture contributed only 6 % to GDP while employing an estimated 660,000 peasant households.

## FOREIGN TRADE

Value in \$ million	1965	1972
Exports	320	350
Imports	240	290
Balance of Trade	+80	+60

Terms of Trade: 1964 = 100

Year	Imports	Exports	Terms of Trade
1965	103	104	101
1966	114	94	82
1974	176	145	82
1977	244	170	70

note x) Because of the split between the modern and subsistence sectors, no accurate figure is available for the economically active population. In 1974, 16 % of the total African population was employed in the wage economy (modern sector) and 25 % of these labourers were foreign, coming mainly from Mozambique and Malawi. It is estimated that the total available labour force was 3,000,000 in 1975, with about one-third in the modern sector and two-thirds in the subsistence sector.

Major Exports in 1965

	Percentage of total
Unmanufactured Tobacco	33
Asbestos	8
Gold	5
Meat	5
Copper	4
Clothing	3
Chrome Ore	3
Raw Sugar	2

Since 1965, Maize and Cotton have replaced declining Tobacco exports and Nickel and Ferrochrome have become mineral exports.

Main Trading Partners in 1965

Country	Exports	Share of Re-exports	Imports
Britain	22	-	30
Zambia	25	64	4
South-Africa	9	10	23
West Germany	9	-	4
Malawi	5	-	1
Japan	5	-	6
USA	3	-	7

Share of Foreign Investment

Estimated Total Foreign Investment: \$ 2,000 million (1976)  
of which:

Public Debt:	18 %
Britain:	36 %
South-Africa	36 %
USA	6 %
Other	4 %

## MILITARY BALANCE

The rebel government of Rhodesia has increased defence spending from \$ 94 million in 1974 to \$ 294 million in 1978. It has a fully mobilized army of roughly 100,000 men and women, of which 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers are Africans. In addition, 10,000 African "auxilliarries" have recently been mobilized to provide a "private" military base for African politicians like Muzorewa and Sithole who have joined the Smith regime. The African liberation forces have an estimated 13,000 guerrillas operating inside Zimbabwe, and 25,000 in training or reserve in neighbouring Mozambique and Zambia.

## NATURAL AND SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY

The Land

Zimbabwe is a land-locked country lying wholly within the tropics. It is approximately 725 km. long (450 miles) and 835 km. wide (520 miles) and covers an area about 389,000 square km. (150,000 square miles) or some 96 million acres. It is therefore 13 per cent smaller than Sweden, one third the size of South Africa and half the size of Zambia.

The country is bounded by three long borders with Botswana in the south-west, Zambia in the north-west and Mozambique to the north, east and south-east. It also has a short border with South Africa in the south and touches Namibia in the west at the eastern end of the Caprivi strip.

Although Zimbabwe lies within the tropics, it experiences more of a sub-tropical than tropical climate for 80 per cent of the terrain is over 610 m. (2,000 feet). There are three major natural regions (see Figure 1). The highveld runs approximately from the south-west to the north-east through the middle of the country and is predominantly flat land over 1,220 m. (4,000 feet) covering 25 per cent of the country. Today it contains most of the important urban and industrial areas as well as the most fertile and productive agricultural lands. This broad high ridge forms the main watershed from which rivers flow towards the Zambezi in the north and west, the Limpopo to the south and the Sabi in the east.

The terrain falls away on all sides of the highveld, forming what is known as the middleveld. Its altitude is from 915 to 1,220 metres (3,000 to 4,000 feet) and it covers 40 per cent of the country. This region is largely used for agriculture and contains many of the African reserves or Tribal Trust Lands. Finally, there is the hot, dry lowveld at below 915 m. (3,000 feet) which mostly lies in the Sabi, Limpopo and Zambezi river basins and covers 35 per cent of Zimbabwe. This region is sparsely populated. (The climatic conditions and land division by population groups will be discussed in Section 2.2.3. and mineral base discussed in Section 2.2.6.)

The Population

The latest population census carried out in Zimbabwe was in 1969, the results were published in 1976 by the Central Statistics Office in Salisbury. Extrapolating the 1969 population figures and incorporating monthly migration data gives an estimate of 6.9 million for the population in 1978. According to the official classification by race, 6.6 million (95.6%) people are Africans, 254,000 (3.6%) are European, and 10,500 Asian and 23,600 Coloured (0.8% together). The growth of population since the turn of the century can be seen in Table 1, of special significance is the high rate of growth of the African population since 1945. At present it is thought to be growing at between 3.2 and 3.6 per cent per annum, which means that the African population will double every 19 to 26 years.

The Africans are comprised of two major tribal or ethnic groups. The Shona-speaking tribes account for 77 per cent (in 1969) of the population and are divided into a number of smaller tribes who speak different, but mutually intelligible dialects - the Korekore (6%), Zezuru (22%), Manyika (12%), Ndau (5%), Rozvi (2%), Kalanga (5%) and Karanga (25%) the largest tribe. Aside from the Kalanga, who live in the far west of the country, the Shona peoples occupy the eastern half of the country in Mashonaland, some living in neighbouring Mozambique. The second major tribe is the Ndebele who comprise 18 per cent of the population and live mainly on the western highveld in Matabeleland. In addition there are other minor groups such as the Tonga in the north-west and the Sotho, Venda and Hlwenwe in the south of the country, together they comprise about 5% of the population. (Figure -2-).

Of the total white population in 1969, 41%, were born in Rhodesia but more than half of these were under 15 years of age and the Rhodesia-born group comprised only 26% of the adult population. The rest were born in South Africa (22%), Britain (23%), Zambia (3.5%) and recently a number of Greeks, Italians and Portuguese entered the country. About 60% of the Europeans arrived in the country after 1945. In the decade from 1965 to 1975 there was a net white immigration of 40,000. 1976 marked the beginning of the white exodus from Rhodesia, and between then and April 1979 net emigration has been roughly 40,000 which is equivalent to 14 per cent of the 1975 white population.

The Asian (of Indian origin) and Coloured (those of mixed race) populations are both small, live in the urban areas and suffer less discrimination than the Africans. The Coloureds are mainly skilled and semi-skilled workers, whereas the Asians tend to be involved in commerce, industry and the professions.

The racial distribution of the population by area in 1969 is shown in Table -2-. Of the total urbanized population which amounted to 20 per cent of the total population in 1975, three-quarters lived in the two main centres Salisbury and Bulowayo. More than 80 per cent of the African population lived in the rural areas, of these 20 per cent lived on the white farms. Since 1969 there has been little change in the percentage distribution of the African population by area. However, the absolute number of Africans living in the urban areas has almost certainly doubled from 676,000 in 1969 to about 1,300,00 in 1978. The latter number includes a few hundred thousand "unofficial" urban residents who are escaping the ravages of war in the countryside. Despite the fact that a relatively small percentage of the African population is urbanized, Africans represent more than 80 per cent of the total urban population.

As we shall see later, the urban African population is disproportionately made up of working age males and to a lesser degree females. The rural population is left with an excess of old people, women and children. This skewed distribution of African labour-power has led to a situation in which 50% to 60% of African households are partly or wholly dependent on incomes earned in the wage economy, rather than from subsistence farming. (Appendix -1-). In this respect Zimbabwe differs from other African countries which were for less economically developed at the time of independence.

The age structures of the major racial groups differ significantly as shown in F-3 & F-4. The European population structure is unusually cylindrical in shape on account of the high level of adult immigration rather than natural increase. The pyramidal shape of the African population is characteristic of underdeveloped countries. In Zimbabwe children under 15 years of age comprise over 50 % of the population and those under 5 years of age about 20 %.



## PRE-COLONIAL HISTORY

Archeological evidence suggests that as early as 400,000 B.C. people lived in the region called Zimbabwe today and excavations have shown the emergence of metal age cultures in the area during the first century A.D. By the fourth century A.D. migrations of Bantu-speaking people from the north had probably begun and in about 1,000 A.D. a major group of Bantu-speakers - the Rozwi - arrived. In the 1300's the Karanga, another Bantu group, crossed the Zambezi and later established the Kingdom of Monomatapa. Evidence of this empire is found in the reports of sixteenth century Portuguese traders. However, by the seventeenth century this state was in decline, and by the early nineteenth century it was nonexistent. A second great African empire, that of Rozwi, had its origins in the fifteenth century, but its real power and prosperity came in the second half of the seventeenth century and the eighteenth century, coming to an end only in the 1830's. It was the Rozwi who built the famous stone structures at Great Zimbabwe and other royal residences at Khami, Dhlo-Dhlo and Maletale. Both empires had practiced long-distance trade with the Muslims and Portuguese on the east coast of Africa, exchanging gold for cloth, beads and porcelain.

The word Shona is a linguistic term used to describe a group of dialects spoken by a number of ethnic groups (tribes) in Zimbabwe. So, when we speak of the Shona people we mean those who speak Shona. Both the Monomatapa and Rozwi kingdoms, which comprised a loose confederation of sub-groups, were in this sense Shona. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Shona, a people with an elaborate culture centered around the Mwari cult, controlled Zimbabwe. During the nineteenth century the Shona were subjected to two waves of invasion from the South. The first by the Ndebele in 1837-38 and the second by the British colonialists at the end of the century. The Ndebele king, Mzilikazi, was a Zulu general who fled from south-eastern "South Africa" because of his rivalry with the powerful Zulu king Shaka. The Zulu warriors were the most powerful and feared African force at the time and were armed with the revolutionary short stabbing spear and large shields. In the course of his flight Mzilikazi incorporated thousands of captives into his small band of men. Later he established a kingdom in Matabeleland with its capital at Bulawayo. The Shona speaking people in the region were agriculturalists and no match for the well trained Zulu warriors. Consequently, many Shona tribesmen were forcibly incorporated into the Ndebele (Matabele) state as the "holi" or serf caste within the Ndebele social hierarchy. They were obliged to learn the language of their captors, while, on account of their numerical majority, they exercised a profound cultural influence on the rulers.

The following brief description of pre-colonial Shona and Ndebele societies is taken from Arrighi. More recent research has tended to modify the common characterization of the Ndebele as militaristic plunderers. Instead they are found to have possessed a productive agriculture, a vigorous commerce, an essentially "civilian" political structure and complex religious ideas. Furthermore, it has been shown that: "the most concerted Ndebele attempt to dominate the Shona took place in the years 1860-1873, in which period a number of Shona groups fell tributary to the Ndebele, but after 1877 Ndebele power was on the wane, while a massive influx of guns.....greatly strengthened the Shona capacity to resist. This was particularly the case in central and northern Mashonaland, where the Shona were virtually impregnable and the Ndebele afraid to go". So, at the time of the arrival of Rhodes' Pioneer Column in 1890, the relationship between the two major African groups in Zimbabwe was not simply one of conqueror and vanquished.

"The Shona were cultivators rather than pastoralists. Their principal crop was finger millet and they grew many varieties of vegetables and fruit. Game and fish were also important items in their diet. Cattle were allegedly not killed for food (except in periods of necessity) but for ritual purposes. However, ritual did not prevent the people from enjoying their cattle as items of food as well as objects of ritual, and ritual killings were in all likelihood spaced out so that the people had a regular diet of beef. Nonagricultural productive activities included basket making, wood carving, weaving and net making from bark fiber, mat making, pottery, and iron work for the manufacture of agricultural implements, knives, and spears.

Social and economics differentiations were very limited compared to those obtaining in other African pre-colonial social formations. Every adult member was entitled to land (which was abundant) in amounts sufficient for his and his family's subsistence. Membership of a village also ensured emergency allotments of food from headmen and chiefs and gifts from kin in case of need. Division of labor was more developed within than among productive units (the families). All that is embraced in the term "house-keeping" were peculiarly feminine occupations. The building of houses and grain stores, weaving, net making, iron work, breaking up of new land, hunting, and the charge of livestock, came within a man's sphere of work. The cultivation of land, sowing, weeding, reaping and threshing were jointly performed by the two sexes, though with a probable predominance of female labor.

A significant share of the surplus produced by the Shona was appropriated by the Ndebele. The form of appropriation varied from those tribes who had been made subject to the Ndebele state and those who had not, but who were exposed to Ndebele raids: in the case of the former, appropriation was in the form of regular payments of tribute; in the case of the latter the appropriation had not been institutionalized and was made through raids. Some Shona tribes lay completely outside the Ndebele range of activities and were therefore subject neither to tribute nor to raids.

The Ndebele people had a much more differentiated system from both economic and social points of view, being divided into castes which arose as a result of the assimilation of conquered peoples. The ruler of the Ndebele state was primarily the commander of the armies and his authority depended upon the control of cattle and captives rather than on control of land, as was the case with the Shona chiefs. The basis of Ndebele social organization was military rather than territorial.

They derived their subsistence from animal husbandry agriculture, tribute from subject tribes, and raiding parties. Cattle played a more significant political and economic role than among the Shona, and they were more frequently and admittedly killed for food. The division of labor was much more marked than among the Shona. Higher caste men concentrated their energies on hunting, raiding, and various martial pursuits, leaving many of the productive activities to the women. Cattle herding and the clearing and fencing of fields were masculine activities, but even in their performance most manual work was done by individuals of the lowest caste which consisted of the original inhabitants of the country. The latter, being of Shona stock, probably continued to organize production in a way not dissimilar from that of the Shona with the difference that part of their labor-time was used up in certain public works in which they were periodically called upon to perform."

Note The history of the colonial period is covered briefly in Appendix - 2 -.

PART 1. BRITISH COLONIAL ZIMBABWE: 1890-1979.1 THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

## 1.1 EVOLUTION OF THE SETTLER DOMINATED POLITICAL SYSTEM

The first white government in Southern Rhodesia was established under the Royal Charter granted to Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company in 1889. Although the Ndebele king, Lobengula, had ceded only mineral rights, the British government expected the commercial company to "discharge and bear all responsibility of Government". From its beginning the white Rhodesian government was virtually free of British interference in its internal affairs.

In 1922, when the mandate of the Charter Company was about to lapse, the voters of Southern Rhodesia (14,700 whites and 60 Africans) were asked to decide in a referendum whether the territory should become a fifth province of South Africa. The proposal was rejected and Rhodesia then became technically a British Colony. However, the constitution provided for such a high degree of internal autonomy that it received a unique official status of a "self-governing colony". Rhodesian affairs were handled not through the Colonial Office but through the Dominion Office. The major control retained by Britain was the power to veto legislation as a safeguard of African rights. That power was never exercised, but the British government did exercise a limited restraining influence. It is understood that there was a constitutional practice under which a Bill concerned with "African subjects" was not introduced by the Rhodesian government until it had been cleared by the British government. Nevertheless, it was during this period as a Crown colony under the 1923 Constitution that Rhodesia developed its system of discriminatory and repressive legislation, and that the expectation arose among the white minority to progress to full independence and dominion status while still exercising minority rule.

In 1953 Britain formed a federation of Southern Rhodesia with the two northern territories of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, both of which unlike Southern Rhodesia, were administrated as colonial protectorates. The constitutional status of each territory was not affected. The federation failed due to the conflict between the growing African nationalism in the north and the hesitant white reformism of the south. In 1963 it was dissolved. The two northern territories soon became the independent black states of Zambia and Malawi. Southern Rhodesia remained a "self-governing colony" ruled by the white minority.

In 1961, a new Constitution was granted by the British parliament in which Britain relinquished its veto power over legislation in return for a Declaration of Rights and a multi-racial Constitutional Council to review subsequent legislation in the light of the Declaration. A new franchise system was instituted based on educational, property and income qualifications which would result in a Legislative Assembly composed of 50 Europeans and 15 African members.

Nevertheless, formal colonial status remained and deprived Rhodesia of the freedom to operate its own foreign policy. In addition, as with all its dependencies, Britain retained the formal legal right to interfere in the internal affairs of the colony.

The white minority was aware of these formal legal constraints on its freedom to rule and feared that Britain might intervene against its interests. Hence, the Rhodesian government demanded independence, which Britain refused to grant without guarantees of progress toward majority rule. Several rounds of negotiations failed to achieve agreement. A Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), threatened and planned since 1964, was declared on November 11, 1965 by the Prime Minister Ian Smith.

The British response to UDI was to declare it an illegal act or rebellion against the Crown. However, Britain was not prepared to resort to arms to crush this rebellion. The Rhodesian UDI was condemned by a virtually unanimous vote of the General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations, and all member states were called upon to not recognize the minority regime. In November 1965, the Security Council imposed optional economic sanctions on Rhodesia, in 1966 sanctions were made mandatory but selective, and finally in 1968 comprehensive and mandatory sanctions were applied.

## 1.2

### THE SOCIAL BASIS OF THE SETTLER REVOLT

By the 1930's a class structure had crystallized in Rhodesia. Within the white community we can distinguish between the interests of the Rhodesian ("national") capitalists in agriculture and mining; those of British and other international investors who controlled the railways, large-scale mining and farming; and the white traders and wage-earners (skilled workers). The Rhodesian Africans had barely begun to be proletarianized and largely retained their traditional peasant life style. The post-World War II industrialization unleashed entirely new social forces in the traditionally agrarian settler colony. Economic development led to the creation of an urban African petty-bourgeoisie and proletariat. It also induced a massive wave of European immigration which in a short period led to the doubling of the white wage-earning class. The newly established manufacturing capitalists began to challenge the traditional racial organization of society and pushed for greater inter-racial competition and the stabilization of the African proletariat in the towns. They foresaw the creation of an African middle class and hoped to co-opt this force in working out a non-racial "neo-colonial" solution to Rhodesia's constitutional conflict.

The reformist movement set in motion by the Rhodesian "establishment" in the 1950's met with stubborn rejection by the white masses and farmers who viewed it as a threat to their socio-economic position. In 1962, these reactionary forces rallied around the Rhodesian Front Party and came to power. The new government immediately set about reversing the process of racial conciliation and used the repressive machinery of the state to crush and outlaw the African nationalist movement.

The Rhodesian Front was committed to attaining political independence on the basis of a white minority rule and this was opposed by the British colonial power. So, when it was realized that there was no way around this constitutional deadlock the government took the fateful step of UDI.

UDI clearly had the support of the majority of the white population who at the time felt extremely self-confident. Big foreign business recognized the short-sightedness of UDI and voted against it. (See Section 2.3) In the decade following UDI, Rhodesia experienced substantial economic growth and the African nationalist movement was in disarray as a result of the unexpected repressive measures. White confidence was particularly reflected in 1969, when a completely new Constitution was introduced which substantially altered the legislature to the detriment of the Africans. Whereas the 1961 Constitution had provided for an eventual, though extremely gradual transition to majority rule, the new Constitution provided at best for an eventual racial equality in government participation. In 1970, the rebel regime declared Rhodesia a republic, severing the last ties to the British Crown.

By 1978, settler confidence in the ability to keep the government permanently in "civilized" (white) hands had been shattered by the re-surgence of the African nationalist liberation movement in the 1970's. This time it emerged as a guerrilla army rather than a constitutional protest movement. In order to save the sinking ship from total destruction the Rhodesian Front capitulated in principle to African majority rule on the 3rd of March 1978, when it signed the so-called "internal settlement" agreement. (See Section 4.3).

## 2 THE COLONIAL ECONOMY: 1890-1978

### Introduction

This study of the economy of colonial Zimbabwe has been broken up into three major sections. The first deals with the formation of the capitalist economy and its inter-relationship with the pre-capitalist African economy over a period of 75 years, from 1890 to 1965. The second covers economic development during the UDI period, 1966 to 1978, and provides a detailed analysis of the important component parts of the economy. The third section gives a brief survey of the extent of foreign investment in the economy.

#### 2.1. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1890-1965: THE OPEN ECONOMY

##### 2.1.1. The Early Period: 1890-1945

The British South Africa Company (B.S.A.Co.) was set up by Cecil Rhodes to exploit the mineral wealth of the territory named after him, Rhodesia. His expectation of finding

a gold reef as rich as that of the Transvaal was, however, largely unrealized. As a result of this failure the B.S.A. Co. was obliged to find other ways of recovering its substantial investment in railways, other infrastructure and mine workings. This was achieved to some extent by the fostering of a white settler community of farmers and merchants who acquired company land and set about supplying the needs of the small mining community. Having paid no dividends at all to its shareholders, the B.S.A. Co. directors decided in 1923 to relinquish control of the administration of the colony to the settlers who then numbered 35,000. Thereafter, Southern Rhodesia became a "self governing colony", the "self", of course, represented the "national" interests of the white settler community.

In the 1923-1945 period, there was little new foreign investment in Rhodesia, except for the establishment of two American chrome mining companies. The settlers were obliged to rely on their small savings from gold mining and farming to expand their domestic capital base. The possession of State power, however, enabled them to gradually push forward the industrialization of the colony. They took advantage of the opportunity provided during World War II to establish a steel industry, a cotton-spinning industry and other infant industries. In fact, gross output in the manufacturing sector more than doubled between 1939 and 1944, and by 1946 had reached £ 17 million or over 3 times the pre-war level.

The overall war-time growth rate in the real Net National Income was only 2.4 % per year. The inability to import in this period led to a build up of a large current account surplus of more than £ 28 million.

#### 2.1.2. The Post-War Boom: 1946-1953

A combination of favourable factors enabled the economy to expand extremely rapidly during the post-war period. The real rate of growth in Net National Income was over 10 % per year. The two main engines of this exceptional economic development were the increase in exports and inflow of foreign capital.

Exports averaged more than 45 % of the GDP throughout the period and their changing structure reflected the change in the industrial basis of the economy. Agricultural exports exceeded those of the mining industry, and tobacco and asbestos replaced gold as the colony's major exports. As a whole, exports more than trebled from £ 20 million in 1946 to nearly £ 64 million in 1953. There was also a marked expansion in the export of manufactures from £ 3.6 in 1946 to £ 15.2 million in 1953. Textiles, foodstuffs and manufactured tobacco were the major contributors and by 1953 exports of manufactured goods represented 24 % of total exports. The structure of Rhodesia's export trade at the end of 1953 was clearly indicative of the pattern that was to develop during the Federal era. Raw material exports were consigned mainly to Britain, Western Europe and the USA, but manufactures and re-exports went almost entirely to the less developed neighbouring countries, Zambia and Malawi.

Between 1947 and 1953 investment in Rhodesia totalled £ 282 million of which more than £ 194 million or almost 70 % represented foreign capital inflows. Net Domestic Capital Formation averaged more than 40 % of GDP during this period. The bulk of the new investment went into the public sector, especially Rhodesia Railways and the Electricity Supply Commission. Foreign funds financed new companies and skilled white immigrants brought a total of more than £ 31 million into Rhodesia between 1946 and 1953. The white population increased by more than 90 % during this period, reaching 158,000 at the outset of the Federation.

### 2.1.3. Federation: 1954-1963

During the federal period Southern Rhodesia consolidated the economic structure which had become established in the post-war boom. The economy remained exceptionally "open", with exports and foreign investment once again playing the decisive roles. Real growth in the Gross National Income was slower and unevenly distributed, with an overall average of 4 % per annum during the decade. Between 1954 and 1957 the growth rate averaged 8 % per annum, it then declined to an average of 2,5 % between 1958 and 1963.

Southern Rhodesia gained most from federation with its industrially weaker neighbours; in particular, they provided a protected market for its manufactured goods. Because of the consolidation of the accounts of the three countries less data is available in this period. It can be seen from T-4 and T-5 that the share of manufacturing in the GDP continued to rise relative to other sectors. Furthermore exports doubled in money terms over the decade and continued to average more than 40 % of GDP.

The investment boom continued into the federal period, declining in the latter years. Investment which had averaged 34 % of Southern Rhodesia's GDP between 1955 and 1958 averaged just over 20 % in the second half of federation, falling as low as 14 % in 1963. Over the decade the total inflow of capital from abroad was about £ 230 million. Much of this investment went into infrastructural development, £ 46 million was borrowed to finance the Kariba Hydro-electric power project, the main benefits of which accrued to Southern Rhodesia. Foreign investment accounted for more than 70 % of total domestic investment when the re-investment of undistributed profits is taken into account.

At the end of the federal period, political uncertainty and economic conditions led to stagnation. The declining confidence in the Rhodesian economy was reflected both in the fact that a net outflow of 17,000 whites was recorded between 1961 and 1963 (though there was a net increase of about 30,000 whites over the decade) and there was a net capital outflow from the country. This period saw the deepening of the infrastructure in Rhodesia and the strengthening of the manufacturing sector. However, government policy had essentially continued the post-war practice of export-led growth supported by substantial foreign investment. Manufacturing industry was regarded as secondary to the expansion of mineral and agricultural exports. It received little



tariff protection and essentially served to provide cheap inputs for the primary industries and processed raw material. The small and highly skewed domestic consumer market inhibited a strategy of industrialization based on the provision of goods for mass domestic consumption. Inherent to this export oriented growth strategy was the necessity to maintain an adequate supply of cheap labour. We will now examine this labour factor which played such a crucial rôle in the process of Rhodesian economic development.

#### 2.1.4. The Proletarianization of the African Peasantry 1890-1965

Samir Amin has described the southern Africa region as the "Africa of the labour reserves". Furthermore, he stressed the fact that there was nothing "traditional" about African societies which had a large proportion of their land expropriated and were consequently obliged to become labour exporters in order to survive. In the case of Rhodesia, Arrighi's study of the proletarianization of the African peasantry layed bare the workings of "primitive accumulation" or the process by which the African peasantry was reduced from self-sufficiency to wage dependancy.

The Rhodesian Africans appear to have been living rather comfortably on the land at the time of the British colonization. The territory was underpopulated and despite formal expropriation of more than 70 % of the African land by the B.S.A. Co. and the settlers, Africans were permitted to remain as tenants on their ancestral lands.

In the early 1900's African farmers supplied the bulk of the food supply to the growing mining and urban regions. By selling their crops on the open market they were largely able to meet the cash taxes imposed by the company administration. The economic strength of the African peasantry undermined the designs of the farmers and mine-owners to turn the Rhodesian Africans into a cheap labour and they had to turn elsewhere to obtain cheap labour supplies. Employers argued that there was no point in raising wages in an attempt to induce the Africans to work, for this would only lead them to work relatively less in order to obtain their necessary cash.

This phenomenon was typical of the transition to capitalist production and in many ways the gradual forcing of the African peasantry into less productive regions of the country was equivalent to the enclosure movement which had led to the proletarianization of the British peasantry in the seventeenth century. Capital accumulation depended on the creation of a working class, hence it was necessary to find means of extruding labour, as cheaply as possible, from the traditional agricultural sector.

Market forces alone were incapable of rapidly bringing about the desired change in Rhodesia, for the African peasantry was too independent. Hence, it was necessary for the bourgeois

regime to use extra-economic means. Land expropriation was the primary tool for creating African dependency. It was necessary to cut-off Africans from the land and diminish their agricultural self-sufficiency. Once a point had been reached at which the African population was no longer able to feed itself and export a surplus to cover taxes, the irreversible process of wage dependency would become established. Then market forces could displace "political" force as the fundamental determinant of the process of proletarianization. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 legally demarcated the European land area for the first time, they got 48.5 million acres, or half the country. The Act confined African purchases to separate and largely non-productive areas, and tried to pack as many Africans as possible into the "reserves". These reserves were for the sole use of Africans and could not be sold to whites, just as white areas could not be sold to Africans. Later on the African reserves became known as Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs).

Arrighi has identified the 1920's as the period in which this qualitative change took place in the Rhodesian labour market. Africans were no longer able to "choose" whether or not to work for a wage, they were compelled by necessity to seek wage labour despite declining wage-rates.

A crucial factor which determined this process was the development of capitalist agriculture as competitor to peasant agriculture. For the gradual creation of an alternative source of food for the towns led to the reduction of the purchase of peasant produce. Unable to meet their cash requirements from agricultural sales, Africans became more and more dependent on the sale of their labour. As settler agriculture developed with the help of massive state aid, African agriculture was underdeveloped by numerous mechanisms e.g. unfair pricing schemes, inadequate transport and the lack of State assistance. For example, in the 1939-1945 period the settler government spent on African agriculture about one fortieth of what it spent on settler agriculture.

As a result of the systematic undermining of the African peasantry during the first half-century of colonial rule the modern economy was ready for "take-off" in the post World War II era. By this time most of the African reserves were caught in a vicious circle of land shortage, deteriorating soil fertility, and rapidly rising population. The historical working of the mechanism of proletarianization described above can be readily seen from the data in T -6 and T -7.

In T - 6 we see the steady growth in the absolute number of Rhodesian Africans employed in the modern sectors of the economy. We note too, that the percentage of the African population employed increased steadily. In T - 7 we find that as Rhodesian born African became dependent on the sale of their labour, the local employers gradually cut-down on the use of imported African labour. These foreign workers, who mainly came from Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique, played a vital role in permitting wage rates to be kept down while Rhodesian Africans were still capable of bargaining for

higher wages on account of their agricultural self-sufficiency.

In the post-war boom African labour was greatly in demand, the total number of Africans (including foreign workers) in wage employment grew from 376.000 to 527.000 or by 7 % per annum. Furthermore, we see in T - 8 that the average annual earnings of African employees rose substantially in both monetary and real terms in the period of post-war expansion. Real GDP per capita rose throughout the 1950's, thereafter it remained constant until 1969.

T-9 gives an indication of the sectoral employment pattern of African workers and their average annual earnings. It is noteworthy that the general rise in post-war African wage rates shown in T - 8 was very unevenly distributed between sectors. In particular agricultural wages grew at only 3 % per annum while manufacturing wages grew at 11 % per annum. This meant that in 1962 the modern agricultural sector, which employed 40 % of the total African labour force, paid wages which were less than half of those paid in the manufacturing sector, which employed only 12 % of the labour force. A rather special feature of the colonial society was that the number of Africans employed in domestic service exceeded the number employed in manufacturing.

What were the origins of the phenomenon of rising wages in this labour surplus economy? Clearly, the rapid expansion of the economy and consequent rapid absorption of labour in the boom period led to pressure on wages. This pressure was intensified by the rise of African trade unions in the 1940's and their use of the strike weapon. However, the main cause of the rapid rise in wages in the manufacturing and tertiary sectors was due to the "upgrading" of a section of the African labour force. With the introduction of mechanization in the new industries after the war came the need for a "semi-skilled" industrial labour force. The urban wage rates established were far higher than farm wages and were intended to attract workers to the towns, where the cost of living was higher. The system of migrant labour continued to operate, though some African families became permanently urbanized.

Finally, an important feature of the post-war industrialization process was the relatively limited capacity of the modern sectors to absorb African labour, i.e. relative to the population growth. When we examine the sectoral employment pattern we find that in the mining sector the absolute number of Africans employed declined by 30 % between 1954 and 1962, while the gross value of output increased by 17 %. In manufacturing the number of Africans employed increased by only 16 % during this period, while the gross value of output increased by over 100 %.

Clearly, the introduction of new production methods which increased the productivity of labour had made possible the substantial rise in real wages after the war. But equally obvious was the fact that the new industries were incapable of absorbing the rapidly rising potential labour force in the African reserves. So, it appears that after a half century of resisting proletarianization the African peasantry had reached a point at which it was increasingly dependent on wage labour for survival. Unfortunately, however, the modern capitalist sector appeared to be structurally incapable of providing wage employment at a rate sufficient to prevent the impoverishment of the rapidly growing African population in the historically formed reserves.

The degree of urbanization in Rhodesia varied considerably according to the racial group. By the early 1960's almost 80 % of the European population was urbanized compared to only 18 % of the African population. The distribution of the African population by sex and age revealed distortions which were a product of the migrant labour system. For, in the urban areas African men outnumbered the women by 2.3 to 1, and in the TTLs women outnumbered men by 3 to 2. Generally speaking, the reserves contained the children, aged and women, while able-bodied men were overwhelmingly employed outside the reserves. It was estimated that about 80 % of all males aged 20-34 and about 50 % of those between 35-39 were absent from tribal homes.

A more detailed picture of the distribution of African income and population in the rural and urban areas will be presented in the course of analysis of the more recent development.

## 2.2 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 1966-1978: THE SANCTIONED ECONOMY

2.2.1. A Macro View: Continuity and Change

The settler revolt against the colonial "establishment" in 1965 was directly related to the post-World War II rapid industrialization. This process had brought about a new alignment of class interests within the European community. The manufacturing sector was particularly concerned with the removal of racial barriers and the creation of a stable urban African work-force and larger urban market. The farmers and white wage earners were strongly against "liberalization" which might have interfered with their labour supply and job security. The African politicians and trade unionists had practised a conciliatory politics until it was clear that the liberalization path was closed by the victory of the reactionary Rhodesian Front party in 1962 and its subsequent unilateral declaration of independence.

Immediately following the UDI of November 11, 1965, Britain cut off trade and financial links with its break-away colony. Thereafter, the United Nation's Security Council imposed "voluntary" sanctions against trade with Rhodesia. But when it became apparent more than two years later that these measures had been unable to bring down the rebel regime, the Security Council imposed comprehensive and mandatory sanctions. These aimed at putting a complete halt to the exportation and importation of all goods and finance capital from or to Southern Rhodesia.

Given the historical "openness" of the economy (i.e. its dependency on trade and capital imports), it was expected that the trade and financial embargo would bring down the regime. However sanctions were never fully implemented and in particular the South African connection to the world market was kept intact. Instead of leading to a quick collapse of the Rhodesian economy, sanctions led to a successful re-orientation of economic policy towards "self-reliance".

The overall growth and decline of the economy is shown in T - 10. During the first nine years of UDI, 1965-1974, the average real growth rate in Gross Domestic Product was 7 % per year. This growth rate was double the estimated rate of population increase and so the real GDP per capita also rose substantially, from \$ 163 to \$ 221 or 35 % over nine years. In 1974, the economy reached its peak, thereafter, it was no longer able to withstand the pressures of war and sanctions. In the four years, 1974-1978, real GDP declined by 15 % and by the end of 1978, GDP per capita had fallen to \$ 165, just a fraction above the 1965 figure.

The structural changes already visible in the pre-UDI economy continued under sanctions and are indicated in T -11 and T -12. In 1965, the manufacturing sector had surpassed the agricultural sector as the leading "contributor" to GDP, in that year the former represented 18 % of GDP and the latter 17 %.

By 1974 manufacturing stood at 24 % and agriculture at 18 %. The share of mining, the third most important productive sector, remained at about 7 % of GDP in these years. However, as we shall see in the course of a more detailed analysis of each sector, these calculations of the contribution of sectors to GDP are particularly misleading in the case of Rhodesia. For they overstate the importance of manufacturing and understate that of the primary industries, mining and farming. The latter supply the inputs for secondary industry and are the chief sources of foreign exchange.

A closer look at the three most important productive sectors reveals that the manufacturing sector grew fastest between 1965 and 1974, rising 142 % in real terms. European commercial agriculture rose 72 % and mining 90 % (T - 13). By 1977, all three sectors had declined materially. Within the manufacturing sector the fastest growing industries until 1974 were "metals and metal products", "non-metallic mineral products", "textiles (including cotton ginning)" and "food-stuffs". Industries producing food-stuffs were the only ones which continued to grow after 1974. All these industries were ideally suited to an import substitution strategy, for they were essentially processors of domestic raw materials.

The relative economic success during the first decade of sanctions requires some explanation. As we shall see in the analysis of foreign trade, sanctions had a strong adverse effect on the ability of the country to export and import. The terms of trade moved sharply against Rhodesia after UDI and as a consequence the import equivalent of exports as a percentage of GDP fell from 44 % to an average of 23 %. Roughly speaking the economy was "half as open" as before. Therefore, while strategic imports were still capable of being paid for, it is clear that growth would have to have been internally rather than externally determined.

What then were the crucial internal factors which stimulated economic growth? An important basic factor was the existence of both industrial and infrastructural overcapacity in 1965. Southern Rhodesia had been the industrial centre in the Federation which had been dissolved in 1963. A second important factor was the availability of an elastic supply of cheap labour. Finally, there was the high rate of new investment, this will be examined more closely below.

In order to meet the threat posed by financial sanctions, the government blocked the repatriation of foreign capital and dividends. This restriction on the outflow of capital led to greater liquidity within the local branches of foreign companies, and tended to induce re-investment of locally earned profits.

In 1965, Gross Fixed Capital Formation amounted to 14 % of GDP (T - 14). After declining slightly in 1966 and 1967, it recovered steadily until 1975, when it reached 23 %. Between 1968 and 1975, G.F.C.F. averaged 19 % of GDP and on average the private sector accounted for 63 % of total investment and the public sector 37 %. In the depressed years of 1966, 1967 and 1976 the share of public investment rose

to an average of 45 % of total investment, indicating that the 1968-1974 boom period was directly attributable to a high rate of private investment.

It has been estimated that of the total private capital investment made between 1966 and 1975, the re-investment of undistributed profits in foreign companies accounted for 39 %. Furthermore, there was a net inflow of foreign capital of \$ 340 million during this period, which accounted for 15 % of Gross Fixed Capital Formation. The compositions of G.F.C.F. by sector and asset type are shown in T -15 and T -16.

Clearly, the reinvestment of foreign company profits and new foreign capital played an important role in the financing of the expansion of the productive sectors of the economy. In the boom period companies earned exceptionally high profits as indicated in T-17 and T-18. The Gross Operating Profits of private companies and financial institutions rose steadily from 22 % of Gross Domestic Income in 1968 to 32 % in 1974. Wages and salaries of white and black employees declined as a percentage of GDI, from 60 % in 1968 to 51 % in 1974.

The rate of capital formation in Rhodesia between 1968 and 1975 was impressive considering the constraints. For in this period, as opposed to earlier phases of expansion in which heavy reliance had been placed on new foreign investment, the economy had to depend almost exclusively on domestic capital formation. The success of this process of capital accumulation is a sign of the maturity of the modern sector of economy. However, it should be remembered that this growth occurred in a special situation. The high investment rate was directly related to both the ability of foreign and local business to appropriate a greater share of the surplus, and the extreme income inequality between the European "savers" and the African workers and peasants.

In conclusion, we might consider whether the economic strategy of import-substitution pursued under sanctions represented a fundamentally different development strategy. Prior to UDI, the Rhodesian economy had been characterized by its extreme openness to foreign trade and investment, its small domestic market and its racially biased class and income structure. Under sanctions the economy turned inwards and the State came to play a far more interventionist role than was formerly the case. This in an effort to avoid spending scarce foreign exchange on products which could be produced locally. However, as the following sectoral analysis will reveal, there has been no fundamental change in the economic structure during the UDI period.

There has been no significant change in the racial division of wealth, rather the earlier pattern of African impoverishment and European enrichment has continued. Rhodesia never became completely cut-off from the world market. While the openness of the economy was reduced by roughly half, strategic imports continued to be received via South Africa. Its exports volume of mineral and agricultural output increased substantially over the 1970's. But, on account of the adverse terms of trade, these exports were equivalent to 20 % less imports. The economy has essentially remained what it always was, a raw material exporting satellite of the world capitalist system, built on the exploitation of cheap African labour.

### 2.2.2. African and European Employment and Wage Changes

In general, changes in employment size and composition have followed the overall changes in the modern economy since 1965 (T-19 and T-20). Throughout this period the African labour supply has been in excess of demand and a large reserve of labour has been built up in the rural and urban areas. The number of Africans unemployed is reckoned to be anywhere between 100,000 and 300,000 depending upon the method of classification used. The problem of African unemployment and underemployment will be discussed in Section 5.1.

The indices for African employment and wage changes during the 1968-1975 boom and the subsequent economic downturn are shown in T-21 and T-22. Overall employment rose by 35 % from 1968 to 1975, the peak year in employment. By 1977 it had declined by an estimated 5 % to 1978. Employment grew fastest in the manufacturing and construction industries until 1975, since then employment has fallen in both industries, though much faster in construction. These trends have continued in 1978. The Public Administrative sector moved sharply against the trend, since 1975 it is estimated to have risen by 30 %, indicating a ever-greater employment of Africans in military and military related services.

The ratio of foreign Africans employed in the money economy declined from 34 % in 1969 to 25 % in 1974, these "foreigners" were largely from Malawi and Mozambique and appear to have been in the country for a long time. In 1973, the 221,000 foreign Africans were predominantly employed in agriculture (54 %), domestic service (15 %), mining (11 %), and manufacturing (8 %). In 1978, it was estimated that 80,000 Zimbabweans were working in South Africa, 30,000 in the mines. Real wage indices indicate an average increase of African earnings of 26 % between 1968 and 1975, average real wages have remained roughly constant since 1975. Wages grew fastest in construction and public administration up to 1975, and slowest in agricultural and domestic services.

A comparison between the overall indices for European and African employment and incomes reveals that while the number of Africans employed grew more rapidly than that of Europeans up to 1975, the latter's real wages rose faster (T - 23).

### 2.2.3. Agriculture: Production Structure and Land Distribution

The Zimbabwean economy is based upon agriculture. More than 5 million of the total population of 6,9 million in 1978 are directly dependent upon agriculture. But the agricultural sector is sharply divided on racial and commercial lines. The land was more or less divided up between the two racial groups. The European farmers and plantation owners built up their agricultural base with the help of the State which they controlled, simultaneously the African peasantry was driven to poverty and the need to export cheap labour. According to the Land Tenure of 1969 Act, the country was divided institutionally into European and African areas. This act was amended in 1977, nevertheless the population distribution and European/African land division still remain much the same. (See Figure 5 and T - 24).



The fertility of the land in Zimbabwe varies according to natural factors such as soil-type, rainfall and altitude, and has been classified as follows: Region I covers the highest ground and is suitable for specialized farming e.g. foresting, coffee, tea, deciduous fruits and dairying. Region II covering most of the highlands, is best suited to intensive crop and livestock production. Region III has slightly lower ground with less rainfall, covers a third of the total land mass, is less suited to crop production and more so to livestock. Region IV has less rain and can only support crops permanently with irrigation and so is more suitable for live-stock production. Region V is suitable only for extensive livestock production. Region X represents scattered land unsuitable for farming. (Figure 6)

In T - 25 we see that not only is the land unequally distributed between racial groups, but that this inequality extends to land quality too. For the Europeans hold 70 % of Region I and II and 45 % of region III, whereas the African peasantry occupies generally inferior lands. Hence, European agricultural productions is predominantly crop oriented while African production is livestock oriented.

When examining agriculture's "contribution" to the GDP we must distinguish between these two distinct agricultural sectors; the European "commercial" sector and the African "subsistence" sector. The former is the major supplier of food to the urban areas and is the country's major foreign exchange earner. Agricultural exports account for between 40 % and 50 % of total exports. Furthermore, agriculture provides between one third and one half of all manufacturing raw materials, such as cotton, oil seeds, dairy products and livestock. European agriculture's relative importance is in fact obscured by the method of industrial classification which places within manufacturing items directly derived from agriculture. For example, the production of cotton-lint represented 82 % of the textile industry's output and 9 % of total manufacturing output in 1974.

In 1965, the contribution of European agriculture to GDP was 12 %. It was the major employer of the African labour force, employing 44 % or 289,000 workers. Only 5 % of the Europeans, 4,400, were employed in agriculture. In contrast, African peasant production accounted for 5 % of GDP, of which 25 % was due to commercial sales and 75 % the imputed value of crop consumption. The number of cultivators in the African reserves or Tribal Trust Lands was then 505,000 and the population nearly 3 million. By 1976, these figures had reached 675,000 and 4.5 million respectively.

During the UDI period the trend visible throughout the colonial period was intensified, European agriculture made great advances, while African production barely kept pace with population growth (T - 26). The effect of the war in recent years has been extremely adverse in the African areas, with cattle losses reaching disastrous proportions.

### 2.2.3.1. European Commercial Agriculture

In 1965 tobacco was the leading commercial crop, it accounted for 51 % of gross agricultural output, followed by maize 12 %, sugar 10 %, beef 12 %, dairy products 4 % and other products 10 %. In 1965, there were 6,266 farms and plantations of which 37 % concentrated on tobacco, 20 % on beef and 7 % on maize. Thus, tobacco dominated the agricultural sector and represented a third of the country's exports. Zimbabwe was the world's second largest tobacco producer after the USA, with 27 % share of world trade in flue-cured Virginia tobacco.

Tobacco was hardest hit by sanctions. To counteract this the government subsidized the producers, stockpiled tobacco and encouraged diversification into other crops, while cutting the tobacco sales quota by half. As a result the number of tobacco growers dropped from 2,800 in 1965 to 1,600 in 1967 and production dropped from 117,000 tons in 1965 to 91,000 in 1967. But tobacco was by far the most profitable crop with average net income per acre being over twice as high as that of maize production, so the losses were substantial. However, since 1972 there has been a upturn in the world tobacco market and much of the stockpiled tobacco has been sold secretly.

The diversification programme appears to have been successful. From 1965 to 1974 the production of maize, the stable crop, increased 6 fold, cotton 10 fold, groundnuts 4 fold, beef, sugar and milk two fold. Self-sufficiency in wheat was achieved. Other cash crops produced include soyabeans, pyrethrum, sorghum, tea and coffee.

The total area under crops increased from 1.1 million acres in 1965 to 1.4 million acres in 1976. The cattle population rose from 1.6 million to 2.9 million for the same years. Numerous irrigations schemes were undertaken and fertilizer self-sufficiency achieved. In 1976 there were 6,682 commercial farms. Of these 4,371 grew some crops and 4,788 were engaged in livestocking, indicating a considerable number of mixed producers.

Overall, the gross output of European agriculture increased from \$ 142 million in 1965 to \$ 394 million in 1976, almost doubling in real terms. Since then the real value of agricultural output has declined slightly, and the 1979 figures are expected to be even worse on account of drought and war. The number of Africans employed increased by 60,000 to 348,000 in 1977, but agricultural employment as a percentage of total employment declined from 44 % to 38 %. The African farm workers real wages remained roughly constant in this period of expansion, and agricultural wages fell as a proportion of manufacturing wages from about one-third to one-quarter.

The most striking feature of income growth in this sector is the extent to which black wages have subsidized both profit earners in agriculture itself and consumers in all

other sectors. The index for real wages of African farm workers stood at 103 in 1975, (1965 = 100). In striking contrast, the share of profits in value-added, which stood at an average of 47 % in the years 1965-1967, had increased to 61 % in 1972-1974.

There was a wide variety in farm size, in fact, inequality in land ownership within European agriculture is almost as great as that between the European and African sectors. Some 60 % of all white farm land is owned by some 10.5 % of the total number of farmers (including corporately owned land). At the other end of the scale about 55 % of all white farmers own less than 10 % of total white farm lands. On the production side, the poorest 43 % of the white farmers produce less than 10 % of white agricultural output, while over half of all output is produced by only 10 % of the farmers. Income distribution corresponds to land distribution. In 1976, 271 farming concerns, 78 corporations and 193 individuals together contributed 52 % of taxable income. The top 11 companies contributed 29 % of taxable income, while two-thirds of all white farmers paid no income tax at all.

Thus, European agriculture is characterized by a large number of relatively small farms and a small number of large farming units. The former are less productive than the latter and their owners provide the rural basis for Smith's regime. The largest plantations and ranches are owned mainly by South African and British companies.

It has recently been reported that 2,000 of the roughly 6,500 European farms have been abandoned on account of the war. But the top 20 % of the white farms that produce 80 % of the national output, found mainly near Salisbury, continue to produce despite guerrilla incursions.

Since UDI, government agencies have increased their support for European agriculture. Liberal short-term credit facilities are provided by the state Agricultural Finance Corporation. While the AFC increased its share of credit in the 1970's, funds from commercial banks and discount houses provided between two-thirds and three-quarters of all short-term credit. Statutory marketing has increased substantially, in 1965 no more than 35 % of total sales were handled by the statutory agencies, by 1973 this proportion had exceeded 70 %. By and large free market prices do not apply to agricultural products domestically.

### 2.2.3.2 African Subsistence Agricultural

The African rural areas contain 80 % of the rural population, and it is estimated that the total population in African areas has increased from 3 million in 1965 to 4.5 million in 1977. The African lands are divided into 105 Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) and 66 Purchase Areas. The adult population structure in the TTLs is distorted as a result of the operation of the migrant labour system, 62 % of the adults living there are women and 38 % men, while over 60 % of all men between 20 and 49 years are migrant labourers.

In the TTLs, land is divided up into common grazing land and arable land which is allocated to the households by the local tribal authority. The cultivators are essentially subsistence farmers and have a significantly different basic attitude to production than that of a market oriented peasantry. They use relatively backward farming methods, few modern inputs, and are cut off from the main transport system and all important credit facilities. Consequently, their economic behaviour is conservative and survival oriented, rather than innovative. Cattle fulfil not only an economic function but also have important social and political roles in Ndebele and Shona society.

Within the wider context of the Zimbabwean economy the TTLs play an important role despite their low output. They contribute only 5 % to GNP, but they provide food and security for the bulk of the African population. By leaving the families of migrant workers in the TTLs wages in the modern sector are effectively subsidized. The TTLs are also expected to provide "social security" for the migrant worker when he loses his working capacity or job, this saves the need to pay pensions and unemployment insurance.

Today there is acute land shortage in the TTLs. Population growth has been rapid and the cattle stock doubled between 1965 and 1977. There has been a constant tendency for grazing land to be shifted to arable land to meet the ever growing food requirements. The result is that by 1977, over 17 times as much arable land as recommended by ecologists had been turned over to the plough. The cattle are primarily used as draught animals and for manure, which is crucial for soil fertility conservation. The crisis in the rural areas is greatly exacerbated by the war which has led to extreme suffering and hardship among the rural African population.

Official statistics indicate a rise in real production in the African areas over the period 1965-1976. However, this increase is calculated by simply multiplying the increasing population by its estimated per capita food needs, so that production always keeps up with population. This calculation seems rather unrealistic considering the disruption caused by war and the deterioration of the land as a result of overcrowding. In many TTLs maize, the African staple, is imported to make up local shortages. It has been estimated that each person requires 385 pounds of maize a year. In 1962, it was estimated that the availability of maize in the TTLs averaged 352 pounds per person per year, by 1977 it had fallen to 231 pounds per person. A limited amount of the TTLs produce is marketed to provide for cash necessities. The extent of peasant sales is closely connected to the harvest and in a good year tobacco, maize and recently cotton are sold. Cattle sales provide the major source of cash, though sales are mainly made from old cull cattle whose usefulness is at an end. While the distribution of land holdings and production levels are less unequal in the peasant sector than in white agriculture, there is nevertheless a significant degree of inequality. The

concept of land ownership has ambiguous meaning in the TTLs where land is communally owned. The distribution of land holdings is derived by dividing the population density by an assumed uniform family size and arriving at a distribution of land area per family. (T - 27) On the basis of the 1969 structure, over 61 % of tribal land was occupied by 29.5 % of the tribal population with an average holding (measured in 1976 equivalents) of some 80 hectares per family. Much of this land area, however, is known to be in the least favourable farming areas of the country. Moreover, most of the tribal population lives on much more densely populated land, with 54 % of all families having less than 16 hectares in 1976. In the most dense areas (comprising 16.5 % of the population) holdings were no larger than 8 hectares per family.

The African Purchase Areas (APAs) play a relatively small role in African agriculture, for they contain only 4 % of rural African population and occupy 9 % of the land area. They are currently divided up into 8,460 farms of which 404 are vacant. These farms were intended to form an outlet for progressive African farmers who were selected for individual ownership on the basis of their farming experience. These farmers have some access to credit and marketing facilities and are more commercialized than the TTL producers, 66 % of their produce was sold in 1973, the bulk of which was cotton. The APAs relative lack of importance is indicated by the fact that the value of their marketed produce was only a quarter of the total African produce marketed in 1973 i.e. \$ 2.9 million out of \$ 11.6 million. Their productivity per acre was roughly three times that of the TTLs, though with respect to maize, only half that of the European farms.

#### 2.2.4. Manufacturing

The manufacturing sector reached its highest point of production in 1974. In recent years it has been hit by a combination of adverse conditions which include shortages of foreign exchange to pay for vital imports, transport problems and a general loss of confidence on account of the war. According to the official statistics at its high point manufacturing accounted for 24.4 % of the Gross Domestic Product, or 54 % of total industrial production (mining, manufacturing, construction, transport and communication, electricity and water). It employed 15 % of the total number of employed, or 2.5 % of the total population.

On the basis of these statistics, Zimbabwe seems to have a substantial manufacturing sector. However, these figures grossly overstate the significance of the manufacturing industry for several reasons. The first is due to classification peculiarity in the official statistics. According to the Private Sector Co-ordinating Committee more than 25 % of the output of the manufacturing sector would normally be placed under mining production for it involves the processing and beneficiation of metals e.g. ferrochrome. Furthermore, it included processed meat, tobacco and cotton-ginning which could be classified under agricultural production.

The reckoning of refined raw materials as manufacturing output tends to inflate this sector. This tendency is reinforced on account of high domestic prices for manufactures due to the effect of tariff protection and monopoly pricing.

Taking into account that approximately 25-30 % of the manufacturing output is "fictitious", we are left with a materially different picture of the relative importance of this sector. Namely in 1974 it represented between 16.5 % and 18 % rather than 24.6 % of the GDP, and 38 % to 41 % rather than 54 % of total industrial production. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe still has the "second" most developed manufacturing sector in the southern Africa region, after South Africa. But Zimbabwe comes a poor second to South Africa, for its adjusted manufacturing output represents only 7 % of the South African manufacturing output, and is only 24 % greater than Zambian output for 1973. Both Zambia and Zimbabwe are dwarfed by the South African industrial giant.

During the first decade of UDI and international sanctions government policy shifted from one of favouring primary production over manufacturing, to one of actively encouraging import substitution via tariff protection and import controls. Economic sanctions had primarily been intended to hit Rhodesian exports, hence it was important to reduce the historical dependency on unnecessary manufacturing imports in times of foreign exchange shortage. The success of the import substitution is revealed by both the growth and diversification of production during the 1965-1974 period.

The volume of manufacturing production doubled between 1965 and 1974, however, by 1977 it had declined by about 13 % from the 1974 level. (T - 28) The fastest growing sectors were non-metallic mineral products, metals and metal products and textiles including cotton-ginning, all of which grew by about 200 %. Other significant changes in the production structure were the rise of metals and metal products to first place and the decline of food products to second place in value terms. The exceptional rate of growth in metal products was partly attributable to a three-fold increase in steel output which reached an annual production capacity of 410,000 tons in 1976, enough to cover domestic requirements. However, also included in this figure is mineral processing, particularly ferro-chrome, which would normally be classified under mining production.

Judging from changes indicated in T - 29 the Rhodesian economy appears to have gone through an industrial transformation during the past decade. The iron, steel and engineering industries tended to "displace" or "challenge" the pre-eminence of foodstuffs, drink and tobacco depending upon the way in which one aggregates the sub-sectors. The textile industry rose in importance from 8th place to 4th place, though the ginning of locally grown cotton accounts for about 80 % of the textile industry's output.

It is significant that the manufacturing sector's expansion took place in times of limited import capacity. The manufacturing industry had historically been a net foreign exchange user despite the rather high level "manufactures" in total exports. After 1965 manufacturing still depended upon imports, its decline since 1975 has been directly due to the cut in its foreign exchange allowances. It is clear, however, that on the whole domestic inputs have progressively replaced imported ones and intersectoral links have been extended since UDI.

As far as product diversification is concerned, it was reported that whereas in 1963 603 separately identifiable products were produced inside the country, by 1970 the number had increased six-fold to 3,837 products. However, given the limited size of the domestic market and the scarcity of foreign exchange it is not surprising to find that in 1970 about 2,500 products or 65 % of the total were monopoly products i.e. produced by one firm. This monopolistic production structure which is usually accompanied by high prices, was characterized by a high degree of concentration. In 1974, there were 1,254 manufactory units producing a gross output of \$ 1,212 million and employing 148,965 people. Of these, 67 units (5 %) employed over 500 people each and together employed 44 % of the work force and produced 50 % of the total output. In contrast, 60 % of all the units employed 10 % of the manufacturing work-force and produced 8 % of the total output.

Given the extent of monopolistic production and the removal of external competitors, a high level of profits could be expected. Gross Operating Profits in manufacturing behaved rather predictably during the expansionary phase between 1968 and 1974, its share of total value-added rose from 43 % to 53 % while that of wages and salaries dropped from 57 % down to 47 %. During this period GOP increased from \$ 66 million to \$ 227 million in money terms i.e. by 244 % or by 152 % in real terms. High profits were the incentive offered by the regime to private capital (mostly foreign) to encourage new investment. Until 1975 this policy appears to have worked, for gross capital investment in the manufacturing sector was greater than any other sector, averaging \$ 58 million a year. About half of this investment went into the base metals, metal products and machinery industries. Productivity appears to have significantly improved, between 1966 and 1976, for the volume of manufacturing production increased by 109 % while the overall increase of the industrial labour force was 83 %.

The geographical distribution of the manufacturing industry is highly concentrated with Salisbury alone accounting for 48 % of gross output and Bulowayo a further 26 % in 1974. Thus, these two centres accounted for three-quarters of manufactory output and an equal proportion of employment. However, over the past decade the government has attempted to decentralize industry so that Que Que and Redcliff have become the iron and steel centres and Gwelo a shoe, textile and ferro-chrome centre.

We have not discussed the ownership structure of the manufacturing sector, this subject will be taken up in the discussion of foreign capital. (Section 2.3) At this point we might mention that foreign companies dominated Rhodesian manufacturing before 1965. During the UDI period they strengthened their hold over this sector by making substantial new investments in the base metal industries and re-investing profits made in their existing establishments.

#### 2.2.5. Construction

In line with the general business boom during the 1967-1974 period, the construction industry expanded rapidly. Gross output at current prices rose from \$ 26 million in 1965 to a high of \$ 94 million in 1975, a real rise of 278 %. Employment increased by over 100 per cent between 1966 and 1974 and represented about 7 % of the total work force. Since net output rose by 210 % during the same period there was clearly a substantial rise in output per worker.

The construction industry had been in recession since the 1950's boom and in 1966 gross output was \$ 60 million, of which 75 % was public sector and 25 % private sector. During the subsequent boom in construction the percentage of public output decreased to a low of 53 %, indicating private (white) confidence in the economy. In these years both private residential and commercial building increased rapidly, and investment increased accordingly. However, by 1974 private building began to decline and by 1976 had dropped steeply, by 33 %. By 1976 the public sector accounted for 68 % output, and the bulk of this output was in civil engineering rather than building. The state has traditionally played a dominant role in this sector, undertaking most of the infrastructure development.

#### 2.2.6. Mining

The mining industry has always been a crucial factor in the Zimbabwe economy on account of its role as a foreign exchange earner, for 90 % of the output is exported. It is also the supplier of both coal and iron for the steel industry. On the basis of the official statistics both the real value and volume of mining production doubled during the UDI period reaching a high in 1976, in 1977 a 5 % decrease in volume was recorded. In 1978 volume dropped by an additional 7 % but the value of production rose to a new high of \$ 250 million. (T - 30).

In 1976 mining provided 7 % of GDP and employed 6 % of the work force. However, if we take into account that a quarter of manufacturing production involving the processing and beneficiation of minerals (in particular chrome) should be placed under mining output, mining production would be equivalent to a much higher percentage of GDP, 14 % rather than 7 % in 1976. Output per worker also increased enormously, for whereas the volume of output increased by about 200 % between 1966 and 1976, the number of workers employed increased by only 33 %. The expansion and diversification of



the mining industry required large capital inputs, much of which came from new investments and reinvested profits of the foreign companies which own 90 % of the mining sector, about which more will be said in section 2.3. In 1968 gross operating profits were \$ 21 million or 44 % of the total value added (wages and salaries represented 56 %). By 1976 g.o.p. had risen to \$ 84 million or 56 % of the total value added (wages and salaries had declined to 44 %). In real terms gross profits had risen by 244 %. During this same period average annual investment was \$ 33 million. Clearly high profits made in a booming world metals market were being ploughed back. In 1974 only 14 mines contributed 74 % of gross production and 64 mines out of a total number of 500 operating mines, accounted for 95 % of production and 88 % of the labour force. Obviously, there were a large number of small workings, mainly in gold mining, which produced the remaining 5 % of the output.

Since 1965, there has been no official break down of the types and quantities of minerals produced. In that year the leading minerals in terms of value of output were asbestos with 27 % of total value, gold with 22 %, copper with 20 %, coal/coke with 12 % and chrome with 8 %. Together these five minerals accounted for 89 % of the total value of output.

The latest unofficial estimates of production indicate that: in 1977 between 250,000 and 300,000 tons of asbestos valued at between \$ 60-80 million were produced; in 1976 17 to 20 tons of gold valued at \$ 60 million; in 1977 40,000 tons of copper valued at \$ 30 million; in 1976 650,000 tons of chromite; and lastly 15,000 tons of nickel, a metal scarcely exploited before 1965, valued at \$ 40 million.

Zimbabwe certainly has a rich mineral base and is currently one of the worlds leading producers of asbestos and chrome, it contains large reserves of both minerals. Besides these dominant minerals the country produces high quality iron ore, emeralds, silver, tin, lithium, phosphates, limestone, silica, clay, tungsten and contains large reserves of platinum.

#### 2.2.7. Transportation

Zimbabwe has a well developed transport system to cope with its primary economic role as a land-locked export-oriented country. The dualism of the economic system is reflected in the development of all means of transport which serve the modern sector, and the lack of development of transport serving the African areas. The former areas are close to the railways and have hard surface roads. The latter are generally more distant from railway stations and sidings and have gravel roads which are often impassable in the rainy season.

Rhodesian Railways is the largest industrial organization in the country, employing over 20,000 workers. At the time of UDI, the Rhodesian, Zambian and Botswana railways were unified. In 1967 Zambian and Rhodesian railways were separated, the Botswana railways are still operated by Rhodesia,

but are expected to be separated soon. Sanctions and war have played havoc with the railway network since 1973 when Zambia closed its border with Rhodesia, followed by Mozambique in 1976. Rhodesian railways, which extend over 3,415 kilometers, had five links with the neighbouring countries: two with Mozambique, Umtali-Beira and Malvernias-Maputo; two with South Africa, one via Botswana and one direct route via Beit Bridge; and one with Zambia via the Victoria Falls bridge. (Figure 7) Until 1976 the Mozambique routes carried 60 % of Rhodesian foreign trade, since then all trade has been re-directed through South Africa, the bulk of which goes via the Beit Bridge line which was opened in September, 1974. In 1979 Zambia re-opened its rail link with Rhodesia, though freight haulage is still limited.

The effects of transport and trade disruption due to sanctions and war are clearly visible in the Rhodesian Railway accounts. Gross tonnage hauled reached its peak in 1972 and had declined by 17 % by 1978. After more or less breaking even until 1972, the railway budget reveals larger and larger deficits over the years. In the 6 years period 1973-1978 the total deficit recorded was \$ 153 million. This deficit is partly due to the rapid expansion programme, the purchase and loan from South Africa of engines, rolling stock and equipment. Some rolling stock is produced domestically. Other sources of the deficit are the loss of revenue from Zambian copper exports and high maintenance costs due to sabotage. Government policy has been to subsidize railway losses rather than raise freight costs which would affect the price of Rhodesian exports.

Rhodesian Railways also operates Road Motor Services which provides a 12,000 kilometer transport service for those areas which are not well covered by rail. Here again the bias is towards the commercialized sectors. This service carries only 5 % of the freight carried by rail.

The road system between white urban centres is well developed, but, it is not uncommon for surfaced road to turn abruptly into a dirt road where entering an African area. In 1974 the major road network comprised the following road lengths: two-lane mat 4,100 kilometers; single-lane mat 1,200 kilometers; gravel and earth 3,200 kilometers. (Figure 7) Since then the mat roads have been extended, especially near the borders of Zambia and Mozambique, as protection against land-mines. The TTLs are served by roads which do not appear on the map although they carry a significant bus passenger traffic during the dry season.

Air Rhodesia was established in 1967 as a result of the break up of Central African Airways, today it only flies domestically and to South Africa, carrying both passengers and freight. Salisbury airport is the largest, with one of the longest civil runways in the world, and is suitable for Boeing 747 and DC 10 aircrafts. Bulawayo, Victoria Falls, Chiredzi (Buffalo Range), Fort Victoria and Dariba airports can all take aircraft the size of Boeing 727s and air traffic control operates at all these scheduled airports. In addition there are a number of small airstrips scattered around the country.

### 2.2.8. Energy and Power

The main sources of energy used in the country are hydro-electricity, coal and oil. Zimbabwe belongs to the Central African Power Corporation's grid, which has a capacity of 11,000 Kwh per year. Kariba hydro-electric power station provides 95 % of the country's electricity, the remaining 5 % comes from coal-fuelled power stations. The Kariba system consists of South Bank and North Bank power stations whose full capacity is 8.500 Kwh per year. The former station is located in Zimbabwe, the latter in Zambia and a joint committee from both countries administers the grid. Between 1965 and 1977 the total electrical energy consumed trebled from 2.029 to 6.129 Kwh. The biggest electricity consumers in 1977 were the manufacturing, transport and construction sectors, they consumed about half of the total energy. The mining sector consumed about 20 %, agriculture 8 % and domestic consumers (overwhelmingly Europeans) 14 %.

Imported liquid fuels are largely petroleum products such as oil, diesel and petrol. Oil is mainly used in agriculture and manufacturing. The mining sector relies upon coal. In 1965, the country had an oil consumption of about 9,000 barrels a day and estimates indicate that today requirements are about 20,000 barrels a day. At present all the crude oil requirements come by rail from South Africa. However, an oil pipe-line from Beira in Mozambique to Umtali and a refinery near Umtali have been built. Both are out of operation on account of sanctions.

Future energy potential appears favourable. A new thermal (coal-fuelled) power station at Wankie has been built, Kariba's capacity can be extended, a new hydro-electric project on the Zambesi river seems feasible, and so too, is the production of oil from coal and shale.

To date the pattern of energy consumption has been strongly biased towards the European section of the community. Whereas practically all European homes and farms have electricity, only 48 % of African homes in Bulawayo and Salisbury have their own electricity. In the rural African areas 95 % of all households have no electricity and rely on wood as their only source of energy.

### 2.2.9. Water Resources

Zimbabwe's water resources are derived almost entirely from the annual rainfall. There is one rainy season lasting from November until March. The mean rainfall related to divisions of the country are shown in T-35. Only a third of the country receives more than 63 centimeters of rain a year. The pattern of annual rainfall is shown in Figure 8. The country's ground-water resources are not yet well documented, but it is known that most parts of the country lack major water bearing rock strata. However, small strata are not neglected and by 1974 there were about 26,000 boreholes.

The uneven rainfall in terms of space and time creates many problems for water supply. The dry season lasts seven months, hence it is extremely important to conserve water in the shorter rainy season. However, there is a high level of evaporation and run-off during the heavy storms and only about 16 % of total rainfall is saved.

Water is stored in 7,200 dams throughout the country, with a total capacity of 3,600 million cubic meters, 85 large dams contained 80 % of the total dam capacity. Thus, there are a large number of small dams. In the rural areas the distribution of both dams and boreholes are biased towards the European farming areas, with the vast majority of African obtaining their water supplies from completely unprotected surface sources and shallow wells.

It is estimated that the existing water storage capacity is only about 11 % of the optimum capacity. At present about 75 % of the country's water consumption is being used for agriculture, about 300,000 acres of land are under irrigation. Most of the irrigated land is in the dry south-eastern part of the country and has been developed by the state-owned Sabi-Limpopo Authority.

#### 2.2.10. Tourism

In 1965 the tourist industry earned \$ 12 million in foreign exchange, placing it as the fourth highest foreign currency earner after tobacco, asbestos and refined copper. Tourism reached a peak in 1972 with estimated foreign exchange earnings reaching \$ 28 million. With the resurgence of the guerrilla war came a rapid decline in tourism. By 1978 the number of tourists visiting the country had dropped by 80 %. The main tourist attractions include the Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe Ruins, game reserves (e.g. Wankie National Park), Lake Kariba, the Eastern Highlands and the Matopo Hills.

#### 2.2.11. Foreign Trade

Foreign trade has always played a big role in the Rhodesian economy. The "openness" of the economy in the pre-UDI period is indicated by the fact that between 1950 and 1965 total exports grew at an average annual rate of 8.5 % and imports 5 %. In 1965, the last year in which detailed trade figures were published, exports represented 44 % of GDP and imports 33 %. In the following years as a result of sanctions the Import Equivalent of Exports (exports adjusted by the terms of trade) as a percentage of real GDP declined on average to roughly half of its pre-UDI level. For the terms of trade moved strongly against Rhodesia, as shown in T - 31. The import coefficient was reduced by about one-third until 1974 and thereafter declined further to about one half of its 1965 level. Despite the decline in the percentages of both exports and imports to GDP, by the early 1970's both had regained their pre-UDI levels in terms of market value and volume.

The composition and direction of trade in 1965 revealed the vulnerability of the economy to sanctions. The major exports were tobacco (33 % of total), asbestos (7.6 %), meat (4.7 %), copper (4.3 %), clothing (3.1 %), chrome-ore (2.7 %) and raw sugar (2.4 %). With the exception of clothing, all other commodities were primary products i.e. agricultural or mining outputs. Rhodesia's major export markets were Britain (22 % of total), Zambia (25 %), South Africa (9 %), West Germany (9 %), Malawi (5 %) and Japan (5 %). Since Zambia was the major importer of Rhodesian manufactures and Britain of tobacco, a substantial re-orientation of trade was required if sanctions enforced by them were to be circumvented.

The re-orientation of Rhodesian exports essentially depended upon South Africa playing the role of middle-man for Rhodesian exports and imports, especially after 1976 when the ports of Mozambique were closed. The changing general direction of exports is indicated in T - 32, which are based on United Nations sources. Between 1965 and 1973 South Africa more than doubled its imports from Rhodesia, roughly absorbing the loss suffered by Rhodesia in the Zambian market. Malawi continued to import from Rhodesia on a slightly lower scale. In 1972, the U.S. Congress permitted the importation of "strategic" minerals from Rhodesia, boosting imports from \$ 14 million in 1965 to \$ 26 million in 1973. This provision was repealed in 1977. Other countries which broke sanctions by trading with Rhodesia include: Japan, Holland, Switzerland, Belgium/Luxembourg, West Germany, Portugal, Austria, Norway, Israel, Spain, Hongkong, Italy, France and Britain.

In line with the diversification of production in all sectors of the economy, we find that the former leading exports, tobacco, asbestos and clothing were replaced by maize, cotton and nickel. Tobacco exports which were halved in 1966, recovered in the 1970's and the high price of gold also boosted foreign exchange. On the import side, we find that in 1965 over 80 % of Rhodesian imports comprised intermediate capital goods, less than 20 % consumption goods. Since UDI, non-essential imports have been sharply cut, but Rhodesia is still dependent on the import of oil, motor vehicles and spare parts and a variety of capital goods. Imports from South Africa as a percentage of total imports rose from 23 % in 1965 to a high of 56 % in 1969 and thereafter declined to 37.5 % in 1973. Thus, in the immediate post-UDI years South Africa played the decisive role in sustaining the Rhodesian economy. A further source of foreign exchange coming from South Africa is derived from the repatriated earnings of the 31,000 Zimbabweans working in the mining industry today.

#### 2.2.12. Balance of Payments

Detailed information on current account transactions were available until 1972, thereafter only net figures have been published. A summary of both current and capital transactions from 1965 to 1977 is presented in T - 33. A brief analysis of the national accounts reveals that while on average merchandise trade was positive, invisible transactions

were increasingly negative and the current account deficit was made good by capital imports.

A closer examination of invisibles indicates that net services moved progressively into a deficit position, starting at -\$ 51 million in 1965 and reaching over -\$ 150 million in 1977. This substantial increase in costs was primarily due to the effect of sanctions and war, which made it more and more expensive for land-locked Rhodesia to trade with the outer-world. As the borders with Zambia and Mozambique were closed railway transit fees were lost, sanction busting transactions added additional costs to trade, as did security expenditures, South African custom duties, longer transport routes and congested ports. The decline in tourism on account of the war further depleted invisible income.

The outflow of net investment income increased over the years, from -\$ 26 million in 1965 to -\$ 43 million in 1977. Rhodesia retaliated for financial sanctions by officially blocking the payment of foreign investment income to all countries other than South Africa. Hence, the figure for net investment outflow mainly refers to payments made to South African investors. British and other foreign investors and creditors have received no payments of dividends, principal or interest since 1965. Money accruing to them was instead paid into blocked accounts. This means that when sanctions are lifted a large foreign debt, upward of \$ 500 million, will fall due. Furthermore, the extent to which the Salisbury government has secretly borrowed abroad and the future status of such loans remain to be seen.

Net capital inflow amounted to about \$ 340 million up to 1977. It is generally thought that the bulk of this capital was obtained from South Africa.

### 2.2.13. Private Banking and Finance

Financial sanctions led to the expulsion of Colonial Zimbabwe from the Sterling area, the freezing of its London held assets, and to the severance of formal ties between British banking subsidiaries and their parent companies. In response to these measures, in 1967 the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia undertook to maintain liquidity by establishing a "closed banking system". It legislated that all financial institutions were required to maintain in the country assets equal to or greater than total public liabilities plus statutory capital and reserves.

The expansion of banking since UDI has proceeded with the same rapidity as the growth of the economy. Commercial bank liabilities (which closely reflect assets) have grown by more than five-fold since 1965. The fastest growing component has been "time and saving deposits" which grew from \$ 60 million in 1965 to an estimated \$ 354 million in 1978. An important reason for their growth is that this form of investment is one of the few available to emigrants. Four large foreign banks control the private banking and finance sector. Foreign banking subsidiaries were obliged to serve the "national" interest and suddenly developed a high degree of expertise in all aspects of financing foreign trade. These skills had hitherto been furnished almost exclusively by the

London offices. How these skills were acquired and the degree to which British parent companies complied with financial sanctions is a closely guarded secret.

These banks have over 120 branches which basically serve the European population, which is the group with the greatest "propensity to save and invest". An estimation of each bank's market share based on deposits revealed that in 1974, Standard had 41 %, Barclays 33 %, Rhobank 18 %, and Grindlays 8 %. Since UDI, the Rhodesian Banking Corporation (Rhobank) grew most rapidly, taking 10 % of the top two's market share. This bank is a subsidiary of the Nedbank of South Africa, though 30 % of its shares are held by the Rhodesian public. Its growth is no doubt attributable to the fact that South Africa did not apply sanctions, and is in line with the general growth of South African interests in Rhodesia during this period.

The three largest banks also own a wide variety of financial institutions including merchant banks, finance houses and discount houses. Although non-financial companies appear to have financed the bulk of their new investments from retained profits and personal savings (i.e. via Stock Exchange flotation), in 1973 it was reported that they paid 80 % of their interest, 12 % of their dividends and 75 % of their rent to banking and financial institutions.

In addition, there are building societies, insurance companies and pension funds, as well as a number of State owned institutions, such as the Post Office Savings Bank, the Agricultural Finance Corporation and an Export Credit Insurance Corporation which facilitates foreign trade. All told, Zimbabwe has a fairly sophisticated financial structure which has managed to withstand the strains of sanctions and facilitate the mobilization of savings into a variety of productive capital investments. This financial structure is rooted in a society with extreme inequalities of wealth, its relevance in an independent Zimbabwe remains to be seen.

#### 2.2.14. Central Government: Finance and Expenditure

It is important to recognize that the Zimbabwean economy is a mixed one with a growing tendency towards greater state intervention, partly due to the abnormal condition of sanctions. The central government's expenditure has been approximately 20 % of GDP over the past decade. The budget is financed predominantly by company and income taxes (approximately 50 %) and indirect taxes (approximately 30 %). In recent years sales tax has increased from 14 % in 1973 to 20 % in 1977, indicating a growing burden of taxation on the lower income groups. There has been a massive increase in official defence and defence-related expenditures since the resurgence of the guerrilla war at the end of 1972 ( T - 34). Military expenditure was nearly 50 % of total central government expenditure in 1978. However, reports indicate that a large percentage, between 50 % and 100 %, of Rhodesia's annual military budget is paid in cash or kind by South Africa.

As a result of the increase in public expenditure the State's share of gross domestic fixed investment and employment has risen. However, these are exceptional times and much of the new investment is war-related.

### 2.3. FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN ZIMBABWE

The development of the Zimbabwean economy was intimately tied to the rate and level of foreign investment. When UDI was declared in 1965 the colony's economy was to a large extent an appendage of metropolitan Britain. It is not surprising, therefore, to discover that the metropolitan oriented economic interest groups in Zimbabwe counseled against and voted almost unanimously against UDI. In late 1964 the Rhodesian Institute of Directors, the body representing the major business interest in the country warned of the damage impending sanctions might do to the economy. In 1965, a poll of members of the Association of Rhodesian Industries showed only 19 out of 294 in support of UDI (three years later this association was still in the forefront of those calling for a settlement). However, once sanctions were enforced and the hundreds of foreign companies operating in Zimbabwe were officially "cut off" from their metropolitan trade and financial ties, we find that "business as usual" became the order of the day.

After declaring UDI the Rhodesian government acted to prevent the sudden outflow of capital by placing restrictions on the transfer of funds abroad and passed legislation to enable foreign companies to be brought under government control if they failed to act in the interests of the nation. Given that 75 % of the executives employed in foreign branches were Rhodesian whites, in practice we find that the foreign companies were "nationalized". They could not repatriate profits and dividends declared were to be paid into blocked accounts. South African companies were excluded from these restrictions. Under these conditions it could only be expected that South African capital would take advantage of its privileged position.

On the basis of a study carried out in 1963, it was estimated that foreign companies accounted for about 68 % or 2/3rds of the total private company income, and that in the same year total foreign liabilities were roughly \$ 1 billion. Of this amount, about \$ 300 million was public external debt and \$ 700 million private liabilities owed mainly to Britain (\$ 400-500 million), South Africa (\$ 200 million) and the USA (\$ 40 million). After a decade of partially operative sanctions, substantial economic expansion and high profits, it was estimated that foreign interests had maintained their overall dominance of the Rhodesian economy and that the total foreign liabilities had doubled by 1976, reaching over \$ 2 billion. The distribution of these assets in Zimbabwe had materially altered, with South Africa becoming an equal partner with Britain. Estimates show that Zimbabwe's foreign



liabilities are made up of \$ 400 m. in public debt, \$ 1.6 billion shared between Britain and South Africa and about \$ 200 million to other countries (of which the USA represents \$ 130 million). Clearly, one of the salient features of the Rhodesian economy is its extreme historical dependence on foreign capital, technology and management. In almost every sector of the economy large foreign companies dominate and in many cases hold monopoly positions. It should not be overlooked that domestic or settler capital, which controls roughly one third of the private sector, and state capital, which has expanded rapidly during the UDI period, are also significant factors.

It was in the manufacturing sector that foreign capital held its highest stake, here 75 % of the pre-UDI profits accrued to it. British interests represented 50 % of the total, and South African interests 21 %. Foreign companies completely controlled or dominated the following industries: beverages, tobacco processing, chemicals and chemical products, basic metals and metal products, building and construction. Domestic interests shared control with foreign interests in the spinning, weaving and clothing industries, non-metallic mineral products, machinery, transport equipment, paper pulp and printing, and food manufacture. The existence of a Rhodesian heavy engineering company (Morewear) seems to be an exception to the pattern of foreign or state control over heavy industry. It was only in the wood and furniture industry that domestic capital held complete control.

During the phase of industrial expansion since UDI, it appears that the large foreign companies have maintained their grip on Zimbabwean manufacturing, though a number of small domestic companies have arisen. Of particular significance has been foreign expansion in the base metals (ferrochrome), non-metallic mineral products, spinning and weaving industries. New industries have been established to produce nitrogen fertilizer, phosphates, sulphuric acid, aluminum, glass and cement. The Rhodesian iron and steel industry (RISCO), which is partly owned by British and South African interests along with the State, has expanded rapidly. The British and US (motor assembly plants) have been partly taken over by Japanese, French and Italian companies. Oil has continued to be supplied to this present day by British, French and Dutch companies via South Africa.

South African companies have certainly gained in market share. No less than five of Zimbabwe's top ten industrial companies are either controlled by or associated with South African companies (Rhodesian Breweries, Hippo Valley, Premier Portland Cement, Plate Glass and BAT). However, of the 150 British companies operating in Zimbabwe, 119 of them also have South African subsidiaries. Therefore in these times of secrecy it is impossible to accurately determine the real holding of each country.

In the pre-UDI mining sector, foreign capital held control in all spheres with exception of gold mining. Since then a major expansion of these interests has taken place with more than \$ 200 million in new investments coming from retained profits and from the South African industrial and mining giant, the Anglo-American company. The latter controls

the largest copper company, MTD Mangula, the Wankie Collieries and the nickel industry. British interests dominate asbestos through Turner & Newall; Rio Tinto Zinc and Lonrho are important in copper and nickel, and some gold mining. U.S. interests are mainly in chrome mining and have also expanded. There are many cross holdings between British and South African companies, though South African capital has the largest share of the Zimbabwean mining industry.

In commercial agriculture, South African interests dominated the largest and most profitable production units, though domestic farmers are more numerous. In 1963 foreign companies earned 75 % of the gross company profits, and of this South African companies accounted for 88 %. These large companies have almost total control over sugar production and the big citrus estates. They also have major interests in tea, foresting, cattle ranching and maize production.

The Banking and Finance sector has traditionally been controlled by British firms, but Rhobank, a South African subsidiary has made spectacular advances since UDI. South African super-markets have in recent years set-up in Zimbabwe, infiltrating the retail trade sector which was formerly dominated by local capital. Wholesale trade is shared between local and foreign interest.

Colonial Zimbabwe is a country which has been exceptionally dependent on foreign capital. The interests of the major foreign companies do not appear to have diminished during the period of international sanctions. High profits were made during the expansionary phase and enormous sums have been paid into blocked accounts, estimated at over \$ 500 million. South Africa has vastly increased its stake in Zimbabwe and it is an open secret that it supplies and finances the bulk of Rhodesia's military needs. What remains a secret, however, is the extent to which loans have been received from South Africa and abroad.

### 3. TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN THE UDI PERIOD

#### Introduction

Here we will study the distribution of incomes and social services - health and education - both within and between the European and African communities. The huge social and economic gap between whites and blacks in Zimbabwe tends to obscure the existence of classes within the African community. Furthermore, the absence of a statistical breakdown of African skill and income differentials makes it difficult to construct an accurate picture of the classes and strata within African society.

#### 3.1. DISTRIBUTION OF THE NATIONAL INCOME IN 1974

National Income in the closing phase of colonialism in Zimbabwe was to a striking degree unequally divided between Europeans, Asians and Coloureds on the one hand and Africans, whether town or country dwellers, on the other hand. Rural income was extremely unequally divided between the settlers and the Africans and although there were differences of income within the rural African community, these were less sharply defined. In the urban areas differences in income between Europeans and Africans were also extreme. Here too, there were signs of income stratification within the African community.

An analyst of the distribution of income between racial groups from 1946 to 1968, came to the conclusion that: " the wealthiest 4-6 % of the population of Rhodesia have received between 50 to 60 % of total personal income...if this is compared with what similar evidence is available for other countries, then personal income seems to be distributed more unequally at least at the top end of the distribution than in any other country for which data is available".

T - 36 seems to uphold these findings, for Europeans (including Asians and Coloureds) who represented only 5 % of the population received 63 % of the income. Africans being 95 % of the population received only 37 % of the income. The enormity of the racial income gap is brought out further when we compare income per capita statistics, for Europeans income per head was \$ 3,062 while that of Africans was \$ 93 i.e. the former earned an average 33 times more than the latter. However, there is a sizeable gap between African rural and urban incomes too. 83 % of the African population lived in rural areas, 63 % in the TTLs and 20 % in the European farming areas. The imputed per capita income of the former group was extremely low, amounting to only one-tenth of urban per capita incomes. The incomes of African workers on European farms were only slightly better than other rural Africans.

Overall, African rural income in Zimbabwe represented a lower proportion of total income than for virtually any other African country. This was the situation in 1974 after an economic boom. Since then the GDP has declined by 15 % and the rural areas have been totally disrupted by the war. There is little doubt that the rural Africans have been impoverished in recent years.

The migrant labour system has historically linked the "high" urban African wage sector to the low income subsistence sector. The urban African workforce is predominantly made up of men whose families have remained in the rural areas. It has been estimated that between 50 and 60 % of all black households were wholly or partly dependent on wage income. (See Appendix - 1)

T - 37 shows the distribution of salaries and wages between and within racial groups in 1975, the high point of total employment. Before making comparisons it should be noted that whereas salaries and wages account for more than 90 % of the incomes of African employees, they represent only 60 % of white incomes, the additional income being mainly made up by profits from enterprises. It was in the European farming sector that the ratio of white to black wages was largest, 27:1. In the manufacturing sector the ratio was 8:1 and in mining 14:1. The overall urban income wage differential (excluding the agriculture and domestic service sectors which account for over 50 % of total African employment) was 7:1.

Income distribution within the European community was marked by a high degree of inequality at the top and bottom. At the top, there was a white elite with incomes far in excess of the average white salary. The Asians and Coloureds had lower incomes than whites.

### 3.2. SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN COMMUNITIES

The whites occupied the vast majority of the skilled jobs in the modern economy. The 1969 census gives the most comprehensive occupational breakdown of the 110,000 classified white jobs (including 7 % Asians and Coloureds): 33 % were Clerical and Productive workers; 22 % Production, Transport and Equipment workers; 16 % Professional, Technical and related staff; 11 % Sales workers; 7 % Agricultural, Fisheries and Forestry workers; 5 % Administrative and Managerial staff and 4 % Service workers. In recent years there has been a substantial emigration of whites, particularly in the professional categories. The impact of emigration on future skilled worker requirements will be discussed in sections 6.4 and 6.5.

An accurate assessment of the urban African class structure is not possible as no breakdown of skills and income differentials has been published. Judging from the wage and salary

statistics shown for 1975 in T - 37, we can discern that in some sectors average wages were appreciably higher than the mean wage. This was true of Education, Health, Finance and Insurance, Transport and Communication. However, these averages can be misleading, for in a table showing the Cash Wage Distribution of Permanent African Workers by sector of employment, we find that in each sector only a minority of the employees were "high" income recipients. (T - 38) If we take \$ 110 per month as the indicator of a wage-elite, then roughly 23,000 or 5 % of the total urban Africans employed, (excluding domestic employees) belong to this income bracket.

The distinction between white collar workers and blue collar workers certainly holds for Africans and obviously the overwhelming majority of Africans belong to the labouring class. It is interesting to observe that the wages of the average school teacher, 14,000 of whom are trained, are only marginally higher than that of a worker in manufacturing. In addition to the teachers, other groups who belong to white collar category are those employed in clerical work, those in the lower-middle ranks of the Civil Service (3,000) and those who have in recent years been "upgraded" within the private sector as part of the "Africanization" program of the major companies.

There are a large number of relatively well educated Zimbabweans, many of whom are not formerly employed. Since 1969, 45,000 students reached "O" levels and there were 3,000 "A" level and university graduates, as well as 5,000 graduates outside the country. Although many Africans have the necessary qualifications to become apprentices in various trades they have been historically discriminated against. Only in recent years has the number of Africans admitted to apprenticeships been increased from 2 % to 14 % of the total trainees. Most of the 413 Africans apprentices registered in 1975 were in the building and mechanical industries.

So far, only a handful of Africans have reached the income level of the white elite, these being the few who are in top government posts and independent professionals, such as doctors and lawyers. In 1969, it was estimated that 19,000 Africans were self-employed, of these 2,000 were classified as Professional and Administrative, 9,000 were productive workers and Transport Equipment Operators. Furthermore, there were 17,000 employees of black businessmen. Taking these figures together it appears that most black businesses employed very few workers and were in fact "one man" workshops. Though, a small black business elite exists within the Transport and Commercial sectors.

Within the agricultural sector, the 9,000 master farmers who owned land in the African Purchase Areas and employed 15,000 workers, certainly formed an elite when compared to the peasants in the Tribal Trust Lands. But, not all these privileged farmers were high income earners and there are indications that substantial differences in wealth exist within the peasantry. Some peasants own large herds of cattle and possess greater and better quality lands, while the number of landless young men is growing rapidly.

### 3.3. HEALTH SERVICES

The dualistic character of Zimbabwean society is reflected in the health and well being of the population. In general, the white population enjoys the highest standard of health and medical care, whether urban or rural, and has a life-expectancy of 70 years for men and 74 for women. The health of the African population varies significantly between urban and rural regions, and the life expectancy for Africans is estimated to be 50 years. Undoubtedly the level of health is directly related to the standard of living or income level. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that the health of the white population is similar to that of the industrialized countries, while that of Africans is similar to that of other underdeveloped countries or nineteenth century England.

#### 3.3.1 Present Health Facilities

As in many colonies health service in Rhodesia started as a network of hospitals serving the European settlers concentrated in urban areas. The African population's health was only treated in so far as it presented a danger to the Europeans or it enhanced the fitness of the labour force, especially in mining. The urban bias has been maintained over the years, while rural health services have been established throughout the country, mainly by Christian missions. In general the health care services were good by standards in many other parts of the African continent.

At present there are five different providers of health services in the country. These are the central government through the Ministry of Health; voluntary associations which consist primarily of Christian church organizations; local authorities; industrial medical services and finally the private sector which includes private practitioners providing Western or traditional medical care. A fee-for-service principle operates i.e. payment is required for all treatment. However, in practice people are not turned away from any facility because they cannot pay.

The Ministry of Health plays the major role in providing health services to the urban areas where the white population is concentrated, and its services are largely curative. In 1977-1978 the Health Budget of \$ 40 million represented 1.8 % of the GDP. This expenditure was about half of the annual national health expenditure, the other half came from non-governmental sources.

The majority of the country's 225 hospitals and clinics are administered by either the Ministry of Health or the Christian missions. The latter play a critically important role in providing health services to the rural population. In 1977, of the 14,000 general hospital beds in the country the missions were responsible for 30 % of the total and two-thirds of all rural hospital beds. The central government provided only a small proportion of the financial needs of the mission hospitals.

Overall, there are on average two general hospital beds for every 1,000 people. The racial breakdown of these beds gives one bed for every 219 Europeans and one bed for every 525 Africans. In general, each racial groups has its own hospitals and clinics. Some specialist services in the central hospitals may be used by all races. In 1976, the government provided one hospital bed for every 225 Europeans and one for every 1,261 Africans. In Salisbury the expenditure per patient in government hospitals is over twice as much for Europeans as it is for Africans. The government funds four central hospitals, two each in Salisbury and Bulwayo; 9 general hospitals, all situated in the major towns with separate facilities for Europeans and Africans; and over 60 rural hospitals and health centres. The mission facilities consist of 82 hospitals and clinics, almost all of which are rurally based. However, in recent years many mission hospitals have been closed down or offer reduced services as a result of the war. In addition, there were 10 small hospitals and 18 clinics run by industry, particularly the mining industry and an important research centre, the Blair Research Laboratory.

A further indication of the racial discrimination in medical services is provided by the doctor/patient ratio for the different racial groups. On average, there was one doctor for every 830 Europeans whereas it is estimated that there was only one doctor for 100,000 Africans in the rural areas. A large number of rural and urban Africans consult the traditional healer either when they first become ill, or when they see that their first choice, Western medicine, is not curing them. The distribution of health personnel other than doctors reflects the same urban bias. Of the Africans employed in the health service, 64 % work in urban areas and 46 % work in Salisbury of Bulwayo.

### 3.3.2 Medical Personnel

In 1977, the health service employed 14,500 people. The majority, 70 % of the employees, are Africans. They tend to fill the lowest paid and least skilled jobs, but, Africans also formed a substantial proportion of the skilled workers.

There is no official breakdown of medical skills by race. It is estimated that of the 855 doctors registered in 1977 (less today on account of emigration), 58 were Africans, most of whom were in government service. There were 135 dentists, only one of whom was an African. Africans represented more than half of the nearly 5,000 registered nurses.

As far as medical training is concerned, the University of Salisbury has a small medical school which has produced 293 graduates since 1963: 64 African, 184 European and 45 Asian and Coloured. Annual graduation is now about 45 doctors. Nurses are also trained in the country, though many have received their education in Britain. There is no dental, pharmacy or veterinary schools in the country and dependency on South Africa for a wide variety of medical needs appears to be great.

### 3.3.3 The Social Pattern of Death and Disease

Data on infant mortality are especially important when assessing the standard of health of communities, since they refer to the age-group most vulnerable to health hazards. While an accurate infant mortality rate (IMR = the number of deaths per 1,000 live births in the first year of life) for the whole population of Zimbabwe is not available, local estimates indicate wide regional variations.

The IMR for Europeans in 1976 was 16.2. Estimates for Africans varied from 21 in Salisbury to 300 in a rural district. Using figures recorded in urban areas close to Salisbury, Health Service authorities have asserted that African IMR's are under 30 per 1,000 live births in urban areas and perhaps 50 per 1,000 amongst the rural population. However, other researches place the rural IMR at between 120-220 and argue that the urban rate is understated, for it ignores the massive inflows of "illegal" migrants to the urban areas in recent years.

The pattern of disease in Zimbabwe is racially distinguishable. The European population with its high standard of living and relative longevity suffers mainly from disease of the heart, cerebrovascular disease and various types of cancer. The African population with its poor standard of living and unhealthy living conditions suffers mostly from: pneumonia, measles, malnutrition, meningitis, gastro-enteritis, nutritional deficiencies, tuberculosis and tetanus.

At present the African population is growing at the rapid rate of 3.5 % per year and it can be expected to double within 20 years. Over 50 % of the African population is under 15 years of age and over 20 % under 5. This population structure is typical of the poor masses in underdeveloped countries and it is generally accepted by the experts that population control or family planning will have little impact on slowing the growth in population and breaking the vicious circle of poverty and high birth rates. It is understood today that high birth rates are the logical response of poor peasants to high infant mortality rates and low real income, for children are considered a form of insurance against adversity. Consequently, it is generally thought that the reduction of infant and child mortality is virtually a precondition for significant reductions in the birth rate.

African children, who mainly live in the overcrowded and unsanitary reserves, are most susceptible to disease, especially if undernourished. Hence, in Zimbabwe childrens' diseases predominate and over half of all deaths are accounted for by under 5 year-olds. The survivors are often in a bad state of health. A study carried out in 1967 in an African rural school showed that seven out of ten pupils were suffering from a chronic illness of some kind: schistosomiasis or bilharzia, malaria, tape-worm, parasites and malnutrition .



Given that the bulk of the diseases suffered by Africans in general and children in particular are directly attributable to the condition of poverty in which the great majority live, there seems to be only one way out of the vicious circle, namely to significantly raise the standard of living of the rural masses.

## 3.4

EDUCATION

As in all spheres of Rhodesian society the education system vividly reflects the racial hierarchy. In general, African children received little or no education at a relatively high cost to their families and European children received an education equal to that offered in the colonial motherland, Britain. Africans were trained to serve as cheap labour in the mines, factories and homes of their white masters, while Europeans were taught to fulfill their "natural" destiny as controllers of all the skilled functions in society. Where locally produced white skills were insufficient, immigrants were expected to fill the gap rather than blackstrainedfor skilled jobs. No Africans were allowed into the Civil Service until 1961 and no African apprentices were trained until 1962. This meant that religion and teaching were the two main avenues of social advancement. However, the sheer numbers of blacks and a degree of liberality among the whites, especially the missionaries and foreign governments who supplied scholarships, meant that the absolute division between black and white education was untenable. Consequently a number of African students (very small compared to the total youth) did manage to obtain a decent education and on independence Zimbabwe will in fact have more highly qualified and semi-educated Africans than most other newly independent African countries.

In addition to the numerous inequalities between African and European education discussed below, it is important to point out that education is compulsory for white children between the ages of 5 and 15, and costs their parents a tiny fraction of their incomes. In contrast African schooling is non-compulsory, starts at 7 years of age and yearly school fees amount to up to 13 weeks wages. There is little wonder therefore, that more than half of the school age Africans are not in school and those in secondary schools tended to come from the more prosperous urban families.

The latest data for African school attendances by age group were published in the 1969 census and illustrate both the percentage of each sex attending school and alternatively the large percentage of African children who never attended school (T - 39). Between 1969 and 1976 there was a 22 % increase in the number of pupils enrolled in schools, i.e. 160,000 additional pupils, while it is estimated that in the same period the number of Africans between the ages of 6 and 16 increased by 1.65 million. So, it appears that in recent years the absolute number of children not attending school has increased. This tendency has been exacerbated in recent years by the closing down of many schools in the rural areas on account of the war.

The consequences of decades of discriminatory educational policy can be summed up in evidence on school standards reached by the African population at large. Thus, in 1969 the census reported that 24 % of men between 17 and 29 years of age had had no schooling, this proportion rising to 33 % and 53 % for men aged 30 to 39, and 40 years and over, respectively. Corresponding proportions for women were 33 %, 49 % and 70 %. In total 41 % of adults 16 years and over had never attended school. The African adult literacy rate was estimated to be 40 % in the vernaculars and 20 % in English.

### 3.4.1. Primary and Secondary Education

At present the lower education system is divided into two racially segregated components, one for Africans and one for Europeans, Asians and Coloureds. For the most part the latter three racial groups also have segregated schools. There were two major levels of education, "primary" with grades one to seven and "secondary" with five additional "standards". The majority of all primary and secondary schools for Africans were run by missionaries or other local organizations. Most of these received some financial aid from the State, but also depended on raising funds from fees and other sources. European schools were predominantly State run and financed.

The budget account reveals the racially unequal expenditure on education. The share of education expenditure in the Gross National Product was 3.7 % (2 % for Africans). This was lower than in other African countries (Ghana 4.7 %, Kenya, Tanzania 4.3 % and Zambia 5.6 %), however, it excludes missionary and other expenditure on education, which mostly goes to Africans. In 1976 the state spent \$ 41 million on African education, i.e. \$ 46 per enrolled pupil and \$ 31 million on European education i.e. \$ 530 per enrolled pupil. Thus, the ratio of State expenditure per pupil was approximately 12:1 in favour of the Europeans.

The effect of the government's financial policy on education is best shown in the following diagrammatic presentation of the number of black and white children by school grade in 1976. (Figure 9). Enrollment for Africans in Grade 1 is 34 times greater than Europeans. Yet, by Form IV the numbers are almost equal and in the upper two forms, which lead to university education, the number of European students (5,835) was almost seven-times greater than the number of Africans (890). From the first grade to the fourth form European enrollment is constant, reflecting the compulsory education, whereas only 4 % of the African school starters reached form four. And it should be remembered that less than 60 % of African children go to school in the first place.

In the primary schools Africans receive inferior education from less qualified teachers in more over-crowded classes. The teacher-pupil ratio was 1:39 for Africans and 1:28 for Europeans in 1975. In the secondary schools the curriculum

was in the main similar for all races and academically oriented, though, 20 % of African pupils attended two year vocational schools. Here too, Africans pupils had inferior teachers and a higher teacher-pupil ratio than the Europeans.

### 3.4.2. Vocational and Higher Education

For secondary school-leavers the possibility of further education is limited and therefore, highly competitive for the Africans. Over the years opportunities have arisen for some Africans to get scholarships in other countries and it is estimated that 5,000 university educated Zimbabweans are currently out of the country.

The racially integrated University of Rhodesia plays a leading role in the domestic provision of professional skills. Its total enrollment in 1977 was 1,600 full-time students and 500 part-timers, of which Africans represented more than half of the first category and a third of the second. Since UDI, full-time enrollment has more than doubled and the number of African students has risen five-fold, reflecting a shift in government policy intended to create an educated African elite. The university offers only under-graduate degrees in the humanities, education, natural and social sciences, and has a small medical school. Many whites go to universities in South Africa or Britain.

There are a number of vocational schools, the largest of which are the Salisbury and Bulawayo Polytechnics which give engineering, commercial and technical training. In 1977, there were nearly 4,000 students of which one third were Africans. In addition, there were 3-year teachers training courses in which 2,500 blacks were enrolled, high level nursing courses with about 100 blacks accepted annually and a number of segregated agricultural colleges with an enrollment of a few hundred students of both races.

## 4. THE AFRICAN NATIONALIST LIBERATION STRUGGLE \*

### Introduction

For the past two decades Rhodesian political life has been dominated by the challenge posed to settler rule by the emergence of an indigenous African nationalist movement calling for independence on the basis of majority rule and by the settler demands for independence from Britain - independence under white minority government. These demands are obviously incompatible. One calls for a complete restructuring of Rhodesian politics, the other looks towards establishing conditions that will guarantee the permanence of the system constructed after 1890.

\* This chapter could be profitably read in conjunction with the history section in Appendix - 2 -.

In this section we will outline the response of the African nationalists to settler and imperialist domination. In addition, some of the social effects of the war will be highlighted and the current political situation will be briefly analysed.

#### 4.1 AFRICAN NATIONALISM: FROM REFORMISM TO REVOLUTION

Modern African nationalism was slow to rise in Rhodesia, its birthdate is generally regarded as 1956, the year the Youth League was established. Since then we can identify roughly two phases in the struggle for African national liberation in Zimbabwe: firstly, the formation and suppression of mass reformist parties 1960-1964; secondly, a period of imprisoned leadership and reconsideration of political strategy leading to a radical transformation of the goals of the struggle and reliance upon armed struggle as the principal means removing the intransigent settler regime: 1966-1979.

The fortunes of the national liberation struggle in Zimbabwe were decisively affected by the collapse of Portugal's colonial empire in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau. From April 1974 the balance of power shifted rapidly towards the Zimbabwean nationalists and by 1979 the Smith regime, which had declared UDI in 1965 to avoid eventual African majority rule, had partially capitulated. The war could no longer be won, 95 % of the country was under martial law, the cities were gradually being surrounded, and the sanctioned economy was steadily declining. Faced with ever-growing pressure, Smith engineered an eleventh hour "settlement" with a few of his former enemies who had themselves been cast aside by the African nationalist forces in the course of the struggle. Today, the struggle continues to remove the white power behind the black mask and to create the conditions for a revolutionary re-organization of the Zimbabwean society.

##### 4.1.1. Phase one: Reformist Nationalism: 1956-1964

In the early years of colonization African resistance was fierce, in 1896-97 both the Ndebele and Shona rose in rebellion. In the course of this "War of Resistance" ("Chimurenga") they were ruthlessly suppressed by superior British arms. The effectiveness of British colonial rule thereafter, was reflected in its ability to induce in the Africans a belief in the invincibility of the British and the white man in general. Until the middle of the 1950's African political organizations had accepted the white rule as inevitable and sought to improve the African social and economic position within the existing colonialist social structure. The African National Congress of Southern Rhodesia, founded in the early 1930's, was such a body of constitutionalist African protest. The formation of the Youth League in 1956 led to the rejuvenation of the old African National Congress in 1957 under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo, James Chikerema and George Nyandoro. The new

African National Congress (ANC) adopted a drastically different political programme which contained the demand for "One Man, One vote" or African majority rule.

The radicalism and success of the ANC in mobilizing blacks across tribal lines in all parts of the country was correctly perceived by the white regime as a threat to its interests, and so, in 1959 the government banned the party and detained about 500 leading members. This was the first major confrontation of white Rhodesian nationalism with black Zimbabwean nationalism and a pattern of conflict rather than conciliation soon emerged.

Following the banning of the ANC, it had survived from September 1957 to February 1959, the National Democratic Party was formed in January 1960 and banned in December 1961. Its successor, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) survived from December 1961 to September 1962. After the ZAPU ban, the nationalist movement split, in mid-1963, ZAPU was reconstituted as the Peoples Caretaker Council and a new party, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was formed. Both parties operated from August 1963 to August 1964, when they too were banned and their leaders imprisoned.

Like nationalist movements throughout the continent, in the early years Zimbabwean nationalists engaged in rural and urban protest meetings, rallies and strikes. They also attempted to win international support for their anti-colonial struggle and in particular, prevailed upon the British government, the legally responsible colonial power for Rhodesia, to facilitate a rapid transition to African majority rule. However, in the case of Rhodesia the settlers controlled the political system and this control was accepted by Britain. The British government was unwilling to intervene as the Rhodesian government passed the laws and took the steps necessary to destroy the nationalist movement. All that the settlers would concede to the Africans was the right to participate nominally within political structures they completely dominated.

As we shall see, it took the African nationalists a while before they recognized the fact that Rhodesia did not fit the typical decolonization pattern and that the only route to majority rule lay in armed confrontation with the settler regime and its "ally" Britain. Although the British role in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict was not simply one of open support for the settler regime, the evidence clearly points to the fact that all British attempts to solve the constitutional problem essentially implied the entrenchment of white minority rule in the foreseeable future.

#### 4.1.2. Phase two: Revolutionary Nationalism: 1965-1979

The defeat of the constitutionalist struggle of the nationalist movements led to a gradual re-assessment of the enemy and the strategy to adopt in order to defeat it. It also led to the

radicalization of the nationalist leaders social goals for an independent Zimbabwe. The two significant changes in this regard were the shift from non-violent struggle to armed struggle/guerrilla warfare and from social reformist to socialist revolutionary aims.

Although sporadic guerrilla attacks were made on settler outposts during the late 1960's, it was not until 1972 that a sustained guerrilla campaign got underway in Zimbabwe. After the arrest or exile of the nationalist in 1964 the Rhodesian government enjoyed a period of relative peace and prosperity until the Pearce Commission in 1972.

The British had failed to reach agreement with the Rhodesian government in 1966 and 1968, but in 1971 agreement was reached whereby white rule was guaranteed until 2025 on the condition that this plan was acceptable " to the African people as a whole". In January, 1972 a commission led by Lord Pearce arrived in Rhodesia to test the acceptability of the proposals. In order to mobilize mass opinion against the settlement the banned leaders of ZANU and ZAPU sent representatives to Bishop Abel Muzorewa, a non-political figure who they thought would be a suitable candidate for this purpose. Muzorewa took up the challenge and succeeded in mobilizing a massive "no" vote to the British/Rhodesian constitutional proposals despite Smith's repressive measures, which led to the shooting of 14 Africans and detention of 300 activists.

The organization he formed for this purpose was known as African National Council and was intended to come only temporarily into existence, so that it would not rival the two banned nationalists parties. However, a third force had been created and Muzorewa was unwilling to leave the political stage. Eight years later, in April 1979 he became the Prime Minister of "Zimbabwe/Rhodesia" as a result of a deal made with the Smith regime known as the "Internal Settlement".

Both ZAPU and ZANU pursued the politics of liberation through the 1970's and remained committed to guerrilla warfare. The success of the guerrilla war gradually eroded the Smith regime's power and brought about the internationalization of the efforts to achieve a settlement in Zimbabwe. After several failed attempts to unify the leading political parties, ZANU and ZAPU, in October 1976 the two entered into a tactical alliance known as the Patriotic Front. The Front remains opposed to the Muzorewa/Smith settlement and continues to fight to this day. A brief profile of each party and an assessment of the Patriotic Front are given below.

Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) was founded in December 1961 and was the direct successor to the banned National Democratic Party. As the only national party in existence in the early 1960's it attracted membership and support from Zimbabweans of every tribe, region and class. However, ZAPU's

monopoly of nationalist politics was short lived, for a major split in the party's executive occurred and in August 1963 a rival party ZANU was formed. The generally accepted explanation for this split is that it was a result of dissatisfaction with Joshua Nkomo's leadership which had laid emphasis on unsuccessful international lobbying rather than domestic politics. Despite its banning, ZAPU continued to exist internally as the People's Caretaker Council until 1964 when it was outlawed and Nkomo detained.

During the latter half of the 1960's ZAPU functioned as an exile movement with its base in Lusaka, Zambia under the leadership of James Chikerema, who became acting President after Nkomo's detention. In 1967 ZAPU undertook a significant but disastrous guerrilla operation into Zimbabwe in combination with the African National Congress of South Africa. In the early 1970's the party executive suffered another split, this time on account of tribal rivalries between Shona and Ndebele members.

At the end of 1974 Nkomo was released from prison and once again led ZAPU, which had by then been reduced from a broad nationalist movement into a predominantly (though not exclusively) Ndebele - Kalanga based party. The Ndebele represent roughly 17 % of the population, the Kalanga 3 %, together they occupy the western province - Matabeleland.

Joshua Nkomo, the veteran leader of ZAPU, was born in June, 1917 in Matabeleland. Although he is generally regarded as being Ndebele, he is in fact Kalanga, a Shona-clan deriving from the Karanga. He has been in the forefront of nationalist politics since the early 1950's and is a charismatic figure, reputed to be free from "tribal" prejudice and appearing to inspire strong loyalty in his followers. Nkomo is popular both with the Soviet Union and the multinational corporations, while his speeches reveal commitment to African socialism. He is a strong contender for the leadership of a future independent Zimbabwe and has in recent years unsuccessfully attempted to achieve power by negotiating a settlement directly with Smith assisted by Dr. Kaunda of Zambia and the Nigerians. ZAPU is reported to have 2,000-3,000 guerrillas fighting in Zimbabwe and a large reserve of well-trained and well-armed soldiers stationed in Zambia.

Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was formed in August 1963 after an attempt to depose Nkomo from the leadership of ZAPU had failed. The first President of ZANU was the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe was Secretary General and Herbert Chitepo was National Chairman. From the outset ZANU's policy statements were militant and aimed at direct confrontation with the enemy defined as "Britain and her settler kith and kin in the country". In 1964, Sithole and Mugabe were detained by the Smith regime and Chitepo became the main organizer of the armed struggle from Zambia.

Starting in 1966 with the Battle of Sinoia, ZANU launched a number of attacks across the border, though little military success was achieved until the 1970's. In 1974-1975 the

external wing of the party went through a severe crisis which cost the life of Chitepo and led to the mass arrest of ZANU cadres and leaders in Zambia. This violent struggle within the party has been attributed to tribal rivalry between the Karanga, Zezuru and the Nyika, all Shona sub-groups. The leadership crisis deepened in 1975 when Sithole, ZANU's President who had been released from prison in 1974, was deposed by the younger party militants.

Robert Mugabe was chosen to replace Sithole as the leader of ZANU. He was born in 1928 and is a Zezuru clansman. In December, 1974 he was released after ten years of imprisonment and immediately set about organizing the guerrilla struggle from Mozambique, in the belief that the only way to bring down the Smith regime was by military means. His radical stance, which included Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology was extremely popular with the younger cadres who were streaming across the Mozambique border into the guerrilla training camps.

In recent years, ZANU's commitment to the armed struggle has begun to pay-off and Mugabe is reputed to be a popular leader among the Zimbabwean people as a whole. His major supporters have been Presidents Nyerere of Tanzania and Machel of Mozambique. China has supplied most of ZANU's weapons in the past, but today Chinese interest in ZANU appears to be waning. It is estimated that ZANU has 10,000 guerrillas operating in Zimbabwe. Its forces control large amounts of territory - semi-liberated zones - along the Mozambique border.

The Patriotic Front. Relations between ZAPU and ZANU had never been the best. Over the years numerous attempts had been made to achieve unity in the nationalist ranks, however, until 1976 all political unification efforts were fruitless.

From the early 1970's, under strong foreign pressure, attempts had been made to bring the military wings of the two parties under a unified command. In November 1975 some success was achieved in this respect and a 18-man Military High Command was set up to command ZIPA, the Zimbabwe Peoples's Army, which was a combination of ZAPU's military wing ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army) and ZANU's military wing ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army). The practical effect of this military alliance is difficult to determine, though much evidence points to its superficiality.

In October 1976 a tactical alliance was formed between ZAPU and ZANU, known as the Patriotic Front. The leaders of the two organizations, Nkomo and Mugabe, agreed to send a joint delegation to the Geneva constitutional talks. The first attempt to formulate the Front's policy was made in January 1977 when it was agreed to establish a co-ordinating committee of ten members comprising ZANU and ZAPU. They laid down four basic objectives: "to liquidate imperialism and colonialism



and thereby overthrow the racist minority regime; to create a national democratic state of the people of Zimbabwe; to eliminate all forms of capitalist exploitation and thus create the conditions for a full-scale social revolution; and to guarantee national peace, security, equal rights and happiness for all in a free Zimbabwe". Both parties claim to be non-racialist and do not want the whites to leave the country. The Patriotic Front has withstood the strains imposed by the continuing struggle for nearly three years. However, until recently the Front remained little more than an alliance between political opponents to fight a common enemy. Efforts to achieve a unified political organization have so far failed. In May 1979, at a meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, ZANU and ZAPU did manage to set up a new Joint Operational Command with the aim of strengthening the guerrilla campaign. Negotiations are continuing to attempt to clear up their political differences. The long-standing conflict between the liberation movements has been a serious hinder to the resolution of the political crisis in Zimbabwe.

The possibility of a civil war erupting after independence cannot be ruled out until the explosive leadership question is settled. It seems probable that need for a solid front against the Muzorewa led Salisbury government and mounting pressure from external powers may unite the rival parties. At the O.A.U. summit in July 1979, the African states confirmed their support for the Patriotic Front and recognized it as the sole representative of Zimbabwe.

#### 4.2. THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE WAR

Over the past three years the civil war in Zimbabwe has accelerated dramatically so that practically the whole population is now deeply affected. The rural African population has borne the brunt of the war so far, and losses of life and livelihood have reached disastrous proportions. It is estimated that between 15,000 and 20,000 people have been killed in the fighting, a large proportion of the dead being unarmed African peasants. In an effort to escape the onslaught many people have fled to the neighbouring countries of Mozambique (120,000), Zambia (60,000) and Botswana (20,000) and to the towns (50,000).

In the rural African areas, where family life and kinship ties are the pivot of society, government counter-insurgency measures have been severely disruptive. Successive policies of the regime of collective fines, forced migration, destruction of villages, the burning and poisoning of crops, the burning of crop storage facilities, the confiscation of cattle and closing down of stores, clinics and hospitals has greatly endangered peasant survival. Recent reports reveal that food and medical supplies were no longer reaching the people, while martial law has hindered the planting of new crops.

One particular destructive policy of the regime is the "protected villages" programme, is similar to that used by the Americans in Vietnam and the Portuguese "Aldamentos" system in Mozambique. In a futile attempt to cut the guerrillas off from the peasants, 750,000 people were forced to live in barbed wire enclosures mainly in the east and south of the country. Many could no longer tend their crops and many lost their cattle. Conditions in these concentration camps are appalling. Malnutrition and diarrhoea are major causes of death, especially among the children. Since September 1978, some 70 out of a total of about 230 "protected villages" have been opened up and the villagers told to return to their non-existent homes without seed or cattle.

In addition to the constant threat of starvation, the rural African areas have also been affected by the closing of schools and clinics by both security forces and the guerillas. One third of all rural schools have been closed and one quarter of a million children are without schooling, apart from those who have never attended school. Only four out of fifty doctors are still working in the rural areas and at least a third of all rural hospitals and clinics have closed.

Finally, the peasantry has suffered a severe economic loss on account of the death of about one-third of its cattle population, 600,000 to 1,000,000 head. This loss was mainly due to the destruction of cattle dipping tanks by the guerrillas as part of a protest against the payment of dipping fees to the government, which had always been unpopular among the peasants. In the absence of dipping, insect borne diseases have multiplied and today threaten the remaining African and white owned herds.

For those peasants who reach the towns, life is extremely difficult, for unemployment is growing constantly as the economic decline continues and the white "employers" leave the country in greater numbers. There is no doubt that the war in Rhodesia, like all wars, has caused enormous suffering. At present there is little chance of a cease-fire and all reports indicate that in recent months the fighting has intensified and will continue to intensify in the near future.

#### 4.3

#### THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION

The "Internal Settlement" was the Smith regime's last hope of avoiding having to come to terms with the externally based Patriotic Front. Unable to win the war against the guerrillas, Smith reached agreement with three leading African nationalists outside the Patriotic Front (Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief Chirau) to hold elections leading to majority rule. Elections which were neither "free nor fair" were held in April, 1979 and Bishop Muzorewa emerged as the most popular leader. On June 2, 1979 he became the Prime Minister of "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia".

Behind the façade of a "transfer of power" to the African majority by means of this settlement lies the fact that real power continues to remain in the hands of the whites for at least 10 years. According to the agreement, the whites were guaranteed 28 out of 100 parliamentary seats although they represented only 4 % of the population. Furthermore, a new constitution was adopted which required a three-quarters majority to alter any entrenched clause. This means that the whites can veto any attempt to erode their power and privilege which are entrenched in the constitution. For according to it, all the major institutions of state power - the security forces, police, judiciary and public services - are to remain in the control of white led commissions. The "Internal Settlement" failed to achieve its objective of winning British and USA recognition for the Muzorewa government and the lifting of sanctions. At the Commonwealth Conference held in Lusaka in August 1979, the newly elected British Conservative government acknowledged the inadequacy of this settlement.

In September 1979 a conference will take place between the parties concerned to discuss a new constitution drawn up by the British which excludes the controversial white veto-right and white control over the army, police and justice. If agreement is reached between the British, Patriotic Front and Muzorewa-Smith, an election will be held. But, in order to ensure that this election will be free and fair the difficult problem of military balance between Patriotic Front and Smith-Muzorewa forces will have to be solved and independent observers agreed upon.

PART 2: INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS.

## Introduction

In the second part of this study, Zimbabwe's prospects as an independent and internationally recognized state will be explored. To start, the colonial economic system will be critically analysed and its principal short-coming, the tendency towards dualism, revealed. Then the potential of alternative development strategies for overcoming dualism will be discussed. Lastly, the main issues likely to be faced by a radical regime intent on re-orienting socio-economic development towards peasant socialism will be considered.

5. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COLONIAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM

"...that the development in the Third World only or even mainly consists of a development of underdevelopment is quite simply not true. The exploitation and repression of the masses is terrible. Unemployment is large and increasing, and will increase even more, as a consequence of the recent decades rapid population growth. The growing cities are being turned into slums. The gap between rich and poor is becoming wider. All this is true. But this is precisely the way it once was in our part of the world, the otherside of an ongoing massive transformation of the productive forces, an economic revolution, capitalistic industrialization."

Gustafsson

"...the thought that 'underdeveloped countries' are quite simply at a stage of economic development which is 'behind' the so called 'developed' countries...is false because these countries are themselves in a radically different situation than that which the presently industrialized countries experienced fifty, a hundred, two hundred or three hundred years ago."

Bettelheim

The aim of this section is to critically analyse the process of industrialization in Colonial Zimbabwe. The question to be answered is whether the first or the second of the points of view quoted above fit the reality of the Zimbabwean industrialization process. Whether this process is tending towards the formation of "unified" or a "dualistic" economic structure. By "unified" we mean that the widening capitalist or modern sector tends to gradually absorb the excess population from the rest of the economy i.e. there is a long run tendency towards economic unification, even though some inequalities may persist for a long period of time. By "dualism" is meant the opposite tendency, namely, the exclusion of a

large part of the population from the benefits of growth, the increasing unemployment or underemployment in the subsistence sector. Once the tendency operating in Zimbabwe today is revealed and its causes explained alternative development strategies will be examined.

Colonial Zimbabwe is passing through a capitalist industrial revolution which was set in motion by the massive foreign investment after the Second World War. During the past three decades the annual Gross Domestic Capital Formation has averaged more than 20 % of GDP. GDP has grown at an average annual rate of 5 % in real terms. These are impressive statistics which certainly indicate a massive transformation of the productive forces associated with industrialization.

The population growth trend indicates that the African population, which today comprises 96.5 % of the total population of the country, has been growing at a very fast rate since 1945. Today Zimbabwe has one of the fastest growing populations in Africa with a growth rate of 3.5 % per year - doubling every 20 years. In the early 1920's only 48,000 Zimbabweans out of a population of 1,000,000 i.e. 4.5 % were employed within the emergent modern sector. Half a century later 700,000 out of 6,000,000 i.e. 12 % were employed. Thus, while the number of persons employed increased 14 times, due to the 5 fold increase in the population, the percentage of the total population employed only rose about 3 fold.

However, capital accumulation in Colonial Zimbabwe relied heavily upon foreign labour supplies and it is necessary to take them into account in order to get a true picture of the labour dimension of industrialization (T - 7). In Table 6 we see the evolution of the total labour employed as a percentage of the total population and find that in 1961, after a decade of rapid development, the proportion of the total population employed reached 19 %. Subsequently, in 1974, after a further period of rapid growth, the percentage employed was barely 16 % of the total population. Today it is even lower. Thus, while employment rose by 50 % between 1961 and 1974, the absolute number employed as a percentage of the population decreased by 3 %.

In recent years a number of students of the Zimbabwean economy have all reached similar conclusions, namely, that the existing capitalist structure is tending towards "dualism" rather than "unification". That despite the impressive growth performance of the economy, it is failing to absorb the potential labour force and leading to the exclusion and impoverishment of the vast majority of the African population. (See Appendix -1-)

## 5.1. THE UNEMPLOYMENT CRISIS

In the 1950's the modern sector absorbed labour from the peasant sector at a faster rate than population expansion. The 1960's was marked by an economic slowdown and it was not until 1968 that a high growth rate was recorded. Between 1968 and 1974 the real growth rate was 8.5 % per annum and employment expanded annually until 1975. It is on the basis of the employment capacity of the modern sector during this expansive phase of capitalist development that the judgement of "dualism" has been passed. If the years of slow growth in the 1960's were included the evidence indicating a tendency towards dualism is even stronger.

African employment statistics are complicated by the absence of an accurate figure for the economically active population, by the presence of large number of foreign workers and by the male/female division of the labour force. Since Zimbabwean males are the first to leave the peasant sector and represent the bulk of the labour force, (women generally remain in the TTLs) we will concentrate our analysis on the behaviour of the male Zimbabwean wage earners.

In the 1969-1975 period it was estimated that the net addition of adult males to the potential economically active population (males between 16 and 60 years) was 260,000. Total employed male Zimbabweans increased from 410,000 to 570,000, that is, by 160,000 or 27,000 new jobs a year. Thus, even in this highly expansive period, 100,000 Zimbabwean males remained "unemployed". The term unemployed here refers to all Africans not employed by "whites". Now even if the increase of African males employed in the informal sector and the APA farmers and their employees are taken into account, it is clear that the adult male population of the TTLs is growing steadily. But today the TTLs are grossly overcrowded and a recent estimate put the number of landless people in the TTLs as high as 500,000.

Projections of labour supply growth to the end of the century (including both men and women) indicate that the "unemployment crisis" will become far more severe. The modern sector is incapable of absorbing sufficient new entrants to the labour market and the TTLs have already exceeded their carrying capacity. Hence, the general conclusion reached by a number of independent observers is that: "the majority of the population - growing in absolute terms - have been largely bypassed by this development" and that "economic growth has often widened the inequalities between the minority in the money sector and the majority outside it".

It is generally thought that only major structural changes in the present economic system could reverse the tendency towards the development of underdevelopment in Zimbabwe today. Before discussing the strategies for overcoming dualism, it is first necessary to attempt to grasp the underlying causes of this phenomenon.

## 5.2 CAUSES OF DUALISM IN ZIMBABWE

The post-war industrialization introduced an essentially different economic structure to the competitive structure which had previously been operative in Zimbabwe. The massive inflow of foreign capital and the setting up of foreign subsidiaries decisively altered the investment pattern. Investment tended to "deepen" rather than "widen" capital, which means that it tended to increase productivity by adding new machinery at a faster rate than new labour. Machines replaced human labour irrespective of the availability of cheap labour supplies. The result was a tendency towards dualism or the structural incapacity of the modern sector to absorb the potential labour force in the peasant sector.

It is the interaction of three interdependent factors - technology, a few large firms dominating the market (oligopoly) and market size - that determines the tendency towards dualism in developing economies. The "basic" cause of dualism is the technological dependency of the emergent capitalist economies on advanced capitalist economies. Given the initially small market, only one or two firms using modern production techniques will easily satisfy existing demand. Production will be oriented towards satisfying the needs of the relatively few with monetary incomes. The potential demand in the subsistence sector of the economy remains only potential because it is not sustained by adequate income. The result is that the backward sector remains stagnant with high unemployment, underemployment and low productivity, while the modern sector experience rising productivity, output, profits and wages.

The colonial economy of Zimbabwe displays many of the typical features of dualism. We have already noted its structural incapacity to absorb surplus labour supplies. A striking feature of the manufacturing sector is the extent to which a few firms and in many cases only one firm, dominate the market. These firms are frequently foreign subsidiaries. The effect of this "oligopolistic" or "monopolistic" structure was evident in the 20 % growth of the share of gross profits in value added during the recent phase of industrial expansion. Though, this was an unusual period due to sanctions.

While real wages rose in all sectors of the economy, wide differences existed between agricultural wages and industrial wages for Africans. Such discrepancies reflect the disconnectedness of the domestic labour market. The urban African worker is "privileged" relative to the farm labourer, a typical feature of a dualistic economy in which unskilled jobs in industry are scarce compared to labour supplies and yet still command a premium.

Another feature of the Zimbabwean economy directly related to the oligopolistic structure is the distorted size of the distribution sector which employs as many Europeans as the

manufacturing sector and "contributes" more to GDP (13 %) than does European agriculture. Small trade is the only outlet for those outside the dominant big business sector, here technological obstacles to entry as well as capital requirements are limited. So here we find a large number of small white businessmen living off inflated distribution costs.

The post-1945 industrialization process in Zimbabwe seems to parallel the typical pattern of oligopolistic growth experienced in third world countries. This is probably due to the fact that the political structure of the colony and class forces behind industrialization represented an exceptionally "pure" capitalist system. The Europeans had only to concern themselves about raising their own consumption level and this could well be achieved by running an "open economy" i.e. open to forces of world market with little state intervention. The modern sector essentially served the Europeans, and African consumption or the lack of it was of little concern to the white ruling class.

During the UDI period government intervention in the economy assumed far greater proportions, but its intention was to guarantee white living standards in the face of economic sanctions. Zimbabwe has never had a government committed to the Africans' economic interests as opposed to the interests of a small minority of settlers and multinational corporations. We will now consider the economic prospects of a genuinely independent Zimbabwe, given the inherited economic structure and the will of a new government to re-shape it to serve the masses.

## 6. INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE: THE SOCIALIST TRANSITION

### 6.1. ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES: REFORMISM OR SOCIALISM?

Colonialism's days are numbered in Zimbabwe. The rebellious settlers are being brought to their knees by the forces of the Patriotic Front and the embryo of a new nation state is rapidly taking shape. In recent years the leaderships of both ZANU and ZAPU have critically analysed the functioning of the colonial economic system and found that it has failed to meet the basic social and economic needs of the African majority.

It is argued that during the colonial period Zimbabwe experienced economic "growth" rather than economic "development". The GNP certainly "grew", but economic growth benefitted only a minority of the population while leading to the relative impoverishment of the majority. The price of industrialization has been paid by the African peasantry and working class and this process must be reversed.



Consequently, both parties to the Patriotic Front have advocated radical changes in the economic structure in order to bring about "vigorous economic and social development of a genuinely independent Zimbabwe" and "Zimbabweanization" of the control of the economy and the distribution of its fruits.

The combined effect of sanctions and war have led to the steady decline of the Rhodesian economy since 1974. There is no knowing when the birth of a genuinely independent and internationally recognized Zimbabwe will take place. The frequent re-alignments within the African nationalist camps, combined with the volatility of the southern African region as a whole and the numerous external parties to the Zimbabwe conflict, make political predictions hazardous. The outcome of the power struggle will decisively affect the crucial choice of a development strategy for Zimbabwe. Powerful objective constraints will immediately confront the new regime and force it to choose between conflicting social interests. Besides the general constraint of economic scarcity, Zimbabwe will face a skills constraint whose dimension will be directly related to the choice of a national economic policy. For, the more rapid the transition to socialism, the greater the likelihood of an exodus of skilled whites and a flight of foreign capital.

Two basically contradictory development strategies are currently being proposed for independent Zimbabwe. One gives priority to the modern sector, the other favours the peasant sector. The former is advocated by the representatives of big business, the latter by the Patriotic Front.

The Whitsun Foundation, the policy-maker for big business in Zimbabwe, has formulated its desired development strategy as follows:

"...there is a need for a strategy embodying two principal goals, namely that of transferring labour off the land out of the tribal areas into urban and other wage employment, and that of transforming the means livelihood of those still remaining. The transfer goal is that of first priority since it embodies an expansion of the modern economy. This is largely a matter for macro-economic policy and for the continuance of a high rate of investment from the white business and financial sector without which economic growth would be difficult to sustain."

It is clear from the above policy statement that this strategy involves the continuation of the "colonial" economic system which led to dualism. Rather than overcoming the tendency towards the marginalization of the rural masses inherent in the existing economic structure, it will perpetuate it. Despite the awareness of Whitsun analysts of the incapacity of the modern sector to absorb the available labour supply, they do not contemplate a fundamentally different strategy, but merely hope to reform the existing racist structure so

as to permit its partial Africanization. The development of African peasant agriculture and the need for land reform are considered important, but as secondary and derivative factors of modern sector growth.

In contrast, the Patriotic Front, while not elaborating on its proposed development strategy at this time, has indicated that the raising of the standard of living of the rural masses is its primary goal. The African peasantry and farm workers who comprise 75 % of the population are by far the worst off economically. In order to break the tendency towards dualism and improve the lot of the majority of Zimbabweans, it is therefore vital that the primary task of the future development strategy should be to uplift the rural masses.

The colonial economy was sharply biased towards the modern sector. This sector received 97 % of the annual new investment while the TTLs received only 3 %. Now this development pattern was not an accident, but due to the way in which the foreign dominated, export-oriented economy functioned. The "reformist strategy" will not change this structural bias, because it involves a compromise with foreign capital whose interest lies in the expansion of the modern sector.

In order to radically alter this process, economic planning will have to ensure that the lion's share of the available funds and human resources will actually be invested in rural development. The whole orientation of the present society will need to be shifted from modern sector growth to socialist development which aims to supply the basic social needs of the masses. "Basic needs" include: the provision of adequate food, clothing and shelter; services such as education, health and transport; as well as mass participation in decision making and political life in general.

The main social and economic issues which will face the future policy makers intent on leading Zimbabwe on a path of transition towards peasant oriented socialism will now be examined. Generally speaking, a contradiction exists between the short-run need to guarantee output by co-operating with big business, and the long-run need to implement a radical anti-imperialist strategy, whatever the cost. For, even a radical regime may be forced to make tactical concessions to the powerful foreign economic bloc in the short-run. Though, by playing one foreign interest against another it could significantly strengthen its hold over the economy.

In the short-run, the socialistic development strategy is unlikely to result in the severing of ties to the world market and the wholesale nationalization of foreign property. Rather, it will probably involve economic pragmatism and planning. The planners will have to try to find ways to eradicate the foreign economic domination, especially by South African capital, while selectively retaining some of its benefits. Above all, they will have to lay the foundation for a new economic system which chiefly serves the rural masses interests, while not ignoring considerations of cost-

efficiency. Clearly, the land reform and rural development policies will be the key to the future development prospects. A successful agricultural revolution could provide the necessary food and capital resources for further industrialization.

## 6.2. THE RADICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

"The problem in Zimbabwe is not the election of a 'President', but: the destruction of colonialism and its institutions; the attainment of genuine independence; and the democratization not only of the vote but all institutions and the way of life in Zimbabwe". The Patriotic Front

The colonial socio-economic system in Zimbabwe was based on racial discrimination and inequality in practically every walk of life. In addition to the creation of vast differences of wealth and access to basic social services between racial groups and urban and rural regions, the system sustained the tribal divisions within the African population. The "community development" policy of the white regime rested upon the authority of traditional leaders, chiefs and headmen, and aimed to strengthen tribalism i.e. divide and rule.

The ideals of the liberation struggle are the very negation of colonial values and practices. The political aim of the "national revolution" is to unite the Zimbabwean people and build a Zimbabwean nation. A new "national" culture will transcend regional, tribal and colonialist cultures. The social goals of the revolution are to introduce democracy and equality into all spheres of life. In short, nationalism and democratic socialism are the guiding principles of the Zimbabwean revolution.

According to the verbal and written statements of the two wings of the Patriotic Front, the guerrilla war is regarded as the starting point for the implementation of these principles. In the "semi-liberated zones" controlled by the forces of the Patriotic Front i.e. those areas where Smith's forces dare not go except by air, social experimentation is already taking place. New administrative structures are gradually being established and new political ideals being taught to the peasants. Today there are more than a million people living in these areas, the refugee camps and the guerrilla training camp in the neighbouring states. Here the foundations of the new society are already being laid. Mass participation is encouraged in an attempt to release popular energies and to place the traditionally hierarchical tribal power structure (e.g. hereditary chieftainship) on a more democratic footing. Much importance is placed on the raising of the status of women, with young women taking an active role in the guerrilla armies. Basic social services are now being supplied by the guerrillas and the peasants themselves. Clinics and schools which were closed on account of the war have been re-opened on a "self-help" basis. Political education plays a major role in the overcoming of the colonization of the mind and the identification of the enemies of the people.

The experiences of Mozambique and Tanzania in their post-independence struggles towards socialism will surely serve as valuable examples for the Zimbabweans. A future radical leadership, with its primary basis of support among the peasants, can be expected to place rural development at the forefront of its reconstruction programme. New administrative systems will be needed to ensure that the alliance between the leaders and the masses is cemented and to implement peasant oriented development policies. The cornerstone of the Tanzanian and Mozambiquean rural development plans are, respectively, the "planned village" and the "communal village". Both serve as rural administrative units and are organized on the basis of popular participation. At the centre of the administration is the "party", which guides the transition to socialism in constant interaction with the mass organizations e.g. youth movements, peasant councils and trade unions. An independent Zimbabwe under the leadership of the Patriotic Front can be expected to follow fairly closely these systems of administration.

According to Patriotic Front policy statements, the basic social services, education, health, transport and communications, will all need to be completely re-organized in order to serve the African masses rather than a colonial elite. Here again the principles of equality and popular participation will guide the transformation process.

Education will be inspired by socialist values aimed at producing "a New Man , who is productive, skilled, self-reliant, cooperative and a confident participant in all aspects of national life". Particular objectives include, universal and compulsory primary schools; new curricula to suit development needs and to overcome colonial racist and sexist values; and adult education programmes to achieve universal literacy.

Manpower training will be a crucial field of education on account of the lack of skilled African workers and the likely exodus of white expertise after independence. The choice of crash and long-term training programmes will be related to the specific situation faced by the country at independence and the future development strategy. It is already known that Zimbabwe is particularly lacking in African administrative and technical personnel. Hence, the training of Zimbabweans in fields such as: engineering, technology, education, health, agriculture, accountancy and administration will receive priority. At present top priority is being placed on the training of middle-level personnel to serve in the transitional administration. This is being done both inside and outside Zimbabwe.

A special problem facing the transitional government will be the re-integration of the 200,000 refugees into the society. Where possible, broken families will need to be re-united, and the social rifts caused by the civil war will need to be healed. In the fields of health, transport and communications, the primary focus will be on bringing adequate services to the rural areas which received only minimal inputs in the colonial period. New health schemes will need to be

devised which place greater emphasis on preventive rather than curative medicine. Roads will have to be built and the means of transport provided in order to open up markets for the peasants outside the main towns. Electrification of the rural areas will be a primary infrastructural requirement.

### 6.3. LAND REFORM: OVERCOMING RURAL POVERTY

It is on the land question that both wings of Patriotic Front have been most vocal. ZAPU's leader Nkomo has on many occasions claimed that all the land of Zimbabwe should belong to the state, that the Zimbabwe peasants have a tradition of communal rather than individual ownership and that this tradition should be maintained. Land that is presently owned individually or by foreigners should be taken over by the government and selectively leased back to the tenants. ZANU's Mugabe has also stressed the "socialistic" quality of the existing Zimbabwean peasant economy, and has advocated the formation of agricultural co-operatives as the foundation for the agricultural sector. The existing corporate plantations would be expropriated and white farmers could become managers in a collective administration.

Clearly, these land reform proposals are in line with a basically socialistic national development policy advocated by the liberation movements. The aim of land reform would not merely be to correct the historical imbalance of land ownership between white and black, but more importantly to re-organize the presently conservative peasant production in the TTLs in such a way as to release new energies in the people, to break down traditional barriers to innovation and improve productivity.

Within the white agricultural sector we can distinguish between the few large, highly capitalized, often company owned farms and the many smaller family farms. Over 50 % of the agricultural output is produced by 10 % of the farms. Therefore, if the new regime reached an arrangement with the big producers to maintain food production the risk of food shortages could be reduced during the transitional period. Many of the small farms have been abandoned on account of the war, and it is estimated that between 8 and 11 million acres of white land have never been under production. It seems futile to try to predict the nature of a future land-reform in Zimbabwe, as this will depend on future political and practical considerations.

Agricultural workers' wages are presently only a third of industrial workers' wages, therefore, any rural development scheme would have to attempt to redress this imbalance. The success of land reform will depend on more than just land redistribution. The ability of the peasantry to transform itself will depend upon new educational policies, the introduction of scientific farming methods and the availability

of credit and capital. In particular, a new pricing mechanism, new priorities in the distribution of fertilizer and seeds, irrigation schemes, feeder-roads and marketing facilities will be needed to improve peasant production in the TTLs. Peasant agriculture has historically been deprived of capital and research and extension services. Therefore, it will be necessary to invest vast amounts of capital and human resources to transform it from an underdeveloped to a growth sector. Private banks have hitherto provided the bulk of the short-term credit to European farming. It seems unlikely that they would be equally effective in providing credit to the African peasants.

A special problem that will have to be tackled simultaneously with land reform, is the migrant urban worker's traditional claim to land in the TTLs. The current lack of social security for Africans in the towns i.e. no unemployment schemes, no medical aid schemes and no old-age pensions, has led the "urbanized" worker to retain a piece of land and some cattle in the TTLs. This system of social security has contributed to the deterioration of land productivity, for small plots are generally inefficient. It therefore seems that a more distinct line will have to be drawn between peasants and urban workers in the future. Urbanized workers and their families will have to be provided with social benefits by the State and encouraged to relinquish their plots in the TTLs to full-time farmers.

A successful land reform should relieve the growing unemployment/underemployment crisis in the short-term. In the long-run it could provide the peasantry with greater economic security and so create the necessary conditions for reducing the population growth rate.

#### 6.4

#### SKILLED MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

Zimbabwe's economy was built up by a combination of small quantities of white technical and managerial skills and large amounts of predominantly unskilled black labour. In 1975, the modern sector, which accounted for 95 % of the GDP, was manned by 121,000 whites (not all highly skilled) and 934,000 blacks. Since then there has been a decline in the number employed to roughly 100,000 whites and 850,000 blacks. It was the policy of the Rhodesian government to fill skilled jobs with European immigrants rather than train Africans. Consequently, when the independent state of Zimbabwe is established it will be highly dependent on white skills. This fact is well known to the leaders of the Patriotic Front. Both Nkomo and Mugabe have on many occasions stressed that their parties want the whites to remain in the country after independence. The only proviso is that they accept the new "non-racist" political system and contribute their skills to the building of the nation.

There are many examples of individual white Rhodesians in all walks of life basically willing to accept a genuine African nationalist regime. How many of course, remains to be seen. At present the white emigration rate is running at around 1,000 per month, the white population has declined

by 40,000 since 1976. A mass exodus of the white population has not really begun yet.

Of the roughly 100,000 whites employed it is estimated that about half - 50,000 are in managerial positions (professional and technical) and 30,000 are skilled workers. The supply of African "skilled" workers is estimated at 30,000. This figure is made up of: 8,000 people presently employed; 3,000 in informal employment; 3,000 unemployed; 3,000 school, technical college and university leavers in Zimbabwe; 2,500 scholarship holders outside Zimbabwe (excluding Eastern Europe), 6,000 post-scholarship holders outside Zimbabwe; and 4,000 in refugee camps, prison and the liberation movements.

The Patriotic Front leaders are acutely aware of the need to rapidly develop their future manpower capacity. At present numerous crash programmes have been started outside the country in anticipation of the vital skills gap on independence. Also, in recent years a number of big companies within Zimbabwe have begun to train Africans on-the-job in skills which were previously reserved for whites. So the skills gap is constantly being narrowed.

Nevertheless, there will be a severe skills shortage in Zimbabwe if a large proportion of the white skilled workers left the country. The economy is relatively sophisticated compared to other colonies on the eve of independence, and even among the educated Africans it is evident that "technical" skills are greatly lacking as well as experience in top level administration. It will be the task of the new government to distribute the available skills to "strategic" sectors in order to prevent the total breakdown of the economy. The experience of crippling skills shortages in post-colonial Algeria, Angola and Mozambique are an indication of what might occur in independent Zimbabwe.

## 6.5. FOREIGN CAPITAL AND THE PROVISION OF SKILLS

Foreign capital plays an extremely important role in the Zimbabwean economy. In particular, British, South Africa and US capital control the heights of the major productive sectors and banking. Independent Zimbabwe will inherit a relatively developed industrial economy as compared to other African colonies at the time of independence. But, it will also inherit a far higher presence of foreign capital than did other African colonies. It can be fairly concluded that the attitude of the new government towards foreign capital will be decisive with respect to the prospects of the modern sector.

As has been discussed above (6.1.), the Patriotic Front claims to be an "anti-imperialist" and "anti-capitalist" movement. However, the degree, timing and manner in which these principles will be implemented "when" the Front comes to power is uncertain. It was suggested that the goal of achieving genuine economic independence and the implementation of socialistic policies will be likely to be tempered by pragmatism with respect to foreign capital in the short-run.

How far this "pragmatism" will extend is unknown. But, if the new government chooses to reach "new" agreements with some of the major foreign companies (which aim to strengthen state control over the economy, while providing the companies with "security") then Zimbabwe's future skills shortage will not be too serious. For it can be assumed that the foreign interests will ensure that they have the vital technical and administrative staff, by recruitment abroad if necessary. The Zimbabwean economy is presently closely tied to the South African economy. The political pressures to disengage it from its dependence on South Africa will therefore be confronted by severe economic constraints. The experience of post colonial Mozambique, its need to continue to rely on its powerful neighbour for many important economic inputs, comes to mind. However, Mozambique's dependence on South Africa is reinforced by the war in Zimbabwe and its decision to close its border and enforce sanctions. A genuinely independent Zimbabwe could substantially alter the current situation by opening up alternative avenues of trade and increasing the pressure on the Apartheid regime to change towards majority rule.

#### 6.6. PEASANT SOCIALISM AND THE MODERN SECTOR

Historically the colonial economy has been based upon agriculture and mining. The manufacturing sector is dependent on both for raw material inputs and foreign exchange to pay for its imported machinery and equipment. In all three sectors production declined in real terms in 1978 and is expected to decline further in 1979. It is not sanctions that have primarily caused the economic decline. Rather it is the escalating war which has disrupted transportation, led to the abandonment of farms and the withdrawal of skilled white manpower from the economy, due to military service and emigration. The African rural population has suffered severe economic losses during the war, unemployment is increasing rapidly and the latest reports indicate that there has been an absolute decline in the standard of living of the urban blacks since 1974. The decline in food production has resulted in higher prices for basic necessities and is adding to inflation, which is running at roughly 10 % per annum.

The economic problems facing a new regime committed to the uplifting of the Zimbabwean masses are formidable, and it will certainly require a strong government with mass support to successfully bring about the necessary structural reforms. The State sector will play an increasingly important role in the direction of investment and control of foreign and internal trade. Experience from other countries shows that State power will need to be used to take-over the commanding heights of the modern economy from the foreign companies, especially in banking and finance. While the transformation of the African peasantry into modern productive farmers is the principal goal, as has been suggested above (6.1.) this



does not necessarily mean that the modern sector will be disregarded. The development of the former cannot be divorced from that of the latter, for many of the inputs required by the peasant sector are produced in the modern sector and vice versa. The main point is that modern sector development should be subordinated to peasant development in the national economic plan. The implications of this reversal of economic priorities for each economic sector will be briefly discussed. It should, however, be noted that the discussion below presupposes majority rule in a not too distant future and without a struggle which would destroy much of the existing economic structure. If the latter occurred economic reconstruction would face significantly different constraints.

In agriculture, the diversified output will continue to supply raw materials for the food, textile and other industries. Zimbabwe peasants have a good farming record and seem to have been capable of taking advantage of opportunities to improve their output in the past. Given massive State support, they should be able to significantly improve their productivity. In particular, the highly profitable labour intensive tobacco production could be expanded on communal or private farms.

The mining sector is also well diversified and hence, less vulnerable to a fall in world market prices. At present 14 large mines produce 80 % of all mineral output. This means that if special measures are taken to ensure continuing production, the risk of a short-run foreign exchange shortage would be minimized. At present prices for gold and copper are high.

The manufacturing sector received limited foreign exchange allowances during the UDI period. Many industries today require new plant and equipment, though with the decline in production over the past 4 years, there must be much excess capacity. The manufacturing industries are to a large extent processors of local agricultural and mineral output. The essence of the import-substitution programme during UDI was to build up domestic processing capacities e.g. three ferrochrome works. Given the limited funds and skills available, it will be necessary to restructure and perhaps close down some manufacturing establishments. The production of luxury consumer goods will need to be stopped, though this type of production has been curbed in recent years on account of foreign exchange shortages. Due to the small size of the domestic market, the local textile and clothing industry, using locally produced cotton, has become export oriented. Such products, which mainly go to the South Africa market, could be redirected to neighbouring African markets or remodelled to serve the mass market in Zimbabwe. The same applies to the food processing industries and other industrial products.

Factors working to improve the Balance of Payments position would include: improved "terms of trade" due to not having to pay the 15-20 % "commission" to middlemen who presently get the illegal trade onto the world market (i.e. sanctions busting). Also, an expansion of tobacco sales and tourism can be expected. The latter was an important foreign exchange earner before UDI, though the majority of the tourists were white South Africans. If the oil pipeline from Beira in Mozambique was re-opened quickly, the cost of oil transport and refinement could be reduced.

Clearly, the future trading prospects of a land-locked country like Zimbabwe are intimately connected to the maintenance of an efficient transport system to the coast. At present Zimbabwe is totally reliant on South African railways and harbours. This dependency will be reduced as former transport routes to the coast of Mozambique are re-opened, however, this will probably involve large investment costs. It was recently announced that all the southern African states would set up a regional transport and communications commission as a first step in a plan to reduce their dependence on South Africa.

The rebel colony has received no international aid over the past 13 years. The USA-British proposal for the creation of an internationally supported "Zimbabwe Development Fund" (ZDF) has not been received with enthusiasm by the Patriotic Front, because of the strings attached. The ZDF was intended to provide US\$ 1.5 billion for general economic and social reconstruction provided that the structure of the economy remained essentially unchanged i.e. a "mixed economy". The view of the Patriotic Front is, that only a socialistic reconstruction of the economy will provide a basis for meeting the basic needs of the Zimbabwean people. Hence, foreign aid will only be accepted if it fits the national development strategy which will be formulated after independence.

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APPENDIX 1: THE EXTENT OF AFRICAN DEPENDENCY ON WAGE LABOUR

It has been argued throughout this study that despite the low absolute number of Zimbabweans employed in the modern sector, a disproportionately high percentage of the population is wholly or partly dependent on the modern sector. How can this seemingly contradictory position be explained? Capital accumulation in Zimbabwe proceeded via a system of reserves (TTLs) and migrant labour. This means that African males in wage employment could be paid lower wages than would have been necessary for the reproduction of their labour because their families could provide many basic necessities e.g. housing and food in the reserves. Thus, accumulation of capital in the modern sector was "subsidized" by the peasant producers in the TTLs. The development of the modern sector was directly related to the underdevelopment of the peasant sector.

Between 1969 and 1975, the percentage of adult Zimbabwean males in wage employment increased from about 35 % to 41 %. However, this increase was accompanied by an absolute increase in the number of adult males still underemployed or unemployed in the TTLs. Thus, while participation in the modern sector increased so too did the absolute number of marginalized men. So it is possible to simultaneously have greater dependency on wage-incomes and a greater tendency toward dualism. Due to the overpopulation of the TTLs and traditional kinship obligations, the migrant worker's excess income and land holding in the TTLs must be shared between more dependants. When no jobs are available as an outlet for the underemployed in the TTLs more people will be driven into extreme poverty, for peasant agricultural production has not been able to keep up with the absolute growth in population. Thinking along these lines we can see why such a high proportion of the Zimbabwean population is currently dependent (wholly or partly) on wage incomes and the modern sector.

Firstly, 41 % of all adult males are formerly employed by whites. A further 5 % of the adult males are either self-employed or employed by blacks who are part of the modern sector, 9 % of the adult females are in wage employment. Now, the statistic used for the "total potential labour force" is simply the number of people between 16 and 60 years of age. This figure clearly overstates the actual number of healthy adults capable of working, furthermore the upper limit of 60 is arbitrary. A much higher percentage of males between 20 and 40 years of age are migrant workers. Thus, in many cases the over 40 year-olds become partially dependent on the cash income of a younger member of the family. Finally, the figure of 41 % given for Zimbabwean males employed excludes "foreign" male workers who would represent an additional 13 %. To what extent these foreigners have become integrated into Zimbabwean society is difficult to determine, but the majority have been in the country upward of a decade.

Thus, while the process of marginalization is continuing, so too is the dependency of Zimbabwean household on the modern sector. Today it can quite safely be concluded that over half of all African households are wholly or partly dependent on the modern sector.

APPENDIX 2: COLONIAL HISTORY IN BRIEF \*

- 1870 Lobengula succeeds Mzilikazi as king of the Ndebele.
- 1888 Moffat negotiates treaty of peace and amity between Lobengula and Britain. Rudd concession agreed with Lobengula (for C.J. Rhodes).
- 1889 Royal Charter granted to British South African Company (BSAC) to enable it to exploit the concession.
- 1890 Pioneer column recruited, enters the territory and establishes Fort Salisbury (12 September).
- 1891 Britain establishes protectorate over Mashonaland.
- 1893 Invasion of Matabeleland authorized (3 October). Bulawayo occupied (4 November). Allan Wilson patrol, pursuing Lobengula, annihilated on Shangani River (4 December).
- 1894 Probable death of Lobengula. Establishment of African reserves in north and north-east Matabeleland. Hut tax imposed. Matabeleland Order in Council.
- 1895 Rhodesia so named by proclamation (23 April).
- 1896 Ndebele rebellion against the British settlers starts in Umzingwani (24 March). Mashona rebellion starts with the Mangwende attack on the Mrewa Native Commissioners' camp (20 June). British storm and capture Mkwati's stronghold at Taba Zi Ka Mambo (5 July). Rhodes' first of five indabas (discussions) with Ndebele leaders in Matopo hills (21 August). British attack on Chief Makoni's fortress in caves at Gwindingwi, using dynamite to blow the defenders out (1-3 September). Makoni surrenders and is shot after a summary trial ordered by Lieut.Col. Alderson (3 September).
- 1897 Kunzwi Nyandoro's kraal stormed by British (June). Mashiangombi's kraal attacked and Mashiangombi killed (23 July). Railway reaches Bulawayo from south (November).
- 1898 Two mediums, Kagubi and Nehenda, tried for murder (2 March). Nehenda and Kagubi executed. BSAC promises and starts payment of £360,000 compensation to settlers. Imperial Order in Council establishes new constitution. Railway reaches Umtali from Beira.
- 1899 First meeting of Legislative Council under new constitution. Railway reaches Salisbury from Beira. Boer War commences, cutting Rhodesia off from the Cape.
- 1900 Mapondera rising in Mazoe. Estimated total of African-owned cattle: 55,000.
- 1901 Mapondera defeated by Mashonaland native police (March). Last battle until 1960's: Mapondera continues guerrilla raids, and to support chiefs Makombe and Chioco in their unsuccessful resistance to Portuguese authority.
- 1902 Rhodes dies. Railway joins Bulawayo and Salisbury. All male Africans over 14 required by law to register and carry the situpa pass at all times. Boer War ends.
- 1904 Mapondera captured, tried, imprisoned, but dies after hunger strike. Immorality and Indecency Suppression Act passed, making sexual intercourse between black man and white woman a criminal offence.
- 1905 Railway completed across Zambezi at Victoria Falls.
- 1906 Africans in urban areas prohibited by law to live outside "locations" except as domestic servants.

\* Source: R. Austin, Racism and Apartheid in Southern Africa: Rhodesia, Paris, 1975.

- 1911 African Labour (Identification) Act - to control recruitment of African labour - essentially to prevent unskilled labour going to South Africa.
- 1914 Commission recommends changes in reserves by reducing them in both extent and quality. Long series of protests, especially in Matabeleland, organized by Nyamanda and the Matabele National Home Movement.
- 1919 Privy Council decisions rejects case for African and Company ownership of the land, and held it belonged to the Crown.
- 1920 BSAC compensated for assets taken over by the Crown. Native reserves totalling 21 million acres established. Legislative Council approves plan for "responsible government".
- 1922 Referendum on closer association with South Africa, or "responsible government"; majority for latter. A Zulu Anglican teacher, Abraham Twala, wrote: "...experience has taught us that our salvation does not lie in Downing Street..."
- 1923 Formation by Abraham Twala of the Rhodesian Bantu Voters' Association, the first African organization to urge Africans to depend on themselves rather than on the British Government. Rhodesia annexed to Britain as a colony (September). "Responsible government" established (10 October).
- 1924 First elections for Legislative Assembly, Sir Charles Coghlan first prime minister. Beginning of Rhodesia party government which continued (with a break in 1936-1937) until 1962.
- 1925 Morris Carter Land Commission appointed to consider setting apart defined areas outside reserves for exclusive acquisition by Africans and exclusive acquisitions by Europeans. Forty-five per cent of land still unalienated. Europeans held 31 million acres, including nearly all land over 3,000 feet and within 25 miles of railways.
- 1926 Carter report recommends land apportionment.
- 1927 Under Native Affairs Act, administrative, judicial and legislative powers in relation to Africans vested in Native Commissioners.
- 1929 Land Apportionment Bill published. African opposition.
- 1930 Land Apportionment Act passed, after approval by Britain. Divides Rhodesia into African and European areas. Compulsory education for Europeans under 1930 Education Act.
- 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act provides structure for industrial bargaining in Rhodesia, excludes Africans by excluding them from the definition of "employee".
- 1936 Native Registration Act requires in town to carry another pass (in addition to his situpa).
- 1938 Compulsory education of Asian and Coloured children.
- 1939 Second World War commences. Empire Training School brings thousands of Britons into contact with Rhodesia during Royal Air Force Training.
- 1945 End of Second World War. Strike of African railway workers.
- 1946 Native (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act requires employers and local government authorities to provide minimum housing for African workers and families. Empowers removal of unemployed from towns. Total control of local government in white hands, "Advisory Boards" deal with African affairs in town.
- 1947 Native Labour Board Act empowers non-representative bodies to settle wages for African workers.
- 1950 Subversive Activities Act.

- 1951 Native Land Husbandry Act introduces stringent conservation measures to force African farmers to de-stock and modify land tenure practices. Introduced and implemented without consultation with Africans, it was resisted by African rural population, two-thirds of whom it would have made landless as they sought temporary employment in towns.
- 1952 Federal constitutional conferences boycotted by African delegates from northern territories.
- 1953 Referendum of Rhodesian voters approved federation by 25,570 to 14,729; only 429 Africans eligible to vote (April). Federation Act becomes law. Sir Godfrey Huggins became the first prime minister of the federation, succeeded by Garfield Todd as prime minister of Southern Rhodesia (July).
- 1955 Youth League formed by Nyandoro, Chimereza, Chisiza, Edson Sithole. Public Order Act gives power to detain and restrict without trial.
- 1956 Youth League organizes successful bus boycott in Salisbury, broken by police. Over 200 detained. Tredgold Franchise Commission to consider a "system for just representation of the people...under which government is placed, and remains in the hands of civilized and responsible persons".
- 1957 African (Registration and Identification) Act passed by Todd's government, entitles "advanced" Africans to an identity card in place of a *situpa*. Winston Field, president of the Dominion Party (a predecessor of the Rhodesian Front), elected to federal parliament. Britain allows federation right to join international organizations and receive diplomatic representation. Native Councils Act passed: introduces "community development" into African local government. New Franchise Act introduced by the United Federal Party (UFP) to "ensure that political power remains in responsible hands", introduces a lower "Special Roll" which could count for a maximum of 20 per cent of the white roll. Federal constitutional amendment effectively increases white electoral control. Southern Rhodesian African National Congress =ANC (based on an organization started in 1934), founded as an African nationalist party demanding "one man, one vote"; President: Joshua Nkomo; Vice-President: J. Chikerema; General Secretary: G. Nyandoro (12 September).
- 1958 Garfield Todd ousted by cabinet revolt, replaced by Sir Edgar Whitehead, who is defeated by Dominion Party in a "safe" seat. All meetings of ANC in rural areas banned. Whitehead and UFP win general election, but Dominion Party receives majority of first preference votes. Plewman Commission reports only 34.5 per cent of African families in urban areas living above poverty datum line.
- 1959 Federation-wide emergency declared; Southern Rhodesia African National Congress banned, 500 members arrested, 300 detained. Devlin Commission reports that federation is main cause of African discontent. Unlawful Organizations Act passed. Preventive Detention (Temporary Provisions) Act provides for detention without trial. Public Order Act amended. Native Affairs Act amended. New Industrial Conciliation Act gives Africans limited rights in white-dominated unions.
- 1960 National Democratic Party (NDP) formed by former leaders of ANC. Southern Rhodesian public service opened to Africans. British Prime Minister Macmillan makes "wind of change" speech in Cape Town. Law and Order (Maintenance) Act passed. Emergency Powers Act replaced the Public Order Act. Vagrancy Act passed.

Monckton Commission report concludes that there is racial animosity in federation; demands its end or radical franchise changes. Constitutional conference in London; African nationalists led by Nkomo, invited to attend after initial exclusion. Pass Lawas repealed, but Africans still required to carry registration certificates (situpas).

- 1961 Immortality and Indecency Suppression Act (1904) repealed. Liquour Amendment Act entitles Africans to buy "European" liquor. Constitutional conference recommends new constitution. After rank and file insistence, NDP announces refusal to recognize new constitution. Further conference meetings boycotted by NDP. NDP banned, reconstituted as Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).
- 1962 Rhodesian Front Party formed, merging Dominion Party and other white opponents of 1961 constitution (March). ZAPU banned (September). Whitehead speaks to United Nations Trusteeship Committee, suggests 1961 constitution would bring majority rule in fifteen years (October). Political meetings on Sundays or holidays banned (the only times when Africans in urban areas could meet). Rhodesian Front defeats Whitehead and UFP in general elections held under 1961 constitution.
- 1963 Former ZAPU executive goes to Dar es Salaam. Conference on dissolution of the federation (June). Prime Minister Field discusses Southern Rhodesian independence with Britain. Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) formed, led by Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole (August). Nkomo forms Caretake Council (PCC) (August). Britain vetoes United Nations Security Council resolution calling upon her not to transfer Royal Rhodesian Air Force (Federal) aircraft to Rhodesia (September).
- 1964 Major-General Anderson appointed General Officer Commanding Rhodesian Army after Field promised no attempt at illegal independence would be made (January). Field, reluctant to consider illegal declaration of independence, forced to resign as prime minister, succeeded by Ian Smith (April). Smith states: "If in my lifetime we have an African nationalist government in power in Southern Rhodesia, then we will have failed in the policy that I believe in" (May). African Daily News, owned by Thompson Organization, sole African mass circulation paper, banned under Printed Publications Act. Emergency declared in Highfield (Salisbury's African township) (August). Labour government elected in Britain (October). Major-General Anderson relieved as GOC Rhodesian Army (October). Smith, under strict security hold indaba of 600 chiefs to obtain approval of "independence" (October). Referendum among voters: "Are you in favour of independence based on the 1961 constitution?" 58,091 voted Yes, 6,096 voted No (November). ZANU "Croccodile Commando" kills white farmer (November).
- 1965 Bottomley, British Commonwealth Secretary, visits Salisbury and detained African leaders. Privately stated to Rhodesian Front the "five principles" on which Britain would consider granting independence (March). ZANU raiders rounded up (April). Prime Minister Ian Smith holds general election stating the main issue to be independence. Rhodesian Front wins all fifty A roll (white) seats. Election almost totally boycotted by Africans (May). ZAPU guerrillas enter Rhodesia (May). British Prime Minister visits Rhodesia, talks with Smith and detained Africans (October). Wilson states the "demand for Britain to attempt to settle all Rhodesia's constitutional problems with

a military invasion is out" (31 October). BSAC police given a pay rise (October). Emergency declared under Emergency Powers Act; uninterrupted to date. After assuring Southern Rhodesian Governor Gibbs that Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) would not take place (5 November). Rhodesian Front declares independence and promulgates the "Constitution of Rhodesia 1965" to end British rule in Rhodesia. Governor dismisses Smith and his cabinet, Britain passes the Southern Rhodesia Act, reaffirming that Southern Rhodesia is part of British Dominions and empowering the British Government to make any necessary Orders in Council. Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order invalidates Smith's constitution and prohibits the legislature from making laws. Wilson calls on Rhodesian citizens "to refrain from all acts which would further the objects of the illegal authorities. Subject to that, it is the duty of all citizens to maintain law and order in the country and to carry on with their normal tasks. This applies equally to the judiciary, the armed services, the police, and the public services" (November). General Assembly and Security Council resolutions call on United Nations Member States not to recognize the Smith regime (November). Security Council resolution 217 (1965) calls United Nations Member States to do utmost to break economic relations with Rhodesia (November).

Note The chronology that follows highlights the main events in Britain's attempts since UDI to secure a constitutional settlement in Zimbabwe. In particular, the chronology makes no attempt to document the development of the armed struggle against the forces of the Smith regime - a struggle which before all else, has forced Smith to the international negotiating table.\*

- 1965 The Smith regime declares UDI (November).
- 1966 The United Nations Security Council mandates Britain to use force to block the illegal unloading of oil for Rhodesia at the Mozambican port of Beira. Britain despatches the aircraft carrier Ark Royal and the frigates Rhyl and Lowestoft to intercept any oil tankers which may attempt to dock at Beira. (The "Beira Patrol" was finally withdrawn by Britain in June 1975, when Mozambique achieved its independence) (April).
- 1966 The first negotiations between Harold Wilson and Ian Smith take place on board the HMS Tiger off Gibraltar. The British government's draft settlement proposals, providing for independence under a white minority government and a constitution with a qualified franchise, are rejected by the regime on Smith's return to Salisbury (December).
- 1968 Ian Smith and Harold Wilson meet for a second time on board HMS Fearless, off Gibraltar. The draft British proposals, again providing for a longterm transition to eventual majority rule, are once again rejected by the Smith regime (October).
- 1969 Harold Wilson, as the author of the "Fearless" proposals, is opposed by all but four Commonwealth leaders at the 1969 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London. Most of the Heads of State emphasise that these proposals are unacceptable as the constitution of an independent Zimbabwe and should therefore be withdrawn. The British government, however, later states that the "Fearless" proposals remain on the table (January). Following the white Rhodesian electorate's approval, by referendum, of the regime's proposed republican constitution, the

\*Source: Zimbabwe: The Facts about Rhodesia, International Defence and Aid Fund, 1977.



- British Foreign Secretary announces that all diplomatic contacts with Rhodesia are to cease.
- 1970 Ian Smith proclaims Rhodesia a republic. On 6 March, Britain, together with the United States vetoes a resolution in the United Nations Security Council to impose tougher sanctions and to use force if necessary against the Rhodesian regime. Edward Heath's Conservative government is returned to power in the British general election. Sir Alec Douglas-Home becomes British Foreign Secretary (June).
- 1971 At the close of a ten-day visit to Rhodesia, Douglas-Home issues a joint statement with Smith announcing that agreement has been reached "on proposals designed to bring to an end the constitutional dispute between the two countries". Among other heavily criticised features, the proposals provide for the continuation of the nation-wide State of Emergency, no significant change in the present system of land distribution and the continuation of political trials and detentions without charge. The proposals, which are conditional upon the British government being satisfied that they are "acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole", are rejected by the Organization of African Unity as "an outright sellout of five million Africans to 243,000 white Rhodesians for generations to come". The UN General Assembly also rejects the proposals by a majority vote (November). The African National Council is formed inside Zimbabwe to mobilise opposition to the proposals. Bishop Abel Muzorewa is elected as its leader (December).
- 1972 The Pearce Commission, consisting of 21 member appointed by the British government and led by Lord Pearce, arrives in Zimbabwe to test the acceptability of the proposals. Despite a promise from the regime to permit "normal political activities" there is extensive police harassment of meetings and demonstrations and many Africans are killed and injured (January). The Pearce Commission submits its report to the British government, including that "in our opinion the people of Rhodesia as a whole do not regard the Proposals as acceptable as a basis for independence". The British initiative fails and the regime takes further steps to clamp down on the activities of the ANC (May).
- 1973 A British Foreign Office team led by Sir Denis Greenhill arrives in Zimbabwe for talks with Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa and others. A number of meetings subsequently take place between Smith and Bishop Muzorewa (June).
- 1974 Ian Smith and Bishop Muzorewa agree on proposals providing for parity in the Rhodesian parliament in 40 to 60 years. They are unanimously rejected by the ANC central committee (June). Following a series of contacts between the Smith regime and emissaries from Zambia and South Africa, talks take place in Lusaka involving delegations from ZANU, ZAPU and the ANC, President Kaunda of Zambia, President Nyerere of Tanzania, President Khama of Botswana, FRELIMO President Samora Machel, and officials of the Smith regime. A number of nationalist leaders, including Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe and Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, are released from detention by the regime in order to attend. The talks deal with the unity of the African nationalist organizations as well as Zimbabwe's constitutional future. On 7 December, ANC, ZAPU, ZANU and FROLIZI agree to merge into the ANC as "the unifying force of the people of Zimbabwe". Undertakings are given by the regime which, had they been observed, could have created the conditions for an informal

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ceasefire in the guerrilla war and the holding of a constitutional conference. (The full text of these undertakings, known as the Lusaka Agreement, were released by the ANC in January 1975). They include the release of all detainees and political prisoners, the revocation of death sentences, the lifting of the state of emergency and the granting of a general amnesty. On 11 December, Ian Smith declares that he has "received assurances to the effect that terrorist activities in Rhodesia will cease immediately, and secondly, that the proposed constitutional conference will take place without any preconditions". However, beyond releasing a limited number of detainees, the regime ignores all the undertakings of the Lusaka Agreement (December). Two meetings are held between the regime and the ANC to discuss the holding of a constitutional conference. During the intervening period, a meeting takes place in Lusaka between the ANC leaders, representatives of the Botswana, Tanzanian and Zambian governments, the South African Foreign Minister Dr. Hilgard Muller and the South African Secretary for Foreign Affairs Brand Fourie. On 11 February the Smith regime announces that certain units of the South African Police are to be withdrawn from forward positions on the Zambezi River (January). The ANC breaks off all further settlement negotiations with the regime following the arrest of Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole on charges of plotting to assassinate other nationalist leaders. Herbert Chitepo, the national chairman of ZANU, is assassinated in Lusaka (March). Despite a Special Court ruling that the ZANU leader's continued detention is fully warranted, Smith announces the regime's decision to release Rev. Sithole at the request of Bishop Muzorewa, four African presidents and the South African government. Sithole is to attend the forthcoming meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers in Tanzania. At the close of their Extraordinary Meeting in Dar es Salaam the OAU Council of Ministers, in the "Dar es Salaam Declaration", confers upon African countries the "freedom to act as go-betweens to facilitate the transfer of power to Africans" in Zimbabwe and Namibia. The Declaration further commits the OAU to unqualified support for the freedom fighters led by the ANC and to negotiations which are aimed at achieving majority rule (April). Bishop Muzorewa, Rev. Sithole and Joshua Nkomo attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in Kingston at the invitation of the Jamaican government. Harold Wilson promises that Britain will hold a Rhodesian constitutional conference within the next three months, even if Smith should refuse to attend. Renewed negotiations between Smith and the ANC reach deadlock over the venue of the proposed constitutional conference - whether inside or outside Rhodesia. (It was reported at the beginning of June that both the ANC and the regime had dropped other preconditions for holding the conference). The regime confirms that Wickus de Kock, Minister of Information, Immigration and Tourism, and four Rhodesian Front backbenchers, have visited Zambia for talks with President Kaunda. David Ennals, British Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, pays a two-day visit to Rhodesia for talks with Smith and the ANC - the first British Minister to visit Rhodesia for 3½ years (June). At a meeting in Pretoria, South Africa, Smith and Vorster sign an agreement with Mark Chona, President Kaunda's political adviser acting on behalf of the government of Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana and Mozambique, and also the ANC. The "Pretoria Agreement", as subsequently reported in the press, called for a formal declaration of intent to negotiate a settlement

by both the regime and the ANC, to be followed by a committee stage inside Rhodesia to decide on the settlement proposals. This would in turn lead to a constitutional conference at a venue to be decided. Delegations from the regime and the ANC meet at the Rhodesia-Zambia border on the railway bridge spanning the Victoria Falls, in coaches supplied by the South African government. President Kaunda and Vorster meet at the bridge and preside over the opening session of the talks. The talks collapse after Smith has refused to grant diplomatic immunity to the exiled ANC leaders to attend the proposed committee state of constitutional negotiations inside Rhodesia. In a statement to the Rhodesian parliament, Smith says he will now open talks with other "representative groups" of Africans (August). Joshua Nkomo is elected president of the African National Council at a congress of his supporters held in Salisbury, and pledges the organisation to renewed negotiations with the regime while at the same time stepping up the armed liberation struggle. (Since September 1975 the African National Council of Zimbabwe led by Joshua Nkomo and the now renamed United African National Council led by Bishop Muzorewa, have functioned as separate organisations inside Zimbabwe) (September). Preliminary talks take place between the regime and the ANC led by Joshua Nkomo, culminating in the signing of a joint declaration of intent to negotiate a settlement (October-December). Starting on 15 December, a series of 13 formal meetings take place between the regime and the ANC delegation led by Joshua Nkomo, together with several committee meetings. From 24-27 February, Sir Denis Greenhill, a former Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, visits Rhodesia as the British government's special envoy. President Samora Machel announces the closure of Mozambique's border with Rhodesia and places his country on a war footing. The regime and the ANC announce that the talks have reached a total impasse on the issue of majority rule. Smith calls upon Britain to actively assist in resolving the constitutional crisis. The British government proposes a two-stage plan based on the following principles: acceptance of majority rule by the parties concerned; elections to take place in 18 months to two years; no independence before majority rule; the negotiations must not be long drawn out; a smooth and orderly transition to independence. Acceptance of these preconditions would open the way for negotiations on an independence constitution. Smith rejects the British proposals, describing them as "no less extreme than those of the African National Council" (March). In a major policy speech delivered in Lusaka in the course of a two-week tour of African countries, the US Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger confirms that the British settlement proposals have United States backing and appeals to South Africa to use its influence to bring about majority rule. He also promises that the US will take steps to fully impose economic sanctions against the Smith regime. In Salisbury, Smith announces that he is bringing four tribal chiefs and six other Africans into the Rhodesian Front government (April). Dr. Kissinger meets Smith in Pretoria and announces that a plan has been agreed by all parties concerned to bring about a peaceful settlement. Smith announces his acceptance of the Kissinger plan in a television and radio broadcast, and gives his version of the contents. They include:

- agreement by the Smith regime to majority rule within two years;
- an immediate meeting between the regime and African leaders to organise an interim government;

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- the interim government to consist of a Council of State and a Council of Ministers, comprised of both black and white members but organized in such a way as to leave the whites with an effective veto;
- the Ministers of Defence and Law and Order to remain in white hands during the interim period;
- sanctions to be lifted and all acts of war to cease upon the establishment of the interim government;
- the establishment of an international trust fund to assure the country's economic development.

The Presidents of the five front-line states - Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia - state that to accept the Kissinger plan as outlined by Smith "would be tantamount to legalising the colonialist and racist structures of power". They call upon the British government to immediately convene a conference outside Zimbabwe with "the authentic and legitimate representatives" of the people to establish a transitional government, prior to the holding of a full constitutional conference. Three days later the British government announces its decision to convene such a conference (September). Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe announce that ZAPU and ZANU have formed the Patriotic Front and will be sending a joint delegation to the proposed conference. They put forward a series of conditions without which any talk of settlement will in the view of the liberation movement have little meaning. These include: the lifting of the nationwide State of Emergency; the abolition of the protected villages; the lifting of all restrictions on political activity; the release of all those sentenced to death, other political prisoners and detainees; the suspension of political trials; and the safe return to Zimbabwe of all members of the liberation movement. Talks open in Geneva under the chairmanship of Sir Ivor Richard, Britain's Permanent Representative to the United Nations. The four nationalist delegations participating are led by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe (allied in the Patriotic Front), Bishop Muzorewa and Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole. Smith leads a Rhodesian Front delegation. Much of the first month of the talks is taken up by discussion of an independence date, eventually set by Britain as 1 March 1978 (October). The Geneva talks are adjourned by the British government until 17 January 1977. The Smith regime has throughout refused to consider any proposals other than its own version of the Kissinger plan.

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Ivor Richard tours Southern Africa for consultations with the front line states, the South African government, Zimbabwean nationalist leaders and the Smith regime. Following a two-day summit meeting in Lusaka between President Kaunda, Machel and Nyerere, and senior ministers from Angola and Mozambique, the front line states resolve to give "full political, moral and diplomatic support" to the Patriotic Front led by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe. The British government informs the various participants in the Geneva constitutional conference that the talks have been postponed and will not resume on 17 January as planned. Ivor Richard arrives in Salisbury on the second leg of his tour and presents Smith with working paper on Britain's proposals for an interim government. They envisage a British resident commissioner who would chair a majority black Council of Ministers and a National Security Council. Smith rejects the British proposals and later confirms his intention to seek an "internal settlement". Ivor Richard

declares at a press conference in Salisbury that the Geneva talks have broken down irretrievably (January). Following discussions in London between the US Ambassador to the UN, Andrew Young, Ivor Richard, and other British and US officials, Britain and the United States agree to mount a fresh settlement initiative. (February). The British Prime Minister, James Callaghan, announces at the close of talks with US President Jimmy Carter that Britain is ready to resume negotiations with the Smith regime. A new settlement plan which has the support of the US has been worked out in co-operation with South Africa, involving "guarantees" of economic leverage by the Vorster government that Smith will accept a two-year transition to majority rule. Smith claims in a policy statement that he had never accepted the principle of majority rule within two years as such, but only as part of the comprehensive package deal offered to him by Kissinger. The two year period would in any event commence after the establishment of an interim government in terms of the Anglo-American plan (March). British Foreign Secretary Dr. David Owen tours Southern Africa. On 11 April, he confirms that the current British plan is for a British-organised conference, possibly chaired by himself and with active US participation, to draw up an independence constitution. The problem of effecting a transfer of power to the majority would be left on one side for the time being. On 14 April the US announce that they are willing to sponsor the conference along with Britain, and to send a delegation. Dr. Owen arrives in Salisbury to consult opinion, the first British Foreign Secretary to visit Rhodesia since Sir Alec Douglas-Home in 1971. An Emergency Congress of the Rhodesian Front renews Smith's open mandate to negotiate a settlement (April). John Graham, British Deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Stephen Low, Ambassador to Zambia, arrive in Salisbury as envoys of the British and American governments to test opinion on the Anglo-American plan for a constitutional conference. Ambassador Young makes it clear at a news conference in London that the idea of American "co-sponsorship" of a constitutional conference - which had been strongly criticised by the Patriotic Front - has been dropped. "But there's no question that we are on board" (May). The London Observer publishes details of secret documents issued in October 1976 to white Rhodesian politicians and military officers, which reveal that the regime never had any intention of reaching a negotiated settlement on the basis of its apparent acceptance of the Kissinger package (June). The Anglo-American envoys, John Graham and Stephen Low, visit Salisbury for a second round of consultations on a revised package. Smith announces plans to hold a general election prior to setting up a broadly-based multiracial government and formulating a new constitution (July). Talks take place in London between Dr. Owen, the US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the South African Foreign Minister "Pik" Botha. On his return to Johannesburg, Botha reiterates South Africa's refusal to put pressure on Smith to accept the Anglo-American settlement terms. In the course of a tour of African countries, Dr. Owen and Andrew Young meet Vorster and Pik Botha in Pretoria for consultations on the Anglo-American proposals. The Rhodesian Front wins all 50 seats in the House of Assembly in the Rhodesian elections (August). The Anglo-American settlement

proposals, published in the form of a British White Paper, are released simultaneously in London, Washington and Salisbury. Dr. Owen and Ambassador Young visit Rhodesia to present the proposals personally to the regime. The proposals, "for the restoration of legality in Rhodesia and the settlement of the Rhodesian problem", are based on the following elements:

- the surrender of power by the illegal regime and a return to legality.
- an orderly and peaceful transition to independence in the course of 1978.
- free and impartial elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage.
- the establishment by the British Government of a transitional administration, with the task of conducting the elections for an independent government.
- a United Nations presence, including a United Nations force, during the transitional period.
- an Independence Constitution providing for a democratically elected government, the abolition of discrimination, the protection of individual human rights and the independence of the judiciary.
- a Development Fund to revive the economy of the country which the United Kingdom and the United States view as predicated upon the implementation of the settlement as a whole.

Three appendices to the White Paper deal with the details of a proposed independence constitution, the arrangements for the transitional period leading to independence, and the proposed Zimbabwe Development Fund. The arrangements for the transitional period, in particular, envisage the retention of a number of institutions which have been essential to the survival of the regime, namely the judiciary, the public service and the police. In a separate statement on law and order issued in Salisbury, Dr. Owen, confirms that not only will the regime's police force be preserved intact during the transitional period but that only certain units of the regular army such as the Selous Scouts, will be disbanded during the transitional period. The British Government nominates Field Marshall Lord Carver, formerly Chief of British Defence Staff, as resident commissioner designate. In this post, Lord Carver would exercise full legislative and executive power during the transitional period. Smith announces that he will shelve his own internal settlement plan while the Anglo-American proposals are being considered. The UN Security Council approves a resolution appointing Major General Prem Chand, of India, as the UN Special Representative to work with Lord Carver to secure a ceasefire in Rhodesia. Major General Chand, a retired Indian army officer, was formerly head of the UN peace-keeping force in Cyprus (September).

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Exploratory talks on the Anglo-American proposals were held in Malta between British Foreign Secretary Owen, US UN-Ambassador Young and Major General Chand on the one hand, and a Patriotic Front delegation headed by Nkomo and Mugabe on the other. After four days these ended in deadlock, mainly over the control of the armed forces during transition (January).


After three months negotiations between the Smith-regime and African delegations led by Bishop Muzorewa, Rev. Sithole and Chief Chirau the "Internal Settlement" agreement was signed. (See Section 4.3) (March). Secretaries Owen and Vance went to Maputo to negotiate with Nkomo and Mugabe. One again no agreement on the control of the armed forces during transition (April). British, Nigerian and Zambian leaders attempt to bring about a rapprochement between Smith and ZAPU leader, Nkomo. Secret negotiations between the two failed (August). President Kaunda reopened Zambia's border with Rhodesia, on account of "economic necessity". Presidents Machel and Nyerere protest strongly (October).

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A new draft constitution was published naming the future republic "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia" and retaining effective power in the hands of the whites (January). Bishop Muzorewa wins the majority of the African vote in the election held under the "internal settlement" agreement. Sithole protests the election result and plans a boycott (April). The Patriotic Front signs "Unity Pact" and pledges to intensify the war (May). Muzorewa becomes Prime Minister, while Smith and three other white conservatives retain cabinet posts. The vice-president of Muzorewa's UNANC party James Chikerema resigns and form a new party. Neither the newly elected British Conservative government nor the Carter administration recognize the new regime. South Africa remains its only ally (June). At the OAU summit meeting, the African states confirm their support for the Patriotic Front and recognize it as the sole representative of Zimbabwe (July). At the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka, agreement is reached between the British Government and the Patriotic Front to hold a constitutional conference (August). The constitutional conference opens in London between delegates of the three parties concerned: British Government, Patriotic Front and Muzorewa-Smith (September).

APPENDIX 3: SWEDISH SUPPORT TO ZAPU/ZANU: PATRIOTIC FRONT  
(in m. Sw. Crs.)

1976/77                      1977/78                      1978/79                      1979/80



Note

The Swedish support to the Patriotic Front is of a purely humanitarian nature. The allocated funds are primarily used for food, clothing, medical equipment and transport to meet the daily needs of the rapidly growing refugee population.



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Figure - 1 - The Three Velds




Figure - 2 -

ZIMBABWE

African Tribes




Figure - 3 -  
Age Structure of the European Population, 1969 Census





Figure - 4 -

Age Structure of the African population, 1969 Census



Source: Rhodesia, Census of Population, 1969, CSO, Salisbury, 1976, p. 10

Figure - 5 -

ZIMBABWE

Land Apportionment




Figure - 6 -

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Natural Regions and Related Farming Systems




Figure - 7 -  
 Transportation System of Zimbabwe, 1970





Figure - 8 - Annual Rainfall




Source: Adapted from George Kay. Rhodesia: A Human Geography, New York, 1970




Enrolment Rates in School for Black and White Children, 1976

A. African Enrolment



B. European Enrolment



Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics, January 1978, Table 4.

Note: 215,530 African children were born in 1968. Only 76 % of these were enrolled in Grade I in 1976 at the age of seven.

POPULATION ESTIMATES (in '000)  
1901-1978

Year	Africans	Europeans	Asians	Coloureds	Total
1901	700	11	-	1	710
1920	1,090	33	1	2	1,130
1945	2,200	81	3	13	2,290
1965	4,260	210	8	13	4,490
1978	6,600	254	11	24	6,900

## DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY AREA &amp; RACE: 1969 (in %)

Area	Europeans	Asians & Coloureds	Africans	Total
Urban	85	90	16.5	20
Rural	15	10	83.5	80

## POPULATION OF MAIN TOWNS

Town (including suburbs)	1969 Census*					Estimates as at 31st December, 1977				
	Africans	Europeans	Asians	Coloureds	Total	Africans‡	Europeans	Asians	Coloureds	Total‡
Bindura . . . . .	9 000	1 000	10	10	10 000	16 000	1 100	†	†	17 000
Bulawayo . . . . .	187 000	49 700	2 410	5 650	245 000	290 000	57 400	2 800	8 600	359 000
Fort Victoria . . . . .	8 000	2 500	150	190	11 000	19 000	2 600	200	300	22 000
Gatooma . . . . .	22 000	2 300	140	190	25 000	29 000	2 500	200	300	32 000
Gwelo . . . . .	37 000	8 300	320	670	46 000	58 000	8 800	400	1 000	68 000
Hartley . . . . .	8 000	600	20	10	9 000	11 000	700	†	†	12 000
Marandellas . . . . .	9 000	2 100	30	10	11 000	21 000	2 200	†	†	23 000
Que Que . . . . .	29 000	3 200	290	200	33 000	49 000	4 100	300	300	54 000
Redcliff . . . . .	7 000	1 500	†	†	8 000	16 000	1 800	†	†	18 000
Salisbury . . . . .	280 000	96 800	4 060	5 140	386 000	470 000	118 900	4 700	7 800	601 000
Shabani . . . . .	14 000	1 600	40	60	16 000	18 000	1 900	†	100	20 000
Sinoia . . . . .	12 000	1 600	210	30	14 000	23 000	1 800	200	100	25 000
Umtali . . . . .	36 000	8 400	520	420	46 000	51 000	9 100	600	600	61 000
Wankie . . . . .	18 000	2 200	†	40	20 000	30 000	2 700	†	100	33 000
<b>Total . . . . .</b>	<b>676 000</b>	<b>181 800</b>	<b>8 200</b>	<b>12 620</b>	<b>880 000</b>	<b>1 101 000</b>	<b>215 600</b>	<b>9 400</b>	<b>19 200</b>	<b>1 345 000</b>
Population of main towns as a percentage of National Total	13.9	79.6	91.5	83.3	17.3	16.8	82.0	91.3	83.5	19.6

\* 20th March, 1969, for Europeans, Asians and Coloureds, and 29th April, 1969, for Africans.

† Nil or less than 50.

‡ Amended.

Source: Central Statistical Office: Monthly Digest of Statistics. (supplement)

T - 4 - INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (£m)

	GDP (NDP 1945- 1953)	Non-Afri- can agri- culture	African agri- culture	Mining and quarry- ing	Manu- facturing	Electri- city, water etc.	Building and con- struction	Distri- bution	Other services
1945	(42.5)	-	-	5.5	5.3	(0.7)	(1.5)	-	-
1946	(49.0)	-	-	5.1	6.5	(0.8)	(2.0)	-	-
1947	(57.5)	-	-	5.1	7.7	(0.9)	(3.0)	-	-
1948	(69.0)	13.2	5.4	6.9	9.0	0.9	5.0	9.9	18.9
1949	(78.0)	13.5	4.9	7.8	10.6	1.2	6.9	10.9	22.2
1950	(95.3)	17.4	4.9	9.4	14.0	1.5	8.4	13.1	26.6
1951	(108.0)	-	-	10.1	18.5	(1.9)	(9.3)	-	-
1952	(130.0)	-	-	13.6	20.8	(1.8)	(11.9)	-	-
1953	(145.0)	-	-	13.2	22.2	(1.9)	-	-	-
1954	168.5	23.7	14.6	14.5	24.6	4.0	13.2	23.4	49.9
1955	186.5	24.6	15.1	15.7	26.8	4.6	15.5	27.0	56.9
1956	211.6	28.6	17.5	16.7	30.1	5.5	17.9	29.6	65.8
1957	238.0	29.7	17.3	17.5	35.8	6.4	23.1	32.4	76.7
1958	249.1	30.0	16.7	17.6	38.8	6.8	23.7	34.3	82.0
1959	264.6	33.9	16.9	17.2	41.8	7.0	21.3	38.6	87.9
1960	279.9	35.6	17.1	19.1	47.2	9.3	22.4	40.9	88.4
1961	294.6	44.5	19.5	18.7	49.5	10.5	18.0	42.6	91.5
1962	299.5	42.7	20.3	17.0	52.5	11.6	16.2	43.3	96.2
1963	308.2	44.3	20.2	15.8	53.7	13.2	14.6	43.9	102.6
1964	323.2	44.2	22.0	19.0	59.0	11.4	16.4	45.6	105.6
1965	341.5	41.5	16.3	24.1	67.4	10.9	16.0	52.3	113.1
1966	342.8	42.8	24.5	22.6	61.5	12.1	16.3	44.7	118.4
1967	375.6	41.0	34.9	23.1	71.1	12.9	20.2	50.6	122.0
1968	390.9	38.0	22.4	24.2	78.6	13.2	25.2	55.8	133.5
1969	464.6	50.1	32.8	31.3	91.2	14.8	28.9	62.4	152.8
1970	491.3	47.6	26.9	33.6	110.2	15.5	29.4	69.1	159.2
1971	569.7	61.2	36.4	35.2	131.0	16.2	32.3	77.8	179.9
1972	644.6	71.8	41.6	35.0	154.1	17.5	40.7	87.8	196.2
1973	700.3	75.0	29.7	48.9	173.9	19.6	42.7	100.6	210.1
1974	840.4	93.8	47.4	60.4	212.2	21.2	50.6	117.3	237.6

Source: see T-5

T - 5 - INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (%)

	Non-African agriculture	African agriculture	Mining and quarrying	Manufacturing	Electricity, water, etc.	Building and construction	Distribution	Other services
1945	..	--	12.9	12.5	(1.6)	(3.5)	--	--
1946	..	--	10.4	13.3	(1.6)	(4.1)	--	--
1947	..	--	8.9	13.4	(1.6)	(5.2)	--	--
1948	19.1	7.8	10.0	13.0	1.3	7.2	14.3	27.3
1949	17.3	6.3	10.0	13.6	1.5	8.8	14.0	28.5
1950	18.3	5.1	9.9	14.7	1.6	8.8	13.7	27.5
1951	--	--	9.4	17.1	(1.8)	(8.6)	--	--
1952	..	--	10.5	16.0	(1.4)	(9.2)	--	--
1953	..	--	9.1	15.3	(1.3)	--	--	--
1954	14.1	8.7	8.6	14.6	2.4	7.8	13.9	29.6
1955	13.2	8.1	8.4	14.4	2.5	8.3	14.5	30.5
1956	13.5	8.3	7.9	14.2	2.6	8.5	14.0	31.1
1957	12.5	7.3	7.4	15.0	2.7	9.7	13.6	32.2
1958	12.0	6.7	7.1	15.6	2.7	9.5	13.7	32.9
1959	12.8	6.4	6.5	15.8	2.6	8.0	14.6	33.2
1960	12.7	6.1	6.8	16.9	3.3	8.0	14.6	31.6
1961	15.1	6.6	6.4	16.8	3.5	6.1	14.5	31.0
1962	14.2	6.8	5.7	17.5	3.9	5.4	14.4	32.1
1963	14.3	6.6	5.1	17.4	4.3	4.7	14.3	33.3
1964	13.7	6.8	5.9	18.3	3.5	5.1	14.1	32.6
1965	12.2	4.8	7.1	19.7	3.2	4.7	15.3	33.1
1966	12.5	7.1	6.6	17.9	3.5	4.8	13.0	34.5
1967	10.9	9.3	6.2	18.9	3.4	5.4	13.5	32.5
1968	9.7	5.7	6.2	20.1	3.4	6.4	14.3	34.2
1969	10.8	7.1	6.7	19.6	3.2	6.2	13.4	32.9
1970	9.7	5.5	6.8	22.4	3.2	6.0	14.1	32.4
1971	10.7	6.4	6.2	23.0	2.8	5.7	13.7	31.6
1972	11.1	6.5	5.4	23.9	2.7	6.3	13.6	30.4
1973	10.7	4.2	7.0	24.8	2.8	6.1	14.4	30.0
1974	11.2	5.6	7.2	25.2	2.5	6.0	14.0	28.3

Sources:

For 1948-50 the data derive from *Accounts* [7] (1946-51), Table 17.

For 1945-7 and 1951-3 from Table 1 of *Accounts* [7] (1967), in the case of NDP raised by 8% to make allowance for output in the subsistence economy. I estimate that the figures for each of the years 1945-53 should be raised by a further 7-8% to make them comparable with the gross figures for later years. (The 'Monckton Report' [8] gives £145.2m for 1952 and £159.5m for 1953 (Appendix VI, p. 304).)

For 1954-9 from Table 1 of *Accounts* [7] (1967), Table 9 of *Accounts* (1954-64), and (for some 1959 data) *Economic Survey* [9] (1969).

For 1960-4 from Table 4 of *Accounts* [7] (1970). Note that in 1970 numerous small revisions were made in the 1960-8 data. These were mainly upward revisions of African agriculture (between £1.2m and £2.0m) and redistribution from 'Other services' to the other sectors. It may therefore be inferred that similar revisions should apply to earlier years also.

For 1971-4 from *Economic Survey* [9] (1974). Note that in this issue also there were many revisions of earlier data, again mainly affecting African agriculture, the adjustments varying between +£4.8m and -£13.5m. No explanation is available for these considerable revisions which represent an average reduction of £4.1m per year in the estimates of the output of African agriculture over the years 1965-73.

Notes:

-Data not available

Figures in this and other tables are in Rhodesian pounds (current). Up to the 1967 devaluation these were equal to the pound sterling; values in the currently used Rhodesian dollars may be obtained by multiplication by 2, and in pounds sterling using the current exchange rate.

The parentheses for 1945-53 for GDP indicate that NDP is in fact quoted for these years. Other figures in parentheses are in fact net output figures and no attempt has been made to eliminate the element of double counting that may be present. This is not usually of large magnitude in later years, for which comparisons are possible. In addition the figures for 1945-7 and 1951-3 are estimates by the author for the mining and quarrying sector and the manufacturing sector. In the case of the former, gross output data were converted to net output using a factor calculated from data for later years. For the manufacturing sector, net output was converted to contribution to GDP similarly. Full details are available from the author.

## THE AFRICAN POPULATION EMPLOYED IN THE MONEY ECONOMY

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. Employed</u>	<u>% of Total Population</u>	<u>Rhodesian Africans</u>	<u>% of Total population</u>
1921	140,000	13	48,000	4.5
1946	377,000	17	180,000	8
1961	613,000	19	336,000	10
1974	933,000	16	700,000	12

## RATIO OF FOREIGN AFRICAN LABOUR EMPLOYED IN THE MONEY ECONOMY

<u>Year</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1903	75
1921	66
1946	52
1961	45
1974	25

## AFRICAN WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT: 1946-1961

	<u>1946</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1961</u>
Total Number Employed (in '000)	376	527	602	628
Average Annual Earnings (in £)	26	43	75	102
Real Wages	30	38	56	65

a/ African Employment by Sector (in '000)

b/ Average Annual Earnings: 1954 and 1962 (in £)

	<u>1954</u>	<u>% of Employees</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>% of Employees</u>	<u>Average Rate of Growth in Wages</u>	
Agriculture	a/	218	39	244	40	3 %
	b/	48		61		
Domestic Service	a/	76	14	95	15	4 %
	b/	71		102		
Mining	a/	62	11	44	7	5 %
	b/	83		124		
Manufacturing	a/	63	11	73	12	11 %
	b/	65		164		

## GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 1964-1977 (in \$ m)

<u>Year</u>	<u>GDP at current prices</u>	<u>GDP at 1965 prices</u>	<u>Total popul- ation '000</u>	<u>GDP per capita, current prices</u>	<u>GDP per capita, 1965 prices</u>
1964	680	672	4350	156	154
1965	733	733	4490	163	163
1966	730	746	4630	157	161
1967	799	804	4790	166	167
1968	843	822	4960	170	165
1969	997	941	5130	194	183
1970	1073	978	5310	202	184
1971	1235	1091	5500	224	198
1972	1400	1190	5690	246	209
1973	1542	1236	5900	261	209
1974	1843	1345	6100	302	220
1975	1993	1328	6310	316	210
1976	2108	1283	6530	322	196
1977	2161	1195	6740	320	177
1978*		1146	6950		165

\* estimates.

Source: National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia, 1971 and 1977 and Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, July 1978 + supplement. Central Statistical Office, 1972, 1977, 1978.

T - 11 - PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY INDUSTRY OF ORIGIN

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Agriculture and forestry	17	19	20	15	17	17	17	17	14	18	17	17	16
Agricultural services	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Mining and quarrying	7	7	6	6	7	7	6	6	7	8	7	7	7
Manufacturing	18	17	18	19	19	21	22	23	24	24	24	23	22
Electricity and water	3	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	3	3
Construction	4	4	4	6	6	6	5	6	6	5	5	4	4
Finance and insurance	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5
Real estate	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2
Distribution, hotels and restaurants	15	13	13	14	13	14	13	13	14	13	13	13	12
Transport and communications	11	10	9	10	10	9	9	8	8	7	7	7	7
Public administration	6	7	6	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	8	10
Education services	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4
Health services	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Private domestic services	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	3
Other services, n.e.s.	5	5	5	6	5	6	6	5	5	5	5	6	6
Less: imputed banking service charges	- 2	- 2	- 2	- 2	- 2	- 2	- 2	- 2	- 2	- 2.5	- 3	- 3	- 4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

T - 12 - STRUCTURE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY INDUSTRY OF ORIGIN - TOTALS (in \$ m)

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Agriculture and forestry:	115	134	150	120	165	148	194	226	207	306	312	324	324
European, Asian and Coloured	82	84	80	74	100	92	119	140	143	193	217	216	216
African	33	50	70	45	66	55	75	87	63	113	95	108	108
Agricultural services	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	10
Mining and quarrying	50	45	47	48	63	68	70	72	97	127	120	157	157
Manufacturing	130	117	134	153	178	213	253	300	344	425	450	436	436
Electricity and water	23	24	26	27	30	31	33	37	41	41	41	48	52
Construction	26	25	33	43	52	54	57	73	81	75	81	75	75
Finance and insurance	20	24	27	30	33	37	41	54	62	76	88	93	93
Real estate	17	18	20	22	27	31	35	38	42	45	44	41	41
Distribution, hotels and restaurants	102	86	98	108	122	134	150	170	196	234	251	255	255
Transport and communication	75	71	66	74	88	85	95	105	105	113	128	137	137
Public administration	40	45	47	51	57	62	70	78	91	106	126	160	160
Education services	24	26	26	29	32	34	40	43	48	55	64	72	72
Health services	12	12	13	14	15	16	19	20	22	26	31	34	34
Private domestic services	23	23	24	26	27	30	33	35	37	40	40	49	49
Other services, n.e.s.	35	38	40	45	51	57	61	67	80	90	103	107	107
Less: imputed banking service charges	- 13	- 13	- 14	- 16	- 18	- 20	- 23	- 30	- 32	- 42	- 52	- 54	- 54
Total GDP at current factor cost 1/	680	681	743	702	929	999	1137	1298	1430	1743	1866	1995	1995
GDP price deflator 1965=100	100	97	99	102	106	109	113	117	124	137	150	164	164
Total GDP at constant 1965 prices	680	696	748	762	877	901	1004	1103	1145	1285	1243	1190	1190
Real annual % rate of GDP increase	-	3	7	2	15	3	11	10	4	11	- 2	- 4	- 4

Source: Central Statistical Office: National Accounts of Rhodesia 1976.1/ Includes non-market production consumed and invested within the rural African household sector.

CONTRIBUTION TO GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT OF KEY PRODUCTIVE SECTORS  
(at Current Prices in million \$)

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1977</u>
European Agriculture	82	193	233
Mining	49	127	146
Manufacturing	128	425	441

(INDEX at Contant Prices 1964=100)

	<u>1974</u>	<u>1977</u>
European Agriculture	172	150
Mining	190	162
Manufacturing	242	190

GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 1964-1977

<u>Year</u>	<u>Gross Domestic Product</u>	<u>GFCF</u>	<u>Public Sector</u>	<u>Public sector as % of total</u>	<u>Private Sector</u>	<u>Private sector as % of total</u>	<u>GFCF as % of GDP</u>
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>
1965	733.1	100.5	40.4	40.1	59.6	58.6	13.7
1966	730.0	84.0	42.6	51.1	41.4	48.9	11.5
1967	799.0	103.8	42.9	41.3	60.9	58.7	13.0
1968	843.6	150.5	42.2	28.0	108.3	72.0	17.8
1969	997.8	149.1	48.3	32.3	100.8	67.7	15.2
1970	1073.4	177.3	64.3	36.2	113.0	63.8	16.5
1971	1235.1	224.1	86.1	38.4	138.0	61.6	18.1
1972	1400.5	258.3	109.7	42.4	148.6	57.6	18.4
1973	1542.8	322.8	124.7	38.6	198.1	61.4	20.9
1974	1843.6	416.1	162.0	38.9	254.1	61.1	22.6
1975	1993.8	461.7	184.3	39.9	277.4	60.1	23.1
1976	2108.5	391.5	178.1	45.4	213.4	54.6	18.5
1977	2161.2	382.9					

Source: National Accounts and Balance of Payments, 1971, National Accounts 1976 and Monthly Digest of Statistics, July 1978.

Note: The figures for capital formation for recent years vary considerably in different sources; wherever possible the more recent quoted figures were taken.



## GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION (\$ M )

ITEM	1968	1969	1970	1971	By Industry							
					1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977		
Agriculture and forestry	20.3	19.9	21.3	26.3	28.0	28.5	37.3	47.0	42.1	33.0		
Mining and quarrying	23.9	16.7	25.3	27.1	19.9	21.1	35.8	39.9	60.4	68.0		
Manufacturing	34.0	33.4	31.1	38.1	41.0	72.2	107.5	116.9	80.4	87.3		
Electricity and water	9.2	5.0	9.2	17.3	28.5	39.0	34.2	42.6	29.5	27.3		
Construction	2.3	3.2	2.8	3.1	5.1	5.2	11.4	10.4	8.1	6.8		
Finance and insurance	1.0	1.5	2.2	3.6	5.4	5.7	4.9	4.6	7.5	5.8		
Real estate	22.5	22.9	27.7	29.6	36.3	49.6	53.6	42.1	33.0	32.3		
Distribution, hotels and restaurants	4.5	7.7	9.7	14.3	15.7	14.3	16.3	16.5	6.3	4.9		
Transport and communications	11.2	11.9	14.6	27.8	34.1	41.0	47.6	56.2	38.7	30.6		
Public administration	2.7	3.2	5.0	4.2	6.4	7.5	13.6	20.6	21.5	26.7		
Education services	1.9	2.4	3.3	4.6	4.7	6.8	10.4	13.7	12.8	10.7		
Health services	1.3	1.1	1.7	1.9	3.1	5.5	5.9	6.3	7.8	6.7		
Other services	2.7	2.1	4.6	3.8	3.3	4.4	6.9	8.7	8.8	7.2		
General purpose investment by government	10.9	11.1	12.3	15.3	19.5	23.6	27.2	39.6	34.6	35.3		
Total	148.3	142.0	170.7	216.9	250.9	324.4	412.6	462.2	391.5	382.9		
					By type of asset							
Residential buildings	22.4	22.8	27.6	29.5	36.2	49.6	53.6	41.9	33.0	32.3		
Non-residential buildings	16.9	14.3	17.9	30.1	38.4	43.4	70.8	79.3	76.1	72.5		
Civil engineering work	47.9	44.0	57.7	68.1	72.2	95.6	105.9	127.9	117.3	113.3		
Transport equipment	12.6	19.4	23.3	28.4	37.4	42.9	48.8	58.3	43.8	41.3		
Other equipment, plant and machinery	48.6	41.4	44.2	61.0	66.9	92.8	133.4	154.8	121.3	123.5		
Total	148.3	142.0	170.7	216.9	250.9	324.4	412.6	462.2	391.5	382.9		

Source: Central Statistical Office: Monthly Digest of Statistics (Supplement) July 1978.

## CHANGING SHARE OF GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION IN SELECTED SECTORS

	<u>1968</u>		<u>1975</u>	
	<u>\$ m</u>	<u>% of sub-total</u>	<u>\$ m</u>	<u>% of sub-total</u>
Manufacturing	34.0	100.0	116.9	100.0
Basic metal industries, metal product and machinery	10.1	29.7	55.0	47.0
Chemical and petroleum products	11.1	32.7	7.3	6.2
Textiles and cotton ginning	1.6	4.7	15.0	12.8
Food products	3.4	10.0	12.3	10.5
Mining and quarrying	23.9	100.0	39.9	100.0
Agriculture and forestry	20.3	100.0	47.0	100.0
European agriculture	16.2	79.8	35.9	76.4
African agriculture	0.4	1.5	0.2	0.4
Central government	3.8	18.7	10.9	23.2
Other sectors	70.1	-	258.4	-
TOTAL	<u>146.3</u>		<u>462.2</u>	

Source: Generated from CSO: National Accounts of Rhodesia 1976

## DIVISION OF NATIONAL INCOME BETWEEN WAGES &amp; PROFITS

<u>Year</u>	<u>African Wages</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>European Salaries &amp; Wages</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Private Gross Operating Profits (companies &amp; finance)</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Gross Domestic Income</u>	<u>(A + B) as % of G.D.I.</u>
1968	194	25	276	35	172	22	786	60
1969	212	23	302	32	216	23	934	55
1970	230	23	329	33	252	25	995	56
1971	255	22	369	32	299	26	1,145	54
1972	284	22	415	32	365	28	1,312	54
1973	316	22	465	32	445	31	1,440	54
1974	371	21	534	30	560	32	1,753	51
1975	436	23	616	33	562	30	1,883	56
1976	482	24	674	34	570	28	2,008	58
1977	530	26	720	36	533	27	2,009	62
	A			B		C		

## NATIONAL INCOME (\$m)

<i>Wages and Salaries</i> . . . . .	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
<i>Imputed Rent:</i>										
Owner-occupied dwellings . . . . .	469.2	513.4	557.7	622.7	694.1	776.4	898.5	1040.4	1138.3	1226.9
Central Government . . . . .	11.5	13.4	15.3	16.9	18.7	20.8	22.0	21.6	23.0	23.6
Local Government . . . . .	1.9	1.9	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.9	3.5	3.9	4.0	3.9
Other . . . . .	5.8	6.4	7.2	8.5	9.6	10.8	11.9	13.6	15.2	17.0
TOTAL . . . . .	19.2	21.7	25.3	28.1	30.9	34.5	37.4	39.1	42.2	44.5
<i>Gross Operating Profit:</i>										
Unincorporated enterprises:										
Households in African areas:										
Net sales . . . . .	40.8	56.0	47.1	62.4	66.4	47.6	89.0	71.2	84.0	88.4
Own consumption and capital formation	4.7	10.1	7.7	12.3	20.1	15.3	23.4	22.9	24.3	17.9
Other . . . . .	57.4	86.5	83.9	94.8	105.0	99.6	128.5	130.1	139.4	130.8
SUB-TOTAL . . . . .	102.9	152.6	138.7	169.5	191.5	162.5	240.9	224.2	247.7	237.1
Companies (non-financial) . . . . .	163.4	206.4	239.9	284.1	343.8	418.4	532.8	529.3	536.6	495.3
Financial institutions: private . . . . .	8.6	10.0	12.1	14.8	21.8	26.5	27.3	32.6	33.7	37.2
Public . . . . .	3.4	3.7	4.1	4.1	4.1	3.7	10.0	11.3	12.2	14.1
Public corporations (non-financial) . . . . .	16.1	21.6	16.4	28.6	35.8	30.1	29.9	42.3	35.6	0.7
Central Government enterprises (non-financial)	6.0	6.7	4.1	—	—	—	—	0.1	0.1	0.1
Local Government enterprises . . . . .	13.0	15.6	17.4	17.5	19.0	20.6	18.8	16.2	17.8	19.5
Less: Imputed banking service charges . . . . .	-16.0	-17.9	-20.8	-22.9	-29.5	-32.5	-42.2	-52.3	-56.2	-66.0
TOTAL . . . . .	297.4	398.7	411.9	494.7	586.5	629.3	817.5	803.7	827.5	738.1
GROSS DOMESTIC INCOME (FACTOR COST) . . . . .	785.7	934.1	995.0	1145.5	1311.5	1440.3	1753.4	1833.0	2007.9	2099.3
<i>Plus: indirect taxes</i> . . . . .	63.3	68.9	87.2	97.9	106.6	118.4	129.2	136.9	170.5	225.2
<i>Less: subsidies</i> . . . . .	-1.6	-0.8	-2.8	—	-5.0	-3.6	-19.6	-9.1	12.3	-14.6
GROSS DOMESTIC INCOME (MARKET PRICES) . . . . .	847.4	1001.2	1079.4	1243.4	1413.1	1553.1	1863.0	2010.8	2166.1	2219.9
<i>Less: net investment income paid abroad</i> . . . . .	-14.9	-17.8	-21.0	-30.4	-35.1	-38.5	-39.8	-37.5	-48.6	-43.5
GROSS NATIONAL INCOME (MARKET PRICES) . . . . .	832.5	984.4	1058.4	1213.0	1378.0	1514.6	1823.2	1973.3	2117.5	2176.4

The wages and salaries given above are based in part on the results of the Annual Census of Production. These figures are not entirely consistent then with the results given in tables 12 and 13 which reflect the results of quarterly employment enquiries.

EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS OF EUROPEAN, ASIAN AND COLONISED PERSONS\*

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
<i>Number in Employment, '000</i>										
Agriculture and forestry . . . . .	5.5	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.8	5.9	5.7	6.0	5.9	5.7
Mining and quarrying . . . . .	3.3	3.5	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.9	4.1	4.1
Manufacturing . . . . .	15.4	16.1	17.2	18.6	20.3	21.0	21.9	22.5	21.7	20.8
Electricity and water . . . . .	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9
Construction . . . . .	4.5	5.3	5.3	5.9	5.8	6.1	6.4	6.0	5.3	4.8
Finance, insurance and real estate . . . . .	5.9	6.3	6.4	6.9	7.7	8.2	8.5	8.7	8.5	8.1
Distribution, restaurants and hotels . . . . .	18.9	19.4	19.4	19.9	20.1	21.1	20.7	20.4	19.2	18.1
Transport and communications . . . . .	13.5	13.2	13.6	13.8	14.0	14.0	14.2	14.6	14.7	14.5
Public administration . . . . .	11.0	11.3	11.5	12.3	12.7	12.4	12.7	12.8	12.2	11.7
Education . . . . .	5.9	6.1	6.6	6.6	7.0	7.3	7.2	7.3	7.3	7.1
Health . . . . .	3.0	3.0	3.2	3.5	3.9	3.9	4.2	4.4	4.2	4.3
Other services . . . . .	8.4	8.8	9.7	10.0	10.3	10.9	11.2	11.2	10.7	10.5
TOTAL . . . . .	97.0	100.0	104.0	109.0	113.0	116.0	118.0	121.0	120.0	117.0
<i>Average Earnings: \$</i>										
Agriculture and forestry . . . . .	2 727	2 786	2 875	2 839	3 017	3 424	4 638	4 817	5 085	5 737
Mining and quarrying . . . . .	3 697	4 200	4 421	4 811	4 865	5 278	6 081	6 949	7 585	8 488
Manufacturing . . . . .	3 170	3 304	3 570	3 812	4 173	4 471	5 119	5 818	6 406	6 678
Electricity and water . . . . .	2 786	3 733	3 800	4 294	4 556	4 882	5 474	6 421	6 947	7 579
Construction . . . . .	2 887	2 792	3 132	3 152	4 155	4 164	4 859	5 333	5 943	6 438
Finance, insurance and real estate . . . . .	2 949	3 111	3 297	3 348	3 704	3 817	4 459	4 931	5 412	6 000
Distribution, restaurants and hotels . . . . .	2 464	2 464	2 639	2 940	3 154	3 322	3 657	4 250	4 635	4 939
Transport and communications . . . . .	2 423	3 545	3 684	3 812	4 179	4 525	4 923	5 304	6 007	6 343
Public administration . . . . .	3 201	3 301	3 526	3 618	3 866	4 669	5 339	5 739	6 364	7 665
Education . . . . .	2 559	2 705	2 712	3 121	3 357	3 616	4 097	4 740	5 164	5 437
Health . . . . .	2 187	2 367	2 506	2 718	2 718	2 974	3 214	3 614	4 119	4 279
Other services . . . . .	2 500	2 636	2 819	2 710	2 883	3 339	3 889	4 080	4 495	4 781
TOTAL . . . . .	2 849	3 021	3 164	3 356	3 676	4 009	4 525	5 093	5 618	6 156
<i>Total Earnings: \$ million</i>										
Agriculture and forestry . . . . .	15.0	15.6	16.1	15.9	17.5	20.2	23.3	28.9	30.0	32.7
Mining and quarrying . . . . .	12.2	14.7	16.8	17.8	18.0	19.0	22.5	27.1	31.1	34.8
Manufacturing . . . . .	48.2	53.2	61.4	70.9	83.7	93.9	112.1	130.9	139.0	138.9
Electricity and water . . . . .	5.3	5.6	5.7	7.3	8.2	9.2	10.4	13.2	13.2	14.4
Construction . . . . .	12.9	14.8	16.6	16.5	24.1	25.4	31.1	33.2	31.5	30.9
Finance, insurance and real estate . . . . .	17.4	19.6	21.1	23.1	28.5	31.3	37.9	42.9	46.0	48.6
Distribution, restaurants and hotels . . . . .	45.8	47.8	51.2	58.5	64.0	70.1	75.7	86.7	88.3	90.7
Transport and communications . . . . .	43.4	46.8	50.1	52.6	58.5	61.8	69.9	78.9	88.3	90.7
Public administration . . . . .	33.6	37.3	39.4	44.5	49.1	57.9	67.8	79.7	103.1	122.6
Education . . . . .	15.1	16.5	17.9	20.6	23.5	26.4	29.5	34.6	37.7	38.6
Health . . . . .	6.5	7.1	7.7	9.4	10.6	11.6	13.5	15.9	17.3	18.4
Other services . . . . .	21.0	23.2	25.4	27.1	28.7	36.4	40.2	45.7	48.1	50.2
TOTAL . . . . .	276.4	302.1	339.1	369.1	415.4	465.1	533.9	616.2	674.2	720.2

\* Employees temporarily absent from their civilian occupation on military service are shown as employed in their normal civilian industry. Military make-up pay met by Government is included under Public administration and not allocated to the employee's normal civilian industry. Accordingly some distortions are contained in the statistics of average earnings. † Totals have been rounded.

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EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS OF AFRICANS

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
<i>Number in Employment, '000</i>										
Agriculture and forestry	283.1	301.9	299.2	305.3	336.4	350.6	359.8	357.8	350.2	342.3
Mining and quarrying	48.4	50.3	53.4	54.1	54.5	54.3	58.2	58.6	59.6	57.4
Manufacturing	80.8	88.9	96.7	104.3	111.7	119.9	131.1	135.3	133.8	126.9
Electricity and water	4.1	3.8	4.1	4.1	4.3	4.7	5.0	5.0	4.8	4.7
Construction	29.7	34.3	36.9	40.9	43.6	50.6	57.8	54.6	46.2	41.4
Finance, insurance and real estate	2.3	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.9	3.1	3.4	3.6	4.0
Distribution, restaurants and hotels	42.4	45.1	45.0	46.3	50.5	54.1	55.9	55.2	57.8	52.4
Transport and communications	22.7	22.2	22.9	25.3	27.0	28.2	29.6	30.7	31.1	31.3
Public administration	24.5	26.3	27.5	27.3	27.4	29.0	30.7	35.1	37.6	43.3
Education	24.3	24.8	24.4	24.9	24.9	26.0	27.5	28.7	29.6	29.5
Health	7.2	7.2	7.5	7.9	8.2	8.6	8.8	9.1	9.3	10.2
Private domestic service	102.0	109.3	109.3	114.0	119.4	122.6	124.4	126.3	126.1	125.0
Other services	21.7	22.1	25.1	25.6	29.5	30.4	33.3	35.7	33.4	34.1
<b>Total*</b>	<b>693.0</b>	<b>735.0</b>	<b>735.0</b>	<b>783.0</b>	<b>840.0</b>	<b>882.0</b>	<b>923.0</b>	<b>934.0</b>	<b>919.0</b>	<b>901.0</b>
<i>Average Earnings \$</i>										
Agriculture and forestry	1.23	1.23	1.27	1.32	1.34	1.44	1.59	1.80	2.09	2.52
Mining and quarrying	3.22	3.36	3.45	3.53	3.60	3.87	4.36	5.07	5.74	6.59
Manufacturing	4.43	4.77	4.82	4.83	5.12	5.69	6.33	7.24	8.11	9.18
Electricity and water	3.90	3.95	4.29	4.88	5.12	5.72	6.03	6.80	7.92	8.94
Construction	3.67	3.32	4.04	4.72	5.07	4.82	5.48	6.56	6.84	7.59
Finance, insurance and real estate	6.96	6.54	7.31	7.60	7.78	8.42	1.000	1.176	1.417	1.725
Distribution, restaurants and hotels	3.84	3.99	4.29	4.73	4.79	4.97	5.49	6.47	7.17	8.09
Transport and communications	6.26	6.76	6.55	7.35	7.50	7.80	8.65	9.61	1.074	1.195
Public administration	4.08	4.45	4.51	5.20	5.20	6.09	7.65	8.52	9.97	1.099
Education	5.12	6.09	6.56	7.58	7.67	8.23	9.13	1.042	1.169	1.271
Health	5.12	5.69	5.73	6.20	6.71	6.98	7.54	8.14	1.075	1.186
Private domestic service	2.81	2.63	2.76	2.89	2.95	3.02	3.21	3.58	3.92	4.52
Other services	3.87	4.16	4.26	4.21	4.34	4.10	5.11	5.79	6.62	7.45
<b>Total</b>	<b>2.80</b>	<b>2.88</b>	<b>3.06</b>	<b>3.26</b>	<b>3.38</b>	<b>3.89</b>	<b>4.02</b>	<b>4.64</b>	<b>5.24</b>	<b>5.88</b>
<i>Total Earnings \$ million</i>										
Agriculture and forestry	34.9	37.2	37.2	40.3	45.1	50.4	57.1	64.4	73.1	79.4
Mining and quarrying	15.6	16.9	18.4	19.1	19.6	21.0	25.4	28.7	34.2	37.8
Manufacturing	35.8	42.4	47.6	50.4	59.3	68.2	83.0	95.0	108.5	116.5
Electricity and water	1.6	1.5	1.8	2.0	2.2	2.5	3.0	3.4	3.8	4.2
Construction	10.9	11.4	14.9	19.3	22.1	24.4	31.7	35.8	31.6	30.6
Finance, insurance and real estate	1.6	1.7	1.9	1.9	2.1	2.5	3.1	4.0	5.1	6.9
Distribution, restaurants and hotels	14.2	15.0	19.3	24.2	24.2	26.9	29.6	35.7	38.6	42.4
Transport and communications	16.3	18.0	15.0	18.6	19.7	22.0	25.6	28.6	31.4	35.4
Public administration	10.0	11.7	12.4	15.4	16.7	19.6	23.5	28.9	31.2	41.6
Education	13.9	15.1	16.0	18.5	19.1	21.4	25.1	28.9	34.6	41.6
Health	3.9	4.1	4.1	4.9	5.5	6.0	6.9	8.5	10.0	12.1
Private domestic service	26.6	27.7	30.2	32.9	35.2	37.0	39.9	49.4	49.4	52.1
Other services	8.4	9.2	10.7	11.2	12.8	14.3	17.0	19.5	22.1	25.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>193.7</b>	<b>211.9</b>	<b>220.7</b>	<b>255.2</b>	<b>283.6</b>	<b>316.3</b>	<b>370.8</b>	<b>433.5</b>	<b>483.8</b>	<b>530.0</b>

\* Totals have been rounded.  
Average earnings have become distorted in recent years by the large number of part-time and casual employees included in the statistics.

INDEX OF AFRICAN EMPLOYMENT AND REAL WAGE STATISTICS IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES: 1975-1977  
1968=100

	<u>EMPLOYMENT</u>		<u>WAGES</u>		<u>PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT</u>	
	<u>1975</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1975</u>
Agriculture	127	121	112	120	41	38
Mining	123	119	120	125	7	6
Manufacturing	167	157	125	127	12	14
Construction	183	137	137	123	4	6
Distribution	131	124	129	129	6	6
Public Administr.	140	172	160	164	4	4
Domestic Service	124	121	104	100	15	14
Average total for all sectors	135	130	126	128	Total empl. 100%=693,000	Total empl. 100%=934,000

INDEX OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT AND REAL WAGES: 1975-1978 1968=100

	<u>EUROPEANS</u>		<u>1978 est.</u>	<u>AFRICANS</u>		<u>1978 est.</u>
	<u>1975</u>	<u>1977</u>		<u>1975</u>	<u>1977</u>	
Average No. Empl.	125	121	116	135	130	128
Average Real Earnings	131	139		126	128	

## EVOLUTION OF ANNUAL EARNINGS OF EMPLOYEES BY SECTOR AND RACE

	<u>Agriculture and forestry</u>	<u>Mining and quarrying</u>	<u>Manufacturing</u>	<u>Distribution, hotels and rest.</u>	<u>Private Domestic</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>1964</u>							
Total African (\$m)	36.4	12.0	25.1	13.2	22.1	45.2	154.0
Total European (\$m)	15.8	9.2	34.8	41.9	-	119.1	220.8
African earnings per employee	123.9	287.8	391.0	322.0	235.9	397.9	237.7
In 1964 consumer prices (\$)							
European earnings per employee	2821.4	3407.4	2740.2	2064.0	-	2550.3	2509.1
In 1964 consumer prices (\$)							
<u>1977</u>							
Total African (\$m)	79.4	37.8	116.5	42.4	52.1	201.8	530.0
Total European and other (\$m)	32.7	34.8	138.9	89.4	-	424.4	720.2
African earnings per employee	128.9	365.9	510.0	449.5	235.3	563.4	326.8
deflated by 1977 Consumer Price Index (\$)							
European earnings per employee deflated by 1977 Consumer Price Index	3219.3	4763.1	3747.4	2771.7	-	3487.0	3454.3
Average annual rate of increase of real African per capita earnings 1964-1977	0.3	1.9	2.1	2.5	- 0.02	2.7	2.5
Average annual rate of increase of real European per capita earnings 1964-1977	1.0	2.6	2.4	2.3	-	2.4	2.5

Source: Central Statistical Office: Monthly Digest of Statistics (Supplement, July 1979). The annual per capita earnings for 1977 were deflated by the Consumer Price Index 180.0 for urban Africans and 176.2 for urban Europeans and others, with the CPI for 1964=100.0. See C.S.O. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics August 1978, Tables (4) and (5) for the commodity structure upon which the index is built.

## DISTRIBUTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP, FARM POPULATION AND RELATIVE PRODUCTIVITIES IN 1974

	<u>White Farming</u>	<u>APLs</u> <sup>a/</sup>	<u>TTLs</u> <sup>b/</sup>	<u>Total</u>
Total population ('000)	1530.0	103.3	3500.0	5133.3
African	1500.0	103.3	3500.0	5103.3
Other	30.0	-	-	30.0
Number of Farmers ('000)	6.2	8.6	660.0	674.8
Wage Labour	356.9	4.4	-	361.3
Total Land Area ('000ha)	14839.9	1072.2	16200.0	32112.0
Area under Crops ('000ha)	614.1	85.9	1677.0	2377.0
Ratio Cropped Area:Total Area (%)	4.1	8.0	10.4	7.4
Total Value of Crop Production (\$m)	231.0	8.0 <sup>c/</sup>	72.0 <sup>c/</sup>	311.0
Average Yield per hectare (\$/ha)	376.0	93.0	43.0	131.0
Total Production (crops+Livestock) (\$m)	320.0		120.0	440.0
Average per hectare total land area (\$)	21.56	6.95		13.70

Notes: a/ African Purchase Lands  
b/ Tribal Trust Lands  
c/ Estimated

Source: GSO Monthly Digest of Statistics; Whitsun estimates (for total farm population and population of TTLs); and Arthur Hunt "The Agricultural Industry of Rhodesia" a background paper commissioned by the Whitsun Foundation.

## DISTRIBUTION OF NATURAL FARMING REGIONS BY RACIAL LAND CATEGORIES, 1977 in '000s Acres

<u>Natural Region</u>	<u>Total Area</u>	<u>European Land</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>African Land</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>National Land</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Total</u>
I	1515.3	1075.9	71	197.0	13	242.4	16	100
II	18144.7	12519.8	69	4536.2	25	1088.7	6	100
III	16938.6	7622.4	45	7283.6	43	2032.6	12	100
IV	32147.8	9001.4	28	17359.8	54	5786.6	18	100
V	25423.0	6610.1	26	12965.7	51	5847.3	23	100
X	3015.0	60.3	2	1628.1	54	1326.6	44	100
Totals	97184.4	36889.8		43970.4		16324.2		



## AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT

Year	African Areas			European Areas		
	Sales through Marketing Agencies \$ million	Production for Rural Household Consumption \$ million	Approximate Total \$ million	Gross Output (at Current Prices) \$ million	Index of Gross Output (at 1964 prices)	Index of Producer Prices 1964 = 100
1964	9.0	27.2	36.2	140.0	100.0	100.0
1965	8.6	26.4	35.0	142.2	93.2	108.3
1966	10.2	47.0	57.2	146.6	113.4	90.8
1967	12.3	60.1	72.4	147.1	117.7	88.5
1968	7.2	39.9	47.1	138.7	97.4	98.3
1969	13.7	55.1	68.8	174.2	129.6	93.2
1970	11.2	46.2	57.4	171.9	122.3	98.8
1971	16.5	61.4	77.8	211.7	154.9	97.4
1972	24.9	65.4	90.3	237.5	169.4	98.2
1973	22.2	46.6	68.8	250.7	140.8	126.9
1974	31.9	88.0	119.9	324.7	165.4	140.5
1975	32.2	70.1	102.3	368.2	171.5	154.0
1976	34.1	87.8	117.0	393.4	182.9	152.9
1977	27.3	87.2	115.0	394.1		
Average annual rate of growth						
in % 1964-1975						
			5.6		5.1	

Source: Central Statistical Office: Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (Supplement) July 1978

Note: In deriving growth rates, in real terms, total African production is also deflated by the unit value of European output

## ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF LAND HOLDINGS IN TRIBAL AREAS IN 1976

<u>Population Density: (in %)</u> <sup>2</sup>	<u>Land Area</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Average Land Area (ha/family) a/</u>	
			<u>1969</u>	<u>1976 Equivalent</u>
Group A: Over 40 persons/km <sup>2</sup>	6.0	16.5	10.9	8.0
Group B: 20-39 " "	32.6	54.0	20.9	15.4
Group C: Less than 20 " "	61.4	29.5	10.8	80.0
Total	100.0	100.0	33.6	24.7

Note: a/ Total land area has been found by converting km<sup>2</sup> to hectares, including all land not just farming land. Total number of families has been found by dividing total population in each density group by a factor of 6. (According to the 1969 Census the average family size of the African population was between 6 and 7). According to the 1969 Census, the total number of families in tribal trust lands found by this method was 485,000. Since there were thought to be some 660,000 families in 1976 the number of families in the population column in the table was inflated by 660/485 to give a 1976 equivalent.

Source: 1969 Census.

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## RELATIVE SIZE OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (\$ m)

	<u>1965</u>			<u>1975</u>		
	<u>Gross Output</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Gross Output</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Foodstuffs	103	26	1	264	20	2
Drink & Tobacco	39	10	4	90	7	5
Textiles	30	8	6	137	10	4
Clothing & Footwear	30	8	5	88	7	6
Wood & Furniture	14	4	9	37	3	10
Paper & Printing	22	6	7	70	5	7
Chemical & Petroleum Prods.	55	14	3	176	14	3
Non-Metallic Mineral Prods.	11	3	10	49	4	9
Metals & Metal Prods.	63	16	2	331	25	1
Transport Equipment	21	5	8	56	4	8
Other Manufacturing	2	0	11	14	1	11
Total	388	100		1,311	100	

T - 28 -  
INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION\* 1964=100

	Food- stuffs	Drink and Tobacco	Textiles including Cotton Ginning	Clothing and Footwear	Wood and Furniture	Paper and Printing and Publishing	Chemical and Petroleum Products	Non- metallic Mineral Products	Metals and Metal Products	Transport Equipment and Workshops	Other Manu- facturing Groups	All Manu- facturing Groups	Electricity Production	Mineral Production	Total Industrial Production
1968	124,1	92,2	151,9	122,4	123,8	108,0	113,5	154,6	134,0	89,9	92,7	117,8	146,6	108,9	118,5
1969	132,8	97,8	217,6	129,5	134,3	117,6	127,3	162,2	154,5	108,0	93,5	132,9	158,2	132,4	134,8
1970	155,9	108,7	200,9	130,5	154,4	141,6	156,1	195,7	188,6	107,2	116,4	148,7	169,1	145,1	149,3
1971	169,0	112,7	222,8	138,9	166,6	150,6	169,0	226,4	216,1	123,1	118,0	160,3	179,4	157,6	163,9
1972	184,7	125,6	259,4	151,8	177,9	167,7	191,4	251,4	247,6	131,6	170,8	184,3	199,0	170,4	177,9
1973	205,3	142,8	277,6	155,5	189,0	174,8	186,8	271,9	269,2	100,3	175,1	194,4	192,1	191,2	194,5
1974	206,6	154,9	291,9	158,6	201,4	193,6	204,1	300,8	293,8	105,3	179,7	207,9	153,6	183,0	199,0
1975	208,9	161,1	283,1	149,6	183,0	178,9	214,3	176,0	291,9*	109,9	166,0	205,9*	161,9	186,6	199,3
1976	220,5	166,5	257,9	141,9	168,8	163,0	190,2	238,4	269,5*	86,4	166,6	194,1*	159,0	200,8	194,3
1977	238,9	155,7	259,9*	136,5	142,9	153,4*	187,8	193,7	230,0*	82,2	177,1	181,7*	114,2	189,2	178,9*

\* Amended

## MINERAL PRODUCTION: 1964-1976

<u>Year</u>	<u>Value (R\$m)</u>	<u>Volume Index 1964=100</u>	<u>Unit Value Index 1964=100</u>
1964	53.5	100.0	100.0
1965	63.9	110.5	108.2
1966	65.2	105.3	115.8
1967	66.7	113.4	110.0
1968	67.4	108.9	115.7
1969	87.7	132.4	123.8
1970	98.7	145.1	127.2
1971	101.2	157.6	120.0
1972	107.4	173.2	115.9
1973	135.9	196.2	129.3
1974	165.1	185.4	165.4
1975	177.8	187.1	177.6
1976	230.5	200.6	214.5

Source: Rhodesia, Central Statistical Office, Monthly Digest of Statistics, August 1977, table 7.

## THE MOVEMENT OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS: 1965-1977

	<u>Exports at</u>	<u>Exports as</u>	<u>Imports at</u>	<u>Imports as</u>	<u>Terms of</u>	<u>Import Equivalent</u>
	<u>current prices</u>	<u>% of GDP</u>	<u>current prices</u>	<u>% of GDP</u>	<u>Trade</u>	<u>of Exports</u>
1965	322	44	245	33	101	325
1966	207	23	179	24	82	170
1967	205	20	193	24	80	164
1968	194	20	220	26	83	161
1969	241	22	213	21	86	207
1970	273	24	250	23	86	235
1971	258	22	299	20	81	241
1972	350	24	291	21	82	288
1973	429 e	30	355 e	23	85	365
1974	329 e	24	329 e	18	82	270
1975	329 e	20	329 e	17	80	263
1976	400 e	23	266 e	11	74	297
1977	500 e	29	336 e	16	70	348

e = estimated

## DIRECTION AND VALUE OF RHODESIAN TRADE (\$m)

<u>Imports</u>	<u>South Africa</u>		<u>Zambia</u>		<u>Malawi</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>% of</u>	<u>total</u>	<u>% of</u>	<u>total</u>	<u>% of</u>	<u>total</u>	
1965	78	23.4	15.3	4.5	4.4	1.3	334
1966	110	46.6	7.0	2.9	3.0	1.3	236
1967	135	51.5	2.9	1.1	2.7	1.0	262
1968	150	51.7	1.3	0.5	2.9	1.0	290
1969	155	55.8	0.6	0.2	3.8	1.3	278
1970	160	48.5	1.0	0.3	5.1	1.6	329
1971	170	43.0	0.6	0.2	5.3	1.4	395
1972	165	40.8	1.5	0.4	4.3	1.1	404
1973	180	37.5	0.4	0.1 <sup>a</sup>	5.6	1.7	480

<u>Exports</u>	<u>South Africa</u>		<u>Zambia</u>		<u>Malawi</u>		<u>USA</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>% of</u>	<u>total</u>	<u>% of</u>	<u>total</u>	<u>% of</u>	<u>total</u>	<u>% of</u>	<u>total</u>	
1965	41	10.3	99.5	24.9	20.8	5.2	14.1	3.5	399
1966	60	25.2	64.9	27.2	17.3	7.2	9.4	3.9	238
1967	80	33.6	45.1	18.9	14.7	6.2	6.5	2.7	238
1968	80	27.8	31.6	13.5	12.6	5.4	1.6	0.6	234
1969	85	28.6	30.5	10.2	12.5	4.2	0.1	-	297
1970	95	27.4	32.5	9.4	15.5	4.5	0.1	-	346
1971	90	23.7	29.5	7.8	15.9	4.2	0.1	-	379
1972	100	21.1	16.2	3.4	21.1	4.5	12.4	2.6	474
1973	103	16.1	11.0 <sup>a</sup>	1.7	21.2	3.3	25.7	4.0	640

a = mostly electricity, Jan-Nov.

Note: Totals are Rhodesian figures, except that for 1973 which is an estimate. South African figures are derived from published figures for Africa less imports reported by African countries.

Source: Seventh Report of the Security Council in Pursuance of Resolution 253, Annex VII.

## BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: CURRENT AND CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS (\$m)

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Merchandise, net	77	27	12	-22.0	32.0	27.9	3.1	62.5	89.6	55.2	33.0	156.8	130.8
Invisible transactions, net	-51	-31	-29	-27.1	-27.4	-40.4	-58.5	-59.7	-103.9	-139.9	-153.5	-149.3	-150.5
Services	-21	-8	-16	-11.2	-5.3	-16.8	-24.8	-21.8	-58.5	-81.3	-89.5	-77.4	-91.7
Investment income	-26	-19	-13	-14.9	-17.8	-21.0	-30.4	-35.1	-38.5	-39.8	-37.5	-48.6	-43.5
Transfers	-4	-4	0	-1.0	-4.3	-2.6	-3.3	-2.8	-6.9	-18.8	-26.5	-23.2	-15.3
Net balance on Current Account	26	-4	-17	-49.1	4.6	-12.5	-55.4	2.7	-14.4	-84.7	-120.5	7.4	-19.7
Capital transactions, net	4	-5	24	-39.5	9.9	26.3	30.5	-2.3	51.6	62.6	101.7	25.7	-22.2
Total Current & Capital Transactions	30	-9	7	-9.6	14.5	13.8	-24.9	0.4	37.2	-22.1	-18.8	33.1	-41.9
Short-term Financing, Changing in Banking Reserves and Omissions	30	-9	7	-9.6	14.5	13.8	-24.9	0.4	37.2	-22.1	-18.8	33.1	-41.9

Allowance has been made for non-monetary gold, internal freight to border, internal freight to border, timing and coverage adjustments in the computation of merchandise trade.

## CENTRAL GOVERNMENT MILITARY ALLOCATIONS 1973/1974 - 1977/1978 (\$m)

<u>Vote</u>	<u>1973-74</u>	<u>1974-75</u>	<u>1975-76</u>	<u>1976-77</u>	<u>1977-78</u>
Treasury	10.3	8.4	9.0	17.0	48.2
Combined Operations	-	-	-	0.1	0.2
Defence	38.8	45.1	60.8	98.4	141.8
Internal Affairs	16.3	25.2	27.9	41.1	39.9
Prisons	3.4	4.3	4.9	5.9	6.6
Law and Order	0.7	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.2
BSAP	24.6	29.9	35.3	48.7	55.6
Total	94.1	113.8	139.0	212.3	293.5
As % of all outlays	30.9	31.3	34.8	40.7	45.3

Source: C.S.O, Monthly Digest of Statistics, Salisbury, January 1978.

## AVERAGE RAINFALL PER YEAR

<u>Rainfall in Centimetres</u>	<u>Percentage of the Country Affected</u>
under - 36	5
36 - 45	8
45 - 54	18
54 - 63	32
63 - 72	20
72 - 81	13
over - 81	5

## DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL INCOME 1974

	<u>Pop. '000</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total Income</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Income/ Capita</u>
Europeans, Asians and Coloureds	300	5	925	63	3,062
Africans	5,800	95	539	37	93
Total	6,100	100	1,464	100	
Africans in Urban Areas	1,000	17	314	65	314
Africans in European Rural Areas	1,200	20	57	12	47
Africans in other Rural Areas	3,600	63	113	23	31
Total	5,800	100	484	100	

## WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT BY RACE AND SECTOR 1975

<u>Sector</u>	<u>No's '000</u>	<u>WHITES</u>	<u>No's '000</u>	<u>BLACKS</u>	<u>RATIO W/B</u>
		<u>Average Annual Earnings \$</u>		<u>Average Annual Earnings \$</u>	
Agriculture and Forestry	6	4,800	358	180	27:1
Mining and Quarrying	4	7,000	57	507	14:1
Manufacturing	23	5,800	135	724	8:1
Electricity and Water	2	6,400	5	680	
Construction	6	5,500	55	656	
Finance Insurance, Real Estate	9	5,000	3	1,176	
Distribution, Restaurants and Hotels	20	4,300	55	647	
Transport and Communications	15	5,400	31	961	
Public Administration	14	5,700	35	852	
Education	7	4,740	29	1,042	
Health	4	3,600	9	934	
Private Domestic Service	-	-	126	356	
Other Services	11	4,100	34	579	
Total	121	5,093	934	464	11:1



CASH WAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PERMANENT AFRICAN WORKERS

June, 1975

Monthly Cash Wage	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	
Under \$10	119	670	2 266	2 070	2 266	2 070	10	510	10	970	190	60	21 320	470	28 790	7 460
\$10 - \$20	108	960	16 320	6 760	30	4 740	30	4 200	260	4 130	720	110	78 540	4 250	120 070	41 490
\$20 - \$30	17	570	14 200	13 960	870	9 950	80	6 640	720	3 370	640	440	30 050	3 930	86 760	56 710
\$30 - \$40	6	120	10 350	31 860	1 410	21 170	120	13 160	2 970	3 470	2 160	2 110	5 920	8 180	102 610	96 690
\$40 - \$50	2	340	6 730	37 860	1 590	12 180	440	11 980	4 750	3 990	1 940	1 820	560	8 900	94 740	84 180
\$50 - \$70	1	590	6 370	28 530	1 220	8 670	1 350	12 790	7 250	9 040	6 490	1 280	-	8 060	87 040	87 040
\$70 - \$90	700	1 650	10 580	260	4 210	830	4 360	3 050	4 000	7 310	960	-	-	1 810	39 020	39 020
\$90 - \$110	460	420	4 100	70	1 540	630	1 850	1 560	2 540	6 400	790	-	-	790	26 680	26 680
\$110 - \$130	370	200	1 760	20	710	290	930	840	1 160	1 240	100	-	-	530	7 780	7 780
\$130 - \$150	30	70	830	20	540	220	480	450	850	420	220	-	-	340	4 440	4 440
\$150 - \$200	80	60	980	10	880	190	570	450	340	420	510	-	-	240	4 580	4 580
\$200 - \$250	10	20	490	-	580	70	170	160	120	180	280	-	-	140	2 700	2 700
\$250 - \$300	-	20	190	-	110	80	60	80	30	190	60	-	-	60	880	880
\$300 +	10	60	410	-	110	70	120	330	140	770	340	-	-	130	2 470	2 470
Total	258	410	60 736	140 380	5 510	65 900	4 400	60 120	22 930	34 140	29 050	9 070	136 380	33 710	602 040	465 660

Source: C50, Wage distribution of African employees by industrial sector for the month of June 1975, DL/973/60, November 1975 (mimeo).

- Key:
- (1) Agriculture and forestry.
  - (2) Mining and quarrying.
  - (3) Manufacturing.
  - (4) Electricity and water.
  - (5) Construction.
  - (6) Finance, insurance and real estate.
  - (7) Distribution, restaurants and hotels.
  - (8) Transport and communications.
  - (9) Public administration.
  - (10) Education services.
  - (11) Health services.
  - (12) Private domestic services.
  - (13) Other services.
  - (14) Total excluding agriculture.
  - (15) Total excluding agricultural and domestic employees.

## SCHOOL ATTENDANCES FOR AFRICAN CHILDREN AGED 6 TO 16 YEARS

<u>Age attained in census year</u>	<u>MALES</u>			<u>FEMALES</u>		
	<u>Total number</u>	<u>Attending school</u>		<u>Total Number</u>	<u>Attending school</u>	
		<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>		<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
6	80,700	7,480*	9.3*	83,680	7,400*	8.8*
7	85,890	33,200	38.7	84,830	31,430	37.1
8	71,440	37,780	52.9	69,960	35,080	50.1
9	92,010	49,820	54.1	88,970	45,930	51.6
10	75,280	45,200	60.0	73,700	41,670	56.5
11	72,710	44,950	61.8	71,500	40,500	56.6
12	62,910	39,080	62.1	60,650	33,910	55.9
13	66,360	38,540	58.1	66,760	32,210	48.2
14	52,890	29,640	56.0	54,850	22,810	41.6
15	62,560	29,740	47.5	59,780	17,600	29.4
16	51,110	21,720	42.5	50,500	11,000	21.8
Total	773,860	377,150	48.7	765,180	319,540	41.8

Source: Rhodesia, Census of population 1969, Salisbury, CSO, 1976

\* In the school enrolment records most of these seem to be recorded as 7 years of age.

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