Kenneth Hermele

Land Struggles & Social Differentiation in Southern Mozambique

A Case Study of Chokwe, Limpopo 1950 — 1987

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FOREWORD

In the beginning of 1985, when I was working as an economist at the Ministry of Agriculture, Álvaro Guimarães, then acting head of the Ministry’s Department for Rural Development, entered my office with a proposal for a rural extension project in support of the poor peasants of Chokwe in the Limpopo valley.

That was my first contact with Chokwe, but I was soon to realize that the history of that area could be read as a condensation of the last thirty years of rural development in southern Mozambique.

It was also Álvaro Guimarães who first took me to Chokwe and who introduced me to its history. In Chokwe, my work was made possible by the support I received from the then head of the agricultural set-up in the area, João Mosca. Alfredo Mucabel, responsible for the irrigation system, granted lengthy interviews in addition to making the remnants of the colonial archives available to me. Agronomist Cristina Amaral of the Ministry’s experimentation station explained some of the mysteries of irrigated rice cultivation.

In Maputo, the staff of the Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique managed to encounter some extremely valuable source material from the colonial period, although the archives have not yet been classified for the twentieth century.

Frequent discussions with Yussuf Adam and Alpheus Manghezi of the Centre of African Studies in Maputo, helped to correct my somewhat oversimplistic impressions of Mozambican reality, past and present. The same goes to say for the assistance I received from historian David Hedges of the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo.

In 1986, I terminated my contract with the Ministry of Agriculture and returned to Sweden. A research grant from the Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries (SAREC) enabled me to return once more to Chokwe as well as to conduct research in Lisbon.

The staff of the library of the Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa was most helpful in supplying the documentation available to the public. Unfortunately, a rule of 50 years’ confidentiality is still being applied in Portugal, which means that the full colonial period will only become accessible in year 2025.

However, I had the privilege to learn from the personal experiences of Manuel Teixeira Duarte and João Lã. Their first-hand knowledge of the colonial period as well as of the first turbulent post independence years helped to fill part of the vacuum created by the lack of written documentation.

Stockholm, April 1988
Kenneth Hermelé
INTRODUCTION

The zone of Chokwe portrays in a concentrated form the various phases of the last thirty years of rural development in southern Mozambique (encompassing the three provinces Maputo, Gaza, and Inhambane). However, this should not be taken to imply that Chokwe is typical for the rural setting of southern Mozambique. Quite the contrary: Chokwe is in many respects exceptional, but it nevertheless has some important characteristics which are of general relevance:

- it is a zone with a differentiated peasantry, since long heavily involved with labour migration to South Africa;

- in the 1950's, the peasants were ousted from their land when an impressive settlement scheme — the Colonato do Limpopo — was mounted along the southern bank of the Limpopo river;

- then, with independence, this zone experienced the successive stages of Mozambican agricultural policy, from the modernization approach to today's land distribution and increased market orientation.

In this sense, Chokwe is atypical but relevant to a discussion of rural stratification, alliance politics, and agricultural strategy. The experience of Chokwe may be taken advantage of to illustrate most of the major issues and difficulties of Mozambican agricultural policy since the transition government from colonial rule to independence (1974–1975) until today.

What, then, are the issues that we may hope to illuminate by studying the example of Chokwe?

- The diversity of the peasantry as such stands out as a fact, naturally varying from zone to zone but generally underestimated. What possibilities have existed to apply a differentiated policy towards this peasantry? And what consequences may be foreseen as a result of the present development phase in terms of social stratification?

- The implications of such rural stratification — past and present — ought also to be discussed. This demands a discussion of the situation in the countryside before independence and the relationship of various social strata to the colonial power.
- A related issue is the position of traditional power wielders in Mozambican rural society as well as of accomplices to the colonial administration such as régulos: what part did they play during the armed struggle, and what were the possibilities to integrate them in a development strategy?

- In what ways may we assume that the chosen development strategy — and the way it was implemented — was influenced by the interpretation that the Front for the liberation of Mozambique, FRELIMO, made of the class struggle and the relationship between traditional power and colonialism, especially as these relations were seen in the liberated zones during the armed struggle? This issue will be treated in relation with alliances and compromises between contending class forces.

- Finally, today, in the present phase of rural development with land reform, rationalizations of state farms, and liberalization of the market mechanisms in general, what considerations of alliances and compromises seem to be of relevance?

The discussion which follows here will implicitly be about “voluntarism” — the notion that the subjective factor may move mountains, that the subjective force makes a strategy feasible. But the analysis also implies a discussion about “defeatism”: were there ever reasonable policy options available to Mozambique which South Africa would have let evolve in peace without interfering? Can we imagine an anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, anti-racist, non-ethnic development strategy emphasizing people’s power and equity, without South Africa attempting to destroy it?

Therefore we must consider the possibility that the compromises and alliances that really count are the external ones, especially with South Africa. In this perspective, it may well be that it is the external policy choices which are the most important. Nevertheless, the perspective in this essay is internal, focusing upon FRELIMO’s options and choices in a given — and hostile — environment.
PART ONE

I. Rural Differentiation and Colonial Ambiguities

Settlement Schemes and the Like

Although the Portuguese “presence” in Mozambique began already during the last years of the 15th century, it was not until the 1920’s that a significant number of Portuguese settled in Mozambique. From the middle of the 19th century and onwards, some colonial attempts had been made to encourage immigration, including extending loans, technical assistance, and social facilities to those who decided to settle in the countryside. Still, these efforts failed. The weak presence of the colonial power outside the coastal zones in the beginning of the 20th century, made Portugal hand over the obligation to settle whites to the chartered companies which administered the central and northern parts of Mozambique as if they were sovereign states, which, as a matter of fact, they were for the duration of the charters which these companies had signed with Portugal.¹

Still, Portuguese settlement in Mozambique did not grow significantly, and had by 1930 only reached 18 000 people; ten years later, the total number of whites was still only 27 000.²

Although the white population of Mozambique almost doubled during each of the following three decades, reaching 163 000 in 1970, Portuguese administrators still considered white settlement a failure and insufficient to effectively control the colony. Neither the settlement of prisoners, nor the settlement of ex-soldiers was able to ease the preoccupation of the administration.³

There was only one way in which Portugal could manage to maintain its control: by renting Mozambican labour, land, and other resources to foreign powers, by playing the role of the intermediary just as any shopkeeper. Therefore, Mozambique was put up for sale:

- migrant labour to all the neighbouring states and even as far away as the Kenyan port of Mombasa or the Katanga mines in Zaire;

- transit transport facilities, especially for northern South Africa (Transvaal) and Rhodesia; and
- foreign (non-Portuguese) exploitation of the rich plantations in the central parts of the country.

In terms of national development, this policy was catastrophic: whole provinces were practically deprived of male labour; and 90–95% of port and railway traffic was for transit purposes, all the way from the establishment of the links up to independence.4

This policy was maintained faithfully until independence with a slight modification during the first phase of Portuguese fascism from 1926 onwards, when a certain preference was given to Portuguese investments. However, the basic reliance upon the neighbouring states, and especially upon South Africa and Rhodesia, was never questioned. With the explosion of the liberation wars in all three Portuguese African colonies in the early 1960's, the policy shifted back to the former total sell-out as a precondition for the political and military support that Portugal sought — and gained — from its NATO allies as well as from the powerful neighbours South Africa and Rhodesia.5

In the 1960's, the advances of the struggle for national liberation threatened the very survival of the Portuguese empire. Simultaneously, the war increased the number of potential "soldier-settlers" by multiplying the number of military troops taking part in the colonial venture. As one of the defenders of this policy explained: war and settlement are "both part and parcel of the same preoccupation: defence."6 Thus, the settlement issue remained a central colonial preoccupation.

Although the Portuguese themselves criticized the settlement policy, complaining that the failure was due to Mozambique lacking resources or to bad planning or to the low "quality" of the settlers, the onset of the liberation war in 1964 rendered settlement essential as a tool to maintain territorial control. Priority zones were identified for settlement, and they were all war zones: Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Tete, Zambezia, and Manica. This, obviously, did not exactly contribute to the popularity of the settlement project as such. The purpose was to contain FRELIMO, an objective which at times was expressed quite candidly: the goal for the settlements in the northern province Cabo Delgado was to "control, protect, and recuperate the native population" in order to "contain the subversive offensive".7

Whereas settlement in the beginning had been intended to secure the Portuguese presence in Mozambique — and hence by force of logic had been exclusively white — another kind of logic began in the 1960's to make itself felt and to reinforce the need to let Mozambican peasants into the settlement schemes. The basic reason for this change of policy was the obvious difficulty to convince Portuguese peasants of the blessings that were to come to them once they settled on
Mozambican soil. This reflected a much earlier preoccupation: that the Portuguese peasants actually were not suited to become settlers. The majority of them looked for an easier life and not for an even harder and more laborious one than the one they already led in Portugal or in any of Portugal’s colonized islands (the Azores, Madeira).8

One way to overcome this drawback was to disregard race and include Mozambicans in the schemes. Another reason for this step was that earlier settlements had created resistance on the part of the Mozambican peasants and cattleholders who had been ousted from their lands, a resistance which the administration now tried to soften by letting some Mozambicans enter the schemes. In this way, the Mozambican presence in the settlement schemes in the war zones reached 16–30 % by the early 1970’s.9

Thus, from the 1960’s and onwards, settlement gained a new importance. In the second Five Year Plan for Mozambique’s development (2º plano do fomento, 1959–1964) 75% of available resources were to be spent to settle Portuguese. Still, settlement never became the major blockage to the advance of FRELIMO that the colonial administration had intended. By 1968, 44 settlement schemes had been established; 24 of them were for whites only, nine for Mozambicans, and nine had a mixed participation. The total area of these schemes was 122,000 hectares, and the number of peasants settled totalled only 2,700; of these, more than 50 % were from the Colonato do Limpopo.

Simultaneously, and for the same purpose, the colonial administration had initiated a programme for resettlement (reordenamento) of Mozambican peasants. This attempt was equally limited in scope: by 1968, 107 resettlements covered 44,000 hectares with approximately 20,000 peasants.10

This means that only 1.5 % of the Mozambican peasantry had been dragged by the colonial administration into this attempt to stem the tide of independence. The intention was primarily to intensify Portuguese settlement and control of the countryside; coupled with this aim was an effort to foster a black rural intermediate stratum, a would-be bourgeoisie in order to reduce the support on which FRELIMO could draw.

These colonial efforts gave very meager results and covered only a small part of the countryside as a whole. Furthermore, their objectives were contradictory, as they intended to foster the economic advancement of the Mozambican peasants while securing the colony in the hands of the Portuguese. What was then the extent of economic power and political influence that Portugal was prepared to share with Mozambicans? As we will see: close to none.

There was another component of the Portuguese war effort which was to affect more Mozambicans than the above discussed policy for settlement and social differentiation. This component was the so
called *strategic hamlets (aldeamentos)*, concentration camps where the peasant population was forcefully gathered in order to dry up the famous water in which every guerilla fish feels at home. Although no confirmed information is available, these *aldeamentos* appear to have numbered over 600 with a total population of more than 700 000, thus dwarfing the other, softer colonial responses to contain the liberation movement.\textsuperscript{11}

**Cooperatives**\textsuperscript{12}

During the 1950's and 1960's, the colonial administration encouraged the establishment of cooperatives for Mozambican peasants. In all but a few instances, the initiative came from the administration itself. The essential objective was to foster a rural middle stratum of Mozambicans while at the same time controlling the spontaneous albeit limited class formation which already was taking place, especially in the southern parts of the country.

In this way, 34 cooperatives were established, mostly during the 1950's. Their basic activity was commercial, such as input supply or marketing of agricultural surpluses.

The cooperatives suffered from a sharp contradiction: they were intended by the colonial administration to foster a black intermediate class, which could contribute to contain any popular movement for real independence among the black masses. Therefore, the cooperatives were based upon a stratum of middle and rich peasants, traditional chiefs and power wielders allied to the colonial administration (*régulos*). The latter group, the colonial collaborationists, took care of the key posts of the cooperatives in order to run them for their own benefit.

Still, the growth of these cooperatives frequently clashed with the interests of the Portuguese settlers and especially with the traders (*cantineiros*). This conflict grew ever more intense as most of the cooperatives dedicated themselves to marketing, thus competing for the commercial margins with the traders. In such cases, the colonial administration normally intervened in favour of the settlers and *cantineiros*, restricting the access of the Mozambican cooperatives to markets, credits, and means of production, all in order to limit the growth of the cooperatives and to avoid that they threatened the traditional sources of enrichment and accumulation reserved for the white settlers and traders.

For example, when Mozambican cooperatives in Coolela (Gaza province) and Zavala (Inhambane province) began to give their members more favourable terms of trade, by paying more for their products
and/or by selling consumer goods cheaper, the local cantineiros managed to have these activities banned by the colonial administration. Similarly, the administration might oppose the wish of a cooperative to acquire tractors because it would have speeded up the process of accumulation.\textsuperscript{13}

Thus, when the cooperatives showed signs to fulfill the political aim for which they had been created — economic advancement of a middle stratum of Mozambicans — the colonial administration abode by its true nature and interfered with the process in order to protect the interests it basically represented.

Because of this inherent limitation, the colonial cooperatives did not meet any of their objectives. They never fostered a middle stratum of any significance because the accumulation process invariably hit the limits of what the colonial administration would permit. Consequently, the cooperatives could not fulfill their second objective, namely to control and direct the spontaneous process of rural class formation so that it would not threaten to disturb the existing set-up. It follows from this that a growing contradiction between an emerging national Mozambican bourgeoisie and the colonial administration was left unresolved.

\textbf{Cash Income}

In spite of — or maybe due to — the various contradictory colonial efforts to encourage a rural middle stratum, the most important source for the class differentiation which actually was taking place came from cash incomes.

These cash incomes came from various sources, including wage labour, marketing of agricultural surpluses, as well as from the sale of forced crops such as cotton. But the most important source in the South was the migrant labour system. Here, labour migration preceded Portuguese control: already from the 1850's, labour migration became an important characteristic of the southern parts of Mozambique. From the mid 1870's, migration had reached such dimensions that South African sterling began to replace cattle and hoes as prime bridewealth. By the end of the 1890's, some 60 000 Mozambicans were employed in the Rand mines, apart from the thousands working in South African agriculture.\textsuperscript{14}

The negative effects of this massive migration upon the region's self-sufficiency did not take long to materialize: by the end of the 1880's, the Maputo area had become a net importer of subsistence foodstuffs such as maize, whereas it previously had been a net exporter.
Towards the end of the 19th century, migration led to a decline in population in southern Mozambique. A great part of the migrants never returned, and those who did were often sick or carried diseases that spread to the remaining population. The whole of southern Mozambique generally lost important male segments of the population, leaving women, children, and the old in the villages.¹⁵

As the migrants were male peasants, the process also had important repercussions on the peasant mode of production. There existed a clear division of labour between men and women in traditional Mozambican agriculture. The principal responsibility of the men was to clear the land, hunt, and take care of the cattle; in addition, construction work (housing, storage, water pits) also belonged to the realm of male activities in peasant society. Although the detailed division of tasks varied between different zones of Mozambique, a sharing of responsibilities between men and women can be held to have been more or less general.¹⁶

Thus, men’s labour was extremely important to peasant production as it complemented the diet with meat from hunting and enabled the keeping of cattle (milk and meat). Furthermore, the shifting cultivation practised in Mozambique required that new lands be cleared on a regular basis. Otherwise, and in absence of crop rotation and fertilizers, yields on unshifted lands would decrease considerably and soils would soon become depleted.

This division of labour clearly benefitted men and disfavoured women: seasonal tasks were reserved for men, whereas the everyday labour was effectuated by women. The workload of the women was further increased by their work around the house: cooking, fetching water and firewood, child care, etc.

Towards the end of the last century, this system was disintegrating. In the South, tasks that earlier had been handled by men, were now being taken care of by women – in addition to all the traditional female work. Later on, some of the migrants’ families resolved part of the traditional male tasks by hiring workers, paying them with migrant earnings.¹⁷

Although this phenomenon of labour migration was most salient in the southern provinces, the same tendencies appeared early on in other parts of Mozambique as well: the centrifugal force of Portuguese oppression spread Mozambican peasants in all directions: South Africa, Rhodesia, Madagascar. Katanga, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania and São Tomé. In Niassa province, one of the smallest in terms of population, 100 000 peasants had migrated to Tanganyika up to 1919; in one year alone, 1912, 45 000 left and crossed the River Rovuma.¹⁸

The scope of labour migration can only be understood if seen as a reaction to the extreme conditions of oppression existing in Mozambique up to independence. Migration was, quite simply, an escape
route, a way out of a system where every man, woman and often child constantly was in danger of being sent to forced labour (chibalo). Furthermore, mine wages were often more remunerative than those generally ruling in Mozambique.

Still, labour migration was more than a flight; it was a necessity. It enabled the peasants to complement their own production of foodstuffs — limited by the exploitation of their labour power through chibalo, forced cultivation, and land alienation — with the incomes earned in migratory work. Consequently, the Mozambican peasants were pushed into migration. Conditions in Mozambique — including low pay, unjust prices for marketed agricultural products, and exploitative prices in the rural shops for basic necessities such as cloth — more than any supposed attraction of the mines explain fully the continuous flow of migrants.19

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For the peasant economy in the South, miners’ wages were a much more important cash earner than the surplus production put on the market by the peasants. In 1967, the wages paid out in the South to the migrants when they returned home (deferred pay) amounted to more than three times as much as the incomes generated by the peasantry’s sale of agricultural products.20

That such a drawn-out experience of migration should result in increased differentiation seems only natural. A scenario such as the following is easy to imagine: the miners, upon returning, would use part of their earnings to acquire tools and implements to improve labour productivity on their lands, they would lend money to their less fortunate (mostly non-migrant) fellow peasants, and when the loans were not repaid, the migrants would turn the former land holders into labourers on their lands. And thus a process of ever more rapid transformation and differentiation would be initiated.

Surprisingly enough, this does not seem to have happened in southern Mozambique, at least not to any significant extent. Certainly, a limited differentiation process, fuelled by migrant wages, was started. But it did not become generalized. Thus, the differentiation process was rather weak and its dominant feature was the growth of non-agricultural activities such as trade and transport.

Four circumstances may explain this situation. Firstly, the double character of migration: it is true that migration gave many peasant households the possibility to initiate an accumulation process by taking advantage of the deferred pay that the migrant workers received upon terminating their contracts or through acquiring necessary means such as farm implements or vehicles while still in South Africa. But it is equally true that for the majority of the migrant
families, this possibility remained beyond the realm of the feasible as migration for these households also meant that their economic base weakened as a result of the continuous appropriation of the male labour force. Thus, the possibilities to realize the possible were in most cases non-existent.

Secondly, mine wages, although superior to the starvation levels existing in Mozambique, were maintained at a drastically low level: in real terms — i.e. considering inflation — wages remained stable all the way from the beginning of the 20th century up to the 1970's. The reason for this astonishing achievement on behalf of mining capital, is that the South African Chamber of Mines began, already in the 1890's, to combat wage increases. As a weapon against worker demands it instituted a maximum average wage system by which the mines were compelled to keep the wages below certain levels.21

As a result, the purchasing power of the migrants' wages remained low, thus limiting the purchase of capital equipment such as tractors. The fact that the returning migrants often had to pay taxes and fees to the local chiefs as well as to the Portuguese administration further reduced the scope for a differentiation process based upon migrant wages.

Thirdly, peasant agriculture in Mozambique was kept severely restricted. The colonial administration did not allow the peasants themselves to market their products, i.e. they could not reap the profits of their labour by entering into commercial activities. Prices of inputs (primarily seeds) as well as of produce were designed to leave only a small margin for the peasants, but did not encourage accumulation. Prices paid for settler maize was double or even four times more than that paid to the peasants for the same crop. Furthermore, the most lucrative cash crops, such as cotton and cashew, although produced by the peasantry, often through forced cultivation, were normally marketed exclusively by settler firms or by the colonial administration.

An example shows the consequences of this policy: during the world economic crisis in the interwar period, Mozambican peasants increased their sales of agricultural surpluses; this could have constituted the beginning of an increased involvement in the market economy as well as a stepped-up accumulation process. However, when the depression was overcome, administrative measures prohibited the traders to purchase peasant maize at favourable prices in order to force the peasants to return to wage employment.22

Fourthly, the Mozambican peasantry had been robbed of its most fertile lands, in the river valleys and in the highlands, by settlement schemes or by individual occupation. Obviously, this further reduced the peasants' potential to accumulate, apart from the political problem that it also constituted. In a colonial report, the lack of good
agricultural lands for the peasantry was highlighted — especially in Maputo, Gaza, Zambezia, and Nampula — and the distribution of land in order to fight the growing independence movement was advocated.23

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In essence, the peasant economy continued dependent upon its two crippling masters, Portugal and South Africa. The "natural" differentiation and development of productivity which could have been brought about by returning migrants was hindered by the low wages and the structural limits erected by Portugal. Similarly, the various efforts that Portugal did undertake from the 1950's and onwards either failed or had a remarkably limited impact: cooperatives, settlement schemes and resettlements did not manage to transform the basically low level of rural stratification in the countryside. The limits of Portuguese colonialism, the weakness of Portuguese economic power coupled with the sale of Mozambican labour and resources to the neighbouring states impeded the realization of a political objective, the necessity to create a black bourgeoisie in order to contain and split the movement for national independence.

Contradictions of Portuguese Colonialism

This, then, is the situation which FRELIMO inherits at independence. To be able to ponder the alternatives that existed at that time, we must first summarize some special traits of Portuguese colonialism.

Portugal did not opt for indirect rule of its colonies, nor for a transition to neo-colonialism — political independence but continued economic subservience — for the simple reason that Portugal's economic weakness did not allow such a step. Similarly, the economic gains that Portugal drew from its colonies were conditioned upon the administrative control that Portugal did manage to exert over the territories and their peoples. The tangible benefits that such territorial control brought could be evaluated in plantation export crops, transit freight incomes, and migrant labour fees and payments.

Simultaneously, however, the colonial regime realized that the increasing social conflicts and contradictions — in short the rise of a nationalist movement — could only be attenuated by encouraging the growth of an indigenous middle stratum to channel and absorb those national aspirations into a national bourgeoisie. Still, this insight clashed with the economic interests of a major part of the Portuguese settlers, who precisely embraced the same ambitions as their more
unfortunate Mozambican brethren. Thus, the Portuguese colonial policy oscillated between these two poles, favouring the development of a Mozambican rural bourgeoisie while simultaneously restraining its growth.

In sum, then, the colonial administration, entangled in its contradictions, undertook steps to foster rural class differentiation, while remaining utterly confined by its military considerations and by the impossibility to look beyond the immediate interests of the Portuguese settlers and traders. This contradiction constituted a dominant feature of the Portuguese occupation of Mozambique.

In fact, the policy aimed at defending the interests of the settlers at the expense of Mozambicans. And it conditioned the future of Mozambique in exactly the same way as the almost complete lack of Mozambican clerks and qualified workers by independence was decided already in 1912 when it was determined that Portuguese should substitute the blacks, Indians and those of mixed blood who had filled those functions until then. The exclusion of Mozambican from these trades was repeated after the second world war, when white trade unions were given the sole authority to man the white-collar positions at banks, insurance companies, traders, etc.24
II. FRELIMO at the Gates of Power

The Transition Period
and Policy Choices

In April 1974, Portuguese fascism collapsed under the pressure from the three simultaneous colonial wars that Portugal waged in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. At the gates of power, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, FRELIMO, found itself faced with a series of decisive policy options. In a short period — less than a year — FRELIMO was to outline a policy to realize its political objectives for independent Mozambique.

It is sometimes claimed that the line which FRELIMO was to adopt already had been indicated by FRELIMO's first leader, Eduardo Mondlane, before he was assassinated in 1969. In concluding his study of Mozambique's colonial heritage and the struggle for independence, Mondlane remarked:

The government of any developing country has as its official aim the achievement of broadly based economic and social progress. I believe that one of the necessary conditions for this is to eliminate social and economic forces which favour minorities. By this I mean not just racial minorities: these will automatically lose their special privileges with the establishment of an African State. In many respects, a greater danger lies in the formation of new African privileged groups; the educated as opposed to the uneducated, factory workers as opposed to peasants.¹

Although rather vague, Mondlane pointed at a preoccupation with a "greater danger", the "formation of new African privileged groups". In an interview shortly before his death, he outlined his own as well as FRELIMO's class position at that point in time:

I am now convinced that FRELIMO has a clearer political line than ever before... the common basis which we all had when we formed FRELIMO was hatred of colonialism and the belief in the necessity to destroy the colonial structure. But what type of social structure, what type of organization we would have, no-one knew. [...] Now, however, there is a qualitative transformation in thinking which has emerged during the past six years which permits me to conclude that at present FRELIMO is much more socialist, revolutionary and progressive than ever and that the line, the tendency is now more and more in the direction of socialism of the Marxist-Leninist variety. Why? Because the conditions of life in Mozambique, the type of enemy which we have, does not give us any other alternative.²

Now, I do not offer these rather lengthy quotes from Mondlane in order to claim that any of the real essential issues for postindepend-
dence policy had really been tackled by FRELIMO before independence. Quite on the contrary: no matter what general policy orientation FRELIMO chose to adopt, the very specific questions of alliances and power sharing could not have been avoided.

Two experiences especially seem to have influenced the policy that FRELIMO did adopt: the crisis of settler society and the FRELIMO experience from the "liberated zones" during the armed struggle.

The Crisis of Settler Society

A grave crisis had struck settler society well in advance of the downfall of fascism. This crisis appears to have been much more a social phenomenon than an economic downturn: the Portuguese exodus reached a serious level from 1970, when emigration from Mozambique began to exceed immigration flows. In a few years time (1970–1973), the total non-black population decreased by 40–50 000 people, a reduction by 20 % from the 240 000 of 1970. Still, in economic terms, increases were recorded up to 1973, the last "normal colonial" year. For example,

- the production of manufactured goods grew by 35 % 1970–1972;
- all principal cash crops increased until 1973, with the exception of cotton, sisal and rice which 1970–1973 declined by 3, 25, and 8 % respectively;
- the trade balance improved 1970–1973 by 17 %, although still remaining negative. During the same period, the positive balance on services increased by 31 %.

Thus, FRELIMO may well have perceived the economic situation as good, and the prospects for independence as bright. As Samora Machel explained when interviewed in June 1975, just before the declaration of independence:

When you [Aquino de Bragança] speak of economic crisis in Mozambique it is the crisis of the so called service economy. [...] After five centuries of colonial occupation and ten years of liberation war, the situation in our country is by no means alarming. We are not worried.

Worried or not, the fact remains that the problems that the revolution was to encounter were to be serious indeed. And although the Portuguese exodus had already begun, there was still time to stem the flood. But no such step seems to have been contemplated by
FRELIMO. On the contrary: all attempts by Portugal’s new rulers to delay the negotiations for independence or to introduce intermediate groups or representatives of settler society were seen as simple machinations to deprive FRELIMO of the whole and undivided power which rightly belonged to it.6

It is true that there existed no nationalistic settler group which could claim to have contributed to the downfall of Portuguese colonialism, and thus to have the political–moral right to share the power of independent Mozambique. Therefore, Portugal’s manoeuvre can be interpreted as simply aiming at delaying the independence process in order to give time for such settler groups to get organized.

Also, after the coup d'état in Lisbon, Mozambique was flooded with “organizations” who claimed to represent various sections of settler society: after April 1974, more than 50 groups7 appeared only to die in September 1974, when FRELIMO as the sole representative of the Mozambican people signed the Lusaka Agreement with Portugal. In the words of Aquino de Bragança:

neither self-determination, nor the independence of Mozambique, nor even the legitimacy of FRELIMO were negotiable. The only item on the agenda was the means for the transfer of power.8

And yet, there existed de facto at least two social groups in the countryside with which an alliance policy could have been feasible without abandoning FRELIMO’s basic objectives:

- small-scale settler farmers who tilled the land in settlement schemes or at dispersed homesteads with a modest level of mechanization (at times even only animal traction). This group was still far from being a rural bourgeoisie to be dreaded by FRELIMO, and their capital accumulation had until then been extremely limited; and

- Mozambican farmers, utilizing approximately the same level of technology as their Portuguese equals. This group, which in the South normally was dependent upon migratory labour movements, had not been able to meet its potential as it was constantly being hindered by the policies of the colonial administration.

For a rural strategy which put production foremost, these two groups could certainly have played an important role. And even if there did not exist any real representative organization which could speak for these groups, the objective necessity to formulate a policy which would integrate them into the overall strategy remained as strong as ever. To meet this necessity fell among the responsibilities of
FRELIMO. As we will see further on, however, the policy line that FRELIMO was to implement was decidedly different.

Still, and for some time yet to come, these groups remained undecided as regards the part that would be allotted to them. The small-scale settlers were still hesitant if they should follow suit with their white brethren in the cities and leave the country. And the Mozambican peasants still expected that independence would give them back their rightful position in Mozambican development so that they finally would be permitted to accumulate as best they could. And, naturally, they assumed that independence would mean a restitution of the lands that had been stolen from them by the Portuguese settlers, lands which had been cultivated by generations before the Portuguese took command of them in a process of land alienation which continued up to independence.

Experiences and Interpretations from the “Liberated Zones”

During the war, parts of the northern provinces were declared “liberated zones” by FRELIMO, indicating zones where the colonial administrative control had been eliminated and substituted by something new: people’s power, mobilization, and participation. These zones, although limited in area and population involved, were extremely important nurseries for the emerging FRELIMO policy. They also constituted testing grounds for steps which later would be attempted nation-wide.

Certainly, contradictions existed inside FRELIMO since its creation in 1962. Actually, the significance of the front FRELIMO was precisely that of gathering various political tendencies united around one common purpose: national independence. With the evolution of the struggle, however, some of these contradictions had to be resolved; if they were not, the very success achieved until then could be lost since a growing popular discontent in the liberated zones accompanied the internal conflict discontent.

The problem was basically the following: there was a “class” line in FRELIMO which sought not only to gain independence but also to eliminate, in an expression of those days, the exploitation of man by man. This line was adhered to by Mondlane as well as by Samora Machel.

On the other hand, FRELIMO also included those who essentially fought for independence in order to eliminate the blockages that the colonial administration had erected against their own economic advance. In terms of the class structure in the countryside discussed
earlier, the economic interests of Mozambican middle peasants and private farmers would be represented by this latter tendency.

This tendency goes back to the period before FRELIMO was founded in 1962. More precisely, it grew out of a resistance to the various impediments constructed by Portuguese colonialism in order to limit the accumulation and growth of the Mozambican rural bourgeoisie. Of special importance was the cotton growing cooperatives that were formed in the northern province Cabo Delgado in the 1950's. They distinguished themselves from the greater part of the cooperatives described earlier (in Section II) in that they were constituted by the peasants themselves, against the will of the colonial administration, and they elected their own leaders. In this way, these cooperatives became true representatives of richer as well as poorer peasants in the area, although they naturally were dominated and controlled by the former group. The cooperatives very soon crashed head-on with the colonial authorities that feared the fact that the cooperatives had been initiated by the peasants' themselves, and that they were not being controlled by the administration.\textsuperscript{10}

When the growth of this cooperative movement is hindered by the colonial authorities, the leaders of the movement join the independence movement. Obviously, their objectives are partly the opposite of those that motivated Mondlane and the majority of his co-founders of FRELIMO. But they nevertheless represented a tendency which had a material basis inside Mozambique and which was important.

During the armed struggle, these contradictions surfaced again, this time as a conflict between the two "lines": one that sought to replace the dominance of the Portuguese by inserting Mozambicans in their place, and another that wished to terminate the exploitation as such.

The contradiction was "resolved" with the defeat of the former group, the bourgeois tendency: in January 1969, the leader of the group, Lázaro Nkavandame, was dismissed from the FRELIMO executive committee. Exactly one month later, Eduardo Mondlane is killed by a letter bomb.

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Thus, the liberated zones were important as they presented clear and concrete contradictions during the evolution of the struggle. These contradictions were "resolved" and the armed struggle brought to a victorious end: independence could be declared by FRELIMO alone.

Yet, these contradictions were not done away with once and for all. For instance, the right to trade, internally as well as externally, was taken away from the defeated tendency. Thus, they were left without the means by which they had appropriated the surpluses that the peasants had made available to the independence struggle.\textsuperscript{10} Still, this
step only touched the superstructure; and beneath the surface, the contradictions survived.

As a consequence, these contradictions found new outlets and continued to influence the history of independent Mozambique just as they had that of the armed struggle.11

This old contradiction within FRELIMO is normally being portrayed as a struggle between popular power and new exploiters. However, there never existed such a clear-cut dichotomy between the popular/socialist and the bourgeois/traditional. Rather it seems to me that the successes that FRELIMO did achieve in the liberated zones – in terms of warfare as well as social organization – to a significant extent were related to the fact that FRELIMO worked through the existing traditional hierarchy. In this way, FRELIMO managed to sway a certain number of régulos and chiefs from their customary alliance with the colonial power and bring them to an acceptance and sometimes even outright support of the liberation war. This facet of the struggle was reported already in 1970 to the Central Committee of FRELIMO, where note was taken of the fact that some régulos were being integrated into the new FRELIMO structures.12

This was not simply a one-sided process where the representatives of traditional power were subordinated to FRELIMO’s objectives. Rather, it was a unity between different social groups resisting a common enemy and the economic, religious, and cultural oppression which they suffered.

Such cases of nationalistic, anti-colonial positions on the part of social groups, normally identified by FRELIMO as belonging to the “collaborationists” or the “new exploiters”, can be found throughout the country, obviously with a concentration in the war zones in the North. But also in such areas as the Limpopo valley in the South, régulos clandestinely supported FRELIMO financially.13

The reason for this de facto existence of a “broad front” was that objective conditions favoured a nationalistic approach. The Portuguese failure to foster a rural bourgeoisie to contain the advance of the liberation struggle as well as the religious and cultural oppression implied a wide-spread discontentment with the colonial order, also in quarters which for ideological reasons might have been expected to think otherwise.14

Obviously, most of these groups were bourgeois in tendency and aspirations, but they nevertheless supported the liberation struggle. In this sense, they were not allies of colonialism. At independence, they felt they had the right to obtain the benefits which the Portuguese for so long had denied them.

Also, in the liberated zones, the extent of social change that the war brought along has been exaggerated. The great achievement during the war was not a complete transformation of the social relations of
production, nor the establishment of collective modes of production, although the latter did take place in some instances. No, the impressive achievement was another one: the fact that in circumstances of war and genocide, FRELIMO gained the support of the peasant population which made possible a new organization of life, production, and trade in the liberated zones beyond the control of the colonial administration. The peasants normally continued to cultivate on individual plots as before, although now as a result of the new organization, part of the harvest was set aside to feed the soldiers. Simultaneously, and more common, the peasants would contribute by cultivating some fields reserved for the soldiers, just as they would share their marketable surpluses with FRELIMO.¹⁵

Thus, it seems as if we have been faced with a misreading of the experience of the liberated zones as well as with a failure to grasp the objective interests and subjective attitudes of important segments of the rural middle stratum. This led to an overstatement of the new social relations growing in the liberated zones — popular power, collective production, cooperatives — and an understatement of the relationship between the progress achieved and the continuing importance of traditional social forms such as the role of the chief and/or régulo and the continuation of individual production on independent plots.

On the Eve of Independence

Strengthened by the collapse of Portuguese colonialism, FRELIMO prepared for independence. At Lusaka in September 1974, FRELIMO's claim to be the sole representative of the Mozambican people was accepted by Portugal: the Lusaka Agreement was signed by eight different Portuguese representatives of military and civil power, whereas the Mozambican side was signed for by one person alone, Samora Machel.

Thus, in principle, the rules were set for the subsequent stages with one sole representative for the Mozambican people who would apply the experiences from the liberation war to the elaboration of a development strategy for independent Mozambique. This strategy aimed at a total transformation of Mozambican society, and especially of rural life. Two principles were fundamental:

- the concentration of the rural population in “communal villages”, where basic social facilities would be made available (schools, medical care, drinking water, etc); and
- the modernization of the countryside through state farms and producers' cooperatives.

These two principles were inter-linked: the labour force to the state farms and cooperatives was to come from the communal villages. Simultaneously, improved productivity on the land through mechanization was a precondition in order to be able to concentrate the rural population; otherwise, the concentration would only lead to superexploitation of the land with concomitant soil depletion and erosion. By introducing improved, mechanized farming, productivity would be increased, the peasants would gradually become labourers, and the countryside would move up the ladder of modernization and wage work, finally approaching socialism.

In terms of class alliances and compromises, the strategy simply meant that no such thing would be necessary, neither with the Portuguese, nor with the emerging Mozambican middle stratum. The FRELIMO discourse was quite clear, and in the weeks preceding the declaration of independence, Samora Machel made a special effort at public rallies in the South to bring home some of the points learnt during the armed struggle:

- the enemy has no colour. In other words, it is not for being white that the colonialists were fought but for being exploiters. Hence, no new landlords or capitalists would be tolerated no matter what colour they might have;

- the land would now belong to the "people" (it was to be realized through the state), and those who claimed private rights had better follow the colonialists and leave the country.16

What was to be the role of the various intermediate strata, white or black, peasants or traders, that (still) did exist in the countryside? None, it seems. Their social, economic, and political position appears not to have been much considered, and the general idea was to accept their existence for the time being, perhaps as an unavoidable trait of transition from one system to another. When things grew quieter, these groups would be dealt with.17

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Less than a year after independence, FRELIMO presented a resolution for the creation of communal villages. It was a concretization of the double aim to concentrate the rural population in order to be able to offer basic social and political facilities, while at the same time laying the foundation for mechanized agriculture.
The rural stratification at the time of independence that FRELIMO presented in this context, distinguished three categories: small, middle, and big farmers. The big farmers numbered 4,000 and consisted almost exclusively of the former white settlers. The great majority, 75% of the total 1.7 million farmers, were small farmers, cultivating less than 2 hectares each. In the middle, there were 390,000 farmers with 2–20 hectares, but with an average as low as 3 hectares.

In principle, private property was banned from the communal villages, and the rich as well as the middle peasants were only to be allowed to participate if they contributed their own means of production.18

This is the same as saying that even the rather limited middle stratum of the peasantry would only be allowed to take part of the new society if they accepted to renounce their own status as middle peasants by handing over their cattle, ploughs, tractors, or whatever means they might possess.

Obviously, this FRELIMO guideline was the opposite of a compromise or an alliance. Its greatest impact was to be on the political level, however, as these conditions never were implemented in reality. In fact, it was peasants from precisely this middle stratum that dominated many of the cooperatives which were created after independence. And since these cooperatives frequently constituted the productive basis of the communal villages, the same middle peasants came to have a disproportionate influence upon the running of the villages as well. In other words, this stratum came to dominate the very institutions from which they were supposed to be excluded, institutions which had been formed in order to eliminate them as a social group.19

It is not hard to see that this line clashed with the aspirations of the emerging rural national bourgeoisie, desirous to replace the fleeing settlers, and hoping to recuperate land which had been taken away from their families by the colonialists. FRELIMO's answer to their aspirations was actually a complete negation of what independence meant to them.

As far as policy options are concerned, the argument here implies a policy which would have continued to integrate all social forces which were opposed to colonialism. Consequently, the de facto alliance which had been achieved in the liberated zones, could have been maintained in the post-independence period by giving due credit to all participants in the struggle for national independence.

What actually did take place seems almost to have been the opposite: neither a compromise with the settlers, nor an alliance with the anti-colonial (albeit bourgeois) nationalists. When the settler exodus continued unabated, and capitalists began neglecting, mismanaging, and even sabotaging their agro-industrial installations
— a process which by the way had commenced well before independence — state intervention became necessary. In this way, most of the state farms as well as the state-run agro-industry arose out of necessity rather than as an offensive strategy. In the process, the problem was aggravated by the fact that more land was integrated into many new state farms than even the Portuguese had managed to steal from the peasants.

Thus, instead of receiving the land which they claimed, the small as well as the middle peasants found themselves ousted again — and this time by a regime which claimed it had come to end the injustices of colonialism. I do not dare to try to quantify the extent of this wave of land appropriations, but there are certainly sufficient cases on record to make anyone worried: Angónia, Moamba, Lioma, the lower Limpopo valley, not to speak of Chokwe itself.\(^20\)

So, instead of accepting the different strands in the anti-colonial movement as legitimate expressions of nationalist tendencies — which would have necessitated some sort of alliance or compromise — the implementation of the rural strategy sharpened the existing contradictions and widened their base to an even greater number of ousted peasants.

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The contradictions created difficulties for the two key components of the rural strategy: the modernization of production through cooperatives and state farms, and the concentration of the population in communal villages. As far as state farms are concerned, the critique normally focuses on over-mechanization. Although this point is certainly correct, it tends to overemphasize "technical" constraints at the expense of socio-economic and political factors. Also, the degree of mechanization in some respects did not surpass that of colonial days. For instance, the number of tractors in post-independence Mozambique did not grow and the level of mechanization (measured in this way) thus was not higher than in 1969. What did change, though, was the concentration of ownership that independence brought along: from a wide-spread, thin layer, the responsibility passed on to a few units: the Ministry of Agriculture increased its possession of tractors by 1 000%.\(^21\)

Hence, a reasonable conclusion is that it was not mechanization \textit{per se} which created the technical difficulties, but the unprecedented concentration of agricultural equipment in the hands of a state structure incapable of taking care of it. Although this concentration to a certain extent explains some of the difficulties encountered by the big state farms, I believe that taking into consideration the political and social contradictions inherent in the state farm concept and, more
specifically, in the way the state farms were mounted, would give a more complete understanding of the reasons for the failure. And it is in this respect that the alliance/compromise component becomes essential.

Why? Because the way the strategy was implemented led to an internalization of the contradictions into the state farms themselves. It was precisely the ousted peasants who were to become labourers and tractor drivers on the state farms which now occupied the very same land that the peasants considered theirs and that in many instances had been taken away from them as late as in the 1950's, 1960's and in some cases even the beginning of the 1970's. In addition, it was exactly those middle peasants who manned the cooperatives' and the state farms' administrative structures.

Thus, the strategy begins to crumble already here: the intended increase in productivity is not realized as state farms as well as cooperatives suffer from inherited social contradictions, further aggravated by their own creation. The concentration of the rural population begins to appear a bad idea as soil depletion, overgrazing, and the difficulties to find water and firewood become widespread.

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Concurrent with its general policy, FRELIMO took the logical step and transformed itself in 1977 from the front FRELIMO to the marxist party FRELIMO. Thenceforth, the principle was clear: FRELIMO was based upon an alliance between workers and peasants. In principle, yes; in reality, the question remained: how was that alliance put into practice?

When the strategy began to crack, the first reaction from FRELIMO was invariably to increase the pressure on the small peasants. Just as in some cases, the elected representatives to the new democratic organs were rejected if it was thought that they represented the “wrong” social group or for belonging to “traditional” society,22 so too peasants who did not enter state farms or cooperatives voluntarily, were pressured by further reductions of their land holdings in order to force them to depend ever more on wages from the state farms.23

This kind of imposition is absolutely contrary to the FRELIMO mode of functioning in the liberated zones. Worse, perhaps, is the occurrence of the same type of arbitrariness in the former liberated zones themselves, where compulsion and lack of respect for the elders have hurt the old intimate relationship between FRELIMO and the peasant population.24

Until the fourth FRELIMO congress in 1983, this line persisted. Nevertheless, even before the congress, steps had been taken to ease the contradiction and to facilitate access to land for small and medium
peasants. Since 1980, returning migrant workers were encouraged to invest in agriculture, and land was made available for them to cultivate. Simultaneously, the import duties which had hindered their free importation of machinery and equipment were removed.25

With the fourth congress, this reorientation assumes prime importance for the rural strategy. At the same time, a new dynamic as far as class differentiation is concerned is unleashed, this time further fuelled by the general liberalization and market orientation connected with the Nkomati/IMF process.
III. The Nkomati/IMF Option

Alliance Policy in Practice

In the 1980’s, Mozambique’s situation grew ever more difficult. The great promises of independence were not fulfilled. Instead of peace, people’s power and development, Mozambique encountered war and natural disasters. This situation, basically caused by hostile neighbours and Mother Nature — none of which seemed to be on the side of FRELIMO — was coupled with a misreading of the experiences of the liberation war as well as with an underestimation of the necessity to maintain or rather strengthen and develop the alliance between all nationalist social strata.

Furthermore, FRELIMO underestimated the external enemy (especially South Africa), and overestimated its own strength to go it alone. As a consequence, Mozambique’s ability to resist was weakened. When the war and destabilization policy began to hurt, the fragility of the internal development strategy became evident.

Mozambique attempted to establish an external alliance to counter-balance its historic dependency on South Africa: it sought full membership of the Council for Mututal Economic Assistance, CMEA, the Eastern European countries’ organ for economic cooperation. However, whereas Cuba and Vietnam had been accepted as members, Mozambique was not. In spite of this refusal, cooperation with and support from the Eastern European countries continued — including military assistance.

As the economic situation deteriorated, a return to a colonial model with forced cultivation of key crops was actually being contemplated. This was, fortunately, mostly a dream — or rather a nightmare — as the control and supervision necessary to enforce such a system was totally lacking. Still, Samora Machel himself told the People’s Assembly about the enormous quantities that would be produced if only every peasant was made to grow cotton.1

In Nampula province, this presidential order was put into practice, prohibiting the free movement of peasants unless their cotton fields and cashew trees were tended properly.2 In general, however, a return to the colonial model was neither possible nor desired.

Likewise, CMEA never became the exit option for Mozambique that it could have become, had Mozambique been allowed in. As things were, the available options narrowed further.
In March, 1984, the Nkomati Accord of "non-aggression and good neighbourliness" was concluded between Mozambique and South Africa. Normally, the accord is analysed in relation to its military components — South Africa's unkept promise to cut support to the MNR bandits and Mozambiques (fulfilled) promise to reduce the ANC presence in Maputo. However, I believe there exists another aspect linked to the Nkomati Accord which in the long run may prove much more important.

Six months after the signing of the accord, in September 1984, Mozambique entered the International Monetary Fund, IMF. Thus a new phase in Mozambican alliance policy became publicly known. In fact, the process had been initiated much earlier: according to Samora Machel, the decision to start the diplomatic offensive which resulted in the Nkomati Accord was made already in the fall of 1982 by the FRELIMO politbureau.3

The first step in this process was taken that same year, when Mozambique acknowledged the so called Berlin clause, meaning that West Berlin constitutes a part of the Federal Republic of Germany. This, in principle, opened the door not only to German development assistance, but also to EEC funds as well as the so-called Lomé Convention giving preferential access for part of its members' exports to the Common Market.

However, increases in development assistance to Mozambique were stalled on the alleged grounds that the war and the security situation did not allow work in the countryside. Two appeals in 1983 for emergency assistance directed to the "international community" to aid the starving peasantry, assailed as it was by the war and the drought, were blocked in this way.4

When the Mozambican foreign orientation increasingly assumed the shape of a firm commitment, the attitude of the international capitalist system changed. The first to indicate the new tune was, of course, the United States: it contributed considerably to the first round of emergency assistance and, what was more important, it told its allies that it was all right to support Mozambique.

In bringing about this new opening to Mozambique, both Nkomati and IMF were essential:

- Nkomati, because it showed Frelimo as a "responsible" holder of state power, a responsibility which only talk could never have proven. Simultaneously, it gave the US a concrete example that "constructive engagement", Reagan's policy in southern Africa, could work; and
- the IMF, because it opened the doors to the international financial world.

Thus, Nkomati was essential in political terms. The IMF membership, however, was a key political and economic move: through the IMF, renegotiations of commercial and official loans (at the so-called London and Paris Clubs, respectively) as well as coordination of development assistance through the World Bank’s Consultative Group were made possible.

In fact, IMF membership is a precondition in order to gain access to this complex and interdependent system of financial institutions and facilities. The reason for this is not hard to find: the IMF simply has been trusted by international capitalism with the rubber stamp of good behaviour: any government entering into an agreement with the IMF is considered “responsible” and is embraced by the various international agencies and bodies upon which it has grown dependent.

As far as Mozambique is concerned, it even became eligible for military assistance from the West after the Nkomati/IMF opening (albeit it never had to relinquish its major military ties with the East). The US supplied a symbolic 1 million USD for non-lethal military material, and Great Britain saw fit to begin military training of Mozambican officers in Zimbabwe.

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In terms of alliances, these moves have not been very decisive as far as external relationships are concerned. In spite of the fact that the war in southern Africa frequently is portrayed as an east-west conflict — and consequently the parties involved are considered to belong to either of the two “camps” — Mozambique has succeeded in carrying out an approximation to the international capitalist system while simultaneously strengthening its economic and military ties with the CMEA countries (e. g. through a new multilateral agreement of cooperation with several East European countries in the fall of 1986). Thus, on the international arena, Mozambique successfully continues to resist being allocated as an ally of any of the “super powers”.

Now, for internal class relations, the situation is different. A marked reorientation has taken place, bringing us back to a situation similar to the one which was considered at independence. The vehicle for this turn-about has been the economic rehabilitation programme agreed upon between Mozambique and the IMF. This Programa de Reabilitação Económica, PRE, is a three year crash programme to set the economy on its feet. Obviously, it is not a neutral venture: it is
NEP à la Mozambique and constitutes a significant change towards an alliance policy of a kind which was never attempted in 1974/1975.

The basic objective of PRE is to "save the Nation", as PRE itself puts it. In other words, the South African war and destabilization of Mozambique coupled with internal difficulties and problems, have brought Mozambique to the brink of national dissolution. Thus, in a sense, PRE signifies a return to the national perspective of the struggle, just as the basic objective of the front FRELIMO was to create the Mozambican nation.

In this perspective, the distribution of land to private farmers and poor peasants, the well-known liberal and market-oriented policies propagated by the IMF, the re-privatization of trade, and the general reduction of state intervention — all essential components of the present phase — clearly mark an effort to establish a new alliance with exactly those groups which were shunned earlier: private farmers, traders, small entrepreneurs, etc.

However, we have not returned to any status quo ante situation: the belated alliance policy which FRELIMO finally set in motion around 1983 with the first land distributions, does not carry the same implications as such an alliance would have had, had it been attempted ten years earlier. The basic reason for this, is the fact that the war in this interim period has wrecked the economy, thus ruining the material bases for FRELIMO's policy as far as both modernization and mobilization are concerned.

The present alliance was imposed by the demands of the international financial system, but the ground had been prepared by the intentional effects of South Africa's war of destabilization as well as by the fragility of FRELIMO's own strategy. This shift in policy comes at a time when the impetus of FRELIMO may well be at its lowest, reduced as it is by South Africa's war of attrition to a level where even the popular support for FRELIMO and its nation-building project may be at stake.

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I will end this essay by raising some issues related to the rather complex interplay between the two perspectives applied here to Mozambique's alliance policy — the internal and the external. But before that, let us leave the general considerations for the time being, and turn to our case study. In the following section we will see how the colonial settlement policy was applied to one specific area, and we will also learn what changes independence brought.
Map 2. Chokwe irrigation scheme
PART TWO

Contemporary Land Struggles in the Limpopo Valley

The Case of Chokwe 1950—1987

During the 20th century, the Limpopo valley in the Gaza province — and especially the Chokwe area — has remained the centre of land struggles. The area was brought under Portuguese control only late in the 19th century when the famous Gungunhana, the Lion of Gaza, was defeated. In the 1940’s, forced cotton growing was introduced, demanding planting of half a hectare of cotton for peasants working with hoes and one hectare for those who had oxen. In the 1950’s, this area saw the commencement of the most important settlement scheme in Mozambique, the Colonato do Limpopo.

After independence, at the third FRELIMO congress in 1977, the Limpopo valley was officially designated the bread basket of the nation. Ambitious production targets were set in which rice production was to reach 60 000 tons by 1980, thus equaling the highest level achieved during the colonial period. A further extension of irrigated land was also decided, which would bring another 15 000 hectares under irrigation.

The reason why the third congress could make such bold decisions was the gravity irrigation scheme mounted by the Portuguese in the 1950’s. It had to be irrigated agriculture, as rainfalls are low and irregular. The scheme goes back to plans from the 1920’s to irrigate the valley. At that time, the idea of a white settlement on the Limpopo aimed at stimulating sugar plantations in the valley. Similar schemes were also initiated by the Portuguese in Angola as well as in other parts of Mozambique. In the early 1950’s, the Portuguese thought these schemes would encompass as many as 75 000 white families, a goal which was far from achieved.

From the outset, these settlement schemes were justified with rather murky ideology: in the words of Trigo de Morais, who elaborated the Limpopo project in the 1920’s and later became responsible to see it through, such schemes would testify to “the accomplishment of the Portuguese” and prove “the achievement of white people”. This mixture of nationalism and racism was superimposed upon the need of Portuguese colonialism to safeguard its overseas possessions.
through actual occupation of the territories. A component of racial coexistence existed as ideology from the beginning, but it was only put into practice when deemed necessary to contain the African independence movements gaining momentum in the 1960's — and then only partially.

However, although projected already in the 1920's, it was not until the beginning of the 1950's that the Portuguese dictator Salazar decided upon the construction of the Chokwe irrigation scheme (see Map 2). A few years later, in 1954, the first ten settlers (colonos, a term which in this section will be used to depict black as well as white full members of the Colonato do Limpopo) arrived from the Alentejo in southern Portugal.

The Colonato do Limpopo

Although the Gaza peasantry, in general, was less dependent on migrant wages than the other southern provinces of Mozambique, migrant wages nevertheless were essential for agricultural reproduction and development. Also in Chokwe, wages — principally from South Africa but to a significant extent from Maputo as well — sustained the peasant economy, while simultaneously fuelling a limited stratification.

An example from the Limpopo may illustrate the process. Samora Machel's father, Mandhande Machel, went to the Rand mines for the first time in 1912, and continued regularly to work in South Africa for 14 years, until 1926. By 1917 he had accumulated enough to marry, and in 1921 he bought his first ox plough. Eventually, he acquired 30 hectares and several hundred head of cattle.4

This kind of growth was not unusual for the area, although it must be stressed that it was far from every migrant who could use his migrant wages to accumulate. Rather, the poor peasants needed their migrant wages just to sustain themselves; it was the already better off that took advantage of the migrant wages and transformed them into productive capital (cattle, ploughs, wives, and — later — tractors, pumps, and other farm implements).

This, then, was the situation that the Colonato encountered. A differentiated and partly advanced peasantry lived in the area, tended cattle, cultivated the flood plains and survived on a mixture of fertile soils and wage incomes.

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As early as the 1930's, Portuguese settlers in Mozambique argued the pros and cons of a white settlement on the Limpopo. Some of the
settlers claimed that the climate would be too hard on Portuguese peasants, and others maintained that those who left Portugal were looking for an easier life and not for a more laborious and difficult one. Therefore, they proposed, if a settlement on the Limpopo was considered necessary at all, then let “natives” undertake the hard and ungrateful task of establishing it. However, when the plans were realized twenty years later, the first colonos were all newcomers from Portugal.

The imposition of the Colonato in Chokwe could not but create sharp conflicts with the existing peasantry. Their opposition was certainly further fuelled by the fact that the majority of the Mozambican workers recruited to construct the Colonato were chibalo workers (i.e. forced labour): hundreds were requested from the Portuguese administrator — and delivered — from Vilanculos, Maputo, Guijá, and Zavala.

The Mozambican peasants were forced to give way to the colonos that were being brought from Portugal to fulfill the “civilizing mission” that Portuguese colonialism used to adorn its imperial ambitions. At the outset, approximately 2,000 Mozambican families were affected and had to make room for the first stages of the Colonato. As new areas were brought into the scheme, the contradictions sharpened.

The colonos themselves, however, probably understood but little of these precedents. They were poor, largely illiterate peasants from Portugal, who upon signing their contracts in the metropole were brought to Limpopo to continue their toil more or less in the same way as they had carried on in Portugal. They were another breed of settlers than the rich, conspicuous Portuguese of the big estates or the rich farmlands, and the Mozambicans of Chokwe did not consider them to be “real whites from Lisbon”. The first colonos who arrived in Maputo harbour were rushed straight to Chokwe in order to avoid too much “exposure”: their state of dress and behaviour was not considered becoming for people coming from the imperial metropole, representing a superior civilization and Christian values...

Also the first Portuguese construction workers were so destitute that the small local Portuguese community already living in the area was struck by pity upon their arrival and began collecting clothes and the necessities of life to hand over to the newly arrived. The Mozambican peasant women were startled by the colonos’ poverty and hard work, and would exclaim when driven too hard by their men: “Do you expect me to slave like a colono woman?!” Actually, conditions were so difficult that many Mozambicans considered colono life to be “chibalo for whites”.

This state of affairs, to a certain extent, was totally in line with the ideology permeating the Colonato. The colonos were under con-
tractual obligations to work the land themselves and they were not allowed to have other occupations or to hire labour. Their holdings were restricted to four hectares of irrigated land per family with an additional area for pasture.

The Colonato was a paternalistic attempt to regulate every aspect of the colono’s life, his work and income, his children’s schooling, religious services, etc. The Colonato authority passed judgement on the colono’s agricultural ability and personal morals, and decided to evict “unsuitable” colonos. The Colonato even assumed the right over the children: sons not needed to uphold the family production unit were to be employed as tractor drivers, and daughters from the age of 12 in the plant nurseries or as domestic servants. Daughters who wanted to leave the Colonato to marry were allowed to do so. But if they left to look for work, they had to obtain the approval of the administration; otherwise, their parents would have to repay the fares that once had brought the children from Portugal to Chokwe. As a rule, each family had to keep two sons above the age of twelve as family labour in order to constitute a complete production unit.10

In short, the Colonato was an attempt to insert a static, semi-feudal, European peasant society in the midst of a hostile African environment, and with modern capitalism expanding all around it.

* * *

However, resistance grew among the Mozambicans as the consequences of the Colonato began to be felt. In 1957, a colonial inspection was carried out of the local administration, and the complaints seemed to be without end. At public hearings (banjas) and special consultations, the régulos of the area voiced the generalized disgust with the Colonato. The basic issues which were brought forward were the following:11.

- Access to land. Although in principle it was stated that the Colonato was intended for blacks as well as for whites, Trigo de Morais actually established rules that blocked the majority of the Mozambicans who had land in the area from access to the Colonato. Already in 1953, he stipulated that no compensation in terms of land would be given inside the irrigated area for fallow lands or for small plots up to one hectare.12

When questioned, the Colonato authorities claimed that they had distributed irrigated land to all those who had had land inside the irrigated area, and they claimed that this had been done in conformity with directives from Trigo de Morais. However, a
survey in 1957 of 454 Mozambican families showed that 60% still, after four years, had not received any land.

- Water and pastures. Another area of peasant protests was the difficulties that the Colonato had created by blocking their customary access to water points and pastures: the irrigation canals cut across dirt roads leading to the river, and pasture had been fenced off in order to keep Mozambican cattle out while the pastures were being reserved for the colonos. Small wonder then that these fences were torn down by angry peasants.

- Indemnizations. The peasants had been promised compensation for the confiscation of their lands, huts, and crops. However, many peasants had not received anything, and especially those whose huts had been destroyed by bulldozers engaged in road work demanded fair indemnization.

- Other areas of complaint presented to the colonial inspector were that settlers were chasing Mozambican women and that they employed Mozambican labour, which — the inspector thought — was "contrary to the spirit which created this settlement."

Thus, during the first years of the Colonato, contradictions built up and more Mozambicans than normal left the area for better opportunities in the neighbouring countries. The settlers were described by the inspector as "living like natives" which he considered "not impressive."

This early phase of the Colonato was accompanied by a whole series of social problems: thefts, drinking, prostitution — there you have the "civilizing mission" in practice. As a consequence, the apologists of the colonial settlement policy began to explain the problems and difficulties encountered in the various settler villages as if they were caused by the "low quality" of the settlers themselves — and not by any objective social, economic, climatic or technical difficulties inherent in the project as such. These difficulties meant that the "demonstration effect" of the white settlement on the Mozambican peasant was lost — a fact which was further underlined by the illiteracy of many settlers and their need to have Mozambicans read the letters they received and help them write the replies.

The Portuguese thus encountered some difficulties in convincing the Mozambicans of their superiority. In 1962, one Colonato employee even complained that he had threatened as well as intimidated, but that the Mozambicans under his authority had paid no attention and had continued with their rather surprising mixture of "vices": polygamy, drinking, religious meetings, and dancing.
In sum, it seems as if the early phase of the Colonato deserved the sinister name it obtained: the Valley of Death. Or in the words of régulo Leonde, who told the colonial inspector in 1957: the Colonato was just like the sun: it burned everything in its way!

* * *

Two circumstances were to force the Colonato to modify its policy. Firstly, the opposition from the Mozambican peasantry had to be counteracted. In the beginning, the Colonato tried to achieve this by letting Mozambican peasants in on probation (fruição de gleba) with only two hectares each.

However, many of the peasants who had been ousted from their lands when the Colonato was started, stayed away in disgust during the first years. This was not only due to the fact that the Mozambicans first had been thrown off the land and now were handed out an unsatisfactory compensation. A strong contributing factor was the requirements to have assimilated such Portuguese virtues as monogamy, Christianity, and the Portuguese language in order to be able to be considered equal to the colonos. Such requirements did not find easy acceptance in Chokwe. Thus, in the first years, the probation opening was to a large extent taken advantage of by peasants from neighbouring districts.

Soon, however, the probation mechanism proved insufficient and in 1959 a few Mozambicans were let into the Colonato as colonos with equal rights and duties — without cancelling the probation category where most of the Mozambicans remained. In the 1970's, the number of black colonos had grown considerably and constituted approximately one-third of the total 1 500 colonos in the Colonato.

Secondly, the four hectares attributed to each colono did not suffice, and by 1960, colonos were given more land, up to 10 hectares depending on the size of the family. The rainfed pasture lands outside the irrigated area that also were part of each colono's holdings were maintained.

Still, this measure was not enough and in 1965 it became possible to acquire new land, up to a total of 20 hectares per family. Every second white and every fifth black colono had taken advantage of this possibility by independence. A total of 3 100 hectares had been added in this way to the colonos' original holdings. Yet this was not sufficient, and rented plots also began to appear; in 1974, they totalled almost 1 000 hectares.

The lands added in this way were in fact not owned by the colonos: if they left or were evicted, they lost this land just as they lost their original plots, home, and cattle. Furthermore, the colonos as well as the Mozambicans on probation, were under contractual obligations to
repay the facilities made available to them. The annual installments were calculated as one-sixth (for colonos) or one-tenth (probation) of the value of the agricultural production of that year.

* * *

With the admission of Mozambicans, the ideology emphasized that the Colonato was for whites as well as for blacks, and that equality and harmony between the races had been achieved. Reality, however, was different.

The myth of racial equality cracks as the Colonato develops. Instead of peaceful racial coexistence on equal terms, differences and inequalities among colonos emerged. The material and productive progress of the colonos showed a clear racist division: the white colonos' holdings grew to become considerably larger than those of the Mozambican colonos: on average 8.5 hectares and 5.9 hectares, respectively.20

The possession of tractors shows a similar picture: of the 197 tractors acquired by colonos 1961–1973, only 12 % belonged to Mozambicans although they constituted one-third of the total number of colonos. The situation was the same — or worse — for cars, motorcycles, and farm equipment.21

The black colonos, although present in all of the villages of the Colonato, lived concentrated in a few of them, where they normally constituted the majority. Three of these villages (Massavasse, Chilembene, and Conhane) accounted for as much as 86 % of the total number of Mozambican colonos in 1969. In this way, Trigo de Morais directive from 1953 to allow mixed plots but not mixed housing had been adhered to.22

Similarly with respect to the prohibition to use hired labour, reality did not match what had been stipulated in the colonos' contracts. Although the contract clearly stated that no external labour was allowed and that only labour sharing or exchange of services would be tolerated, the Portuguese colonos employed Mozambican workers when need arose as we can gather from the complaints to the colonial inspector (see above). Wage labour was also utilized by the Mozambican colonos, but presumably on a reduced scale on account of the smaller holdings. This practice was common from the outset of the Colonato: already in 1958, the Colonato threatened to expel those colonos who hired workers other than shepherds. Nevertheless, by 1965, 95 % of the colonos were utilizing wage labour.23

* * *

In fact, the Colonato never became the model for settler agriculture that it was intended to be, neither the multi-racial paradise that would
have proven the difference between Portuguese and other colonizations. Instead, the Portuguese colonos began to leave the Colonato already in the late 1950's. By 1974, 583 white colonos had left, 80% of them voluntarily or because of illness. During the same period, 177 Mozambican colonos also left, 85% of them expelled. This means that over one-third of the colonos who had entered the Colonato left it again before independence.

The "voluntary" exodus of white colonos is understandable against the background of hard work, misery, and social problems that characterized several of the Colonato villages. The social failure of the Colonato also becomes evident when considering that of the 120 white colonos that left in 1974, 55 (or 46%) were still illiterate.24 When these unfortunate colonos returned to Portugal, many of them were totally lost and would loiter at the quay in Lisbon until they were picked up by the secret police PIDE.25 I wonder if they remembered the credo that the dictator Salazar once formulated for the Colonato:

A hoe in every hand
A home for every family
Bread in everybody's mouth26

Yet, the question must be raised if the Colonato was a failure also from a technical, agricultural point of view. Already in 1958, the first warnings of low yields were heard, endangering the enormous — economic and political — resources invested in the Colonato. Signals of this kind, indicating serious problems with the supply of inputs (such as seeds, pesticides, and fertilizers) and lack of water — a serious deficiency in any irrigation scheme, one would think — were repeated during the following years, often accompanied by proposals to free the colonos from their contractual obligations to refund the Colonato.

Other problems arose because the colonos often were installed on their lands too late to plant, or because the fields had been poorly prepared before handing them over to the colonos. The discontent reached considerable proportions: in 1961–1963, e. g., half of the new colonos received their fields badly prepared and too late for planting, and the Colonato felt it necessary to reinforce the customary relief programme that it offered to new colonos in terms of basic necessities such as flour, rice, soap, and cooking oil.27

Consequently, many colonos faced economic problems. As things were going, they would have to go on paying their debts to the Colonato for an estimated thirty years! The Colonato authority considered that 8 hectares was the break-even point where incomes and outlays balanced; in 1974, 46% of the colonos had fields inferior to this size. And to reach that (low) income level which obliged colonos to pay income tax, as many as 15 hectares would be needed. No
wonder, then, that smuggling as well as illegal transport and marketing continued to constitute the colonos' response in order to overcome these financial difficulties and escape from their contractual obligations in terms of installments.28

Thus, it should come as no surprise that the white settlement in the Colonato reached its maximum already in 1968, with 1 146 white colonos; that year also shows the highest total number of colonos, 1 593. The number of black colonos was actually stopped from rising even earlier, in 1964, when 476 Mozambican colonos existed.

Mozambicans were not allowed to substitute the departing Portuguese colonos. Therefore, after 1968, the total number of colonos decreased slowly, reaching 1 380 at the end of 1974. The number of Mozambicans on probation, however, increased steadily and totalled 2 584 in 1974 (see Table 1).

Table 1. Colonato do Limpopo. Actual Land Occupation 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nº</th>
<th>Area hectares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonos</td>
<td>1 380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- of which Portuguese Mozambicans</td>
<td>968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On probation</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3 964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* * *

The social contradictions built up within the Colonato. Portuguese colonos began to leave in considerable numbers already in 1959, tired and disgusted by the hard life and the slow progress. However, the Colonato authority did not accept more Mozambicans to take the places made vacant by the exodus of the Portuguese after 1964 — the year of the initiation of the armed struggle — as this would have endangered the whole settlement aspect of this colonial venture.

At the same time, however, the pressure from the surrounding peasantry increased as the number of Mozambicans living inside the Colonato area but without irrigated land more than doubled, from 2 000 families in 1953 to 4 500 families in 1964.29 Consequently, an ever greater number of applications to enter on probation were submitted. And the Colonato authority continued to dream about expanding the
area, planning in 1969 for 30 000 hectares and in 1972 for 35 000 hectares.30

Meanwhile, the conflicts from the early days of the Colonato continued as peasants from the rainfed lands in dry years raided the Colonato in search of food; and the barring of the cattle from the river continued to cause conflicts as fences were torn down to let the cattle reach the water points.31

To avoid a confrontation, the Colonato authority had to accept a growing number of Mozambican peasants on probation, but it could not allow them to enter the Colonato as full-fledged colonos, as this would have meant a recognition that the settlement policy on the Limpopo had failed. The Colonato was at a stalemate.

The Transition to Collective Agriculture

Independence brought a new phase to the struggle for the lands of Limpopo. During the first crucial years, from the transition government 1974–1975 to the flood of 1977, the future of the Colonato seems to have been undecided. Contradictory directives were issued, now advocating collectivization, and then again arguing in favour of a continuation in one form or another of the Colonato.

Nevertheless, in July 1975, right after independence had been proclaimed, a first effort to set the priorities was made: no new colonos were allowed to enter the Colonato; all peasants wanting to enter on probation would only be allowed to occupy two hectares or only one hectare for widows and divorcees; furthermore, no applications for acquisition or renting of land would be approved.32

The Colonato administration had been caught in the middle, partly giving way to the pressure from the peasantry while at the same time braking the “Mozambicanization” of the Colonato. The policy was far from consistent, as peasants were allowed to enter on probation. And they came in great numbers: from 2 600 at the end of 1974, their number grew to 6 000 in 1976. By then, another 10 000 peasants from outside were demanding access to the irrigated lands of the Colonato.33

It is possible that FRELIMO’s objective at that point of time, in 1975, was limited to “freezing” the situation in the Colonato, awaiting a decision on its future development. However, the forces in operation had a logic of their own. And also, letting peasants in on probation was in contradiction to “freezing” the situation, just as it would prove detrimental to any attempt to transform the Colonato into collective moulds, such as state farms or cooperatives.

During this period — from the creation of the transition government in 1974 until the third FRELIMO congress in 1977 — the struggle for the lands of Limpopo grew ever more intense. Two
categories of peasants exerted pressure in order to be able to take the place of the Portuguese colonos:

- The Mozambican colonos who through independence expected to be able to substitute the Portuguese settlers and attain a position which always had been denied them by the colonial administration.

- Mozambican poor peasants, on probation or without any irrigated land at all, who wanted to be promoted to colonos, or at least to obtain irrigated land.

In this struggle, the Portuguese colonos were to lose out. They lacked support from any organized, political force, and the vague and contradictory policies which seemed to bear the hallmark of FRELIMO did not promise anything in particular.

In fact, FRELIMO at this early stage did not have much of a policy with respect to the Colonato. But there were others who did. On the ground, the Mozambican colonos took advantage of the new organs of power which independence brought, especially the Grupos Dinamizadores ("dynamizing" groups), which were supposed to guarantee the popular character of the revolution. In fact, the black colonos, the middle peasants of the region, took advantage of these groups and increased the pressure on the Portuguese by threats and intimidations. The objective apparently was to clear the way for their own ascension to power — or at least to the Colonato lands.

Of course, the Portuguese colonos interpreted the activities of what they called the "dynamiting groups" as FRELIMO policy and as an indication of what independence would bring. And they responded uniformly to this confusing and contradictory situation: during 1975, 261 of them left the Colonato, bringing the total number of colonos down to 1,148, of which 418 were Mozambicans. From then on the fall was vertical, with approximately 400 Portuguese colonos leaving in 1976 as well as in 1977.

* * *

1977 marks a decisive turning point in several respects. Firstly, it was the year of the third FRELIMO congress, the first since independence. It unequivocally pointed to state farms and cooperatives as the guiding principles for agricultural development, requiring "organization and mobilization of the people in state farms and cooperatives as well as the erection of communal villages". The state sector was to be "dominating and determining".34
Secondly, the congress tied great hopes for the future to the Limpopo valley, designating it as the bread basket of the nation and exhorting new record harvests and expansion of the irrigated lands.

Thirdly, and unexpectedly, the policy laid out at the congress was promoted by external powers: simultaneously with the congress, the Limpopo overflowed and large areas of the valley were inundated. This catastrophe made FRELIMO form a special commission to resettle the affected population. Among the commission members were the then Minister of the Interior Guebuza and the then Minister of Agriculture de Carvalho. The commission set out to implement the decisions of the third congress by resettling the population in such a way as to facilitate the transformation of the Colonato into collective moulds.

The commission worked fast: three weeks after the flood, its conclusions were drawn. A few days later they were made public:35

- the population should be resettled on high lands in communal villages;
- if the population refused to adhere, "administrative measures" (i.e. force) could be utilized;
- state farms and cooperatives should have priority access to the Colonato lands;
- all the lands within the Colonato which could be considered sub-optimally utilized would be transferred to state farms or cooperatives; and
- those peasants in the Colonato which did cultivate their lands in an acceptable way would nevertheless be transferred to another zone if their plots were needed by state farms or cooperatives.

This policy matched perfectly the general orientation of the third FRELIMO congress. In its most naked form, the objective as far as Chokwe was concerned was formulated by the weekly magazine Tempo: the reorganization of the Colonato would contribute to the proletarization of the countryside and simultaneously contain the growth of a rural bourgeoisie.36

These drastic measures — although mild in comparison with what would come in a year or two — naturally created a lot of resistance, and many peasants refused to leave their homes. By now, almost all the Portuguese colonos had already left the Colonato, and the Mozambican colonos and the peasants on probation as well as those who still remained outside the irrigated area began to realize that their possibility to enter as real colonos was about to be taken away from
them. Thus, the opening created by the exodus of the Portuguese and by the advantage that Mozambican colonos took of the *Grupos Dinamizadores*, was closed by the intervention of FRELIMO itself.

It was clear to the FRELIMO commission that this reorganization of the irrigated lands of Limpopo as well as the resettlement of the population affected by the flood would cause resistance. That is why the commission endorsed removal by force, should the peasants resist the winds of change. That is why Zacarias Kupela, today the secretary general of the FRELIMO Youth Organization OJM, when presenting the conclusions of the commission at a rally in Chokwe warned that the decisions of the commission would provoke a reaction of sabotage and resistance, against which repression would be used.\textsuperscript{37}

These guide-lines were harsh enough, but when they were put into practice, the severity of the policy became evident. In June 1979, the following directives were issued concerning ex-colonos and peasants on probation:\textsuperscript{38}

- the following categories would lose their fields:
  - peasants that did not cultivate their land or who cultivated less than one hectare;
  - peasants in debt to the state irrespective of the amount owed;
  - peasants whose debts were unknown because they had not declared their production;
  - peasants who did not live exclusively from agriculture;
  - peasants who were outside the district even though their wives cultivated the lands;
  - workers of the newly created state farm or of any of the production cooperatives;

* peasants who cultivated only part of their farms would have their lands reduced to the area really cultivated (if it was more than one hectare; otherwise they lost it all); and

* farms could not be inherited.

This medicine obviously had a bitter taste for various social strata. Worse, it antagonized both of the two most important social groups of the area:

* the Mozambican colonos and those on probation whose hopes to take over after the Portuguese were broken; and

* the peasants on the rainfed areas whose aspirations to retrieve some of the lands which had been taken from them were crushed.
In those confusing times, the sentiment of the Chokwe peasantry was brought out at a rally in Chokwe, presided over by Armando Guebuza and veteran FRELIMO leader Marcelino dos Santos. The two FRELIMO leaders were addressed by one of the peasant elders: "Let me tell you an anecdote. A bird was kept captive in a bird-cage. Along came FRELIMO and freed the bird; instead they tied a rope to the bird's leg. Now I ask of you: has the bird been liberated or not?"39

***

Thus, from the point of view of alliance policy, the picture seems clear: no compromise was attempted with the middle peasantry. And as far as the poorer peasants outside the Colonato were concerned, the intention was to transform them into labourers on the state farm and cooperatives.

Worse, perhaps, was that both these groups of peasants were to assume key functions in the state farm as foremen and administrators, and as workers and drivers, respectively. The success or failure of the state farm thus became closely linked to two groups of peasants whose ambitions had been smashed by the mounting of the very state farm they were supposed to make work.

Also, the attempt to create clear-cut proletarians by refusing wage earners and wives of migrant workers irrigated land implied in reality a break with the century-old reproduction system that had sustained the peasantry on a mixture of wage incomes and agriculture. Not only did this weaken the reproductive basis of the peasant economy as such, but it also increased the strain on the strategic aim to turn peasants into workers as now the whole burden of reproduction was to be carried by wage labour alone.

The Failure of CAIL

The operation was successful — the Colonato died. But the contradictions survived, and grew more acute as the state farm CAIL developed, ever more entrenched in the contradictions it inherited, further aggravated by its own creation.

CAIL, the Complexo Agro-Industrial de Limpopo, was the most important state farm of them all. But the peasants of the area were not at all keen to see it succeed, nor were they interested in being employed by it, nor in moving to the communal villages erected to supply CAIL with labour after the flood of 1977. Rather, they simply demanded to be able to take advantage of the irrigation scheme constructed on their lands and until then mostly benefitting

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Portuguese colonos. But instead of being let in, those who had land were forced to abandon it or, in a few cases, to move to inferior land with serious salinity problems.

The contradictions were not softened by the fact that the administration in the district prohibited wage labour for peasants having irrigated land. Although it may be understandable that absentee landlords should be fought, motivated (male) workers would hardly be forthcoming to CAIL when wage employment meant the loss of their irrigated fields — even though the wife (or wives) continued to cultivate them.

Neither was the situation improved by the fact that moving to the communal villages meant that the peasants had to walk 5, 10, up to 20 km to their fields, nor by the long distances (one hour in each direction) to get water, nor by the difficulty to get hold of firewood, nor by the lack of organization, nor, finally by the generalized state of hunger and destitution in these villages.40

** **

But CAIL continued its path, proudly trying to fulfill the hopes bestowed upon it by the third FRELIMO congress, seemingly oblivious of what fate had in store. However, by 1981 the harvest failed: of the 52 000 tons of rice planned, 26 000 tons were harvested. The total planned area, 16 000 hectares, had been planted, but the yield was only half of that expected, 1.6 tons/hectare as against the target 3.2 tons/hectare.

The explanation presented by CAIL for this failure was the well-known — and long — list of "falta de," lack of: the problems encountered were explained by the late arrival or lack of seeds, pesticides, fertilizers, the lack of seasonal labour for the harvest and consequently low yields from the fields.41

Even though all these falta de- reasons contain elements of what could be considered to constitute an analysis of CAIL’s failure — and although several of these problems persisted already during colonial times — they still do not disclose some of the key factors which conditioned the outcome.

It seems to me that the basic reason why CAIL did not — or rather, could not — manage to surmount the difficulties and problems encountered — real, objective factors which in any socio-political environment would have been difficult to cope with — this basic reason should be looked for in the creation and roots of CAIL itself.

The contradictions created in the area — superimposed upon an old differentiated social structure — with the installation of the Colonato; the forces represented by the Mozambican colonos and those on probation, whose numbers so benevolently had been allowed to increase during the first years of independence; the subsequent
forceful expulsion of these peasants and the forced resettlement after the flood of 1977, all these factors taken together, so it seems to me, explain fully why it would be somewhat naive to expect these very same peasants to be disciplined, dedicated and conscientious in their new role as foremen and farm workers at CAIL.

Furthermore, the well-known problem of competing activities was also felt, especially during the rice harvest, when the need of CAIL to employ great numbers of workers collided head on with the peasants' own harvests, irrespective of whether they worked on cooperative or individual plots. One way to "resolve" this conflict was applied in Gaza in 1978, when Samora Machel ordered seven districts to supply 5,000 men each during one month to CAIL for the rice harvest. Although such recruitment campaigns had been customary during colonialism, as far as CAIL was concerned they ought not to have been necessary now that CAIL utilized a mechanized agriculture with combine harvesters and all. In fact, this need to recruit so many seasonal workers indicated a failure of CAIL's production system.

But we must be a little more specific. Before independence, there existed only one or two combine harvesters and approximately 150 tractors in the Colonato, whereas all colonos had oxen for animal traction. Still, most colonos rented tractors when needed, just as they all employed wage labour. Thus, the Colonato had already come a long way from the manual, family agriculture that Trigo de Morais had envisaged.

Still, CAIL brought a completely new level of mechanization — and thus of complexity — to Chokwe, introducing such fancy techniques as pesticide spraying by airplanes. This production system was introduced through a bilateral technical assistance agreement between Mozambique and Bulgaria. There is no doubt that from a technical point of view severe mistakes were committed which contributed to the bad harvests. Simultaneously, the ecological balance was hurt and the salinity problem aggravated.

Nevertheless, consequences would not have become so dire had it not been for two key groups of CAIL employees who made sure that the problems and difficulties which others — "FRELIMO", "the Bulgarians" — had created would have the most severe impact possible. Thus, the former Mozambican colonos and peasants on probation who now occupied posts as foremen, administrators, heads of workshops and production units, as well as the peasants who had been transformed into workers and drivers, all embraced the opportunity handed to them by overinvestment and an inappropriate level of complexity. In an atmosphere of complete irresponsibility (deixa-andar), they watched CAIL sink to the bottom.

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The failure of the 1980/81 campaign caused an investigation of CAIL and its problems. This commission, headed by Marcelino dos Santos, brought many of the basic issues into the open, but the conclusions proved partly contradictory. On the one hand, a total revision of the whole operational set-up of CAIL was proposed, including management, supplies of inputs, storage facilities, maintenance, crop diversification, and stabilisation of the workforce. On the other hand, it was strongly underlined that the high "optimistic" goals of the Ten Year Plan 1980–1990 (PPI) had to be achieved, and that CAIL in particular was under the obligation to meet the growth rates required to realize the plan.44

Thus, at this particular juncture of time it proved impossible to move beyond the inherent contradictions of CAIL. And although an "informal" occupation of some 50 hectares irrigated land which were not being cultivated by CAIL was undertaken by former colonos in 1982, it would take another year until new measures were introduced that once more shifted the balance in the struggle for the lands of Limpopo.

The Contradictions Resolved — or a New Phase in the Struggle?

In 1983, CAIL was dismembered. After five years of continued efforts to get the giant to stand on its feet, CAIL was broken up into separate state farms, each one with 1 000–1 500 hectares, each one with its own direction, administration, workshop, etc. Had the difficulties encountered by CAIL only been of a technical-administrative nature, maybe this is all that would have been needed: the single state farm is divided into several, management and administrative functions are strengthened and decentralized, a greater emphasis is placed upon maintenance, etc.

But the transformation of CAIL did not limit itself to a mere administrative reorganization. One of the basic problems was the political contradictions in the area, or in other words, the land issue. Therefore, solutions had to be found on this level as well, and land distribution became the crucial question.

Based on the former colonato villages (see Map 2) a new geographical organization of the area was decided. Around each village co-exist the "four sectors": a state farm, production cooperatives, private capitalist farmers, and peasants. The population in each village earns its living from one or several of these sectors.
14 000 peasants have received land in the area, from one-half to one hectare, with a total of 10 000 hectares distributed. The plots are cultivated individually, although the peasants are obliged to conform to the demands of the irrigation scheme and a more or less simultaneous ploughing (with oxen or rented tractors), planting, and harvesting.

440 private farmers occupy 8 700 hectares, with great individual differences, from 4 up to 200 hectares. Half of their area is situated inside the irrigation scheme, whereas the other half lies outside the original irrigated area and pumps its water from the river or from the canals which carry water to the former Colonato fields.

These private farmers are part of the planning process of the whole area. Just as the peasants, they are obliged to comply with the agricultural calendar imposed by the irrigation system. But in addition to this, the private farmers enter contractual obligations stipulating the crops to be grown and the shares to be sold at official prices to the state marketing agency. This share varies depending on the area of each private farmer, but it goes from 60 % in general up to an incredible 90 % for those who cultivate more than 100 hectares. In fact, the private farmers are to a large extent contract growers for the state — although they obviously can dispose of important quantities of the production themselves, as well as make a lot of money from vegetables in the cool season.

The private farmers were chosen according to a series of criteria: agricultural capacity, experience, possession of implements (tractors, motor pumps, ploughs, oxen), also taking into consideration those who had been colonos or on probation in the Colonato. Thus, the private farmers today constitute a mixture of those traditionally wealthier families of the region who through migrant labour initiated an accumulation process, and the remainder of the colonos and those on probation; a total of 40 Portuguese farmers also remain in this group.

The present set-up, with seven state farms, one joint venture with the transnational LONRHO, and private, peasant and cooperative sectors, is summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. *Agricultural Set-Up in Chokwe 1986/87*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>N°</th>
<th>Area hectares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State farms</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lonrho</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private farmers</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>8,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants</td>
<td>14,600</td>
<td>10,100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cooperatives</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>31,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The result of the reorganization has been an impressive increase in productivity. Whereas CAIL in its last year (1982/83) managed a rice yield of 2.5 tons/hectare (to be compared with the catastrophic harvest of 1980/81 with only 1.6 tons/hectare), the average harvests since the land was distributed show an average yield for the state farms of 3.5 tons/hectare.

Thus it seems as if the major impediments to agricultural production in the Chokwe area have been done away with — and the rice harvest of 1986, 50,000 tons — the biggest since independence — would testify to this. Simultaneously, however, class differentiation has gained a new momentum as the inherent stratification tendencies have been let loose.

In a sense, the redistribution of the land brings us back to 1974/1975. Then, no compromise with the colonos — Mozambican or Portuguese — nor with the peasants on probation was effected. Now, such a compromise has de facto been concluded. But the land struggle — and the differentiation — continues, although partly on a different terrain than before:

- **Firstly**, the scope of migration to the Rand has been drastically reduced as part of South Africa’s destabilization move towards Mozambique. This change took place right after independence: in 1975, 19% of the active male population in the Gaza province was away as migrant workers. One year later, the share had fallen to only 4%, and has remained low ever since.45

  On the other hand, wages on the Rand have risen and thus today a reduced number of migrants dispose of greater resources which may reinforce the differentiation process.

- **Secondly**, stratification is further fuelled by the fact that more and more peasants are available for wage labour — in spite of the fact that almost all peasants in the irrigated zone have received land. The
growth of wage labour is primarily caused by the problems of reproduction encountered by peasants living on rainfed land outside the irrigated zone, where irregular rainfalls coupled with the reduction in migrant incomes have forced a partial but successive transformation of the peasantry to wage labour.

To an increasing extent, these labourers are refugees from the war which rages on the periphery of Chokwe. Today there are private farmers who employ hundreds of completely dispossessed refugees — young men, women, and children — who have fled the war.

Also, some of the poorer peasants who have received irrigated plots, have encountered difficulties and are now either renting their land to other peasants and/or selling their labour power.

- Thirdly, differentiation is also strengthened by the fact that the private farmers as well as the poor peasants are heterogenous groups, where a small minority in each controls the basic means which facilitate accumulation.

For the private farmers, these means are basically land and tractors, and for the poorer peasants the decisive factor is cattle. The 40 Portuguese private farmers form an outstanding group: their average holdings are 50 hectares, twice as much as for the private sector as a whole. Half of these Portuguese private farmers have tractors, whereas the rule in the private sector is only one in four.

Similarly, the peasantry's possession of cattle is extremely skewed: 70% of the peasants in Chokwe do not have any cattle whatsoever. Similarly, only 8% of the peasants owned as much as 66% of the total herd.46

* * *

Today, Chokwe lives with a fragile equilibrium. The distribution of land to the private and peasant sectors as well as the reorganization of the state farms have created a very dynamic situation with strong centrifugal and differentiating forces. These forces are further nourished by the crisis that torments the peasant population on rainfed lands as well as those thousands of peasants who take refuge in Chokwe from the war.

Against this background, it is not difficult to envisage an intensified struggle for the lands of Limpopo, where an ever more dynamic private sector may come to dominate over a weakened state sector unable to counteract the growing proletarization of an impoverished peasantry.
PART THREE

By Way of Conclusion

To Samora Machel, CAIL constituted the essence of FRELIMO’s entire agricultural strategy. In 1982, in Chokwe, he stated that CAIL was “the centre of a class struggle. Therefore, imperialism is watching, hoping that the CAIL experience fails in order to prove that socialism cannot triumph in Africa.”

Now, we may well ask if it was this class struggle that brought CAIL to its knees? Probably, but the downfall of CAIL was facilitated by the inappropriate manner in which the state farm was set up and run.

And what is the situation today: have the former contradictions been overcome, does the new alliance policy ensure a peaceful and harmonious development in the countryside? I believe not; but an important change in the areas where land has been distributed, is that although the contradictions remain, they are now mainly external whereas before they were incorporated into the very soul of the state farms themselves. This, in turn, means that the viability of state farms finally may be tested on their own merit. Therefore, it constitutes a hopeful sign that the state farms in Chokwe, once freed from their internal contradictions, have managed to improve yields as well as profitability, although several of them still show poor results. This general improvement has been achieved without any new investment. In fact, no new major investments have been made in the state sector since CAIL received its injection of machinery and equipment around 1978.

In Chokwe today, the success or failure of the new organizational set-up depends to a considerable extent upon the possibility to counterbalance the strong differentiating forces in operation within the system as described in Section V above. A fragile balance was achieved by distributing the land and reorganizing the state sector. However, once established, this balance is constantly being threatened by centrifugal forces in operation within the set-up itself. And more: the process is further fuelled by external influence, such as an increasing number of dispossessed peasants seeking refuge in the Chokwe area.

But there are also other external influences. Policy priorities imposed from the outside by agencies such as USAID and the World Bank reinforce the stratification process by channelling support to that sector most prone to accumulate — the middle peasants, the so called
private farmers — at the same time as they exclude support to the state sector which is responsible not only for its own production but also for maintaining the infrastructure which constitutes the very basis for agriculture in Chokwe as a whole. Thus, "peaceful coexistence" between the four sectors is constantly being threatened — from internal differentiating forces as well as from the imposition of alien policy priorities.

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The new alliance in Chokwe is part of a national policy already set in motion by the fourth FRELIMO congress in 1983 and expanded through the economic reform programme PRE. Such an alliance was apparently not deemed necessary in 1974–1975, although, as I have argued in this essay, the experience of the armed struggle as well as the objective situation facing FRELIMO on the eve of independence might well have been interpreted in such a way as to have demanded some kind of political alliance.

Today, the implications of such an alliance may well be different from what they would have been in the aftermath of the national liberation war. On the one hand, the political and economic power of FRELIMO has been drastically weakened by South African aggression and destabilization coupled with a voluntaristic policy line. Therefore, the negative stratifying effects may well become stronger than they would have had to be ten years ago.

On the other hand, the external relation of forces has also changed, although in a more complicated way. Through the Nkomati/IMF/process, FRELIMO has, in a sense, accepted the customary class bias and differentiating effects implied in such a package. Of course, this could be interpreted as constituting an agreement with international capital through its agent the IMF/World Bank Group. And in a way it is, especially as far as finance requirements and debt rescheduling are concerned. In principle, private as well as foreign capital have always been accepted by FRELIMO; still, it was only when external pressure forced a realignment of the international support available to FRELIMO that concrete steps were taken to put this policy in motion.

However, this realignment has not implied an alliance with the South African apartheid regime. On the contrary, South Africa's destabilization policy continues, as aggressive as ever. The simple reason, I believe, why South Africa maintains the pressure on Mozambique is that Mozambique still manages to ride the east-west see-saw without allowing itself to be placed in either "camp", and that FRELIMO has not relinquished its social ambitions nor its nation-building project.
Hence, although the pressure exerted on Mozambique has forced an internal class alliance policy, it has not as of yet resulted in any decisive change of the long-term objectives of FRELIMO policy. Although it has a rather bitter taste, we may therefore conclude that FRELIMO is trying to pass from a voluntaristic approach to one which is defined in the realm of what is possible.

Obviously, this is not an easy transformation, and the present phase of Mozambique’s development puts these long-term objectives under severe strain. One of the first signs of this was the abolition of the subsidized food rationing system which, although insufficient, helped the urban population to survive. In the beginning of 1988, the subsidies were cut, and the wage increases that followed were not enough to compensate for the loss.

Similar changes of balance are felt throughout Mozambican society as public expenditure is being reduced, hurting e.g., education and health services, two of the areas which benefitted most from independence.

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In sum, then, the Nkomati/IMF option offered an escape from the cul de sac, but an escape with severe political implications.

The readjustment process initiated in 1983 and carried forward by PRE in 1987 seems likely to be drawn-out and no decisive improvements are foreseen before the middle of the 1990’s. The government budget deficit is foreseen to continue in the red, and so is the balance of payments.2

This means that Mozambique will remain under severe pressure from the IMF to restrain government spending further, which will affect the social sectors foremost since 40 % of the state budget is spent for defence purposes. In addition, the IMF programme implies a continued dependency upon aid and a growing commitment to semicommercial loans. Hence, annual negotiations to reschedule Mozambique’s external debt will continue and the global foreign debt will grow. In essence, therefore, Mozambique will remain dependent upon the financial flows controlled by the IMF as well as upon favourable debt rescheduling, a process which also hinges on good relations with the IMF.

In this perspective, continued support of FRELIMO and Mozambique is essential in order to meet the combined negative impact of South African destabilization and IMF-induced policies. Otherwise, the alliance policy entered into in the middle 1980’s may very well lead to an uncontrollable process of class differentiation far beyond what was originally envisaged when the policy was set in motion.
Notes

Abbreviations used in the notes

AHM  Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, Maputo
BTFPL  Brigada Técnica de Fomento e Povoamento de Limpopo, Chokwe
CEA  Centro de Estudos Africanos, UEM, Maputo
GdL  Gabinete do Limpopo, Chokwe
MINAG  Ministério da Agricultura, Maputo
SIREMO  Sistema de Regadio "Eduardo Mondlane" (ex BTFPL), Chokwe
UEM  Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo

PART ONE

I. Rural Differentiation and Colonial Ambiguities (pp. 9–18)


12. The principal source for this section is Yussuf Adam: Cooperativização agrícola e modificações das relações de produção no período colonial em Moçambique, tese de licenciatura, mimeo, UEM 1986.


20. Marc Wuyts: Camponeses e economia rural em Moçambique, INLD, Maputo 1981, table VI.


II. FRELIMO at the Gates of Power (pp. 19–30)

2. Eduardo Mondlane interviewed by Aquino de Bragança, quoted from John Saul: “Foreword” in Mondlane, *op. cit.*, p. X.
16. See various speeches by Samora Machel quoted in *Notícias* May 30, June 1, 8, and 18, 1975.
20. For the lower Limpopo valley, see Roesch, *op. cit.*, and CEA (1979), *op. cit.*; For Chokwe, see Section V below; For Angónia, Tete, see CEA (1983): *Organizar os trabalhadores das machambas estatais do CAIA, and CEA (1983a): Famílias camponesas da Angónia no processo de socialização do campo*; For the tea districts
of Zambézia province, see CEA (1982), op. cit., and CEA (1982b): O papel dinamizador da EMOCHÁ na transformação socialista da alta Zambézia; For Moamba, Maputo province, see CEA (1979a): O desemprego e a sua ligação com o campo; For Lioma, Zambézia province, see Eulália de Brito: Relatório da saída de campo ao CAPEL, mimeo, UDA/MINAGRI 1982.


23. CEA (1979), op. cit., pp. 7–8, 33–34; and Section V below.


III. The Nkomati/IMF Option (pp. 31–35)


PART TWO

Contemporary Land Struggles in the Limpopo Valley (pp. 36–55)

1. Notícias, September 26, 1983.

2. A Trigo de Morais: A água na valorização do ultramar, Agência Geral das Colónias, Lisbon 1951, p. 39; For Angola, see Bender (1978) op. cit., part II, note 3.


8. Associação de regantes, Relatório Anual 1965 (Villages Madragoa [today Chilembene] and Sagres [Nwachicoluane]), SIREMO.
9. Interview recorded by Alpheus Manghezi, CEA, and personal communication from Alfredo Mucabel, SIREMO.
10. Trigo de Morais: Despachos à BTFPL Nº 13/58 (Mão de obra do Colonato de europeus e assimilados) and Nº 10/58 (no title), SIREMO; BTFPL: Informação 74/ARCAP/59, 28/11/59, AHM, file S/9a Nº 258.
26. Salazar's credo, which was engraved on a pillar to mark the dam — the functional centre of the Colonato do Limpopo — reads in Portuguese:
   “Para cada braço uma enxada
   Para cada família o seu lar
   Para cada boca o seu pão”
27. Trigo de Morais: Despacho à BTFPL Nº 4 and 5, 1958 (no titles), SIREMO; Associação de regantes: Auxílio financeiro aos colonos, 31/1/64, SIREMO; Associação de regantes: Relatório Anual 1965 (villages Madragoa [Chilembene] and Sagres [Nwachicoluane]), SIREMO; GdL: Imposto sobre as explorações a pagar pelos colonos, 10ª ST, 20/10/70, SIREMO; GdL: Dispensa do pagamento do sexto mínomo na campanha orizícola de 1972/73. Informação Nº 94/10ª ST/73, 24/7/73, SIREMO.
31. BTFPL: Relatório do 1º semestre 1957, 4º ST, p. 5; Associação de Regantes, Relatório Anual 1965 (Village Sagres).
39. As retold by Alfredo Mucabel and Eduardo Cuna in separate interviews in Chokwe.
41. CAIL: Relatório de balanço do 1º semestre do PEC/81, mimeo, August 1981, CEA Archives.
43. Recenseamento agrícola, op. cit., tables 4.2a, 6.2a and 11.3.

PART THREE

By Way of Conclusion (pp. 56–58)

Research Reports

Below you will find a list of Research Reports published by the Institute. Some of the reports are unfortunately out of print. Xero-copies of these reports can be obtained at a cost of SEK 0.50 per page.

1. Meyer-Heiselberg, R., Notes from Liberated African Department in the Archives at Fourah Bay College, Freetown, Sierra Leone. 61 pp. Uppsala 1967. (OUT-OF-PRINT)

2. Not published.


