


Conflict Studies Research Centre

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**The Enlargement of The West
& The Future of Ukraine**

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By undertaking to enlarge NATO and the EU, we have not only enlarged our definition of the West, but our commitments and vulnerabilities. Amongst states with little near or mid-term prospect of joining either club, the impact of enlargement is proving to be even more profound. Their response to the stresses and inducements of the enlargement process is already influencing the character of the wider NATO and the 'greater Europe'. It is also putting NATO and the EU under pressure to develop more complementary and coordinated approaches to security and to their own protection. The events of 11 September are therefore strengthening two powerful impulses: enlargement and exclusion. In these new circumstances, states with 'European' or 'Euro-Atlantic' aspirations are facing sharper choices, tougher demands and a less charitable and 'enlightened' definition of Western self-interest than they once could assume.

Where Ukraine is concerned, these choices and demands are not only acute, they have produced changes in policy. The oft observed tilt towards Russia since summer 2000 arose not only in response to President Putin's 'tougher' and 'more pragmatic' policy, but the growing conviction that 'the West is closed to us'. Yet at this very time, cooperation with NATO over defence reform assumed a new, intense and highly active character. Ukraine's orientation - not to say its performance - reflects the power of internal forces. But it also points to the existence of a variety of forces, sensitive to external stimulants and pressures. The response of Ukraine - its 'shadow structures' as well as its official ones; its society as well as its state - to these stimulants and pressures will not affect Ukraine alone.

The aspiration articulated in 1991 by President George Bush to create 'a Europe whole and free' naturally kindled expectations in former Communist Europe that newly resuscitated and newly established states would be welcomed into the institutions which had given integrity and definition to the 'free' part of Europe since the Cold War divided the continent. Ten years after this goal was proclaimed, NATO has admitted but three of the nineteen states which now make up this region, and the European Union has admitted none.¹ Even in the pre-11 September environment, there was reason to ask whether this gap between expectation and result contributed to Europe's security.

Great power does not always produce great policy. It remains to be seen whether the 'war against terrorism' will widen the West's field of vision or narrow it. It is worth recalling that the last great challenge to Western thinking, the end of the Cold War, did both. In Western Europe and North America, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union not only produced triumphalist declarations and 'initiatives',

but contradictory expectations, competing priorities, timidity, confusion and denial. Until 1994 there was reasoned speculation that NATO would simply disappear. The reasons that it did not disappear immediately were the timeless ones of habit, inertia, uncertainty, prudence and corporate interest – sometimes but not always reinforced by a premonition that Soviet threats would sooner or later return in Russian national garb. Only in 1994-5 did ‘partnership’, enlargement and conflict in the Balkans give NATO a new sense of purpose and an ambitious agenda of transformation.

More than two years before NATO committed itself to enlargement, the European Union agreed at its June 1993 Copenhagen European Council that it would consider former Communist states as candidates for accession. Yet at the higher political level, quite a few political figures still harboured private ambivalences about the collapse of constraints which had kept not only Europe but Germany divided. At working level EU bodies remained fixated on a course of ‘deepening integration’ which could only delay the widening of the Union. For all the thought given to strengthening the mechanisms of Common Foreign and Security Policy, little thought was given to the security implications which EU policy posed for non-members, let alone the need to develop a joint EU-NATO approach to security building in Central and Eastern Europe. It took two military conflicts in the Balkans to elevate the EU’s security priority and refocus it.

Well before 11 September, there was growing apprehension that what President George Bush Jr defined as the ‘false lines’ dividing Europe during the Cold War would be replaced by real ones.² To Samuel Huntington and a still more deterministic school of post-Soviet Russian and Ukrainian geopoliticians, these new dividing lines are understood in ‘civilisational’ terms. To participants in NATO and EU assistance programmes and a vastly larger class of economic actors, great and small, these dividing lines are experienced daily in much more prosaic, but equally tenacious form: as differences of political, legal, administrative and business culture. Ukraine’s experience illustrates not only the irrelevance of Cold War divisions, but the irrelevance of their dismantlement – for Ukraine has achieved not only a high degree of cooperation, but a degree of integration with Western military structures; yet socially and economically, its ‘vector of development’ continues to diverge from its most dedicated ‘strategic partner’, Poland, and even sympathetic observers believe that it is still failing in its ‘strategic challenge’ of becoming a ‘full member of the European family of civilised nations’.³

Were members of this ‘European family’ to conclude that old dividing lines had simply moved further east, there might be cause for disappointment and depression, but not necessarily apprehension. Apprehension arises for three reasons, and Ukraine is central to all of them. The first of these is Russia. The perception that Ukraine cannot join the West despite the geopolitical ambitions of both parties risks reinforcing other arguments in Russia about the distinctiveness of ‘former Soviet space’ and the irrelevance of Western models to Russia itself. The highly activist and Western orientated policy of President Putin does not resolve this dilemma, for even today his classically Russian ambivalence remains: should the West adjust its standards to accommodate Russia, or should Russia alter its standards to become part of the West? Moreover, to many inside Russia, the global reach of new terrorist threats validates, rather than undermines, the widespread post-Soviet conviction that Russia must emerge (vide Boris Yeltsin 1993) as the ‘guarantor of peace and stability in former regions of the USSR’.⁴

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Second, one should not assume that the deterioration of conditions in Ukraine – and with it, the proliferation of ‘shadow structures’ and the progressive criminalisation of the state – will simply affect Ukraine and other newly independent states, rather than prove (vide Anatolii Grytsenko) ‘a source of additional threats to European countries in terms of drugs, weapons, illegal immigrants, prostitutes and ecological disasters’⁵ [and, he might have added, money laundering and terrorism].

Third, Ukraine is scarcely in a unique position. As Anton Bebler has noted, ‘the armed hostilities in the Balkans...[have] caused a huge rise in the illicit traffic of arms, narcotics, falsified documents and forged currencies, and in the smuggling of persons, precious metals and stones, oil and essentials such as food, detergents and spare parts’.⁶ As Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anatolii Zlenko, noted in July 2001, conditions in parts of the Balkans, Transnistria, Abkhazia the north Caucasus (and, he might have added, Kaliningrad Oblast’) are already becoming ‘dangers for Europe as a whole’. Some of these entities also have become zones of opportunity for extremists based outside Europe. If Ukraine, with its population of 50 million and ‘unique geographical position’ bordering several NATO and EU members (and the Black Sea) were added to the list of failing or pathological states, the dangers to Europe would surely be greater than they are at present. For all of these reasons, Western leaders have described Ukraine’s future as a ‘key factor’ in the future security of Europe.

But Ukraine is only the most compelling example of a general proposition: what happens to the states who do not join the ‘greater Europe’ will be felt by those who do. Many today fear that the Schengen border regime and other elements of EU’s *acquis communautaire* could become an ‘iron curtain’ dividing Europe. Yet bad as this case would be, it would not be the worst case. In the worst case, Schengen would become the economic equivalent of a Maginot line, providing limited security or simply an artificial sense of it. Unless NATO and the EU develop an effective strategy for the excluded states – as well as a long-term strategy for including them – both entities might have to revise their assumptions about the costs of enlargement and the means required to maintain European security.

With this challenge as its backdrop, two sets questions deserve exploration:

1. Are NATO and EU enlargement policies addressing real security problems? Are these policies broadly compatible or at cross purposes? Are they diminishing the burdens placed upon states likely to be excluded or increasing them?
2. As a ‘pivotal’ state, how has Ukraine responded to the stimuli and pressures of the twin enlargements, and how successfully have NATO and EU responded to Ukraine’s needs and concerns?

The Two Enlargements: Genesis & Evolution

The European Union and NATO have brought different criteria and different methods to the enlargement process: methods which are having as profound an effect on states currently excluded from the process as on those brought into it. Therefore, the possibility exists that the two enlargements will proceed not only along separate paths, but at cross purposes. The cross currents already in evidence are producing much disorientation in Ukraine, Russia and several other countries, taxing the intellectual resources of those struggling to understand ‘objectively’ what

is taking place and, at the same time, struggling to define – and where necessary, redefine – their own national interests. Only in 1999 was there clear official recognition that divergences between NATO and the EU could prove damaging to both institutions and harmful to European security. Although this recognition is gradually producing innovations in structure and policy, these might not be sufficient to harmonise the dynamics of what are certain to remain two very different institutions.

Of the two institutions, it is NATO which until recently has been the more outward looking and the more positive towards enlargement. This is not merely on the grounds of self-perpetuation evident in the axiom of former Secretary General Manfred Wörner that 'NATO has to go out of area or out of business'. It is because NATO is a living, rather than a fossilised security organisation and capable of seeing that 'deterrence' and 'defence' offer only partial protection against post-Cold War security challenges. It is also because the internal criteria which NATO aspirants must meet are easier to specify and vastly easier to satisfy than the necessarily complex, profound and protracted internal transformations demanded of countries seeking to join the European Union.

For all this, the post-Cold War NATO was for several years a reluctant enlarger (even after completing its Study on Enlargement in December 1995); and until the Madrid summit of July 1997, enlargement was largely a demand driven process. Given the 'Russia first' policy which prevailed in a number of member states well through 1994, it took some time for these demands to be understood. Although Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic viewed Russia as a problematic factor in European security, by the time of Madrid, few viewed Russia as a military threat to themselves and no one of consequence believed that Russia was the prime factor making membership essential. The urgency was more fundamental and more transcendental. NATO membership was synonymous with membership of the West. Return to a 'grey zone' was synonymous with insecurity – and not only international insecurity, given the need to guarantee the irreversibility of *internal* changes. These were *a priori* propositions, tenaciously held.

By 1997, these concerns were giving new emphasis to what had always been consistent, if second order, justifications for NATO's existence. Lord Ismay's much quoted proposition – the purpose of NATO is 'to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down' – did not reveal a hidden agenda, but an open and avowed one: the prevention of conflict between NATO's members and the banishment of 'balance of power' politics from the heart of Europe. The united Germany of Helmut Kohl was as sensitive to these concerns as the West Germany of Konrad Adenauer had been. Since 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany had predicated its foreign policy on the *illegitimacy* of the German national interest. After 1989 as after 1949, Germans have been determined to confront security challenges as members of a European and Euro-Atlantic community and not as Germans. They were swift to grasp that the corollary of Central Europe's exclusion from the collective structures and disciplines of NATO would be the renationalisation of security policies in the region, including eventually their own. They were also swift to agree with Poles, Czechs and Hungarians that nothing less than NATO membership would dispel the ghost of Germany in Central Europe.

Moreover, well before Madrid, the Clinton administration had concluded that NATO enlargement had become central to the continuing relevance of NATO and continued American support for it. This conclusion was vitally important to those, like Vaclav Klaus, who believed that a 'European idea' which excluded the United

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States and Canada would have no attraction for his countrymen. It was equally important to Western European governments convinced that the intertwining of security communities in NATO provided Europe with an indispensable means of insuring that an isolationist or unilateralist spirit did not return to the United States. In sum, by the time of the Madrid summit, it had become obvious that NATO enlargement was essential not to protect the West from Russia, but in order to protect the West from itself.

Taken together, the effect of these concerns and imperatives was to put classic military considerations into the background. To be sure, this shift in emphasis has not sat comfortably with a number of key institutional players. Whilst two US presidents, William Clinton and (to date) George Bush Jr, have been enlargement enthusiasts, neither the US Congress nor the US armed services have always welcomed the proposition that the 'defensibility' of new members should be secondary to supposedly more transcendental concerns. Yet between the launch of Pfp in January 1994 and 11 September 2001, that has been the clear trend. During these years, enthusiasts and sceptics gradually found agreement on one key point: enlargement should not *weaken* NATO's military potential, even if it did nothing to strengthen it. The events of 11 September and NATO's subsequent invocation of Article 5 are a reminder that this military minimalism has its limits, even if we assume that military threats will not arise in East-Central Europe itself.

At the Brussels meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 10-11 January 1994, the Alliance issued invitations to all non-NATO OSCE states to join a newly established Partnership for Peace (Pfp). It is ironic that this programme, initially designed to deflect pressure for NATO enlargement (and much criticised by the candidate states of Central Europe) instead evolved into an essential instrument of enlargement policy. Once NATO committed itself to enlarge, Pfp acquired a twofold significance: as a means of preparing candidates for accession (reinforced in April 1999 by Membership Action Plans) and as a means of enabling states with no intention of acceding to draw closer to the NATO fold. As a series of 16+1 programmes (now 19+1), Pfp has been an exceptionally flexible instrument, allowing each of the 27 Partners to determine the scale, depth and intensity of its cooperation. Over the years, it has diminished the distinction between membership and partnership in four respects:

- Limited but increasing institutional integration at NATO HQ for Partners so willing, including a progressive extension of Partner participation in NATO planning and deliberations;
- Participation in NATO exercises and NATO led peace support and crisis-response operations;
- 19+1 programmes of cooperation in areas relevant to interoperability of forces, national defence reform and the establishment of civil-democratic control of national armed forces – programmes vastly supplemented by a network of bilateral (eg UK-Ukraine, Poland-Ukraine) programmes 'in the spirit of Pfp'.
- An undertaking by NATO to 'consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security'⁷ – effectively, extending Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty to Partner countries. Assurances that Partnership for Peace allows for joint operations with NATO in the event of such a threat have been given on at least one occasion.⁸ At the height of NATO's military operations in

Kosovo (Operation Allied Force), Romania received, in all but name, a temporary Article 5 guarantee from the North Atlantic Council.

Partnership for Peace has been 'enhanced' on two occasions. At their Spring 1997 Ministerial Meeting, NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers established an Enhanced PfP Programme, upgrading the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to a more active and integrated Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, establishing a Political Military Steering Committee on Partnership for Peace and, on the basis of IFOR/SFOR experience in the Balkans, strengthening the position of Partner countries in the planning and conduct of NATO led operations. At their 23-25 April 1999 Washington summit, the Allies established a Membership Action Plan for candidate members as well as an Enhanced and More Operational Partnership, including an expanded Planning and Review Process (PARP) for Partner country armed forces, analogous to the Defence Planning Goals which NATO members agree every two years.

These Partnership mechanisms and innovations beg several questions. The first, which should have been blindingly obvious from the outset, is whether Partnership for Peace, 'an immediate and practical programme' for transforming 'the relationship between NATO and participating states', addresses the specific security needs of Partner countries. Several of its core objectives - 'creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations' - may be of limited relevance to states whose most chronic security problems are fragile legitimacy, poor national cohesion, weak civic orders, unstable neighbours and the criminalisation of trade and finance. NATO's growing emphasis - most evident in its relationship with Ukraine - on internal transformation and defence reform, as opposed to external cooperation, reflects its growing awareness of these problems. But national armed forces are the *ultima ratio* in meeting security problems which fall within the day-to-day purview of police, courts, tax authorities, customs services, border troops - and with worrying frequency, emergency services. All countries of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact have inherited armed forces - not to say security services, interior forces and ordinary police - which address these problems poorly and in many ways add to them. Such 'force structures' - which in Ukraine as well as Russia have only proliferated since the Soviet collapse - were a staple part of a Communist political culture founded upon hostility to civil society. NATO has only recently turned its attention to this wider mosaic, and it has sensibly realised that it cannot reassemble it on its own.

A second question is whether closer interaction with NATO can change the working culture of national armed forces, not to say other components of the security sector. A prime objective of establishing liaison delegations and Staff Elements at NATO Headquarters and the Partnership Cooperation Cell in Mons was to expose Partner representatives to working arrangements based on multinationality, decision by committee, delegation of authority, sharing of information and 'habits of cooperation'. But exposure to a working culture and immersion in it are two different things. The balance of opinion at Headquarters characterises the quality and 'spirit' of Ukraine's participation as falling well short of that of the Baltic states (who, unlike Ukraine, are candidates for membership) but as noticeably different in kind from that of the Russian Federation, whose participation, even in the relatively harmonious period between conclusion of the May 1997 Founding Act and NATO's military intervention in Kosovo, was largely focused on high level forums and confined to areas directly impinging upon Russian interests.⁹ The decision taken by the NAC on 6 December 2001 to work towards the establishment of a NATO-Russia

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Council still begs this old question: will Russia's increased role in high level decision-making be reinforced by Russian participation at working level? The establishment of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council in 1997 did not lead to this, and it is far from inevitable that the NATO-Russia Council will do so. If it does not, what degree of depth will cooperation have, and what is to guarantee that this new episode in cooperation will prove any more durable than the last?

A third question is whether officers with NATO experience have influence in their military establishments. Surprisingly, no systematic audit has been conducted of the career progression of Partner officers with experience in NATO posts, NATO led operations and military academies of NATO member states. The fragmentary evidence available points to a positive trend, but also some surprising discontinuities. Even after Hungary's accession to NATO, mid-ranking officers complained that advance through the promotional ladder was slow, that they were often mistrusted by more senior, Warsaw Pact trained officers and that their experience was not always put to good use.¹⁰ Where Ukraine is concerned, well placed observers and specialists have until recently painted a picture similar to this one or even less favourable. Within the past two years, however, the trend has become markedly more positive. At middle and senior level, NATO experience has been treated as a definite plus in filling a number of positions relevant to the country's defence reform: in the Ministry of Defence and General Staff, in training commands, the National Armed Forces Academy, the staff of Commander-in-Chief Ground Forces and in at least one of three Operational Commands.

A fourth question – in fact two related questions – is what NATO's commitment to 'consult' means in practice and what is meant by a 'direct threat' to a Partner's 'territorial integrity, political independence, or security'. The Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia of 8 December 2000 accusing Russia of 'unilateral measures...which actually means the violation of the territorial integrity of the state' did not produce, in the eyes of Georgians, a clear response from NATO.¹¹ Neither has there been a clear response in the immediate aftermath of reports of Russian aerial bombardment of the Pankisi Gorge during 27-28 November 2001. Moreover, outside classified forums, NATO has not formally deliberated upon its response if Ukraine were to become the object of a 'direct threat'. According to a January-February 2000 poll conducted by the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies (UCEPS), only 10.5 percent of Ukrainians believe in NATO's desire to defend Ukraine, and only 37.5 percent believe that NATO would honour an Article 5 commitment if Ukraine actually joined the Alliance.¹² But the second half of the question is equally problematic. 'Direct threat' is a perilously constraining term in a part of Europe characterised by fragmented states, powerful transnational structures and multiple, opaque relationships between state bodies, 'private' business and criminal entities. In these post-Communist as well as post-Cold War conditions, 'direct threats' are usually the most difficult as well the least necessary ones to pose. As the authors of Ukraine's National Security Concept recognise, a defence and intelligence system organised to respond simply to such (largely dated) threats might find itself without the means to anticipate, forestall or manage the types of crises which more likely to arise in today's conditions.

A fifth question, which NATO has forcefully articulated itself, is just how far the Alliance can assist states in the larger task of integration with Europe. As a security organisation, NATO is limited in its ability to advance a country's 'strategic course' of becoming a 'full member of the European family of civilised nations'.¹³ It is unlikely that even an intimate and comprehensive relationship with NATO will curb police corruption, ensure that customs officers are decently paid, make local

goods competitive in European markets, decrease unemployment and attract foreign investment. The Polish formula was economic transformation *and* security, with security being the dependent variable. Unless the less advanced countries of Europe can replicate the Polish formula and engage the *private* economies of Western Europe and North America, most of their citizens will continue to ask the question they ask at present: 'What does cooperation with NATO do for me?'

It would be easy to elaborate upon such questions and qualifications to the point where they appeared to negate all that NATO has done to transform defence priorities, defence cultures and security in Central Europe. NATO's accomplishments should not be belittled. In new member states as well as candidate states, enlargement and its corollaries – PfP and Membership Action Plans – have been the prime, and in some cases the sole impetus for defence and security reform. Amongst candidate members, the animus to 'renationalise' defence policy has stalled, and amongst new members it has virtually disappeared. Amongst new members and several candidates, 'habits of cooperation' and integration of planning, procedures and working arrangements are becoming a reality. Despite divisions of opinion within populations and some arguable sins of omission by NATO itself, the vast majority of elites in candidate countries equate NATO membership with security, even if some are less inclined than they were before Kosovo to describe NATO as a 'purely defensive alliance' and equate it with 'the projection of stability in Europe'. To be sure, these doubts are far more deeply entrenched inside the non-candidate countries. As a country subject to deep divisions of public and elite opinion, yet enjoying a unique intensity of cooperation with NATO for a non-candidate country, Ukraine is a special and somewhat schizophrenic case.

Towards the EU, a measure of schizophrenia on the part of Ukraine is also present. Like a number of other Central and Eastern European countries, Ukraine has gradually come to realise that the attitude of the European Union will have a deeper impact upon its future than the attitude of NATO. Significantly, EU membership is not only an official goal of Ukraine – which has no plans to join NATO 'in the foreseeable future' – the goal is broadly supported by the population, 55.1 percent of whom believe that Ukraine should join the EU within the next five years!¹⁴ The schizophrenia lies in the failure of Ukraine to take significant practical steps to advance this aspiration. Schizophrenia is also accompanied by disappointment, a feeling shared by a number of other countries of the region. Until recently, the European Union has displayed an ambivalence towards Ukraine verging on coolness, and it could even be said to display an ambivalence towards its own undertakings to enlarge the Union, given at the Copenhagen European Council of June 1993 and reinforced by invitations to specific Group 1 and Group 2 countries at Helsinki in December 1999.

For this ambivalence, there are three reasons. First, until recently the internal culture of the European Union has not been focused upon security, but economics and integration. In practice, 'ever closer union' has been a project designed to achieve further harmonisation amongst member states whose legal systems, employment practices, welfare provisions and economic policies are, by post Communist standards, remarkably harmonised already. Therefore, the challenge for a non-member state is not simply one of catching up, but catching up with a moving target. This contradiction — between the 'deepening' of Europe (the further integration of those already inside it) and its widening — can be directly attributed to the European model itself. The refrain, common until quite recently, that 'the EU is not seeking new members' not only illustrates the difference between EU

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priorities and NATO's; to many in Central and Eastern Europe, it also implies that the EU has limited interest in, and surely no sense of responsibility for developments which occur outside it.

Second, and in marked contrast to NATO, it has taken some time for the priorities of the EU to be materially affected by the ending of the Cold War. As the quintessentially Cold War institution, NATO swiftly came under pressure to transform or dissolve – and was subject to this pressure first and foremost from the electorates of its member states. But as a non-military institution, the European Union initially escaped these pressures. This largely explains why the EU continues to apply an old model – protectionist as well as *communautaire* – to the new task of enlargement. If a widening Europe does not reconsider the logic of 'deepening', then EU enlargement could become the process of moving barriers east. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is the EU, not NATO, which has the greater potential of creating 'new dividing lines' in Europe – although the Russian perception is decidedly, and perhaps understandably, different from the perception of its neighbours.

To those with no immediate, let alone foreseeable prospect of accession to the EU, the Schengen Agreement on frontiers, signed in June 1985, meets the specifications of a new dividing line.¹⁵ Ukraine, Romania and the three Baltic states have used PfP not only to draw closer to NATO's web of institutions and relationships, but to draw closer to the West as a whole. NATO enlargement has complemented and facilitated this process. Yet apart from the Baltic states (all of them now confidently on the path to EU accession) there is reasoned apprehension that EU enlargement could disrupt this process and reverse promising trends which are knitting regions together. These trends are at risk not only between Poland and Ukraine (where before 1999 some 1.7 million people per month crossed the border under a visa free regime), but between Hungary and Romania, as well as Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The implications of Schengen for Moldova, Kaliningrad Oblast' and other *oblasti* in Russia's northwest regions are also serious.

Still, it must be said that the implications for Ukraine are especially serious because its geographical location between the EU and Russia make it extremely difficult to implement measures which would enable it to harmonise its border regime with Schengen criteria, thereby maintaining a relatively open and friendly western frontier. Ukraine's fixed and consistent official position – that all of its borders must have the same legal status – is difficult for the EU to accept because the Ukraine-Russia border is the point of entry for two thirds of contraband and 90 percent of illegal migrants. Ukraine's official position is also flatly unacceptable to Russia, which has consistently maintained that internal borders of the CIS should be delimited (drawn on maps), but not demarcated.¹⁶ Although it is Ukraine's view that 'demarcation does not require the construction of walls or any obstacles',¹⁷ Russia continues to rebuff efforts to establish any kind of demarcation.

The third reason lies in the nature of the EU and the enlargement process. Enlargement is not a geopolitical project, but a process of integration. The social, economic and political criteria for membership are uniform and, in principle, apolitical. But there are understandable reasons why this point is not as clear as the EU would wish it to be. First there is the perception – not entirely unfounded – that the EU has several distinctly political concerns, notably the avoidance of steps which could be perceived as unfriendly to Russia. Ukraine, with arguable justification, has not perceived equivalent EU attentiveness to its own concerns and interpreted the EU's delay in officially acknowledging its 'European vocation' prior to

the December 1999 Helsinki Council as a calculated snub. The EU's ostensible disavowal of geopolitics is further obscured by the trend explored in this essay: the growing security mindedness of the European Union, overtly expressed by its Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as its Common Security and Defence Policy. Distorted as these perceptions might be, they are symptoms of a more serious problem: the difficulty of introducing the EU's radically apolitical values to a part of Europe which remains deeply politicised and profoundly geopolitical in its thinking. According to EU criteria, Ukraine and Russia 'belong together' because of their common level of development – a view often expressed (albeit privately) by EU representatives and officials. To Ukraine's pro-Western elites, these sentiments suggest that the EU regards a country's interests, sentiments and aspirations as of no account. This is, indeed, a radical view for EU officials to take, given the fact that common levels of development have not, until recently, produced harmony even in Western Europe, where two great wars of the twentieth century were fought between countries at equivalent levels of economic development.

The risk in present EU enlargement policy is therefore twofold: that it might encourage the tendencies (including fatalism and despair) which NATO has struggled to counter; no less regrettably, that it might fail to realise the positive potential at the heart of enlargement itself. Is the European Union intended to be a magnet or a barrier? The case for barriers against illegal migration, organised crime, arms and drugs is *a priori* and unanswerable. But must this necessarily translate into barriers against countries and, if it must, then for how long? Today Ukraine and other states now understand that it is primarily the EU, not NATO, which will decide whether they become part of Europe or part of Europe's 'grey zone'. They are also just beginning to understand that in taking its decisions, the EU will not be guided by the foreign policies of these states, but their internal policies; indeed, they are at last beginning to grasp that their 'European choice' entails Europe's growing involvement in their internal affairs.¹⁸ The approach of the EU could therefore turn out to be the greatest single stimulant to the methodical and sustained reforms which 'aid' and diplomacy have had such limited success in fostering. But these possibilities will not be realised unless countries believe that they have something tangible to gain from doing what is demanded of them. For this reason alone, it would be sensible for the EU to present the accession of Ukraine and other excluded states as a desirable and, in the long term, achievable objective.

ESDP: Complementary, Disruptive or Irrelevant?

The commitment in the October 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam to frame a Common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – reinforced by the Anglo-French initiative at St Malo (December 1998) and the European Councils at Cologne (June 1999), Helsinki (December 1999), Lisbon (March 2000), Feira (June 2000) and Nice (December 2000) – has sparked a vigorous and apprehensive debate within some NATO countries, not to say Russia, as to whether the EU could, by intention or misadventure, weaken the Alliance or divide it. The coming into force of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in November 1999, the simultaneous appointment of Javier Solana as High Representative for the CFSP and the establishment of a Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee and a Military Staff have sharpened these debates, as has the Helsinki Council's establishment of a Headline Goal of dedicating 50-60,000 troops for EU led crisis response operations by 2003.

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Those looking for anti-Atlanticist sentiments amongst the more visionary proponents of ESDP will have no trouble finding them. Nevertheless, the statements and actions of the majority of those responsible for developing ESDP point in a decidedly different direction. For one thing, ESDP framework documents are quite careful to state that there is no intention of conflicting with NATO or overlapping with it: ESDP limits itself to humanitarian intervention and regional crisis management, EU capabilities must be 'separable but not separate' from NATO, Europe will only act 'where NATO as a whole is not engaged', and NATO is to remain the sole guarantor of collective defence.¹⁹ No less important, ESDP reflects an overdue recognition that enlargement is a profoundly complex security issue and that the EU must be as concerned with security in the future as it has been with economics in the past. In the words of NATO Assistant Secretary-General Klaus-Peter Klaiber, 'the old formula, NATO does security and the EU does economics is no longer viable'. What is more, there is increasingly emphatic recognition that 'we must harmonise the [NATO and EU] enlargements'.²⁰

These statements beg many questions, not least for non-member states, but there are logical as well as substantive reasons to doubt whether trends are leading to a Transatlantic divorce, rather than the opposite: a more Europeanised NATO and a more Atlanticist EU. The first logical reason is that neither today nor in the foreseeable future is there a realistic chance that Europe will find the wherewithal to reproduce NATO's distinctive, specialised and very costly defence capabilities. The EU, which has a GDP equivalent to that of the United States, spends 60 percent as much as the latter on defence and for this expenditure acquires 30 to 40 percent of the capability. It will require formidable political will to alter this equation and a revolution in thinking and political priorities to equalise it. Therefore, the logical conclusion is that any EU military operation will depend upon NATO assets, will require NATO consent and hence will require the consultation, discussion and debate which have always been the prelude to NATO consent. Indeed, it will also require the establishment of mechanisms of consultation between NATO and the EU which prior to ESDP did not exist. This is more likely to strengthen NATO's position in Europe than weaken it.

The second logical reason is that if ESDP develops at all, it will develop in the context of the consolidation of a broader Western community and its further enlargement. The three recent NATO members and the majority of prospective EU members are decidedly Atlanticist. Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and the three Baltic countries know in their bones that developments to their east will have a profound bearing on the character and security of Europe. They also fear that a Europe dominated by France and Germany – and from which the USA and Canada are absent – could become a Europe which, as of old, will be tempted to make bargains with Russia over their heads and at their expense. It is NATO's view that a more institutionalised EU-NATO relationship should reduce this fear. In Klaiber's words:

There can be little doubt that a structured dialogue between [the EU and NATO] would make a coherent approach vis-à-vis Russia much more feasible. And it would eliminate any Russian temptation to play Europe and America against each other.

Practice is confirming what logic would suggest. As early as 1993, the Alliance took steps to make NATO assets available for Combined Joint Task Forces in operations of the Western European Union (WEU), designed to fulfil the tasks set by the EU at its 1992 Petersberg (Holland) summit: humanitarian intervention, search and

rescue, peace-keeping, crisis management and peace-making. NATO's 50th Anniversary summit in Washington in April 1999 unequivocally endorsed ESDP and the decision to build on existing NATO and WEU mechanisms. Since then a careful symmetry has been developing between ESDP planning, NATO's defence planning system and its Planning and Review Process; the EU's Collective Capability Goals have been synchronised with NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative, and a number of ad hoc NATO-EU working groups have been established. Despite discussions about questions of participation reminiscent of dialogues in *Alice in Wonderland* – eight members of NATO are not members of the EU and four members of the EU are not members of NATO – there can be little doubt that NATO hopes ESDP will evolve into the long sought 'European pillar' of the Alliance. President Bush's Warsaw speech suggested, in defiance of all stereotypes about his supposed isolationism, that the hope is shared by his administration as well.²¹

More intriguing than this institutional convergence are steps relating to enlargement. Speaking in Latvia in spring 2000, EU President Romano Prodi declared that '[a]ny attack or aggression against an EU member would be an attack or aggression against the whole EU'.²² This declaration surely begs the question who is to *defend* 'the whole EU', given universal agreement that the EU will not possess capabilities for collective defence. Nevertheless, Prodi's statement is further (and highly authoritative) indication that the EU is synchronising its thinking with NATO's and at last becoming alert to the security implications of its enlargement policy.

Does this mean that the EU is becoming alert to the security implications for excluded states? Lord Robertson's declaration in Kyiv (5 July 2001) – 'we will not leave a partner country alone in an emergency' – has not been echoed by the EU. At Feira and Nice, the EU discussed arrangements to make it possible for Ukraine and other non-members to contribute to joint operations. But it has not discussed how the EU might in turn contribute to *their* security. NATO's programmes of cooperation (which reached the unprecedented total of 500 NATO-Ukraine events in 2000) have no analogue in the European Union. This has been lamented by Poland, which more than any other EU candidate state understands the acute 'soft security' challenges which Ukraine and other countries face, as well as the assistance which the EU might be able to provide. This recognition is shared by the EU Commissioner for External Affairs, Chris Patten, who is rightly disturbed by the security gap in 'civilian aspects of crisis management' and the EU's failure to better exploit its expertise in 'police deployment and training, border control, institution building ... combating illicit trafficking, embargo enforcement and counter terrorism'.²³

The trend towards greater security mindedness by the EU does not guarantee that the security interests of non-members will be adequately taken into account. But it makes it increasingly unlikely that the EU will be indifferent to them. By the same token, there is no inexorable linkage between greater attentiveness to the security needs of non-members and greater respect for their economic interests. Yet again, a Union concerned about the security implications of its actions is more likely to be alert to these connections than a Union which is not. Where Ukraine is concerned, at last there are signs that connections are being made.

Ukraine Between The West, The East & Itself

Since 1991, Ukraine's independence has been predicated on the 'strategic course of entering Europe'. It is in European, not Eurasian terms that Ukraine has defined its statehood. The first *and only* governments of a modern, independent Ukraine have placed so much rhetorical emphasis on 'integration with European and Euro-Atlantic structures' that setbacks along this road have been seen by many as setbacks for the state or worse, as challenges to its legitimacy. Yet, since the handing of the torch from President Leonid Kravchuk to President Leonid Kuchma in 1994, Ukraine has also pursued a 'multi-vector policy'. This policy reflects three realities.

The first reality is that for any independent Ukrainian state, Russia is bound to be a pervasive and problematic factor: pervasive because of a related (but far from common) history and an extensive (but far from unalterable) economic dependency; problematic not because Russia refuses to accept Ukraine's *nezavisimost'* (juridical independence), but because of its reluctance to accept Ukraine's non-aligned status²⁴ and, no less important, because of the widespread sentiments that *samostoyatel'noy Ukrainiy nikogda ne budet* ('Ukraine will never be able to stand by itself') – and that friendship and 'drawing closer' are two sides of the same coin.²⁵ Even in the bolder and more creative period of his presidency (1994-7), President Kuchma perceived that Ukraine would have no chance of remaining independent without a 'strategic partnership' with Russia, ie without Russian *consent*. Equally, he believed that there would be no chance of securing Russian consent unless Ukraine had strong ties with the West and the West displayed a strong stake in an independent Ukraine.

The second reality is that the West will not support Ukraine on an anti-Russian basis. President Kravchuk's efforts to persuade Western governments to embrace Ukraine as a bulwark against a potentially resurgent Russia fell on stony ground. What Western governments will accept is the proposition that progress in realising Ukraine's 'European choice' – and the essential corollary to this progress, internal transformation – can strengthen those forces in Russia who are democratically minded and who are determined to define the country's interest in post-imperial, rather than neo-imperial terms. This prospect is far more likely to be realised in conditions where Ukraine and the West enjoy mutually beneficial relations with Russia than in conditions where Russia feels estranged from either party.

The third reality is that inside Ukraine, as in Russia, there are deep divisions about the identity of the nation and state. In significant measure, these are regional divisions. Yet with two significant exceptions – the six oblasts of western Ukraine (which did not become part of a Russian dominated state until 1939-40) and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (which did not become administratively part of Ukraine until 1954) – they could not be fairly described as ethnic divisions. The celebrated 1994 poll of inhabitants of Donetsk region – in which 84 percent identified themselves as 'Soviet people' – is indicative of a general pattern, inasmuch as the number of ethnic Ukrainians adopting this appellation was similar to the number of ethnic Russians who did so.²⁶ Almost as important as these regional divisions is the divide between officials and experts on the one hand and the ordinary population on the other. It is in the nature of this divide that the difference between Ukrainian and Russian orientation to NATO emerges, for whereas the Ukrainian population is more polarised in its attitudes than the Russian public (and on the whole less negative), it is distinctly more sceptical

towards NATO than the country's elite; whereas in Russia the elite is decidedly more critical of NATO than the population.²⁷ Although the polls reveal manifest divisions, they also reveal an important leavening characteristic: the majority of Ukrainians have a non-bloc orientation. Majorities of those expressing an opinion oppose membership of NATO as well as membership of the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty.²⁸ In contrast, 52 percent favour membership of the EU within five years, very possibly because the EU is not perceived as a bloc: only 3 percent see EU membership as incompatible with 'geopolitical closeness to Russia'. It is also noteworthy that whereas 86.9 percent describe Russia as a 'priority strategic partner', 65.5 percent and 62 percent respectively describe the USA and Germany in these terms. Moreover, 65 percent believe that strategic partnerships are important primarily for economic reasons, whilst only 36 percent value them primarily on grounds of security.²⁹ In the minds of those who perceive the world in 'either-or' terms, many of these polling results appear contradictory. Not unreasonably, the majority of Ukrainians do not see the world in this way. For this majority, there is no contradiction between being pro-Russian and wary of the Russian state – and no contradiction between being pro-Western and wary of NATO. Therefore, a Ukrainian President pursuing a multi-vector policy will not add to the country's divisions – at least on grounds of foreign policy. But what does the multi-vector policy mean in practice? Should it mean that Ukraine should synchronise its 'advance towards Europe' with Russia (a view supported only by the Left)? Should it mean balancing movement towards Europe and NATO with strategic concessions towards Russia (the view of President Kuchma)? Or should it be a means of manoeuvre towards Europe designed, like the CIS *à la* Kravchuk, to continue the process of 'civilised divorce' from Russia?

Viktor Yushchenko, Borys Tarasyuk and most other supporters of the latter policy understand that without measures to increase Ukraine's *samostiynist'* (its 'ability to stand'), their own policy will be unrealisable and the President's policy will cede control of Ukraine's economy and, progressively, its power of autonomous decision to its eastern neighbour. The measures designed to strengthen *samostiynist'* and strengthen the European course are identical. At the most basic level they involve ending the negotiability of the legal order, putting in place property rights, contracts and mechanisms to enforce them, creating taxation regimes which stimulate entrepreneurship rather than stifle it and establishing laws designed to restrain the powerful rather than enfeeble those who are already far too weak. They also involve establishing the minimal conditions of transparency: the ability to know *what* decisions are taken, *where* they are taken and *by whom* they are taken. These measures are required not only in order to integrate Ukraine into Europe, they are required in order to integrate Ukraine.³⁰

With the exception of Viktor Yushchenko's government (December 1999-April 2001), these issues have been addressed largely by declaration. The prime reason for this is obvious to any Ukrainian taxi driver: beyond every 'intractable' economic problem stands a powerful political force. The dual nature of Ukraine's anti-Soviet revolution – national as well as political – initially obscured the fact that in Ukraine, as in Russia, the revolution was a contained revolution and that power remained in the hands of local and national elites who swiftly learnt how to transform bureaucratic into financial control. In this state of affairs – where, despite the collapse of central and local budgets, the size of bureaucracies has increased since Soviet times – licensing, regulation and law-enforcement have become rent-seeking activities (and instruments of political pressure), rather than ways of protecting the entrepreneur, the consumer and the citizen. A second, related reason is that the more formidable 'oligarchic' interests in Ukraine – the fuel and energy complex, the

financial and banking sector and, indeed, the security and intelligence network – are transnational structures *de facto*, moreover not transnational European structures, but structures of the former Soviet Union, collusive and highly inbred and wedded to a mode of business largely opaque to outsiders.³¹ Western pieties of ‘transition’ – and more recently ‘globalisation’ – have altogether ignored the real transition which has taken place from Soviet disintegration to the emergence of a ‘state of a new type’ and a ‘new class’ dedicated to preserving it. In sum, the problem is not simply that civil society is too weak in Ukraine, but that other forces are too strong. Their strength was demonstrated all too clearly when Yushchenko was dismissed from power despite clearing the state’s debt in pensions and wages and despite achieving the first real economic growth in Ukraine since independence. The ‘Yushchenko experiment’ demonstrated that change is possible in Ukraine. But its outcome only reinforces the perception that ‘the principal security threat to Ukraine is Ukraine itself’.³²

Therefore, success along the internal vector is plainly prerequisite to success along the others. Yet, not only is this point not conceded by all Ukrainian decision makers; it is not understood by all of them. One reason for this is that even many Ukrainians with a ‘Euro-Atlantic’ slant preserve the belief that European integration is a matter of ‘high politics’ rather than a process of instituting ordinary and practical changes in the way an economy works. To this day, many still speak of integrating with ‘European structures’ as if this were synonymous with integrating with Europe. A second reason for this misunderstanding, ironically, is Ukraine’s past accomplishments. In the post-independence period, the dominant Western image of Ukraine, reflected in a notoriously inaccurate 1994 CIA report, was of a Yugoslavia in the making, threatened by separatism and ethnic conflict and (unlike Yugoslavia), threatening ‘nuclear anarchy’. Ukraine not only avoided these calamities, it carried through a programme of unilateral nuclear disarmament and, without conflict or upheaval resubordinated and substantially dismantled armed forces of the former USSR on Ukrainian territory. No less significantly, between 1994 and 1997, Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs ably compensated for internal weakness, securing for Ukraine a strong diplomatic identity, an active international presence and a truly independent voice. The NATO-Ukraine relationship and the May 1997 accords with Russia were this policy’s prime achievements. Nevertheless, these very achievements have done much to prolong the culture of declaration in Ukraine’s political establishment and delay the emergence of a culture of implementation. For all the skills behind these achievements, they were also the fruit of favourable geopolitical conditions which have since deteriorated.

The geopolitical climate has deteriorated for three reasons. First, NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo has had a traumatic and lasting effect. It has presented NATO in a provocative and even threatening light to a population which had largely viewed it in more benign, favourable and even protective terms. (Today, 46 percent of the population view NATO as an ‘aggressive military bloc’.)³³ It undermined the tenability of the multi-vector policy by rupturing good relations between Russia and the West. It sharply heightened concerns that Ukraine could be drawn involuntarily into disputes and conflicts outside its borders.³⁴ It also created precedents which could be used by others (eg Russia in Crimea) to override state sovereignty in the name of ‘human rights’. Finally, it has persuaded pro-NATO Ukrainian elites that NATO has ‘demoted’ Ukraine and that its Balkan commitments will divert NATO’s attention for years to come.

Second, the combination of Kosovo, NATO enlargement and the New Strategic Concept has had a strong effect on Russia, persuading much of the military and

security establishment that the former Soviet Union could become a future venue for NATO's 'coercive diplomacy'. This perception of geopolitical pressure from NATO and US 'hegemonism' cannot be divorced from the determination to go for a final solution of the Chechen problem, transform the former Soviet Union into a 'zone of special interest'³⁵ and adopt the 'far tougher' policy towards neighbours which Ukraine has since had to suffer.³⁶ Ukrainian negotiators and decision-makers perceive that Putin has disciplined, if not ended Russian *mnogogolisiye* ('multi-voicedness') and that he is using economic pressure as a tool to secure not only economic gains but geopolitical changes.³⁷ These pressures make it more difficult to oppose actions perceived as harmful to Ukraine's security (eg using Crimea as a base for training Russian naval infantry for combat operations in Chechnya).³⁸

The third unfavourable factor, as already noted, is the impending enlargement of the European Union. Even unqualified reformers like Viktor Yushchenko perceive that the rigours and pace of the accession process for Poland and Hungary do not present Ukraine with stimulants, but with tests which it is doomed to fail. Those who fear reform have simply concluded, along with President Kuchma, that 'the West is closed for us now'.

The perception that 'the West is closed' certainly solidified after the revelations known as 'Kuchmagate': the publication of tapes allegedly implicating President Kuchma in the murder of journalist Grigory Gongadze and in several other arguably more serious abuses of power. The scandal has not only weakened the legitimacy of Ukraine's political order, it has compromised what President Kuchma long ago identified as real independence, Ukraine's 'freedom to choose'. This is because the revelations have driven what appears to be an immovable wedge between the President and those most capable of advancing Ukraine's 'strategic course of entering Europe', notably the supporters of former Prime Minister Yushchenko, dismissed on 26 April 2001. By the same token, the scandal has made him dependent on those whose commitment to this goal is merely declaratory as well as those who oppose it altogether. No less significantly, the scandal (which led not only to Western recriminations, but moves to expel Ukraine from the Council of Europe) enabled Russia to assume the mantle of defender of Ukraine's sovereignty³⁹ – a role which most Ukrainians and Westerners would have found implausible, if not unimaginable even a short time ago.⁴⁰

A Refocused Partnership with NATO

In view of the factors discussed above, it is reasonable to assume that NATO-Ukraine cooperation would become more cosmetic and that defence reform would be exiled to the antechamber of pieties and hopes. In fact, since December 1999 NATO-Ukraine cooperation has entered an intense and highly practical phase, defence reform has finally acquired direction and substance, and both efforts have secured presidential support. Counter-intuitive as these changes might appear, there are three compelling reasons for them. First, whilst conceding to Russia what he must, President Kuchma wishes to preserve as much of the multi-vector policy as he can and therefore has a clear incentive to reinforce the few channels of the Western vector – the Polish-Ukraine relationship being another such channel – which produce benefits for Ukraine. Second, the worsened geopolitical climate (and a revised official threat assessment) argue strongly against further postponement. Third, the economic condition of the country has finally persuaded a critical mass of key players that a bloated and underfinanced defence establishment could become a social and, ultimately, a national security problem for the country.⁴¹

The Enlargement of The West & The Future of Ukraine

Today, as opposed to 1997, the prime goal of NATO-Ukraine cooperation is not advancing Ukraine's 'European course' but, in the words of the Minister of Defence, Army General Kuzmuk, 'supporting defence reform in the country'.⁴² Now as well as then, no equation is made between cooperation with NATO and future membership. Indeed, the military leadership, like the political leadership, is as opposed to Ukraine joining NATO (on grounds of external security and internal concord) as it is supportive of closer ties with it. The conclusion innocently and widely drawn that those opposed to NATO membership are necessarily anti-NATO is therefore misconceived.

It is often forgotten that Ukraine did not inherit an army in 1991. What it inherited was a force grouping – without a Defence Ministry, a General Staff and central organs of command-and-control. Moreover, this grouping, its formidable inventory of equipment and its highly trained officer corps were designed for one purpose: to wage combined arms, coalition, offensive (and nuclear) warfare against NATO on an external front and under somebody else's direction. In 1991 these formations were not equipped, deployed or trained to provide national defence or, for that matter, integrated military operations of any kind.⁴³ As they stood, they were bone and muscle without heart or brain. In the post-independence period, therefore, Ukraine did not merely face the task of 'reforming' an army, but creating one. Having accomplished this far from straightforward task, Ukraine's Armed Forces entered a period of stagnation whose ills only began to be addressed after President Kuchma established an interdepartmental commission on defence reform in December 1999, chaired by Army General Oleksandr Kuzmuk (Minister of Defence) and Yevhen Marchuk (Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council).⁴⁴ To understand what has and has not been achieved (as of August 2001), it is essential to analyse defence policy as well as its implementation.⁴⁵

Unlike the operation of a market economy, national defence must be a planned activity. Failure to produce a tight correspondence between national security policy, military doctrine (the purpose and the priorities of armed forces) and military programmes (detailed schemes for their development) will lead to waste, confusion and, in the worst case, breakdown. Producing such a correspondence is not easy, particularly in the radically transformed circumstances confronting newly independent states, and in nearly all of these states it has not been achieved because old mentalities and strong interests continually intrude.⁴⁶ Programmes therefore matter, because nothing sensible can be accomplished without them.

In contrast to the post-Soviet norm (which, according to President Putin, applied to Russia until last year), Ukraine adopted a National Security Concept (approved by parliament in January 1997) which was a model statement of first principles. It assaulted the general war ethos (which has been inbred in the Soviet trained officer corps of Ukraine) by stipulating that in conditions where both state and society were weak, the prime security challenge would be to forestall and resolve local crises, emergencies and conflicts and prevent them being exploited by actors (internal and foreign) with ulterior political ends. Proceeding from this analysis, the Concept identified 'the strengthening of civil society' as the first of nine security challenges for Ukraine. Ukraine's first State Programme of Armed Forces Development (1997) had its merits, but was not consistent with these principles. A far more impressive consistency has been achieved in the current State Programme of Armed Forces Development and Reform 2001-2005, which was submitted to President Kuchma in May 2000.⁴⁷

The capabilities mandated by the Programme furnish obvious incentives to exploit NATO's post-Cold War expertise in joint operations, complex emergencies and 'operations other than war'.⁴⁸ Therefore, at the same time it was submitted to the President, the State Programme (minus a classified geopolitical assessment) was submitted to NATO for analysis and comment. In April 2001 NATO presented its recommendations at a meeting of the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform (a body established under the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership, which has no analogue between NATO and any other country). On the basis of NATO's assessment that stipulated force levels would still be grossly out of balance with resources, Ukraine is now considering a more intense schedule of reductions.⁴⁹

Cooperation with NATO has now moved beyond the formal exchange of ideas to a scheduled process of audit and consultation. In 2001 Ukraine became an active participant in NATO's Planning and Review Process (PARP): a PFP programme requiring each participating country at regular intervals to supply NATO with a detailed inventory of its military assets and, jointly with NATO, identify real costs, as well as capabilities in short supply or surplus to needs.⁵⁰ Ukraine will also draw up a detailed package of National Defence Reform Objectives for initial review by NATO in December 2001. A mechanism has also been devised for keeping NATO advised on a regular basis of the Programme's implementation. These are significant steps for a military establishment schooled to regard transparency as a threat to departmental interests and national security.

These steps have also given more focus to the considerable volume of activities which take place between NATO and Ukraine each year. More than 500 bilateral activities were scheduled between NATO Allies and Ukraine in 2001, as well as 250 multilateral activities with NATO. These numbers in themselves, of course, say very little about the value of cooperation: eg, the establishment of the Polish-Ukrainian battalion (POLUKRBAT) has been worth several dozen such 'activities'. Although the volume of Ukraine-Russia military activities is comparatively modest (in stark contrast to cooperation in the military-industrial sector), this is not to say that Ukraine sees no value in such cooperation.⁵¹ As a case in point, Russia's merger of Air Forces and Air Defence Forces is being closely studied. But few believe that the Russian Armed Forces are an attractive model for the conduct of joint operations and the regulation of civil conflicts. Additionally, as the issue of the joint naval force demonstrates, many question whether Russia's military cooperation goals are compatible with Ukraine's. As Leonid Polyakov, Director of Military Programmes at UCEPS, maintains:

*So far, Russian officials, unlike NATO's, have never voiced their concern about the weakness of Ukraine's defence or the slow pace of its military reform. One might infer that Ukraine's problems in building its Armed Forces are simply more acceptable to Moscow than Ukraine's success in that area.*⁵²

Eight months into the Programme, the catalogue of measures implemented is necessarily sparse. NATO representatives confirm that troop reductions have begun, that front-line organisation is being overhauled, that reorganisations of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces are in train (possibly as a prelude to merger) and that preparations for the closure or merger of surplus facilities are proceeding. A major training command for peace support operations has been established, and a NATO bloc of courses is being established at the National Armed Forces Academy. Moreover, every new officer is now obliged to learn English, French or German as part of his academic curriculum.

Yet there must be two areas of major concern. The first is resources. With a budget 75 percent larger than Ukraine's, Hungary is reducing the size of its armed forces to 45,000 and Ukraine to 200,000 servicemen.⁵³ This discrepancy is less indicative of the lack of realism of Ukraine's military establishment than the irresponsibility of its political establishment. But it is also indicative of two other factors which the NATO approach frequently overlooks. In the first place, Ukraine, unlike Hungary, is a non-aligned country bordering seven states (and the Black Sea) and lying in the vicinity of several conflict zones. Even as harsh a critic of Ukraine's defence policy as Anatoliy Grytsenko believes that the strength of MOD armed forces should not fall below 150,000 and that the defence budget should not fall below 2.5 percent of GDP.⁵⁴ In the second place, conscripts are an extremely cheap component of Ukraine's armed forces (the wage per conscript being \$50 per annum). Ukraine's entire conscript cohort of 130,000 (nearly half the army) costs the defence budget \$65 million, roughly one-and-one-half percent of the total. It is reductions, not high force levels, which are expensive, because any serious reduction scheme must involve reorganisation, base closures and, by law, the retraining and resettling of officers, which is already an acute and sensitive issue. Professionalisation (at wages of \$50 *per month*, along with vastly improved housing and training) is even more expensive. Therefore, whilst force levels as low as 200,000 are under discussion, the Ministry of Defence will not commit itself to reduce below 295,000 until the government provides a defence budget projection to 2005. This explains the decision to defer large-scale professionalisation to 2010 (50 percent of the force) and 2015 (100 per cent). Unless the budget is steadily and substantially increased, these 'plans' will remain wishes. Within current budget constraints, the best one can hope for is progress in priority areas (structural rationalisation and the training and provision of rapid reaction forces), modest advances in equipment repair and maintenance, token advances in professionalisation⁵⁵ and a halt to further deterioration in the R&D base and social sphere (housing, *dedovshchina* and health).⁵⁶ These would be far from nugatory accomplishments, but they are not guaranteed, and even if they were realised, the bottle would still be half empty.

The second concern is that, with the limited exceptions of the Border Troops and Emergency Services, reform has not begun to touch non-MOD force structures, which (excluding ordinary police and depending on the estimate accepted) employ just under or very much over 50 percent the number of personnel serving in the armed forces. Yet here reform is most vital, not only in the interests of combating emergencies and conducting 'multi-component operations', but in the interests of democracy in the country.⁵⁷ Measured against a Western template, progress in changing mindsets and extending transparency throughout the MOD military system is uneven, but by comparison with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and SBU (Security Service of Ukraine), it moves at lightning speed. Significantly, the focus of the Joint Working Group will now be extended to include Border Services, the Ministry of Emergency Situations and the Ministry of Interior (MVS). Where the latter body is concerned, this will be an uphill struggle. Reform programmes for the MVS and SBU, promised in 1999, have not been published even in excerpted form. Here as in Soviet times, the best information remains anecdotal information. By no recognised standard could these forces be said to be under civil democratic control. At best, they are under control of an elected President, but the tape scandal has forced many to question even this. In this sphere, it might be no exaggeration to say (*pace* Grytsenko) that 'military forces are developing on their own'.

NATO-Ukraine cooperation is the one significant area of Ukraine's cooperation with the West which has fostered enthusiasm rather than mutual frustration. As refocused, its core objective, defence reform, proceeds unevenly but at last with

deliberation. Defence reform, and NATO's approach to it, is also widening the circle of those who understand the connections between military and economic policy, between transparency and sound management and between security, civil-democratic control and democracy. Thanks to NATO's involvement in this process, the dozen or so NGOs engaged in defence issues have gained in expertise and influence.⁵⁸

EU-Ukraine Cooperation: Signs of Life?

By the second half of Borys Tarasyuk's tenure as Foreign Minister of Ukraine, the Ukraine-EU relationship had become a *dailogue des sourdes*. With growing insistence and desperation, Tarasyuk warned of a retrograde turn in Ukraine's policy if the EU did not take resolute steps to acknowledge the European vocation of a state which was first in the former Soviet Union to conclude a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the Union (in June 1994, ratified 1995). To all appearances unmoved, the EU for the most part merely reiterated its position that EU-Ukraine relations would not improve until Ukraine took steps to implement the PCA – which Ukraine had done little to implement, but which, by the same token was only brought into force by the EU, three years after Ukraine had ratified it, on 1 March 1998 – and after much US pressure.⁵⁹ Even as late as 22 May 2001, European Commission President Romano Prodi and EU President Göran Persson had pointedly ignored Ukraine's European aspirations in an article in the International Herald Tribune which coupled Ukraine with Russia as a state 'having common borders with the countries aspiring to join the EU' – as if Ukraine has not been aspiring to do just that!⁶⁰

Nevertheless, the EU had already begun to show signs of movement nine months before Borys Tarasyuk's dismissal on 29 September 2000. The European Council Common Strategy on Ukraine, adopted at the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 provoked disappointment by not inviting Ukraine to join the process that the Group 2 states had joined. Nevertheless, the Common Strategy stated:

*The EU acknowledges Ukraine's European aspirations and welcomes Ukraine's pro-European choice. The EU remains firmly committed to working with Ukraine at national, regional and local levels, in order to support a successful political and economic transformation in Ukraine, which will facilitate Ukraine's further rapprochement with the EU.*⁶¹

The Common Strategy also made two far from grudging points about Ukraine's contribution to European security. First:

The freedom, independence and stability of Ukraine rank among the greatest achievements in the new Europe rid of old dividing lines. Geography as well as size, the resources of its population as well as its location along the North-South and East-West axes give Ukraine a unique position in Europe and makes it a determinant regional actor. [Author's emphasis]

And:

*The fact that Ukraine has since independence been a source of regional stability, despite its domestic difficulties and diversities, is a laudable achievement.*⁶²

The Enlargement of The West & The Future of Ukraine

In October 2000 (one month after the EU-Ukraine Summit of 15 September), the EU removed what Ukraine had long regarded as a gross inequity, the stigma of being a 'non-market' country: a stigma which the EU had lifted from the shoulders of the Russian Federation and China two years before.

But the breakthrough only occurred at the Göteborg EU Council meeting on 15-16 June 2001. In a separate section on Ukraine in the concluding document, the Council declared:

*Stable and positive political and economic development in Ukraine is of strategic importance for Europe. The Union acknowledges Ukraine's European aspirations and will continue to support democratic development, human rights, the rule of law and market-oriented economic reforms. The forthcoming visit by the President of the European Council is a manifestation of this support.*⁶³

Far more significant than this statement was its location in the document – under the first heading, 'The Future of Europe'. The document's three paragraphs on Russia (one positive and two critical) were placed under the seventh heading, 'External Relations'. Moreover, the Göteborg Council resolved to invite Ukraine (together with Moldova, as well as the Group 1 and Group 2 countries – but *not* Russia) to the forthcoming European Conference devoted to the enlargement of the Union. Not least significant, as soon as the summit ended, Göran Persson travelled to Kyiv in order to 'communicate to the Ukrainian side the Göteborg decisions concerning the deepening of cooperation in different spheres' as well as the EU's 'eagerness' for intensifying relations.

Tokens of change these are. But they are noteworthy enough to persuade normally sober observers that Ukraine has at last received its 'long-awaited signal' from the EU. The explanation for this state of affairs presented by the Ukrainian news weekly *Zerkalo Nedeli* is worth citing:

*One can think that, belatedly, the EU became frightened, perceiving just where a serious crisis could lead in a country of 50 million in the very centre of Europe. And it belatedly realised that a policy of cutting its relations with Ukraine not only would not accelerate reform or reduce poverty, corruption and the power of the oligarchs, but merely strengthen all of these negative phenomena – and what's more, arouse pessimism and a collapse of spirit on the part of Ukraine's not so numerous Euro enthusiasts. Belatedly also, uneasiness swept the EU concerning Ukraine's list towards Russia (it still has not thrown geopolitics overboard). However, without doubt, those who claimed that the European direction pursued by the previous [Yushchenko] government has borne fruit have been proved right. It is an irony of fate that these fruits will be tasted by others.*⁶⁴

Enlargement is producing 'belated' changes in the EU's thinking, but it is indisputably producing them. It would require considerable boldness to conclude that these changes will summon an equally noteworthy response from Ukraine's President. But hints of change there are. Most, if not all observers have concluded that the diminution of the internal crisis has partially restored the 'self-possession' (*samoobladaniye*) of the President and, perhaps not incidentally, produced a governmental programme under Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh which is more reformist than widely predicted.⁶⁵ The President's self-assurance has, in turn,

diminished his dependency on Putin and stimulated fresh attempts to outmanoeuvre him (if only in the timeless Ukrainian way of failing to deliver what was solemnly conceded). Moreover, new manifestations of Russian pressure – a fresh tightening of VAT regulations and, as many predicted, a gubernatorial rather than ambassadorial approach on the part of Russia's new envoy, Viktor Chernomyrdin – have aroused a fear of Russian intentions which, in Leonid Kuchma, has never been far below the surface.⁶⁶ These are ripples on the water, not strong currents. But they set a realistic challenge for the West: preserving the short-term conditions which make long-term battles worth fighting.

The Impact of 11 September

To all appearances, Ukraine instantly grasped the momentous importance of the terrorist tragedies in New York and Washington. So unequivocal and sure footed were its initial responses in support of the United States that they could only have been instinctive. In an 'address to the Ukrainian people' on the morrow of the attacks, President Kuchma expressed shock at the 'unheard-of horrible crime', which he characterised as 'historically unprecedented in terms of its scale, cruelty and cynicism'.⁶⁷ Unlike President Putin, whose support was equally instantaneous, President Kuchma and the Foreign Ministry (MFA) took the additional step of endorsing NATO's invocation of Article 5 on 14 September. On 8 October the MFA firmly endorsed the launching of US military operations in Afghanistan the day before. At a time when much of Ukrainian (not to say European) opinion was uncertain about who precisely bore responsibility for the attacks on the United States, the MFA showed no such hesitation:

*The decision to undertake the operation is based on the **unquestionable** evidence of the involvement of Osama bin Laden and his organisation 'Al Qaida' in the terrorist acts in the USA and of the assistance to him of the leadership of the Taliban movement. [Author's emphasis]*

The statement went on to state that United States military operations were fully legal under international law:

UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) and Article 51 of the UN Charter on the right of individual or collective self-defence have established a legal basis to carry out a global antiterrorist operation. [Author's emphasis]⁶⁸

In contrast to the intramural difficulties besetting the Russian leadership – whose Defence Minister initially expressed opposition to US forward basing in the Central Asian states bordering Afghanistan – Ukraine, starting from a less significant geographical position than that of its eastern neighbour, struggled to find ways of being helpful to the conduct of US operations. By the date of the foregoing MFA statement, it had been decided to open Ukraine's airspace to US military aircraft en route to Afghanistan, as well as provide access to Ukraine's military facilities on a case by case basis. In the month between 9 October and 8 November, a total of 221 US aircraft had transited the 'Ukrainian zone of responsibility' over the Black Sea in support of the military operations.⁶⁹

On the basis of these *bona fides* of trans-Atlantic solidarity, Ukrainians might have every reason to conclude that the events of 11 September will raise Ukraine's profile, reinforce the dynamic of the Ukraine-NATO relationship and anchor Ukraine

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more securely in Europe. Yet, it is entirely possible that the opposite will prove to be the case.

The first reason for scepticism on this front is the impetus given by 11 September to the security mindedness of the Western community, most notably the European Union, whose 'fortress Europa' mentality will surely not be weakened by this definitive demonstration of the virulence of global terrorism. The heightened sensitivity to transnational terrorist networks 'with global reach' translates logically and powerfully into heightened attention to what is already becoming the EU's most significant concern, the integrity of the enlarged Union: the robustness of its frontiers; the competence, professionalism and probity of security and law enforcement bodies (not to say the quality of trust and coordination between them); financial security and the strength and transparency of banking and customs regimes; the strength of civic institutions and, not least of all, the health of political orders. On the one hand, these concerns are likely to translate into increased attentiveness to the internal condition of the countries bordering the 'greater Europe' and seeking admission to it. But on the other hand, they will translate into increased demands, accelerated timescales and diminished patience. In these more threatening conditions – conditions which mark the end of the post-cold war era – Western self-interest is likely to be less generous and 'enlightened' than it has been to this point. States which lack the will or capacity to control their borders and place limits on the activities which occur inside them do not face the prospect of accelerated integration into Europe, but exclusion from it.

If this possibility is taken seriously at the commanding heights of power, there is only very private indication of it. Coincidentally on 11 September, the EU and Ukraine issued a Joint Statement at the conclusion of their latest summit. Out of 26 paragraphs, two are devoted to trade and free movement, one is devoted to regional policy, one to ESDP, one to ecological security and one to scientific and technological cooperation. The rest are devoted to strengthening human rights, democracy and market orientated reform in Ukraine. In all, the terms 'democracy', 'transparency', 'human rights' and 'freedom of speech' are employed over a dozen times, and the longest paragraph is devoted for the most part to 'strengthening pluralistic, independent media'.⁷⁰ In the joint press conference which followed, President Kuchma expressed 'full understanding with our European partners' and quite reasonably gave roughly equal attention to the external and internal issues covered during the discussions. But on the issue of press freedom and, specifically the Gongadze case, President Kuchma stated that:

I and the majority of Ukrainians believe that this was a serious provocation aimed at destabilising the ... political and social situation in Ukraine. As to what the final aim was, you should ask its organisers, not only in Ukraine but in your countries as well. I am referring to the West because the campaign unfurled in the Western mass media had no precedent.⁷¹

To European leaders desperate for signs of change, this assessment would not have suggested that change was in the air.

The second reason for scepticism is, to Ukrainians, familiar and eternal: the Russian factor. In the minds of many Ukrainian and several Western students of Russian policy, the events of 11 September have been a breakthrough *for Russia*, and they have been adroitly used in pursuit of firmly held, but problematic Russian interests in areas ranging from the transport of energy to the 'transformation' of NATO to the subordination of Russia's neighbours and the eradication of

'extremism' and 'separatism' inside the Russian Federation itself. Yet in the eyes of Western governments, these events have ushered in a profoundly significant set of departures in Russian policy and attitudes, and they have raised the prospect of a deep and enduring partnership between Russia and the West. Ukrainians are in no position to criticise the rapprochement between Russia and NATO, let alone the United States, and the Ukrainian authorities have studiously avoided doing so. Yet the MFA and MOD have openly expressed concern that Ukraine should not be ignored, let alone left behind as this process develops. The concern is well founded, for there is reason to doubt whether Ukraine will command significant attention from Western governments and multilateral bodies, captivated, vexed and on all sides driven by the challenge of capturing and giving substance to the spirit of 'alliance' with Russia, lest the spirit evaporate.

Third, there is the prosaic, but potentially portentous fact that, particularly in the United States, the events of 11 September have been a potent distraction – in Leninist terms, a strategic diversion – from other strategic interests, significant ones amongst them. How many of the US officials and Congressional members who imposed trade sanctions on Ukraine on 27 January 2002 have knowledge of even a single one of the steps catalogued above which Ukraine has taken to render support to the United States since 11 September?⁷² In a country in which 'international' television coverage has been reduced to an obsessive chronicle of 'the war in Afghanistan', a safe estimate would be 'few'.

The Evolution of Self-Interest

Since the end of the Cold War, the creation of a 'greater Europe' – 'a Europe whole and free' – has not only been a dominant theme of diplomacy, it has been the principal piety of the post-Cold War era. The piety has generated countless initiatives, it has created an entirely new class of experts, middlemen and consultants, it has produced illusions and disillusionment in equal measure and at a more mundane level, it has produced disappointment and waste. But it has also produced the enlargement of NATO, the reasoned expectation of its further enlargement and the all but certain enlargement of the European Union. Enlargement has been a major stimulant to the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe. But it has not always been a sufficient stimulant, and in some quarters it has stimulated resistance.

Like transformation, enlargement has limits. At one level, the limits are being defined by the character of the communities which others seek to join. The members of these communities have interests apart from enlargement, not least, the integrity of the communities themselves – integrity which can easily be lost if standards are compromised and membership diluted indiscriminately. Admitting new members has costs and risks for those who admit them. The costs and risks which the West assumed when it sought to create a Euro-Atlantic community at the start of the Cold War are very different from those which it will assume now that 'the Cold War is over'. The lesson of enlargement to date is that the West, like God, helps those who help themselves. On the self-help principle, the West has embraced Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary – and despite the Russian factor, it is embracing the Baltic states as well.

The second level, therefore, is being defined by the character of the candidate countries. In some of them, convictions, realism and civil society have been strong

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enough to make external support the crucial variable. Elsewhere, external support has collided with real fault lines in political and economic culture, and it has also collided with the powers who sustain them. This is what has happened in Ukraine. Should we therefore conclude that there is no prospect of Ukraine joining the European Union in the long term or, in the mid-term, drawing closer to it? Should we also treat these as forgone conclusions, immutable by our own efforts?

The adoption of these conclusions would have serious implications. In the first place, they would signal to many that whatever Ukraine does to solve its problems, the 'greater Europe' will be built without it. To many others, they would simply signal that meaningful change is not possible. These messages, fortified by feelings of betrayal, would shift the centre ground of politics and the balance of power in every political institution. (The Putin phenomenon is evidence enough that the centre ground of politics moves, that disillusionment is a potent force and that not every democrat is a democrat for life.) In the second place, these conclusions would make equidistance, not to say an independent course between Russia and NATO untenable. It is a secondary issue whether this would lead to 'integration' – which in the Soviet sense implies burdens and responsibilities as well as control – or simply a deeper and more extensive subordination to Russian interests. In either case, Ukraine's 'freedom to choose' – which in 1996 Kuchma defined as the *sina qua non* of independence – would wither away. Third, and therefore, these conclusions are likely to produce deterioration and turbulence. Ukraine is not Belarus. At least a quarter of its population is anti-Russian, and a much larger proportion is apprehensive about Russian state power and policy. Amongst the policy elite, where these proportions are higher, a considerable number understand what democratisation and westernisation mean in practice. Even if there were no connection between Russian influence, collusive and opaque norms of business and the 'domination of authoritarian tendencies' in Ukraine,⁷³ the malignant characteristics present in the political system and dominant in the economy would surely grow if the West signalled that Ukraine had no prospects in Europe.

How damaging would these developments be to the West? 'The West' was created by the Cold War. Throughout that period, the Euro-Atlantic community lived with dividing lines and prospered behind them. In defiance of all the incantations, security in the 'new Europe' (ie *Central* Europe) can be built without Ukraine, and it can be built without Russia. But it cannot be built on the basis of today's security policies and financial assumptions. The conviction that NATO enlargement should be driven by political rather than military considerations rested on the assumption of a relatively benign environment in the East. Given the present economic configuration of Europe, the emergence of an estranged or even hostile bloc of states in the former USSR would not force NATO to return to the defence policies of 1980. But it would force it to return from a world of 'risks' to a world of threats. Either NATO would adjust its policies to suit such a world, or it would cease to serve a useful purpose. The pressures upon the EU would be no less severe. Today's concerns regarding the presence of zones of misery and conflict on the periphery of Europe – and corridors of migrants and crime through it – will grow by an order of magnitude if partnership is replaced by 'zones of influence' and 'information and intelligence struggle' – and if alliances between states, money launderers, arms smugglers and assassins become a matter of course. The Schengen Agreement will not protect Europe from these developments.

The challenge for both NATO and the EU in Ukraine is to maintain the short-term conditions which make long-term battles worth fighting. This means extracting the maximum value from channels of influence which work (NATO-Ukraine cooperation

and defence reform). It also means taking Ukraine's European aspirations seriously and hence maintaining the conditionalities as noted by the Goteborg European Council – 'democratic development, human rights, the rule of law and market-oriented economic reforms' – which remind Ukrainians to take them seriously. The Gongadze affair has been a sharp reminder that many who hold power do not. Unfortunately, it is now an open question how – or even whether – the West will try to influence the shape of the post-Kuchma era. When the USSR collapsed, thoughtful Russians and Ukrainians declared that it would take a generation to overcome the Soviet legacy. Today, such declarations do not challenge the West, they deter it. This is a real change in the Western climate, damaging to the West itself. If Ukrainians wish to avoid more serious damage, they will need to ponder Carlisle's question: 'If I am not for myself, who will be for me?' After 11 September, this question should be ringing in people's ears.

ENDNOTES

¹ The 19 states are Albania, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia (FYROM), Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine and Yugoslavia. The number expands to 22 if the three states of the Transcaucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, are counted as part of Europe.

² 'Remarks by the President in Address to Faculty and Students of Warsaw University', 15 June 2001 (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010615-1.html)

³ Volodymyr Horbulin, Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, 1996-9, 'Ukraine's Place in Today's Europe', *Politics and the Times* (journal of the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine), October-December, 1995, p15.

⁴ In his speech to the Civic Union on 28 February, 1993, Yeltsin declared that 'the time has come for distinguished international organisations, including the UN, to grant Russia special powers of a guarantor of peace and stability in former regions of the USSR'. Some six months earlier, even a well placed Foreign Ministry liberal, Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev (the first Deputy Foreign Minister with responsibility for the 'near abroad') stated that it was vital for the West to recognise Russia as 'leader of stability and military security on the entire territory of the former USSR'. Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev, *Strategiya i taktika vneshney politiki Rossii v novom zarubezhe* (undated author's copy, submitted in August 1992).

⁵ Anatoliy Grytsenko, *Civil-Military Relations in Ukraine: A System Emerging from Chaos* (Groningen, Netherlands: Centre for European Security Studies, Harmonie Paper 1, 1997), p1.

⁶ Anton Bebler, 'Corruption Among Security Personnel in Central and Eastern Europe', in David Betz & John Löwenhardt, ed, *Army and State in Postcommunist Europe*, (Special Issue), *The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol 17, March 2001, No 1, p142.

⁷ Partnership for Peace Framework Document, Article 8.

⁸ Comments attributed to the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, Gerhard von Moltke, at the 1994 Istanbul meeting of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, published in the official parliamentary newspaper of Ukraine, *Holos Ukrainy*, 14 June 1994.

⁹ Between the launch of Operation Allied Force (April 1999) and Lord Robertson's visit to Moscow in April 2000, all Russian cooperation with NATO was curtailed, and it has only partially been restored. The view of International Staff members maintaining direct liaison with the Russian delegation is that, both prior to this curtailment and after the partial restoration of cooperation, Russians at all levels of authority have been extremely reluctant to deviate from a 'top-down' approach to NATO-Russia relations and have shown very little interest in participating in activities at working level. In the view of one mid-level official, 'the military and political leadership seem determined that cooperation not affect mindsets'. The Headquarters view is that Ukraine's participation at working level is considerable and that its interest in deepening this participation is genuine. Complaints are frequently expressed about Soviet style inhibitions about sharing information and – as in all other

spheres governing relations with Ukraine – a gap between commitments and their fulfilment. In the latter respect, NATO's audit of Ukraine's Partnership Work Programme in 2000 noted that implementation levels were considerable higher than they were in 1999.

¹⁰ James Sherr, 'NATO's New Members: A Model for Ukraine? The Example of Hungary' (Conflict Studies Research Centre [hereafter CSRC], September 2000).

¹¹ A Georgian delegation to NATO headquarters in early 2001 was greatly dissatisfied with the reception they received when they sought to document Russian pressure. They were also taken aback by the confidence expressed by NATO officials that Russia would honour in full its base withdrawal commitments, given at the November 1999 Istanbul OSCE summit.

¹² National Security & Defence, No 8, 2000 (Ukrainian Centre for Economic & Political Studies [hereafter UCEPS], Kyiv), p15.

¹³ Volodymyr Horbulin, *op cit*.

¹⁴ National Security and Defence, No 7, 2000 (UCEPS), p9.

¹⁵ Two states, Ireland and the United Kingdom continue to 'opt out' of the Schengen Agreement and subsequent Convention (and two non-EU states, Iceland and Norway opted in). The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty abolished this opt-out for new members. Hence, Schengen automatically forms part of the *acquis communautaire* of Poland, Hungary and other states on the path to accession.

¹⁶ The principle was once again formulated by the Russian Foreign Ministry on 16 August 2001, which stated that 'the Russian-Ukrainian border should be a border of peace, accord and interaction; it should unite not separate the people of our countries ... The formation of artificial barriers and obstacles would contradict these objectives and complicate contacts between people and cooperation between economic entities, especially in frontier areas'. (Interfax, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, hereafter SWB).

¹⁷ First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuriy Sergeyev, head of the Ukrainian delegation to the joint border commission. 'Borders of Ukraine: An Unfinished Area of a Decade of State Building', Monitoring: Occasional Report No 27, August 2001 (Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine), p5. See also 'The Legal Status of the Russian-Ukrainian Border: Problems and Prospects', Monitoring: Occasional Report No 18, June 2001.

¹⁸ The term 'involvement' is used advisedly, as it implies an activity that is more pervasive than 'interference', but one that takes place between equals.

¹⁹ At a symposium in Kyiv, 4-6 July ('The World in the 21st Century: Cooperation, Partnership and Dialogue'), the Assistant Chief of Staff, EU Military Staff, Brigadier Jean-Luc Lagadec affirmed that ESDP is designed to benefit NATO as much as the EU. A similar stance was taken by General Joachim Spiering, former NATO Commander-in-Chief North, who added that 'the United States will remain the most important European power for years to come'.

²⁰ Spiering, *ibid*.

²¹ The relevant passages are: 'All nations should understand that there is no conflict between membership in NATO and membership in the European Union. My nation welcomes the consolidation of European unity, and the stability it brings. We welcome a greater role for the EU in European security, properly integrated with NATO. We welcome the incentive for reform that the hope of EU membership creates. We welcome a Europe that is truly united, truly democratic and truly diverse ... And all in Europe and America understand the central lesson of the century past. When Europe and America are divided, history tends to tragedy'. Bush, *op cit*.

²² Bert Koenders (Netherlands) 'NATO Enlargement: Draft Interim Report' (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Political Committee, Sub-Committee on Central and Eastern Europe).

²³ The Rt Hon Chris Patten CH, 'The Future of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the role of the European Commission', Conference on the Development of a Common European Security and Defence Policy, 'The Integration of the New Decade', Berlin, 16 December 1999, pp1 & 4.

²⁴ Despite the 28 May 1997 Black Sea Fleet accords, Russia continues to propose the creation of a joint naval force (*soyedineniye*) in the Black Sea. On 14 May 2001, Deputy Foreign Minister Valeriy Loshchinin, appointed the previous month to supervise relations with the CIS, declared that the building of 'allied and neighbourly relations with Ukraine is a strategic priority in Russia's foreign policy'. (Interfax, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts.)

²⁵ The official aspiration of bringing Ukraine into the Russian-Belarus Union surfaced even in the wake of the 31 May 1997 'Big Treaty' between Russia and Ukraine, which was roundly presented by Kyiv as *de jure* recognition of Ukraine's independent course. On 10 June, one of the most arduous proponents of the accords, Ivan Rybkin (then Secretary of the National Security Council) restated the view that 'Russia, Belarus and Ukraine' would benefit from being together (*Trud*, 10 June 1997), a view echoed by another supporter of the accords, Ivan Serov (then First Deputy Prime Minister) on 6 January 1998. On 17 June, spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Gennadiy Tarasov warned against 'attempts to interfere' in relations between Russia and the CIS and also linked Ukraine with Belarus as 'priority countries' for Russia.

²⁶ Hence, in a very different region, Kyiv, a 1995 Democratic Initiatives poll revealed 62 percent of ethnic Ukrainians and 58 percent of ethnic Russians firmly in favour of independence; on the other hand, 16 percent of Ukrainians and only 10 percent of Russians pronounced themselves against it.

²⁷ Whereas 32 percent of Ukrainians favour the country's eventual membership (23 percent within five years), 19 percent of Russian respondents regard NATO membership as a priority. Whereas 46.2 percent of Ukrainians regard NATO as an 'aggressive military bloc', 56 percent of Russians do so. National Security and Defence, No 8, 2000 (UCEPS), p14-15.

²⁸ Twenty-three percent favour NATO membership in 5-10 years, 9 percent in 10-15 years, and 51 percent 'never', 17 percent 'hard to say'; 27 percent favour membership of the Tashkent Treaty in 5-10 years, 4 percent in 10-15 years and 42 percent 'never', 27 percent 'hard to say'.

²⁹ National Security and Defence, No 12, 2000 (UCEPS), p5-6. The poll shows eight countries as having 'priority' importance, ranging on a scale from 86.9 percent to 48.8 percent: Russia, USA, Belarus, Germany, Kazakhstan, Poland, Canada, Uzbekistan.

³⁰ For a fuller discussion of Ukraine's economic and civic deficits and the imperative of establishing a 'civic state', see James Sherr, Ukraine's New Time of Troubles (CSRC, October 1998), p7-15.

³¹ Indeed, they are transparent to very few insiders. Anatoliy Grytsenko's appraisal of Viktor Chernomyrdin's appointment as Russian Ambassador is pertinent: 'He is a man who knows exactly the economic value of everything that exists in Ukrainian-Russian relations. He knows not only the official reports of the state Committee for Statistics and the CIS Interstate Economic Committee, but also the shady schemes out of which both the Ukrainian and the Russian businessmen who now influence politics made their first capital. He knows exactly who owes how much to whom, which means that in this regard it will be both easy and difficult for the Ukrainian side to work with him.' (*Strana.ru* web site 11 May 2001.)

³² Oleksandr Goncharenko, presentation to conference on 'The National Security of Ukraine in the Context of World Community Experience', Kyiv, 9 October 2000.

³³ Opinion poll presented in National Security and Defence, No 8 2000, p19 (Ukrainian Centre of Economic and Political Studies, Kyiv).

³⁴ Russia's dispatch of a 'humanitarian' convoy to Yugoslavia (halted on the Hungary-Ukraine border) in April 1999, its redeployment of the intelligence ship *Liman* (and initial preparation to redeploy other vessels) from Sevastopol to the Adriatic and its plans to transit Ukraine with Airborne Troop reinforcements after the 'brilliant dash to Pristina' in June 1999 provoked anxiety and, in some quarters, alarm. For a more comprehensive discussion, see James Sherr & Steven Main, Russian and Ukrainian Perceptions of Events in Yugoslavia, CSRC Paper F64, May 1999, p2, 17-24.

³⁵ In late 2000, Andrey Fedorov, former First Deputy Foreign Minister, stated, '[t]oday we are speaking more or less openly now about our zones of interests. In one way or another we are confirming that the post-Soviet territory is such a zone ... In Yeltsin's time we were trying to wrap this in a nice paper. Now we are saying it more directly: this is our territory, our sphere of interest.' Hence the declaration of Deputy Foreign Minister Yevgeny Gusarov at the November 2000 meeting of the OSCE: 'We have been warning our Western partners that we oppose the use of the OSCE for interference in the internal affairs of the countries situated to the east of Vienna. This time we are sending a clear signal: we won't allow this to happen'. (Financial Times, 23 January 2001.)

³⁶ The apprehension that the United States could use 'human rights' as a flag of convenience to support separatist movements is present even in Central Asia. The 30

March 2000 *communiqué* of the Shanghai Forum (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) pledged the Forum to 'promoting multipolarity' and to 'resolutely oppose any country's intervention in the internal affairs of other countries on the excuse of protecting national and religious interests and human rights'.

³⁷ A full discussion of Russian policy towards Ukraine under Putin is well outside the scope of this paper. The reader is invited to consult three of the author's papers on the CSRC website (www.csrc.ac.uk): 'A New Regime? A New Russia?' in Anne Aldis, ed, *The Second Chechen War* (September 2000), 'The Dismissal of Borys Tarasyuk' (CSRC Occasional Brief, October 2000) and 'Viktor Chernomyrdin's Appointment as Ambassador to Ukraine' (CSRC Occasional Brief 82, May 2001).

³⁸ Leonid Polyakov, 'The Russian Factor in Ukraine's Relations with NATO: Possible Outcomes and Policy Implications for Ukraine and NATO', June 2001, p6. [Draft - Quoted with permission.]

³⁹ For a Russian perspective which presents the Russian Federation not only as the prime beneficiary of the Gongadze affair, but comes close to implying a degree of Russian connivance in the scandal, see 'Kuchma - Our [P]resident: Putin Must Meddle in the Internal Affairs of Ukraine', *Izvestiya*, 13 February 2001. Resident is the Russian term for the chief intelligence officer posted to a foreign country.

⁴⁰ The apparent indifference of Russia's political authorities to the implications of 'Kuchmagate' for the future of democracy in Ukraine would appear to substantiate the widespread perception of democratically minded Ukrainians of a linkage between Russian influence and 'the dominance of authoritarian tendencies in the system of [Ukrainian] political power'. *Monitoring: Occasional Report No 3* (Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine), February 2001. The December 2000 Minsk and February 2001 Dnepropetrovsk accords, providing for extensive Russian participation in the privatisation of Ukraine's energy infrastructure - 16 documents which were presented to *Ukraine's government* in only excerpted form - substantiate a further concern: that Russian-Ukrainian relations in the energy sphere do not meet the minimal conditions of competitiveness and transparency.

⁴¹ On 1 January 2000, Ministry of Defence Armed Forces numbered 310,000 servicemen plus 90,000 civilian employees, all supposedly funded by a defence budget of some \$450 million plus \$80 million legally raised by the forces themselves. It is sometimes concluded that because this budget is disproportionately small compared to that of the Russian Federation (\$7 billion for a military establishment of some 1 million personnel), Ukraine's forces are in even more parlous condition than Russia's. This however overlooks the costs of maintenance, testing, modernisation and command-and-control for a strategic nuclear force, three ocean going fleets and other power projection capabilities absent in Ukraine. In both cases, these figures exclude substantial and heavily armed Interior forces and other non-MOD formations.

⁴² Statement to the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform, October 2000.

⁴³ Unlike the Ministry of Internal Affairs and KGB, the Soviet Ministry of Defence and Soviet General Staff had no branches in the Union Republics. With one exception, the organisation of the Soviet Armed Forces was functional and operational, not territorial. The one territorial component of defence organisation, the USSR's 15 Military Districts, grouped together entities responsible for conscription, training and mobilisation. But these districts were not territorially coterminous with Union Republics, and they did not possess the capabilities and command structures required to plan or conduct coordinated military operations. What Ukraine inherited in 1991 were limbs without brain or body: three Military Districts and the forces which happened to be stationed in them.

⁴⁴ For a scathing and well documented critique of 'military reform' before 2000, see Anatoliy Grytsenko, 'Military Reform in Ukraine: The Start, or Another False Start?', *National Security and Defence*, No 1, 2000, p2-40 (UCEPS).

⁴⁵ For a fuller discussion, see James Sherr, 'A Fresh Start to Ukrainian Defence Reform?', *Survival*, Vol 43, No 1, Spring 2001 (IISS, London).

⁴⁶ This has also been true for nearly all countries of the former Warsaw Pact. Even after their accession to NATO the Czech Republic and (to a lesser extent) Hungary still have not put these difficulties behind them.

⁴⁷ Unlike the 1997 Programme, the current Programme is truly a *state* programme, drawn up in consultation with experts from the Ministry of Finance and in accordance with a Long-Term Defence-Related Funds Allocation Forecast to 2015, approved by the Cabinet of Ministers.

⁴⁸ The NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform has identified six areas for collaboration: rationalisation of defence structure, professionalisation, reform of border troops, reform of internal security forces, reduction of mobilisation resources and stocks and civilian democratic control.

⁴⁹ In Ukraine as in Russia, the de-activation of military units is an expensive business, as is the retirement of officers, given the legal stipulation that they be provided with housing.

⁵⁰ In the former USSR only the Baltic countries participate more intensively in PARP. Out of 27 Partners, 19 participate to some degree.

⁵¹ The number of Ukraine-Russia activities has gradually risen every year from 28 in 1998 to 52 in 2000. In statistical terms, this puts it on a par with Poland and at about 60 per cent of the Ukraine-UK level.

⁵² Polyakov, *op cit*, p15. Many also cannot understand the basis of Russia's proposals for a 'joint naval force' in the Black Sea, given the fact that the two sides cannot even agree on their respective borders and exclusive economic zones in the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov. The differences which exist over economic rights are surely no less than they are between Ukraine and Romania.

⁵³ In a country whose black economy is at least as large as the legal economy, the Armed Forces benefit from a number of hidden subsidies, many of them perfectly legal. Much of the accumulated Armed Forces debt – an estimated UAH 10-15 billion since 1991 – has been effectively written off. Military forces legally – and without charge to the state budget – provide services to regional authorities and farming cooperatives in exchange for provisions, food and occasionally petrol. In addition to these activities, the Armed Forces raised \$65 million and are required to raise \$165 million in 2001 from non-budgetary sources.

⁵⁴ National Security and Defence, No 1, 2000, (UCEPS), p32-33.

⁵⁵ That there are such advances is shown by the fact that Ukraine now has two NCO academies.

⁵⁶ *Dedovshchina*, systematic brutality against younger recruits by those more senior, is generally believed to be a less serious problem in Ukraine than in Russia – which is unsurprising, given the fact that Ukraine's armed forces are not employed in combat operations. Nevertheless, the problem is a very serious one. (It is estimated that between 60 and 70 soldiers committed suicide in 1999, 50 percent of all deaths for that year.) In Ukraine, as in Russia, there is an active Organisation of Soldiers' Mothers, headed by Valentina Artamonova. There is also an ombudsman in the *Verkhovna Rada*, Nina Karpachova, whom soldiers have the right to address even in wartime.

⁵⁷ According to a UCEPS poll in late 2000, the largest percentage of citizens express trust in the Armed Forces (30.2 percent). The level of confidence in the militia (civil police, subordinate to the MVS) is 11.8 percent, just 0.1 percent below the courts and 0.1 percent above the Office of Public Prosecutor. National Security and Defence, No 11, 2000, (UCEPS), p10.

⁵⁸ The Armed Forces have overcome some, but far from all of their former inhibitions about collaboration with NGOs. Moreover, a key state research institution, the National Institute of Strategic Studies (which before its resubordination to the Presidential Administration in autumn 2000 was a component of the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC)) contains about 60 analysts, some of whom now write with fresh and original perspectives.

⁵⁹ In this discussion, Ukraine's Foreign Ministry was keen to note that whereas Ukraine began to negotiate its PCA six months before the Russian Federation (which had not declared an EU vocation), its agreement had come into force four months behind that of its eastern neighbour.

⁶⁰ IHT article cited in the Ukrainian news weekly, *Zerkalo Nedeli* in Russian by Tat'yana Silina, *Prorvalo*.

⁶¹ Annex V, p EN 30.

⁶² Annex V, p EN 31.

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- 63 Presidency Conclusions, Göteborg European Council.
64 *Zerkalo Nedeli*, op cit.
65 Ibid.
66 On Chernomyrdin, see James Sherr, 'Viktor Chernomyrdin's Appointment as Ambassador to Ukraine', CSRC Occasional Brief No 82, May 2001.
67 'Address of President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma to the Ukrainian People', 12 September 2001.
68 'Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine', 8 October 2001.
69 Statement by Ihor Dolhov, official MFA spokesman, quoted by Interfax-Ukraine, 8 November 2001 and cited in *SWB*.
70 'Ukraine-European Union Summit, Yalta, 11 September 2001, Joint Statement'.
71 Ukrainian Television, 11 September, cited in *SWB*.
72 On 23 January, US trade sanctions took effect against Ukraine's lucrative CD pirating industry. The sanctions impose a 100 per cent duty on all Ukrainian imports except textiles and according to the arguably inflated estimates of the Ukrainian government, could cost Ukraine \$470 million per year and 14,000 jobs. Ukraine has retaliated with a ban on imports of American poultry, which currently constitute 90 per cent of poultry imports. With arguably good reason, Ukraine has argued that it is victim of the proverbial double standard and that Russia's larger CD pirating industry has not received similar treatment. For detailed discussion and commentary, see Ukrainian Monitor, 21-27 January 2002 (Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, <http://www.cpcfpu.org.ua>).
73 Monitoring, op cit, (Occasional Report No 3, 2001).

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