


Conflict Studies Research Centre

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NATO'S NEW MEMBERS: A MODEL FOR UKRAINE? THE EXAMPLE OF HUNGARY

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Well before their accession to NATO on 12 March 1999, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic had turned post-Communist change to positive and 'irreversible' effect. For good reason, this achievement is a point of interest, not to say fascination for countries of the former USSR suffering from a more virulent strain of the Communist legacy that still burdens the Central European states of the former Warsaw Pact. The fascination is particularly strong in Ukraine, a country which borders two of NATO's three new members, a country which enjoys a uniquely close relationship with Poland, but at the same time a country whose nine-year commitment to a 'Euro-Atlantic course' has done little to transform the national economy or lead the vast majority of its people out of the post-Communist wilderness. Where economics is concerned, those who believe there is a 'Polish model' for Ukraine to follow might be optimistic, but they are not foolish – and those who argue more modestly that Czech, Hungarian and Polish experience have more to offer Ukraine than British or Canadian experience scarcely have a case to answer.

But does it follow that these countries are the best qualified to point the way forward in the sphere of national security and defence? Here it would be rash to say that substantial change occurred in the Visegrad three before NATO and the 'accession process' intervened with their own demands, timetables and pressures. More than three years after the Madrid summit, it would still be rash to say that these countries possessed competent, self-confident and mature defence and security elites, let alone integrated defence and security systems.

The Visegrad three still have far to go in the task of creating armed forces, security structures and control mechanisms appropriate to a democratic state and beneficial to its security. Many of their shortcomings are distinct to them. On balance, Ukraine's shortcomings and its challenges are more profound. But there is a balance to be struck. In two respects, Ukraine started from a position of relative advantage in 1991.

In the first place, the Warsaw Pact was not a mechanism for creating strong armies in Central Europe, but weak ones, incapable of resisting the activity of the Soviet Armed Forces on their national territories and across it. The 'national' armies of the Pact were not *national*. They were neither under the command of national authorities, nor equipped, deployed or trained for national defence. Even the most senior commanders of the Czech, Polish and Hungarian armies were deprived of operational (combined arms) and strategic command experience. What is more, these 'armies' were not *armies*, because they lacked the means to conduct integrated military operations. They were simply collections of units and formations designed to fit into a Soviet dominated infrastructure and order of battle. They were bone and muscle, without heart or brain and without the capacity for an independent existence.

In contrast, Ukraine did not possess even the pretence of a national army in 1991, yet because Ukrainian officers formed a large proportion of senior command personnel in the *Soviet* Armed Forces, Ukraine's current military establishment has

a collective memory and some experience in planning the operations of armies and fronts, as well as a rich military-scientific background in the 'art of war'. In content, much of this background fails to speak to Ukraine's current security challenges. But in form it has encouraged an integrated approach and a desire to engage with first principles. This approach and desire are visible in Ukraine's Armed Forces. But they are not always visible in Poland's military establishment, and where the Czech and Hungarian military establishments are concerned, they are relatively absent.

Secondly, Ukraine is a non-aligned country, proximate to areas of tension and adjacent to a far greater country, the Russian Federation, whose commitment to Ukraine's long-term independence is questionable. This position has been a salutary discipline. It has stimulated deep if not always clear thinking about the ends and means of security policy, and it has fostered habits of self-reliance on the part of much of the political and military establishment. In contrast, the expectation and eventual achievement of NATO membership have not helped to foster defence mindedness on the part of the Visegrad three. For a great proportion of the political establishments of these countries, NATO has been seen as the solution to security problems rather than a framework for resolving them. This attitude retarded defence reform in the past and still retards it.

The experience of the recent NATO member states bears study in Ukraine because of what has been achieved, as well because of what has not. But it bears critical study, because the Communist inheritance is not the same in all places and because the current conditions guiding, shaping and hindering reform are less similar still. Of the three Visegrad countries, Hungary probably offers the most fruitful point of comparison. Like Ukraine, Hungary borders seven countries. Like Ukraine, perhaps even more so, it has reason to regard itself as a front-line state.

THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S ARMY

The Hungarian People's Army was conceived and developed as a tool of 'internationalism' and the defender of a 'socialist commonwealth', whose aims and policies — not to say military doctrines and strategies — were devised outside the country. Its officers were relatively privileged products — and symbols — of a system which defined the 'state' the 'people', 'authority' and 'duty' in terms which an unempowered populace accepted with resignation, if at all. The military establishment benefited but also suffered from a system which restricted military-technical knowledge to their own profession,¹ yet was so compartmented as to deprive even senior representatives of this profession with the knowledge to relate the parts to the whole. In civilian and military spheres alike, information (and open discussion) was confined to what concerned one directly, and not always to as much as that. No Hungarian military officer was encouraged to 'think strategically', either about military operations themselves — being limited to an operational-tactical competence in the conduct of war — or about the relationship between orders given, the military policy of the state, the needs of the national economy, the demands of society and the interests of the country he ostensibly served.

By the time the NATO Council extended an invitation of membership to Hungary at its Madrid summit (8 July 1997), this army, renamed the Hungarian Home Defence Forces (HHDF), had been downsized, restructured and redeployed. It had been subordinated to a new, democratically accountable political authority, and it was

becoming responsible for new national and Alliance tasks. But in composition, capability, training and ethos, the HHDF was a diminished and cowed Hungarian People's Army. Only slightly before Madrid did it become obvious that Hungary could not join NATO with the army that it possessed. From 1996 onwards defence reform became an important issue for the governing Socialist-Liberal coalition. Since the right-of-centre FIDESZ government took office in May 1998, it has become a major priority.

Nevertheless, by the time Hungary acceded to membership of the Alliance on 12 March 1999,² the efforts of these governments had merely transformed the HHDF from a superficially reformed institution into a half-reformed one. Recognition of this fact, graphically brought home by the Kosovo conflict, persuaded Prime Minister Victor Orban to embark upon a full Strategic Defence Review in July 1999. This review has formulated a tightly sequenced package of goals, plans and timetables designed to produce a 'modern, NATO-capable, flexible and sustainable defence force' by 2008.³ Yet even those persuaded of this review's forthrightness and seriousness are bound to note that it simply provides a set of military-technical solutions to military-technical problems. Implementation of the review is dependent on achieving a far greater transformation: the acceptance of the review's solutions – and their long-term demands and costs – by Hungary's cross-party political establishment and the electorate it answers to. Without a broader commitment to defence than that which presently exists in the country – and without a far broader understanding of defence and security issues – successful implementation of the review is unlikely.

At this potential turning point in Hungary's defence reform, three questions arise. What practical challenges is Hungary confronting in its effort to create a 'NATO-capable' force – and, more importantly, a modern, democratic and NATO compatible defence and security system? Is a ten year record of gradual and often grudging progress primarily a commentary on the shortcomings of the Hungarian political and defence establishment – or is it testimony to the tenacity of the Communist legacy and the unrealistic expectations of Hungary's new allies? Does Hungary today possess the policies, the personnel, the will and the means required to create 'armed forces providing reliable defence and contributing to the common security of the Alliance'?

THE PROBLEM OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN CONTEXT

During the Communist era, 'civilian control' of defence was at one and the same time pervasive, but narrowly focused. In the USSR, the Armed Forces were accustomed to stand to attention before a closed circle of powerful civilians in the Party's Politburo. Through the Chief Political Directorate of the Communist Party Central Committee and the 'special departments' of the KGB, these civilians had mechanisms at their disposal which not only ensured the 'reliability' of the Armed Forces, but their total obedience. Paradoxically, the very effectiveness of these mechanisms persuaded the Party leadership to entrust the Armed Forces with a dominant influence in military-technical decisions and accept its monopoly of military-technical expertise.⁴ In non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries like Hungary, 'civilian control' was not narrow, it was absent. In its conduct of military operations (e.g. the crushing of the 'Prague spring'), the Hungarian People's Army answered to commanders who took orders from the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. In

peacetime, it was trained, equipped and deployed according to Soviet (and largely Soviet General Staff) directives.

Against this background, the framers of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) gave due emphasis to the need to inculcate post-Communist military establishments with the very different norms of civilian democratic control prevalent in NATO countries. But PfP's prime movers devoted less attention to a challenge of equal importance: remedying the 'deformations' of civilians. The experience of Hungary's defence reform to date demonstrates that, however successful civilians are at 'controlling' the army, they will have no chance of changing it for the better until they acquire the knowledge to change it — and until they recognise that a well motivated army is an asset to a democracy, rather than a threat to it. Unless civilians recognise that their attitudes, too, bear the imprint of the past, the risk for Hungary (and for NATO) is that 'reform' and 'democratisation' will demoralise the army, alienate it and in simple demographic terms destroy it. Therefore, the measure of progress in civil-military relations is not the number of civilians in 'control'. It is the extent to which the armed forces feel themselves to be an integral part of the democratic order, the extent to which civil-military *collaboration* becomes the norm, the extent to which civilians can bring an informed perspective to military discussion and the extent to which national defence policy becomes the business of the country as a whole.

The establishment of democratic and effective civilian control and the establishment of a national security system are directly and inseparably related. This relationship can be seen at four levels: state policy, law, administration and armed forces development.

First and foremost, it is essential that military policy reflect rather than determine the country's fundamental national interests. The military instrument, and the resources devoted to it, must also reflect the country's democratically established priorities. Even in a mature democracy, these goals are easier to proclaim than they are to achieve. But if they are to be achieved, it is up to the political authorities — and ultimately the country as a whole — to formulate a national security policy and establish an integrated national security system. Only on such a basis will it be possible to define the role of the armed forces and establish a division of labour amongst various arms of the state. For such a division of labour to work effectively, the armed forces must understand that there are economic, social, ecological, as well as military aspects of security. In turn, other state institutions (local government, law enforcement, customs, emergency services) must understand that many of their own responsibilities have defence implications. Moreover, the political authorities themselves must decide the appropriate weight that MOD armed forces, paramilitary forces and police should play in the security system, and it is they who must devise a mechanism to coordinate their respective efforts. Clearly, these political authorities require the motivation and knowledge to define the ends and means of security and relate the parts to the whole. Moreover, if the armed forces are to contribute to this enterprise and not just 'work to rule', it is essential that they identify with the political order and its values. The prospects of this will be greatly enhanced if civilians respect the military profession, if they are knowledgeable about defence themselves, and if there is no doubt about their commitment to effective armed forces.

Second, it is essential that the process of decision-making be codified and transparent. The content of defence policy is bound to change in a democracy, but the system itself must be stable. First and foremost, this requires legislation: clear

and authoritative answers to the questions ‘who commands?’, ‘who serves?’, ‘who allocates money?’, ‘who spends it?’, ‘who is accountable for what?’ and ‘who is answerable to whom?’ Particularly in societies undergoing rapid transition, there is every risk that vacuums in law and authority will be filled by intrigue and trials of strength. Such trials will invariably politicise the armed forces. The beginning of wisdom is to recognise that the majority of serving officers are not politicians in uniform but military professionals who wish to know ‘where they stand’. True military professionals do not oppose, but positively welcome a legal framework which defines their responsibilities. Military politicians, on the other hand, must be identified and removed from military service. Yet even after this is done, the legal framework will only achieve its goals if lawmakers are knowledgeable enough to weigh the alternatives before them and understand their practical consequences. Third, the implementation of defence policy — as opposed to the carrying out of orders in the field — depends upon effective administration. In a democracy, this requires a professional civil service: a corps of administrators whose political neutrality is unquestioned and who are competent and expert enough to execute government policy. The practice of neutrality requires an ethos of neutrality. This ethos and the requisite specialist knowledge will only be forthcoming in a society which accords sufficient value and prestige to public service.

Finally, there must be one set of assumptions governing defence, economic and social policy on the one hand and the manning, structuring and equipping of the armed forces on the other. An ‘ideal’ structure which is not financeable is more likely to be a liability than a limited success. Yet resources are not the only issue to be confronted. What is the nature of the likely threat? Is the emphasis to be placed on coalition warfare or self reliance? expeditionary operations or territorial defence? internal security, border defence or conventional war? high readiness or mass mobilisation? mobility or defence in depth? defence on one axis or several? joint, combined or independent operations? These choices have clear implications for budgeting, weapons procurement, manning, training and conditions of service. The wrong decisions in these specific areas will inevitably play back into first order issues, complicating and even damaging agreed priorities and interests. If the armed forces are to be the tool of policy and not an obstruction to it, it is essential that civilians understand the implications of proposals put to them and the practical consequences of their own decisions.

No democracy addresses these issues without discontinuities, distortions, and the process that Clausewitz called ‘friction’. But the institutional weaknesses, mental unpreparedness and intellectual disorientation characteristic of ‘post-Communism’ present a risk that discontinuities will become severe enough to damage both national security and the process of transformation itself.

GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT

Of the three states who acceded to membership of NATO in April 1999, it is Hungary whose geopolitical circumstances are the most unenviable.⁵ Indeed, Hungary is the only new member with a potential minority problem — but it is the fragility of neighbours where this 3.2 million minority resides and the saliency of the issue in Hungary (whose constitution enshrines the state’s ‘sense of responsibility’) which risks transforming this minority problem into a geopolitical one.⁶ In a formal and practical sense, this geopolitical fragility is now a potential vulnerability for NATO as a whole, greatly reinforcing NATO’s stake in the stability

of eastern and southeastern Europe. Of Hungary's seven neighbours (Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Ukraine and Slovakia), it is the latter five whose stability is in question, and it is there that Hungarian minorities happen to be situated:

- In **Ukraine** the condition and civil rights of the 180,000 Hungarian minority is a subject of disappointment but not serious dispute, and relations between Budapest and Kyiv are characterised by a high degree of cooperation. But political instability in Ukraine, not to say Russian pressure upon it, could alter this picture substantially.
- More problematic is the long troubled relationship with **Slovakia**, with its Hungarian minority of 650,000 — although the policies of the post-Meciar government and the prospect of Slovakia's integration into NATO now provide grounds for optimism.
- Historically the most serious problem has been the position of the two million strong Hungarian minority in **Romania**. The conclusion of the Hungarian-Romanian Basic Treaty (September 1996), the Romanian elections of November 1996 and a growing web of military cooperation have largely transformed the climate since tensions spilled over into ethnic clashes in 1990. But dramatic as Romania's change of direction is, it is not necessarily deep, because the centre-right's election victory left a polarised electorate in its wake, a polarisation profoundly amplified by the Kosovo conflict. There is a strong chance that Romania's exclusion from the 'second wave' of NATO enlargement could reconsolidate discontented forces.
- But the greatest vulnerability at present and for the foreseeable future is the implicit hostage status of the 350,000 Hungarian minority in the Vojvodina region of **Serbia** (and to a lesser extent the smaller minorities in the Slavonia and Baranja regions of **Croatia**). Despite reasoned apprehensions, Hungary's participation in IFOR/SFOR did not endanger this expatriate population. Yet NATO's intervention in the Kosovo conflict (Operation Allied Force) has sharply exposed the predicament inherent in Hungary's policy: a policy based on the premise that 'the situation of national and ethnic minorities cannot be considered an exclusively internal affair'⁷, yet a policy which by virtue of this premise risks provoking hostility to Hungary, as well as Hungarians living outside it.

It was on the basis of these concerns, as well as more classic ones, that the National Assembly adopted the following Principles in 1993: (1) defence of the country in event of total war, (2) defence in the event that conflicts in adjacent countries encroached upon Hungarian territory, (3) defence against belligerents crossing Hungarian territory in order to attack a third party, (4) defence from regional and local attacks, (5) conducting UN mandated peacekeeping operations and (6) maintenance of general deterrence.

There is a widespread conviction that Hungary cannot assume these burdens alone, and it is an open secret that NATO membership is intended to lift as many of them as possible from Hungarian shoulders. The 1998 'Principles' adopted by the National Assembly places far less emphasis on national, and a far greater emphasis

on collective defence than its 1993 predecessor. Yet well before the adoption of this document, Hungary's political and defence establishment grasped that NATO was determined to remain an alliance of 'producers' and not simply 'consumers' of security. It was to meet this expectation — as well as national requirements — that Hungary, in addition to its 500-personnel contribution to IFOR/SFOR, granted facilities on its territory for Transit Country and Host Nation support. The Operational Group (OG HHDF) established in December 1995 and subsequent (September 1997) Operations Control Centre were set up not only to coordinate Hungarian forces and observers but manage a programme encompassing the leasing of installations at Taszar (US Air Force), Kaposujlak (US Army helicopters), Kaposvar (US small arms range), Taborfalva (US heavy weapons training) and Pecs (deployment centre for IFOR/SFOR Nordic brigade). The support of Hungary's government for Operation Allied Force — in the face of considerable public concern — therefore continued a trend that was well established.

Because the trend was established, Hungary was surprised to discover in summer 1997 that NATO considered its efforts very far from adequate. In no uncertain terms, Hungary was put on notice that NATO would insist not simply upon support from its new members, but on concrete measures which would make their armies NATO capable. This insistence and the sharp exchanges which arose in connection with visits from EUCOM (US Europe Command) and OSD (Office of Secretary of Defence, US DOD) appeared to signal a belated elevation of military entry requirements into the Alliance. This perception, not to say pressure, has played a decided role in reform efforts to the present day. By the same token, the belatedness of this pressure explains why many first order questions were deferred until the present Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Forum (FIDESZ-MPP) government took office in May, 1998.

DEFENCE REFORM FROM 1989 TO 1998

Of the two broad dimensions of reform, legal and institutional, it is the latter which demands more sustained attention and unity of effort. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is the latter which has received less attention throughout the post-communist world. Despite early successes in demilitarising the political system and (possibly not so effectively) in depoliticising the armed forces, Hungary was without a coherent strategy for institutional reform until the summer of 1998. It is in the area of legislation that greatest progress has been made since 1989. Nevertheless, even now the full legislative framework is not complete.

Hungary's democratically orientated defence reforms date from the Round-Table agreements at the close of the Communist era in 1989. But it was the election of the first post-Communist government (March-April 1990) and the December 1990 package of reforms that conclusively eliminated Hungarian Socialist Workers Party influence (and the Central Committee's Political Directorate) from the armed forces and brought servicemen within full coverage of human rights legislation (thanks to which Hungarian servicemen, unlike many of their NATO counterparts have access to a civilian Civil Rights Commissioner as well as civilian courts). Assisted by the CFE 1A accords, force reductions were also accomplished (from 155,000 to 100,000 by December 1992) — and far more easily than many suspected. With the swift collapse of the command-administrative system, the militarisation of the economy (which had been the least extensive in the Warsaw Pact) was swiftly rendered moot.

Instead, the momentum of demilitarisation soon reached the danger point, with defence spending falling to 1.4 percent of GDP in 1995 and 1.2 percent in 1996.

Nevertheless, measures to subordinate the armed forces to civilian authority and neuter their political influence proved more problematic. Before 1989 the Ministry of Defence incorporated the Defence Staff, and the Minister constituted the highest ranking figure in the Hungarian People's Army. But for the fact that this Minister was a serving officer, the arrangement, at least on the surface, resembled mainstream Western practice. Apparently unmindful of this practice, the country's transitional authorities in 1989 believed that the integration of MOD and Defence Staff represented a dangerous concentration of power. They therefore separated the Army's political and administrative component (the MOD) from its operational elements (the Defence Staff, army headquarters and subordinate commands). Yet because they also mistrusted *executive* power, they proceeded to divide civilian power as well, designating the President Commander-in-Chief, with operational control over the forces and granting the Prime Minister and Cabinet authority over a vastly diminished MOD, which was now confined to unspecified administrative functions. The new arrangement, which made the Commander of the Hungarian Army ('Chief of Defence') directly accountable to the President, had three unintended effects. It placed the Defence Minister and the government itself outside the operational chain of command; it created two parallel structures, multiplying incentives for intrigue and foiling attempts at transparency;⁸ most paradoxically of all, it left the President notionally supreme but in practice (in the Defence Minister's words) 'the figurehead on the Army's body'.

Fortunately, the illogicality of the army's dual subordination swiftly became apparent when, at the height of the nationwide taxi strike of October, 1990, the President and Prime Minister issued contradictory instructions to the armed forces: a state of affairs which prompted the resignation of the Commander of the HHDF in April, 1991.⁹ On 23 September, 1991 the Constitutional Court redefined and diminished the President's authority. The Court concluded that because Hungary was a parliamentary republic, executive power resided in the Government and not the President, whose role was 'titular' rather than operational. While the President retained his right to appoint senior commanders, these appointments would not take effect unless they were countersigned by the executive. The Court also found in favour of the supremacy of the Defence Minister over the Commander.

These prerogatives were further refined by the National Defence Act of 1993, which granted the President the right to ask the Government for information concerning any aspect of military policy, structure and operations. On the other hand, the 1994 defence reforms removed the President's appointment initiative, limiting him to approving appointments proposed by the Minister of Defence.

When a coalition of left-wing parties came to power in May, 1994, two fundamental controversies were still unresolved. The first concerned the President's remaining prerogative to declare a state of war, exigency or emergency. According to a constitutional amendment of 1989, the President could only exercise this authority when the National Assembly was not in session. Even in this extreme case, employment of the armed forces would have to be sanctioned by the National Defence Council: a body largely subservient to the President in 1989, but subsequently widened in composition to include the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Commander of the HHDF, Speaker of the National Assembly and the heads of all parties represented in the legislature. Recognising that the arrangement could prove unworkable in practice, the new government eventually secured an additional

constitutional amendment, Article 19E, authorising the Government 'in accordance with the defence plan approved by the President' to order the employment of the armed forces when the National Assembly was not in session, subject to its review and endorsement within thirty days.

The second controversy, the separation of the MOD from the Defence Staff, is one that the Constitutional Court deliberately left open. Whilst declaring the Minister supreme over the Commander, the Court ruled that the separation of their respective structures was not a constitutional issue. Only after the Hungarian Socialist Party-Alliance of Free Democrats coalition came to power in May 1994 was a plan tabled for the merger of the MOD and Defence Staff. Yet the plan was defeated by centre-right parties on the grounds that it was poorly prepared. Nevertheless, FIDESZ was determined to merge the two structures. Following their accession to power in May 1998 the new FIDESZ-MPP government set about drafting a revised plan. As of November 1998, this plan was 'in the advanced stages of preparation'. By May 2000, there was still no agreement as to how this merger is to be accomplished.

Despite this deadlock, the Socialists and Liberals instituted a number of defence reforms, reducing the armed forces from 100,000 to 62,000, reducing conscription from 12 to 10 months, converting the Defence Staff into a NATO-compatible structure, establishing a centralised Logistics Command for both the Army and Air Force and taking the first substantial steps to rationalise the structure of the latter service. After years of steady reductions in the defence budget, the government also committed itself to an annual increase in spending of 0.1 per cent of GDP with effect from 1997.

Despite these measures (most of them concentrated in the government's final two years), in overall terms the content of defence policy from the collapse of the Hungarian People's Republic to the Madrid summit had been *negative*: dismantling the former system of authority, demilitarising the political order and resubordinating the structures inherited. Whilst resolving several fundamental issues of subordination and control, Hungary's political authorities failed to articulate a positive agenda conducive to the creation of new and effective armed forces. Legislation did not adequately define basic principles of national security, let alone provide security and defence blueprints precise enough to guide armed forces development. FIDESZ brought an entirely new sense of purpose to this enterprise. Yet two years after their accession to power, one can still debate whether the results have been commensurate with the effort.

EVOLUTION OF THE FIDESZ GOVERNMENT REFORMS

The preceding Socialist-Liberal government of 1994-8 had made substantial efforts to strengthen civil, democratic control and establish a comprehensive framework to underpin it. Over the course of this government, the National Assembly's Defence Committee steadily expanded its prerogatives and secured progressively wider access to data and documents. By the time the government left office, the mechanism of oversight also included the Constitutional Court (established in 1990), the Parliamentary Commission for Human Rights (1995), the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman, the State Audit Office (1995), reporting to the National Assembly, and the government's analogue to the State Audit Office, the Government Supervisory Office.

On coming to power in May 1998, the Orban government rightly concluded that whilst these oversight mechanisms had done much to extend civilian, democratic control, they had done little to coordinate defence policy. Thirteen months later, at the conclusion of NATO's bombing campaign in Kosovo, the government drew an equally damaging conclusion: that their own efforts had done nothing to provide Hungary with the armed forces it required. Therefore, the efforts of FIDESZ should be considered in two stages.

Defence Reform from May 1998 to Kosovo

Victor Orban's efforts, culminating in the establishment of a National Security Cabinet (NSC), reflected two concerns: the need for the armed forces and Ministry of Defence to be integrated into a wider national security system and the absence of higher level coordination for national security and defence.

Even before establishing the NSC, the Prime Minister set up several other mechanisms designed not only to strengthen his own authority but ensure that higher-level coordination worked its way through the relevant government bureaucracies. Between August 1998 and August 1999, two separate staffs of defence specialists were attached to the government. The smaller of these formed part of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Secretariat of the Cabinet, headed by Zoltán Rockenbauer, one of five State Secretaries subordinate to the Prime Minister. This entire secretariat numbered 16 people, including the four-person defence section headed by Réka Szemerényi. The more substantial body was the 30-strong defence staff in the Office of the Prime Minister, headed by Dr. Bela Gyuricza, a retired 2-star general, serving with the rank of State Secretary and National Security Adviser. Apart from his own staff, Gyuricza directed the work of three secretariats: Security and Defence Strategy (headed by Péter Siklósi), Defence Coordination and National Security (General Nemeth) and National Security Information Analysis (Mr. Lohn). To Gyuricza fell the principal task of providing high level direction, integration and oversight of defence policy. Not surprisingly, his prerogatives touched off a power struggle within the government.

Apart from Dr. Gyuricza, a second high ranking official, the Administrative State Secretary of the MOD, Tamás Wachslar, became the direct channel of Prime Ministerial authority in the Ministry of Defence. His position and his extremely vigorous performance realised Orban's intentions, strengthening the linkage between the Prime Minister, MOD and National Assembly (thus reinforcing the standing of the PM's Parliamentary State Secretary). But in this first period, the primary driving force within the Ministry of Defence itself — and the second mechanism of coordination at working level — was the International branch of the MOD, headed by Dr. István Gyarmati, who served with the rank of Ambassador. Subordinated to Gyarmati were four departments: Defence Planning and Policy (headed by Zoltán Martinusz), Euro-Atlantic (Dr. Dezsö Kiss), NATO (Ms. Zsuzsa Vasóczki), and Bilateral (Brigadier Saras).

This system's merit lay in the fact that through Gyuricza's office, a mechanism had been established which provided transparency, coordination and the timely exchange of ideas and information across most of the security community. At working level, three interdepartmental working teams were set up: (1) Siklósi (head of Gyuricza's secretariat for Security and Defence Policy) + Martinusz (MOD) + Iklodi (MFA), (2) Siklósi + Gyarmati (MOD and Martinusz's superior) + Joo Rudolf (Under Secretary for Security Policy, MFA and Iklodi's superior), (3) Lohn + the heads of the five intelligence and security services.¹⁰ These teams in turn provided the nucleus

for broader consultations extending to the National Assembly, the Institute of Strategic and Defence Studies and the growing network of NGOs.

Backed by this strong and focused structure, the Orban government turned its attention to three key areas of activity. The first of these was law and regulation. At the time the government came to power, there was virtually no normative base for force planning and development. With NATO accession imminent, the need to knit together the first principles of defence policy with middle range and more detailed frameworks became critical. At the top of this normative hierarchy, the government drafted a document on Basic Principles of Security Policy, intended to provide an overarching legal framework for the next 10-15 years. This legally binding document secured parliamentary approval with wide cross-party support on 29 December 1998. The second block of issues was to have been addressed by a document on National Security Strategy, a far more detailed executive framework document not requiring parliamentary approval. Completed in draft form in May 1999, it was overtaken by – and in large part incorporated into – the subsequent Strategic Defence Review. The third block of issues was to have been addressed by a still more detailed executive framework document on National Military Strategy, originally scheduled for completion by autumn 1999. The substance of this document swiftly became a bone of contention between the MOD (which originally had custody over it) and the Defence Staff (which acquired custody over it) and hence became hostage to the interminably vexing question of the merger of these two bodies.

But all told, the government realised the better part of its legislative and regulatory programme. By the time of NATO accession, the National Assembly had not only approved the Basic Principles, but the government's first 'NATO legal package': the Washington Treaty and other basic NATO documents, status of forces agreements (SOFA), as well as amendments to laws on defence, military service and national security.

In equally important spheres, success eluded the government. The first of these – the perennial 'sexual question' according to Bela Gyuricza – was the merger of the MOD and Defence Staff. During this first stage, and indeed since, every formula for accomplishing this objective – long accepted in principle by both institutional parties – has stumbled at the same hurdle: subordination of the Chief of the Defence Staff. Although a consensus already existed to abolish the post of Chief of Defence (a post held by the Chief of the Defence Staff since 1997), and the principle of 'shared authority' between CDS and Minister was accepted in 1998, two key issues have remained a subject of bitter dispute. Half by design, half by default, the system established since 1989 had created a strong Chief of Defence and a weak Minister – who, as noted above, originally found himself effectively outside the chain of command. General Ferenc Vegh, an able and energetic CDS by any standard, recognised the untenability of these arrangements and, despite the reservations of many of his deputies, conceded the logic of his subordination to the Minister of Defence. The obstacle lay in the fact that under the system put in place by FIDESZ, the Minister's deputies and department heads answered to him through the Administrative State Secretary. To the State Secretary, Tamás Wachsler, the incorporation of the CDS into this system – and within his own purview – was fundamental to effective civilian control. To General Vegh, it was an operationally nonsensical solution devised to gratify the ambitions of a particular State Secretary. The second, related issue was the subordination of the Defence Staff. Although the Minister accepted that the CDS should retain operational authority over the armed forces, he also insisted that he should lose his staff, which would henceforth report

to the State Secretary. From the operational point of view, this was doubly nonsensical, and General Vegh resigned in spring 1999.

The final area of concern to the government, force development, proved equally problematic until the pressures of the Kosovo conflict overcame much of the bureaucratic stalemate. Indeed, what progress had been achieved before Kosovo was also the result of external pressure – NATO's deadlines and planning framework – rather than the government's own efforts. In response to NATO's deadlines, 45 Target Force Goals (TFG) were signed in June, 1998. However, they provide limited guidance on force structuring and force development.

Until the launch of the Strategic Defence Review, two variants of force development were under consideration. The first and more radical was developed by the Siklósi-Martinusz team. On the assumptions (a) that a high-level of professionalism but a small force was required to meet national and Alliance tasks (e.g. peace support) and (b) that general war would be preceded by lengthy strategic warning, this team proposed the establishment of two separate structures. The first would be a small, standing force of professionals, able to respond rapidly to limited border incursions and IFOR/SFOR type deployments. The second would be a large reserve force formed on the basis of universal 6-month conscription. This would be sufficient to provide rudimentary training for a cohort which would complete its training only when mobilised during the warning period prior to a general war. In its initial form, this variant raised numerous questions about the relationship between the peacetime and wartime command structure, the formation of an NCO corps, the professional standing component of reserve formations, the structure of arms and concepts of operations. The Defence Staff was not only mindful of these gaps but sceptical as to whether the government plan could address them. Their own plan called for a single, largely voluntary but mixed conscript/professional force. Albeit more conservative and complicated than the government's variant, the military insisted that once in place, it would prove to be a more sustainable and operationally sound structure.

At the conclusion of Operation Allied Force, Hungary volunteered a contingent of 300 men for KFOR. To the astonishment of the government and the MOD alike, it took six weeks to identify and assemble a contingent of servicemen with the requisite qualifications. This discovery was the impetus for Hungary's first systematic attempt to reconcile force structure, economic resources, Alliance commitments and national interests.

The Strategic Defence Review

By the time the SDR was launched, the government's decision-making structure had been somewhat streamlined. The death of Bela Gyuricza led to the consolidation of his staff with that of the Foreign Policy and Defence Secretariat (since January 2000 headed by its former deputy head, Réka Szemerényi). Moreover, in spring 1999 Prime Minister Orbán finally fell out with the widely respected, politically nimble but independently minded István Gyarmati. After a brief interlude, Gyarmati's former subordinate, Zóltan Martinusz, became State Secretary for International Policy at the Ministry of Defence. But the principal beneficiary of Gyarmati's departure was the Administrative State Secretary, Tamás Wachsler, who has gradually asserted his authority over defence reform. Wachsler not only proposed the SDR, but persuaded Orbán that he was ready to fight for it and lead it.

On the surface, the Review is the product of a balanced civil-military effort: a SDR Steering Group of senior civilians and military officers, headed by Wachsler, and a MOD Defence Reform Working Group, led by the CGS. But in practice the former body established the main principles and directions of the SDR (approved by the National Security Cabinet on 29 October 1999) and the latter was confined to the task of preparing an Implementation Plan (approved 16 March 2000). Moreover, through his deputy, Karas (Deputy State Secretary for Economic Affairs), Wachsler has effectively widened his sphere of authority within the staff of the HHDF. Although the SDR has received much media publicity and comment, the process has been criticised in the armed forces for being strictly top-down, involving few senior military participants and lacking virtually any consultation with opposition members of the Parliamentary Defence Committee.

Despite the bureaucratic blood letting which the process produced, there was broad agreement on two points from the start. First, Hungarian forces would need to meet NATO's needs and requirements. Five missions were defined by the government:

- contributing to operations on Hungarian soil alongside NATO allies;
- creating limited expeditionary military capabilities to meet Article 5 contingencies;
- integrating Hungary's air defence into NATO Integrated Air Defence;
- active participation in crisis response operations under the auspices of NATO, UN, OSCE, WEU and EU;
- creating forces able to respond to natural and industrial catastrophes.

Second, the criteria of force structuring would have to shift from functional to operational characteristics: training, deployability, readiness and sustainability. The gap between the current structure of the forces and that sought can be measured by the eight year schedule drawn up for the programme's implementation:

- *Stage 1, 'Reposture and Rebuild' (2000-3):* reducing force levels and raising welfare standards and conditions;
- *Stage 2, 'Refurbish and Train' (2002-5):* increase RRF capabilities and introduce NATO compatible training;
- *Stage 3, 'Sustain and Modernise' (2005-8):* modernise hardware and systems and professionalise the forces

Five principles are to guide the implementation of these stages:

- *Force reductions.* The number of servicemen should be reduced from 61,000 to 45,000 by the end of the first stage, 70 military units should be regrouped into 20 garrisons (and 40 deactivated), and 25-30 bases closed;
- *Increased defence budgets and defence economies.* Budgets should gradually rise to 1.61 per cent of GDP on the basis of moderately optimistic assumptions about economic growth. During the first stage, most of the budget should be allocated to welfare improvements; during the second and third stages the budget priority will shift to readiness and modernisation, respectively;
- *Modernisation and streamlining of the command-and-control system.* The post of Chief of Defence should be eliminated. The Minister will direct the

CDS (senior military commander), who in turn will command military units through the Service Staff.

- *Changes in force structure and operations.* Divisions will be restructured into brigades. Training and operations should become increasingly joint.
- *Technical and infrastructure improvements.*

Programme or Aspiration?

The SDR 'Highlights' document submitted to NATO is detailed and substantiated, containing not only a current and projected inventory of peacetime/wartime authorisations (TOE), but clear illustrations of what has been decided and what remains to be done. Work on the SDR has been accompanied by a still ongoing study of the costs of manpower, forces and facilities, as well as analysis of the military value of each component. Yet the Review's seriousness does not guarantee its successful implementation. Doubts arise because of three provisional, but acrimonious areas of concern, as well as three long-term ones.

The first provisional concern – the long-standing 'sexual question' – is the integration of MOD and HHDF. Since Gyarmati's departure, Wachsler has succeeded in achieving a large measure of integration through the back door. At least one Deputy to Laszlo Fodor, the CGS, has referred to Wachsler's Deputy State Secretary Karas as his 'real boss'. But is this an example of progress or the classic post-Communist syndrome, whereby personalities matter more than institutions and back channels count for more than the chain of command? If Wachsler or Karas are replaced by weaker figures, then the question will be thrown open again: who is answerable to whom?

The second concern – equally long-standing – is how the envisaged force is to be manned. Wachsler, supported by several civilians in Szemerényi's secretariat, has proposed a refinement of the two-tier structure originally formulated by the Siklósi-Martinusz team in 1998. Under this scheme, professionals will make up 25,000 of the 45,000 force. The balance will be recruited on the basis of 6-month conscription, down from the current nine months, but with a further twist: conscripts will have the right to buy themselves out of service after two months. This proposal might well square the circle between the numbers problem and the growing demand for the total abolition of conscription, advocated forcefully by the Alliance of Free Democrats (now in opposition). But it is also seen by the parliamentary left as socially inequitable and by the military as yet another example of Wachsler's lack of operational mindedness.

The third concern, least apparent but most serious, is the failure to elaborate mechanisms for bringing the programme to fruition. Twenty-five to thirty bases are to be closed, but *how* are they to be closed? Instead of devising and implementing plans for their deactivation, many base commanders, like Warsaw Pact commanders of the past, sit and wait for orders. These commanders, moreover, have never been part of a mobility culture and have no experience of such restructuring. Many of them have served out the bulk of their careers in one region and believe it is their right to stay there. If and when the orders come, in what spirit will they be implemented and with what results? In the former Soviet Union, base closures have not produced economies and rationalisation, but confusion, waste and environmental desecration. Is this to be Hungary's future, too?

It is concerns of this kind which point the way to more deeply embedded ones:

Weak institutions. Despite the trend to coherence under FIDESZ, the fate of Gyuricza's staff, the battle over the Administrative State Secretary's prerogatives and struggle over the subordination of Fodor's deputies illustrate the extent to which structures are still being designed around people rather than functions. Even those institutions which are integrated *pro forma* do not behave as integrated institutions in practice. Today Hungary's Ministry of Defence lacks a well developed committee system straddling the different administrative blocks. In the UK most defence policy is made by such committees – interdepartmental (and civil-military) in composition, with access to all data bearing on their area of functional competence. Thanks to this system, policy is at least as much the product of ideas from below as of decisions from the top. But in the absence of such a system, blocks can become compartments and areas of relevance to the whole can be hidden from almost everyone. It is therefore not surprising that Wachslar is concerned to establish who controls Fodor's J4 (Chief of Logistics), a branch which controls over 40 per cent of MOD finances. Neither is it surprising to find in other areas that intrigue often takes precedence over teamwork, that information is a strategically guarded commodity, that openness is treated as a threat to survival and that control over policy matters more than its substance. These practices, staple to Communist institutional culture, still survive at working level in Hungary.

A Half-Reformed Officer Corps. By any measure, Hungarian officers are becoming more accustomed to working in a NATO environment and thinking along NATO lines. Out of an officer corps numbering 7,100, 1,000 have attended courses in the West. Hungary's own officer education system was thoroughly modernised in 1996. The two officer training establishments (Zrinyi Miklos National Defence University and Bolyai Janos Military Technical Academy) have received accreditation from the Ministry of Education and also provide degrees for civilians in national security studies. Western concepts of leadership are emphasised, as well as English language training. Each academy is well supported by a Scholarship Programme and Reserve Officer Programme. Most impressively, 90 per cent of officers now possess a BA. The weaknesses of the system are threefold. By several accounts, the curriculum has become *too* academic, the result being that the officer corps is divided between those educated under the narrow and very specific military-technical curriculum of the old system – by NATO criteria *mis*-educated – and a younger contingent, largely free of these influences, but below NATO standards in military-technical proficiency. The other shortcomings are more serious. The first of these is the fact that 20 per cent of those who obtain their degree – an increasing number of them with an MA – fail to serve. Although this is a less catastrophic depletion rate than that prevalent in the former USSR, it is still unacceptably high. Hungarian law does not oblige graduates of (taxpayer funded) military academies to enter the armed forces, and a disturbingly large proportion now take advantage of this legal liberty. The third and more long-term problem lies in an institutional culture still dominated by senior officers, the greater proportion of them products of a Warsaw Pact education. To their widespread irritation, younger Western educated officers roundly complain that their postings fail to reflect their qualifications and that opportunities for advancement are stifled. According to István Gyarmati (former State Secretary of MOD), as of November 1998 there was still no approved scheme for retiring officers whose qualifications and performance were deemed unsuitable. The unsuitability is not only deeply felt, it is all too visible in a military system which still resolves around patron-client relationships, in which cronyism is prevalent and where, at best, promotion is earned by qualifications and seniority rather than by merit. Hungary has pledged to abandon this long-life career model

in favour of a NATO 'up or out' merit system, but without a 'renovation of cadres', the pledge will remain a declaration.

Absence of a proper NCO corps. The absence is most apparent in quantity – 9,000 NCOs in an army still 61,000 strong. But it is most telling in training and qualifications. Only five per cent of Hungarian NCOs speak a foreign language, only half of them have a secondary school diploma, and only one third of them have any *military* qualifications. This remains a Warsaw Pact NCO contingent in all but name. Even with Herculean effort, it is unlikely to become a NATO capable NCO corps until the three stages of defence reform are close to completion. Fortunately, the problem is recognised, and efforts are underway to remedy it. Yet the efforts thus far – establishing three NCO schools, one per service – will be too modest to transform today's 1:1 officer-to-NCO ratio to the 1:3 ratio sought within a reasonable period of time.

Deficiency of civilian expertise and meaningful civilianisation. The principals within the military educational system (most impressively, Professor Ferenc Gazdag of *Zrínyi Miklós*) have undertaken impressive initiatives to incorporate civilians into BA and MA courses largely designed for officer candidates. But as of late 1998, only 26 per cent of officials in MOD are regarded as 'qualified' civilians, and the proportion in the General Staff, 8 per cent, is considerably smaller. In many cases, the qualifications are open to question. To this day, the bulk of civilians in defence institutions are 'experts' appointed from within political parties or, at best, by them. They are politicised by definition and are threatened with demotion or disappearance not only with each change of government but every change in the balance of the governing coalition. The fragility of coalitions combined with Hungary's peculiar literalism about 'democratic control' means that parties have a 'legitimate' right not only to stake a claim to ministries, but to a given proportion of departmental posts within them. This threatens to make a nonsense of administrative as well as operational coherence. To judge from their behaviour, many political parties are quite prepared to see the pendulum swing from the closed, military monopoly of the old system to a 'democratic' MOD sensitive to every twitch in the political barometer. What is totally missing from this conception of 'democratic control' is stability, not to say the means of achieving it: a professional and professionally neutral civil service.

CONCLUSIONS

Following an unavoidable period of demilitarisation and a debilitating period of drift, a critical mass of Hungarian decision makers began to address the first principles of national defence in 1996. Their efforts in the last years of the Socialist-Liberal coalition and the first years of FIDESZ were deliberate but early steps in the pursuit of serious goals which have only recently been defined with coherence and precision. The approach to NATO membership and its immediate aftermath have had a deeper impact on the depth and tempo of these changes than many realise. Contrary to the expectations of many Atlanticist Hungarians, the military and civilian components of Hungary's defence system have discovered that membership of the Alliance is an undertaking, not a solution. At working level membership is institutionalising pressure for change rather than lessening it. This institutionalisation – present in questionnaires, demands for Target Force Goals and Target Force Programmes and joint planning sessions of SFOR, ARRC and AFSOUTH, not to say joint operations in Kosovo – is the greatest foil to the iron law

of inertia that still reigns in much of the Hungarian defence establishment. It is these pressures which have created the momentum we have described, moving first order questions to the foreground, providing challenges for the capable and exposing those who are not up to the task. Even a seasoned pessimist is bound to concede that there has been considerable progress since 1996 and that there is likely to be considerably more before the eight year programme of 'rebuilding', 'refurbishing' and 'modernisation' runs its course.

Yet the stark fact is that without changes in Hungary's political culture and a transformation of its defence and security culture, this well crafted programme will fail to meet its objectives. For all the pressures of NATO integration, and for all its comprehensiveness, NATO has only partially addressed these challenges. From the outset, Partnership for Peace and bilateral programmes 'in the spirit' of PfP have attached disproportionate importance to the integration of *armed forces* in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet the problems are much wider. As Réka Szemerkenyi observed some years ago:

there are no programmes designed for increasing the expertise of civilians in defence and military matters. As a result, the civilians are losing their comparative advantage originating from before 1990....Instead of closing up the gap between civilians and the military...the expertise gap is only deepening and consolidating.¹¹

In fact, the problems might be even wider than Dr. Szemerkenyi suggested. If the 'expertise' of civilians is important, are their attitudes not equally important? To a large degree, the attitudes of Hungary's political establishment were formed during the Communist period. Much of today's political class bears the imprints of its intellectual, dissident and anti-military past. Even the most defence minded civilians suffer from a temperamental schizophrenia, politically wedded to a programme of producing 'NATO capable forces', yet instinctually wedded to a military policy of demilitarisation. The resolution of this contradiction is an obsession with 'control', an obsession which not only takes precedence over operational considerations, but unwittingly thwarts the emergence of cooperative practices and genuine civil-military collaboration. What incentives now exist for choosing a military career in Hungary? Potentially they are vast for a country which in all but name is a front line state. Were the military establishment well led and well regarded, the challenge, responsibility and training associated with a military career would more than compensate for its disappointing material rewards. Yet officer candidates will not be attracted to a demoralised and stigmatised military establishment even if its budget is trebled. Today, unsympathetic civilians are as responsible for this demoralisation as the still conservative, unreformed and top heavy military establishment.

Will NATO's preoccupation with 'civilian, democratic control' assist or hinder Hungary's emergence from this state of affairs? Many of the West's more influential experts in civil-military relations share the moral commitments of Hungary's political establishment, commitments which have arisen in response to analogous evils: militarism, Fascism and National Socialism. To be sure, the residues of Hungary's totalitarian past are not only pervasive, but subtle, and many Hungarian democrats - as habituated to 'bureaucratic struggle' as any Communist insider - are not free of them. Yet of equal import is the revolutionary immaturity of Hungarian democracy. In one respect at least the consequence of revolutionary immaturity - Communist or democratic - is the same: ideology trumps professionalism and thwarts the emergence of the mature administrative culture

which Max Weber termed 'legal-rational'. The challenge for Hungary as for other post-Communist countries of Central Europe is to create a national security system which is embedded in the liberal democratic order, which serves this order and *which is stable and effective*. This demands a set of balances and restraints – not to say a level of trust and consensus – which is not yet present. Hungary no longer suffers from an absence of civilian, democratic control. It suffers from an excess of politicisation and political interference in what should be a politically neutral and national endeavour. If Hungary aims to implement its defence programme by 2008, it will need to grasp this challenge well before then.

A MODEL FOR OTHERS OR MERELY LESSONS?

A detailed examination of defence reform in Hungary and other recent NATO member states is less likely to leave Ukrainians with a sense of familiarity than a sense of disorientation. To a greater degree than most appreciate, the political cultures of these states have been – and certainly have become – very different from Ukrainian political culture. In some respects, it would be right to say that these differences represent advances and deserve emulation. By comparison to the NATO standards it must meet, Hungary's relatively compartmented structures of decision making are insufficiently transparent, but by Ukrainian standards, they are a world apart. The mechanisms put in place by FIDESZ and developed by Gyuricza, Gyarmati, Vegh and Wachslar are the very things which have enabled Hungary to conduct an in-depth defence review and, within specified margins of uncertainty, calculate real costs and identify real choices. Ukraine's security system lacks such transparency. Its MOD Armed Forces and its emergency services are less opaque than its other security structures – Border Guards, Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and Security Services (SBU) – but that does not make them transparent. For all the progress it has made, Ukraine largely lacks the mechanisms which enable Hungary to 'control' its defence and security system, and as a result Ukraine's decision makers are handicapped in understanding what can and cannot be achieved with the resources available. Its State Programme on Defence Reform and Development, approved in May 2000, is in many respects an impressive document, but it is essentially a statement of objectives and aspirations, not the in-depth audit and review which the army and the country require.

Yet to view all of Hungary's differences solely as 'advances' is to misunderstand the difference between democratisation and defence reform. By Ukraine's standards, Hungary's civil society is confident and developed. This, to be sure, is an advance. But in its semi-mature state, this civil society is also a burden, and several of its manifestations in the defence sphere – politicisation, fractiousness and interference – are brakes on the enterprise of constructing a rational security system, not advantages.

In looking at the drawbacks as well as the benefits of what Hungary has achieved, will Ukrainians be tempted to say that they would be better off reforming now and democratising later? This would be an appealing conclusion to the key players in a what is still a largely Presidential, oligarchical, limited and illiberal democracy. Ukraine's National Security Concept of January 1997 – an exemplary document by any standard – was ratified by Parliament, but it is the product of first-class thinking by experts in Ukraine's National Security Council, rather than nation-wide discussion. Would greater Presidential backing, for these experts (and analogous staffs in the MOD and General Staff) not do more for defence reform than more

public participation and debate? This case could be put convincingly, but it is a perilous case. The National Security Concept is an exemplary document for several reasons. One of them is recognition that in order for Ukraine to develop a division of labour between MOD Armed Forces and other security formations, relations between these formations (and the political bodies controlling them) must be based upon transparency, trust and adherence to a common scheme of loyalties and values. A second and consequential reason is the fact that the Concept defines the 'strengthening of civil society' as the country's highest national security priority. Despite Hungary's checkered record of defence reform, Hungarians no longer need ask themselves what state, what political order, what people and what values its security services and armed forces protect. Can Ukrainians give an equally confident answer to these questions? If not, the need for democratisation should be self-evident.

ENDNOTES

¹ As noted by Lt Col László Kelemen, Senior Legal Advisor to the Hungarian MOD, '[b]efore 1989, only professional soldiers were eligible to work in defence administration. Anyone who wanted to work for the MOD had to join the military as a professional soldier.' 'Civil Control over the Military — The Hungarian Experience', in Conference on Civil-Military relations in the Context of an Evolving NATO, 15-17 September, 1997, published by MOD and MFA Hungary).

² The exchange of accession documents preceded by over a month NATO's formal welcoming of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into the Alliance at its 23 April 1999 Washington summit.

³ As summarised by Brigadier General Zoltan Szenes, former Hungarian Military Representative to NATO, currently Assistant Chief of Staff RHQ AFSOUTH, Naples.

⁴ This, of course, was not true under Stalin. Moreover, the Khrushchev era was characterised by numerous – and in the eyes of the military, capricious and damaging – interventions into military-technical policy. This 'amateurism' and these inconsistencies and 'hare brained schemes' were a major reason that Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964. His successors placed a high premium on continuity, 'professionalism' and 'stability of cadres' – not only in the military sphere but in others where Khrushchev had upset established bureaucratic interests.

⁵ Only those of the Czech Republic could be described as enviable. Poland faces at least two abnormal neighbours, Kaliningrad Oblast (part of the Russian Federation) and Belarus, and a still fragile neighbour, Lithuania: a country which has not yet acquired the means to restrict the operations of Russian organised crime on its territory or across it.

⁶ The Constitution, as amended in May 1995 proclaims: 'The Republic of Hungary bears a sense of responsibility for what happens to Hungarians living outside of its borders and promotes the fostering of their relations with Hungary'.

⁷ 'Resolution 94/1998 (XII. 29.) OGY of the National Assembly on the Principles of the Security and Defence Policy of the Republic of Hungary'. More than once, the resolution notes that 'Hungarian foreign policy focuses on its neighbourhood...and the welfare of the Hungarian communities living abroad'.

⁸ In the words of Lt. Col. Kelemen, 'When in 1993 I visited NATO headquarters, a procurement officer told us about his visit to Budapest. He said that during his stay...he was unable to figure out who was responsible for a certain area. In the MOD he was told to go to the HDF Command, and in the Command he was told to go to the MOD' (Kelemen, op.cit., note 55, pg. 159).

⁹ General Kalman Lorincz's resignation was rejected by the President, Prime Minister and Defence Minister.

¹⁰ These are the Military Intelligence Office, Military Security Office [military counterintelligence], Information office [analogous to MI6], National Security Office [analogous to MI5] and National Security service [analogous to GCHQ and NSA]. The establishment of a separate military counterintelligence office was an example of post-Communist change. Like other Soviet and Warsaw Pact military establishments, the

Hungarian People's Army had no right to conduct its own counterintelligence, military CI being the responsibility of 'special departments' subordinate to the state security service.

¹¹ Réka Szemerényi, 'Western Policies and Civilian Control of the Military in Central Europe', in MOD and MFA Hungary, op. cit., pp 52 and 54.

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