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**The Prospects
for Civil War
in Montenegro**

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THE PROSPECTS FOR CIVIL WAR IN MONTENEGRO

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A NEW TIME OF CRISIS FOR MONTENEGRO

Milo Djukanovic's election in December 1997 resulted in Montenegro following an increasingly divergent path from Serbia in economic, social, security and foreign policies and demanding a redefinition of the constitutional relationship between the two members of the federation. As Podgorica has gone its own way, ignoring the instructions of a federal government whose legality it does not recognize, so Belgrade has been increasing political, economic and psychological pressure to bring Montenegro to heel. FRY President Slobodan Milosevic has now made a further move which may bring this slow-growing crisis to a head.

Milosevic's constitutional term of office as president of the FRY was due to expire in July 2001. As expected, for he is a man obsessed with holding power for its own sake, he has changed the rules. The largely tame federal parliament has rubber-stamped his proposals to introduce direct election of the federal president and parliament by all Yugoslav citizens and to allow him up to two further four-year periods of office. This amounts to a constitutional coup, not least because it ignores the rights of Montenegro under the 1992 FRY constitution. The government in Podgorica was not consulted on the changes, which legally require sanction through a Montenegrin referendum. If implemented, they will transform the federation into a unitary state in which Montenegro will become, in effect, merely a region of Serbia – the very antithesis of the change in the relationship proposed in the Montenegrin "platform" put to Belgrade in August last year. The Djukanovic government is thus faced with either accepting Montenegro's loss of status and rights (and its own demise) or defiance and, probably as an inevitable corollary, the organization of a referendum on leaving the FRY and becoming fully independent.

FRY presidential and parliamentary elections have been scheduled for 24th September 2000. Western powers (especially the US State Department) have been urging Montenegrin participation in the elections in the hope that this could swing them against Milosevic. In contradiction to this policy, however, the leaders who met in Okinawa recently for the G-8 summit unanimously agreed not to recognize the result of elections based on revisions to the FRY constitution which were not approved by Montenegro. The ruling coalition in Montenegro has refused to accept the legality of the constitutional changes and consequently the validity of the elections. Its policy will be to ignore them as if they do not exist, while not placing obstacles in the way of those who wish to exercise their vote. Javier Solana, speaking for the EU, has endorsed this approach.

In the West, the Montenegro problem is often perceived in simplistic terms. Patriotic Montenegrins, a clear majority, wish to break away from a false federation in which there is no equality and to create an independent state of multi-ethnic/confessional and reform-oriented character which is in favour of Euro-Atlantic integration. They are opposed by an evil, Serbian nationalist dictatorship which is using the Yugoslav Army (VJ) and unrepresentative local stooges to bully the country into remaining under the thumb of President Milosevic. The truth is not quite so simple. If western governments behave as if it were, they will run a grave risk of adopting mistaken policies.

This paper will attempt to explain the current situation in the FRY, how and why it represents an increased threat of conflict in Montenegro and some of the implications for NATO. While every effort has been made to be succinct, the complexities of the problem inevitably require some detailed explanation and argument.

POLITICAL DIVISIONS IN MONTENEGRO

According to the 1991 census, Montenegro's population was 615,035, of which 61.9% declared themselves Montenegrins, 14.6% Muslims, 9.3% Serbs, 6.6% Albanians and 7.6% other (mainly "Yugoslavs" but including about 20,000 Croats). When the question of Montenegrin independence was floated at the London Conference on Former Yugoslavia in 1992, it became apparent that the population was not, as in other republics, divided on the issue along ethnic lines. In the referendum on independence held in that year, 66% of those that voted favoured staying within a truncated federation with Serbia. Since then, however, Milosevic has inflicted numerous disasters on the FRY, culminating in the NATO attack in 1999 (disasters which led to an influx of 120,000 refugees into Montenegro, of whom about 60,000 still remain). As a result, the strength of the pro-independence faction has undoubtedly grown; many others would support remaining in the federation only if full equality within it was to be guaranteed by Belgrade's acceptance of the Montenegrin "platform" of August 1999 for a redefinition of the relationship. However, as President Djukanovic admitted on Croatian TV (16th June 2000): "There is still a very pronounced rift in Montenegro. It is apparent that we have a pro-Europe majority, but we also have a respectable, traditional, pro-Milosevic minority" - a point underlined by the opposition Yugoslavia Coalition's showing in the June 2000 local elections; it won in Herceg Novi, with 49.8% of the vote to the Djukanovic coalition's 38.7% and polled a respectable 40% in the capital to the victor's 50%.

It is impossible to determine, from extravagant claims and counter-claims and unreliable polls, just where the political balance of opinion lies. Probably about one third of the population, the Serbs and Montenegrins (mainly the northern clans) who identify closely with Serbia, are still totally committed to integration; there have already been meetings of clan councils to pledge themselves to the cause of Yugoslav unity. Perhaps as much as 60% would favour a redefinition of relations or independence, or would so opt if push

comes to shove. It is possible that the passage of time, with growing Montenegrin self-confidence and prosperity (subsidised by western aid) contrasting with continued Serbian economic decline and political degeneration, would win a decisive majority for independence. This was certainly Djukanovic's hope, voiced in his interview for "Danas" (7 July 2000). "We are not in a hurry to make a final decision because of our internal divisions. We also believe that...time that will go by will be our ally. A growing number of people in Montenegro understand the essence of the democratic, reform-oriented, and European option offered by the current Montenegrin leadership, and there are less and less impassioned, pro-Milosevic people. That is why we will not pursue a policy of rash moves...but will carefully follow developments in the international and domestic – Montenegrin and Yugoslav – political stages."

But time is not on Djukanovic's side. The federal elections scheduled for September may precipitate a crisis. Even if they do not, and the governing coalition tries to prolong its ambiguous position *vis-à-vis* a hostile Belgrade, fresh Montenegrin elections are due next year. The extreme nationalists are growing in strength and confidence and they may force the issue of a referendum on independence. There are signs that Djukanovic's grip on his coalition is weakening. Moreover, it is far from clear that their old-fashioned socialist nostrums will result in the federalist opposition losing ground. Economic reform is antagonizing many Montenegrin voters. Privatization is seen as enriching the corrupt, even criminal, elite of Djukanovic's circle at the expense of workers' rights and employment prospects. Inflation is hurting many. While the collapse of the tourist trade and many other economic difficulties are a direct result of Belgrade's actions, the opposition may be able to sell the message that a change of government and an end to the rift with Serbia will lead to improved conditions.

In other words, the opposition in Montenegro is not to be seen merely as a backward-looking, unpatriotic force in politics. For a significant minority, it proposes the right answers to the republic's problems. That minority would be larger, perhaps even becoming a majority, if it were able to shake off the impression held by many that it is working more in the interests of Milosevic than of Montenegro. Society is split along ideological lines, on issues of both national identity and economic policy.

DEVELOPMENTS THAT COULD PRECIPITATE CIVIL WAR

Provocation from Belgrade

Milosevic has demonstrated that he is not concerned with the loss of territory, even Serb inhabited, *per se*. He has acquiesced in the loss of not only Slovenia and Macedonia but also of Slavonia, Krajina, Bosnia and (*de facto*) Kosovo. He would probably accept the defection of Montenegro too, even if it did mean loss of access to the sea, if it would serve his political end. His sole concern is retention of personal political power in Serbia – a

determination reinforced by his international indictment as a war criminal. If letting an uncooperative Montenegro leave the FRY would reduce the dangers he faces in the heartland, he would face the prospect with equanimity. If its defection would threaten his domestic situation, or if his political position was dangerously weakening and he decided that he could survive only by once again playing the Serb nationalist card to rally support, he would have no compunction about trying to overthrow Djukanovic. If that meant civil war in Montenegro, so be it. In this context, it is worth noting that Montenegro is the only distraction left to him in his internal political power games. Croatia is relatively strong and on its way to international respectability. He can continue efforts to destabilize Kosovo, but NATO presence there will prevent him from accomplishing much. Likewise, NATO presence in Macedonia and Bosnia limits his room for manoeuvre in these areas.

The critical questions, therefore, are:

- Whether or not, in his view, an attempted coup in Montenegro, or a move to annex the Serbian/federalist, northern areas of it, would help Milosevic to win the September federal presidential and parliamentary (and Serbian local) elections;
- Or could it provide him with an excuse to ignore or annul an unfavourable result;
- And if Milosevic does win and the Montenegrin government decides to hold a referendum on independence, would an attempt to pre-empt the vote be likely to weaken or strengthen his position in Serbia.

When he called the elections, the answer to the first question seemed clear. He would be able to win at least the federal elections without resort to more than the usual ballot rigging and without having to embark on a Montenegrin adventure with its attendant risk of further NATO intervention. His regime had recovered quickly from defeat by NATO and the loss of Kosovo (still, of course, unacknowledged as permanent). The independent media, although it continues to exist, has been effectively muzzled. The security apparatus is loyal and pervasive and the judiciary controlled. The army's leadership can be relied on (though doubts must exist about some in the middle ranks and below in the event of civil disturbance requiring use of the military). Intimidation, blackmail and vilification as corrupt US/NATO stooges have inflicted damage on most opposition politicians. The opposition is, as usual, divided. While a disparate group of parties have joined together as the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) to support Vojislav Kostunica for president, the largest party, the Serbian Renewal Movement, has put up its own candidate (albeit not its charismatic leader, Vuk Draskovic), thus splitting the anti-Milosevic vote. The Radicals have also fielded a candidate who is more likely to take votes from the opposition than from Milosevic. And while federalist Montenegrins are likely to turn out for Milosevic, separatists will probably follow the Djukanovic line and boycott the polls. Moreover, the regime will be able to massage the results (especially, as in previous elections, by manipulating the Kosovar vote).

With so much going for him, Milosevic had every reason to believe, when he fixed the elections for September (ie, before looming food, fuel and economic crises burst over Serbia), that he would win a new term of office in the first round. Yet polls, dubious as they are, must be giving him some concern. They have consistently been showing an increasing Kostunica lead: Beta's, published on 10th September suggests that, in the first round, Kostunica would get 45.1%, Milosevic 38.3%, the Radical Nikolic 10% and Renewal's Mihailovic 6.6%; in the second round, Kostunica could expect 56.6% and Milosevic 43.4%. Perhaps Milosevic has underestimated the vulnerability of his regime, the agenda of which no longer reflects that of ordinary people, especially the young and educated who would like to break free of what could be called the Balkan psychology. Polls have been showing 70% or more of the population want change and 60% want better relations with the West. Though there has hitherto been no consensus on its parameters or who should bring it about, factors on which Milosevic has been counting, perhaps the voters are prepared to try Kostunica; after all, he has a reputation for honesty, consistency and patriotism that other politicians lack. Perhaps people are tired of continual economic decline and the daily struggle for survival rather than being simply acclimatised to it. The political mood may be analogous to that which brought down the ruling regimes in Bulgaria (1996), Slovakia (1998) and Croatia (1999). This is not to suggest that Milosevic is certain to lose – far from it. But if he really is getting worried (and he is a paranoid), to the extent that he fears defeat is more than likely, he has three obvious options.

First Option He can capitalize on the (controlled) media's criminalization of the opposition and accusations that they are the agents of hostile powers determined to break up or subjugate Serbia. and ban the more threatening opposition parties. This would convert a concealed, elective dictatorship into an open one – a move fraught with danger. The opposition controls many major cities. The introduction of martial law that would probably be required to cope with the backlash would mean confrontation with local government and a probably united, well-organized opposition capable of bringing tens of thousands onto the streets. The police might not be able to cope and the army's middle/junior leadership and rank and file might refuse to disperse the crowds – the "Romanian solution" (in reference to the overthrow of Ceausescu) talked about by opposition politicians last year. Indeed, there may be enough "young Turks" in the army who would be prepared to join a revolution, overthrow Milosevic, establish military rule and become kingmakers. The ruling political/criminal elite might desert him in an effort to save themselves and their privileges. The west might well support a revolutionary backlash – Milosevic would expect it to do so.

Second option Milosevic can try to ride out the electoral storm, relying for victory on intensification of the pressures and constraints which already bear on the opposition and resorting to even greater, and therefore more obvious, manipulation of the elections. That may work, but it could lead to a backlash greater than that after the 1996 municipal elections, great enough, in fact, to threaten his regime's survival. If it does not work, almost his only

remaining recourse would be to refuse to recognize the result. Such a course poses even greater dangers than the first one.

Third Option If he decides that it is simply too risky to proceed with the elections, or if he lets them go ahead, right through to the second round, and loses, Montenegro could provide Milosevic with the excuse he needs to declare a state of emergency without giving rise to potentially unmanageable popular discontent. Action to crush the Djukanovic regime in the cause of preserving Yugoslav unity would rally many Serb nationalists to his side: after all, if Montenegro is allowed to leave the federation, where is the line to be drawn – at Vojvodina? at the Sandzak? If it were to be opposed by opposition politicians, Milosevic would be able, once again, to condemn them as unpatriotic, paid servants of the USA and NATO who are doing their masters' bidding in driving forward the destruction of Yugoslavia and Serbia. This time-honoured gambit of playing the nationalist card to get him out of a domestic political hole has succeeded in the past. Milosevic may well believe it could do so again. However, precipitating a showdown with the Montenegrin government would not be without risks. Firstly, the Serbian people might finally have tired of conflict and refuse to be distracted from domestic issues. Secondly, and perhaps more likely, NATO might intervene, this time with perhaps unmanageable political consequences.

All of these options are potentially high-risk. It is possible that exploding Montenegro will appear to Milosevic, sooner or later, to be the least bad. In particular, several factors may convince him that the danger of NATO intervention is acceptably low. He may calculate that:

- No power, not even (*pace* his own propaganda) the USA, is enthusiastic about a breakaway Montenegro, hence the so far limited and ambiguous support for Djukanovic;
- The US administration, which is already encountering problems in Congress over its Balkan policy, will be paralysed throughout the autumn by the presidential election campaign;
- Without American leadership, or even with it, given a growing disillusionment with the results of the Kosovo war, European pro-interventionists will be unable to create a consensus for action;
- Without intervention on the ground, for which there will be little appetite given the nature of the terrain and fighting and the problems already besetting the alliance in Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO will be unable to accomplish much in Montenegro – and another air campaign against Serbia might be seen as politically impossible or counter-productive.
- In any case, a Montenegrin adventure will be less dangerous than a year ago, when opening a second front would have been positively foolhardy.

Developments Within Montenegro

It has become customary to think of conflict within former-Yugoslavia as something that is fomented by Milosevic. While this has been largely true in the past, it need not always be so.

As pointed out earlier, Montenegrin nationalists are gaining in strength and confidence. Djukanovic is having increasing difficulty in keeping his ruling coalition united behind his policy of gradualism (or fence-sitting). He may have his hand forced, or be supplanted, by those who desire an immediate referendum on independence. Drawing a possibly false parallel with Kosovo, such nationalists may believe that, when the chips are down, NATO will underwrite such a move and its results (even to the extent of coercing a recalcitrant north for fear that accepting partition would set an unwelcome precedent). Were Montenegro to force the issue rather than Belgrade, Milosevic's position in responding to "provocation" would be much strengthened, both domestically and internationally.

There is currently a tense stand-off within Montenegro between the federal authorities, especially the VJ and the paramilitary 7th Military Police Battalion, and the Montenegrin, including the largely militarized police. It is entirely possible that one of the regular confrontations will get out of hand, with blood being spilled. This could lead to a consequent escalation of tensions, forcing both sides into corners from which civil war results despite the wishes of either side; giving way may simply be seen as a greater evil than conflict.

SCENARIOS FOR CONFLICT

Possible Triggers for Conflict

The uneasy *status quo* may continue over the election period, though it would be unwise to count on it. It is unlikely to persist over a longer stretch as the internal situation in Montenegro and in Yugoslavia is unstable. Trigger points for the destabilization of Montenegro could be any of the following, alone or in combination:

- President Djukanovic announces a referendum on independence;
- The FRY government announces that it will suspend the Montenegrin parliament for unconstitutional activity (eg, trying to sabotage federal elections, denying Montenegrins a democratic choice, or persistent refusal to accept and implement federal laws);
- Local outbreaks of violence in response to disputes over the control of military and other facilities, especially airports, leading to military activity by the VJ and possible mobilization to protect federal installations;
- Montenegrin closure of the border with Serbia;
- Montenegrin government mobilization of local defence/police forces under its control, possibly accompanied by a declaration by the Podgorica parliament of a referendum or even independence, or following a border incident or a dispute over the control of customs/transit of goods/attempt to lift the FRY blockade by force;
- A change of leadership in Montenegro, or in the FRY, after which Montenegro initiates moves towards independence;

- Increasing levels of political ("terrorist") violence in the FRY, blamed on violent Montenegrin nationalists and leading to the declaration of a FRY-wide state of emergency;
- Milosevic-controlled paramilitaries enter Montenegro and are opposed by the local population;
- The north-south split in Montenegro revealed in the June local elections creates a *de facto* internal border in the republic.

Scenarios for the Development of Conflict

There is no realistic prospect of a pro-Milosevic coup ousting the Djukanovic government. The essential element of surprise action by forces at the heart of the regime is absent. Unlike Croatia and Bosnia when the break up of the old Yugoslavia started, the Montenegrin government is alert and well-prepared. It fields an increasingly well-armed, well-trained and largely reliable, mostly paramilitary, police force reputed to number up to 20,000 (making one Montenegrin in 30 a policeman!). The VJ's 2nd Army, stationed in Montenegro, is probably of similar strength and has almost a monopoly of heavy equipment. Its commander, Col Gen Obradovic is a Milosevic placeman and the majority of officers and soldiers are Serbs. However, not all of the 20% or so Montenegrins could be relied on and even many of the Serbs probably have little stomach for an internecine fight. Any attempt to seize power in Podgorica using the VJ, spearheaded by the Serb/federalist manned 7th Military Police Battalion, would inevitably be the precursor to civil war. The following scenarios suggest ways in which conflict could develop. They could develop consecutively as a result of escalation or simultaneously.

First scenario Belgrade attempts to pre-empt by military force moves towards greater Montenegrin autonomy or independence. Each side mobilizes its assets in Montenegro, with Serbian nationalist militias moving in to reinforce the VJ. There is a short, sharp conflict, probably starting before the completion of mobilization, over control of federal strategic facilities such as Podgorica airport or the port of Bar. Fighting would be intense and largely conventional, limited to key political, administrative and transportation choke points and lasting a week or two. Whoever won this phase, it would, however, be unlikely to be decisive. There would likely be a slide into one of the other scenarios as the population would be both inflamed and polarized, with those hitherto reluctant to become involved being forced to choose sides.

Second scenario Most likely, this would evolve from the first scenario. It could, though, as postulated above, develop from the current, highly visible stand-off between the VJ and the Montenegrin police which leads to armed clashes and/or a series of escalating political moves and counter-moves. In either case, a high intensity civil war develops. This would cover most or all of the country and involve most of the population in a struggle over the issue of independence; the more bitter and prolonged the struggle, the less possibility there will be of a compromise on greater autonomy for Montenegro

within a FRY framework. The main contenders are likely to be rival militias/paramilitaries. Fighting would become increasingly brutal and civilians would be deliberately targeted by both sides, resulting in large displacements of population. As Montenegro is mainly mountainous, especially in the north, with few arterial roads connecting different regions, there is likely to be an intense struggle to seize and hold the mainly narrow passes. The northern region is mainly Serb and federalist inhabited, but the bulk of the Muslim population lives in the Sandzak (which straddles the border with Serbia) and there is a large Albanian enclave in the municipality of Plav on the border with Kosovo. These topographical and demographic facts would strongly influence the location and nature of the fighting, the flow of displaced persons and humanitarian aid efforts.

Third scenario This is probably the most likely, possibly resulting from the failure of either side to win a quick victory in either of the other two. It could well stem from the refusal of the Serb/federalist north, supported by the VJ, to accept secessionist moves by the Podgorica government. In this case the conflict could possibly be confined to the mountainous regions of the north, though there could be no guarantee that it would not engulf the whole. The conflict would resemble that in Bosnia. Communities would be forced to choose between allegiances and pockets of fighting would develop between neighbours divided along political, ethnic and clan/family lines. Some villages would be razed and others subjected to prolonged sieges. There would be no well-defined front line; rather a series of disconnected battlefields with gaps between them. Much military effort would be directed less against the enemy's forces than against civilians with the aim of terrorising them into submission or flight. Population movements would largely comprise efforts by the old, women and children to flee, with the men staying put to fight. To complicate matters still further, banditry, blood - feuds (both traditional in the region) and squabbles over booty would be an added source of fighting.

THE LIKELIHOOD OF INVOLVEMENT BY NEIGHBOURS

None of Montenegro's neighbours has any love for the Milosevic regime. The only one likely to support it (reluctantly) would be the Bosnian Serb Republic; it needs the FRY to underwrite its existence and balance its enemies. While it is unlikely that any of the neighbours would wish to become officially and directly involved in a civil war, indirect involvement is more than likely. Groups and factions in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian Serb Republic, Kosovo and Albania (and the Serbian part of the Sandzak) have ethnic, confessional and business ties with one side or the other. There is also strong anti-Milosevic sentiment in each of these areas. The region as a whole is awash with arms and the combatants would have no difficulty in getting at least light and crew-served weapons. Many volunteers, some pressed, mostly genuine, could also be expected to swell the ranks of the fighters. The possibility of conflict spreading beyond the

confines of Montenegro, whatever the wishes of governments, cannot be dismissed.

However, at least there is no real danger of any of the neighbours taking advantage of conflict to press territorial claims against either belligerent. Since the change of regimes in both Zagreb and Podgorica, Croatian-Montenegrin relations have become increasingly cordial. This, combined with Croatian aspirations towards international respectability and the presence of UNMOP, makes it unlikely that Croatia would seize the opportunity to solve by force the question of the Prevlaka Peninsula (an issue which can, in any case, be resolved peacefully with Montenegro). Disunity and the NATO presence there will prevent the Muslim-Croat Federation from interfering in the Sandzak or the Bosnian Serb Republic. Similarly, NATO will be able to stifle any possibility of a major KLA attempt to seize Kosovo *irredenta* in southern Serbia.

IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO

Standing aloof from a conflict in Montenegro is probably not an option for NATO.

- When Montenegro adopted an anti-Milosevic stand during the Kosovo war (despite being subjected to NATO bombing), the alliance clearly promised to protect the republic from the consequences; any attempt by Milosevic to use force against the Podgorica regime would be met with counter-force. Since the war, several alliance members have encouraged Montenegrin continued, nay increased, defiance of Belgrade. NATO has thus incurred a moral obligation to Montenegro in the event of any intervention by Serbia. Were it to refuse to recognize and act on that obligation, its moral stance and credibility would be threatened.
- In any case, NATO would inevitably become increasingly caught up in any conflict. As has been argued above, any conflict could not be confined within Montenegrin borders. However unofficially, neighbouring states would become involved. The alliance has extensive responsibilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, especially for security and borders.
- Moreover, there would certainly be great, probably irresistible pressure for it to support efforts to bring humanitarian aid to areas of fighting, to help and protect the inevitable refugees and probably to impose peace.

As Montenegro would be an even more forbidding environment than Kosovo for NATO peacekeeping, let alone peace enforcement, operations, the alliance should be doing everything it can to deter civil war there. This implies the twin track approach apparently being followed by some powers, but implemented more clearly and forcibly:

- Using diplomatic and financial/economic carrots and sticks to dissuade Montenegrin nationalists from pressing the independence issue;
- Impressing *unequivocally* on Milosevic that exploding Montenegro is not one of the options that he can use to solve his domestic Serbian problems. Currently, he is all too aware that there is little stomach in

NATO for any involvement on the ground (the only sort that would make a difference) and he could easily fall prey to wishful thinking and believe that military intervention was out of the question. To be effective, deterrence requires the assembly of forces, including ground troops, in the region before the crisis peaks and can slide into conflict.

Kosovo was last year's lesson on the futility of the Dayton approach of trying to solve one aspect of the problem of former-Yugoslavia while doing little of substance to prevent others from surfacing, or preparing in good time for that eventuality if prevention proves impossible. Montenegro may provide this year's lesson. Vojvodina, the Sandzak, the Presevo region, Macedonia – any or all of them may provide a subsequent year's. As events since 1991 have demonstrated, it is no use hoping that problems will not become crises and crises will not develop into conflicts. Nor is it enough to follow short-term policies that postpone, or keep the lid on, crises in the hope that time will provide a solution. An integrated, regional strategy that goes beyond pious words (the Balkan Security Pact?) is required. And it requires ready, capable and visible military force and a demonstrable will to use it to underpin the strategy. If the Atlantic alliance lacks the forces and/or the political will, then it should rethink its grand-sounding new strategic concept and settle for something more modest.

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