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The Radical Imagination of Peace: Belonging and Violence in South Africa’s Past and Future

The Security-Development Nexus and the Imperative of Peacebuilding with Special Reference to the African Context

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After our previous edition (4.2), which was a special one on *Electoral systems, Elections and Conflict Mitigation in Southern Africa*, this edition (5.1) is a regular one again, but it happens to have a theme too. Although no topic was suggested to authors or used to select material, the articles and even the book reviews included in this issue appear to be interrelated around the theme of *interrelatedness*.

One can of course dismiss this as a mere coincidence. But one can also give it a second thought, and realise that interrelatedness is such a crucial element in the field of dealing with conflict that focused attention on it can serve a very good and relevant purpose.

In dealing with conflict, whether in a professional or an everyday context, we continually have to take interconnectedness seriously. The parties in a conflict situation find themselves in some sort of relationship – otherwise they would not have been in conflict with each other. The cause of a conflict is usually no stand-alone matter, but something intertwined with histories, cultures, identities or other complexities. Talks about a conflict can seldom be kept simple. They have to include all the backgrounds, parties, positions, purposes, interests and needs related to the situation.

Therefore, the more insight we gain into interrelatedness, the better equipped we become to prevent, manage, resolve or transform conflict situations. We trust that the articles included in this edition will stimulate our thinking about interrelated people and matters, and improve our preparedness to deal with any conflict, and especially with more complex conflict situations.
The two middle articles are about the interlinkages between conflict resolution and development. In one of them the further link between development and democracy is also explored. From the data and the discussions two inferences seem to emerge, however. Firstly, there are clear indications of links between democracy and development, between democracy and peace, and between development and peace. Secondly, however, no conclusions can be drawn about guaranteed shortcuts to conflict resolution.

Where a satisfactory degree of political and socio-economic democratisation and development has taken place, there should be a favourable climate for dealing with conflicts and resolving them. Where there are prospects of ongoing improvement in democracy and especially in development, the situation may become even more conducive to dealing with conflicts appropriately and satisfactorily. It can never be assumed, however, that conflict resolution will always manifest itself as a by-product of democracy and development.

After all, there are versions of both democracy and development that do not satisfy the people concerned. In the old South Africa, for example, there was a ‘democracy’ which only included the privileged minority. And when the minority government of that deplorable era inflicted apartheid on the majority of South Africans, it used the euphemistic ‘rationale’ of ‘separate development’! As South Africans, we are obviously ashamed of those fallacies and disasters, but we are in a position to remember and share what we have learnt.

The two articles on these interlinkages can therefore make us aware of opportunities and challenges, but they can also make us wary of optimistic illusions. Growth in democracy and development can improve the prospects of peace and security, but automatic, straightforward results should not be expected.

The other two articles provide us with valuable perspectives on fellow-human interrelatedness. The first one prompts our thinking (and imagining) about problems and possibilities around the phenomenon of our belongingness. As social human beings we do sense and experience that we belong to the groups into which we have been born. Such intra-group and intra-ethnic belongingness is self-evident and justifiable. What should also be self-evident, however, is that any monopolising of the right to belong is grossly unfair. People who happen to be born into other cultural groups have the right to belong to those groups.
This insight is an important first step in becoming liberated from a restricted, exclusive sense of belonging. The major step, however, is the breakthrough to real inclusiveness. Then a legitimate but limited intra-group belonging can grow into a wider-ranging inter-group experience. Diversity can be duly recognised and can even be genuinely embraced. Differences, which are inevitable, can be approached non-violently and their underlying problems solved satisfactorily. Interrelatedness can become a lived reality.

Finally, the fourth article serves as a fitting practical conclusion. If conflicts are indeed between interrelated people and about interrelated issues, a participatory approach seems to be the most appropriate way of dealing with them. In the article such an approach is propagated with regard to a specific conflictual area, but its applicability in any situation is obvious.

What has to be remembered and taken seriously, however, is that participatory rhetoric cannot simply be used to disguise a unilateral agenda or a top-down mentality. A genuine participatory approach is no show or scheme. It is based upon a mindset of inclusive interrelatedness. It is inspired by a fellow-human attitude, which is not disheartened by the complexities of diversity and differences. It is adopted by people who are not afraid of the tensions and problems of human co-existence, but are committed to live a fascinating life of interrelating both with our fellow-humans and our entire environment.
The Radical Imagination of Peace: Belonging and violence in South Africa’s past and future

Suren Pillay*

Abstract

Conceptions of race and belonging are central both to the violence of South Africa’s past, and the relative peace of South Africa’s present. In the colonial world the question of belonging was related to the distinction between Settler and Native, a distinction that came to be racialised as settlers became natives, and natives became foreigners. If there was an enduring question that split the anti-apartheid movements in South Africa, then this was it: what would be the fate of the white settlers in a South Africa without apartheid: where would they belong? This paper argues, through a discussion of two shifts in the conception of belonging in South African political thought, that if South Africa represents a

* Mr Suren Pillay is a lecturer in the Department of Political Studies at the University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa. This paper was presented to the Second International Symposium on Peace Processes in Africa: an Experience for Colombia, in Bogotá, D.C., Colombia, November 8-9, 2004. A section of this paper draws on a previously published article of the author (Pillay 2004).
peaceful transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, then it was the answer to the question of ‘who belonged’ that probably swayed the forces of social change in one direction, rather than another.

The history of South Africa, viewed from inside and outside, is marked by the question of how race has facilitated domination. I want in this paper to speak about Race in South Africa and its connection to violence and peace. But we cannot talk about peace processes without talking about violent processes first. Solutions are defined by their problems. But I will talk about the problem not by recounting the thousands who died resisting apartheid, or the thousands who died defending apartheid, or the hundreds of thousands who were annihilated by the colonial settlers of British, Dutch and French ancestry. Nor of hundreds of thousands whose lives were intangibly violated by the experience of forced land removals, of disrupted and denied futures, or of families dislocated by the experience of migrant labour. Or of the legions of anonymous fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, sons and daughters, whose experiences and trauma could not be recounted at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission where we were battered by gut-wrenching stories and choked by graphic accounts of sensational violence, a violence that resists comprehension. But this violence, the grisly gore of it, can by its sheer veracity, its sheer scale, its sheer brutality, become an object of awe in and of itself. Because from where we stand, its mere existence, its mere translation from thought into deed astounds us. I want therefore to resist the temptation to recount the details of this manifest violence because it might be more useful to think about the mundane than the sensational. It is often in the mundane, or as Hannah Arendt found, in the banal, that violence, and perhaps peace, resides. I want therefore to connect the innocent word and the violent deed into a single economy of meaning to make some of the violence intelligible and some of the peace intelligible. And I want to do that, by telling two tales about race and belonging in South Africa.

Conceptions of belonging are both central to the violence of South Africa’s past, and the relative peace of South Africa’s present. Who belonged? Who had a right to belong? In the colonial world the question of belonging was related to the distinction between Native and Settler, as the noted Ugandan scholar, Mahmood Mamdani, has observed when he asked: ‘When does the Settler become a Native?’ (Mamdani 1996)
Belonging, The First Story

The British colonial government in South Africa created a position called the ‘Colonial Historiographer’ in the early 1800s. This person administered the colonial archive and also produced authoritative knowledge about South Africa, which was put to various uses. The most prolific and influential occupant of this post was a Canadian by the name of George McCall Theal. Theal noted that ‘in reality this country was not the Bantu’s originally any more than it was the white man’s, because the Bantus were immigrants’. He went on: ‘We must prove to these people that we were no more intruders than they were, and that they enjoyed now as much as they were entitled to’.

For Theal, the land was empty and was simultaneously occupied by the Bantu and the settlers. The Bantu had come down in waves and fought vicious battles of conquest with each other. Their predisposition to war needed an overarching authority to create peace, and this burden fell to the colonial government of European settlers – what Rudyard Kipling was to call ‘The white man’s Burden’. Where ‘the Bantu’ are spoken about, they are almost always also referred to as ‘immigrants’, leaving us with no doubt as to their non-indigeneity. White settlers, in this historical narrative, were no less ‘settlers’ than Blacks were. Wars of conquest were thus transformed into mutually credible claims of belonging to be decided by the Law of ‘the right of might’.1 By concentrating on migration, common arrival, and strength, this historical narrative of ‘the natives’ was also inadvertently telling a story about ‘the settler’ – a story which made settler claims to land, based on conquest, equally, if not more valid. European settlers, in this account, were merely the latest of a ceaseless history of waves. Military superiority or inferiority of those that preceded, or arrived at the same time, was a valid basis on which belonging and ownership could be decided.

1 It is not my concern here to prove the facticity or otherwise of the historical claims discussed, suffice it to say that there is a convincing body of work, both historical and archaeological, which suggests that the land had been settled for thousands of years before the time Theal suggested. Cf Cornevin 1980 for a refutation of what she calls the ‘myths’ of apartheid, and Maylam 1986 for a particularly well-researched account of the South African iron age.
Now let me recall another rather dispassionate scientific academic discussion. This time, not amongst the English settlers, but amongst Afrikaner nationalists, whose nationalism, one must remember, was formed largely in relation to what they perceived as the imperialism of the British Empire.

Afrikaner nationalists set their claim to belonging apart from the English – who formed to some extent the major part of their Other. The idea of the British as ‘uitlanders’ (foreigners) was to render an Afrikaner identity that was no longer a settler one, but rather a native one. The settler question, for Afrikaner nationalists of the 1930s and 1940s, was resolved through the articulation of two broad themes. Firstly, all had equal claim to the land, since all arrived at more or less the same time. Secondly, Afrikaner self-identity and belonging in Africa were willed by divine intervention. But this idea was to be reworked. For one, it came to be framed more explicitly within the discourse of ‘race’.

The geneticist, Eloff, published his *Race and Racial Mixing* in 1942. Eloff, in this work, draws on Theal’s idea of a mutual arrival, but tells the story slightly differently, with a more overt racialisation of migrations. This theory of racialisation was influenced by what is now called the Hamitic hypothesis – marked by the Napoleonic expedition into Africa. Prior to Napoleon’s expedition, the idea of Africans as the Canaanites condemned to servanthood by Noah (as in Genesis, Chapter Five, of the First Testament) held sway. Following the Napoleonic ‘discovery’ of the Egyptian signs of ‘civilisation’, a gradual process of de-Africanising Egyptians took place. What were taken to be signs of civilisation were credited to European-Asiatic (as Caucasian) influence. Well-known examples are the Berbers in North Africa, and of course the Tutsi in Central Africa.

This version of the Hamitic hypothesis conflated language and origin. A shared language meant a shared racial origin, and racial identities could in effect be read off linguistic ones (Saunders 1969:528). Furthermore, this version of the Hamitic hypothesis was to racialise the distinction between pastoralists and agriculturalists – based on those identified as being of Hamitic origin through

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2 See Van Jaarsveld 1981.

3 For analyses of the intersections of memory, identity and colonial law in relation to the Hutu and Tutsi, see Malkki 1995 and Mamdani 2001.
language and civilisational markers. The post-Napoleonic version was thus to separate those living on the African continent into those who were ‘indigenous’ and those of Hamitic descent who were coming from elsewhere.

Racialising the migrations described by Theal more explicitly, Eloff saw the ‘Bushmen’ of Southern Africa, the Khoi and San, as Hamitic descendants originating in North Africa. For Eloff the ‘existing races of mankind’ could be divided into three broad ‘stocks’ (afstammelinge). These were ‘Yellow, Black and White’, all descendants of Shem, Japheth, or Ham’ (Eloff 1942). Drawing as he does, on the Hamitic thesis, Eloff’s account thus continues the distinction between indigenous and those less indigenous.

A later generation of students returned to South Africa from Holland and Germany where they had encountered notions of the organic nature of nationhood (nasieskap). It was the confluence of religiosity and nationalist discourse, by no means a unique one in the making of nationalist thought generally, that converged here in apartheid.

The Nationalist Party victory in 1948 and the vision of apartheid that came into existence consolidated, amongst other things, a way of dealing with the Settler/Native distinction. The settler was recast as ‘belonging’ and the native came to be recast as ‘foreign’. The Native Question in South Africa has broadly been answered in three ways. Firstly by genocidal violence, as experienced by the

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4 ‘Because Hamites discovered in Africa south of the Sahara were described as pastoralists... pastoralism and its attributes became endowed with the aura of superiority of culture, giving the Hamite a third dimension: a cultural identity’ (Saunders 1969:530).

5 After colonial settlement, Hamitic, as Caucasian, was further refined to make hierarchical distinctions within it – thus contemporary settlers could act with paternalism to those who were historically Hamitic descendents.

6 Theal too suggests a North African origin of Bushmen, and the racial migration and civilising influence of Caucasians is also to be found in Theal, but less explicitly. This was, I would argue, because writing at that time he was less concerned with what would later become the Verwoerdian concern for the ‘separation of the races’, and more concerned with conquest and domination. Theal’s history is replete with non-pejorative accounts of ‘mixing’, since it was produced in the context when colonial belonging was still argued for as a civilising project.
San and the Khoi. Secondly, it could be resolved through assimilation, through various Christianisation and civilisation projects, largely associated with particular periods of British colonial rule, particularly in the Cape and Natal provinces. And thirdly, it could be resolved through difference and segregation. All three answers were applied in South Africa, sometimes at the same time in different parts of the country. Each built upon the other, rather than replacing the other. The result is a varied and sometimes contradictory set of arguments which has as effect white rule. Each provided a different rationale for rule and a different mode of administration over those ruled. State consolidation under Afrikaner nationalist rule confronted ‘the Native Question’, and confronted the challenge of working out a comprehensive and single answer to be implemented systematically across the territorial breadth of South Africa.

The South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC) of 1903-1905 had established that ‘the word “Native” shall be taken to mean an aboriginal inhabitant of Africa, south of the Equator, and to include half-castes and their descendants by Natives’ (Ashforth 1990:13). The report of this commission was to establish a series of recommendations which established the broad elements of state segregationist policy with regard to the ‘Native Question’. It recommended that ‘Native Reserves’ be based on ‘ancestral lands held by their forefathers’ (Ashforth 1990:35). At the same time Christianisation, the value of hard labour, and government of Natives through Tribal administration were put before the State as answers to the Native Question.7

Here we glimpse a moment of the contradictory co-existence of rationales of domination. The SANAC invocation of ancestral lands is at odds with Theal’s writings which dismiss the value of ‘being there first’ as right to ownership. This Janus-faced moment contains two political rationalities: an answer to the Native Question which looks toward the future of state formation and citizenship, whilst the other looks toward the past and the moment of conquest.

The 1913 Land Act stipulated that a total of 13% of the land would be designated for Natives, governed by the Governor General who would act as ‘Supreme Chief’. The identity of ‘Native’ was not only a descriptive one, but

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7 For a critique of ‘ancestral lands’, see Ashforth 1990:35-36.
also a legal one: to be classified as Native was to have limited land ownership, employment opportunities, and land tenure practices.  

The eighteen-volume report of the Tomlinson commission in the 1950s addressed the effects of ineffective segregation and urban black settlement, noting that a gradual process of overlapping had taken place. ‘Coalescence’ and ‘overlapping’, the report concluded, could not be allowed: ‘Either the challenge must be accepted or the inevitable consequences of the integration of the Bantu and the European population groups into a common society must be endured’ (Houghton 1956:59). What were the ‘consequences’ which the report ominously hinted at? It noted that ‘the ultimate result – though it may take some time to materialize – is complete racial assimilation, leading to the creation, out of the original communities, of a new biological entity’ (Houghton 1956:12).  

The student newspaper of the Afrikaans National Student Union put the matter as follows:

The Liberalistic and negrophilistic sections of our country’s intelligentsia are much better organized, and in many cases better equipped than the Afrikaner to propagate their viewpoint of racial equality which can only result in eventual racial integration. It is necessary for the Afrikaner intelligentsia to scientifically formulate the Boers’ point of view about non-white groups [my emphasis].

8 Parts of the Union, like the Cape, still gave a certain amount of franchise rights to those Natives who could pass various ‘civilisational’ criteria.

9 The Tomlinson report reflected a series of concerns of academics and state bureaucrats about South African life at the time. These themes, particularly, ‘culture contact’, were prominent in anthropological discussions, and could be found in both broad traditions of South African anthropological work – the social anthropologists and those who worked within what came to be known as the Volkekunde (‘pure’ Afrikaans for ‘Anthropology’) tradition. It was their conception of racial characteristics and cultural identity that was particularly illuminating.

These experts brought into the discussion the idea that all peoples live within and are formed by an ‘ethnos’. A shift occurred from the racial classification of society to cultural difference. Anthropologists became the experts to turn to.\textsuperscript{11}

Whilst for geneticists like Eloff \textit{race} determined the world, for Coertze it was \textit{culture}. Whiteness was split into a British ethnos and an Afrikaner ethnos. The Afrikaners were also regarded as a chosen people. And those classified as Native became Bantu. Bantu was further divided into two broad groups, based on linguistic communities. The first was Nguni, which comprised Zulu, Ndebele, Xhosa and Swazi. The second was Sotho, which comprised South Sotho, North Sotho, Tswana, Venda and Tsonga peoples. Here again, language communities were being mapped onto cultural communities. And cultural communities established political boundaries. The broad category of ‘Native’ was thus exploded into a number of different Bantu ‘tribes’ around which territorial and political boundaries could be built.

The shift was now almost complete. Settlers had become Natives, and Natives now \textit{belonged}, but they belonged \textit{elsewhere} – they were to become foreigners. If the boundaries of cultural communities were also to be the boundaries of political communities, then membership of differing cultural communities meant belonging to different political communities. If South Africa were to be conceived as a white ‘Nation’, made up of the Afrikaner volk and the English speaking whites of European descent, then to be tribally defined in South Africa made one racially an outsider, and ethnically a member of a different political community – a ‘homeland’.

In the writings of ethnos theorists and government documentation inspired thereby, ‘belonging’ was conceived as ‘ethnic’, and the concern was about policing the boundaries of belonging and difference, i.e. cultural, ‘organic’ boundaries rather than physical, spatial boundaries. The physical boundary of saying where one could live, for example, would \textit{follow} as an administrative need

\textsuperscript{11} The policy of creating clearly demarcated Bantu Authorities involved anthropologists who would advise on the cultural borders of the Authorities and identify the ‘correct’ chiefs to lead them, particularly amongst groups like the Mfengu in Transkei and Ciskei, and the Tsonga in Transvaal, who lacked, in their view, the degree of centralisation in political authority required in the vision of rule imagined for Bantu Authorities.
that had become both ‘rational’, as a scientific way of governing, and historically logical.

The dramatic wave of forced removals of the 1960s, which wrenched thousands from their homes and dumped them into barren, overcrowded or windswept wastelands, was therefore an attempt to get rid of ‘black spots’ which dotted the otherwise white map of ‘European areas’. The targets of forced removals were primarily those urban Africans, or ‘de-tribalised Bantu’, as Verwoerd preferred to call them, who had attempted to settle in towns. Some were the remnants of the African peasantry who were squeezed off the land in the 1930s. In the end, both groups, now racialised and ethnicised, ‘belonged’. The political question that posed itself as self-evident was: How does this diversity live ‘harmoniously’ and ‘peacefully together’, but ‘separate’ and apart – that is, in apartheid?

**Belonging, A Second Story**

There is a simple and rather innocent sounding phrase in a document drawn up at a meeting in South Africa in 1955. That document, ‘The Freedom Charter’, became a manifesto for one section of the anti-apartheid nationalist movement, that is the African National Congress, South Africa’s present ruling party. There were also those broadly allied with this document and known as ‘charterists’. The line in the document reads, ‘South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white’. The ANC pursued a political programme which through various forms, began with the idea that South Africa was a racially exclusive state, and that the goal was not to re-racialise the state through demanding a black majoritarian future, but rather a de-racialised state with a non-racial future. That is, to not replace a white minority with a black majority.

This was not a view shared by all in the anti-apartheid nationalist movement, nor by all in the ANC itself. It was a position only adopted in the latter years of its existence. In 1927, the ANC president J.T. Gumede issued a statement ‘To all Leaders of the African People’ (Gumede 1927), in which he made a call for unity. Gumede noted that it ‘is my earnest desire to create mutual understanding among all the leaders of our race, and to secure their
co-operative support particularly at this hour of the destiny of the race. Gentlemen, this is a critical time in our history; it is a time when we should sink our personal ambitions for the greater ambitions of the race’ (Gumede 1927:304). Gumede, as I noted above, was speaking here as the president of the ANC. The organisation at this point was seen as the representative of a ‘race’, the black race, ‘the Bantu people’, or as it appeared in government documentation, the ‘native people’. Race and political identity merged here into a singular form of political expression and organisation, which fragmented resistance to apartheid along racial lines. Thus the Coloured Peoples Organisation, the African Peoples Organisation, the South African Indian Congress and the Congress of Democrats, amongst others, that met at Kliptown in 1955 to adopt the Freedom Charter, arrived as racialised representatives of mostly disenfranchised racially defined groups in South Africa, broadly conforming to what was seen as the ‘four nations’ of South Africa. The Freedom Charter, which proclaimed that South Africa ‘belongs to all those who live in it, black and white’, thus recognised the existence of racial difference, but also the historical peculiarity of a settler colonial identity that had become settler nationalist identities, which saw itself as ‘belonging’ in South Africa and not to a European colonial metropole.

There were those, who like the Pan-Africanist Congress, led by Robert Sobukwe, broke away from the ANC precisely around this issue. They argued that South Africa belonged to the black majority, and that white settlers in South Africa did not have a guaranteed future there. *Africa for Africans* was their slogan (Thompson 2000:210).

There were many political and economic questions that divided the anti-apartheid opposition in South Africa in the latter half of the twentieth century, often along the infamous lines of the debate around race and class.\(^\text{12}\) Should apartheid, the debate went, be seen as primarily a racial problem or should it be seen as the creation of a particular form of the capitalist mode of production? The former required a popular political struggle against national oppression; the latter required a class struggle against racialised capitalism. The debate linked

\(^{12}\) See Saunders 1988 and Wright 1977 for illuminating discussions of these debates, from the vantage point of South African historiography.
analysis to the strategies and tactics of political struggle. Accepting one analysis meant accepting a particular ideological programme.

It could be argued however, that if there was an enduring question that split the anti-apartheid movements in South Africa, then this was it. What would be the fate of the white settlers in a South Africa without apartheid? Where did they belong? The 1959 PAC breakaway posed this question indirectly, the formation of the Black Consciousness movement posed it directly, and the violence between the United Democratic Front and followers of the Azanian Peoples Organisation in the 1980s posed it as a matter of urgency. Of course, it was a debate that divided the ANC leadership itself, most starkly after the 1969 Morogoro consultative conference when ‘non-Africans’ (whites, coloureds, Indians) were allowed to become members of the ANC in exile. The outcome of this decision, expressed in a document titled ‘Strategy and Tactics’, noted that this change in membership policy needed to manage two factors. Firstly, it needed to not ‘be ambiguous on the question of the primary role of the most oppressed African mass and, secondly, those belonging to the other oppressed groups and those few White revolutionaries who show themselves ready to make common cause with our aspirations, must be fully integrated on the basis of individual equality’ (ANC 1969:390). This tension between group and individual representation was partly managed by maintaining National Executive Committee positions for Africans, a policy upheld until 1985. But at the time this resolution sparked a crisis in the leadership circles of the ANC. At the unveiling of the tombstone of the ANC leader Robert Resha in London in July, 1975, Ambrose Makiwane observed that ‘[t]he trouble the African people have at present is that our strategy and tactics are in the hands and dominated by a small clique of non-Africans. This is as a result of the disastrous Morogoro Consultative Conference of 1969, which opened membership of the ANC to non-Africans’ (Makiwane 1975:400-401). December of 1975, some four months later, the National Executive Committee of the ANC expelled Ambrose Makiwane as well as Alfred Mqota, George Mbele, Jonas Matlou, Tennyson Makiwane, O.K. Setlapelo, Pascal Ngakane and Thami Bonga, noting that they ‘have arrogantly refused to denounce their counter-revolutionary activities’ (ANC NEC 1975:403). Periods of severe division and violent conflict within the anti-apartheid movement therefore turned on this political question.
If South Africa represents a peaceful transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, then it is the answer to this question, perhaps more than any other, that swayed the forces of history in one direction rather than another. Yes, how one gets from violence to peace is important. But a peace process requires radical acts of imagination by the parties involved. The process itself may be secondary to the imagination which enables it. And that imagination, if it is to work, is radical because it must defy the common-sense choices. It must transcend the limitations imposed upon it by the past. That the process in South Africa was as inclusive as possible, that the process, despite challenges from the ideological right and the ideological left, could stay on track through some very challenging events, like the assassination of Chris Hani or the AWB invasion of the Kempton Park Codesa talks, was because the process was able to satisfy a fundamental challenge to peace: Who would belong, who could belong, who had a right to belong? Race, Ethnicity and History defined the answer in the past. Race, Ethnicity and History would not define it in the future. And the result is eloquently crystallised in the speech delivered by the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki at the adoption of the new Constitution of the Republic of South Africa in 1996. Some 40 years after the writing of the Freedom Charter, Mbeki noted: ‘It is a firm assertion made by ourselves that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white’. ‘I am formed’, he proclaimed, ‘of the migrants who left Europe to find a new home on our native land. Whatever their actions, they remain a part of me’. He went on: ‘I am the grandchild of the warrior men and women that Hintsa and Sekhukhune led, the patriots that Cetshwayo and Mphephu took to battle’... ‘I am the grandchild who lays fresh flowers on the Boer graves at St Helena and the Bahamas...I come of those who were transported from India and China whose being resided in the fact, solely, that they were to provide physical labour...being part of all these people, and in the knowledge that none dare contest that assertion, I shall claim that I am an African...we refuse to accept that our Africanness shall be defined by race, colour, gender and historical origins’ (Mbeki 1996).

Mbeki, in this speech about what it means to be an African, situates it within a seemingly seamless historical discourse found in the Freedom Charter. But despite this expressed continuity there is also a departure. The Freedom Charter’s discursive and material world was one of the racialised notions of
blackness, a South Africa of ‘four nations’, a South Africa of ‘Europeans’ and ‘Non-Europeans’, a South Africa where to be African was to mean ‘black’, was to mean inhabiting a world of pass laws, customary laws, petty discriminations and grand limitations. The departure lies in the speech’s poetic recognition of diversity as a unity contained within a single national and continental identity, rather than many fragmented racial and ethnic identities. At the core of this speech is a statement about belonging. A reassuring statement. A statement that speaks with equal measure to anxieties and fears, and to hopes and dreams. A vision that confounds the historical laws of wrong, right and revenge that so often have turned ‘victims into killers’ (Mamdani 2001). That makes perpetrators of wrongs scared to take their feet off the necks of their victims, because surely one expects the victims to turn on you with the full vengeance of their might. It is this fear that Rian Malan spoke of so vividly in his book My Traitor’s Heart: ‘Pebbles leapt off the road in brilliant clarity, casting shadows as stark as shadows on the moon. The night was as silent as outer space. I was walking on the moon. All I could hear was the drumming of blood in my ears, and the rasp of my own breathing. I was out of my mind with terror, and in that moment, in that moment it came to me; the force that held the white tribe together, and kept our sweating white fists locked in a death grip on the levers of power’ (Malan 1990:289).

It took a radical act of imagination to grasp that so much turned on fear, and by offering and proving their commitment to overlook race, to transcend race, the ANC convinced the parties representing white South Africans that their future was safe. It even placated the far right white parties by constitutionally recognising the possibility of an Afrikaner homeland or volkstaat in a new South Africa. Mbeki’s notion of an African is therefore distinctive since it seeks to deracialise Africanity and de-nativise it. Being African is not synonymous to a racial identity or origin in the biological sense. It is therefore not about where you are from but where you are at that determines your eligibility for ‘belonging’ and citizenship. It is, to some extent a multiplicity of collective experiences, both

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13 Even though it was an offer later withdrawn once the far right was deemed no longer a considerable threat. I have discussed this in a forthcoming chapter (Pillay forthcoming).
good and bad, a totality, embodied – ‘a part of me’ – in him as a representative of the ‘state’, as deputy-president, coupled for the first time to the ‘nation’ in a fully representative manner in South Africa. To be an African for Mbeki, is to embody the baggage of history in order to fully represent the totality of experiences which therefore requires him to speak not as the leader of a liberation movement or a political party, but as the official authority of a sovereign state.

And so we might say that we had a peaceful transition in South Africa, in a place where few would have predicted that the horrific violence in Africa in 1994 was going to be in Rwanda and not South Africa as Mahmood Mamdani noted. But ten years on, the remarkableness of that gesture towards one’s oppressor might not seem as prudent for some. For in the peace process, there are some who note cautiously that in favour of Peace we set aside the question of Justice. And the relationship between peace and justice – between security and fairness, between ‘political life’ and ‘biological life’ – profoundly shapes the dilemmas of South African life today.

The peace process, otherwise known as the negotiated settlement, protected the political life of South Africa. It has entrenched a government that is widely considered as legitimate, in severe distinction to its apartheid predecessor. A remarkable degree of political stability thus characterises the national discourse around the institutions and practice of political life. There is substantive participation in electoral politics at national and provincial level (Daniel 2004). The opposition parties within parliament, albeit small, seek to address their concerns within a parliamentary framework rather than outside of it. There is an increase in what we might call the judicialisation of politics, that is to say, the addressing of political demands through legal channels and constitutional discourses. Important economic and social demands have thus been expressed via the courts resulting in landmark decisions, setting legal precedents, like in the ‘Grootboom’ case which dealt with land removals, the case for access to anti-retrovirals for those living with HIV and Treatment Action Campaign’s use of the law in that case, and the Mikro School case around the language of

14 See www.idasa.org.za for a number of useful studies measuring participation within South Africa’s post-apartheid democracy.
instruction at public schools. The expression of political discontent through judicial mechanisms is an indicator of the perceptions of the efficacy, transparency and trust in these mechanisms to successfully mediate and regulate the power of the government in relation to the sovereignty of the constitution, which contains the fundamental rights to which citizens are entitled. These are positive developments.

It is at the level of biological life that serious concerns must be expressed. And it is here that Justice most glaringly presents itself as tangled in a web of constraints – historical, national and global. Government policy discourse shifts constantly between redistributive promises to its mass constituency that profound change is on the way, and reassuring promises to its minority privileged constituency that their lives and their privilege will stay the same and in fact get better. And despite their perceptions, it has indeed got better for most of the previous beneficiaries and for the small number of new beneficiaries (Gelb 2005:397). Not that things have been altogether bad for the victims of apartheid. In the President’s State of the Nation address in 2004 numerous successes are correctly identified. Between 1994 and 2004 housing subsidies were allocated to 1,6 million houses built for poor families. Some 70% of households were supplied with electricity and nine million people now had access to clean water (Mbeki 2004). In addition 1,8 million hectares of land had been redistributed, and secondary school enrolment stood at 85%, with a range of childhood interventions set in place, including a child care grant. These are impressive achievements targeted specifically at what I am referring to as the biological life of South Africans, most of whom have been living in conditions of abject poverty and material insecurity for decades. Whilst government achievements with regard to basic conditions of life, like access to water, housing, electricity and health care must be applauded, it is the sustainability of these interventions that is worrying. Critics point out that substantial numbers of people have since been disconnected from access to electricity and have been denied access to drinking water because they cannot afford these services. The institutions concerned are determined, however, to recover costs for services provided rather than see access to basic services as a constitutional right affecting biological life.¹⁵ In these instances the redistributive action is curtailed by the assurances to private capital that a macro-economic framework is in place which fosters
economic growth through ‘free’ market mechanisms, thereby negating the total impact these positive redistributive gestures might have on the people most in need of them. And despite these interventions, inequalities are widening, particularly within racial groups. As Reg Rumney notes: ‘The income inequality present at the dawn of democracy grimly persists...Moreover, the divide has grown within racial groups, as a small group of black people has become exceedingly rich’ (Rumney 2005:403).16

Whilst there has been growth in the South African economy, it can be described as ‘jobless growth’. This is particularly troubling given the level of unemployment in South Africa, which by wide definitions of unemployment hover at around 40% whilst ‘strict’ definitions place it in the low 30%.17 And unemployment continues to rise by between 1 and 2% per year, most dramatically affecting those classified as ‘African’, with an increase in unemployment amongst those so classified from 20% in 1995 to just under 40% in 2002 (Altman 2005:426). In addition, during the same period, the number of people employed in the formal sector of the economy dropped from 72% to 51%, while unemployment in terms of the strict definition leapt from 16% to 31% (Altman 2005:437). Given these statistics, it is troubling to note the comment of a senior member of the Presidency in South Africa, Joel Netshitenzhe, about ‘mistaken views that the poor are worse off than during the apartheid years’ (Business Day 2003). Poverty affects those most vulnerable the worst of course. Up to 40% of South African children, despite valiant efforts at providing a child grant support system, are today living below the poverty line. And poverty exacerbates illness, particularly chronic diseases. HIV/Aids now accounts for more than 40% of mortalities in South Africa,18 up from around 9% in 1995 (Woolard 2002).

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15 See in this regard the work of Patrick Bond (2000), Hein Marais (1998) and Sampie Terblanche (2003).

16 See also Bhorat et al 2001 and Whitford & McGrath 1994 for similar findings.

17 The ‘strict’ definition does not include people who are unemployed and are no longer seeking a job.

18 Government officials have been involved in the dispute about whether criminal violence or Aids is the leading cause of death.
In the laudable attempt to placate the fears of white South Africans during the peace process the ANC may have ensnared itself. The moment President Mbeki mentions the fact that most whites are wealthy and most blacks are poor there is an uproar from the smaller white parties, accusing the President of ‘dividing the nation’ by talking about race and talking in racial terms. The government’s attempts at affirmative action and black economic empowerment (BEE) are attacked by some in the white opposition as ‘reverse racism’. Ironically then, the biggest champions of non-racialism now are the previous beneficiaries of apartheid. To talk about race and to view the past through that prism is to put the spotlight on their privileges as beneficiaries of a system labelled a crime against humanity.19 Secondly, the government’s attempts to recognise diversity have meant it has had to make gestures toward cultural recognition claims which demand respect for difference. But where cultural differences coincide with racial differences, recognising cultural differences can mean promoting racial differences and continued racial privilege. Hence the Minister of Defence, Mostiuoa Lekota, remarked not so long ago (Independent online 2004), that we might want to move beyond the celebration of diversity, if it is at the expense of celebrating our commonalities, since it contains the threat of splitting the country up into balkanised communities (concerns that arise, no doubt, from the S.A. Defence Force’s recent peacekeeping experiences in Central Africa).

Meanwhile, the sensational political violence of the past, recounted at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, may have transformed itself into the mundane socio-economic violence of the present – the structural violence of hunger, poverty and homelessness, and the almost normalised perception of the violence of murder, robbery, rape and hijacking. As Ted Leggett (2003) notes: ‘A country of some 44 million, it experiences at least 22 000 murders a year, which is about 25 per cent more than the United States, a violent country with over six and a half times the population’.20 The insecurity of living under the

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20 There is a discrepancy between the perception of the levels of crime amongst the public and the official statistics of the state however. The official statistics show a decrease rather than an increase in murder rates, for example. My point however
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authoritarian police state of apartheid that was everywhere may have been replaced by the insecurity of the increasingly absent state. At the level of perception, but in many instances in actual practice, the state appears to be not there, or to be unable to provide for its citizens’ needs, at least for the needs of those most in need, like the majority of black South Africans, children, women, and the ill. The state seems unable to provide jobs, housing and medical care, at least at the pace and on the scale required to lift the poor out of poverty and insecurity in the medium to short term. The lesson of South Africa, if there is one, is not simply the one contained in the remarkable gesture of reconciliation made by the majority of victims to their oppressors which enabled the Peace process. The lessons of South Africa may still be unfolding. For there is still an unanswered question that everyday finds a bigger chorus: the question not just of peace, but of how one creates a Just Peace.

For it is this rather impolite question that continues to haunt the dignified veneer of South Africa’s settlement and the longevity of its stable political life. We have redefined ‘African’ in order to show that we are not thinking in terms of a racial identity. We are not making ‘all who live in it’ Africans who now belong, almost regardless of what they have might have done in the past, and thereby enable a relatively peaceful transition to democratic rule. We have, in Thabo Mbeki’s stately eloquence, refused ‘to accept that our Africanness shall be defined by race, colour, gender and historical origins’. We have thereby endorsed a lesson which needs wider resonance in a country on a continent witnessing simmering levels of xenophobia. But we must also refuse, as robustly, to accept

cconcerns the perception of the high probability of insecurity with regard to matters of everyday life and well-being, amongst black and white South Africans, even if this is at odds with the empirical manifestations of violence in some instances. See the following note.

21 A number of studies of perceptions of the most pressing concerns of South Africans have borne this out, where joblessness and crime are listed as priorities. For example, see wa Kivulu 2002.

22 The UCT based Afro-Barometer survey reported that ‘only one in ten South Africans believe that their elected representatives act in their best interests’ (Mail and Guardian 2002).
that our Africanness shall be defined by injustice, by poverty, and by disease. These realities are indeed part of what it means to be an African for many. They are surely not a part of the legacy that we want to carry into the future, if there is to be a future to which we all belong, equally.

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The Security-Development Nexus and the Imperative of Peacebuilding with Special Reference to the African Context

Theo Neethling*

Abstract

This article is premised on the contention that the link between security and development is a complex, but indisputable one. Many of the world’s poorest states have experienced violent conflict in the past decades and it is today widely accepted that contemporary armed conflicts require sustained efforts which address not only the military dimensions of conflicts, but also the political, humanitarian, economic and social dimensions of conflicts. For some years there has been a growing concern with and a specific emphasis on the necessity of linking security and development to achieve meaningful peace, and pursuing this by means of special peacebuilding measures. To this end, a range of reforms throughout the international system have been implemented to facilitate peacebuilding endeavours.

* Prof Theo Neethling is Chair of the Subject Group Political Science (Mil) in the School for Security and Africa Studies at the Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University.
From an African point of view, the question arises as to what confronts the peacebuilding agenda on the African continent. Furthermore, what instruments and programmes have been put in place to address armed conflicts from a peacebuilding perspective? To what extent have peacebuilding endeavours been undertaken in the international community in general and in African states in particular? These questions are examined and reflected upon in this article as they are obviously of great importance, given the acute need to apply relevant and constructive measures and strategies in the search for sustainable development and long-term security on the continent.

1. Introduction

Africa is known as a continent that is steeped in armed conflict and instability, the sources of which are both diverse and endemic. The most violent and devastating conflicts have notably been intra-state in nature: conflicts with considerable peacekeeping consequences for regional and international role-players. Such conflicts have led to despair, destitution, poverty, disease, refugee problems and internally displaced persons. In short, there is a pressing need for African and other role-players to register greater progress on the need to address and resolve the conflicts on the continent and to strengthen the foundation for durable peace and economic development.

De Coning (2004:42) points out that extensive research undertaken over a considerable period suggests that about half of all peace agreements fail in the first five years after their conclusion. This could often be blamed on protagonists in conflicts, because they frequently agree to peace agreements for tactical reasons without being firmly committed to a long-term peace process. Also, international role-players are sometimes to be blamed for pressuring protagonists to sign peace agreements when they know that the agreements are likely to fail because of unrealistic time frames, or as a result of the root cause of the conflict not being addressed. Therefore, for some years there has been a growing concern with and an emphasis on the necessity of linking security and development to achieve meaningful peace, and pursuing this by means
of special peacebuilding measures. Lying at the nexus of development and security, peacebuilding requires a readiness to make a difference on the ground in preventing conflicts or establishing the conditions for a return to sustainable peace. Peacebuilding essentially implies the consolidation and promotion of peace and the building of trust in the aftermath of a conflict to prevent a relapse into conflict or war. More broadly outlined, it relates to integrated approaches to address violent conflict at different phases of the conflict cycle. To this end, this article sets out to examine to what extent peacebuilding programming in the area of conflict resolution and peacekeeping has been developed and is being implemented and integrated with other dimensions of peacekeeping endeavours on the African continent and further afield.

In the following analysis, the link is described between security and development with a view to clarifying the security-development nexus from both a theoretical and a practical perspective. Against this background, peacebuilding as a theoretical and practical tool in strengthening and solidifying peace processes is analysed. Furthermore, the challenges that confront the international peacebuilding agenda, as well as measures, instruments and programmes to address armed conflicts from a peacebuilding perspective with specific emphasis on the African experience, are assessed and reflected upon. Finally, the South African view on conflict resolution and peacebuilding is explored.

2. Outlining the Security-development Nexus

The link between conflict (insecurity) and development is a complex, but indisputable one. Most of the world’s 20 poorest states have experienced violent conflict in the past decades. Because the nature of conflicts has changed fundamentally in the post-Cold War era, contemporary conflicts are now increasingly internal, intense and protracted, and their social, economic and environmental consequences are considerable and long lasting (UNDP undated).

In 1995, the Commission on Global Governance proposed that the following be used as norms for security policies in the ‘new era’ (Commission on Global Governance 1995:84-85):
All people, no less than states, have a right to a secure existence, and all states have an obligation to protect those rights.

The primary goals of global security policy should be to prevent conflict and war and to maintain the integrity of the planet’s life-support systems by eliminating the economic, social, environmental, political and military conditions that generate threats to the security of the people and the planet, and by anticipating and managing crises before they escalate into armed conflicts.

Military force is not a legitimate political instrument, except in self-defence or under the auspices of the United Nations (UN).

The development of military capabilities beyond that required for national defence and support of UN action is a potential threat to the security of people.

Weapons of mass destruction are not legitimate instruments of national defence.

The production of and trade in arms should be controlled by the international community.

The principles advocated by the Commission on Global Governance in 1995 clearly pointed towards changing perceptions of what constitutes security. This coincided with the emergence of human security – a security paradigm that is vested in the belief that the state-centric security thinking of the Cold War era has become insufficient for coping with the challenges of today’s security landscape (Werthes & Bosold 2004:1). Shortly before, in 1994, the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Development Report probably promoted the notion of human security for the first time (Fourie & Schönteich 2001) when it was stated that:

[the concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression... For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Will they and their families have enough to eat? Will they lose their jobs? Will their streets and neighbourhoods be safe from crime? Will they be tortured by a repressive state? (UNDP 1994:22)
Since 1994, a host of role-players considered, proposed and reflected on appropriate human security definitions and conceptualisations. Although a commonly accepted definition does not seem to exist, Werthes & Bosold (2004:2) argue that there are some basic premises all definitions have in common, namely: a liberty/rights and rule of law dimension; a freedom from fear/safety of peoples dimension; and a freedom from want/equity and social justice dimension.

Upon closer scrutiny it appears that some middle-powers (e.g. Canada) base their approach to human security mainly on human rights and an extended arms control nexus; thus a combination of the first and second dimensions. The Asian approach (e.g. the Japanese approach), however, seems to be more related to a conceptualisation that stresses the connection between security and economic and social development, and could be subsumed under the second and third dimensions (Werthes & Bosold 2004:2-3). This has clearly manifested in the following conceptualisation by former Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi (as quoted by Werthes & Bosold 2004:3):

‘Human security’ is a concept that takes a comprehensive view of all threats to human survival, life and dignity and stresses the need to respond to such threats. The economic crisis confronting the Asian countries today has been a direct blow to the socially vulnerable – the poor, women and children, and the elderly – threatening their survival and dignity.

The above-mentioned clearly points towards a security-development nexus and should be viewed against the background of linkages between security and development that formed a central focus of research during the latter half of the 1990s. From a more political policy point of view, Sending (2004:11) argues that it was only in the late 1990s that a clear and more ‘politicised’ agenda emerged, which bore the promise of an integration between development and security policy. As an agenda related to the concept of ‘human security’, it was launched in an effort to integrate both development and security concerns with a focus on individuals rather than states. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s report, The Responsibility To Protect, specifically stated that ‘the responsibility to protect’ – i.e. any form of intervention by international role-players or multinational institutions against a state or
its leaders – should be focused on the human needs of those seeking protection or assistance (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2002:8,13). Moreover, this document should be seen as a ‘radical political document’ (Sending 2004:11), effectively making state sovereignty dependent upon the ability to provide ‘human security’ (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2002:13). Therefore, the emphasis of the security debate should be on ‘human development with access to food and employment’ (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2002:15).

The UNDP Human Development Report of 1999 clearly states that ‘while underdevelopment may not directly cause violent conflict, poor social, economic and environmental conditions as well as weak or ineffective political institutions certainly diminish a society’s capacity to manage social tensions in a non-violent manner’. To this end, UNDP became involved in development assistance, which is geared towards building or rebuilding that capacity (UNDP undated).

As far as conflict resolution is concerned – the dimension where peace-building comes into play – the point is rightly made that ‘[e]nsuring a speedy and smooth transition from the large-scale, short-term, externally driven humanitarian and military interventions that are typical in the midst of crisis to the more grass roots, longer-term, locally-driven development interventions that must take root in the transition out of conflict is no easy task’. This is why ‘credible peacebuilding and development programming’ is of such importance (UNDP undated). In view of the above, Tschirgi (2003:1) states that since the end of the Cold War, it has become commonplace to assert that peace and development are intimately linked and that the UN and other international role-players need to address the twin imperatives for security and development by means of integrated policies and programmes through peacebuilding in support of conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction.

3. Peacebuilding as a Link Between Security and Development

Not all development impacts the security environment. Conversely, not all security concerns have ramifications for development. Where peace and security
are affected by factors that (may) cause, perpetuate, reduce, prevent or manage violent conflicts, peacebuilding comes into play. Lying at the nexus of development and security, peacebuilding requires a readiness to make a difference on the ground in preventing conflicts or establishing the conditions for a return to sustainable peace (Tschirgi 2003:2).

Since the early 1990s peacekeeping operations have become charged, for example, with the task of enforcing peace, and of assuming de facto sovereignty over a territory, as in the case of East Timor and Kosovo. As a consequence of developments, security policy and peacekeeping operations have increasingly assumed responsibility for managing large-scale socio-economic and political change. It has also been realised and recognised that investments in both conflict prevention and post-conflict resolution form an integral and central element of security policy. To this end, it is today accepted that to provide peace and security, policy instruments outside the toolbox of traditional security policy need to be mobilised.

Furthermore, ‘development policy’ has been transformed to suit a new socio-economic and political environment. Since Cold War thinking presented a paradigm that defined development assistance as external to security, ‘development policy’ was only indirectly tied to issues of security in the form of guaranteeing political support and preserving the spheres of influence of the two super powers. Importantly, the policy tools of development were never employed specifically to reduce the potential for violent conflict (Sending 2004:3).

In other words, the end of the Cold War offered an opportunity for international role-players to revisit dominant conceptions of security, and to devise integrated and coherent policy instruments and programmes to address violent conflict from a peacebuilding perspective. As far as a proper understanding of peacebuilding is concerned, Tschirgi (2003:2) states that at its core, peacebuilding aims at the prevention and resolution of violent conflicts, the consolidation of peace once violence has been reduced, and post-conflict reconstruction with a view to avoiding a relapse into conflict. Proceeding beyond the traditional security (military) approaches of the Cold War era, peacebuilding seeks to address the proximate and root causes of contemporary conflicts, which include structural, political, socio-cultural, economic and environmental factors.
An Agenda for Peace, introduced in 1992 by the UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Boutros Ghali, presented a concept of peacebuilding that has gained widespread acceptance in academic and political circles. According to the Secretary-General, peacebuilding consisted of ‘sustained, co-operative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems...’ (UN Secretary-General 1992). However, Haugerudbraaten (1998) argues that the measures listed in An Agenda for Peace, namely disarming, restoring order, destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, training security forces, monitoring elections, advancing the protection of human rights, reforming institutions and promoting political participation, did not carry the notion of being sustained efforts that addressed the underlying or root causes of problems. In addition, a host of questions and issues were also raised as a matter of discourse with regard to peacebuilding as a notion. Some of the most pressing questions were inter alia (Haugerudbraaten 1998) those about:

- The aim of peacebuilding: Is peacebuilding about removing the root cause of a conflict or about finding ways to resolve old and new disputes in a peaceful manner?
- The temporal (time) aspects of peacebuilding: Are the measures employed in peacebuilding short- to medium-term or long-term ones?
- The main actors of peacebuilding: Who are the main actors in peacebuilding – indigenous or external actors?

After considerable debating and disagreements regarding the exact meaning of peacebuilding, the Secretary-General modified his position in the 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace and suggested that peacebuilding could also be preventive (UN Secretary-General 1995). This coincides with a somewhat broader view that peacebuilding is essentially about removing or weakening factors that breed or sustain conflict, and reinforcing factors that build positive relations and sustain peace (Hitchcock 2004:38). Hence it could be stated that peacebuilding has evolved from a strictly post-conflict undertaking to a concept with a broader meaning, and the general consensus would seem that peacebuilding efforts should (ideally speaking) already be attempted during the earliest indication of tension in a situation of potential conflict. Against
this background, Tschirgi (2003:1) points out that the term peacebuilding was gradually expanded to refer to integrated approaches to address violent conflict at different phases of the conflict cycle. To this end, conflict prevention and peacebuilding are often considered two sides of the same coin.

However, it should be noted that the exact concept of peacebuilding remains an issue of conceptual confusion, disagreement and discourse (Haugerudbraaten 1998; Shannon 2004:36). Disagreements especially revolve around the point that some international role-players or functionaries view peacebuilding as short- to medium-term undertakings aimed at preventing a resumption of violence, and not as long-term developmental and nation-building endeavours. Others clearly view the purpose of peacebuilding as to avoid a return to conflict and argue that in some cases it may require ambitious long-term nation-building efforts by international actors. As far as this article is concerned, the view is taken that the role of peacebuilders could be salient when civil wars have ended not in the conquest of one of the parties, but rather in a peace settlement between two parties (typically as in Mozambique). However, where civil war was the consequence of resource scarcity (as earlier in the Horn of Africa) or skewed land property structures (as in Central America), one could only hope to accomplish limited objectives by promoting good governance. In such cases, undertakings have to involve long-term processes, and a number of indigenous role-players must be involved (Haugerudbraaten 1998). In other words, the aim, duration and actors involved should depend on specific peacebuilding challenges and would differ from one case to another.

On a more practical note, the challenge for the UN – as the pre-eminent organisation responsible for international peace and security – was how to transform the short-term presence of peacekeepers into efforts aimed at societal transformation. Efforts aimed at building peace, as opposed to providing security, brought security thinking and practice into closer collaboration with development policy. Experiences from El Salvador and Mozambique, from Angola and Cambodia, all suggested that a central challenge for the UN would be to formulate policies and strategies that focused on the foundations necessary for the rebuilding and restoration of war-torn societies (Sending 2004:5). From an international or macro perspective, peacebuilding, therefore, required that the elaborate doctrines, strategies and institutions that were developed during
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the Cold War to deal with issues of international peace and security be regarded as inadequate for dealing with conflicts in the ‘new’ era (Tschirgi 2003:1).

Against this background, a range of international reforms throughout the international system has taken place to facilitate peacebuilding endeavours. There were numerous proposals for a fundamental overhaul of the UN system, *inter alia* by the 2000 Report of the Panel of UN Peacekeeping Operations (otherwise known as the Brahimi report). Furthermore, major aid agencies established conflict prevention and peacebuilding units. There was also an effort on the part of some Western governments to align their foreign, security and development policies and programmes to respond to the evolving conflict prevention and peacebuilding agenda of the contemporary international community (Tschirgi 2003:4-51).

Today, a great deal of the international debates about the future of security and development policy, respectively, tends to focus on the need for more and better co-ordination between already existing bureaucratic organisations, such as the UN’s Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), or between UNDP and United Nation’s Children’s Fund (UNICEF), on the one hand, and DPA and DPKO, on the other. By its own account, UNDP’s work is now central to post-conflict peacebuilding. Areas in the nexus of peace and security where, for instance, UNDP is most active are the demobilisation of former combatants, comprehensive demining action, sustainable return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, and the restoration of governance institutions to support the rule of law and build just and democratic societies. Thus, the role that UNDP normally plays in a peace process is essentially a supplementary one – a role geared to coaxing the parties towards further accommodation in a peace negotiation that has already been triggered by a fundamental shift in the military and political balance. In such situations, UNDP’s involvement boils down to be that of a facilitator; often in close collaboration with NGOs and institutions of civil society; creating a politically acceptable distribution of power through institutional development projects that address the legal framework within which the nation’s polity should act; and identifying common development needs and designing projects that straddle internal political and military boundaries,
separating the participants and using the projects as a mechanism for fostering common ground and reconciliation (UNDP undated).

From an African point of view, the question arises as to what confronts the peacebuilding agenda on the African continent. Furthermore, what instruments and programmes have been put in place to address armed conflicts from a peacebuilding perspective? To what extent have peacebuilding endeavours been undertaken in the international community in general and in African states in particular? These questions will be examined in the section below.

4. Contemporary International Peacebuilding Programming

Traditionally, development actors have only in exceptional cases worked ‘on conflict’ by acknowledging and setting out to address the interlinkages between conflict and development programming. In recent times, donors and agencies have endeavoured progressively into undertaking ‘conflict-sensitive development’. In addition to the above, there are especially three sectors where international actors have started to design and develop new programmes and activities to respond to peacebuilding challenges. These are programming in the fields of governance, security sector reform and rule of law (Tschirgi 2003:8-9).

*Governance programming* is aimed at shaping a society’s capacity to reconcile conflicting interests and to manage change peacefully. Traditionally neither development nor security agencies concerned themselves directly with governance programming. Today, with a series of weak, failing or vulnerable states, both development and security agencies have started with governance programming. The UN, therefore, became increasingly aware of the need to integrate governance issues through the provision of technical assistance with regard to constitution making, election monitoring and public sector reform. In addition, other international organisations became involved in democratisation projects, civil society support, transparency and anti-corruption initiatives, as well as conflict resolution projects.

*Security sector programming* implies the involvement of international organisations in security sector reform, disarmament, demobilisation, and
reintegration of former combatants, and the protection of vulnerable and war-affected populations. In addition, it also involves the addressing of security issues through a fundamental restructuring of security institutions, such as the police and defence forces, as well as instituting civilian oversight to advance democratic control and accountability. Traditionally, the security sector fell within the exclusive domain of political and security institutions. Nowadays it is recognised as central to peacebuilding and a great deal of work has been undertaken in this sector in recent times.

*Rule of law programming* basically embraces multiple aspects, such as the promotion of human rights, constitution making, traditional justice mechanisms, and legal and penal reform. Given its centrality to peacebuilding, there has been a proliferation of rule of law initiatives and activities in peacekeeping operations, post-conflict reconstruction, and in supporting governments to strengthen their legal institutions within a longer-term peacebuilding agenda.

This said, this section will provide an overview of international peacebuilding efforts undertaken in a ‘conflict-sensitive development’ context and in the above-mentioned sectors to make a difference on the ground in preventing violent conflicts or establishing the conditions for a return to sustainable peace. In addition, the focus will be directed on recent experiences on the African continent in the said sectors. Finally, the South African approach to peacebuilding will specifically receive attention.

### 4.1 Peacebuilding in Kosovo

The case of Kosovo is perhaps the most significant and outstanding case of a methodical and extensive peacebuilding undertaking in the contemporary era, as the UN for all practical purposes took charge of all the executive, legal and judicial competencies of this province. Since 1999, the UN structures faced some daunting peacekeeping and peacebuilding challenges in Kosovo. Although many of the northern parts of the province remained virtually untouched by the hostilities, towns such as Pec, Djakovica and Mitrovica sustained massive damage. Generally speaking, the public service structures in Kosovo were largely inoperative after the war with many municipalities functioning inadequately or not at all.
On 10 June 1999, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 (1999) which authorised the creation of an international presence, comprising a military and civilian branch. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) quickly took charge of the military branch, which became known as the Kosovo Force (KFOR). The UN Secretary-General took charge of the second branch by establishing the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (Chapaux 2004:3). Importantly, Resolution 1244 (1999) gave UNMIK the task of supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction. It also provided for extensive governance and rule of law programming.

As regards the deployment of an international security presence in Kosovo, it was decided in terms of Security Council resolution 1244 of 1999 that KFOR’s immediate task was concerned with the more robust peacekeeping activities in the peace process. Its task was to eradicate the violence from Kosovo, which had become so much a part of Kosovan life. KFOR’s role was also to create the conditions necessary for the rebuilding of Kosovo and to assist in the establishment of a democratic and legitimate political dispensation. Its aim was to take the gun and the grenade off the streets, and to do so impartially (Fursdon 1999:24).

In terms of what was described by the UN as ‘a massive international effort to turn war-devastated Kosovo into a functioning, democratic society’, it was decided that the allocation of tasks would be dealt with by four main components, respectively responsible for civil administration, institution building, humanitarian aid and reconstruction (UN Secretary-General 1999).

4.1.1 Civil administration component
The civil administration component was divided into three departments:

1. The public administration/civil affairs department was tasked to establish the multi-ethnic governmental structures essential for the sustainable delivery of public services where and as long as required.
2. The police department was tasked to define UNMIK’s law and order strategy in Kosovo in accordance with two main goals: the provision of interim law enforcement services; and the rapid deployment of a credible, professional and impartial Kosovo Police Service.
3 The judicial affairs department was established in the context of the urgent need to build genuine rule of law in Kosovo, including the immediate re-establishment of an independent, impartial and multi-party judiciary (UN Secretary-General 1999).

4.1.2 Institution-building component
The tasks of UNMIK’s second component, the institution-building component, were identified as strengthening the capacity of local and central institutions and civil society organisations, as well as promoting democracy, good governance and respect for human rights. It also included the organising of elections.

As an immediate priority, it was decided that UNMIK would work in the field of democratisation and institution building. This would relate to collaborating with other international organisations to identify the needs of local civil administrators and provide them with the required training. It would also facilitate the awareness and involvement of citizens in social and political change in Kosovo by strengthening the development of ordinary citizens, women’s and youth groups, and professional, cultural and other associations. UNMIK was also tasked to undertake programmes to facilitate conditions that would support pluralistic political party structures, political diversity and a healthy democratic political climate. Concerning elections, UNMIK would organise and oversee the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement. This included the holding of elections and the creation of an environment where free, fair and multi-ethnic elections would be possible.

In the field of human rights it was decided that UNMIK would strengthen the rule of law in Kosovo and develop mechanisms to ensure that the police, courts, administrative tribunals and other judicial structures could operate in accordance with international standards of criminal justice and human rights (UN Secretary-General 1999).

4.1.3 Humanitarian component
The third component of UNMIK, the humanitarian component, would be led by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Two special tasks were identified, namely humanitarian assistance and demining action.
The aim of humanitarian assistance was to ensure that adequate shelter, food, clean water, medical assistance and employment would be available to meet the protection needs of internally displaced persons and the growing number of returnees into Kosovo. Humanitarian programmes would also target urgent and essential infrastructure repairs and short-term rebuilding efforts.

It was decided that demining action would focus on humanitarian relief. This included the setting up of an information management system regarding a demining action database, defining the scope of the mine threat, mobilising demining action resources, and conducting demining action liaison and planning with other role-players, including KFOR. In the longer term, the focus would be to co-ordinate demining action support for the reconstruction of Kosovo (UN Secretary-General 1999).

4.1.4 Reconstruction component
The fourth component of UNMIK, the reconstruction component, was tasked to promote peace and prosperity in Kosovo and to facilitate the development of an economic life that would bring better prospects for the future. It was decided that this component of the mission would be managed by the European Union. The main functions of the reconstruction component would be to plan and monitor the reconstruction of Kosovo; prepare and evaluate policies in the economic, social and financial fields; and to co-ordinate between various donors and international financial institutions in order to ensure that all financial assistance was directed towards the relevant priorities (UN Secretary-General 1999).

4.1.5 General strategy
As regards UNMIK’s general strategy of operation, it was decided to conduct its work in five integrated phases. The first phase would focus on the establishment and consolidation of UNMIK’s authority and the creation of interim UNMIK-managed administrative structures. Once basic stability was achieved, the second phase of UNMIK’s efforts would be directed towards the administration of social services and utilities, and the consolidation of the rule of law. The third phase would then be to build upon the second and would be the finalisation of preparations for and the conduct of elections. In the fourth phase, UNMIK would oversee and assist elected Kosovo representatives in their
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efforts to organise and establish provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government. The fifth and last phase would depend on a final settlement and would basically oversee the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to institutions established in terms of a political settlement (Annan 1999). It is, therefore, clear that the peace process for Kosovo has been considered in terms of the achievement of a desirable political end-state.

In view of the above, Chapaux (2004:7) states that the action of the UN in Kosovo is far beyond the one of a simple peacekeeping mission. ‘The aim of the economical part of the UNMIK is not to come back to the status quo ante by rebuilding what war had destroyed but indeed to create a state of prosperity in Kosovo... it is relevant to point out that the (Security) Council sees a direct link between economic prosperity and international stability’. In fact, in Kosovo, UNDP participated actively in the assessment and planning of the peace process and worked closely with the rest of the international community to develop programmes to enable Kosovars to rebuild their lives and futures for a sustainable and stable Kosovo (UNDP undated). Thus developments in Kosovo have shown the international community’s determination to ensure that Kosovo progresses on the path of co-existence and reconciliation. However, what is needed – and presently lacking – is concrete action on the part of the leaders and people of Kosovo to implement measures to ensure that renewed conflict would not erupt (UN Secretary-General 2004:15).

Finally, it should be noted that the political strength and economic capacity of the Developing World have been instrumental in ensuring that peacebuilding has featured prominently as an integral part of peacekeeping in Kosovo. In fact, in the context of realities in Africa – where peacekeeping is more often than not concerned with enforcing peace in impoverished, weak and collapsing or collapsed states – it has sometimes been contended in the past that peacebuilding has more relevance for the countries elsewhere in the Developing World than for those on the African continent. In view of the above, the relevance of peacebuilding in contemporary African peacekeeping undertakings will be assessed in the section below.

4.2 African challenges and responses
It could rightly be asserted that concerns regarding post-conflict peace-
building were largely peripheral to the debates on and the practice of conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Africa during much of the 1990s. For instance, Malan (1999:4) asserts that African sub-regional organisations ‘have pursued overtly political objectives’ as a rationale for intervention, and that sub-regional organisations could not lay claim to the right of intervention on humanitarian grounds. Likewise, Schraeder (2004:291) contends that ‘interventions are (were) theoretically driven by the self-interest of the intervening country’. However, recent peacekeeping interventions seem to have moved beyond the pursuit of ‘overtly political objectives’ and are now also concerned with processes essentially relating to removing or weakening factors that breed or sustain conflict, and reinforcing factors that build positive relations and sustain peace (Hitchcock 2004:38). In this regard, the cases of Angola and Sierra Leone, for instance, are clearly pointing towards substantial peacebuilding processes on the African continent.

4.2.1 The case of Angola

Angola entered the process of reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction in 2002 with a legacy of over a million people killed, a third of the population (over 3 million people) displaced and in need of emergency assistance, and 105 000 ex-combatants to be re-integrated into society (Shannon 2004:40). Thus, since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding for the Cessation of Hostilities, between the military leaders of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in April 2002, Angola has been faced with the challenging task of post-conflict peacebuilding in an unstable social, economic and political environment, and in the midst of a severe humanitarian crisis (Hitchcock 2004:38).

Since disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) is a vital process in the transition from war to peace, a DDR process is underway in Angola as part of the ongoing peacebuilding process. Without going into much detail, the quartering, demilitarisation and demobilisation process of UNITA began immediately after the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding and was carried out by the Angolan Armed Forces. The peacebuilding process got underway in April 2002 with the quartering of a total of more than 85 000 UNITA soldiers in family reception areas in 27 quartering areas. The quartering
process was still ongoing when it was announced that the demobilisation of these ex-soldiers would begin in earnest, and that a number of UNITA soldiers (approximately 5 000) would be integrated into the Angolan Armed Forces in accordance with a selection process that had been initiated. International technical assistance to the DDR process has been led and facilitated primarily by the World Bank under the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme. The DDR process also provided for the peaceful co-existence between ex-combatants and residents in areas of resettlement and return, as a critical priority for the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants. In the Angolan case this is especially important because the majority of soldiers remained for long periods of time in the armed forces (Porto & Parsons 2004:32,35,43,60).

A number of difficulties have been encountered with the DDR process, mainly due to a lack of adequate planning and unrealistic timetables. This resulted in large numbers of ex-combatants not receiving the necessary supplies or attention, and an increase in criminal activity. Health problems and malnutrition further complicated the situation in the camps. Another reason why the DDR process was and is being hampered by difficulties relates to the government’s reluctance to involve the UN to any significant degree. In addition, there is limited co-ordination between the various actors, such as the World Food Programme, NGOs and humanitarian agencies. Despite many difficulties facing the DDR programme, a considerable advantage is the fact that it is home-grown, that the former enemies agreed on a cease-fire and that there was unhindered political will demonstrated in the completion of the peace process (Hitchcock 2004:39-40).

It should be noted that peacebuilding in Angola went far beyond DDR. In short, NGOs did extensive work with regard to preparing for elections, undertaking human rights training and civic education, as well as rendering humanitarian and development assistance (Shannon 2004:40,42).

Apart from the Angolan process the peace process in Sierra Leone presents another recent example of a significant peacebuilding undertaking on the African continent. In fact, the Sierra Leone peace process presents a case of considerable magnitude in terms of comprehensive peacebuilding programming in a post-conflict state.
4.2.2 The case of Sierra Leone

After a disastrous encounter with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in May 2000, when the UN suffered one of its worst setbacks in the history of UN peacekeeping, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) made significant strides towards achieving its goals. The UN has moved speedily to increase the capacity of UNAMSIL to a strength of more than 17 000 uniformed personnel, and the mission appeared to be better organised and equipped than before. To this end, UNAMSIL was able to play a meaningful role in helping Sierra Leone’s war-ravaged population in moving towards an election process.

In his report of 14 March 2002, UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, reported the following with regard to the peace process (UN Secretary-General 2002:2-5):

- The overall security situation in Sierra Leone was generally stable.
- The disarmament process had progressed well with a total of 47 076 combatants disarmed between 18 May 2001 and 17 January 2002.
- Some 1723 ex-combatants had been selected for reintegration into the Sierra Leone army.
- Substantial progress had been made in preparing for presidential and parliamentary elections.
- Political parties could continue to prepare for the scheduled elections.

The Secretary-General furthermore reported that the disarmament process and the deployment of UNAMSIL throughout the country had created a relatively more secure environment, which provided the opportunity for Sierra Leone to hold free, fair and credible elections, to concentrate on national reconciliation and recovery, as well as on building sustainable institutions. Interestingly, the Secretary-General mentioned that ‘the international community has invested heavily in Sierra Leone, both politically and financially’ (UN Secretary-General 2002:11-12).

Against this background, the conducting of general elections on 14 May 2002 represented a significant step forward in Sierra Leone’s elusive search for peace and democracy. Though the elections did not result in a change of government, the participation of the RUF signalled a commitment to both
peace and the democratisation process. One of the remarkable features of the 2002 elections was the level of public engagement and the peaceful nature of the campaign process (Jalloh 2002:59,61). Another remarkable or most outstanding feature – especially significant from a peacebuilding perspective – was the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) under the Lome Peace Agreement of 1999 between Sierra Leone’s government and the RUF. The TRC, clearly meant to be a nation-building project, was intended to address impunity, to break the cycle of violence, to provide a forum for both victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, as well as to get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation. Modelled on past commissions in Chile, Guatemala and South Africa, the TRC intended to investigate the causes, nature and extent of human rights violations that occurred in the country, help restore the human dignity of victims, and promote national reconciliation. Apart from fostering national reconciliation through the TRC, it was also decided to establish a Special UN Court to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law that have taken place in Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996. However, the Court was meant to be punitive as opposed to the TRC with its aim of being complementary to promoting sustainable peace in Sierra Leone (IRIN 2002).

Other issues that received attention in the peacebuilding process relate to programmes in the fields of humanitarian assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons, the consolidation of civil authority, the promotion of human rights and good governance, as well as the restoration of the legal system. Without going into much detail, it should be noted that considerable amounts were invested and practical aid was provided by the European Union, as well as the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States. For instance, the United States’ total humanitarian and emergency contribution in the fiscal year 2002, including grants to the World Food Programme and other aid agencies, assistance to refugees, programmes to combat HIV/AIDS, reintegration of combatants and development programmes, amounted to USD 56 million (Human Rights Watch 2003).

Approximately five years after its creation, UNAMSIL is (at the time of writing) approaching the end of its mandate in December 2004. Amongst other
successes, UNAMSIL managed to disarm some 75,000 former combatants, facilitated significant improvement to infrastructure, expanded state authority, and has almost rebuilt the national police to the target of 9,500 officials. Although UNAMSIL has enjoyed considerable success, certain challenges remain and others are sure to arise in the upcoming withdrawal process. Low levels of public confidence in the capabilities of the police and armed forces may especially pose security challenges of a serious concern. However, should the peace process – and post-conflict peacebuilding – prove to be successful, it will represent a major success in international peacekeeping in one of Africa’s most conflict-ridden states (Molukanele et al. 2004:42-43).

Thus, from the above it is clear that the peace processes in the cases of Angola and especially Sierra Leone (to mention only two recent African experiences) clearly involve a human security approach, specifically based on a liberty/rights and rule of law dimension; a freedom from fear/safety of peoples dimension; and a freedom from want/equity and social justice dimension. Moreover, it involves a commitment to peacebuilding; a willingness to make a difference on the ground in preventing conflicts or establishing the basic conditions for making sustainable security and development possible.

Having said this, the question arises as to what the South African view on peacekeeping entails. This question is of considerable importance given South Africa’s political and economic strength on the continent, as well as the country’s evolving role in African peacekeeping requirements. To this end, the South African view will be explored in the section below.

5. The South African View and ‘Developmental Peacekeeping’

In 1999, the South African Government published a White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (hereafter White Paper). This document has a wide scope and covers not only the philosophical and political aspects of involvement in peace missions, but also the practical aspects of the country’s potential contributions. From a foreign policy point of view, the White Paper is certainly a document of much significance. It is possibly the most important foreign policy document of the last decade to pass Cabinet, since
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it forced the South African Government to outline its philosophy on conflict resolution and its general approach towards Africa (Cilliers 1999:10).

Importantly, the White Paper states that there is no singular short-term approach to resolving crises. Peace missions should, therefore, be viewed as long-term endeavours, which include a significant investment in peacebuilding. According to the drafters of the White Paper, peacebuilding involves inculcating respect for human rights and political pluralism, accommodating diversity, building the capacity of the state and civil institutions, and promoting economic growth and equity. In the words of the White paper, ‘these measures are the most effective means of preventing crises, and are therefore as much precrisis priorities’ (SA Department of Foreign Affairs 1999:10). This clearly coincides with the point that peacebuilding was gradually expanded to refer to integrated approaches to address violent conflict at different phases of the conflict cycle.

The White Paper especially emphasises peacebuilding in terms of governance programming and rule of law programming (SA Department of Foreign Affairs 1999:10):

While the staging of free and fair elections normally marks the transition of the post-conflict state, this state has little chance to prosper unless emphasis is also placed on the essentials of efficient and effective governance, namely: adherence to the rule of law; competent and fair judiciaries; effective police services and criminal justice systems; professional civil services with an ethos of democratic governance...

The White Paper also alludes to ‘conflict-sensitive development’ as the White Paper describes peacebuilding as a ‘diplomatic/developmental’ process, and not primarily a ‘military responsibility’ (SA Department of Foreign Affairs 1999:10). At the same time, the White Paper does not say much about developmental issues or challenges, except for referring to a need to attend to ‘the reorientation of the state and its personnel away from partisan interest towards developmental goals’ (SA Department of Foreign Affairs 1999:10).

More recently, in 2000, the (now former) Deputy Minister of Defence, Ms Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, introduced the concept of ‘developmental peacekeeping’ to politicians and defence functionaries (Madlala-Routledge...
2000:4). This concept is defined as a post-conflict reconstruction intervention which aims to achieve sustainable levels of human security through a combination of interventions aimed at accelerating capacity building and socio-economic development, which will result in the dismantling of war economies and conflict systems, and replacing them with globally competitive ‘peace economies’. An important feature of developmental peacekeeping is that it does not distinguish between peacekeeping and peacebuilding on a process level, as if they were separate phases or elements in a linear process. This view implies that peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding are integrated in one process. On an operational level this means that post-conflict reconstruction interventions operate in synergy with peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Practically speaking, this would mean that post-conflict reconstruction practitioners and resources are deployed alongside peacekeepers irrespective of the existence of cease-fire agreements (Madlala-Routledge & Liebenberg 2004:128).

The concept of developmental peacekeeping is premised on the ‘problem statement’ that current peacekeeping interventions are unable to resolve resource-based conflicts or conflicts that are being sustained by war economies – which is typical of African conflicts. Moreover, it is asserted that current peacekeeping approaches are characterised by long time lapses before developmental and peacebuilding interventions can be implemented in war torn zones. This leads to an inadequate capacity to dismantle war economies, as well as an inability to absorb ex-combatants and to destroy conflict systems (Madlala-Routledge & Liebenberg 2004:127).

A very ambitious concept indeed, developmental peacekeeping focuses on the realisation of the African Union and NEPAD’s priorities. Firstly, it is believed that developmental peacekeeping will work towards achieving sustainable political and economic development which will, furthermore, advance democracy, as well as regional integration and co-operation through the dismantling of exploitative war economies. Secondly, it is contended that developmental peacekeeping will create a platform for policy reforms and increased investment through the dismantling of war economies. This is primarily to be achieved through the development of an integrated development plan or framework for post-conflict reconstruction and development (Madlala-Routledge & Liebenberg 2004:130).
A striking feature of the proposed concept of developmental peacekeeping is the basic assertion that capacity building and socio-economic development will result in the dismantling of war economies and conflict systems, and in replacing them with globally competitive economies. This view coincides with the contention that there are strong linkages between scarcity, inequality and institutional weaknesses in societies and their (in)abilities to ensure peace and security. Moreover, it supports the view that underdevelopment and poor social, economic and environmental conditions, as well as weak or ineffective political institutions diminish a society’s capacity to manage social tensions in a non-violent manner. Although developmental peacekeeping has not received any official policy endorsement at governmental level, it underscores a firm belief among some role-players in the South African context that specific measures, instruments and programmes in terms of human security and ‘conflict sensitive development’ may need to be implemented to address armed conflicts constructively.

6. Appraisal and Conclusion

It is commonly known that armed conflicts on the African continent have seriously undermined the attainment of development, security and democratic consolidation. From a scholarly and practical point of view, such conflict reinforces the inextricable link between durable peace, long-term security and sustainable development. It is today widely accepted that contemporary armed conflicts require sustained efforts that address not only the military dimensions of conflicts, but also the political, humanitarian, economic and social dimensions of conflicts. Specifically, for some years there has been a growing concern with and emphasis on the necessity of linking security and development to achieve meaningful peace, and pursuing this by means of special peacebuilding measures.

Based on the aforementioned case studies or references to peacekeeping in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Angola – to cite only a selected few cases – there seems to be a growing awareness that peacebuilding should be an essential part of any multinational peacekeeping undertaking. In referring once again to Sierra
Leone, the citizens of this West African state went to the polls on 26 and 27 February 1996 before there was any sign of a cease-fire or peace agreement. Instead of the usual ‘UN prescribed pattern’ of cease-fire, peace agreement, demobilisation and then elections, the ‘peace process’ of 1996 began with the staging of elections. Not surprisingly, Sierra Leone’s people had a short-lived experiment with democracy. In 2002, there was clearly a different methodology as peacebuilding measures, instruments and programmes had been put in place. Policy instruments outside the toolbox of traditional security policy were mobilised and development-related interventions were made in the search for durable peace and democracy.

Finally, it has been argued in this paper that the end of the Cold War has offered an opportunity for international role-players to revisit dominant conceptions of security and development policy, and to devise integrated and coherent policy instruments and programmes to address violent conflict from a peacebuilding perspective. However, Tschirgi (2003:13) warns that the ‘window of opportunity’ that opened internationally in the 1990s with regard to the global search for security and development through integrated peacebuilding approaches, has been closed somewhat in the mean time. The reason is that international attention tended to turn to ‘issues of hard security’ again since 11 September 2001. ‘It would be a great mistake to underestimate the significance of the normative, political, institutional and operational changes that have been undertaken since the 1990s and to allow these gains to be overtaken by the climate of fear that has marked international affairs since 11 September. The case has to be made continuously that development and security need to be mutually reinforcing – especially when many of the threats that confront the international community emanate largely from failures of development’ (Tschirgi 2003:13).

Be that as it may, it is evident that a range of international reforms throughout the international system has taken place to facilitate peacebuilding endeavours. Much was indeed done to facilitate a fundamental overhaul of the UN system, while major aid agencies established conflict prevention and peacebuilding units. Also, some Western governments aligned their foreign, security and development policies and programmes to respond to the conflict prevention and peacebuilding agenda and challenges of the contemporary international
community. This means supporting policies, activities, programmes and projects which facilitate war-prone, war-torn or post-war countries to recover from conflict in order to address longer-term developmental and security goals. All in all, it could be argued that this has led to a better understanding of the political economy of armed conflicts, as well as a drive towards applying appropriate strategies and priorities to deal with developmental and security challenges in responses to violent conflict and civil war. Obviously, this is of great importance from an African perspective given the acute need to apply relevant and constructive measures and strategies in the search for sustainable development and long-term security on the continent.

**Sources**


The Security-Development Nexus and the Imperative of Peacebuilding


Implications of the Democracy-Development Relationship for Conflict Resolution

Dirk Kotzé*

Abstract

The article uses a working hypothesis based on three assumptions, namely that democratisation is directly and positively correlated with conflict resolution/prevention; that socio-economic development is directly and positively correlated with democracy; and therefore that democratisation and socio-economic development provide a fitting structural basis for resolving and preventing conflict.

Firstly, the nature of conflict resolution is examined in the context of four categories. For the purpose of the discussion, the behaviouralist and instrumentalist/structuralist approaches are used. Secondly, the relationship between

* Dr Dirk Kotzé is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Sciences at the University of South Africa. One of his teaching responsibilities is conflict resolution at both undergraduate and graduate levels. One of his research projects is a comparative study of truth commissions and international criminal tribunals as instruments for conflict resolution and prevention. As part of his studies he attended an advanced course at Uppsala University’s Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
democracy and economic development is investigated. Research conclusions indicate that with regard to democratic regimes, economic development is a more important variable than political legacy, religious or linguistic factors. High growth and loss of personal income are potential threats to democratic consolidation and stability, and egalitarian income distribution is conducive to democratic durability. Data from African countries are used to test these general conclusions. These data qualify the correlation between growth and democracy, and shift the focus more to the social impact of growth and away from growth per se. Income and human development indices provide even less confirmation of the development/democracy correlation. Thirdly, the nature of democracy is briefly analysed to determine how development and conflict resolution can fit into its composition. The instrumentalist and intrinsic approaches are used.

The overall conclusion is that neither democratisation nor economic development, nor a combination of them can be applied under all circumstances for conflict resolution.

1. An Elusive Correlation?

In the late 20th century the end of the Cold War created expectations of a more peaceful world, and one in which democratisation is more prevalent. It was expected that Huntington's 'third wave' (Huntington 1991), in symbolic terms, would meet with Fukuyama's 'end of history' (Fukuyama 1989). Ideology was the cause of conflict while democracy is the guarantee against it.

Normative and qualitative assertions (like the 'end of history' or structural analyses of society) present us with the view that democracy is one of the most assured guarantees against conflict. Moreover, the ‘democratic peace’ assumption predicates that democratic societies do not engage in conflict with each other (Brown et al. 1996, Elman 1999:87-103, Chernoff 2004:49-77). A third dimension can be added to the correlation. Socio-economic development is considered to be either a catalyst for democratisation, or a consequence of democratisation. It presents us with a triad of assumed correlations, namely –
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- that democratisation (including good governance) is directly and positively correlated with conflict resolution/prevention (Reychler 1999);
- that socio-economic development is directly and positively correlated with democracy;
- and therefore, that democratisation and socio-economic development provide a necessary structural basis for resolving deep-rooted conflicts or for preventing conflicts.

For the purpose of this article these assumed correlations serve as a working hypothesis. Concrete illustrations of the practical relevance of this hypothesis are the following. The World Bank has embraced it, it has been incorporated in the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ for European Union (EU) membership (http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.html) and in the context of the ‘Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance’ of the new African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The World Bank’s package of conditionalities includes concepts like good governance and multi-party democratisation, as well as economic structural adjustment. In its view, structural adjustment, or now Poverty Reduction Strategies (http://www.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.hsf/67ByDocName/ConflictAnalysisPovertyReductionStrategyPapersPRSPinconflict-affectedcountries) can serve as the blueprint for socio-economic development. The third component (conflict) is implied in reconstructing the state. A predatory state or a state without the necessary institutional capacity is often the cause of conflict. This view about a properly institutionalised state was the focus of the World Bank’s World Development Report, The State in a Changing World, in 1997.

Much research has already been conducted about the relationship between democracy and development (for example, Przeworski et al 2000, Quinn & Woolley 2001, Przeworski 1991, Freedom House, Iheduru 1999, Przeworski & Limongi 1993, Landa & Kapstein 2001). Similar research about a relationship between democracy and development on the one hand, and conflict resolution on the other hand, is not so readily available.

A notable, practical example where this triad of correlations is embraced, is the view of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) on humanitarian assistance. One of its policy documents states (SIDA 1999:1):
Programmes of development cooperation can contribute to preventing armed conflicts before they break out with the aid of targeted development projects, programmes for strengthening democracy and human rights, regional cooperation programmes and supporting communication between hostile parties.

In this article the approach is to concentrate firstly on conflict resolution as a concept – in particular the various approaches used, how they define the essence of conflict and whether democracy/development has a function anywhere in them. Next we summarise the research already done about the relationship between democracy and development. Finally, we integrate our analysis of conflict resolution into the research on democracy/development and investigate possible logical correlations between them. This study does not include an empirical investigation of possible correlations between conflict resolution and democracy/development. On the basis of these qualitative conclusions empirical studies can follow later.

2. The Essence of Conflict and Conflict Resolution

For the purpose of testing the working hypothesis, it is firstly necessary to consider how conflict and conflict resolution are understood in this discussion.

Perspectives on, and approaches towards, conflict and conflict resolution can be summarised in the following four categories or schools of thought:

1) One school of thought locates conflict at both the individual and societal/national levels. The proponents assume that at both levels the individual person is the unit of analysis. Figure 1 presents a schematic visualisation of it. Behaviour associated with conflict can be caused by, or can result in, overreaction (often because of misunderstanding, lack of communication or irrational emotionalism), overperception (negative attitudes or stereotypes, or misrepresentations), invention of an enemy (as a common external threat, to conceal internal differences, or to exploit nationalism and patriotism) or ethnocentrism (as a means to polarise a group or nation on the basis of identity or a ‘we/they’ distinction.
Human nature is often described by biological or physiological conceptions. One can add to them the notion of social learning, such as processes of socialisation and cost/benefit calculations about the usage or avoidance of conflict. Another component of this school of thought is the well-known notion of dissonance between expectations and actual rewards. Ted Gurr’s construct of ‘relative deprivation’ and James C. Davies’ of a ‘J-curve’ are examples of such dissonance. All of these are perceptions, psychological constructs and individual experiences. Its logical implication is that conflict resolution should respond by changing these perceptions and addressing their causes (Sandole & Van der Merwe 1993:7-16).

2) Traditionally, conflict has been treated as competition for the realisation of interests, often individual interests. Conflict resolution therefore manifested itself in the form of compromises. Power and coercion were often applied to deliver the compromises. In this context the task of a mediator was to present a compromise which the less powerful party had to accept (Burton 1987:7-8).

3) During the Cold War period, conflict was not resolved but suppressed or contained. Coercion and crisis management were often used. The emphasis was therefore on short-term stability and not on longer-term sustainability (Harris & Reilly 1998:13).

4) The most contemporary school of thought concentrates on human needs and systemic (state) failure as the main causes of conflict. (It is incorporated in figure 2. See page 67.) Human needs and systemic restructuring are presented in the ambit of an institutionalist and structuralist approach. Human needs are linked here to identity needs, while systemic needs are related here to self-determination and unequal distribution of human interests. The most ontological human need, according to this view, is identity need (for example in Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi or the Sudan) (Burton 1987:16; Harris & Reilly 1998:9-10). Other human needs, described by Stephen John Stedman (in Deng & Zartman 1991:367-369,373) as basic human needs, are resource needs, dignity needs, power needs and value needs. When persons are involved in conflict, they also develop security and survival needs. These needs are exacerbated by crises in
national governance or systemic failure. This is used as an explanation why intra-state conflicts have become more prevalent than inter-state conflicts. Therefore, the emphasis has also moved from solving conflictual relations between states, to resolving relations within states. Mutual agreements regarding both human needs and self-determination are zero-sum in nature and therefore no compromises can be contemplated. Instead of bargaining and searching for a settlement characterised by compromises, self-determination needs and human needs can only be addressed by analytical problem solving. Human interests, on the other hand, are not necessarily zero-sum in nature, and they can be the subject of bargaining, depending on the power relations between the competing parties. In the end both types of needs and interests have to be accommodated in one conflict resolution package. As a result of the focus on internal, systemic failure in both types of needs and interests, the emphasis in conflict resolution shifted to an institutional approach; in other words, to finding the most appropriate state institutions to resolve the failure. In this respect the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) presents democracy as a normative, instrumentalist framework (Harris & Reilly 1998:16-17). As already mentioned, SIDA (1999) has a more structuralist approach, and focuses on a combination of development and political structures. (Both approaches are explained further below.) Vivian Hart (2003) developed the notion of ’conversational constitutionalism’ in a publication for the United States Institute of Peace, which can be considered a third variation. Its emphasis is on democratic processes of constitution making as a conflict resolution approach.

At present conflict resolution appears to be accommodated within two schools of thought, namely a behavioural approach and an institutionalist/structuralist approach. These approaches can be summarised in the following two figures (see page 67).

The two approaches are not mutually exclusive, though no publications could be found in which they are integrated. The most obvious point of contact is between the societal* level in the behavioural approach in figure 1 and communal identity* in figure 2.

The preferred outcomes of the two approaches do not necessarily overlap. In the behavioural approach, conflict resolution focuses on individuals and their roles in society – especially for the purpose of establishing social harmony amongst
Implications of the Democracy-Development Relationship for Conflict Resolution

Fig. 1: Behavioural Approach

Individual $\rightarrow$ societal* $\rightarrow$
- overreaction
- overperception
- enemy invention
  (self-protection)
- ethnocentrism ('we' / 'they')

- biological
- physiological
- social learning

- expectations / rewards dissonance (relative deprivation)

Fig. 2: Institutionalist / Structuralist Approach

INTER- $\rightarrow$ INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS

self-determination/ communal identity* / human interests
  (ontological human needs) (unequal distribution)

- no compromise
- compromise

- analytical problem solving
- settlement / power bargaining

- political structures (Burton) / suitable institutions (IDEA) /
  'conversational constitutionalism'

$\downarrow$

democracy
them and their societies at a behavioural level. The structuralist approach emphasises conflict resolution as restructuring of the political environment but does not prescribe democratic structures as the only option. For Burton it is important to find long-term, sustainable solutions acceptable for all. Though his focus is on political structures, the fact that he identified problems of communal identity superimposed on unequal distribution, as even more troublesome, means that the structures should also promote fair socio-economic distribution (i.e. another form of structural change). SIDA is quite explicit about such an objective.

The institutionalist approach of IDEA (Harris & Reilly 1998) is less concerned about distribution matters, and concentrates on the range of options of democratic institutions available to negotiators and mediators. For them, conflict resolution is about finding the most appropriate of these institutions. Harris & Reilly (1998:16) used Angola as an illustration of this point: the 1991 Bicesse peace agreement focused on elections (i.e. a democratic practice and institution), which were to lead to a power-sharing government. Thomas Ohlson (1998:74) disputed the idea that it provided for power sharing. According to him, both parties preferred a winner-takes-all system. The Angola constitution was unsuitable for power sharing, because most of the executive powers were concentrated in a single-person President. Therefore the loser in the September 1992 presidential election, Jonas Savimbi, went back to the bush. In defiance of Savimbi, twelve Unita elected members of Parliament took up their seats. In December 1992 a government of national unity was sworn in, with Unita being allotted four of the 27 ministerial/vice-ministerial posts (Ohlson 1998:76). Conflict continued because of the zero-sum nature of the executive Presidency, and the power-sharing government as a democratic institution could not counter it.

A permutation on the institutionalist approach is Vivian Hart’s (2003) of an institutionalist (constitutionalist) approach and democratic dynamics. According to her (Hart 2003:2), constitution making ‘has become a part of many peace processes. New nations and radically new regimes, seeking the democratic credentials that are often a condition for recognition by other nations and by international political, financial, aid, and trade organizations, make writing a constitution a priority’.
Hart’s notion of ‘conversational constitutionalism’ is, however, a deviation from traditional constitution making as represented by the 1787 American Constitution. According to her, such an approach views constitution making as concluding a conflict and as a codification of a conflict settlement in order to produce permanence and stability. It constitutes therefore an act of completion, a final settlement or a social contract in which basic political definitions, principles and processes are encapsulated. In her view, such a process should not be an act of final closure, because it will entrench the post-conflict distribution of power and will exclude new participants. Her insistence on a democratic and flexible process of constitution making makes a moral claim for participation.

This combined approach appears to be tailor-made for conflict resolution, but relies too much on only one historical example, namely South Africa. Hart’s ideas are also only applicable to a relatively short transitional period. In the case of South Africa they applied to the period between the interim Constitution (1993) and finalisation of the 1996 Constitution. The process after 1996 reverted back to IDEA’s institutional approach, or democratic consolidation in the form of institution building. The 1996 Constitution closed the constitutional phase of conflict resolution, but provided an enabling framework for other processes such as affirmative action, land reform, black economic empowerment and reconciliation.

A second permutation is the structuralist approach underpinning SIDA’s approach. It ventures beyond institutions and includes changes to the social, political and economic structural or systemic configurations in a society. It entails redistributions of power, status or wealth, and new class associations. The mentioned processes of affirmative action, land reform or black economic empowerment are structuralist in approach. Insofar as they have been institutionalised, the structuralist and instrumentalist approaches complement each other.

In summary: present-day scholarship and practices in conflict resolution do not focus exclusively on democracy and socio-economic development. An important school of thought (that also includes peace education/peace studies) has a strong behavioural orientation. However, the structuralist and institutionalist approaches are endorsed (maybe even preferred) by many decision-makers. For example, Kofi Annan (in Harris & Reilly 1998:vii) wrote...
that more complex conflicts have ‘obliged the international community to
develop new instruments of conflict resolution, many of which relate to the
electoral process and, more generally, to the entrenchment of a democratic
culture in war-torn societies, with a view to making peace sustainable’. A further
example is the Brookings Institution’s Africa Program which set as its goal ‘to
elucidate what institutions can be devised that will produce enduring peace’

The next step is to now move the focus to research conclusions regarding
the relationship between democracy and development.

3. Democracy and Development

The working hypothesis assuming that socio-economic development is directly
and positively correlated with democracy is examined in this section.

The hypothesis and therefore the relationship between democracy and
development are often presented in terms of causality. In this respect at least
three options are possible, namely –

1) Taking development as the point of departure, the premise is that develop-
ment is the necessary condition for a strong, high-growth economy which will
be the catalyst for democratisation. Key examples in this regard are the newly
industrialised Pacific Rim and possibly also China.

2) On the other hand, taking democratisation as the point of departure, the
premise is that it is a necessary condition for development. Examples to support
this are India and some Latin American countries.

3) The two projects, democratisation and development, may also be taken
as running concurrently, and most of today’s developing countries are indeed
expected to follow this option. One may look for example at the political and
economic conditionalities of the World Bank and IMF.

What is development? According to Przeworski and others, it is about structural
transformation, and changes in values and ethical approaches (such as nepotism or corruption). Furthermore, development articulated as increase in growth, is operationalised as increase in income, productivity, consumption, investment, education, life expectancy, employment, childbirth survival and similar indicators (Przeworski et al 2000:1,3).

In the current international climate, development is viewed through the prism of ‘modernisation’, with the main emphasis on growth and its ‘trickle-down’ effect to the society at large. It predicts a social structure which is more complex. The paradigm also predicts that newly mobilised groups (who will emerge partly as a result of higher growth and concomitant, improved socio-economic development) will rise against the incumbent undemocratic regime. At the same time development depoliticises certain spheres of society, and frees politics from too many demands and expectations. For example, politics is not anymore the main instrument for social and economic upward mobility. Development is associated with differentiation and specialisation and thereby spheres of competition in societies are multiplied and diversified.

Another variation of modernisation can be attributed to the newly industrialised countries (NICs) in the Pacific Rim: high growth (i.e. development) which depends on a ‘benevolent autocracy’. They made a strong case for a general belief that democracy’s freedoms and rights are incompatible with high economic growth. Hence, development and democracy are not necessarily causal in their relationship. From another point of view but with the same implication, Turkey serves as a noteworthy case. It developed a huge economy but the population exhibits all the symptoms of development with marked disparities in respect of almost all the main development indicators. As an aspirant EU member since 1999, Turkey has to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria, which includes political and economic liberalisation. Hence, since 2002 the Turkish government has adopted radical changes which can only be described as a new ‘wave’ of democratisation. The *Turkish Daily News* (9 May 2005) reported the following about how these political and economic changes affect economic growth:

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan conceded that the layman had yet to reap the fruits of economic growth and other positive developments, but he said time was needed to[0] for economic reforms to be digested.
Seymour Martin Lipset can arguably claim credit for introducing in 1959 the debate about a probable relationship between the degree of economic development and the prevalence of a democratic regime in a country. He concluded that a strong, positive relationship between the two variables exists (Przeworski et al 2000:78-79), but he did not conclude anything about a correlation of causality between them. Adam Przeworski and others tested those conclusions and produced the following results:

- As a variable with an impact on democratic regimes, economic development is more important than the regime’s political legacy, religious or ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (diversity) or the impact of the international political environment. But an important qualification is that economic development is not directly and positively correlated to democracy: democratic transitions are less likely in both poor and rich countries, and more likely in intermediate-income societies (Przeworski et al 2000:92). (It can therefore be presumed that democratisation is unlikely in the absence of some degree of pre-existing development.)
- With regard to growth as a factor, Przeworski, on the one hand, concluded that regime types do not affect the growth rate (Przeworski et al 2000:160). Democracy, therefore, does not produce higher growth rates than other regime types. Freedom House, on the other hand, surveyed GDP growth rates (in the period 1990-98) and linked them to their assessment and ratings of the levels of freedom in the states. Their conclusion is that in developed states the highest growth rates prevalent are in partly free (not totally free) societies. In developing states there is a direct, positive correlation between growth and freedom (Freedom House). Therefore, in totally free developing societies growth can be higher than in unfree societies, while in developed states it is optimal in partly free societies. For Freedom House, regime types are therefore relevant.
- In related research but with a slightly different focus, Quinn & Woolley (2001:653) concluded that economic policies in democracies tend to be risk-avoiding or avoiding volatility. High growth is associated with volatility, and hence democracies will also avoid high economic growth.
- Regarding per capita income, Przeworski concluded, firstly, that a strong
positive correlation is present between the level of per capita income and the degree of democratic stability/survival. However, wealthy countries are less sensitive to a decline in income than poor countries. (A similar positive correlation exists between education and democratic survival.) A decline, therefore, in personal income in developing states is related to a high probability of democratic decline. A decline in income is not a threat to non-democratic regimes, however (Przeworski et al 2000:101,109).

The level of growth and changes in income are therefore sensitive variables, though Quinn & Woolley showed that economic volatility is even more sensitive.

- Another aspect related to growth, is that democracy is more stable in egalitarian societies than in those with high levels of income inequality. Non-democratic regimes are, once again, not affected by it, and their regime stability is not influenced by income inequality. Moene & Wallerstein (2001:23-25) concluded that income distribution of most egalitarian societies is characterised by relatively higher spending on income replacement (i.e. unemployment insurance, sickness pay, occupational illness, disability, etc.) than on other forms of social security. Public expenditure on pensions, health care, family benefits and housing does not have the same impact on egalitarianism as income replacement. We can therefore conclude that democracy is more stable in states with relatively high levels of public spending on income replacement. It can also be inferred that in developing democracies high priority should be placed on secure income in the form of job creation and employment security.

From the above-mentioned research results the following conclusions are possible:

1) High growth (associated with high volatility) and loss of personal income (or insufficient income replacement) are potential threats to democratic consolidation and stability. According to Freedom House, high growth rates are more likely in, and compatible with, both developed and partly free (but not fully free or fully democratic) states as well as developing and free (fully democratic) states. For Przeworski et al democratic transitions are more prevalent in
intermediate-income societies. Growth, for them, is not determined by the regime type. Developing but poor states with a low growth-rate are therefore unlikely to democratise or increase their growth rates.

Democratisation and consolidation are hence optimal in conditions of intermediate growth and income, combined with sufficient income replacement.

2) The more egalitarian income distribution is, the more likely is democratic stability. It is partly associated with spending on income replacement. It means that states with intermediate-income levels and with egalitarian income structures have a good chance to succeed with democratisation and democratic survival. It suggests an optimal situation in which intermediate levels of growth are present, but growth that does not widen the income gap and that does not result in loss of, or threat to income.

In view of the above conclusions, ‘small N’ samples of case studies in Africa have been selected to test the conclusions in conditions specifically characterised by conflict. Thereby their relevance for conflict resolution can be investigated.

3.1 African case studies: Growth
The correlation between growth and democratisation is the first to be tested by three southern African case studies. Both South Africa and Mozambique conducted democratisation elections in 1994 after prolonged periods of conflict. Angola concluded a peace agreement (Bicesse) in 1991 and held a multi-party election the next year. However, the disputed outcome of the Angolan presidential election introduced a new wave of civil war that only came to an end in 2002. Angola, with its extended period of conflict and lack of national

Fig. 3: Per Capita GNP (Average Annual Growth Rate, and Ranking)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>0,1%</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>-1,1%</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>-0,9%</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>-3,6%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,6%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6,6%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-6,1%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-37,4%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

consensus on democracy, therefore serves as a control case for the other two cases of relatively peaceful democratisation. Their growth rates in terms of per capita GNP and their GNP ranking in the world (1 = lowest GNP in the world) are summarised as follows:

The figure shows that in the case of South Africa during its period of undemocratic rule it had the 89th lowest per capita GNP in the World Bank database. It improved by two places in the period 1985-95, which included the new, interim Constitution (1993) and the 1994 general election. It improved even more (by 17 places) in 1998-99. Mozambique, on the other hand, was the poorest country during its undemocratic period. It improved one place in the five years after its 1994 general election (compared to South Africa’s 17 places). Both states experienced relatively successful introductions of multiparty elections and general democratisation. Both have experienced improvements in growth rates since 1994 though the levels of growth differ markedly: in South Africa it was an increase of 0.2% and in Mozambique of 3.0%. Mozambique’s real growth rate of 6.6% is high in terms of international standards: the 5th highest after Moldova, Turkmenistan, South Korea and Ireland (World Development Report 2000/2001:274-275). The research results, therefore, are expected to suggest that Mozambique will experience problems with economic volatility, and therefore with democratic stability, while the situation is the opposite. The fact that its high growth has not yet produced a significant overall change in its economy (i.e. it improved by only one position in the world rankings) is a possible explanation for the absence of democratic instability. Compared with South Africa’s improvement of seventeen places based on a growth increase of only 0.2%, it suggests that research should not only look at real per capita GNP growth as an indicator of possible economic volatility, but also at the growth rate in relation to the economy’s level of development. It is suggested here for further research that a high growth rate (and high volatility) in relatively low GNP societies might not threaten democratic survival as much as the same growth rate in intermediate- and high-GNP societies.

Both South Africa and Mozambique experienced increases in growth between 1995 and 1998. Therefore, the general research conclusions that a decline is a threat to democratic survival, cannot be tested here. Angola, on the other hand, continued with undemocratic and violent conditions, which have
had devastating effects on its growth rate. Since the middle of 2002 a new peace is emerging and a new constitution is also in the pipeline but it is still too early to use it as a new case study.

3.2 African case studies: Income distribution
Moene & Wallerstein’s (2001) research results concluded that the more egalitarian a society’s income distribution is, the more likely is its democratic durability. In order to test it, we can look at a few cases in Africa, and use India (an important developing and democratic state) and Switzerland (as a democratic country with the highest per capita GNP in the world) as control cases. To the right follows a table with the income or consumption patterns of select African states (see page 77). Due to incomplete data, it is impossible to do comparisons for similar annual statistics, though the majority of data represent the early- and middle-1990s at the time of widespread 'third wave’ democratisation. Therefore, instead of presenting the data as chronologically comparable, it can only be used to search for possible trends. For example, first multiparty elections were held at different points in time in: Kenya (1991), Zambia (1991), South Africa (1994) and Mozambique (1994). Linking comparable time differences between the elections and the annual statistics might shed light on the relevance of income distribution for economic development.

From this figure it appears that the median distribution of the African states is 6% / 11% / 15% / 22% / 46%. The countries closest to it are Morocco, Algeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Mozambique, and Ghana to a lesser extent. Switzerland follows the same pattern, and India in 1997 was not far from it. The countries that deviate substantially from it are Rwanda in 1983-85 before the genocide (the most egalitarian example listed here), Kenya, Zambia and South Africa. The latter is the most unequal of them all, followed by Kenya (1992). After Rwanda, Ghana appears to be the second most egalitarian example – almost identical to India.

Tendencies in the democratising states are the following: in Kenya income/consumption distribution improved most dramatically of all the cases; in Zambia it is a mixed tendency; in Ghana it remained relatively unchanged; and in South Africa the situation worsened slightly, though the time difference between the two sets of data is in the latter case too short for a conclusive result.
### Implications of the Democracy-Development Relationship for Conflict Resolution

#### Fig. 4: Distribution of Income or Consumption

Distribution between the quintiles in the populations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>lowest 20%</th>
<th>21-40%</th>
<th>41-60%</th>
<th>61-80%</th>
<th>highest 20%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1990-91</td>
<td>6,6</td>
<td>10,5</td>
<td>15,0</td>
<td>21,7</td>
<td>46,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>6,5</td>
<td>10,6</td>
<td>14,8</td>
<td>21,3</td>
<td>46,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>6,9</td>
<td>11,0</td>
<td>15,1</td>
<td>20,9</td>
<td>46,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>7,0</td>
<td>11,6</td>
<td>16,1</td>
<td>22,7</td>
<td>42,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>6,9</td>
<td>10,9</td>
<td>15,3</td>
<td>21,5</td>
<td>45,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>6,8</td>
<td>10,3</td>
<td>14,4</td>
<td>20,4</td>
<td>48,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1983-85</td>
<td>9,7</td>
<td>13,2</td>
<td>16,5</td>
<td>21,6</td>
<td>39,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>6,7</td>
<td>10,7</td>
<td>17,0</td>
<td>62,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>5,0</td>
<td>9,7</td>
<td>14,2</td>
<td>20,9</td>
<td>50,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>5,8</td>
<td>9,8</td>
<td>17,7</td>
<td>63,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>2,9</td>
<td>5,5</td>
<td>9,2</td>
<td>17,7</td>
<td>64,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>6,5</td>
<td>10,8</td>
<td>15,1</td>
<td>21,1</td>
<td>46,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3,9</td>
<td>8,0</td>
<td>13,8</td>
<td>23,8</td>
<td>50,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4,2</td>
<td>8,2</td>
<td>12,8</td>
<td>20,1</td>
<td>54,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>7,9</td>
<td>12,0</td>
<td>16,1</td>
<td>21,8</td>
<td>42,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>8,4</td>
<td>12,2</td>
<td>15,8</td>
<td>21,9</td>
<td>41,7</td>
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<td>CONTROL</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>8,5</td>
<td>12,1</td>
<td>15,8</td>
<td>21,1</td>
<td>42,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>8,5</td>
<td>12,1</td>
<td>15,8</td>
<td>21,1</td>
<td>42,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>8,1</td>
<td>11,6</td>
<td>15,0</td>
<td>19,3</td>
<td>46,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>5,2</td>
<td>11,7</td>
<td>16,4</td>
<td>22,1</td>
<td>44,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>6,9</td>
<td>12,7</td>
<td>17,3</td>
<td>22,9</td>
<td>40,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the non-democratic states the tendencies are that in Morocco it remained unchanged and in Algeria it improved slightly.
Conclusions about discernible tendencies are almost impossible, except to say that consistent patterns are not visible. In 1983-85 Rwanda was the most egalitarian case, though not democratic. However, it could not prevent the genocide in 1994. Ghana is the second most egalitarian example. Since adopting a new constitution and the presidential elections in 1992, it experienced relative democratic durability. On the other hand, in South Africa as the most unequal case (which will probably deteriorate even more), durability of democracy has not been threatened for more than ten years.

In Zambia, where between 1991 and 2001 a multiparty system was established but electoral manipulation has been rampant, the tendency is mixed: the proportion of the low- and high-income groups increased, while the middle shrunk. In Kenya, following more or less the same political pattern, the income distribution improved quite dramatically after the first multiparty election.

The tendency towards equal distribution in Algeria showed an improvement, though it was engaged in a civil war since the aborted election in 1991. In Morocco, however, with exactly the same income distribution as Algeria’s, and also engaged in conflict with Western Sahara since the 1970s, there is an unchanged distribution pattern.

How egalitarian is the pattern in Africa? In comparison with the most egalitarian societies in the world (the Slovak Republic the most egalitarian, Belarus 2nd most, followed by Austria, Japan, Finland and Norway) the medians are the following (computed from World Development Report 2000/2001:282-283):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>lowest 20%</th>
<th>21-40%</th>
<th>41-60%</th>
<th>61-80%</th>
<th>highest 20%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median (Africa)</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median (top six, world)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia (top – world)</td>
<td>11,9</td>
<td>15,8</td>
<td>18,8</td>
<td>22,2</td>
<td>31,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda (top – Africa)</td>
<td>9,7</td>
<td>13,2</td>
<td>16,5</td>
<td>21,6</td>
<td>39,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 5: Comparison of Distribution of Income or Consumption
Distribution between the quintiles in the populations
The starkest disparities between Africa and the rest of the world are in the categories of quintiles with the lowest 20% and the highest 20% of the populations. It means that in the top 20% of the populations in Africa about 10% more wealth is concentrated than in that segment in the other societies. Income/consumption in the lowest 20% is about five percent less than in the other societies. (It is notable that the two most egalitarian societies – the Slovak Republic and Belarus – were part of the Eastern bloc, and therefore are relatively new democracies. It enhances the validity of comparisons made between the medians in Africa and the rest of the world.)

All the African cases of democracies used here are relatively young. None of them have regressed into a non-democratic regime. Data from troubled states like Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic were not available to test the research results against them.

So far we have treated development and growth as the independent variables and democratic durability as the dependent variable. In the next section we turn it around, to democracy as the independent variable and conflict resolution as the dependent variable.

### 3.3 African case studies: Human development index

An important indicator of the degree of development is quality of life as expressed by the human development index (HDI). From the working hypothesis it can be derived that development would improve the quality of life (operationalised as HDI), which in turn will prevent future conflicts caused by socio-economic disparities. Alternatively, it expects that under conditions of democracy and development, the HDI in a state will increase.

The following case studies have been selected from the United Nations Development Program’s 2003 database to test it (see Figure 6 on page 80).

Mozambique and South Africa launched their democratisation in 1994. The HDI of South Africa decreased between 1995 and 2001, while that of Mozambique increased. The HDI of Botswana – one of the oldest democracies in Africa – decreased since 1990. South Africa and Botswana therefore falsify a positive correlation between democracy and increased HDIs. States characterised by relatively peaceful but undemocratic practices – like Swaziland, Kenya and Zimbabwe – all shared decreases in their HDIs. On the other hand, between...
1975 and 1995 South Africa under apartheid experienced sustained increases. States in the midst of internal physical conflicts or soon after conflicts – Algeria, the Sudan, Rwanda and the DRC – revealed a contradictory tendency: most of their HDIs have increased, except for the DRC’s. Two models of IMF-directed development in Africa - Ghana and Uganda – confirm the expected tendency of increased HDIs, but they are far behind Algeria in relative terms, which is destabilised by a debilitating civil war. Except for the Seychelles (ranking 36), Libya (ranking 61), Mauritius (ranking 62) and Tunisia (ranking 91), Algeria is the highest African state on the index despite its internal conflict. Macedonia (ranking 60) – a conflict-ridden Balkan state – is higher on the index than most relatively peaceful African states.

Fig. 6: Comparison of Human Development Indices

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<tr>
<td>107</td>
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<td>0,510</td>
<td>0,559</td>
<td>0,609</td>
<td>0,648</td>
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<tr>
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<td>129</td>
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<td>0,474</td>
<td>0,487</td>
<td>0,515</td>
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<td>133</td>
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<td>0,399</td>
<td>0,431</td>
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<tr>
<td>145</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>0,570</td>
<td>0,626</td>
<td>0,614</td>
<td>0,567</td>
<td>0,496</td>
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<tr>
<td>146</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
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<td>0,535</td>
<td>0,519</td>
<td>0,489</td>
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<tr>
<td>147</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>0,402</td>
<td>0,403</td>
<td>0,412</td>
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<tr>
<td>158</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
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<td>0,394</td>
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<tr>
<td>164</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>167</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>0,419</td>
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<td>0,429</td>
<td>0,417</td>
<td>0,380</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0,325</td>
<td>0,356</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP 2003:243-244
Implications of the Democracy-Development Relationship for Conflict Resolution

HDI is a composite indicator of life expectancy at birth, education, per capita GDP and other development indices. From the above it appears that the HDI indices make it impossible to conclude a specific correlation between development and conflict. Neither is it possible to detect a correlation between HDI and democracy, especially in the cases plagued by conflict.

The overall conclusion about the relationship between democracy and development as informed by the African case studies is that they do not in all respects confirm the general research results. The case studies are, however, too limited in scope as a basis for theoretical amendments, but at least they suggest more subtle qualifications of the research results.

4. Instrumentalist versus Intrinsic Nature of Democracy

The second important part of this article is about the relationship between democracy and development on the one hand, and conflict resolution on the other hand. Can democracy and development, therefore, constitute a blueprint for conflict resolution – especially in view of the institutionalist or structuralist approach?

In order to understand how democracy and/or economic development can be part of a programme of conflict resolution, it is firstly necessary to determine how people perceive democracy. If they understand it as dependent on development, then the research conclusions in the previous section become relevant for a conflict resolution design. If they understand democracy as separate from development, only the relationship between the political (and not economic) dimensions of democracy and conflict resolution is relevant.

The next step is therefore to look at people’s perceptions of, and attitudes towards, democracy. Broadly speaking, two variations have been identified (Huntington 1991:5-9):

1) The intrinsic or procedural perspective, in which democracy is valued as an end in itself, and people value its political freedoms and rights. Democratisation therefore entails agreement on, and implementation of, political institutions
and procedures that encapsulate democratic values like participation, accountability, equality and freedom.

2) The *instrumentalist or substantive* perspective, according to which democracy is valued as a means towards other ends, mostly as an instrument to alleviate socio-economic conditions and promote equality. For democracy to be consolidated, it needs to be seen as producing positive socio-economic results. Socio-economic equality is therefore treated as either an integral characteristic of democracy or as one of the most important criteria for assessing democratic performance. The durability of democracy is therefore correlated to socio-economic equality and egalitarianism.

The intrinsic perspective can be sustained even under conditions of an economic downturn or social upheaval. On the other hand, support for democracy from an instrumentalist perspective is conditional upon acceptable economic and government performance. These perceptions are also followed in academic scholarship: Jon Elster and Claude Ake are examples of those who subscribe to an instrumentalist view; Adam Przeworski and Larry Diamond, for example, subscribe to the intrinsic view.

The relevance of these two perspectives for conflict resolution is the following. Should the argument be followed that conflict can be resolved by changes to the political and/or economic structure of a society and that democracy is the regime form most preferred for securing such changes on a sustainable basis, it implies that the citizens have to have an instrumentalist perspective of democracy. In other words, the people should expect democracy to produce outcomes in areas other than ‘pure’ politics, such as improved socio-economic conditions, and thereby remove the socio-economic and related causes of conflict. Should an intrinsic perspective be the dominant view of the people affected by a conflict, democracy will be a conflict resolution instrument only if the conflict was exclusively about a minimalist notion of democracy, such as about providing human rights, or about democratising elections. As an example of this view, George Ngwane (1996:13) argues that ‘one way therefore that African countries have been handling Intrastate conflict is through the call for constitutional talks which are sovereign or the creation of Transitional Governments especially when there are controversies on electoral
processes’. Przeworski’s empirical research conclusions support his minimalist or intrinsic view of democracy (Przeworski et al 2000:15), which suggests a limited utility value for democracy in conflict resolution.

In order to test these views further in the African context, the following research results can be summarised:

Bratton & Mattes (2001) reported on surveys about democracy perspectives in Zambia (1993, 1994), Ghana (1999) and South Africa (1995). For Zambians the essence of democracy is competitive elections and their electoral freedom of choice. Ghanaians concentrate on civil liberties and personal freedoms as the essence of democracy. South Africans, on the other hand, used a more materialistic view and focused on equal access to houses, jobs and decent income. The authors’ general conclusions are that Africans are more inclined to use an intrinsic perspective (like emphasising individual liberties, political rights) than an instrumentalist view (South Africa is an exception). They qualify their conclusion by saying that Africans tend to include a combination of both elements in their perspectives, but that the balance between them differs across countries. Preferences for political goods within the intrinsic view differ also: in Zambia it is for elections; in Ghana it is for freedom of speech (Bratton & Mattes 2001:448-455).

The relevance of these conclusions for conflict resolution is that perceptions of democracy are determined by contingent factors and cannot be generalised about. The utility value of democracy for conflict resolution can therefore be determined only after knowing what people’s opinions about democracy are in terms of the intrinsic/instrumentalist choice. It, therefore, does not support IDEA’s unqualified advocacy of democracy. Conclusions about SIDA’s advocacy of a structuralist approach which includes development, are more difficult to make, because we have not investigated in this article the impact of development in the absence of democracy, on conflict resolution. This conclusion about democracy’s utility value only partly supports Przeworski’s results, because he totally excludes an instrumentalist view from his concept of democracy.

The investigation can be taken one step further by testing the counter-situation, namely in which a democracy and relative peace already exist, but a gradual decline in popular trust is experienced. Is it correct to expect that such a situation is prone to conflict? In other words, that once democracy’s
instrumentalist utility value declines (but not necessarily its intrinsic value), it creates opportunities for conflict? Does it mean that a *consolidated* democracy is a guarantee for conflict prevention?

Robert Mattes et al. (2000) did a survey on views about democracy amongst South Africans approximately five years after the 1994 elections, and compared them with the rest of Southern Africa. Their conclusions were the following:

- South Africans’ assessments of their political institutions and leaders are becoming increasingly pessimistic;
- South Africans are less interested in, and participate less in democratic politics, than their neighbours;
- South Africans have the greatest awareness of the concept of democracy in Southern Africa; they have a largely positive understanding of the concept; the average South African rejects all the non-democratic alternatives, but with less frequency and strength of opinion than in the rest of the region;
- South Africans are less supportive of, and committed to, democracy than their regional neighbours.

Opinions about the South African political system are summarised as follows:

- No widespread sense of legitimacy for the political institutions has yet emerged;
- Elected institutions enjoy less popular trust than purely state institutions; and
- Satisfaction with governmental performance has decreased (Mattes et al 2000:ii-iv).

These research conclusions indicate that South Africa’s democracy has not yet reached the stage of consolidation (‘the only game in town’). Assessments of elected representatives, their institutions and government are increasingly negative. However, support for the concept of democracy and its pure institutions (i.e. an intrinsic perspective) is more sustained. Given the fact that a materialist/instrumentalist view is most prevalent in South Africa, one could anticipate less support for democracy, and more passive than active support.
Implications of the Democracy-Development Relationship for Conflict Resolution

In respect of conflict (crime excluded), no substantial increases appeared in South Africa in 1994-2000. On the basis of one case, South Africa, it is unscientific to reach a general conclusion and induce it into a theoretical construction. But without including other variables and case observations, a single case can, however, falsify a hypothesis about direct causality between a decline in democratic trust and conflict. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that even in a predominantly instrumentalist environment like South Africa’s, the absence of conflict does not depend solely or mainly on a consolidated democracy.

Conclusion

In this article a triangulation of democratisation, economic development and conflict resolution/prevention has been the focus of attention. This was motivated by the increasingly popular notion applied in conflict situations like Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan and the DRC, that democracy and development are mutually supportive national imperatives and moral objectives, and/or that a combination of democratisation and economic development is the most preferred blueprint (in the name of post-conflict reconstruction) for conflict resolution and prevention of conflicts in future. Three working hypotheses were derived from these notions.

The first hypothesis is that democratisation (including good governance) is directly and positively correlated with conflict resolution/-prevention. The conclusion in this regard is that democracy is not a generic concept and depends on varying public perceptions. The differences between instrumentalist and procedural approaches (and accompanying perceptions) to democracy have been discussed above. The root causes of a conflict have to be aligned to the particular understanding of democracy in any given environment. If the root causes are about political discrimination, the absence of a social contract or human rights violations, while the dominant understanding of democracy is procedural in nature, then a positive and direct correlation between democratisation and conflict resolution is highly likely. If the root cause is about identity matters like religion or origin (for example, about the content of Ivoirité in
Côte d’Ivoire) and democracy is predominantly substantive in content, then democracy is less likely to be the most appropriate instrument for resolving the conflict. It is therefore appropriate to conclude that the first hypothesis is determined by a contingent relationship. This conclusion is not directly applicable to the ‘democratic peace’ notion: the claim that democratic states do not engage in conflict with one another. ‘Democratic peace’ is more relevant for maintaining peace by diplomatic means than for peace making. Therefore, that debate does not form part of this article.

The second hypothesis is that socio-economic development is directly and positively related with democracy. This hypothesis relies largely on the research done by a wide range of scholars, notably Przeworski and his colleagues. Their research concluded that democratic regimes are more sensitive to economic development than to the impact of their political legacy, religious or ethnolinguistic diversity or the international political environment. Economic growth in developing states is also directly and positively correlated to freedom. Per capita income is strongly correlated to the degree of democratic stability, and a decline in income in developing states increases the probability of democratic decline. A select number of African case studies were used to test these conclusions. Regarding growth as a variable, all the case studies do not support a positive correlation with real per capita GNP growth, but suggest that the growth rate in relation to the economy’s level of overall development be taken into account. Relatively low real growth but with major, visible impact on the economy, can cause more volatility and democratic instability than high growth with little social impact. Changes in income distribution associated with economic growth and egalitarianism do not register any discernible impact on democratic stability, thereby deviating from Moene & Wallerstein’s research conclusions. The human development index as an indicator of quality of life is another variable with no consistent correlation with democratic stability. Hence, the African examples question the validity of a theoretical correlation between democracy and economic development.

The overall conclusion is that the durability of democratic regimes is more sensitive to changes in the indicators of development (like growth, volatility or income distribution) than the durability of non-democratic regimes. Economic development factors are also not a catalyst for democratisation.
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The third hypothesis is that democratisation and socio-economic development provide a necessary structural basis for resolving deep-rooted conflicts or for preventing conflicts. Conclusions regarding the second hypothesis question a consistent correlation between democracy and development. Therefore, their mutually supportive function as a tool to resolve conflict is inherently questionable. If one adds the problems raised with the first hypothesis, the only option left is whether economic development on its own (under undemocratic conditions) can resolve conflict. It has not been investigated in this article. Two examples of applying this option were the attempts at socio-economic development in selected South African townships (notably Alexandra) in the 1980s, and as an element of the British anti-guerrilla strategy in Malaysia. The former failed and the latter succeeded.

All of the above suggest that neither democratisation nor economic development, nor a combination of them, as instruments of structural social change, can be applied under all circumstances for conflict resolution. Sometimes they can be counterproductive and actually enhance a situation's conflict potential.

Sources


Moene, Karl Ove & Wallerstein, Michael 2001. Insurance or redistribution: The impact of income inequality on political support for welfare spending. (Mimeo.).


Implications of the Democracy-Development Relationship for Conflict Resolution


Conflict Management in the
Niger Delta Region of Nigeria:
A Participatory Approach

Rosemary N. Okoh*

Abstract

This paper introduces an alternative approach to conflict management in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The Niger Delta region, the crude oil bearing region of Nigeria, has witnessed an unprecedented spate of violent conflicts in the recent past, and all efforts to quell the conflict seem to have failed to yield the desired results. The proposed approach is based on collaborative problem-solving methodology to conflict management. Not only does this approach obviate the inherent problems of the control and adversarial method that has hitherto been adopted by government and other stakeholders in the Niger Delta; it gives participants an equal chance to express their views, generate options and influence the final decision. The paper however recognises that the participatory approach is not completely flawless. It requires very careful planning, determination on the part of all stakeholders as well as highly skilled facilitators.

* Dr Rosemary Okoh is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Economics, Delta State University, Abraka, Delta State, Nigeria.
Introduction

There is consensus among scholars on the inevitability of conflict in relations among human beings (Weeks 1992.ix, Fraiser & Hipel 1984:3, Burton 1987a:8 and 1987b:137-138, Moore 1987.ix, Okoh & Ewhariemen 2001:3-4). Some even extol conflict as ‘an essential creative element in human relations… the means to change… and the means by which some social values of welfare, security, justice and opportunities for personal development can be achieved’ (Burton 1987b:138). Nevertheless, the destructive dimensions of violent conflict cannot be left out of account, and it is generally agreed that whether or not conflict plays a positive or negative role is essentially a matter of how it is managed (Imobighe 1997:276-277). The effectiveness or otherwise of the management of conflict is itself largely dependent on how well the causes of the conflict have been understood.

Conflict refers to contradictions arising from differences in the interests, ideas, ideologies, orientations and precipitous tendencies of the people concerned. These contradictions are inherent at all levels of social and economic interactions of the human race. It may therefore exist at the individual, group, institutional, regional, national and international levels. Conflict is thus a pervasive phenomenon in human relationships and has been seen as the ‘basic unit for understanding social existence’ (Nnoli 1998:3-5).

Conflicts may have negative or positive effects. The resolution of conflicts helps to push society towards enhanced humanity. Conflicts are inevitable in human affairs but if carefully handled, they can lead to social and economic progress. When unresolved contradictions are allowed to linger and explode into violence, however, conflict becomes undesirable and may develop into a menace. Violent conflict is therefore the consequence of the inability or failure to accommodate and resolve contradictions in society through arrangements and procedures that eliminate their negative effects and maximize their positive effect. According to Nnoli (1998:16), such failures result from the inability of conflicting units to accept the arrangements and procedures that have been adopted to resolve the conflict. This is the case with the management of conflicts in the Niger Delta.
Three major reasons give credence to the proposal of participatory approach at this time.

First, the level of poverty in the area is deepening, as the inhabitants of the area are unable to carry on with their economic activities such as farming, fishing, and very little else. Agricultural activities usually grind to a halt in communities where violent conflicts take place. Houses, farm lands and fishing ponds are often burned down or destroyed and usually abandoned as villagers escape into safer areas where they do not have access to farm lands or fishing ponds. Violent conflicts also lead to deaths of many male household heads, leaving a large number of widows, orphans and incapacitated people. The increase in morbidity leads to a fall in agricultural productivity, lower income and intensified poverty.

Secondly, the obvious failure of the old perspectives and management strategies of the host communities, Federal Government and the oil companies makes it imperative to search for a better strategy to facilitate negotiations between different stakeholders in projects and policy dialogue.

Thirdly, the zone is the economic nerve centre of the nation, which cannot afford the perennial disruptions to oil production occasioned by violent conflicts.

Under the current democratic political dispensation in Nigeria, a participatory approach to governance is inevitable for the attainment of good governance, transparency and accountability. This approach is of particular importance in the management of the perennial conflict in the Niger Delta region. Previous attempts at the application of the approach failed to achieve the desired results, perhaps because of a weak formalisation and generalisation of the practice. Hence an important objective pursued in this paper is to increase the sensitisation of all stakeholders regarding the existence and efficiency of the participatory approach for the resolution of the issue of frequent violent conflicts in the Niger Delta region.

The Niger Delta and the Nigerian Economy: The Contradictions

Nigeria is generously endowed with natural sources of energy resource. These include coal, crude oil, natural gas (associated and non-associated natural gas),
lignite and a number of renewable energy resources such as fuel wood, biomass, hydropower and solar energy. Crude oil occurs in seven prospective basins, that is, Niger Delta, Anambra basin, Chad basin, Dahomey basin, Sokoto basin and the Benue Trough, while condensates are found in the South Eastern shelf. Presently crude oil exploration and commercial activities are concentrated on the Niger Delta basin acreage and the continental shelf (Central Bank of Nigeria 2000:81). There is enough evidence that 99% of Nigeria’s proven crude oil and gas reserves are situated in the Niger Delta (Okoh 2001:390).

The Nigerian economy now revolves around the exploitation and exportation of crude oil. Nigeria’s crude oil is the sweet and light type, being low in sulphur content. It is highly sought after in the international crude oil market. Currently, Nigeria’s oil production accounts for 8% of the OPEC total daily production and 3% of the world’s volume (Nigerian National Petroleum Company 2000:5). Nigeria’s gas reserve is even greater than the proven crude oil reserves though it has largely remained unexploited. Nigeria’s gas reserve is estimated at about 124 trillion cubic feet. In energy terms this is said to be twice as much as the nation’s crude oil reserves (Okoh 2001:390). Gas is obtainable in the form of associated and non-associated or dry gas, condensate gas and natural gas liquids. It is said that 60% of the available gas is located east of the Niger and 40% west of it. The estimated on-shore component is 71% of the total, while 29% is offshore. Unfortunately about 75% of associated gas produced annually is flared. Of all the natural resources, crude oil has become the pivot of the Nigerian economic revolution. The petroleum sector accounts for approximately 35% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 96% of foreign exchange and about 80% of total government revenue (Nigerian National Petroleum Company 2000:6).

The Niger Delta is made up of seven out of the 36 states of Nigeria. The oil-producing states include Delta, Bayelsa, Cross River, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Edo, Ondo and Imo states. But Delta, Bayelsa, Cross River, Rivers and Akwa Ibom states constitute the Niger Delta, which occupies a landmass of 70 000 square kilometres, an area of high ecological value. These states are made up of about 500 densely populated rural ethnic minority communities (Okoh & Egbon 1999:410), some of which have a long history, dating back to colonial times, of what has generally been understood as interethnic conflict. The people of the Niger Delta are polygamous and warlike. The annual festivals of many
Niger Delta communities involve cutlass-toting displays, which often lead to provocations that result in violent conflicts. The people are mainly fishermen, but small numbers are farmers. The Niger Delta region in Nigeria is believed to be the world’s third largest mangrove and fresh water swamp, a third of which is wetland.

In the last four decades the Niger Delta has witnessed a high level of petroleum sector activities. Subsequent to the first successful drilling at Oloibiri-1 in 1956, the Nigerian government’s legislations and concessions to various oil prospecting companies set the stage for large scale explosion in exploration and production activities from 1970 to date. The Niger Delta has nearly 200 oil fields with well over 400 oil production and storage facilities scattered within its swamps and creeks. These are operated by multinational firms such as Shell, Mobil, Chevron, Elf, Agip and Texaco, in joint ventures with the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (Okoh & Egbon 1999:410). As the Niger Delta became the prime basis of exploration and production of crude petroleum oil, the search for oil and gas was intensified in both deep and shallow waters as well as inland. In time the Nigerian economy became a victim of the ‘Dutch disease’. This refers to a situation in which a booming export sector, that is, Nigeria’s oil sector, increases the relative price of non-tradable goods and services, thus hurting the rest of the tradable sector. Approximately 90% of her foreign earnings and 70% of total revenue accrue from the petroleum sector. Government effort (particularly during the military regime) was geared towards expanding its revenue flow from the sector, to the utter neglect of the inhabitants of the area.

The oil and gas production and refining facilities such as terminals of pipelines, flow and pump stations, manifolds and refineries are scattered across the landscape of the Niger Delta. Many years of oil and gas production with frequent occurrence of crude oil and petroleum product spillage have left the people of the Niger Delta dispossessed of their land, land fertility, delta forest (mangrove), water resources and their livelihood. These losses have led to high levels of poverty and unemployment (particularly among youths), infrastructure decay, moral decadence and crime in the area. The region has become ridden by violent conflict, which caused the wanton destruction of its people and valuable properties, and left millions of dollars unrealised due to deferred production as

The high activity level in the Niger Delta has exposed the area to the dangers of pollution of water, land and air as well as oil spills which have endangered aquatic life as well as the entire ecosystem, topography and surface vegetation. The problem of deforestation has led to loss of bio-diversity in the mangrove swamps, and to the destruction of nurseries and feeding grounds for many commercially important species of fish and crustaceans. The contamination of water bodies by oil has also led to the contamination of fisheries, freshwater and brackish water swamps, and to the killing of fishes, crabs, oysters and periwinkles. This has therefore destroyed artisan fishing which is of great importance to Niger Delta economy. The 45 years of oil production in the area has brought about defoliation of mangroves and the acceleration of erosion and flooding in the coastal areas. There is also the case of contamination of rivers and inland waters, which are important sources of drinking water and food, thereby rendering such water and food unfit for human consumption. Ground water pollution is another serious impact of oil production. As it was expected, the activities of the oil industry did not spare the health of the human components of the Niger Delta environment. For instance, Ndifon (1998:804-813) identified oil acne (a special skin eruption due to exposure to oil) among respondents. He also reports the incidence of cancer, decreased fertility, fever, cough, abdominal pain and diarrhoea, while as much as 85 percent of respondents suffered a combination of these symptoms.

The difficult terrain makes road construction and maintenance an uphill task. The Niger Delta inhabitants thus suffer from poor road conditions, leading to high cost of transportation. The area has been denied the much-needed development of social and economic infrastructure such as electricity, roads and pipe borne water. The Niger Delta states suffer from relatively high rates of both rural and urban unemployment. The neglect of the region for so long against
the backdrop of so many unresolved issues seem to have resulted in the breeding of an army of miscreants.

The externalities associated with the exploration, production and transportation of crude oil are of the negative type. They may be classified into quantifiable and non-quantifiable externalities. The quantifiable negative externalities include such effects as numbers of fish killed as a result of oil spillage in fishing waters, numbers of hectares of crops destroyed or replaced with giant pipelines and rigs. These are easy to identify and value in monetary terms. The payment of adequate compensation to displaced communities or individuals may suffice. The non-quantifiable negative externalities on the other hand include the loss of potential output which would have been derived from unpolluted land and water, the increased health hazards resulting from increase in hydrocarbons in the water and air, the increase in the mortality and morbidity rates associated with environmental pollution, as well as the loss of income by farmers as result of polluted farmlands. Also, the loss of vital sources of drinking water, the effect of moral decadence and the loss of societal values are all examples of non-quantifiable externalities which are of grave consequence to the people. These are not easy to identify, value or state in monetary terms. Most of the externalities associated with crude oil exploitation in the Niger Delta are of this sort. These externalities precipitate the contradictions in the Niger Delta.

All of these have culminated in socio-economic problems such as high levels of poverty and unemployment, community and oil company conflicts, intercommunity conflict over land and compensation, decay in societal values, poor roads and transportation network, high cost of fuel, paucity of housing and infrastructure facilities, moral decadence and high crime rates. These problems have been said to be located within the revenue-sharing principles, formulae and practices of the federal government which have starved the Niger Delta of much needed funds (Okoh & Egbon 1999:407, Egbon & Okoh 2000:11-12, Okoh 2001:391, Okoh 2002:81-83). Since 2000 the federal government has increased the proportion of revenue shared to the Niger Delta states, and infrastructure development has improved through the activities of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), but the levels of poverty, unemployment and violent conflicts are still quite high.
The Nature of Conflict in the Niger Delta Region: The Issues at Stake

The nature of conflict in the Niger Delta may be classified into four variants.

**Inter-community conflict**, which may be as a result of long standing disputes between two or more communities, unsettled boundary problems, disputes over oil-bearing land, or incursions into community land.

**Intra-community conflict**, which may be due to long standing disputes between individuals within a community, political marginalisation by a ruling ethnic group or class, an unacceptable traditional ruler, or embezzlement (real or imagined) of compensation by community leaders.

**Community versus oil companies conflict**, which may be caused by several factors. There are factors related to the presence of oil installations in a community. For instance, an incursion into community land, a threat or perceived threat to the continual existence of a community, ineffective communication between communities and oil companies, unrealistic formalities of claim tenders, non-payment of compensation for occupied land. Some factors are specifically related to environmental pollution: non-payment or inadequate payment or unduly delayed payment of compensation for polluted land and water resources, abject poverty due to displacement and loss of livelihood arising from pollution of farm land or fishing waters. The devastating effects of the oil industry do not only affect the economy and the ecosystem, but also the cultural and social systems of the Niger Delta. Disputes between communities and oil companies are therefore often of long standing nature and difficult to resolve.

**Community versus (federal, state or local) government conflict**

For this variant many of the problems are linked to the federal government. The causes of the community versus government conflict may be some or a combination of the following:

- The parlous state of existence and material conditions prevailing in the Niger Delta;
- Low level and quality of development in the region and the near absence of a common development framework and focus;
Conflicts in the Niger Delta region are becoming increasingly frequent and intensely violent, leading to incessant loss of lives and property. Violent conflicts and economic progress are mutually exclusive. This is precarious, particularly for Nigeria whose major source of foreign exchange earnings – Nigeria’s engine of growth – is the bone of contention in the Niger Delta. Moreover, recent management strategies, such as the creation of such institutions as the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), the creation of local government areas/councils, the provision of social amenities and payment of compensation for land failed to arrest conflicts in the Niger Delta. If anything, the violent conflicts have taken a turn for the worse. This points to the need to revisit the management strategies of relations within and between communities and oil companies, and communities and government, with a view to instituting conflict management procedures that would lead to peace and sustainable development in the Niger Delta region and the Nigerian economy. It is clear that violent conflicts in the Niger Delta have socio-cultural, political and economic dimensions which are interconnected with oil-related issues, such as deprivation, marginalisation, environmental degradation, military interventions in the conflicts and old rivalries between the communities.
Current Strategies for Managing Conflicts in the Niger Delta

The management strategies adopted so far have been based on how each of the three stakeholders in the Niger Delta saga, that is the communities, the oil companies and the federal or state government, perceives the problems of the Niger Delta and the methods for dealing with them.

Firstly, the host communities have come to the conclusion that their destinies are in their own hands and as such they have constantly employed strategies and tactics ranging from ‘reactive pacifism’ to ‘reactive militancy’ (Onosode 2003:111-115). This has taken the form of demand by groups for political empowerment, increased fiscal allocation to compensate for resource exploitation, and environmental degradation, resource control and overall development (Osaghae 1998). The basic strategies include:

• Unorganised and organised verbal agitation;
• Community meetings;
• Sit-ins, vigils;
• Written petitions to oil companies and the government;
• Media interviews and newspaper publication;
• Delegations to oil companies and government;
• Vocal threats, communiqués, mass rallies and demonstrations;
• Temporary occupation of installations and oil premises;
• Adoption of oil companies staffers;
• Blockades and disruption of company operations;
• Legal suits;
• Sabotage;
• Violent combats between the warring communities, and
• Political action (Onosode 2003:111-124).

These strategies have heightened tension, insecurity and conflicts in the region.

Secondly, the oil companies have perceived that the basic need of the communities is the alleviation of poverty through provision of basic social and economic infrastructure. The oil companies, as part of their corporate social responsibilities to the host communities, ‘hand out’ what in their point of view
are the missing links needed to effect mutual co-existence between them and the militant communities. These come in the form of community development projects such as construction of roads, jetties, health centres, electrification, science equipment, and employment and scholarship schemes for members of host communities. Unfortunately, the communities view these efforts as paltry vis-à-vis the perceived value of resource exploitation by the oil companies and the federal government. Violent conflicts have therefore continued unabatedly.

Thirdly, the federal government has most probably perceived the conflicts in the Niger Delta as acts of insubordination to the nation. Hence its management style has been that of controlling the conflict. This approach has involved the use of control measures, force, coercion, impatience with dialogue and information gathering.

There have thus been two strands of management strategies for Niger Delta conflicts. The first involved a number of ad hoc measures. One of these measures was the use of force to quell violent uprising in a bid to force the aggrieved people into quiescence. For instance, soldiers have been sent into communities to raid, kill, maim and set villagers' houses on fire. This was the popular management style, particularly during the military rule. The present democratic government has had to take recourse to such brutal control measures to coerce conflicting communities to avoid or accommodate conflict. Other measures in this category included litigations, ad hoc tribunals and judicial commissions of inquiry into such conflicts, special ad hoc committees, militant declarations and ultimatums, hurriedly organised symposia, workshops and conferences, ‘peace talks’, elders’ forums, environment friendly publications and workshops organised by the government, oil companies, NGOs, communities, traditional rulers, print media, pseudo-environmentalists and an array of nascent groups and movements (Onosode 2003:121-125).

The second strand is based on the ‘paradigm shift’ to the new understanding that the essential link between peace in the Niger Delta, the oil companies and the Nigerian economy is community development projects. Such projects have included the provision of social and economic infrastructure, compensation for polluted land, a youth’s skill acquisition programme and scholarships for students of Niger Delta origin. More recently, after much agitation from Niger Delta indigenes, the revenue shared to Niger Delta states has been increased
by releasing 13% of the derived income to the states of the region. Upon popular demand, specialised institutions have been established to cater for the needs of the Niger Delta. These included the now defunct OMPADEC and the current NDDC. The basic mandate of NDDC is to further pursue the aims and objectives of the community development paradigm, that is, the provision of social and economic infrastructure.

These management strategies notwithstanding, the violence has continued unabatedly with grave consequences for the Niger Delta communities, the oil companies and the Nigerian economy at large. According to Onosode (2003:124), the current top-down approach to the endemic problem has failed to deliver results that are simultaneously socially and economically sustainable. This can be ascribed to the lack of a common development framework and focus. This therefore calls for a new approach that would meet this need. The participatory approach is hereby being proposed.

The Participatory Approach to Conflict Management in the Niger Delta

The participatory approach to conflict management is a collaborative approach to ‘problem solving’ and decision making. It places an equal priority on the relationship with the other parties and on a mutually satisfying outcome. The strategies of the ‘problem-solving’ conflict management style include building trust, communicating face-to-face, gathering information, dialoguing, negotiating, valuing diversity, team building, having focus group discussions, searching for alternatives and seeking ‘win-win’ solutions (Kepner & Likubo 1996:11-28).

Previous methods of conflict management in Nigeria have been adversarial, such that communication between the various stakeholders, that is federal government, oil companies and communities, has been tactical and withholding, argumentative, fault-finding and blame-trading. The attitudes have mainly been suspicious, one-sided, past-oriented, aggressive and defensive. The procedures have involved bargaining from established positions, attacking the other party, using whatever standards are adjudged to be effective in achieving individual goals, and considering options which advance specific parties’ positions.
The participatory approach to conflict management can be said to be a collaborative and problem-solving methodology. It is a democratic process, which recognises the people’s right and responsibility to manage their own affairs. The collaborative problem-solving process allows parties or stakeholders with different views to participate. All participants are given equal chance to express their views, generate options and influence the final decision. According to Academic Association Peaceworks (2004:32), ‘when people participate in making a decision, they support it’.

Under the collaborative problem-solving methodology, communication is honest and open. It shares information and avoids fault finding and blame trading by the parties. The reciprocally assertive attitudes are future-oriented and trust-building. The procedures involve negotiation, a focus on the problem and not on parties or persons, a search for common ground, a search for a fair and objective basis on which to take decisions, and a search for options that may lead to mutual gains (Academic Association Peaceworks 2004:32-35).

The participatory approach, which was first known as Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), is now generally referred to as Participatory Learning and Action (PLA).

Chambers (1994a:954) described the PRA as:

a growing family of approaches and methods to enable local rural or urban people to express, enhance, share and analyse their knowledge of life and conditions to plan and to act.\(^1\)

The PLA approach combines:

- A set of diagramming and visual techniques originally developed for livelihood analysis and now widely used in Natural Resources Departments and in development agencies, and
- Underlying principles of grassroots participation from human rights

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\(^1\) For an in-depth analysis and development of PRA procedures see Robert Chambers 1994a, 1994b and 1994c.
activism, which involve rethinking power relations and partnerships between development agencies, experts and poor people. These are now being developed further to facilitate negotiation between different stakeholders in projects and policy dialogue (Altinkaya 2002:1-2, Mayoux 2003:3-4).

Participatory approaches enable a wide cross-section of people to share information and opinions about their lives and their environment. It is a bottom-up approach to solving problems and making decisions. Participatory methods use a diverse and flexible set of techniques for visual representation and stakeholder involvement characterised by a set of underlying ethical principles. The participatory approach to development has developed a set of visual tools which can be flexibly applied to assist the synthesis and analysis of information that can be used in group settings and as part of individual interviews. Also the participatory methods use a set of guidelines for facilitating participation and negotiation in focus group discussions and workshops where different stakeholders are brought together. This may not employ much of the visual techniques. According to Mayoux, the emphasis is on innovation and creativity in adapting previous practice to new contexts and needs. In our present circumstance, the essence of the participatory approach would be to bring together all the stakeholders in the Niger Delta saga, in order to contribute towards the creation of favourable conditions that may increasingly facilitate sustainable development in the Niger Delta region and the Nigerian economy as a whole.

The underlying principles on which the participatory approach is based are the following:

• **Embracing complexity**
The participatory approach acknowledges complexities and seeks to understand them rather than over-simplifying reality in accordance with predetermined categories and theories. This is of particular interest to the Niger Delta situation, which is saddled with enormous complexities such as multiplicity of rival tribal and ethnic groups with complex historical relationships.

• **Recognition of multiple realities**
These realities should be taken into account in analysis or action. In the case
of the Niger Delta there are many such realities, which policy makers would rather wish away than attempt to solve them. Prominent among them are the high poverty levels of the bulk of the Niger Delta inhabitants, the demand for resource control and the unhealthy competition among the communities in crude oil-bearing areas.

• **Prioritising the realities of the poor and most disadvantaged**

Here the participatory approach takes all stakeholders as equal partners in knowledge creation and problem analysis. In the case of the Niger Delta the main stakeholders are the host communities (youth, men and women), the oil companies and the federal government, state government and local governments. Others may include NGOs, civil society, community based organisations (CBOs), and institutions such as NDDC.

• **Grassroots empowerment**

The participatory approach does not only aim at gathering information about impact, but also aims at making the assessment process a contribution to empowerment through linking grassroots learning and networking into policy making.

The participatory approach has the capability to bring information from a diversity of sources more rapidly and cost-effectively than quantitative or qualitative methods alone (Mayoux 2003:7). The participatory approach is potentially capable of contributing towards increasing the relevance of impact goals and indicators, and of the representations of the stakeholders, the reliability or understanding of development processes; and the credibility of practical inferences.

The techniques of participatory methodologies include the following:

**Visual techniques**

These techniques may include diagrams, ranking techniques, time trends analysis, mapping techniques, calendars and ethno-classifications. It is said that the eye receives 83% of information while the other four senses receive the remaining 17%. Hence the key to improve communication is to visualise
ideas. The visual techniques could be applied in the communication process of participatory conflict resolution in the Niger Delta by holding discussions with groups or teams, surveying the opinions of participants, evaluating alternative proposals, identifying problems to be tackled, analysing situations and writing the opinions, ideas, proposals on cards, blackboards, flipcharts, maps, calendars, etc. These visual techniques can be used to list different headings, characterise dependent relationships, interrelated lists and complex interrelationships.

There are a number of advantages for applying visual techniques in conflict management. First, contributions are not lost and forgotten. Writing down a contribution shows the participants that their ideas or messages have been received and duplicated. Secondly, heterogeneous information and contributions become easier to understand with the help of visual aids, which reduce the dangers of misrepresentations and misinterpretations. Thirdly, discussion is limited to arguments relating to the subject matter and is thereby made more objective-oriented. By so doing, emotionally biased contributions can be dealt with separately and more appropriately. Fourthly, the particular stage of discussion is apparent at all times and the direction it is taking is obvious. This is also helpful for those who join the group at a later stage. Participation in discussion is enhanced as emphasis can be placed on hearing the views of every single participant. The implication is that participants’ identification with contents and decisions made can be improved. The usefulness of visual techniques is limited, however, in cases where participants do not want their views publicised or where formal traditions do not allow such a publication.

**Group and team dynamics techniques**

These may include focus group discussions, role-play and participatory workshops. The basic tool used for the analysis of participatory group and team dynamics is the semi-structured discussions or interviews (SSDs or SSIs). The SSD is a form of guided interviewing where only some of the questions are predetermined. It does not involve the use of questionnaires but at most a checklist of questions as a flexible guide. In contrast to formal survey questionnaires, many questions are formulated during the interview or discussions are generated by the responses of participants. SSDs may be held with:
• Individuals from different categories of the community who have an interest in the same topic;
• Key informants who are interviewed for specific information only they may have (as traditional rulers who may have special knowledge about the history of conflicts with neighbouring communities, oil companies or the government);
• Groups of stakeholders who can provide general community level information; and
• Focus groups with whom certain issues may be discussed in detail, e.g. financiers of violent conflicts, the gun barons, the local warlords, government representatives, oil companies and policy makers.

The face-to-face interaction enabled by this tool can be valuable for gaining understanding of the issue at stake and establishing rapport between communities and policy makers.

For maximum benefit from an SSD, the facilitator must learn to listen, be ready to learn from the discussion, facilitate and not dominate, lecture or interrupt the discussants, respect other people’s opinions, set an agenda and prepare discussion by summarising findings.

**Specialised participatory techniques**

These techniques may include the open house, road shows, open space technologies, participatory appraisal, future search, appreciative inquiry and open agenda conferences. The specialised participatory techniques are very useful for incorporating the views and ideas of the elite class who may not be available for community/public meetings. Reaching this group is of grave importance, however, as the information they provide may tend to stir the warring communities to rise up in arms against the government or the oil companies.

The most prominent of these techniques is ‘the open house’, which was developed as a constructive alternative to public meetings. It provides a forum where interested people can obtain information and register their views. The venue is usually a well-known place in the community such as the town hall or the palace of the traditional ruler. Display panels are used to present key
information about the proposals or issues at stake. These should give visitors a clear understanding of the issues and/or proposals. A short video presentation can be used to enhance written information. A table with hand-out materials is usually provided. Refreshments may also be provided.

To maximise the gains from the open house technique, a systematic feedback is critical. The facilitators may ask the visitors to complete a short survey as they leave the open house. This will help to generate quantitative data and background information for cross tabulation, for example, the geographic location, sex, age and occupation of respondents.

Road shows are variations on the open house. In this case facilitators transport the open house from place to place, setting up and running the open house format in a range of locations suitable to the target audience (Altinkaya 2003:1-2).

The other methods mentioned above are variants of the open house techniques.

**Benefits of Community Participation in Conflict Management**

Effective community participation has been said to impact positively on social and economic progress. The following are some of the specific benefits of effective community participation in situation analysis and policy making.

In the first place it improves the quality of policies and services. When diverse stakeholders are included in decision making, the policy makers benefit from their first-hand understanding of issues. They provide reality checks, which facilitate the testing of a priori assumptions.

Secondly, community participation helps solve complex problems. Social, economic and environmental problems are nearly always complex, and the Niger Delta is a case where working together can increase the possibility of finding sustainable solutions.

Thirdly, community participation builds trust and understanding. This is particularly useful in the Niger Delta where these two elements of development are conspicuously missing. People develop confidence in a government/agency
that openly invites them to participate in decisions that affect them. A foundation of trust is a priceless element when tough decisions (as is the case in the Niger Delta) need to be made.

Fourthly, community participation helps create an inclusive society. When government acts in co-operation with communities, people feel more powerful, more fairly treated and more valued. This is expected to create a peaceful environment in which the community members can help solve their own problems. This in turn would encourage self-reliance and innovation leading to sustainable development in the Niger Delta region and the Nigerian economy as a whole.

Fifth, community participation helps in measuring progress. Active relationships with the community are valuable for monitoring policy outcomes. The contacts with communities can help policy makers to:

- Identify people to be involved in monitoring and evaluation;
- Develop appropriate indicators to measure progress, and,
- Design appropriate ways of gathering data.

Finally, community participation in policy and decision making will help to ensure that human rights are upheld (Mayoux 2003:2-3) and that the Niger Delta people can get a fair share of the ‘national cake’.

**Challenges of the Participatory Conflict Management Approach**

It is important to state here that participatory methods face a number of inherent challenges. Some are due to the visual tools and others to the participatory process. The extent to which a participatory methodology attains its potential contribution depends essentially on the level of care with which it is used. The participatory tool kits should only be handled by facilitators who have vast experience in handling them, and in the knowledge of the community’s traditions, customs and, most importantly, language. The Participatory Conflict Management Approach also faces other challenges, which are listed below:
Time pressure
This is pervasive but must be overcome. Time invested early in inclusive collaboration will save time later.

Fear of conflict
This must be resisted since it can lead to denial or suppression of the open dialogue that is needed to resolve potential conflict.

Temptation to revert to old ways of doing things
Typical examples are: not wanting to listen, being ‘right’, isolating and excluding, attacking and defending, competing, trading blames, practising authoritative leadership and decision making. There is a need to persist and persevere through the awkward phase of learning new skills as this would lead to greater benefits in the future.

Narrow or partial measures of success and achievement
There is always the tendency to want to settle with partial measures of success and achievement. Patience is required to allow collaborative processes to work themselves out. For the collaborative problem-solving approach to conflict management to be effective, these challenges must be recognised and adequate adjustments made to overcome them.

Participatory methods have been employed in poverty-alleviation programmes refugee-resettlement projects and micro credit programmes in New Zealand, India and many developing countries with varying degrees of success. In Nigeria the application of the participatory approach has been on ad hoc bases mainly for data gathering. The Niger Delta Environmental Survey (NDES) used it to gather and analyse information (Onosode 2003:123). The oil companies have now included PRA/PLA procedures as part of environmental impact assessment. Again, however, the consultants involved in such studies use the tool on ad hoc bases to gather information and fulfil their contract obligations. The European Union through its Micro Projects Programme (MPP3) is currently using the participatory approaches in community development in three Niger Delta States, Delta, Bayelsa and River States. The Federal Ministry of Agriculture
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is also beginning to adopt it for its fadama programme and the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP). These programmes are yet at their foundation stages.

This paper calls for an integrated conflict management model which sees conflict management as a process embracing three levels of activities, that is, (1) conflict prevention, peace promotion and consolidation; (2) conflict control and abatement; and (3) conflict resolution (Imobighe 1997:275-280).

1. Conflict prevention, peace promotion and consolidation should involve a behavioural code, confidence building measures and integrative activities, and democratic practices.
2. Conflict control and abatement should involve passing resolutions, making appeals, and using neutral forces to separate hostile parties.
3. Conflict resolution should involve intensive negotiation, the use of mediatory organs, and conciliation activities (Academic Association Peaceworks 2004:22-28).

It is being advocated here that a well thought out community participatory process be built into the policy and decision-making procedure for the Niger Delta region at all times. This would involve the establishment of governance structures, such as the setting up of a community monitoring team by the community members, which has good representation and gender balance at the community level. It will also involve the employment of trained facilitators by the oil companies and government as well as the involvement of pro-active organisations such as the Civil Society Organisations – NGOs, CBOs, and civil rights groups. These would collectively be able to define and advocate a common policy agenda for the Niger Delta region, and to actively contribute to and provide feedback on new policies and their implications (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2001:1-6). It would also require parastatals, such as the National Centre for Economic Management and Administration (NCEMA), which have been involved in training and other capacity-building activities, to train a team of facilitators for government agencies, NGOs and CBOs who would effectively institute the participatory process and nurture it to maturity.
Conclusion

The conventional methods of dealing with contradictions in the Niger Delta have no doubt failed to broker peace in the region. Rather, these strategies have heightened tension, insecurity and conflicts in the region. The participatory approach to conflict management is no doubt an invaluable tool which would enable a wide cross-section of people to share information and opinions about their lives and environment. People, who under normal circumstances are voiceless and powerless in the community, are empowered to gain confidence and to speak out. The face-to-face interaction which it provides, creates the opportunity for policy makers to gain an understanding of the issues at stake and to develop community trust and confidence for the government and its intentions. The application of a participatory approach in the Niger Delta is not new but policy makers have over the years paid lip service to the issue, and its principles have not been wholly applied. Hence the desired result of peace in the Niger Delta region has remained an illusion.

Sources


Rosemary N. Okoh

Resources for Sustainable Development in the Niger Delta, held at Delta State University, Abraka, Delta State, Nigeria, in September, 2000, 79-88.


The end of the Cold War ushered in the ascendancy of the neo-liberal ideology as the world’s development paradigm. Characterised as the new world order by the then US President George H.W. Bush, neo-liberalism saw the collapse of one-party states in Africa, and consequently the adoption of multi-party democracy.

Key highlights of this wind of change in Southern Africa included the independence of Namibia in 1990, the defeat of hitherto ruling parties in the first multi-party elections in Zambia and Malawi in 1991 and 1992 respectively, and, more fundamentally, the demise of the apartheid state in South Africa in 1994 and the rise to power of the African National Congress (ANC), led by the legendary Nelson Mandela.

The book under review is a collection of papers reflecting on the situation in Southern Africa ten years after these momentous events. The book has grown out of a conference held in November 2003, but goes beyond the
conference theme and reflects on the broad issues of democracy and governance in Southern Africa.

The main reason for this is that though apartheid was confined to the borders of the Republic of South Africa, its impact was felt across the entire region. For, as it were, the apartheid state did not just destabilise South Africa's neighbours, but also the other countries of Southern Africa, which have a common history and geography and, thus, a common future.

Divided into four sections and thirteen chapters, the book is organised around several themes inherent in the democracy and governance discourse in Africa. These include the impact of the past legacy on the present, democracy as a concept and value system, political and social institutions, the nexus between politics, economics and development, as well as gender mainstreaming.

In the introduction, Chris Landsberg and Shaun Mackay provide an overview of the theoretical framework on which the analyses are premised. In addition to belabouring the importance of praxis-theory unity, they note that the decade under review saw numerous multi-party elections in Southern Africa, and successful peace processes in Angola and Mozambique.

This transition has not been smooth sailing, however, as most countries are characterised by weak states or weak institutions of governance, whilst some states are even sliding back to autocracy. A salient point, which no doubt will recur in other books if it has not already done so, is whether the end of political apartheid has translated into tangible economic benefits for the majority, or whether it has simply ushered in a black middle class whose socio-economic interests and political advantage obscure the poor. The question is whether South Africa has just moved from political apartheid to economic apartheid.

Section one has three chapters, all focusing on governance and democratisation in Southern Africa. Chapter 1 by Chris Landsberg reflects on developments in South Africa ten years after the end of apartheid. But the author extends his analyses to the region for two main reasons. First, the countries in the region share a common future, and, secondly, South Africa cannot avoid engaging them given its big-brotherly position. It is actually this position that has catapulted South Africa to prominent roles in regional institutions such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
and continental initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU).

Landsberg then gives a panoramic view of developments across the region, from Botswana through Angola and Zimbabwe to Swaziland, Mozambique, Malawi, Mauritius and Tanzania. Several issues arise. First, some countries have failed to align their electoral systems and political practices to the new realities of plural democratic culture. Second, fractious politics between and within political institutions has undermined the effectiveness of these institutions. And thirdly, though expected to exert peer pressure, leaders in regional bodies such as the SADC have tended to express solidarity with each other.

In chapter 2, Khabele Matlosa focuses on the challenges of transition. Aptly titled *Caught Between Transition and Democratic Consolidation: Dilemmas of Political Change in Southern Africa*, the chapter touches important theoretical issues around the concept and practice of democracy in Southern Africa. These include the form and design of political institutions, the linkage between the form and substance, the nexus between state delivery systems and market forces, and the reality of globalisation and its influence on nation-states.

Section 1 ends with an analysis of political institutions, that is, political parties and electoral systems, by Ed van Thijn and Roel von Meijenfeldt. The writers raise three points. One, across the region the democratisation process is being driven by the ruling elite. In effect, this has led to the emergence of dominant ruling parties and weak, ineffective opposition parties. Yet, dominant parties are dangerous to the democratisation process for they undermine checks and balances among institutions of the state. Two, political parties lack internal democracy. This leads to entrenchment of personality cults around party leaders. And three, independent election management institutions are of crucial importance.

Section 2, also divided into three chapters, addresses the issues of power relations and gender mainstreaming. In chapter 4, Peter Vale situates the gender mainstreaming question within the overall power relations theory, and concludes that gender is not about biological differences but about the way the world has been constructed. Thus, the issue of gender rights must be seen in the broad context of resistance to oppression.
Chapter 5 by Nomboniso Gasa takes the cue from there and focuses on the implications of gender rights for democratisation. Noting the centrality of the overall political process in women's lives, the author contends that it is not possible to conceive gender issues outside the socio-political framework. For African women, therefore, the issue is the quest for balance between individual freedom and socio-political liberation.

Closing the section is Chapter 6, which is essentially a case study in which Debie Lebeau and Eunice Lipinge detail the role of women in Namibia’s struggle for independence and subsequent struggles for gender rights. The writers assert that in Namibia the issue of gender mainstreaming has been institutionalised, with a fully-fledged ministry for women’s affairs that does not only formulate gender programmes, but also co-ordinates gender activities in the country.

Section 3 of the book, which covers Chapters 7 to 10, is quite provocative, as it seeks to examine the challenges that have confronted liberation movements in their transition to political parties. In Chapter 7, Mwesiga Baregu explores the differences between political parties and liberation movements. These differences include *inter alia* the key goals, strategies and tactics, and operation methods. A critical theme running through the presentation is that refocusing a liberation movement from the goals of liberation to those of democratisation is a key challenge.

This challenge has bred two contradictory and competing forces in Southern Africa. On the one hand, there are the popular forces of consolidation, which seek to accomplish the goals of the liberation, and on the other hand, there are the minority but powerful forces of reversal, which seek to obstruct and frustrate the accomplishment of liberation goals.

In the next chapter, Raymond Suttner addresses the dilemmas of the past legacy, the transition to democracy, and the consolidation of democracy. These dilemmas arise from the dialectics of the various tendencies that exist within liberation movements seeking to transform themselves to political parties, and the perceptions of those driving the democratisation process. In a nutshell, the writer argues that the consolidating of democracy depends on how the ruling parties resolve these dilemmas.

The next chapters are closely related. Wiebe de Jager highlights the relevance of Information and Communication Technology to political parties and electoral
systems, whilst Francis Makoa analyses the problems of electoral systems and the problem of non-acceptance of election outcomes. The analysis suggests that it is imperative for the discourse about elections and electoral systems to go beyond periodic elections, universal suffrage, and the presence of institutional and legal frameworks, and to address deeper issues such as ownership of elections, confidence in electoral systems and the modes and procedures for verifying election results.

The book closes with section 4, which covers chapters 11 to 13. These chapters explore the nexus between economics and development, and the politics of land. Issues raised revolve around Africa’s economic fragility, which is attributed to political instability. Other causes mentioned include power transfer problems, kleptocratic leadership, as well as the economic model inherited from the colonialists.

This section raises an interesting question, albeit implicitly: Is Africa underdeveloped because of political instability, or is political instability a consequence of economic underdevelopment? Which is the cause, and which is the effect? Several texts written years before the demise of apartheid have debated this question. Ten years after apartheid’s end, scholars in Africa are still debating it.
Reviewed by Jannie Malan
Senior Researcher at ACCORD

A book with such a striking and hopeful title deserves attention. The rhyming keywords differ little in spelling, but function in radically opposed semantic fields. Warfare is about eliminating an enemy – consisting of fellow human beings who happen to be motivated by their ideology or culture, or simply by their political and military leaders. Welfare is about rendering social services and improving the quality of life of fellow human beings. These keywords and the two directional prepositions indicate that the publication wishes to promote a paradigm shift from fighting to serving.

The sub-title defines the specific focus on human security in a Southern African context. During its brief history of not much more than a decade, ‘human security’ has become a thought-provoking and change-provoking concept. It brought to an end the millennia-old custom of thinking and acting only in terms of state security. Human casualties, suffering and insecurity, both military and civilian, were always deplored, of course, but traditional history
books tended to concentrate on the wars that were fought between states and were won by military might. Lately, however, more and more civil wars came to be fought within states. They were caused by poverty and deprivation, and they resulted in greater poverty and deprivation. The want and the fear of the ordinary people increased. Their human insecurity became a matter of great concern. This did not only happen in countries subjected to civil war, but also in those suffering from drought and disease.

The coining of the term ‘human security’ was therefore an important first, awareness-raising step. But further steps had to follow. Discussions had to take place, and decisions and plans had to be implemented through effective programmes and projects.

This is where the book under discussion fits in, and where it can make its significant contribution. Its introduction begins with a list of seventeen indicators of serious human insecurity, and a reference to an abundance of programmes responding to all these needs. A major problem with such programmes is also stated, however: the lack of co-ordination of efforts. The rationale behind the book is then formulated as follows: ‘...the need for an integrated version of and approach to human security in the Southern African context formed the background to the partnership that resulted in the symposia on which this publication is based’ (p 2).

The contributions from both workshops – the one in South Africa, 1998, and the other in the Netherlands, 1999 – are presented as eight chapters arranged in two parts. The first is a more conceptual and general part, and the second a more pragmatic and Southern Africa-focused one. It may also be said, however, that in each of the chapters practical implications are mentioned or implied.

Readers should bear in mind, of course, that almost all the chapters originated as presentations at the workshops. For publication they were thoroughly revised and/or updated or expanded, but they obviously communicate the particular perspectives and emphases of the various authors (and inevitably some overlaps and repetitions). Most readers will probably appreciate this challenge to read attentively and comparatively, and to allow their own inferences and conclusions to take shape. Readers who expect ready-made synopses and prescriptions may be disappointed, however.
The concept of human security is well described and discussed. It is distinguished from state security, but its interconnectedness to state security is also emphasised. In both directions, the good or bad quality of the one type of security influences the quality of the other type. Most governments are indeed trying to improve their human security record, but for the sake of their own future some governments care more about the security of their state and less about that of their citizens.

The interdependence which is strongly emphasised in the first chapter is that between human security, human development and human rights. These three are, in fact, the socio-political, socio-economic and socio-legal components of human dignity. Where any of these elements is/are lacking, or where there is a justice gap or an education gap, the demands for change grow stronger and the likelihood of conflict becomes greater. Preventive and transformative approaches are discussed with regard to pre-, in- and post-conflict situations. The importance of the involvement of the people in a process, and of the ownership of a process by the people, is emphasised.

Possible problems are discussed, but shortcuts to problem solving are warned against. Problem-solving theory should not be applied in ways that fail to question an existing order, or fail to aim at transforming a prevailing situation. Proper use should be made of critical theory that takes equity, justice and freedom seriously, and attempts to change an unjust status quo.

Relevant and urgent recommendations are therefore made about integrated, comprehensive approaches. It is through providing development and rights that security can be promoted. And the development that is needed is a broad one, comprising economic, social and political improvements. After all, ‘the ultimate purpose of knowledge and its application are aimed at improving the human condition’ (p 59).

Where the focus is on the Southern African context, due attention is given to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its sub-structures that are specifically responsible for security and related matters. Relevant details are given and discussed with regard to history and functioning, funding and other problems, individual and organisational shortcomings, general and specific objectives and prospects.
Of particular interest and value are the discussions of ways to promote human security – in general and in the Southern African context. Early warning signs should be taken seriously, and appropriate early action should follow. Preventive action should be promoted and undertaken in spite of the lack of interest that is often shown towards it. Although it is not, and cannot be, spectacular, it can be effective – and cost-effective as well. Policies and practices to limit the supply and flow of small arms – for use in armed conflict or in crime – and to promote disarmament and demobilisation should be supported and implemented. A whole chapter is devoted to dealing with the limitations to human security caused by crime and corruption. When preventive measures have been unsuccessful and violence has erupted, intervention should take place swiftly. Possible ways of intervening are discussed: diplomatic action, for instance mediation, economic action, for instance sanctions, and military action, for instance the preventive stationing of troops in a neighbouring country. When finally a conflict has been satisfactorily resolved, post-conflict peacebuilding should take place in a multi-dimensional way. Local ownership of peace agreements should be established. Reintegration of soldiers, structural reforms, and consolidation of the rectification of root causes should be implemented as soon as possible.

It is clear that the authors of these chapters and the editors of this book had no illusions of magic shortcuts that can take fighting groups ‘from warfare to welfare’. Nor did they envisage miracles that would suddenly and dramatically improve human security in Southern Africa and elsewhere. They are presenting their publication both realistically and optimistically. They acknowledge that ‘human security is only at its inception – a runner-up on the security agenda’ (p 27). But they are convinced that human security has a strong case to justify its recognition and propagation.

This dual orientation is a very relevant and very valuable advantage of the book. Another advantage is the amount of interrelated aspects, examples, insights and recommendations mentioned and discussed. But its greatest value is probably embedded in its message of conceptually informed practicality, which is clearly reflected in the planning of the two parts: a more general conceptual frame of reference, and a more specific agenda of possible approaches and actions. It should encourage and empower its readers to maintain an always
fruitful cross-fertilisation between theory and practice. Through critical and creative thinking and through insight-based and commitment-driven words and actions, we can indeed co-ordinate our contributions towards improving the human security scenario – in Southern Africa, Africa, and abroad.