Contents

EDITOR’S WORD ............ 3

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Jelena Radoman
THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM ............ 4

Barry Ryan
ALL THAT'S CONSTANT IS CHANGE: A BRIEF POLITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM IN SERBIA 11

THE POLITICAL USAGE OF CONFLICTS

Jelena Radoman
IN WHAT WAY HAS THE SECOND CHECHEN WAR CONTRIBUTED TO PUTIN'S 'STRONG STATE’ PARADIGM? ............ 20

Věra Stojarová and Miroslav Mareš
KRAJINA – OBSTACLE FOR THE CROATIAN INTEGRATION INTO EURO ATLANTIC STRUCTURES? . . . . . 27

Tatjana Petrović
DIVERGENCE OF THE EU AND RUSSIAN SECURITY POLICIES: THE CASE OF INDEPENDENCE OF KOSOVO AND THE LINK WITH THE "FROZEN CONFLICTS" IN MOLDOVA AND GEORGIA ............ 46

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Dragana Đurašinović – Radojević
PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY ............ 64

REVIEWS

Marko Savković
"REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS", INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND ECONOMICS ............ 76

Biljana Kotevska
"THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION", STEPHAN KEUKELEIRE AND JENNIFER MACNAUGHTAN . 80

Dorđe Popović
"SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN TRANSFORMING SOCIETIES: CROATIA, SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO", TIMOTHY EDMUNDS ............ 82

CALL FOR PAPERS ............ 85

CHICAGO GUIDE FOR BIBLIOGRAPHIES AND FOOTNOTES ............ 87

NOTES ON THE CONTENTS

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The Centre for Civil-Military Relations promotes the open and responsible participation of civil society towards increasing the security of both citizens and the state, based on the principles of modern democracy. The Centre also endeavours to support security cooperation with neighbouring countries and Serbia's integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.

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The recent controversy caused by the disagreement between the Army Chief of Staff, Zdravko Ponoš, and Minister of Defence, Dragan Sutanovac, has provoked strong reactions from politicians, experts and the general public alike. Most politicians and experts base their arguments on the principle of democratic civilian control of the armed forces and on the need for professional conduct in the military. The scale of the response is significant because it has served to highlight the fact that Serbia’s incomplete security sector reform remains a relevant issue. The first article of the eleventh issue of the Western Balkan Security Observer focuses on the concept of security sector reform, the origins of the concept and its real-world applicability. Taking into account the fact that this concept was developed with transitional, post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies in mind, we invite our readers to assess for themselves its applicability to Serbia. Barry Ryan, author of the article on police reform in Serbia, argues, amongst other things, for the necessity to take into consideration the specific social and political context in which security sector reform is being implemented. His article also introduces the notion that police reform in Serbia is a continuous and on-going process that has always been burdened by the politicisation of the police force – in other words, its manipulation by those in power.

The necessity of reforming security sector institutions that directly took part in the war is not the only legacy of conflict that post-conflict societies must tackle. The latest issue of WBSO contains three articles that deal with attempts to use concluded and “frozen” conflicts for political ends. The article on the Second Chechen War analyses the war through the lens of of Russian domestic politics and shows how the military offensive aided the rise of Vladimir Putin; a new political leader with his own political style. In their article about the Republic of Serbian Krajina, Vera Stojarova and Miroslav Mareš examine whether the Croatia’s post-conflict legacy could hurt its attempts to join the EU and NATO. In her article Tatjana Petrović studies the differences in the foreign policy and security strategies of the European Union and Russia in their approach to solving problems such as Kosovo, on the one hand, and “frozen conflicts” in Moldova and Georgia, on the other.

Dragana Đurašinović – Radojević analyses the mechanisms and procedures in place to effect oversight of the European Security and Defence Policy and, as she puts it, “its imposing human and material resources and their increasingly frequent application”. In her analysis Đurašinović – Radojević remains aware of the danger of a “double democratic deficit”, i.e. the problem of insufficient parliamentary oversight of Europe’s security and defence policy.

This issue of WBSO also carries a review of security-related articles published in the latest issue of Review of International Relations, an Institute of International Politics and Economics periodical. Marko Savković analyses three articles dealing with topics such as the concept of security sector reform, EU security and defence policy and regional security cooperation.

The foreign and defence policy of the EU is a topic also covered in The Foreign Policy of the European Union by Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan, reviewed for this issue of WBSO by Biljana Kotevska.

Also reviewed in this issue is Tim Edmund’s Security Sector Reform in Transforming Societies – Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. According to the reviewer Đorđe Popović, this book constitutes recommended reading for all those interested in both the theory and practice of security sector reform. Edmunds adopts a comparative analysis approach to two cases of post-authoritarian and post-conflict society in transition. Whether the events in 2009 confirm or refute the applicability to Serbia of concepts developed in Western European discourse, these events will nonetheless demand the close supervision and involvement of the broadest spectrum of security sector actors.

Jelena Radoman
Abstract

Although it is theoretically uncompleted, the concept of security sector reform is of huge practical importance since it is used as an indicator of success when assessing broader processes of social transformation. The meaning and the origins of the concept as well as the organizations to which it is being applied are discussed in this paper. The problem of the practical applicability of holistic and all-encompassing concept such as SSR is also discussed.

Key words: security sector reform, civil-military relations, developmental studies, security studies, transition

Introduction

The subject of this paper is the concept of security sector reform (SSR). SSR is a relatively new and underdeveloped concept that was developed in the academic community in 1990s. Despite being an ill-defined and contested concept, it is used as an indicator of success when assessing broader processes of political and societal changes such as processes of state transition and democratization. Even though there is not consensus on what security sector and therefore SSR encompasses, there have been attempts to regulate the area in a number of international documents. The reform of security sector organizations has even been placed as one of the conditions that potential member states should meet in order to achieve full membership in international organizations such as NATO and the European Union. The discrepancy between the theoretical underdevelopment and the significant practical weight of SSR demonstrates that further
work should be done developing the concept and improving its operationalization.

Most of attempts to define organizations which are incorporated into security sector stress the complexity of the concept and holistic nature of SSR.\(^5\) SSR is defined as being broad and encompassing but there is no consensus on its particular elements. Notwithstanding significant differences between broad and narrow definitions of security sector\(^6\) there is agreement on the basic institutions that certainly constitute elements of the security sector. These are the armed forces, the police force and intelligence organizations. The \textit{differenza specifica} between these and other state organizations is that the former are authorized to use coercive force on behalf of the state authority.\(^7\) While this distinction between security sector organizations and other state organizations is unambiguous and comprehensive less attention has been paid to identifying differences between individual security organizations. The concept of SSR is used as it is equally applicable to all three organizations. In doing so, however, substantial differences between them are being neglected and overlooked.

\textbf{What is SSR?}

While the security sector is made of those organizations “that apply and manage coercive force for collective purposes”, security sector reform is “the process through which security sector actors adapt to the political and organizational demands of transformation”.\(^8\) SSR is a holistic and normative concept. It is not a value-free process requiring mere adaptation of a state’s security forces to changing security and political circumstances. The concept of SSR assumes the adaptation of security forces in a particular preferred way according to standards established by liberal democracies.\(^9\) Thus, SSR constitutes an important component of the Western democratization agenda meaning not only the reorganization and reduction of previous large conscript-based military forces and of intelligence agencies that served the particular interests of past authoritarian regimes, but also a change in the way the state conceives of security and determines what is to be protected, from which threats and by what means.
SSR therefore assumes a change in the thinking about security. Therefore, the process of SSR has to be differentiated from a process of a mere reorganization of the state’s security forces which could be regarded as a technical process of the organizational adaptation to altered circumstances.

The origins of the concept

The concept of SSR emerged from three main fields of study: field of civil-military relations, development studies and security studies.

Theoretical reflections about the nature of relations between society, governance and the armed forces are the first source which discusses the concept of SSR. The main concern in the area of civil-military relations was how to control the praetorian ambitions of army leaders and how to keep them loyal to their civilian masters. Although the modern concept of SSR is applied both to armed forces and to other security organizations, subordination of security agencies to civilian leaders is still the ultimate precondition for any reformed security sector. Those concerns are strongly promoted as a democratic civilian control of security organizations which is a core element of the concept of SSR. The emphasis on democratic civilian control serves to prove that SSR is a value oriented concept which strongly promotes the values of liberal democracy.

SSR appeared on development agendas when the link between security, conflict and economy became obvious, thus becoming a part of donors’ attempts aimed at post conflict stabilisation, democratisation and economic development. Donor community efforts seeking to stabilisation of a post conflict area had to deal with the security organizations which were involved in the conflict. They were confronted with very practical and urgent problems, such as the demobilisation of combatants, establishing functioning and legal security forces capable of maintaining law and order and sanctioning those who committed atrocities, and were faced with issues in which security organizations played a role. The assumption that professional security organizations which are under firm democratic civilian control are less prone to becoming initiators of or to be engaged in conflict,
rose on the bases of conflict and post-conflict experiences. Moreover, professional security forces are believed to be predictable and reliable instruments in the hands of civilian leaders thus serving as a regional confidence building structures. As a result, their reform becomes a precondition for sustainable peace, and therefore, domestic and international stability.

SSR also became part of the development agenda in light of links between security and development too. It is not only true that an underdeveloped country is more prone to becoming involved in conflict but underdevelopment became a security issue itself. The broadening of the security agenda to include economic, political, social and environmental security as legitimate security concerns has happened in parallel to more attention being paid to the dignity of human life with a man being acknowledged as a referent security object. Security has been viewed as a public good and the state is in charge of providing it to its citizens. If the state fails to provide it to its citizens then it is described as a weak or a failed state, it thus becomes a source of insecurity and security threat in itself. Security sector is a part of an efficient state apparatus which provides citizens with a secure environment within which they exercise their basic, economic, social and political rights. Therefore, SSR has been viewed as a concept of good governance, thus serving as a precondition to the receipt of an economic aid by countries striving for post-conflict or post-authoritarian reconstruction and democratisation.

The link between the development agenda and SSR also results from the significant developments in the field of security studies. The prominence of SSR in both academic literature and in the development agendas correspond to the previously mentioned broadening of the security agenda. The main change in thinking about security was the shift from an agenda with only one relevant security object, the state, to an agenda in which society, particular social groups and individuals also became legitimate security objects. That shift in thinking was reflected in the SSR process since any reform process of a state’s security organizations is initiated by the introduction of strategic documents in which state leaders define what should be protected, from what threats and by what means. The process of transition to liberal democracy affected the way in which states define their

17 Although SSR today appears as an undisputable element of democratization efforts in any part of the world, there are authors who correctly point out that it still remains unclear in what ways SSR supports the process of democratisation. See, for example, Edmunds, SSR in Transforming Societies, 22.
security. Unlike authoritarian states which used to claim the defence of narrow sectional interests of the authoritarian regime itself\textsuperscript{18} as the main interest in a security domain, democratic states adopt and incorporate a broader security agenda and the concept of human security\textsuperscript{19} into their strategic documents.\textsuperscript{20} The professionalisation of the armed forces, decrease or increase in the number of police personnel or reorganization of intelligence organizations is only a technical aspect of the reform process, subordinated to the strategic choices. The emergence of new political or economic security issues on state’s agendas is affecting the nature of the missions and tasks that the state security organizations are authorized to perform. The issue of organized crime, for example, has brought on new missions and tasks for the armed forces which they were not familiar with before, such as supporting domestic police operations.\textsuperscript{21}

This does not mean that the concept of SSR is only relevant in the cases of developing or transition societies. Although it is most prominent as a part of a development agenda, it is highly relevant for societies which are usually described as consolidated or mature democracies. The changes in global security caused by the emergence of new security threats and changed perceptions of threat are the main reason for the involvement of the security organizations of these countries in the process of reform. The decision to get involved into peace support or peace enforcement operations, for example, confronts them with the need for substantially reorganizing their military systems which are required to take a new list of assignments and to adapt to the new conditions of engagement. The above remark that SSR is not a process of mere technical and organizational adaptation but mostly a process which prompt profound changes in the administrative and governmental systems at stake is also valid when dealing with SSR in established democracies. For example, the foreign deployment of armed forces challenges established domestic mechanisms of democratic oversight over these and requires their adjustment. Both in developing and developed countries, SSR is used as a measure of state effectiveness in creating and implementing security policies in mature democracies.

Theoretically, the process of SSR is divided into two phases labelled ‘first’ and ‘second generation’ SSR.\textsuperscript{22} The objective of first generation reforms is to establish institutions of democratic

\textsuperscript{18} Edmunds, SSR in Transforming Societies, 34.


\textsuperscript{20} Definition of security which incorporates ‘human security’ agenda in: OECD, “Guidelines”, 20.


control over the security sector, meaning the introduction of security-related legislature, of a clear chain of command within security organizations and ensure their subordination to political leadership. Firm acceptance of the norms and values of democratic control over security organizations by both civilian and security establishments and strong social commitment to those values should be achieved in the second generation of reforms. Therefore, the first generation reforms correspond to institutional changes in transitional societies, while the second generation reforms are part of the consolidation of democratic political culture. The labels “first and second” do not necessarily reflect the temporal sequence of the reforms, since it is only a theoretical categorization of the diverse elements of the SSR process. In practice, reforms of the first and the second generation can take place simultaneously.

Conclusion

As a summary of the reflections on the concept of SSR thus far two key points can be made:

- SSR is a complex and holistic concept which combines assumptions generated in the field of security studies with concepts and norms of good governance and liberal democracy. SSR is a concept of huge practical importance which aims to establish professional security systems which operate under democratic civilian control.
- There is a broad consensus over the fact that specific processes of SSR have to be viewed within their own specific national, security and political contexts. There are no generally applicable models of SSR.

The main methodological and practical problem emerging from these points is the difficulty to construct an assessment toolbox which would serve to measure states’ performances in terms of SSR but also to compare the successfulness of SSR achievements between different countries or regions. However, it is exactly the holistic nature of the concept which enables the possibility of a general assessment model for SSR. The concept’s complexity is regarded as one of its main assets since it incorporates different levels of governance, from the country’s top polit-
ical establishment to military or police personnel entitled to use force on behalf of the state. It also deals with the different organizations’ performances, from governmental to civil-society organizations and individuals as referent security objects, and with various issues – from the changes in the perception of security to disarmament in post-conflict societies.

Another shortcoming of SSR is that the concept doesn’t allow for the identification and analyses of significant differences between the various security institutions. Whilst SSR has a strong focus on reform of the armed forces in particular, the emphasis on inseparability of security sector institutions does not allow for separate accounts of the reform of its particular elements. Therefore, there are two possible directions for the further development of SSR as a concept: either to persist in developing the concept’s holistic character which will not reflect the practice of reform where different security organizations are showing different levels of reform, or to highlight the security organizations’ separate characteristics which might however undermine the concept’s key value, namely its complexity.
Abstract

Policing in Yugoslavia and in Serbia historically exhibits a greater affinity towards the maintenance of a particular socio-political order than it has the rule of law. This article argues against common held international contentions that the police in Serbia is resistant to reform. By reviewing the police force’s history, a tendency towards constant reform reveals itself. Yet, despite the constant change, policing is persistently politically dependent and in rivalry with the military. This history of policing in the Balkans was evidently not taken into account by international organizations frustrated by the unwillingness of the Serb police to wholly adapt the liberal formula on offer. The pace and direction of police reform in this context appears closely tied to wider structural reforms of the socio-political order.

Key words: Yugoslavia, Serbia, Police reform, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, socio-political transition.

Introduction

Contrary to widespread perceptions of a recalcitrant and monolithic institution, policing in Serbia has been in a constant state of reform from its earliest beginnings in 1804. In fact, the institution has proven so obedient to the vicissitudes of socio-political change that it provides an accurate barometer of political history in Serbia. Compelled to be more concerned with the maintenance of order rather than the enforcement of law, uniformed policing has never

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been insulated from the socio-political and economic context in which it has operated. While there is little evidence of a struggle to gain autonomy, a brief look at its relationship to the various authoritarian regimes that depended on the police helps us understand why policing in Serbia developed along a different trajectory from policing in other European states. It enables us to view more clearly the reasons why the police decided not to continue defending the regime from the popular will on 5th October 2000. Moreover, by tracing a political history of policing in Serbia we are in a better position to map out the future prospects for the so-called democratisation of the force.

Policing Constitutional Monarchy

From the beginning of policing in its modern sense the police in Serbia have exhibited both an affinity towards central authoritarian rulers and a rivalry with the military. Both traits might be traced to the earliest days of policing in the nineteenth century in their role to protect the constitutional monarchy from demands for parliamentary reform emanating from emergent political parties. It is noteworthy that until 1875 all newspapers were forced to present a proof-copy to the police an hour before publication.¹ In fact so fragile was the Serbian kingdom that the nascent state was arguably not only dependent on its security forces but was subservient to it.² Interestingly the earliest calls for police reform emanated from the socialist Radical Party, which at the time, according to Jelavich ‘was particularly interested in curbing the influence of the police in elections, a prerequisite for their own victory’.³

Reforms instituted by King Petar Karadjordjević however took a different route after the regicide of Obrenović in 1903. Karadjordjević augmented police numbers by elevating night watchmen to the status of gendarmie, aligning them with a powerful military nexus. Cox has pointed out that it is indicative of the power wielded by this military police that no steps were taken to arrest the conspirators to Obrenović’s murder.⁴ Subsisting under the military umbrella might have afforded the gendarmerie a great deal of power and prestige, but at the same time this lack of autonomy hindered the development of policing in a manner that is not evident in western European states. Even as late as

1918, when the Ministry of Interior was first formed, policing in Serbia was still under the command of the army.

The formation of the Ministry of the Interior was part of a series of reforms associated with the creation of the Royal Yugoslavia and occurred during a liberalising period of Karadjordjević’s rule. Perhaps the first sign of a break with the military might be traced to February 1921, when the first police training school was opened in Belgrade. Unfortunately for the police this year also saw the death of King Petar and the throne pass to the more authoritarian King Aleksander. It was Aleksander who formally created a police force independent of the military in 1929 but who also saw the potential role of the police to secure order in his increasingly fractious kingdom following riots that occurred after the assassination of Stjepan Radić in 1928. Aleksander viewed the police as pivotal to the maintenance of his regime and allocated it a central role when he declared his dictatorship in the same year. His first act was to rewrite the Law on the Protection of the State. The sweeping powers this legislation granted to the police were used fully and viciously and, according to Horvat, the kingdom became a police state where ‘legal authority was regularly pushed aside while in its place came the secret police, the military police, the court police, the police of influential individuals’. Atrocities that occurred in Hercegovina and Macedonia by the Serb-dominated force together with police repression being instituted in Croatia, exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions in the kingdom and led to the disintegration of the support for south Slav unity. Ironically enough, while political policing led to the disintegration of the first Yugoslavia, it would nevertheless become the foundation upon which a communist dictatorship would resurrect the next version of Yugoslavia.

Policing Communism

It was tasked to Slobodan Penezić Krcun, as Minister of Interior in Tito’s new Yugolsavia, to oversee the establishment of the ‘peoples militia’ in 1946. Wearing bottle green jackets and khaki trousers, the force was indistinguishable from the Partisan army. It conformed to Tito’s desire for a reliable and obedient force capable of maintaining communist order by immersing itself amongst the populace. The construction of intelligence net-

5 J. Horvat, Hrvatski panoptikum (Zagreb, 1965), 223.
works was therefore a priority function of the force up until 1953, when Krcun was replaced by Vojin Lukić. Lukić headed the police during a period of judicial reform following the intense anti-cominformist campaign that, even according to Aleksander Ranković, the archly powerful Federal Secretary of Internal Affairs, had compromised the judicial system ‘converting ordinary crime into political criminal offences in a indiscriminate manner’.7 Reforms included a change of uniform to the more familiar blue associated with policing and the introduction of the concept of ‘social self-protection’. Accordingly, ‘peoples councils’ (mesna zajednica) were established in every borough to implement social self-protection in 1953 that would become important to police officers as a site of liaison with members of their communities.

Nonetheless, while social self-protection might have shown some validity in Serbia, the predominance of Serb police officers in other republics in Yugoslavia tended to undermine the concept. In 1971 a Croat newspaper, Hrvatski tjednik was able to point out that while Serbs comprised merely 15% of the city’s population, Zagreb’s police force comprised 56.5% Serbs and 40.8% Croats. 8

More reforms were implemented in the 1960’s when Milan Mišković, a Croat not under Ranković’s influence, was appointed Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs. His appointment prefigured Ranković’s purge in 1966 when the extent of police corruption and police involvement in smuggling came to light. Ranković, a centraliser and a conservative, is generally blamed for the disproportionate number of Serbs and the appointment of a Croat might be understood to be an attempt to balance the ethnic scales. Misković’s brother was head of military intelligence so his appointment ultimately enabled the military to gain more influence over policing in Yugoslavia. Indicatively, in 1974 Colonel-General Frankoj Herjević, a Croat from the Yugoslav army, was appointed Federal Minister of Internal Affairs; a position he would hold until 1984.

Operational reforms in the 1960’s saw the ‘people’s militia’ become the ‘militia’ in 1966 and a new system of non-military ranking introduced in 1967. A new uniform was issued that was uncannily close to that worn by the British ‘bobby’. These changes however did not detract from the use of the police by the government to repress dissent emanating from nationalists in Croatia. In the early 1970’s Tito had begun to confront what he
termed a dangerously liberal influence in Yugoslavia and hastened to ‘reunite, recentralise and rediscipline’ the party during one of his more authoritarian periods of power. The use of armed police power as an adhesive to be applied at will to remedy the cracks spreading throughout an increasingly brittle Yugoslavia could however only be a temporary measure.

The death of Tito, economic decline and a resurgence of nationalist politics marked the beginning of a new reform period for the police in a tense and increasingly fractious Yugoslavia. The deaths of several men in Titograd (now Podgorica) in October 1988 saw the first time that the police had killed protesting workers. In 1989 police were involved in clashes in Kosovo where twenty-two protestors were killed. This prompted Albanian members of the Ministry to resign en masse, only to be replaced by hastily recruited Serb officers of questionable abilities. Meanwhile in Serbia, the police was being vigorously reformed to serve the objectives of Milošević’s ruling SPS. Rather convincing evidence exists that during protests in Belgrade in 1991, the police were deployed in a manner that would force them into conflict with protestors unhappy with Milošević’s policies. In response to the threat to his regime, Milošević announced an increase in the size of the police and called up reserve police forces. A new Minister of Interior, Zoran Sokolović, was hired to oversee this period of reform. Under Sokolović, the use of foot patrols was abandoned and the crime prevention aspect of policing was de-prioritised. Social self-protection was made obsolete. Policing became a distinctly more repressive affair as its budget simultaneously rose from the unusually high 15.13% of GDP to 27.0%. In 1991 a Law on Internal Affairs facilitated the centralisation of the police and local government was relieved of responsibilities it held over law an order. A law on ranks was passed in 1995, which conferred military ranks on eighteen administrative levels of the Ministry, making it more administratively more prestigious than the army. Furthermore, officers now routinely wore dark camouflage fatigues and helmets, having received a much more martial education in the Police Academy and at the Police College. It was estimated by British intelligence that up to 5000 of these new recruits were deployed to Kosovo by 1998, where emergency legislation had conferred enormous power on the police to quell ethnic-Albanian disturbances.

9 Vreme, 7 November 2002.
Economic sanctions (compounded by the government’s unwillingness to cut expenditure), a banking collapse in February 1993, and the highest rate of hyperinflation ever recorded had ruined the economy and created a massive grey economy. Utterly dependent on the loyalty of its security forces in this environment, the government turned a blind eye as its police force moved into this grey economy. In order to counter the legitimacy deficit being experienced by these conditions seemingly contradictory but ultimately superficial reforms were instituted in the mid 1990’s. Efforts in 1995 to improve the image of by providing officers with identification badges were augmented with policies to improve the organisation’s relationship with the media. Under Vlajko Stojiljković, appointed Minister of Interior in 1997, foot patrols were re-introduced and patrol officers were instructed to take more cognizance of non-crime safety issues. The effects of these measures were minimal, as evidenced by a poll undertaken at the time that found 33.7% of the population completely distrusted the police. In short, Milošević had practically reversed the development of the police back towards the sort of gendarmerie that operated in the late nineteenth century. The thin blue line between the survival of his increasingly illegitimate regime and the demands of the Serbian public became ever more difficult to defend.

Milošević’s attempts in July 2000 to push through constitutional reforms that would grant him virtually dictatorial authority over the FRY government concentrated the opposition movement. However, the ratification of Vojislav Kostunica’s disputed victory in the August elections had only a minor impact on Milošević’s rule when compared to the effects of the Kolubra miners strike, which began on 29th September 2000. Traditionally supportive of SPS rule, the miners strike proved to commentators such as Crampton that ‘even the most favoured sons of Serbian socialism had forsaken Milošević’. The strike sparked a contagion of protest that the police did nothing to prevent. Police barricades allowed strikers to march through to Belgrade where a crowd of around 500,000 protestors had gathered to call for Milošević’s resignation. The Head of Secret Police, Rade Marković, later stated that police support for the regime had been declining since the September elections and that ‘an awareness that Milošević had lost entered the heads of the police’. And while formally the police were given orders to ‘take extreme measures’ against the protestors, an agreement between

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Zoran Djindjić, one of the protest’s leaders, and the charismatic ‘Legija’, Commander of the Ministry of Interior Special Operations Unit, guaranteed that the police would not intervene. It took until 5th October for the Kolubra strikers to reach Belgrade and it is a telling indicator of the centrality of force to Milošević’s government that it fell within a week of losing the confidence of the security forces.

Policing Democratic Transition

With a new socio-political order to maintain the Serb police was to be once again subjected to reforms – this time however change was being directed not only by the new government, but also by the international community, under the guise of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Saturated by corruption to the point of extreme ineffectiveness, overly militarized, dangerously powerful and entirely unused to upholding the rule of law, it was generally understood that major structural reform was in store that would tame the Ministry of Interior. In March 2003 when Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić was assassinated the extent of the reform required became tragically visible. According to the International Crisis Group 16 the fault lay in the manner by which the parallel structures established by Milošević were left intact by Djindjić’s government. The report identified a nexus of state security, paramilitary organizations, politicians and war criminals preventing reform of the Ministry. Despite the rhetoric of reform very little had altered in the years between October 2000 and March 2003. To be sure, the introduction of female police officers, the blue European style uniforms with name tags and use of clearly identifiable vehicles indicated some change had occurred. However, structurally the institution was administered virtually identical to the way it had always been.

‘Operation Sabre’, which was launched in the wake of Djindjić’s murder, authorised the Serb police to revert to its more traditional repressive and militant model of policing. By some accounts the operation was successful: 40,000 illegally held weapons and two million ammunition shells were confiscated while the power and influence of the infamous organised crime gang of Zemun in Belgrade was eradicated. On the other hand 10,111 people were taken into custody and 3700 charges were brought against 3200 individuals. This extraordinary number of

15 Sell, 346.
arrests gives credence to any suggestion that not all the arrests were related to the assassination. In fact only 45 people were charged with directly attributable assassination related crimes. Moreover, Amnesty International criticised the use of torture by the police. 17 It would seem evident that the police used their emergency powers to pursue matters not directly related to the state of emergency.

While the police routinely reverted to normal powers following the emergency, a report issued by the OSCE in 2004 testifies to the lack of structural reform in policing.18 Operation Sabre bred a new confidence amongst police officers that had for years been subject to criticism. Issued with a similar level of authority, and with a corresponding licence to utilise their military training, the police proved itself as adept at upholding the new socio-economic order in Serbia as it had been upholding the old order.

The other remarkable trait visible in Serb policing is its predilection towards central authority and its suspicion of popular accountability structures. It would seem that although the police is willing to support the democratic order, there is little evidence to suggest that the government is anxious to make policing itself a democratic institution. For instance, attempts to establish an independent police inspectorate have foundered due to government interference. Additionally, an OSCE recommendation to lustrate compromised police officers was interpreted to facilitate a political re-shuffle of police management, allegedly to closer align the institution with the political objectives of the Minister of Interior, Dragan Jocić.

Conclusion

Reform has been a constant feature of policing in Serbia. Reform is of course tightly linked to the politicised nature of policing in the region and to the tendency to denigrate the rule of law in favour of the whims of a ruling party. In times of stability order has been maintained by utilising the police to establish networks of informants and to blend uniform work with secret police work. In times of instability order was imposed by a police force trained, equipped and ready to use force. Whatever order pertains – liberal or illiberal - it will be maintained. The police force’s inaction on 5th October 2000 was an exceptional break from its tradition of allegiance. There is little evidence however to

18 M. Downes, Police Reform in Serbia; towards the creation of a modern and accountable police service (Belgrade: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission to Serbia and Montenegro, 2004).
propose that the police was actively facilitating the transformation of Serbia into a liberal democracy. Nor is there evidence that the police itself was enthusiastic about incorporating the transparency and accountability structures associated with such a policing in a democratic polity. Policing remains conservative, politically obedient and thus vulnerable to corruption and manipulation. It is not entirely clear that the reformers in the international community readily appreciated the revolution required to implement their suggested reforms. By insisting on decentralization and an independent inspectorate, it not only threatened to transform policing but also to drastically change the nature of Serbia’s political culture. The lessons to be drawn for security sector reform in Serbia and elsewhere is that true change must be constructed from within – foreign models tailored in different contexts and imported without a due appreciation of the specific political and historical context at hand will rarely succeed. Police reform requires more than simply a reformation of the police.
In what way has the Second Chechen War contributed to Putin’s ‘strong state’ paradigm?

Jelena Radoman

Abstract

The main purpose of the present paper is to explore the link between Vladimir Putin’s arrival in the post of Prime Minister of the Russian Federation and the beginning of the second Russian military campaign in Chechnya. Over the course of the military campaign Putin promoted the idea of a “strong state” which became a distinctive element of his political style. The author does not mean to claim that Putin was promoted as a new political personality only as a result of the circumstances of the war, but rather that the “successes” of the Russian armed forces and Putin’s personal attitude towards the issue of Chechnya have certainly boosted his popularity as a new leader and that of his political programme.

Key words: Vladimir Putin, “strong state”, second Chechen war, “the power verticale”

Introduction

The second Russian military campaign in Chechnya coincided with the rise of a new political leader, Vladimir Putin, and consequently with the beginning of a new period in modern Russian political history. This has proven to be of far-reaching significance for current Russian politics. Its importance is reflected in the appearance of a new political leader whose public image was initially shaped by his attitudes towards the war, and in his political agenda which was widely influenced by the circumstances of that war. The main emphasis of Putin’s political agenda was placed upon the concept of a ‘strong state’, namely upon the necessity to transform Russian political insti-
tutions and its system into a model of a functioning, efficient and professional state institutions.¹ The manner in which the Second Chechen war was conducted and consequent policies that were introduced in Russian politics reflected that belief in a ‘strong state’ as the guarantor of order and security, but in a rather perverted way. The ‘tough’ and uncompromising attitude of the Russian authorities towards Chechnya as well as the later centralizing and undemocratic moves over centre-regions relations, media and non-governmental organizations could be regarded more as an illusion of state effectiveness than as evidence of genuine strength of both state institutions and Russian society. Therefore, the second war in Chechnya will be examined through the paradigm of Putin’s rise to power and the consequent changes in Russian politics in order to identify the main implications of the military campaign for the contemporary Russian politics.

**Putin’s rise to power and the Second Chechen War**

An appropriate explanation of the link between Putin’s rise to power and the beginning of the second war in Chechnya lies somewhere between the two extreme views on the issue. One of them is that ‘the links between the war and Putin’s rising political fortunes are mainly circumstantial’,² and the other is that ‘Chechnya made Putin Russian president’.³ A more moderate position would be to acknowledge the fact that Putin’s firm attitude towards the issue of Chechnya shaped his image as a tough and decisive leader and that is precisely the image he preserved until today in the mindset of most Russian citizens. Also, the fact is that the beginning of the second Chechen war provided an opportunity for the mostly anonymous chief of the Federal Security Service (FSB) to shape his image into that of a decisive leader which helped him to win two presidential elections. Two days after Boris El’tsin had appointed Putin Prime Minister, Chechen ‘rebels’ entered Dagestan, which immediately provoked a Russian military response in September 1999. Research into public opinion shows somewhat contradictory information regarding Putin’s popularity and the dynamics of the war. First of all, there is a clear connection between the high popular support for Putin and the popular reaction to the events connected with the war, such as the bombings of the apartments in Russian cities in summer 1999, the assault on Grozny in January 2000 and after the Dubrovka siege in November 2002, although after the terrorist attack in Beslan popular support actually declined.⁴ At the same time there are contradictions between the

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results of two polls: the first shows that in the aftermath of the Dubrovka siege around 75 per cent thought he was not successful in defeating fighters in Chechnya and achieving a political solution to the problem; the second shows that almost the same percentage announced that they would support him in the next election. These contradictory results serve to assure Putin of that his actions would be tolerated in times of the crisis.

Elements of Putin’s understanding of a ‘strong state’ can be seen in his attitude towards Chechnya. First of all, in his view, the entire survival of the Russian Federation would have been at risk if Russia had been defeated in Chechnya. He feared a spill-over into the whole of the Northern Caucasus which might eventually result in the ‘Yugoslavization’ of Russia. Therefore, Putin made it his mission to prevent the collapse of the country, for which he was ready to sacrifice his political career. State territorial sovereignty and statehood are the *sine qua non* of a ‘strong state’ platform. He also firmly refused to define the Chechen issue as an attempt at secession, which would have required different ‘laws of war’ to be applied. That is why a state of emergency was never officially introduced in Chechnya, neither during the first nor the second Chechen war. Unlike the first Chechen war which was defined as a ‘restoration of Constitutional order’, the second one was fought under the auspices of a ‘counter-terrorist operation’. The definition of the Chechen military actions as ‘terrorism’ is highly problematic in itself, since Chechen rebels certainly used terrorism but with specifically secessionist ambitions; their secessionist rhetoric is evidence of this. Putin himself tended to define the events in Chechnya as a criminal rather than a political matter. In order to support this stance he used specific language when talking about Chechen rebels, describing them as bandits, criminals etc. The specific language he used led to their dehumanization which helped to create the false belief that the brutal use of force in Chechnya was acceptable and legitimate. This was also supported by the official statements that Russia was defending itself from ‘international terrorist gangs’ and ‘armies of killers’, while Putin himself promised Russian citizens that the authorities would resolve the situation in a ‘one-and-a-half to two weeks’. Thirdly, Putin explicitly used the ‘weakness’ of Russia a source of vulnerability. The perception of Russia’s weakness and therefore the need to work on the strengthening of the state has became one of the leitmotifs of Putin’s policy since the second Chechen war. What can certainly be accounted as Putin’s personal achievement is putting the issue of ‘state weakness’ on the agenda and convincing Russians that the causes of the weakness should be over-
come by strengthening of state apparatus and creating an efficient and centralized executive power. Direct proof that he was successful in convincing the audience of the validity of his interpretation of the Chechen situation is the fact that in 2000 three quarters of the Russian citizens believed that the Russian soldiers were fighting bandits in Chechnya, while around half of the polled population said that the war was being fought to prevent the break up of Russia. Even stronger proof that he had been successful are Putin’s two consequential election victories and his constantly high popularity among Russian citizens. One cannot say that Putin would not have been equally successful in persuading his audience without the events of the war. But, it is obvious that the terrorist attacks, such as the apartment bombings in three Russian cities in the summer of 1999, the Dubrovka theatre siege in October 2002 and the Beslan school siege in September 2004, had a tremendous psychological impact on Russian citizens and made them ready to accept the changes and the measures which Putin announced. The concurrence of these events with Putin’s rise and consolidation of power may not have been the crucial factor that shaped his political fortune but surely contributed to it significantly.

The impact of the ‘strong state’ platform on the war and Russian politics

The manner in which the second war in Chechnya was fought is evidence of the Russian authorities’ wish to prove state capability and efficiency in dealing with problems. Tarnished by defeat in the first Chechen war, the Russian Army in 1999 was given a decisive task – to take control of the entire Chechen territory – along with carte blanche in how to achieve it. As a result the Russian forces used vastly superior weapons to those which Chechens have accessed to, with no concern for ‘collateral damage’. The military did prove very efficient in completing its task, which greatly helped the army to regain popular esteem and support. In that way, military success helped Putin to create an illusion of effectiveness in resolving problems. That was the first element of the illusion that was created regarding the end of the conflict in Chechnya. The second important element was the politics of normalisation in Chechnya, namely ‘Chechenisation’. This was officially introduced in June 2000 with the appointment of former resistance fighter Akhmed Kadyrov as Putin’s head of administration in the republics. The essence of that policy

13 Trenin, Malashenko, Lieven, 155.
14 Baev, 118.
15 Baev, 118.
16 Russell, 83.
resided in devolving of more power to elected pro-Russian Chechens, although ‘many of them were violent, corrupt personalities with agendas of their own’. The politics of ‘Chechenisation’ was aimed at fulfilling two goals: firstly, to shift the burden of anti-terrorist operations on to Chechen domestic forces, and secondly to show Russia’s success in dealing with the problem efficiently in a short period of time. In all ways it served to support the illusion of Russian state effectiveness, thus supporting Putin’s emphasis on a ‘strong state’.

One of the main domains in Russian politics where important and far-reaching changes took place from 2000 which could be regarded as a direct consequence of the second Chechen war, are the relations between the federal centre and the regions. The dissolution of the USSR challenged those relations and encouraged the regional leaders towards the idea of a loose federation or even a confederation (a ‘Russia of the regions’) in the late 1990s. The first Chechen war seemed to have been perceived by the regional leaders as a chance to negotiate more autonomy from the federal centre, using ‘their loyalty to the federation over Chechnya as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Moscow’. It seemed they were successful in that intention since between 1994 and 1997 when a series of bilateral treaties were signed between Moscow and the regions on the issue of the regions’ broader autonomy. The second Russian military campaign in Chechnya, and to an even greater extent the developments in Russian politics triggered by both the war and Putin’s rise to power, dramatically altered this trend in centre-regions relations.

A direct consequence of the need for a ‘unity of the country, strengthening state structures and creating an efficient system of internal security’ all the elements of his vision of ‘strong state’ was Putin’s call for the abolition of direct elections for regional leaders and the promotion of nationwide political parties, as well as the introduction of the proportional system for the State Duma elections. Roemer Lemaître claims that the Kremlin used Beslan as a pretext to accelerate the construction of so-called ‘vertical power’, which was used as an instrument to suppress all independent sources of power. But the sources of that tendency in Russia could be traced to the period of the second Chechen war when Putin started to use ‘strong state’ rhetoric. The main changes in regional policy were the abolition of popular elections for regional leaders (abolished by the 2004 Federal Law) and the introduction of broader powers for the president to dismiss regional leaders. These changes raised questions about whether they were in line with the Russian Constitution and with the principles of federalism. Indeed some authors claim that at least the appointment proce-

18 Trenin, Malashenko, Lieven, 47.
19 Trenin, Malashenko, Lieven, 54.
The ‘strong state’ agenda implies a certain kind of state-civil society relations. The Russian authorities pursue a ‘statist model of state-society relations’ according to which civil society organizations are supposed to work in harmony with state institutions. The state therefore claims to be the highest authority and interprets the national interests which civil-society organizations are then supposed to follow. That kind of understanding of state – civil society relations in Russia is reflected in the current Russian authorities’ attitudes towards the media and non-governmental organizations. Although in his ‘Millennium speech’ Putin declared that the ‘strong state’ agenda requires ‘...a full-blooded civil-society to balance out and monitor the authorities’, both his personal stances and especially official policy towards the role of the media during the second military campaign in Chechnya indicate attitudes which are quite the opposite. Asked by a journalist about the Andrei Babitsky case, the journalist who had been reporting on the horrors of the war in Chechnya, Putin made it clear that in his view the journalist had been undermining the state of society’s morale by working directly for the enemy. This judgment tells us more on his attitudes towards the role of civil society institutions than the purely symbolic statements about the ‘partner relations between the executive authority and civil society’. It implies, first of all, that the state institutions are those which define the national interests and that civil society organizations are expected to support that interpretation and work together with the state. Secondly, it also implies if they do not follow it they deserve public condemnation and the denial of the right to represent anything else that is not the state position. This reference to ‘society’s morale’ was not accidental, since Putin believed that society’s general morale could be restored by turning Russia into a strong state, which would vanquish popular feelings of anxiety and insecurity. The official policy during the campaign was in line with Putin’s personal stances. Concurrently with the military campaign an ‘information war’ was launched. ‘Strategic use of
information’ resulted in limited access to first-hand accounts information and military processing of the information which would be released to the public, which emphasized the savagery of the Chechens and gave a positive gloss on the Russian army.\textsuperscript{29} Journalists and television channels critical of state policy and military actions in Chechnya, such as Anna Politkovskaya and Vladimir Gusinsky’s NTV, came under various kinds of pressure. Condemnation of and hostility towards any public criticism or judgement of the state authorities’ actions can hardly be seen as testimony of ‘partner relations’ between state and civil-society organizations. The suppression of criticism is a tool aimed to build an illusion of strength rather than to support independent sources of state power.

\textbf{Conclusion}

A ‘strong state’ platform in Russian politics is an ideological base for a political programme aimed at strengthening state control, centralized decision-making and state supremacy over civil society organizations. The launching of this platform coincided with the second war in Chechnya and with the appearance of a new incoming political leader, Vladimir Putin. While we can assume that he would have been successful in promoting that programme even without the war, it is indubitable that the military success of the Russian army in their aggressive campaign of 1999-2000 and Putin’s personal decisive stance towards the issue did much to persuade the Russian electorate of the desirability of that programme. The second military campaign in Chechnya helped the realization of that programme firstly by promoting Putin as a ‘tough’ and decisive leader and secondly by strengthening the ‘power verticale’. The fight against international terrorism, as Russian authorities officially defined Chechen military actions, has been used to justify changes in centre-region relations and to impose restrictions over basic political rights in a democratic society, such as freedom of expression. The manner in which the war was fought and consequent developments in Russian politics could both be explained by the ideology of a ‘strong state’ which resulted in the creation of an image, rather than any reality of strength of the Russian state and the society over which it rules.

\textsuperscript{29} Cited in Trenin, Malashenko, Lieven, 146.
Republika Srpska Krajina\textsuperscript{1} – obstacle for the Croatian integration into Euro Atlantic structures?\textsuperscript{2}

\textit{Věra Stojarová and Miroslav Mareš}\textsuperscript{3}

UDK: 32(497.5/.6) ; 342.1(497.6)

\textbf{Abstract}

The article focuses on the government in exile of Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK)\textsuperscript{4} in the context of Balkan studies and applying on actors analysis in security studies. It describes different phases of the conflict in Srpska Krajina and it tries to give an overall picture of the goals and aims of the government or RSK, of the methods and means used, and it tries to sketch out possible future scenario for the RSK and implications for Croatian integration into NATO and the EU.

\textbf{Key words}: Republika Srpska Krajina, government in exile, Serbia, Balkan, security, nationalism

\textbf{Introduction}

Interconnected national, religious and territorial conflicts constitute typical political and security situations in the history and present of the Balkan region. Territorial claims make up an important part of Balkan politics. One of them (which has it roots in the Balkan wars of the first half of the 1990’s) is claim to independent Republic of Srpska Krajina (Republika Srpska Krajina - RSK), which is today represented by the so called Government of RSK in exile in Belgrade and by various Serbian extreme right wing organizations. The existence of this government, which directs its claims over contemporary Croatian territory, is connected with nationalist forces in contemporary domestic Serbian politics; however, it also has some links with

\footnote{1 In accord with Croatian scientist Nikica Barić (Barić, Nikica. \textit{Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990-95}, (Zagreb: Golden marketing-tehnička knjiga, 2005)) the authors decided to put the name Republika Srpska Krajina neither into italics nor into quotation marks. Though, this has any negative or positive connotations and does not mean the authors approve the RSK as legitimate actor. Terms such as Patriotic war (Domovinski rat) or ethnic cleansing (etničko čišćenje) are used as stances of various actors and do not mean the authors side with any side of the conflict.

2 This paper has been undertaken as part of the Research Project ‘Political Parties and Representation of Interests in Contemporary European Democracies’ (code MSM002-1622407) and as part of the Research Project “Conceptualisation of security and the application on the Western Balkan region” (GAČR 407/08/P268).

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4 The English versions of RSK use sometimes Republic of Serbian Krajina, sometimes the original name Republika Srpska Krajina. For the purpose of the text we will use the later term and term Krajišnici (Krajišnici) will be used for the people living in the region. The Serbian national feeling (Srpsstvo) was translated as Serbianship.

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and the potential to influence regional security and international relations. The question of Srpska Krajina is a topic of relevance for political forces involved in finding a solution to the contemporary issue of Kosovo and it is an interesting matter in the light of Croatian’s future admission into Euro Atlantic structures. The Macedonian invitation into NATO was blocked at the Bucharest summit by the Greek delegation due to a name dispute. The same can happen to Croatia with Slovenian side because of the dispute over Piran bay or from various other actors due to e.g. the unresolved territorial disputes with the so called Government of Republika Srpska Krajina. While the difficult relations with Slovenia could be solved under the NATO or EU umbrella, the issue of a self-proclaimed Republika Srpska Krajina could have implications for the external relations of NATO or EU with Serbia, one of the key actors in the stabilisation of the Western Balkans.

The contemporary structure of political actors in the Balkans includes various actors. One of them is the above mentioned RSK government – in - exile. This entity could be analyzed through the lens of contemporary Balkan studies, using an actor - oriented analysis of international relations and security studies as well as a domestic policy analysis, all of which will be included in this paper. The aim of this article is to analyze the unfolding around RSK – the initial historiographic and descriptive part of the article is followed by an analysis of the aims, means and methods of RSK and its relation with other actors in the international arena. The aim is also to assess the potential security threat for the Republic of Croatia emerging from the side of RSK and its potential impact on the future integration of Croatia into the Euro - Atlantic structures.

The self-proclaimed RSK government in exile provided us with the primary as well as secondary sources. The authors have undertaken several face–to–face as well as e-mail interviews with the representatives of RSK and used the RSK materials for the purpose of this article. For the Croatian point of view, we contacted Public Information Office of the Croatian government. The Croatian perspective was taken from one of the best books about the RSK Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990-1995 written by Nikica Barić and common text of the Croatian authors Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat. As for complementary sources, the ICTY decisions, Veritas documents, Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (HHO), HIDRA, Krajišniks and other websites were used.\(^5\)
Conceptualisation of Governments in exile

Governments in exile were common for many states during various historical periods. The first wave in modern history came during WWI and during minor wars in the post-war period in the Soviet area, then during WWII (this is probably the “golden era” of governments in exile, as in this time they were really important actors in international relations), and since then, in many isolated cases during the Cold War as well as in post-Cold War period.6

Several contemporary organizations, which self-proclaimed themselves as governments-in-exile, were created after break up of former communist multinational states and after the “re-structuring” of their former territory during and after armed conflicts in this area. These are, amongst the others, the exiled government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, the Abkhazian government in exile and the exiled government of Republika Srpska Krajina. However, these are not “classic governments in exile” from the point of view of international law. According to international lawyer Alexander Koberg, a government in exile:

1) is recognized at least by the host state,
2) has lost the territory because of occupation after the war,
3) declares the will to be recognized as regular government of the state (currently under foreign control)
4) seeks primarily the return of its territory and
5) has some elements of continuity with the government which was in place before the loss of its territory.7

However, the legal criteria are only a few elements of many to provide a possible framework for governments-in-exile. The history, goals, structure (including violent formations), strategy and environment (allies, enemies, access in media etc.) of the groups, which claim recognition as governments in exile, should be also investigated. The objective of the research is usually to explain the real impact of governments in exile on the politics in the home territory, on the politics of the diaspora, on the politics of the host state or on the neighbouring countries and on international relations and security.

Republika Srpska Krajina

The name Krajina refers to the Military Frontier (Vojna Krajina) which was created by Austria against the Ottoman Empire and it means ‘the edge’. Krajina offered special rights in

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7 Alexander Koberg, Die Exilregierung im Völkerrecht, Eine Untersuchung ihrer rechtlichen Klassifikation (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2005), 41.
order to attract people to settle there and create a buffer zone against the Turks. At the end of the 19th century, military rule was abolished and Krajina was incorporated as a civil-administrative unit into the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Between the two World Wars the area was part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, also known as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The autonomous Banovina of Croatia 1939-1941 was gradually transformed into an Independent Croatian state in 1941-45. After the WWII, the region became part of the People’s Republic of Croatia and the Socialist Republic of Croatia respectively.

The dissolution of Yugoslavia brought about new claims discourses for independence by Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. The new Croatian constitution met with resistance with the local Serbs living in these areas who protested against secession from their mother country. The Serbs claimed that the new Croatian constitution violated the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 1974 and claimed subordination to the Belgrade government. In July 1990 the nationalists in Krajina created the Serbian National Council with president Milan Babić in order to oppose Croatian independence. The Krajina Serbs even established their own paramilitary structures under the leadership of Milan Martić, the chief of police in Knin. In a referendum on the sovereignty of Krajina, the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants called for the autonomy of Krajina. However, this referendum was not recognized by the Croatian government which declared independence on 25th June 1991.

The Serbian autonomous Oblast of Krajina was created on 21st December 1990 and four months later confirmed its will to secede from Croatia. Republika Srpska Krajina was proclaimed on St. Nicolas day (Christian holiday) 19th December 1991; the Constitution of RSK was approved on the same day. The SAO Western Slavonia, Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem joined RSK in February 1992. Republika Srpska Krajina had not only its political representatives but also formed the Serbian Army of Krajina (Srpska vojska Krajine, SVK). According to Krajina sources, the territory covered 17 028 km² and it was populated by 435 595 inhabitants. The self-appointed RSK even proclaimed its own monetary system and issued the new currency – krajinski dinar. The independence of RSK was not recognized by any other state, not even the former FRY. As Barić states, the process of constitution of Serbian autonomous units in

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8 In 1929-1941 was Yugoslavia divided into 9 territorial units - Banovinas.
9 The radicalism of the rebelled Serbs did not respond with the official Yugoslav policy, because their wish to be attached to Serbia was violating the still valid Constitution of SFRY (Barić 2005, 102).
10 Oblast equals to smaller territorial unit in Yugoslavia.
12 Barić 2005, 401.
Croatia was illegal because it began at the time when Croatia was still part of SFRY and it was violating the 1974 Constitution.\(^\text{14}\) As for the Croatian population, the largest part left RSK during 1991 while the rest underwent persecution by the Serbs. Although RSK authorities claimed to consider Croats as equal to Serbs, the de facto situation was reversed.\(^\text{15}\)

According to the 1974 Constitution or better to say according to the Badinter commission, the RSK did not have the right to secede. The RSK lasted till the August 1995 when the Croatian offensives Flash (Bljesak – operation launched in Western Slavonia in May 1995) and Storm (Oluja)\(^\text{16}\) were launched and the whole territory was gradually re-integrated into Croatia. Both operations resulted in great numbers of refugees fleeing mainly to Serbia.\(^\text{17}\) The 5\(^{th}\) of August is celebrated in Croatia as Victory Day which is seen with animosity by Serbian society. The whole territory was gradually handed over from the UNTAES peacekeepers to the Croatian authorities; the whole process lasted till 1998.

**Party system in the RSK**

The most important party in RSK was the Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka, SDS). The SDS was set up in Knin as a party which united ethnic Serbs in Croatia under the leadership of Jovan Rašković\(^\text{18}\) and later on under the president of Knin municipality, Milan Babić. The SDS was inciting with its propaganda the Serbs living in Croatia using the populist rhetoric about “the restoration of Ustasha, genocide over the Serbs, a Croatia-Albanian agreement about the breaking of SFRY” and reminding them of the German bombardment of Belgrade in 1941, “the Ustasha concentration camps and the hundreds of holes filled with killed Serbs”.\(^\text{19}\) Even though SDS tried to present itself as the main united force against Croatia, the party was divided. Already in 1991, one of the regional party leader Milan Djukić left and set up the Serbian National Party (Srpska nacionalna stranka, SNS).\(^\text{20}\) After Rašković left, the most of the rivalry took place between Milan Babić and Milan Martić. Babić was against Slobodan Milošević and his interfering into Krajina matters, while Martić sided with Belgrade and followed Milošević’s decisions. The personal enmity between those two was transposed even into the RSK govern-

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\(^\text{14}\) Barić 2005, 108.
\(^\text{16}\) For the analysis of the war operations see Marijan in: Zdenko Radelic, ed. Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2006), 97-190.
\(^\text{17}\) See UNHCR data. In 1996 there were 310,088 asylum applications from the overall Croatia (mainly in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), USA, Austria and Germany) and 144,147 IDP’s within Croatia. 336,600 refugees from Croatia were residing in industrialized countries in 2001; the number dropped in 2005 to 132,200. No reliable data available only for RSK (“2002 UNHCR statistical yearbook,” UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/413733cc4.pdf) (accessed 15 October 2008), 71-72. According to Krajina sources the number 750,000 of Serbs living in Croatia before the war dropped to 70,000. http://www.krajinacafe.net/ris/razuc/pdf_modules/zzmagazine/article.php?articleid=5. For the “Serbian numbers” see Dokumenti centar VERITAS, http://www.veritas.org/vu/ (accessed 15 October 2007). For one of the best demographic analysis see: Dražen Živić in Zdenko Radelić, ed. Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2006), 420-483.
\(^\text{18}\) Rašković became discredited within the Serbian society, after some of his secret statements about Serbs (Serbs are mad nation) and Milošević (great Bolshevik, communist and despot) were made public (Baric 2005, 212). Some of his statements were clearly pacific (I do not want to lead you into the war, I can lead you into peace and if you want war you shall be led by someone else). However, e.g. Serbian intellectual S. Livada stated that the Rašković declarations were product of myth mania and even necrophilia, that Rašković is bloodthirsty necrophyl who wants to spill Croatian blood. (Livada cited from Baric 2005, 219).
\(^\text{19}\) Barić 2005, 113, 125.
\(^\text{20}\) The nickname of the party was “Party of Tudjman’s Serbs”, because the party was loyal to Croatia and did not really stood in the opposition to the regime.
ment, and as a result Babić was replaced with the more loyal Goran Hadžić as president of RSK. The main aim of SDS was “the creation of RSK as modern state, internationally recognized and equal to all other states which emerged after the dissolution of SFRY. Eventually, RSK should become part of a united Serbian state, which would be constituted on the ethnic and historical Serbian land”.  

21 After the end of the war in Croatia, the SDS ceased to exist. Part of its supporters set up together with the Independent Serbian Party (Samostalna Srpska stranka, SSS) a new party in 1997– the Independent Democratic Serbian Party (Samostalna srpska demokratska stranka, SSDS).  

Besides SDS, which occupied the main place in the RSK party system, other parties should also be mentioned. Based on the model of Šešelj’s Serbian Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka, SRS), the SRS RSK was founded in Vukovar in 1992 under the leadership of Rade Leskovac. However, the SRS RSK did not evade internal rivalry either. Leskovac tried to break the ties to the mother party in Belgrade and to make the party independent, but he was soon replaced by the more loyal Branko Vojnica. The party from then on was subordinated to Vojislav Šešelj and SRS.  

23 After the signing of the Erdut agreement and the re-incorporation of Eastern Slavonia into the Croatian territory, the party was in 1998 re-constituted under the name Party of the Danube Serbs (Partija podunavskih Srba, PPS) under the same leadership.  

The disunity and fractioned nature of the Serbian political elite is again clearly illustrated by the example of the The Communist Union – Movement for Yugoslavia (Savez komunista – Pokret za Jugosloviju, SK-Pj), which was founded at the end of 1990; it never gained enough power and was never able to achieve its goal – the preservation of the communist SFRY. One of its leaders and president of Vrginmost town council Dmitar Obradović was accused of cooperation with the Croats and of harming Serbian interests. In June 1992, an initiative was launched to make Kordun and Banija into a special area within RSK; this suggestion was attacked by some top RSK officials, who saw it as a separatist move and an attempt to return under Croatian authority. As a consequence of this dispute D. Obradović, whose municipality was also in Kordun, was soon killed, and the assassins were never found.  

25 One of the witnesses in the ICTY, Slobodan Lazarević, declared in 2002 that the assassination was committed by the anti-terrorist unit of the 21st Corps of SVK.  

Besides the above mentioned political parties, there were couple of others, however they remained marginal.
Government of Republika Srpska Krajina

Krajina formed real para-state structures; parliamentary as well as presidential elections were regularly held. The most successful party in the electoral race was the Serbian Democratic Party, founded on 17th February 1990 in Knin. Alongside SDS, the Serbian Radical Party, the Social-Democratic Party of Krajina and Serbian Party of Socialists participated in these elections. The RSK even approved a new flag and national coat of arms (almost the same as the coat of arms and state flag of Serbia) – the tricolour (red, blue, and white) with the coat of arms (white double-head eagle with cross and fire steels) and the same national anthem (Bože pravde).

The first president and head of the self-proclaimed was Milan Babić (19 December 1991- 16 February 1992) followed by acting president Mile Paspalj (16 February 1992- 26 February 1992), Goran Hadžić (26 February 1992-February 1994), and Milan Martić (February 1994-7 August 1995). Milan Martić’s mandate was prolonged by the Parliament of RSK on 26th February 2005; however he is currently sitting in The Hague on a 35 year-long sentence for ethnic cleansing and other war crimes. The parliament was made up of 92 MP’s from 28 districts (opština). Some of them died and some of them went back to Croatia. More then 2/3 live in Serbia and are still active in the RSK government-in-exile. The internal relations within Krajina leadership were not optimal – the main tensions were “pro/anti Milošević and with or without Croatia/Serbia”.

The government in exile formed shortly after Operation Storm and was reconstituted in 2005 in Belgrade. The member of the National Assembly of Serbia and of the Serbian Radical Party, Milorad Buha, was elected by the Parliament of RSK as the Prime Minister of RSK on 26th February 2005; however he is currently sitting in The Hague on a 35 year-long sentence for ethnic cleansing and other war crimes. The parliament was made up of 92 MP’s from 28 districts (opština). Some of them died and some of them went back to Croatia. More then 2/3 live in Serbia and are still active in the RSK government-in-exile. The internal relations within Krajina leadership were not optimal – the main tensions were “pro/anti Milošević and with or without Croatia/Serbia”.

The government in exile formed shortly after Operation Storm and was reconstituted in 2005 in Belgrade. The member of the National Assembly of Serbia and of the Serbian Radical Party, Milorad Buha, was elected by the Parliament of RSK as the Prime Minister of RSK on 26th February 2005. All the members of the current RSK in exile or members of the Parliament of RSK have other jobs and only work for RSK in their free time. The only exception is Slobodan Jarčević, the former minister of foreign affairs of RSK; he is a pensioner and spends his free time working for RSK. The RSK government in exile resides in the disputed building of the Serbian Radical Party in New Belgrade. The SRS provides the RSK government-in-exile with a room for free and pays its expenses for electricity, telephone and computer. The government publishes its materials on an internet portal thanks to the owner who also gives them

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28 The flag of Republika Srpska is left without the coat of arms and it is only plain tricolour.
29 The first coat of arms was having a sign “Krajina” which disappeared with the amendment of Constitution of RSK in 1992 while at the same time the eagle gained the crown over its head.
30 Official anthem of Serbia. Interesting in this regard is the fact, that Republika Srpska also adopted similar symbols. However, the Constitutional Court of BiH declared the Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution-al Law on Flag, Coat of Arms and Anthem of the Republika Srpska as unconstitutional. The Court has voted against the use of the BOS pravde as unconstitutional already in March 2006, which was re-approved in January 2007. The parliament of RSK reacted and approved only music without lyrics as official anthem of Republika Srpska at the end of May 2007. However, the decision of the Constitutional Court of BiH was upheld by the Constitutional Court of Republika Srpska in July 2007. For the Court decision see Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.ustavnisud.ba/public_press/int/1063.php?id=14192&st=3566&ct=397 (accessed 15 October 2008).
31 Indicted for crimes against humanity and others by ICTY in 2004.
33 Barić 2005, 463-473.
34 Buha became MP in the Serbian parliament for the SRS when Ostoja Stojanović, MP for the SRS, passed away.
35 Very interesting is the fact that as being MP in Serbian parliament, Mr. Buha is in the section for Constitutional issues and Department for defence and security. Along the prime minister, the government has six ministers: Minister for the Information Ratko Ličina, and other ministers without portfolio: Dr. Momčilo Subotić, Dr. Miroslav Aleksić, Svetozar Vojić, Boro Bogunović, Mili Bosnić. Government secretary is Branko Babić and Counsellor Slobodan Đerđević.
36 Zemun, Magistratski trg 3. New Belgrade.
the domain for free. The government is not financed by anyone and does not even collect any money from the Krajišnics. Once the RSK representatives asked the Serbian minister of foreign affairs Vuk Drašković for the RSK’s money from the National bank of Serbia, but Vuk Drašković was not willing to reply. Vojislav Šešelj is presented in the RSK documentary book as one of the first diplomat of RSK and is followed mainly by the Serbian intellectual emigrants in Europe or in the USA, which help to promote Serbian interests in the West or support RSK financially.

According to the RSK government in exile, the parliament as well as government are neither politically nor ideologically divided: “We could say centre. Not leftist, not rightist.” This shall help RSK to meet its political objectives and “tomorrow, when we set up the Republika Srpska Krajina, the political environment will definitely be made of by different political parties – as in all other states”. Nonetheless, the political claims of its representatives locate RSK at the far right edge of the political axis (nationalism, xenophobia).

The aims of Government of RSK

The parliament of RSK, together with the government of RSK in exile, decided to start working again in order to raise awareness internationally about the “crimes of genocide and ethnic cleansing of Serbs carried out by Croatia...It is the first time in modern history that one state expels a nation from a common state and is not responsible for that”. The aim is to raise awareness abroad of the Croatian genocide and the ethnic cleansing of Serbs in RSK and Serbs in Croatian towns. “There will be new politicians who will not have this (almost Nazi) sin in their soul and will understand the government of RSK. Our duty is to make public the fact that Croatia was a state made-up of two nations – Croats and Serbs.” Therefore, the main aim is to make Croatian war crimes public, internationalize the whole issue so it would be recognized by the UN, the Council of Europe, the EU etc.

According to the government of RSK, its biggest success was that the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe recommended to Croatia on 26th January 2006 rejection of aftermath of expatriation and terror of Serbs from 1991-1995 and launch-
ing of the constitutional arrangements which was in 1991 – which means Croatia shall be re-set up as a state with two nations – Croats and Serbs – with equal rights.39

Political means and methods, propaganda

The RSK government in exile is very active in publishing books and leaflets; it sends quite regularly the diplomatic notes to embassies, consulates and foreign diplomats. The official letters addressed to the diplomats are also sent to all the subscribed members.40 However, even though the Government of RSK has been very active in its PR and correspondence with foreign diplomats, consulates, embassies, and the editorial boards of newspapers its efforts have does not yield any positive results yet and RSK government remains largely ignored by most of its addressees.

Probably one of the first key documents was an Aide Memoire addressed to the editorial boards of newspapers in the former Yugoslavia in the beginning of 1993. The core argument of the document is that the Republic of Croatia has no right for secession and that “the present struggle of the Serbian people in the RSK and Republika Srpska of Bosnia is not an act of either rebellion or cessation, but rather unification of all Serbian territories into one geographic and ethnic unit, as it existed in 1375-1918”. Basically the whole manuscript tries to identify the main culprit of the situation – Croatia and the Croatian nation by trying to present Croatia as “the most brutal and barbaric policies of genocide which World has ever seen……even the Army and SS units of the German military were stunned by what they saw when the German Military Command in Zagreb reported to the German High Command “that all attempts to bring the Croatian military in line with civilized forms of war-making have failed.”41 The text follows with the proclamation that the government of RSK will prepare a list of all the Serbs who have been expelled from Croatian town for publication.

The most important document after the re-establishment of RSK is the Memorandum of the Republika Srpska Krajina which draws firstly on the SFPRY Constitution of 1974 claiming the secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia as unconstitutional; it also refers to the Geneva convention to support the fact that a genocide against the Serbian nation by the Croats. Finally, it lists the

39 Email correspondence of RSK government in exile with the authors, (4 September 2007)
40 The authors have been on the subscription list for the period from 4 May till 4 August 2008. During that period of 3 months 45 open letters were addressed to the high-level politicians.
41 Slobodan Jarčević, Republika Srpska Krajina, Državna dokumenta (Beograd: Agencija Miroslav, 2005), 118.
crimes committed by the Croats during WWII and describes the current lack of human rights of Serbs in Croatia. The manuscript concludes with an appeal to international community: “Based on the above mentioned facts, the parliament and government of RSK in exile demand their declared protectors – UN, EU and OSCE – to take part in solving the problem of the Serbian nation in Croatia and of the status of the Republika Srpska Krajina.”

What is interesting is that all documents repeat the historical facts as perceived by from the Serbian side but do not mention their aims and how they would achieve them. In none of the documents was it mentioned whether the government of RSK would prefer to become part of Croatia with a special autonomous status, or of a federal unit, or whether they would like unifications under Serbia with Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The texts are full of pessimism; they basically repeat the same facts over and over again; aconstructive approach is lacking. When looking at the portal Krajinaforce, we could read that this “nongovernmental website was set up using the joint efforts of exiled Krajišniks with the intention of bringing together our embattled people, to share some useful information, to try to ease the sorrow and longing for our Krajina”. This sentence is quite symptomatic of all the collected documents – refugees from RSK as well as RSK government in exile long for THEIR Krajina, however do not say what they understand by this term.

The RSK propaganda is full of nationalist, negativist and populist features. The documents are full of “Croatian Ustashas, butchers and murderers”. The texts keep recalling the past; most of them refer to the WWII, the Ustasha regime, Jasenovac, Croatian separatism under the formation of Hitler’s Germany, the genocide against Serbian nation, injustice throughout history. However, the negativism is not only directed against Croats, but also against the Roman Catholic clergy or the international community who have proven incapable of ensuring the protection of human rights throughout the whole last century. The negativism against the enemy is done in a simple way and the authors are quite straightforward; the texts are full of emotive terms such as ‘heartland’ and ‘poor Serbian nation’.

Probably one of the key arguments of the ex-foreign minister of RSK is that the Croats, Bošnjaks, Romanians and Montenegrins are all former Serbs. In his books he is trying to give evidence for his argument that Croats are former Catholic Serbs: “Serbian leaders tolerated the conversion of Catholic
Serbs in Serbian Krajina and in BiH into the Croatian nation, which was carried out by the Croatian politicians and Roman Catholic clergy in the period 1918 – 1941. According to him Croats have no right to self-determination and to create their own nation state since they are all Serbs. The same goes for the Bošnjaks and creation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because according to Mr. Jarčević the inhabitants of BiH are all Serbs, they only have different beliefs. Even more spectacular is the idea that the Romanian nation was a result of a process of state engineering by the Roman Empire, Roman-Catholic Church, Protestant Church, Austria and France. The same conspiracy theories go for the creation of the Montenegrin nation – the whole argument is that inhabitants in the current borders of Croatia, BiH, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro all once spoke one language, were all once Serbs and only due to the manipulation of historian facts by historians and world conspiracy is Serbia the only state which left for the Serbs. Mr. Jarčević goes even further stating that most Germans are of Serbian (Slavic) origin and allegedly, the same is valid for Great Britain, due to the Slavic (Serbian) names of the English (Scottish) rivers on the old maps: Morava, Tisa, Vedura, Tamiš, Deva, Lug, Tara, Derventa, Drina. When asking RSK about Greater Serbia, the answers don’t make much sense: “We deserve that because we were always allying through the whole history with the democratic states (unlike Croatia) and we have been punished throughout history. We are aware of the fact that at the minute the idea is not realistic, perhaps tomorrow.” Sometimes they even refer to maps from the 8th and 9th century when Serbia had its borders in Istria, which is even further than Vojislav Šešelj argues for.

Propaganda can also be found as well on the already mentioned portal of Krajina refugees where we can read that the goal and aims of ‘Krajina Force’ are: - the promotion of (and working on) the idea of justice and truth for all - gathering of documents, photos, declarations and statements (statements of those who lived through the horrors of civil war in Yugoslavia, of the victims and witnesses of crimes) media articles, books, videos etc., of the persecution and oppression over the Krajina Serbs, of the ethnic cleansing of Krajina Serbs from their rightful homeland for centuries - Krajina, which represents certainly one of the greatest exodus of people in the modern age, a crime that still remains unsanctioned and unpunished.” This black and white

46 RSK government in exile, 3.
47 Email correspondence with Slobodan Jarčević, former foreign minister of RSK and current counsellor of RSK (5 September 2007=.
48 Slobodan Jarčević, Kako odrediti srpsku diasporu.
vision is present in all of the documents; we always read about good Serbs and bad others, about injustice that happened to Serbs and so on.

Armed formations of the Republika Srpska Krajina

The creation of the Serbian military forces was not really a difficult job, since in 1990 around 60 % of the police force and 70-80 % of Special Forces in Croatia was of Serbian origin as claimed by Tudjman in one of his interviews for the BBC. The Serbs serving in the state forces refused to listen to the orders coming from Zagreb and formed their own units - the very first ones were formed around the former police units.

The Army of the Republika Srpska Krajina (Srpska vojska Krajine - SVK) was originally formed by the corps of Territorial Defence Army; six corps were formed. SVK corps were made up of 26 brigades and 5 regiments but in reality one corps of SVK corresponded to one strong brigade and brigade of SVK corresponded to one strong battalion. In the beginning of 1995 another corps was formed; as a result the Krajišniks had 240 tanks (30 of 30 M-84), 160 of carriers, 560 artillery pieces, 28 rocket guns, 230 anti-armoured weapons, 72 launchers of anti-armoured rockets, 280 systems of counter air rockets, 360 archies, 22 airplanes and 8 helicopters. Altogether SVK had 38 000 soldiers plus 14 500 reservists and 4 100 policemen.

Within SVK probably the most famous were so called “Kninjas” (name is mix from “Knin” – capital of the RSK + “ninja”) under the command of Dragan Vasiljkovic (“Captain Dragan”) or the Martić’s police force (Martićevci) who have been indicted for attacking civilians and for ethnic cleansing.

Besides the official Army of RSK, there were also several paramilitary formations among which the most famous was probably the so-called Tigers under the command of Željko Ražnatović Arkan. Military analysts estimated the number of Tigers to come to somewhere between 500 and 1000 despite Arkan’s claim about 8 000 men. They were either trained by Arkan himself or by Radovan Stojić Badža. Other famous formations included the Serbian Chetnics movement led by Vojislav Šešelj (currently indicted by the ICTY), the Serbian Guard (military wing of the Serbian Renewal Movement, Srpski pokret obnove, SPO) or the White Eagles of Mirko Jović.
Vukovi sa Vučjaka (Wolves from Vučjak) were operating in Western Slavonia (Okucani, Pakrac, Jasenovac) and were led by Veljko Vuk Milanković. From April 1991 till the end of the war in 1995 these were the paramilitary formations responsible for most of the ethnic cleansing which occurred in former Yugoslavia. These groups were financially and logistically supported by the Serbian Ministry of Interior. The most famous members of the security forces participating in the organisation of the paramilitary formations were Radovan Stojičić-Badža, Frank Simatović-Frenki and Mihalj Kertes, former commander of the so-called Red Berets.

During the military operation Storm in 1995 Croatian forces overthrew the armed forces of Republika Srpska Krajina and its territory came under control of the Croatian state. Some small units tried to organize armed resistance against the Croats. One year after the Croatian victory, on July 26, the Krajina Liberation Army (KOA) attacked the Croatian arms factory in Slavonski Brod (18 people were injured). The group declared a terrorist campaign against Croatia and against Serbs, who were loyal to the Croatian government. Such attempts to fight with guerrilla or terrorist methods were limited and had no significant effect. Even the president of the association representing Krajina refugees Mihajlo Vučinović and the former paramilitary leader Željko “Arkan” Ražnatović allegedly refused to use the terrorist methods of the KOA. Vučinović was afraid that such actions would be used by the Croats as a argument for the repression of Serbs who stayed in Krajina. Since then, there have not been any known reports of armed groups in Srpska Krajina. Only a few militant statements and a “Kninjas cult” among the small part of Serbian diaspora from Krajina are visible.

Relations with other states and units

The announcement of the reconstitution of RSK government in exile was met with resistance, but not only in the Croatian circles. The Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader commented about the RSK in exile, that “it is group of people who think that Greater Serbia is still a relevant topic today.” The relations remain poor and the Croatian government refuses to recognize RSK government in exile, claiming that “the same people were manipulating Serbian society in Croatia and the creation of RSK
THE POLITICAL USAGE OF CONFLICTS

government in exile can only harm the peaceful coexistence of the Croats and Serbs in Croatia.”

RSK does not help to improve the relations and keeps informing the public that it will sue the Republic of Croatia for genocide during the war 1990-95 at the International Court of Justice in the Hague. The fact that the prime minister of the self-proclaimed government in exile was sentenced to 13 year imprisonment by the ICTY in the Hague does not help the situation either.

However, it was not only the Croats who denounced the RSK government in exile. The current Krajina leaders also immediately condemned the RSK government in exile. The biggest critic was probably Milorad Pupovac, MP for the Independent Democratic Serb Party and the president of Croatia`s Serb National Council:

“...These are the same people who caused the Serbian exodus by their politics …These people dare to say ‘Croatia can not be in Europe because it ethnically cleansed the Serbs’. They should learn that they are responsible for the exodus of Serbs because they have been forming ‘their country’ from the very beginning.”

Pupovac claims, that very much the same people refused the Z-4 plan in February 1995 while six months later in summer 1995, right before operation Storm, they claimed to accept the Z-4 plan. The Serbian politician thinks that the former Krajina leaders who are now trying to represent Krajina caused the ethnic cleansing and that they should not intervene in Krajina matters since that they are living in Serbia and have no clue about what is going on in Croatia, neither should they and shall not interfere into Serbian-Croatian matters within Croatia.

Relations with the Republic of Serbia seem rather complicated. Slobodan Milošević always tried to convince Serbs in Krajina that he supports their goal and that he would never betray them. In an interview in 1993 with Slobodan Jarčević the interviewing journalist already asked a question about rumours that Milošević would betray and sell Krajina to Croatia and that Milošević was holding secret meetings with Tudjman whose results have not been made public. Slobodan Jarčević commented on these rumours: “We always ask Milošević what he was talking about and he was always telling us that he does not talk in our name and that he would always obey the solution which would be found between the government of RSK and Croatia...I believe that those (secret) conversations are similar to the conver-
sations between our two governments. These have to be similar conversations.”

The RSK government in exile was not allowed to work under Milošević’s regime as the Serbian government claimed it would have additional problems with the UN, EU and other actors of international relations. This situation was prolonged under the Koštunica government; the interdiction was not followed and the parliament was convened on 26th February 2005 and the new government under the Prime Minister Milorad Buha was set up.

Vojislav Šešelj was one of the people who already had a different opinion at that time and was always reminding the Krajina Serbs that Slobodan Milošević would sell RSK to Croatia as happened during the Dayton negotiations. Laura Silber and Allan Little already in their first edition ‘The death of Yugoslavia’ already stated this allegation: “There is considerable speculation that in exchange for Milošević abandoning claims on eastern Slavonia, Tudjman had agreed to hand over Prevlaka… Belgrade wanted to swap Serb land in the hinterland of Dubrovnik which would make secure Croatia’s Adriatic resort, in exchange for Prevlaka. The deal was never formalized.”

Nowadays documents of Serbs from Krajina openly talk about the secret deal of Milošević and Tudjman: “Serbia, headed by the treacherous regime of Slobodan Milosevic, watched this exile and pestilence of ethnic Serbs almost peacefully although by the earlier signed agreements Yugoslavia, and later Serbia was to guarantee the security for RSK both militarily and politically. Today’s regime in Serbia goes even further in this betrayal of Serbian national interests, and is speedily improving relations with the new Croatia, without even a mention of RSK, without a mention of the persecution, oppression and exile of the Serbian population from areas which had been Serbian for centuries.”

Both sides are aware of the fact that initially Milošević was ready to help in order to achieve his aims but that he sold Krajina for “higher” goals.

The RSK government claims that relations with politicians in Serbia as well as Republika Srpska have always been rather complicated because of their internal fights. The only person to have good relations with RSK government in exile is said to be Vojislav Šešelj. The current relations of RSK government in exile and Republic of Serbia are rather restrained. Even though the Serbian government does not allow the registration of gov-

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70 Email correspondence of RSK government in exile with the authors, (4 September 2007).
73 The answer to the question: What are your relations towards the Serbian politicians, e.g. Vuk Drašković, Vojislav Šešelj, Vojislav Koštunica, Zoran Đinđić, Boris Tadić, Slobodan Milošević, Željko Ražnatović Arkan, Bjana Plavšić or other popular politicians? (Email correspondence of RSK government in exile with the authors, 4 September 2007).
In the mid-1990s, the most important party in Serbian politics is the Serbian Socialist Party (SPS) which was led the whole time since its foundation in July 1990 by Slobodan Milošević and as it seems it will be part (under leadership of Ivica Dačić) of the government after the parliamentary elections which took place in May 2008. Another strong political party, which was in certain periods sitting in the government coalition together with SPS, is the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). The party is since its foundation in 1992 led by Vojislav Šešelj, since his indictment by ICTY the party is formally led by Tomislav Nikolić. One of the main political parties being in opposition towards the Milošević regime was Democratic Party of Serbia (DS) which was led since 1994 by the pro-western oriented Zoran Đinđić. The difference in the personal opinions about the Serbian future caused that the nationalistic wing split in 1992 from DS and created Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) led since then by Vojislav Koštunica. Another important opposition party during the Milošević regime was the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) of Vuk Drašković. The party wants to restore the monarchy and uses quite often the nationalistic rhetoric. One fraction of SPO led by Velimir Ilić split and created New Serbia (NS) in 1997. This party has been in coalitions either with SPO or recently with DSS. Another quite new party is G17+ which was created from the economic think-tank in 2002. Last but not least we have to mention the minor political parties which succeeded in the last elections by creating coalition: Civil union of Social Democrats of Vojvodina (LDP), Social Democratic Union (SDU) and League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina (LSV). The GSS was mainly associated with Vesna Pešić and in April 2007 the party merged with LDP.

The protection of Serbs living abroad is secured under the Serbian Constitution which was approved in 2006.74 The Serbian legislation is quite open in relation to refugees who would like to gain Serbian citizenship; basically the only relevant condition is the claim that one perceives Serbia as his / her state.75 The enhancing of Serbian statecraft through the protection of Serbian diaspora can be seen in the formation of the Ministry for Serbian diaspora in 2007, consisting of three sectors: Economic sector, Sector for culture, education and sport and quite interestingly the Sector for the issue of status.76

Since the fall of the Milošević’s regime, none of the governments have been willing to recognize officially the representatives of RSK in exile. Therefore, unless the government is set up by SRS, there is no chance of an approval of the government of RSK in exile by the host state – the Republic of Serbia.77

In term of relations towards other non-recognized subjects, the government of RSK received proposals (through the mediation of the RSK advocate in USA John Levy) from UNPO (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisations). On 12 September 2008, the RSK government recognized Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia. The government shall decide in the coming year with which subjects diplomatic relations will be established. The government opened its National Bank in Sveta Jelena, and one bank in London offered financial and business cooperation with the government of RSK which would not be possible with the banks in Serbia.
RSK in the light of Kosovo independence

The negotiations over the status of Kosovo status and the will of the international community to give Kosovo independence raised again the issues of Republika Srpska Krajina and the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While the representatives of the later claim “if Kosovo why not us?”, the RSK government in exile called on Croatia to go back to the Z-4 plan in 2005 - it is one of the plans that come back regularly on the scene. The plans for Kosovo status have been compared to the Z-4 plan in essence – more than autonomy, less than independence. Lately the plan was again brought up by Slobodan Erić, vice-director of the Centre for Geostrategic Research, in late August 2007 and presented at the International Press Centre of Tanjug, and later sent to the state organs of Croatia, Serbia, UN and OSCE.

However, even though the international community is striving to build on image of justice, fairness and impartiality, it is quite obvious that the potential of Albanians to secede is the main reason for giving independence to the Kosovo Albanians. The number of Serbs in Croatia has dropped from 12 %78 to 4, 5 - 5 %,79 the government does not really facilitates the returns of refugees and IDP’s and the potential of the Krajina Serbs to secede is quite small. The only who could gain from Kosovo independence might be ones (and if ever) Republika Srpska, there is no one left to whom autonomy could be granted in Krajina.

RSK – threat for regional stability?

The operations Storm and Flash helped to constitute an ethnically clean and homogenous state.80 Even though the Erdut Agreement from 12 November 199581 stated the conditions for the peaceful return of Serbs and their reintegration into Croatian society, the Croatian government under the leadership of Franjo Tudjman was not really ready for the return of the Serbian minority. The return was hindered by the fact that most Serbian houses were occupied by Croats, and by the obstruction and counteracting of local administrations.82 A multietnic state can not exist if Independence Day for one part of society means the...
expulsion of the other part of society, which perceives this day as Day of Defeat.

Even though the return of refugees is very slow and most of them still decide to stay abroad, there is still a will to reconstitute Krajina, as Krajšniks say OUR Krajina. As one looks at the work of the RSK government in exile, it appears more as a dream or unrealistic vision, which even those who are dreaming do not really want to change into reality. The Serbian nationalists are stuck in their delusions and if the dreams became reality they would be lost. As Miroslav Filipović states: “Serbian nationalism has lost since 1990’s not only all battles but also a big part of the real possibilities it had to promote Greater Serbia...There is no Greater Serbia anymore, but it does not mean there are no more Serbian nationalists.”

The constitution of the dreamt autonomous region of Republika Srpska Krajina or of a state within the Croatian Federation is dependent on the return of the Serbian expellees. If the rest of the former 12% of the population does not return, there can be no discussion about autonomous status even in the light of negotiations about Kosovo independence. The only one who could possibly gain from the Kosovo independence (and if at all) would be Republika Srpska in BiH, however even that is disputed. The future of RSK government in exile seems to be continuity – residing in Belgrade and writing diplomatic notes to embassies and foreign diplomats and/or open letters to the media. The potential of Krajšnics to secede is negligible.

The government in exile of the RSK is not a “classic government in exile” according to international law, despite the fact that it declares its will to be recognized as a regular government of the state and it struggles for the return of its claimed territory. It is neither recognized by Serbia (host state) nor by other states. Neither the claim to the territory of Krajina nor the legal existence of RSK have been supported by the international community; Croatian rule is considered to be exercising sovereignty over an independent state rather than exercising occupation (as presented by the representatives of RSK). The continuity of the RSK government in exile was broken for a relatively long time. From the point of view of political science the RSK government is a specific interest group within Serbian and Balkan politics, which is closely tied to the nationalistic stream of Serbian politics, namely the Serbian Radical Party. Nevertheless, the real impact on Serbian, Croatian and international politics is very
limited, its main goal is to disseminate the propaganda of Serbian nationalism. It is a dominant factor among the diaspora of Serbs from Krajina in Serbia.

The RSK government in exile is very active in terms of propagandist activities; on the other hand, its declarations and statements are of no interest to mainstream media. The government supported the violent activities (the last significant violent acts of Serbs from Krajina took place in 1996). Some violent actions could be effective in the terms of media attention (in relation to Croatian potential membership of NATO and of the EU), on the other hand they can harm the image of the RSK representation.

The range of propaganda activities of the RSK government in exile could also be enlarged as work for the government of RSK is an important life career (or specific hobby) for several people. There is no real expectation to obtain the claimed territory under control of this government again. The independence of the RSK has (in contrast to independence of Kosovo) no international support and after the admission of Croatia in NATO, the return of Serbian Krajina under Serbian control is only fictional. The only scenario in which the RSK would arise again as regional issue would be if SRS was about to create a government in neighbouring Serbia and recognize the RSK government in exile. The last elections in Serbia showed that this scenario could become reality very easily; paradoxically the regional stability lies now in the hands of Socialist party of Serbia and is dependent upon whether SPS will prefer to make a coalition with the nationalist SRS or with the pro-European bloc. At the minute, though, it seems the SRS will not take part in the Serbian government and regional stability shall be preserved by stressing the integration of Serbia into the European Union. Currently, the Republika Srpska Krajina government in exile presents neither a serious threat to the integrity of Croatia nor for regional stability. The issue of RSK shall by no means create an obstacle for the future external relations of NATO and EU after Croatian admission into these supra national entities. As it stands now, the RSK government in exile is an interest group based in capital of Serbia with no real power supported by neither relevant actor in the international arena nor in Croatia proper. The RSK government in exile seems to be only the vision of a couple of people longing for their unrealistic dream – Republika Srpska Krajina.
Divergence of the EU and Russian Security Policies: The case of independence of Kosovo and the link with the “Frozen Conflicts” in Moldova and Georgia

Tatjana Petrović

Abstract

The paper elaborates on the link between Kosovo and the “frozen-conflicts” in Moldova and Georgia and addresses the difference between the EU and Russian approaches to secessionist movements in their neighborhoods. The research was conducted in spring 2008 and did not include the war in Georgia of August 2008. Nevertheless, a retroactive view provides additional verification of the research conclusions and indicates that some aspects of the eruption of violence in Georgia could have been predicted. After an introduction, the paper briefly presents the central issue and the overall EU-Russia security relations. Subsequent parts provide a comprehensive analysis of the respective conflicts and the involvement of the EU and Russia. The conclusions put forward, amongst other, the propositions on: divergence of the EU-Russia security and foreign policies, a possible chain reaction of the Kosovo independence in the post-soviet sphere, and eventual broader implications on the general EU-Russia relations and the regional security.

Key words: EU foreign and security policy, Russian foreign policy, geopolitics, conflict resolution, Kosovo independence, “frozen conflicts” in Georgia and Moldova, EU neighborhood, Russian neighborhood

Introduction

The paper will elaborate on recent changes in the EU-Russia security relations connected to their disagreements on secessionist movements in their neighborhoods. Being an ongoing issue, the
process is still unwrapping and it is often difficult to identify a moment when the most important conclusions could be finalized. The time period analyzed in this paper refers to the period up to mid-April 2008. Consequent events may or may not verify the findings of this paper, but its validity should be assessed only in regard to that particular timeframe.

The main research question regards an eventual impact of connection between the declaration of independence of Kosovo and the so-called “frozen-conflicts” in the post-soviet sphere. The focus is put on the policy differences between the EU (and its most prominent members) and the Russian Federation and the consequences of increasing policy divergence between the two.

At the center of the paper will be the Kosovo status and the involvement of the EU and Russia. In regard to the “frozen conflicts”, only three selected ones will be included – one from Moldova and two from Georgia.

Overall, I would like to shed more light on: emerging EU-Russia disagreements on the role of EU in post-conflict regions in their neighborhoods; the problematic justification for the “special” case of Kosovo and the possibilities for a chain reaction in the post-soviet sphere; and the implications of “soft” EU approach to promoting sustainable solutions to separatist conflicts and its comparison to a more traditional security measure applied by Russia.

Defining the issue

Francois Renaud from the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center argues that “All the peoples, provinces or minorities which aspire to independence on the five continents will now be able to claim the example of Kosovo.”\(^1\) He posits that Russia will get a chance to provide further support to the secessionist movements in the post-Soviet sphere at its own will. He also comments that scenarios similar to the Kosovo independence may emerge in other parts of the Balkans (Serbs in Bosnia, Albanians in Macedonia, Serbs in Kosovo) as well as within the EU: the Catalans, the Basques, the Turkish Cypriots, the Flemish and the Hungarians of Slovakia.

This may sound strange given the repeated statements from the European Union officials that Kosovo is a special case and that the same treatment will not be provided to others seeking independ-
ence elsewhere. However, the real question is whether the EU can actually enforce such policy or not.

The first challenge is that the EU does not have a common foreign policy position on the Kosovo independence. Due to sharp disagreements amongst its member state, the EU made a decision that each member-state will decide on its own. The most prominent state – namely: Germany, the UK, France and Italy immediately recognize independent Kosovo and started to follow the US lead in establishing formal foreign relations with it. Those EU countries that have similar secessionist situations as Kosovo is for Serbia decided not to endorse the declaration of independence. Spain, Greece, Slovakia, Romania and Cyprus applied the argument that “territorial integrity should have priority over the principle of self-determination.” Fearing problems with their own separatist movements those EU countries refused to go along with other EU member states, but at the same time approved the EU mission to Kosovo. The contradiction between those two decisions is explained by their expectation that the EU mission to Kosovo is only an intermediary situation pending a more comprehensive resolution of the UN Security Council.

As for the Russia, her resistance to independent Kosovo is a result of two other policies. First, it is the Russian position on the “frozen conflicts” in the former Soviet Union. If Moscow would openly support independence of those separatist regions on its own it would be exposed to international resistance. However, if it proves that Kosovo independence cannot be stopped Russia would use the argument of “precedent having universal reach” and support other separatist movements more legitimately. In the meantime keeping the “frozen conflicts” frozen provides Russia with a powerful means for preventing attempt of some of the neighboring countries to join NATO.

The second policy is even more important for the EU. Russia increasingly tends to oppose a European solution to the conflict in their common neighborhood – by arguing that the UN should not be replaced by EU and that those conflict regions should not be considered an internal EU issue. Hence, Russia does not want the EU to act without its consent in Kosovo or any other relevant conflict region.

The argumentation presented above indicates that both the EU and Russia are trying to play a diplomatic game hoping that their own scenarios will become operational. However, one approach excludes the other and the impact on the general EU-Russia rela-

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3 Renaud, 2008.
4 Renaud, 2008.
5 Renaud, 2008.
tions of an emerging divergence in foreign and security policy may be considerable. Therefore, it is worth analyzing the relationship between EU and Russia on the particular issue of the Kosovo status as well as in regard to possible implications of the Kosovo independence on the “frozen conflicts”. At the end those issues play a key role in the future of regional security and the future of the EU-Russia relations.

Overview of the EU-Russia security relations

Already for some time, the relations between the EU and Russia are in the state of stagnation or even worsening. Despite increased trade and symbolic diplomacy, there is “mistrust, frustration and permanent bureaucratic squabbling between Moscow and Brussels”. Moreover, the EU became increasingly disappointed about the prospects for “Europeanization” of Russia. For Russia the EU, as a “bureaucratic formation pursuing socialist economic policies that stifle economic growth”, looks much less attractive than it was the case in the 1990s. From a more formal point of view, the current EU-Russia Treaty (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement – PCA) expired and negotiations on a new one have not yet started. It seems that Russia and the EU are not ready to harmonize their positions on potentially contentious issues so they prefer to put greater attention on purely technical cooperation.

Russia today has higher ambitions in regard to its involvement in world and European affairs while its new “Great Power identity” is increasingly being formed in opposition to the “West”. The EU reaction to the new circumstances in Russia is expressed in cooler and harsher attitude with more emphasis on a sort of “policy of containment.” In the same way Russia defines itself in relation to “others”, the Europeans uses the discourses of “othering” Russia to underline their mutual differences. Moreover, the EU “frontal attacks” connected to the issue of democracy and human right in Russia often led to “widespread hostility and resistance” amongst the Russian public.

The degree of interdependence between Russia and the EU is very high. Half of the Russian trade is with the EU and a quarter of the EU energy supplies come from Russia. Moreover, they are closely connected in regard to a number of concrete issues - such as the conflicts in their common neighborhood and the international terrorism. Neither part denies the need for a genuine partnership:

7 Medvedev, 2006.
8 Medvedev, 2006.
10 The Treaty lasted for 10 years. It was automatically extended for another year, pending a new agreement.
16 Ivanenko, 2007.
EU acknowledges the key role that Russia plays in Europe and Russia would like to have a more prominent voice in Europe. However, “this basic understanding has not been translated into actual choices and policies.”

Nevertheless, neither side can articulate the long-term goals of their relationship or a set of common values, norms and interests that would operationalize the rhetorical “strategic partnership” – an expression that continuously features in documents and speeches. The EU would like to see Russia, primarily as energy and raw material provider and it keeps insisting on particular set of values that Russia should internalize. But, the role EU envisaged for Russia is far from the one Russians would like to play and the EU emphasis on values is increasingly welcomed with criticism.

While insisting that the strategic partnership should be based on equal treatment, Russia is also requesting the recognition of differences in values and the cultural context.

The EU has the capacity to build a common policy towards Russia only at a broader level and in regard to norms and values. Such broad policies are continually affected by more pragmatic, interest-driven bilateral positions. The EU simply does not have a mechanism for preventing national interest of its member state issues from affecting EU common policies. In that sense, EU positions end up as a wide framework within which each EU member state may develop their own relationship with Russia.

On the other side, some EU member states have the preference for bilateralism with Russia also because they have the institutional capacity to pursue their own national interests irrespective of the EU. Russia too prefers to deal with the EU through bilateral relationships and sometimes even to exploit internal EU differences. One of the reasons for that is the Russian challenge in dealing with the multilayered European bureaucracy. And, finally, there is the particular US and NATO role in the EU-Russia relationship which is continuously emphasized by President Putin as being destructive.

Even within the EU institutions, there is incoherence in presenting the nature of the EU-Russia relationship. For instance, the High Commissioner on Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana argued that “Every member state has of course bilateral relations with Russia, which are marked by individual interests and an individual history...[however] In the context of the EU’s CFSP, we always act with the consent of every single member state.”

Shortly after, the EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson said:
“The incoherence of European policy towards Russia over much of the past decade has been frankly alarming. No other country reveals our differences as does Russia.”25 We should also note that the connection between foreign and trade policies in the case of EU-Russia relations is critical.

The Lisbon Treaty may provide some new instruments for a more cohesive EU foreign policy.26 The most important are: increasing the importance of the position of the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy; strengthening coordination between the European Council and the Commission by merging this position with the one of the EU Commission’s vice-president; and supporting the work of the High Representative with a integrated European External Action Service.27 However, in case the Treaty fails in addressing the main security challenges collectively, some EU states “might fall back onto their own national policies, at a heavy cost to EU unity.”28 And the magnitude of the challenges in the European neighborhood is considerable: from Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia to Middle East and North Africa.29

Moreover, the EU political intentions are often not matched with its economic and military capabilities.30 Previous efforts to yield comprehensive defense policy have not been effective. At the same time “for any kind of military planning and operations with regard to Russia, the Europeans will prefer to act through NATO.”31 Hence, the EU connection to the NATO introduces another problematic issue because Russia considers the NATO expansion (and the EU role in it) “a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.”32

The Kosovo status

For the purpose of briefly describing the background of the Kosovo status issue, a couple of critical observations should be made. From a historical point of view, Kosovo has been a major problem for a very long period.33 After large Serbian migrations in XVII and XVIII centuries, Albanians started to inhabit the region. When Kosovo became again34 a part of Serbia after the Balkan Wars (beginning of the XX century) Albanians in Kosovo had already emerged as the dominant community. Then, after the Second World War, the number of Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo became almost equal. Finally, in the 1980s the Albanian population

27 Another opportunity, although not explicitly included in the Lisbon Treaty is the strengthening of the EU Special Representatives. See the argumentation in Giovanni Grevi, “Pioneering foreign policy: the EU Special Representatives”, Institute for Security Studies (2008).
32 Vladimir Putin, Speech at the 43rd Munich conference on Security Policy, (10 February 2007).
34 Serbia lost Kosovo to the Ottoman Empire soon after the 1389 Kosovo Battle.
reached large majority in Kosovo - at that time a Serbian province within the SFR Yugoslavia.

After disintegration of SFR Yugoslavia, the Serbian Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija was stripped off in 1992 from previous status (provided for in the former Yugoslav constitution of 1974). Until that point, Kosovo had almost equal rights as the Republic of Serbia despite the fact that it was part of the Serbian territory. In addition to this conflict of authorities, another incentive for the constitutional change was related to the increased separatist requests of the Albanians. Indeed, the first Albanian declaration of independence took place in 1990 when 2/3 of the Albanian representatives in the Provincial Assembly passed the so-called Kacanik Constitution. However, the Serbian authorities regained the control and Kosovo was not even de-facto independent until 1999.

The problems in Kosovo rendered extreme Serbian and Albanian nationalism making the conflict reach its peak in 1996. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) started with insurgencies as a reaction against moderate politics of the Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova and inspired by the legitimization of ethnic borders in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbian Government declared KLA a terrorist organization and initiated severe response. In 1998 the NATO and the Contact Group became more involved, but with no success.

After the final failure of international mediation in February 1999 a new non-negotiable agreement was proposed and rejected again – this time by the Serbian Government. The outcome was the NATO campaign that ended after the Kumanovo agreement implying withdrawal of the Serbian forces from Kosovo and deployment of KFOR (NATO led Kosovo Force). On 10 June 1999 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 which gave mandate for establishment of an interim civil administration in Kosovo – UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) as well as provisional institutions of local self-government. It is crucial to underline that the UN Resolution confirmed Serbian sovereignty in the Province of Kosovo and Metohija and did not define the final Kosovo status.

After a long period of stagnation, new negotiations on the status of Kosovo were initiated in 2005 followed by a series of failures. In mid 2007 the negotiations took the form of direct interaction between the Serbian Government and Kosovo Albanian repre-
sentatives, but an agreement was not reached by the end of the year.38

The Kosovo Albanians argued for an independent Kosovo Republic – as an expression of the right for national self-determination and unwillingness to reintegrate into Serbia. Along those lines, the Kosovo Prime minister announced that “recognizing Kosovo’s independence would close the dark chapters of Balkan history, and create the opportunity for a new and sustainable regional stability.”39

For the Serbian Government any solution was acceptable if it did not lead to separation of Kosovo. The Serbian Parliament adopted a Resolution that remained its position to date. It indicated, amongst other, the following:40

1) Considering the legal reasons and the UN principle of inviolability of sovereignty and territorial integrity any externally imposed solution will be considered illegitimate, illegal and invalid.

2) Serbia is in favour of a compromise solution that would satisfy the state interests of Serbia, interests of ethnic-Albanians as well as Serbs and other ethnicities in the Province.

3) Serbia would provide the maximum level of autonomy (the principle of “more than autonomy and less than independence”) – but would not accept independent international status.

4) Any solution that does not align with the above would lead to regional instability and clear disrespect of international laws.

On 17 February 2008, the Assembly of Kosovo approved declaration of independence. It immediately produced a world-wide debate about the international recognition of an independent Republic of Kosovo.41

Many of the most internationally prominent countries decided to endorse the declaration as an urgent matter – in the first place: Germany, the USA, the UK, France and Italy. Their main argument was connected to the Kosovo national self-determination right and inevitability of the historical outcomes deriving from the NATO intervention in 1999.42

Some other prominent international actors, such as Russia, China and India, strongly oppose an independent Kosovo. They consider it as a possible and serious precedent as well as a unilateral move made without the consent of Serbia and without a UN Security Council approval.43 The Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said: “We are talking here of the disruption of all the basic fundamentals of international law in Europe... It would undermine the basics of security in Europe... It would inevitably result in a
chain reaction in many parts of the world, including Europe and elsewhere.”

The disagreement on the Kosovo status is particularly relevant for the EU, which failed to endorse a common policy - due to disagreement of, primarily, Spain, Slovakia, Romania and Cyprus. Those countries have their own separatist movements and they do not want to endorse the Kosovo independence fearing similar developments on their own territory. The foreign minister of Spain announced that “Spain is not going to recognise this unilateral declaration of independence... because it does not consider that this respects international law.”

Finally, there are countries that may not completely agree with an independent Kosovo, but have decided to follow the lead of the US and of the largest EU states. This group includes also some of the neighboring countries of the Balkans that either recognized the independence of Kosovo (e.g. Croatia) or are still waiting to see what the near future will bring (e.g. Montenegro).

The prominent resistance to the independent Kosovo within the EU is probably best summarized in a statement by the Slovakian independent Member of the European Parliament, Irena Belohorska. She said that the unilateral declaration of Kosovo independence sets a dangerous precedent that presents a threat to the notion of a common European foreign policy. Moreover, she argues, consequent “Legalising the politics of extremist movements - for example in Corsica, the Basque region, Northern Ireland, and the Flemish part of Belgium - presents a threat to the idea of a united Europe.”

Beside all the discussion on legality and legitimacy of the declaration, one thing still remains critical for the future stability: a critical mass of countries that would recognize it in the upcoming period. A very relevant fact is that some of the most powerful countries already endorsed the independence and started developing official foreign relations. However, Kosovo would prosper without sufficient international backing and the membership in the UN and other main international and regional organizations. And, up to this point in time, only some 32 (out of the total of 192 UN member states) recognized independent Kosovo.

In spite of all, the EU started with the deployment of the EULEX (the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo) on 16 February - even before the declaration of independence. The 2,000 EU police and customs officers, judges and prosecutors are expected to help prevent human rights abuses and to strengthen

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44 BBC, 18 February 2008.
45 BBC, 18 February 2008.
46 BBC, 18 February 2008.
49 BBC, 18 February 2008.
50 Aljazeera, 19 March 2008.
Kosovo institutions. The deployment is planned to finish after a period of 4 months (by June 2008) while the UNMIK is expected to slowly disengage.

The Russian opposition to the independence of Kosovo increased even more after the deployment of the EULEX. Vitaly Churkin, Russian Ambassador to the UN confirmed the Russian position that the EULEX is not in accordance with the UN Security Resolution 1244 and therefore is illegal. He underlined that the Resolution “clearly mandates solely the UN administration and NATO peacekeepers with an international presence in Kosovo, and the territory legally remains a part of Serbia.” At the same time, the UN denies that there will be any transfer of powers from the UN to the EU and that “UNMIK will perform the duties entrusted to it under Resolution 1244, until UN Security Council decides otherwise.” So far, the division of votes in the Security Council has prevented any new Resolution, thus leaving the EU Mission in Kosovo in a deadlock.

However, the EU Representative to Kosovo, Peter Faith, considers the EU mission legal even though it has no backing from the UN Security Council. Such position is based on an expectation that the UNMIK authorities will be actually transferred to new independent Kosovo institutions while the EULEX will provide only the technical assistance.

While confirming that the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 is still in power, Ban Ki-Moon, the UN Secretary General, repeated the opinion of the countries that recognized the Kosovo Republic – that Kosovo is a special case; that every other case should be considered in its own right; and that Kosovo differs from other cases because the international community has been involved in the Serbian sovereignty in Kosovo since 1999.

Just a couple of days before that statement, the Italian Foreign Minister, Massimo D’Alema, admitted at the NATO Summit that independence of Kosovo “is not born from an unilateral initiative of the people of Kosovo, but it emerged within NATO... If it had been the case of a unilateral act, nobody would have taken the endorsement of the independence into consideration”. For the same reason, he continued, Italy is against recognition of independent Abkhazia i.e. NATO is not involved there and the will of the people for national self-determination is not sufficient to grant them independence.

52 “EU Kosovo mission to be deployed,” BBC, 16 February 2008.
53 BBC, 16 February 2008.
54 “Saying ‘No’ to Kosovo independence,” BBC, 28 February 2008.
57 “Moskva: Samo u okviru mandata UN”, [Moscow: Only within the mandate of the UN] B92, 11 April 2008.
58 Massimo D’Alema, “Prokljšenje nije bilo jednostrano”, [Proclamation was not unilateral] B92, 6 March 2008.
Russia continues to deny the sui-generis character of Kosovo and repeatedly threatens with the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia if “the West recognizes the independence of Kosovo.” Such position is also reflected in the statement of the President Putin that confronted the policy of the NATO and the EU by saying: “I am convinced that the only mechanism that can make decisions about using military force as a last resort is the Charter of the United Nations... And we do not need to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN.”

A prominent observer of the Serbia-Kosovo issues wrote that the period of the UN protectorate will be replaced by an era of the EU protectorate. He further argued: “…the new Kosovo... will not be a member of the UN, blocked by Russia, and it will face unremitting hostility from Serbia... this will be a major test not only for ESDP but also for the EU in general.”

The “frozen conflicts” in Moldova and Georgia

Moldova has always been a country upon which Russian and European Empires exerted great influence. After the Romanian accession into the EU and NATO, Moldova found itself again a the border zone between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic countries. Consequently, the Transnistrian conflict and the presence of the Russian military became a security issue that goes beyond the problem of internal territorial integrity of Moldova.

Being a part of Transcaucasia, Georgia is situated at the crossroads between Russia, the Middle East, Europe and Central Asia. Georgia’s geo-strategic position is of high importance for Russia, the US and the EU and this became even more critical in regard to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Economic development indicators of both Moldova and Georgia show that both countries are highly dependent on Russia - in particular, regarding energy dependency. In both countries, Russia continues to maintain military presence and to monopolize the peacekeeping process. Due to geo-strategic importance, the NATO and the EU want to increase their influence in Georgia and, to a lesser degree, Moldova. At the same time, the political elites in Moldova and Georgia continue their quest for integration into the EU and NATO political and economic structure.

For a long period there has been no progress in conflict resolution in either Moldova or Georgia, so those cases became a part of
the group of “frozen” conflicts. Such status of “no peace, no war” indicates a false stability which enables further consolidation of separatist regimes and continual violation of human rights.\(^\text{70}\)

**Moldova**

The Republic of Moldova became independent after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Transnistrian region (Pridnestrovie in Russian) that is inhabited by large percent of Russians and Ukrainians declared independence already in 1990. The 1992 war between the internationally unrecognized Pridnestrovsian Moldavian Republic and the Republic of Moldova rendered some 1,500 casualties.\(^\text{71}\) After the end of the conflict a peacekeeping force comprised of Russians, Moldavians and Transnistrians was established and the OSCE start to monitor the peace agreement implementation. At the referendum in 2006 the independence of Transnistria was almost unanimously approved by the people.

The EU-Moldova Action Plan of 2005 set the basis for the EU assistance within the framework of the EU Neighbourhood Policy.\(^\text{72}\) It is of particular relevance both for the eventual prospects of European integration and as a means of counteracting negative consequences of occasional Russian trade blockage.\(^\text{73}\) The ruling Communist Party of the Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin actually won the 2005 elections on the pro-European platform.\(^\text{74}\) After a new quiet Moldovan rapprochement with Russia in 2006, the European assistance to Moldova increased considerably\(^\text{75}\) and Moldova became the second highest per capita beneficiary of the EU aid under the EU Neighbourhood Policy (after the Palestinian Authority).\(^\text{76}\) However, the EU remains comparatively weak in comparison to Russia in terms of the influence in Moldova.

The EU established the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) in 2005.\(^\text{77}\) The Mission’s mandate is purely technical (advice and training), but it is also geared towards resolving the conflict in Transnistria.\(^\text{78}\) The EUBAM rendered very negative reaction from Russia that interpreted it as a challenge to the Russia dominance in that region and a channel for introducing customs blockage of Transnistria.\(^\text{79}\)

The EU position on Transnistria is that it should not be internationally recognized and that the Moldovan territorial integrity should be re-enforced. Moreover, the EU emphasizes that the

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\(^{70}\) Ciobanu, 2004.


\(^{72}\) For details, see The Centre for European Policy Studies, “EU membership gives Romania new opportunities in its relations with Moldova” (19 February 2007).

\(^{73}\) Nantoi, 2007. This relates particularly to wine which is the most important Moldovan export product.

\(^{74}\) Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2007.

\(^{75}\) For the period 2007-2010 it is 254 million Euros. Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007.

\(^{76}\) Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007.

\(^{77}\) It was a response to a joint letter from Presidents of Moldova and Ukraine who asked for EU support in capacity building for border management and customs on the whole Moldova-Ukraine border (including the border between Ukraine and Transnistria). Initially, the Mission had a two year mandate, but then extended up to November 2009. Source: The Council of the European Union, *EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine*.

\(^{78}\) Source: The Council of the European Union, *EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine*.

\(^{79}\) Nantoi, 2007.
Kosovo case is not a precedent and that this sui-generis example of Kosovo could not be applied to Transnistria.\(^8\)

Without officially recognizing the independence of Transnistria, Russia continues to provide its regime a considerable financial support\(^8\) and free gas supply. Russia often supports peace proposals that consider Transnistrian regime a side in the conflict i.e. a state distinct from Moldova.\(^2\) Moreover, Russia actively supports state-building in this separatist region while extending the negotiations indefinitely. According to a prominent expert on the Transnistrian conflict such Russian strategy is “aimed at implementing the Kosovo model”\(^3\) meaning that the final expected outcome of the Russian involvement is an independent state.

Triggered by the recognition of Kosovo from the USA and key EU states, the government of Transnistria once more requested the international community to recognize its almost 18 years of de-facto independence.\(^4\) Their position is that Transnistria posses a more solid basis for international recognition than Kosovo. They further argue that Kosovo and Transnistria as well as Abkhazia and South Ossetia share the same fate of remaining semi-recognized for a long period.

Recently, the Moldovan President said: “It is inconceivable that we abandon the territorial integrity of our country.”\(^5\) He argued that the solution to the Transnistrian conflict lies in the hands of Russia, the USA, the OSCE the EU and that it is dependent on complex negotiations that involve the Kosovo status as well as other critical NATO-Russia issues.

**Georgia**

The Republic of Georgia also became independent in 1991 after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Its two break-away regions followed similar paths as Transnistria. The Republic of South Ossetia declared independence in 1991 and the Republic of Abkhazia in 1991 - and neither has been internationally recognized since then.

The 1991-1992 conflict between separatist South Ossetia and Georgia rendered some 1,000 casualties. After the end of the conflict a peacekeeping force comprised of Russians, Georgians and Ossetians was established and the OSCE started to monitor the peace agreement implementation. At the referendum in 2006

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\(^8\) In 2006 alone Russia provided 77 million USD to Transnistria with a population of over half a million. This is almost 3 times more than what EU provided to Moldova with 3.3 million people. Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007.

\(^2\) Nantoi, 2007.

\(^3\) Nantoi, 2007.


the independence of South Ossetia was almost unanimously approved by the people.

The conflict in Abkhazia took place in 1992-1993 and rendered more than 20,000 casualties. The war ended with the division of the region between the self-proclaimed independent Republic of Abkhazia and an Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia – the latter recognized by Georgia as an autonomous region within its territory. After the war, the forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (mostly Russian) were deployed along with a UN mission. In 1994, the break-away Republic of Abkhazia declared once more the independence of the part of the region under its de-facto control.

Georgia keeps arguing that Russia intentionally maintains the conflicts “frozen” while Russia keeps ignoring such accusations. According to the Georgia Government the conflicts could be resolved by removing the Russian peacekeeping forces and decreasing the Russia’s role as a mediator. Therefore, Georgia expects to join the NATO and ensure her security, deter Russia and resolve the current “frozen” conflicts. For the same reasons, Georgia seeks closer relations with the EU. Russia emphasizes that she will not tolerate NATO expansion to Georgia and with every Georgian attempt to move closer to the NATO the Russia increases its threats. Officially, both NATO and EU are trying to distance themselves from the conflicts in Georgia and they do not consider its resolution as a precondition for either the NATO membership or further EU assistance.

A more substantial EU involvement in Georgia started after the Georgian Rose Revolution in 2003 when President Mikheil Saakashvili took over the power. The new pro-western government made Georgia’s integration into the EU one of the top foreign policy priorities. In 2004 the EU deployed one year long “rule of law” mission to Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS) and in 2005 a team of experts was deployed to support border reform. In 2006 the EU-Georgia Action Plan was adopted in line with the European Neighbourhood Policy.

The EU puts emphasis on Georgia’s socio-economic reforms perceiving them as a main precondition for conflict resolution. For Georgia, the relationship with the EU is perceived primarily as a means of acquiring political support to its relations with Russia and for resolving the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, the EU-Georgia Action plan prioritizes the

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rule of law and improving the investment climate, and not directly conflict resolution.

The EU supports the Georgian interpretation of the conflict in the break-away regions, so it continues to recognize “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders.” Moreover, the EU invites Georgia “to align itself with EU positions on regional and international issues.” As the matter a fact, Georgia usually supports all of the main EU’s foreign policy positions. Such an alignment applied also in the case of recognition of the Kosovo independence. While Georgia has not recognized Kosovo, it still follows the EU general position. The Georgian Foreign Affairs Minister stated: “Despite any scenario of developments, however, the issue of Kosovo is unique and should not be linked to any other conflict, including those on the territory of Georgia.”

And it is exactly the position of the EU as described by the Head of the EC Delegation to Georgia and Armenia: “We totally reject any similarities with Kosovo. Kosovo is not a precedent for the conflicts in the Southern Caucasus.”

On the other side, the separatist regimes in Georgia – in the same way as the Moldovan one – argue that Abkhazia and South Ossetia have more political and legal rights for independence than Kosovo. Hence, both governments renewed their request for international recognition after the declaration of the Kosovo independence. Moreover, they claim that the case of Kosovo officially proved that the right of national self-determination overrules the principle of territorial integrity.

While refusing to recognize the independent Kosovo, Russia continues to threaten that she will recognize independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia if Georgia joins NATO. Russia claims that her intention is not to integrate territories of other states, but that Abkhazia and South Ossetia simply want to become part of Russia.

**Conclusions: An unending game?**

The EU prefers to focus on those conflicts where it can “make a difference i.e. conflicts which would be potentially solvable.” In the case of the post-Soviet sphere, the EU considers technical assistance a best strategy - along with taking more time for trust building between the parties in the conflict. In contrast...
to Russia, the EU does not have (nor it plans to have) any military presence and its involvement remains to be based on “soft power”.

In the case of Kosovo the EU made a risky move: its most prominent states recognized the independence of Kosovo and the EU collectively assumed great responsibility for the success of that political project. However, the EU decided to continue its refusal to grant independence in the post-Soviet sphere – cases very similar to the case of Kosovo. The justification is based on the Kosovo’s sui-generis character and most probably also due to the particular NATO role (as we saw in the statement of the Italian foreign minister).

By combining the two different policies in rather similar cases, the EU renders new challenges that further overstretch its capacity.\textsuperscript{103} Moreover, the EU failed to ensure internal consensus on the problem of territorial integrity vs. the right of national self-termination. Hence, the current EU foreign and security situation may lead to further complications in the relations with Russia and even to regional instability of considerable proportions and a further decrease of the EU internal policy cohesion.

The weak justification for the sui-generis of the Kosovo independence and refusal to grant the same treatment to the “frozen” conflicts was further affected by the most recent moves of the Moldovan and Georgian governments. Both of those started to promote the very same model that Serbia used for Kosovo: unusually high degree of autonomy and almost anything else that would not threaten the territorial integrity.\textsuperscript{104} The problem of different EU responses to almost the same conflict resolution proposals undermines the EU credibility – both in the case of Kosovo and in all other conflict regions. The continuous emphasis that territorial integrity and support to socio-economic development\textsuperscript{105} and trust building should be the only measures applied in Moldova and Georgia put the EU into extremely difficult situation. The competition with Russia that applies only the “soft” power may not become effective rendering complete failure of the EU foreign and security in its neighborhood.

The defiance of Serbia in the case of Kosovo would not have caused so many problems for the EU had there not been for Russian continued refusal to align with the NATO and EU on the issue of Kosovo. At the same time, Russia is also being inconsistent in its defense of the Serbian territorial integrity and, thus, the international legal order – because of her own projects for

\textsuperscript{103} The EU is also involved in other regions some of which it perceives to be more urgent, such as Afghanistan or Palestine. See the argumentation in Popescu, 2007.

\textsuperscript{104} See for instance, the offer of Georgia to Abkhazia an unlimited autonomy and the post of vice-president of the country on 28 March or the statement of Moldovan President on 12 March 2008.

\textsuperscript{105} See, for instance, the statement that Transnistria will become attracted by improved socio-economic situation in Moldova. Kalman Miszei, 17 April 2008.
the “frozen” conflicts. In principle, Russia is applying the very same strategy the “West” used in Kosovo: supporting institutional building while extending the negotiations indefinately (or preventing its success by promises of future independence) – up to the point where the separatist regime is de-fact0 independent and the return to the previous status is unfeasible.

The EU had already faced Russia opposition on multiple diplomatic fields and the Kosovo status only added to the growing list of problems in the EU-Russia relations. Moreover, the status of Kosovo enabled further divergence in EU and Russia foreign and security policies and brought to the open some of more tacit issues. The multiplication of the problems is also facilitated by continued lack of common EU-Russia interpretation of international and European norms and standards. As a consequence, undermining the existing political order in Europe may render more weight to more tangible means of competition – military and economic / energy. And on those two fields EU is considerably weaker.

Predicting of future scenarios can hardly be attempted at this point, but the combined consequences of divergent EU and Russia policy may prove to work in a sort of counterproductive synergy. The EU endorsed the separation of Kosovo from Serbia and opened the way for eventual separation of the Republica Srpska from the Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia continue to justify the intention of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to join Russia. So, what would happen if Kosovo decides that it “simply wants to become part of Albania” or if the Republic of Srpska follows the example of Kosovo, separates and then joins Serbia? Would that give a final green light for a possible full-fledged revision of all borders in Europe and elsewhere?

In the context of the deadlock of the UN Security Council, insisting on double standards by either the EU or Russia provides a context of further deterioration of European and international order. The recognition of independence of Kosovo already decreased the stability in the Balkans and it seems to be inducing a chain reaction elsewhere by proving a pretext for Russians to act more openly in the “frozen conflicts”. There is no solid legal or legitimate obstacle for national self-determination of any other peoples. In the Balkans it may be Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Kosovo or Albanians from Macedonia and South Serbia. Similar issues may unwrap in certain EU member states with their own long-standing separatist tendencies.
In that context, the President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus stated: Kosovo “is not an isolated issue that was resolved on one peace of Balkans... For me Kosovo is a precedent. We opened a Pandora box in Europe and it may have drastic consequences.”106

Putting diplomatic games and the EU-Russia competition aside, the solution may be looked for where it was supposed to be found in the first place – within the auspices of the UN. Hence, the indication that the UN Secretary General may initiate a new round of negotiations on the Kosovo status107 brings hope. A new effort towards an agreement on common EU-Russia solution based on the existing international political order (even if that means going back the status quo ante) would certainly help considering the future in less apocalyptic terms.

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107 Ban Ki Moon, “Ban Ki-Mun razmislja o ponovnom pokretanju pregovora o Kosovu?” [Ban Ki-Mun considers re-launch of Kosovo negotiations], Blic, 11 April, 2008.
Parliamentary Control of the European Security and Defence Policy

Dragana Đurašinović – Radojević

“While this government is in office, not a single soldier will leave the country without the support of parliament” (the statement of José Luis Rodríguez Zapater, the Spanish Prime Minister, September 2005).1

Abstract

The fact that the European Union as a specific international organization of 27 member states which has over 2 million members of the armed forces on its disposal and whose overall defence expenditures are almost one quarter of global costs is developing common security and defence policy is certainly the fact that deserves researchers’ attention. But at the same time equally important seems to be the issue how the control over this policy is being executed. In this paper we will try to see in what way the parliament oversight over European Security and Defence Policy is being executed, with a focus primarily on mechanisms and means on disposal of the European Parliament.

Key words: European Parliament, security and defence policy, parliamentary control, EU operations, armed forces

Introduction

The European Security and Defence Policy is an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which, in order to contribute to international peace and security, aims to enable

the European Union to develop its own civilian and military capabilities in terms of crisis management and conflict prevention. Bearing in mind that EU’s goal is to become a global actor with autonomous foreign policy, mobilization of defence resources is considered to be an important element to underpin credible Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

If we exclude monitoring missions and crises exercises, 2003 marks the year that the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) became operational. Namely, deploying police forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EU emerged at the international scene as a security actor. Afterwords, development in the field of ESDP rapidly achieved the level of cooperation and integration that would be hard to imagine five years ago.

Despite the critics that ESDP operations are often the result of the EU scouring the globe for places where it can “plant its flag and claim to be doing effective work”, one should not underestimate the very fact that, during the last five years, nine operations were completed and thirteen are still ongoing within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy. Those operations engage more than 7000 armed forces personnel, and are not only civilian, but also of a military nature, and are carried out not only in Europe, but also in the Caucasus, Asia and Africa. Moreover, the latest operation “Atalanta” near the Somalian territorial waters, for the first time engaged naval forces under the EU flag.

Whether ESDP is an attempt to fulfill the long-standing dream of a federal Europe with its own independent army and defence policy, or is simply another compromise amongst Europeans to allow NATO to survive by linking its military operations to the civilian and diplomatic resources available in the EU, the fact is that nowadays EU has its own capacities for operation, multinational battle groups, fond for financing common costs and European Defence Agency, as well as other capacities for successful development of me ESDP.

The aforementioned facts show that the last few years have seen a rapid development and intensification of the European Security and Defence Policy. Therefore, it is essential to examine the checks and balances, primarily parliamentary control, regulating these imposing human and material resources and their increasingly frequent application. Thereby, we will focus

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2 Geoffrey Van Orden, Memorandum submitted to the UK House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, March 20, 2008.
5 Budget for the ESDP, financed from the CFSP budget, was 159 million Euros in 2007 while costs in 2008 increased by 80% to 285 million Euros. Moreover, these costs do not include the financing of the ATHENA mechanism, for financing common costs of military operations within the ESDP.
our analyses on how the European Parliament excercises oversight over ESDP, namely on mechanisms and instruments on disposal to the European parliament in that respect.

The Challenges of Parliamentary Oversight over the ESDP

To this end, it is necessary to examine the challenges that characterise parliamentary control of the ESDP, taking into account the specific natures of both the European Union, as a governing body, and of the ESDP itself. Namely, foreign policy is still regarded as a sensitive area of sovereignty over which nation states are reluctant to cede control to supra-national bodies. The widely held view is that control of foreign policy, and especially the security and defence components thereof, should remain primarily in the hands of national parliaments. An additional challenge, even for national parliaments, emerges in the form of the traditionally held view that the prosecution of security policy and the administration of security affairs is the “natural” domain of the executive branch of government.6

At the other hand, the issue of the Union’s democratic legitimacy and accountability is not a new issue for the representatives of academia,7 and dominant view in existing literature is that EU is facing problem of the “democratic deficit”.8 Since EU member states agreed to create armed forces and decide collectively on their deployment within the EU institutions, this problem is no longer limited to issues concerning the management of common market, but also applies to foreign, security and defence policy.

Contemporary academic discourse raises questions pertaining to parliamentary control of the EU’s civilian and military missions, which frequently criticise the ESDP for “avoidance of legitimacy”.9 According to the critics there is a vacuum in the parliamentary control of the EU’s foreign and security policy. The fact that neither the European Parliament (EP), nor any national parliament, can provide oversight creates a “double democratic deficit”10 in a highly sensitive area. Furthermore, these concerns are compounded by the fact that powers that are, to all intents and purposes, withheld from national parlia-

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ments are not transferred to the European Parliament. Therefore, the EU does not have the power to ensure robust legislative oversight of the ESDP whilst national oversight practices vary too greatly to perform this role. Moreover, members of the European parliament, through several resolutions, pointed to the serious deficiencies in that regard.

Additionally, the complex coordination of EU institutions that is necessary for effective parliamentary control of the ESDP is also a significant challenge. In order to understand how parliamentary control of the ESDP functions, it is necessary first to take a look at the decision making process that governs this policy. Decisions regarding the ESDP are brought collectively and unanimously by the Council of Ministers (henceforth, the Council). The Political and Security Committee, a body comprising ambassadors from all the member states, plays a crucial role in defining the EU response to a crisis. The Committee can propose collective action to the Council. The Commission contributes to these activities through a representative who attends meetings of the Political and Security Committee and actively participates in civilian crisis management.

Under Article 21 of the current Treaty of the European Union the EU Presidency is obligated to consult with and inform the European Parliament of the main aspects of the CFSP, including the ESDP, and the tendencies thereof. Furthermore, the Presidency will then “see to it that the views of the European Parliament are properly taken into account”. However, this primarily relates to the exchange of information between the Presidency and the EP as the Article does not explicitly state that the Parliament must be informed before a decision on committing to a mission is taken. Nor does it state that the EP must sanction the commencement of a mission, except in the event that additional funds are required from the CFSP budget, and only in the case of civilian crisis management missions. In such a case the Council is required to request the approval of the EP for an increase in the budget. However, it should be borne in mind that the funds for military ESDP missions are not drawn from the EU budget as they are provided by the member states on an individual basis.

14 On the decision of the European Council in Nice in 2000 the permanent political and military bodies of the Council of the European Union were formed: the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff.
16 The conclusion of an Interinstitutional Agreement, the Interinstitutional agreement on budgetary discipline and improvement of the budgetary procedure, made it possible for the EP to be informed before additional expenditure on the CFSP is requested “no less than five working days after the final decision” (“Interinstitutional Agreement Between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on Budgetary Discipline and Sound Financial Management”, Official Journal of the European Union, C 139/7, 14.6.2006).
Mechanisms and Instruments Available to the European Parliament for Oversight of the ESDP

The mechanisms and instruments that European Parliament has on its disposal for the oversight of ESDP activities include adoption of documents – resolutions, recommendations and reports, as well as decisions on ESDP missions, budgetary control, establishment of EP working bodies that deal with ESDP, organizing of parliamentary hearings, questioning of representatives of the Council or the Commission, posing parliamentary questions, paying visits to the troops on the ground etc. Besides that, institutional capacities of the European Parliament do not imply only formal powers of this institution, but also adequate number of staff employed, existing expertise, financial resources etc.

The adoption of resolutions, recommendations, reports and decision making

As already specified, according to the Treaty of the European Union, the European Parliament does not have any formal powers to pre-approve ESDP missions. However, the EP can pass non-binding resolutions and recommendations before the Council ratifies a decision on Joint Action or before the ESDP mission in question begins. The initiative for the adoption of such a resolution can come from any MEP. The draft of this proposal is then passed to the relevant committee for approval, i.e. the Subcommittee on Security and Defence or the Foreign Policy Committee and to the Council of Presidents of the EP.17 To further illustrate this, the European Parliament passed two resolutions that preceded the military missions EUFOR Althea and EUFOR DRC.18

The European Parliament procedure for making recommendations to the Council, as regulated by Articles 90 and 114 of the EP Rules of Procedure, specifies that the draft of the recommendation can be prepared either by a committee whose activities pertain to the CFSP, if approved by the Council of Presidents, or a group of at least forty MEPs.19 In urgent cases approval for the preparation of a draft proposal can be given by the President of the Parliament who instructs the relevant com-

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17 The Council of Presidents is the main governing body of the European Parliament and is made up of the President of the EP, the heads of parliamentary parties as well as representatives of independent MEPs.
18 The first resolution was passed on 17 November 2004, almost half a year after the decision to take Joint Action (12 July 2004) and two weeks before the operation began. The resolution on EUFOR DRC (16 March 2006) was passed before the Council decided on Joint Action.
mittee to convene as soon as possible in order to discuss the draft recommendation.

As far as reports on the ESDP are concerned, Article 21 of the Treaty on the EU and Article 112 of the EP Rules of Procedure stipulate that the Council should provide the EP with an annual report on the development of the CFSP and the ESDP, presenting an overview of the defence and security activities of the Council including civilian and military missions. The Parliament then responds by producing its own reports and passing recommendations regarding future ESDP activities. As has already been mentioned, the Council is required to ensure that the views of the EP be taken into consideration, even though it is not clear to what extent or based on what procedure the Council is expected to do this. In addition to the Council’s annual report, special EU representatives can also produce their own reports, however, they are not obligated to do this and the reports are produced on an ad hoc basis.

**Budgetary Controls**

The imposing financial resources available for ESDP activities have already been mentioned in the introduction of this paper, even though criticisms can also be found in the literature that EU member states spend more than 200 million EUR on defence, and still have difficulties to find two helicopters for a mission, as well as that overall number of troops deployed in ESDP operations represents only 0.3 percent of defence personnel of all EU member states. However, budgetary control is one of the most significant aspects of parliamentary control and it is for this reason that it is necessary to examine the complex procedure for financing ESDP activities.

The European Parliament and the Council adopt the annual EU budget which is administered by the Commission. The European Parliament oversees expenditures relating to ESDP civilian crisis management operations. Additionally, each member state finances ESDP missions separately according to the ‘costs lie where they fall’ principle. In other words, each country that participates in a given operation covers its own costs (e.g. seconded national personnel), while the shared costs of the mission are divided between the member states according to the

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20 The Foreign Affairs Committee of the EP is responsible for the preparation of draft reports which are then voted on during the annual plenary session of the European Parliament, at which issues regarding CFSP/ESDP are considered.

21 Born, Dowling, Fuior and Gavrilescu, 13.

ATHENA mechanism (i.e. planning costs, shared equipment, operational costs, local and international civilian personnel etc.).

According to EU budgetary procedure, the European Parliament can specify the maximum budget for the CFSP. CFSP expenditures are included in a chapter of the EU budget but a list of expenditures, which includes the funds provided by individual member states for civilian ESDP missions, is provided to the EP on a quarterly basis. Furthermore, according to Article 43 of the Interinstitutional Agreement, the Presidency of the Council must inform the EP every time CFSP expenditures are revised no later than five days after the adoption of the decision pertaining to CFSP expenditures. This agreement also introduced a compulsory consultative meeting of the EP and the Council to be held at least five times annually. This meeting is intended to inform Parliament on the expenditure and financial plans for the CFSP, including the costs of operations. In the event that the CFSP budget proves insufficient, the Council must request additional funds from Parliament.

It seems as though this complex procedure for CFSP and ESDP financing does not contribute to an increase in transparency, nor does it facilitate parliamentary control. National parliaments are able, in accordance with national budgetary procedures, to control the costs of foreign operations but cannot oversee the administration of the ATHENA mechanism. The European Parliament also cannot execute any kind of formal control over the ATHENA mechanism as military expenditure is not part of the CFSP budget. The Council can inform Parliament on aspects of the application of the ATHENA mechanism during the consultative meetings but is not obligated to do so. In short, the current nature of the ATHENA mechanism is such that neither the European Parliament nor national parliaments are able to control this important element of ESDP military expenditure.

Working bodies

The parliamentary body that has the authority to execute oversight over ESDP activities is the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, part of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The
Subcommittee was established at the beginning of 2004 and is authorised to monitor the development of the ESDP including: both civilian and military operations, relations with NATO (including cooperation with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly), anti-terrorism policy, prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, security sector reform and disarmament, demobilisation and re-qualification. As a sub-committee this body has a lower administrative status and its activities depend on its parent committee – the Foreign Affairs Committee. The 2007 budget for this subcommittee was 160,000 Euros and was intended for the completion of research projects.27

As a rule the meetings of the Subcommittee are public. Access to classified information relating to security and defence is, according to the 2002 Interinstitutional Agreement, granted to the President of the EP and the Special Committee of the European Parliament, which is made up of the President of the Foreign Affairs Committee and four MEPs selected by the Council of Presidents. Furthermore, these MPs are required to pass security screening28. The level of secrecy of a document is determined by the Council, using the same document classification system as NATO – top secret, secret and classified. MEPs, however, do not have access to documents defined as top secret. In addition to this, the Council retains the right to withhold information from the European Parliament if this is deemed necessary. This right was exercised in relation to the EP investigation into illegal CIA prisons.29 The Special Committee meets every six weeks with the High Representative of the CFSP, or with his representative, with the aim of examining classified information.

Statement of the officials, parliamentary questions, hearings and visits to the troops on the ground

One significant authorisation that the Members of the European Parliament have at their disposal is the right to call representatives of the Council or the Commission to give a statement before the Parliament, even though no sanction is in place if the representative in question refuses such an invitation. EU officials can appear before the EP on their own initiative if

27 Born, Dowling, Fuior and Gavrilescu, 17.
such an appearance is approved by the President of the Council or if they are invited by the EP itself.\footnote{European Parliament, \textit{Rules of Procedure}, Article 103.} Parliament additionally informs on ESDP developments through general statements of national and EU officials before the plenary of committee meetings, mostly Foreign Affairs Committee.

As far the \textit{posing of parliamentary questions} is concerned, it ought to be mentioned that the EP Rules of Procedure differentiates between the posing of questions which require a verbal response and those requiring a written response. Article 108 of the Rules of Procedure stipulates that the Committee, a political party or a minimum of forty MEPs can ask a question of any member of the Council or the Commission that will receive a verbal response from representatives of EU institutions during the debate in the European Parliament. The Rules of Procedure, however, stipulates a relatively strict procedure for this mechanism. The questions must be submitted in written form to the President of the Parliament, who then passes them to the Council of Presidents. The Council then decides whether the question will be accepted and where on the agenda it will be placed. Questions posed to the Commission must be submitted to this institution at least one week before the session at which they will be debated and questions intended for the Council must be submitted at least three weeks in advance.

On the other hand, each MEP can pose a question to the Council or the Commission if the answer is expected in written form. Article 110 of the Rules of Procedure obligates EU institutions respond to questions by Members of Parliament which require an urgent reply, but not detailed additional research, no later than three weeks from the submission of the question. Furthermore, the EP Rules of Procedure stipulate that each MP has the right to one “priority question” once per month. Non-priority written questions should receive a reply within six weeks of being submitted. MEPs are required to specify that their question is a priority question but the President of the Parliament has the power to decide whether this is the case.\footnote{MEPs parliamentary questions mostly referred to enquiries whether the actions of personnel engaged in the mission were in accordance with human rights standards, clarifications with regard to financial resources, evaluation of certain missions etc.}

The authority to \textit{organise parliamentary hearings} and evaluations on ESDP developments is most frequently made use of by the Foreign Affairs Committee or more precisely, it’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence. On that occasion, representatives of the Commission and the Council are invited to
address the Committee, as well as academia representatives and various experts. As an example, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Committee on Development and Subcommittee on Security and Defence recently for the first time held public hearing on security and development, which was also the first time a common meeting of all three committees was held.32

Members of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence made use of the right to organise a parliamentary visit of deployed troops in 2005 and 2006 when the EUPM and EUFOR missions in Bosnia were visited.33 During the summer of 2006 MEPs also visited the operational headquarters of the EUFOR DRC mission in Potsdam and troops stationed in Kinshasa.34 These visits enabled the MEPs to assess how the missions are executed and, more significantly, to become acquainted with the problems faced by soldiers in the field. The findings of these visits were then compiled in short reports by the head of the delegation.35 Such reports include special recommendations for the execution of the mission, as well as the general situation in the country and region in which the mission is taking place or about future ESDP activities.

Expert Staff

In order to conduct effective parliamentary control the European Parliament needs sufficient human resources and relevant expertise. MEPs have at their disposal expert advisors engaged in the Office of the Directorate-General for External Relations, including the Policy Department and the Subcommittee Secretariat, as well as the employees of political groups. The Policy Department is responsible for the provision of expert political support, including the production of research and analyses on issues pertaining to security and defence policy, for the main political institutions of the EP (the President, committees and parliamentary delegations). The Policy Department is also responsible for contact with the Council and the Commission and for maintaining links with external contributors such as institutes, universities, governmental and international institutions and suchlike. However, it is rather worrying fact that from 160 employees of the Directorate-General for External Relations there is currently only one expert on securi-
ty issues and only twelve others with expertise in fields that are linked to security issues.36

The Subcommittee Secretariat employs only eight people, who are part of the Directorate-General for External Relations. The Secretariat is responsible for the organisation of briefings for MEPs, assisting the authors of research projects and the composition of draft texts. Additionally, the Secretariat is responsible for the organisation of meetings and public hearings as well as for the work between sub-committee sessions.

Concluding Remarks

Even when the aforementioned information is taken into account, it seems that the European Parliament still does not play a significant role in the creation of EU security and defence policy. In addition to the problems faced by the European Parliament – from the specific nature of the EU itself, through the complexities of coordination, the decision making process and intricate financing procedures to the imprecise division of responsibilities between it and the national parliaments – this institution also has only very modest formal powers of oversight over the European Security and Defence Policy. Concerns are compounded by the fact that MPs in the European Parliament do not utilise even the few tools that are at their disposal. It is, after all, political will that is the key condition for effective parliamentary control. That this is their responsibility should be further reinforced by their mandate, the European Parliament being the only institution directly elected by EU citizens.

It seems necessary that the European Parliament reinforce its powers as soon as possible but it is also necessary that this institution gains more experience in the use of parliamentary procedures and in the practice of parliamentary oversight. What is more, all participants in the academic discourse on this subject highlight this issue, warning that there exists a “double democratic deficit” in this area.37 Additionally, engagement of armed forces in missions abroad evolved from marginal phenomena to important tools for maintaining and/or creating international stability and peace, becoming the prime activity for most of me armed forces nowadays. Therefore, need for strengthening

36 Born, Dowling, Fuior and Gavrilescu, 18.
37 The term used by Hans Born in his similarly entitled book: ‘The Double Democratic Deficit’: Parliamentary Accountability and the Use of Force under International Auspices.
parliamentary dimension in this field becomes decisive factor of its democratic legitimacy.

On the other hand, it is unfortunate that the majority of the national parliaments of member states have not been completely effective in executing robust oversight, not only of the ESDP, but of the defence and security sector as a whole. And finally, the ESDP is one of the areas of common policy in the EU that has only recently begun its development so it can be hoped that practice of parliamentary oversight will, when the ESDP becomes fully operational, also continue to develop and that the “parliamentarisation of ESDP” will become a crucial issue.38
Review of International Relations

(Nevenka Jeftić, institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 2008)

Reviewed by Marko Savković
(Research Fellow at the Belgrade School of Security Studies)

In its periodical, the Review of International Affairs, the Belgrade Institute of International Politics and Economics presents the findings of the project “Serbia and the Modern World: Outlook and methods for political, security and economic consolidation in the context of contemporary processes in the international community”. Three articles caught our attention, each of them covers a separate but significant security related topic.

In their article, “Establishment of EU and NATO Security Structures”, Ana Jović-Lazić and Ivona Ladevac present an overview of the process of forming European (and Euro-Atlantic) security structures. The authors were able to completely fulfil the task they had set themselves – in other words, they have produced an excellent historical overview of this process. However, an analysis of the contradictions that followed the development of the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy, which would give a more complete picture of this process, was lacking.

The current state of EU-NATO relations is not the result of a “predictable development of events”, as Lazić and Ladevac claim. Whether or not the US expected the EU to take on more responsibility, the capability for autonomous military action was developed gradually, and not always with Washington’s blessing. The authors have, nonetheless, observed differences between those states that were in favour of greater independence from NATO (e.g. France) and those who opposed the idea of the EU becoming a military alliance (e.g. the UK).

Another criticism we might level at the authors is that they were not able to tackle the international context in which these policies were formed. Instead, they concentrated on describing the contents of declarations, strategies and agreements. Consequently, the reality of war in Kosovo received little attention when it came to explaining the motives of some of the EU’s main players, such as Britain and France. A similar problem arises when we examine the
section devoted to analysing the Constitution Agreement, where we learn that the creation of the position of EU Foreign Minister was opposed by Britain. The authors then fail to answer the question they themselves posed why can the EU not maintain a unified stance in the international arena?

Even though her article is entitled “Threats to Security and the Concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR)”, Svetlana Đurđević-Lukić focuses primarily on current dilemmas faced in implementing the concept of SSR. In her introduction she repeats one of the oft cited fundamental dilemmas in security studies; how to achieve a balance between demands for the protection of the public’s human rights and civil liberties and the obligation of state institutions to guarantee public security? This is followed by a useful definition of “forms of intervention in the broadest sense [...] from the promotion of democracy, through development aid, to the creation of absolute protectorates and military occupation”. The “broading” and “deepening” of the concept of security is explained in one paragraph. The author completes an introductory outline of relevant literature with the criticism that there is a lack of divergent views on concepts such as human security, state building and good governance. In contrast to this, the concept of SSR “clearly focuses on security issues” and includes “strong elements of support for democratisation and development”.

Đurđević-Lukić favours a holistic approach to security sector reform that would include the “integration of partial reforms”, the “connection of measures put in place to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of security forces”, the “existence of mechanisms that provide effective control” and the “greater participation of civil society”.

The applicability of SSR concepts is illustrated by alluding to four separate contexts; the liberation of Latin American countries from military dictatorships, the fight against poverty, the post-conflict context and finally the reality of the situation in the former Yugoslavia which encapsulates the legacies of all of the previous contexts.

When discussing two generations of security sector reform, Đurđević-Lukić turns to the work of Fareed Zakaria on “illiberal” democracies, which was not so much a study of SSR, as of the incomplete nature of democratisation around the world.

The difference between the passing of legislation and its implementation has proven to be one of the central challenges of SSR, which Đurđević-Lukić expresses as an issue that “calls into ques-
tion the existing balance of power, vested interests and dominant paradigms”. Tracing the roots of SSR the author was able to show how the donor community has become the architect of the further development of this concept.

In line with the views expressed at the beginning of her article, the author’s criticisms are not aimed purely at the concept of SSR, as much as at its implementation and applicability. The author is of the opinion that the problems of implementation resemble the challenges all foreign actors face when promoting concepts which aim to create security, development and democracy. As a case study Đurđević-Lukić has chosen the aid the US Government began donating to the countries it saw as being of “strategic importance” after the 9/11. The rapid increase in foreign aid, the lion’s share of which was donated by the Department of Defense, with little regard for the human rights record of the recipient country, is a far cry from a holistic approach. Đurđević-Lukić criticises this US policy because it divides SSR into “stabilising operations and defence reform” and support for the establishment of “the rule of law and good governance”. In her conclusion, Đurđević-Lukić quotes Nicole Ball who considers the lack of understanding for security sector reform, as displayed by the US Administration, to be one of the chief causes of the failure of stabilising operations and post-conflict reconstruction.

In their article, “The Beginnings of Regional Defence Cooperation between the Countries of South Eastern Europe”, Dragan Đukanović and Dalibor Kekić agree with the assessment that the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe has not included enough on defence related cooperation. They cautiously welcome the Regional Cooperation Council as an “umbrella institution” which will “channel” existing regional initiatives. In an accompanying table they list not only the aims, participants and documents of particular initiatives but also include a category on the “Level of Regional Ownership”. Even though this table is not the authors’ own work, it is nonetheless worth taking a look at regional security initiatives in this new light. The transfer of responsibility for SSR is a process that is still on-going. The completion of this process will not solve the problem of implementing this concept, but it may demonstrate a growth in capability enabling SEE countries to manage their own reforms.

As the authors chose to focus on cooperation specifically relating to defence matters, they turn to analysing the achievements of the Initiative of the Defence Ministers of SEE countries, as a kind
of political forum, and the SEE Brigade (better known as SEEBRIG) under its command.

The remark that SEEBRIG can participate in “coalitions of the willing” could be problematic, it is not accompanied by any kind of clarification and so could imply operations that contravene the organisation’s charter.

We would like to express our agreement with the author’s assessment that the “participation in peacekeeping operations mandated by the UN or NATO directives are of crucial importance for the maintenance and advancement of SEEBRIG’s credibility in the eyes of the international community”. The conclusion of the Đukanović and Kekić’s article still avoids mention of the debate about Serbia’s military neutrality. This is particularly unusual considering Serbia’s declared aim to participate in SEE BRIG programmes such as Civil-Military Emergency Planning of the network of simulated exercises SEESIM. Though more committed participation in SEE BRIG would not require a change in strategic orientation, the political dimension of increased involvement should have received greater attention in this article.
“The Foreign Policy of the European Union”

Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan

Reviewed by Biljana Kotevska
(Research Fellow at Analytica, Skopje, Macedonia)

Events in the last two decades, following the fall of the Iron Curtain, as well as the most recent events in Europe and at the global political scene in 2008 increased the interest of scholars in the European Union as a global actor and especially in the European Union’s Foreign Policy (further on EUFP). This makes the book of Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan very timely. Part of the Palgrave Macmillan European Union series, “The Foreign Policy of the European Union” is one of those books one always appreciates - it presents the topic in a coherent, comprehensive and clear manner providing the reader with an in depth knowledge on the topic.

The authors set two goals for them selves to achieve with this book. The first is to provide an overview and analysis of the EUFP. The second is to reappraise the nature of the EUFP and foreign policy in general, looking beyond the narrow focus of conventional foreign policy analysis on states, crises and conflicts by focusing also on the structural foreign policy. If we are to rate this book according to whether the authors have achieved the goals set by them selves than we can freely give it a high grade. Justification of this statement follows in the lines bellow.

The book offers a very good overview and analysis of the EUFP presented in a logical progression with a clear language making the content very easy to follow and to understand. It starts with a historical outline of European integration and foreign policy, moving on to presenting the actors and the policy making processes in the EUFP’s system, as well as the relations of the EUFP with the national foreign policies of the Member States. Then it moves on to analyzing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), furthering the discussion with aspects of EUFP which go beyond these two (such as Human Rights and trade for example, as well as the
foreign policy dimension of terrorism, energy, environment and other areas of the internal policies). Next is an overview of the main arenas of the EUFP in different parts of the world, concentrating on three arenas – the new and the potential Member States, the countries falling under the European Neighborhood Policy and Africa. This is followed by a discussion on the relations of the EU with – as the authors name them- two sets of global structural powers: first set – the multilateral organizations; second set - USA, Russia, China, and a group of influential structures considered under the umbrella term Islamism. The book closes with an interesting chapter looking at the findings of the authors within the International Relations Theories and the European Integration Theories, assessing also within this part the authors’ choice of framework which is the structural foreign policy – conventional foreign policy.

The adoption of the structural foreign policy – conventional foreign policy framework is justified by the authors with the liberty it gives them to do a multipillar analysis as well as with the terminology it leaves at their disposal, since they consider the EUFP to be a multipillar and multilevel, operating within a complex multilocalational web of interlocking actors and processes. The multipillar perspective of actors and processes proves to be a good mode since it offers a multi-dimensional insight which presents far more realistically the functioning and scope of the EUFP than what an analysis of (only) the second pillar can offer. With regards to the terminology employed, the authors’ claim is that this approach gave them a liberty to consider dimensions of foreign policy which are usually overlooked (such as the 10+2 Enlargement round and the EU policies towards the Balkans) because of lack of appropriate terminology and analytical instruments.

Accepting the limitations in their research (in terms of the framework as well as the cases which have been taken into consideration in this study), the authors additionally point out to week spots in the EUFP research in general, presenting in very brief their view on how the future of EUFP research should advance (one example is by adding more outside-in perspective).

Also worth noting is the book’s associated website <http://www.palgrave.com/politics/keukeleire>, containing supporting materials as well as updated information on the publication, and a very useful internet guide on EUFP (Prof. Keukeleire’s site on EUFP: <http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/eufp/>).

A closing remark in this review would be a recommendation of this book to everyone who is interested in the topic of EUFP, no matter of their level of knowledge on the topic. Whether one is just starting to familiarize herself/ himself with this topic or one already has a well advanced knowledge, this book is definitely worth reading cover to cover.
The latest publication of Timothy Edmunds on security sector reform in transforming societies is a significant contribution to the understanding of the reform process, especially in countries that were used for case studies in this book. Edmunds analyses in this book the relation between the societies which are in the process of transformation and their respective security sectors.

In the first chapter, the author begins his analysis with the general concept of security sector reform. He presents this concept to the readers in a way that not only experts in this field could easily understand its essence. Edmunds draws the readers’ attention to the traces of origin of the security sector reform concept which can be seen in early works that dealt with development, security and civil-military relations. His definition of security sector is also significant. The author understands the security sector as “those organisations that apply and manage coercive force for collective purposes.”

Going one step further, Edmunds defines the security sector reform as a process “through which security sector actors adapt to the political and organisational demands of transformation.” Emphasizing the importance of the security sector reform in the Western Balkans the author also brought to the readers’ attention the danger that this definition could easily be understood only as a neutral technical activity. The security sector reform in this region is implemented as a part of a broader process of democratic transformation, post-conflict reconstruction and consolidation. Edmunds warns us with every right that the process of democratisation does not imply that liberal democracy will be achieved at the end of this process. The democratisation process can often lead to non- or semi-democracy. This is especially true in post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies. Therefore, according to Edmunds, the main goal of the security sector reform is to contribute to the security of the political community in an effective and efficient manner, and in the framework of democratic civilian control.
Edmunds offers three levels of security sector reform analysis – political, organisational and international level. At the political level security sector reform deals with the relation between the security sector and the political process. Claiming that every government that wants to implement its power in an uncontested manner has to establish and consolidate mechanisms for civilian control over the security sector, Edmunds points out that the security sector actors can manifest their discontent with the security sector reform by intervening directly in the political process. This statement can also find its stronghold in Samuel Finer’s *The Men on Horseback*. Finer analysed and showed in this work what instigates the military leadership to intervene into politics, or as Finer claims, what actually stops it to intervene considering the monopoly over the use of force an hierarchy that cannot be compared to any other state apparatus.

Analysing further the concept of the security sector reform, Edmunds claims that this reform on the political level consists of two interconnected processes – the first and the second generation of the security sector reform. While the first generation of the reforms is focused on the formal establishment of civilian control over the security sector, the second generation is focused on consolidation and further democratisation of these measures in practice. The measures mentioned here are establishment of constitutional, legal and institutional provisions for civilian democratic control, establishment of the basic preconditions for centralised oversight and transparency in the security sector and depolitisation, or as Edmunds defines it even better, departification of the security sector.

Security sector reform on the organisational level addresses the changes within the sector. In that way the security sector adapts to the changes in the society. The most important of these changes is professionalisation. According to Edmunds professionalisation is not the abolishing of the conscription and implementation of the professional armed forces as it is sometimes wrongly believed. Professional organisation in the security sector, according to Edmunds, is an organisation which is capable of undertaking its activities in an effective and efficient way in a framework of democratic civilian control. These organisations should have clearly defined and widely accepted roles. Also they should have clear rules which define their responsibilities as a whole, as well as the individual responsibility of their members.

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The international level of the security sector reform addresses the relation between domestic security sector reform and external pressures and influences. Taking Western Balkans as an example, Edmunds differentiate three interconnected strategies used by the external actors in order to encourage the security sector reform – security assistance, pre-conditionality and direct conditionality. Security assistance consists of external programmes and activities which encourage the reform process. Pre-conditionality addresses the criteria and preconditions countries have to fulfil in order to gain certain benefit on the international level. The criteria for joining the EU and NATO are the best examples of pre-conditionality. Direct conditionality is used in order to force countries into something that is imposed. These measures consist of certain amount of coercion and the best example for direct conditionality is required cooperation with the ICTY.

After the theoretical introduction Edmunds analyses concrete case studies – Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro. The title Serbia and Montenegro cannot be held against the author considering that the country in question changed its name couple of times in short period of time. Edmunds explains in the introduction that he chose these countries mainly because of their great similarities. Except for the size, both countries have similar problems which are influenced by their post-conflict and post-authoritarian heritage.

These well chosen case studies Edmunds brings under the theoretical framework which he analysed and explained previously. His comparative analysis of the security sector reform in both countries follows all three levels of the reform – political, organisational and international. Showing his sovereign knowledge of the facts that characterise the security sector reform process in these countries, but also the situation in which these facts took place, Edmunds helps his readers to understand this highly complex problem. Not only giving general remarks, Edmunds bravely analyses concrete cases which shows once again the level of his expertise and recommends this book not only to experts in the field but also to wider public – people who survived the events Edmunds writes about and who will, after reading of this book, much more easily understand the situation in which these events took place.

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3 Defining the object of his analyses the author explained that at the time of the writing both states were part of the state union.
Call for Papers-International Conference: Culture and Security Sector Reform: Political, Strategic and Military Culture in Transitional Countries, (Sremski Karlovci, Serbia 7-10 May 2009)

The aim of the conference is to explore the linkages between political, strategic and military culture in post-Communist states, and in particular in the Western Balkans. In doing so, it will seek to bridge the gap between structure and culture and offer to the academic and policy communities in the Western Balkans a better understanding of the salience of political, military and strategic cultures in the process of SSR. With this aim, we seek contributions that will address the issues of culture and SSR. The topics include, but are not limited to:
- Theoretical approaches to the study of political, strategic and military culture
- Political culture in the Western Balkans, comparatively and individual countries
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- The impact of Euro-Atlantic integration processes on strategic and military culture
- Factors influencing culture in individual states.
- The impact of culture on the Security Sector Reform in post-conflict and post-authoritarian countries.
- The role of military education in SSR

Paper proposals and filled application forms should be written in English and submitted by e-mail to office@ccmr-bg.org by 15 March 2009 at the latest. Paper proposals should include the name of the proposer, title of the paper and a 200-300 word abstract. In case of acceptance, the full paper should be sent to the organizers by 3 May 2009. Also, if you are interested to attend the conference, without presenting your paper, please send us a short motivation letter together with your CV to the same e-mail address.
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