Ukraine Against Herself: To Be Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, or Neutral?

by Jeffrey Simon

**Key Points**

Since independence, Ukrainians have been evenly split between those who desire to be part of the Euro-Atlantic (European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization) community and those who gravitate toward Eurasia (Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States). During the 1990s, when the European Union and NATO were focused on Central Europe and Russia was politically down and economically weak, Ukraine was able to have it both ways.

Since the Orange Revolution, Ukraine has made significant progress developing a Euro-Atlantic–style democratic political system, demonstrated a vibrant open media and civil society, and successfully advanced civilian oversight of its Euro-Atlantic–oriented military, which has built strong ties with NATO.

Despite this progress, Ukrainian opinion remains sharply divided on integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Attempts by Ukrainian leaders and some current members of NATO to promote a Membership Action Plan, in the hope that public opinion would follow, have backfired. Not only has Russia, now more autocratic, responded with missile threats, cutting gas supplies, and meddling in Ukraine’s domestic politics, but the cross-cutting internal and external pressures are aggravating profound political instability, actually making Ukraine a less appealing candidate for membership in either the European Union or NATO.

Under these circumstances, the challenge is to provide Ukraine sufficient time to consolidate successful democratic governance and develop domestic consensus on this critical strategic choice. Rather than pressing Ukraine toward early accession, the new U.S. administration should keep open the possibility of NATO membership, but for the time being encourage Ukraine to follow the model of Finland, another nonaligned Partner for Peace, as it attempts to reconcile the competing popular factions in the country and to navigate between its Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian neighbors. By nurturing its political stability, the United States will enhance Ukraine’s value to the Alliance over the longer term.

**The Dilemma**

Ever since Ukraine declared independence in August 1991, its main security preoccupation and challenge has been its search for identity. Nostalgic to maintain its long and close association with Russia, which has become increasingly competitive with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), and at the same time eager to become a more cooperative and close partner with the Euro-Atlantic community, Ukraine has consistently tried to have it both ways. On the one hand, Ukrainian political leaders’ aspirations for membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions have been driven, in part, by the desire to solidify independence from Russia. This impulse has roots that go back to the earliest days of its independence, when the fate of ex-Soviet nuclear weapons deployed on Ukrainian territory was being decided and Kyiv appealed to the United States and its NATO Allies for security guarantees against the specter of Russian resurgence.

Yet at the same time, Ukraine’s history, culture, and economy are closely entwined with Russia’s. Ethnic Russians and others living in eastern Ukraine are more negative about NATO and the EU than those in the western part of the country because they see such integration with the West as jeopardizing a good relationship with Russia. Since about half of Ukraine’s population is Russian-speaking, and about 17 percent are ethnic Russians, the country’s prospective membership in NATO and the EU has been met with apprehension by roughly 60 percent and 45 percent of Ukraine’s citizenry, respectively. In fact, roughly 45 percent of the population would rather participate in Russia’s Common Economic Space.
than the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Hence, Ukraine’s progress toward its government’s stated goals of NATO and EU membership has been anything but easy, stumbling over these domestic obstacles, which even 4 years after the Orange Revolution remain the most important barrier to the country’s Euro-Atlantic progress.

Internal Symptoms of Crisis

This Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian dichotomy and tension have been reflected in Ukraine’s often tumultuous domestic politics and had an impact upon its constitutional development. Indeed, since the Orange Revolution brought Viktor Yushchenko to the presidency in January 2005 with an agenda to bring Ukraine closer to the Euro-Atlantic community and after four governments marked by political turmoil, Ukraine’s efforts to define itself as either Euro-Atlantic or Eurasian continue to be plagued by its lack of public and political elite support and absence of strategic focus.

With popular support for NATO and EU integration consistently at only 20 percent and 45 percent, respectively, Ukraine’s centrist political parties have not even developed a consensus on the issue in the decade or more that it has been on the national agenda:

- In the March 2002 election, of the seven Rada parties, only Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine (NU), which received 23.6 percent of the vote and 112 seats, sought membership in NATO and the EU. Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych was interested in a “single economic space” to bind Ukraine with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.

- In the March 2006 election, five parties won seats. Again, only Yushchenko’s NU bloc (81 seats) supported NATO integration, while former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko’s BYT (Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko) (129 seats) was noncommittal, and the other three parties commanding a total of 240 seats—a clear majority—were opposed.¹

In other words, despite the remarkable consolidation of democratic governance in Ukraine and the clear erosion of support for the Communist Party over the past 17 years, this has not translated into popular support for membership in NATO. Indeed, the policy differences rapidly metastasized into a struggle over constitutional prerogatives between the president, the prime minister, and the Rada. When the new government convened in 2006, it was under a constitution that had been amended in December 2004 during the heavily contested presidential elections of the Orange Revolution. No longer could the president appoint or fire the prime minister, who is now selected by a majority of the Rada members, changing the power relationship between the two. President Yushchenko’s challenge would now be how to stitch together a governing coalition that could put aside past personal and political differences, build a consensus on NATO–EU integration, and convince society of its worthiness to rule. Unfortunately, he failed.

While an Orange (Yushchenko and Tymoshenko) coalition attempted to form a government in coalition with Oleksandr Moroz’s Socialist Party, Moroz instead opted to enter a Yanukovych-led “anti-crisis” government, along with Petro Symonenko’s Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU), that would lead Ukraine in a Eurasian direction. Problems immediately arose over the president’s prerogative in foreign and security policy and the Rada’s control of the purse and power to dismiss ministers. When Prime Minister Yanukovych went to Brussels on September 14, 2006, to withdraw Ukraine’s bid for a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), Yushchenko cried betrayal. Conversely, when Yanukovych visited the European Union to request Ukraine’s accession, EU external relations commissioner Benita Ferrer-Waldner informed him that the EU had no plans to offer membership, but instead proposed closer economic and political ties. This rejection undermined Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic supporters, who took up the argument that NATO was a first step toward the more popular (but unwelcoming) EU.

The foreign policy rift between the president and prime minister was magnified by confusion over authority and led to a major constitutional crisis. The situation deteriorated further after the cabinet returned a number of presidential decrees unapproved. Yanukovych bypassed the president and foreign minister by conducting negotiations with Russia on Ukrainian membership in the Common

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Economic Space and providing Russia a stake in the Ukrainian gas transport system. In response, President Yushchenko dissolved the Rada on the grounds that Yanukovych was usurping the president’s powers and subverting the will of the people.

Political destabilization worsened when the government accelerated its efforts to strip away the president’s powers. Yushchenko reacted by firing Prosecutor General Svyatoslav Piskun on May 24, 2007; Interior Minister Vasyl Tsushko retaliated by deploying troops to prevent the newly appointed minister from taking office. When Yushchenko announced that he was taking control of the interior ministry and ordered its troops to Kyiv, Tsushko countermanded the order. Fortunately, violence was avoided during a tense 2-month standoff, which resulted in an agreement to hold new parliamentary elections. The entire episode, however, strongly indicated the need for constitutional reform.

The September 2007 parliamentary election resulted in a fragile Tymoshenko and Yushchenko (BYT–NU) coalition government with 30.7 and 14.2 percent of the vote, respectively, and only 227 seats of the Rada’s 450. Yanukovych’s Party of Regions (PRU) won 34 percent of the popular vote and 175 seats, and the Communist Party acquired 27 seats. As had been the case during Tymoshenko’s previous tenure as prime minister in 2005, she and the president found it difficult to work together, and their political infighting continued. Even after the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008, when Yushchenko criticized Russia and visited Tbilisi (with fellow presidents from Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) to render moral support to Georgia, Prime Minister Tymoshenko refused to support him, and her government collapsed. After months of continued political turmoil and once again facing the prospect of new elections, which would most likely result in yet another unstable coalition government, Tymoshenko and Yushchenko appeared to reach an uncertain peace on December 10, 2008, by reforging their Orange coalition. Only time will tell how stable this new arrangement will be.

Political Schizophrenia

While the Ukrainian political leadership has been slower than its neighbors to publicly promote the virtues of NATO integration, its military outreach toward NATO and other European countries has been fairly impressive. Even though Ukraine’s first Military Doctrine in October 1993 specifically rejected membership in military blocs, it was the first CIS state to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) in February 1994. In December 1995, Ukraine deployed 400 mechanized troops to NATO’s Bosnia Implementation Force (IFOR) and increased the number to 550 in the following year. Ukraine was the first country in the Commonwealth of Independent States to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace in February 1994.

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low-on Stabilization Force (SFOR). From 1995 through December 1999, when they withdrew, more than 2,800 Ukrainian servicemen took part in this NATO mission.2

What is particularly important, though, is not just the troop numbers. NATO provided much-desired operational experience.3 On the other hand, the missions were extremely costly. While Ukraine had been active in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in Angola and in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, the UN had always reimbursed Ukraine for these operations. Indeed, UN peacekeeping was actually a money-maker for the Ukrainian armed forces, which received $72.5 million for UN operations from 1992–1999, far more than they had expended.5

In marked contrast, Ukraine’s defense ministry had to pay for NATO operations from its cash-starved budget, which also meant that in order to save money, Ukrainians deployed for 12 months, while their Polish partners rotated every 6 months. But the lengthier deployments paid benefits by raising their professional expertise, which the military recognized and appreciated.6 As has been the experience in many other post-communist transition countries, it is plausible (though no public data are available) that for professional reasons a higher percentage of Ukrainian servicemen support NATO integration than is found in the wider population.7

At the July 1997 Madrid Summit, Ukraine signed a “Charter on a Distinctive Partnership” that elaborated new areas for consultation and cooperation with NATO, to include creating Joint Working Groups on Defense Reform and Civil Emergency Planning and establishing a NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine’s defense ministry. In addition to the 2,800 troops to NATO IFOR/SFOR, Ukraine deployed 250 troops to Kosovo (KFOR) in September 1999, increasing the force to more than 530 in 2001, as part of a joint Ukrainian-Polish battalion.8 Ukraine ratified a PFP Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in May 2000, condemned on September 14, 2001, the acts of terrorism committed against the United States, and signed an Exchange of Classified Information Agreement with NATO in 2002.9

Ukraine first officially stated its intention to join the Alliance at the Reykjavik NATO-Ukraine Foreign Ministers session in May 2002.10 Despite NATO concerns about Ukraine’s transfer of air defense equipment to Iraq (for example, Kolchuga radars), the NATO-Ukraine Commission adopted an Action Plan at the November 2002 Prague Summit that provides a framework for intensified consultations and cooperation.11
Ukrainian supporters portray this Action Plan as preparation for its ultimate accession to the MAP.

While Ukraine did not participate in direct military operations in Afghanistan, it provided overflight rights for NATO military transports on their way there. Later, in 2003, Ukraine did send 1,650 troops to Operation Iraqi Freedom with the joint Ukrainian-Polish battalion as part of the Polish-led Multinational Division Central-South. After 30 months and loss of 18 lives, Ukraine withdrew from Iraq in December 2005.14

In June 2004, President Leonid Kuchma replaced Ukraine’s 1993 Military Doctrine with a new one that portrays NATO as the basis for the European security system and pledges to pursue Euro-Atlantic integration.15 At NATO’s June 2004 Istanbul Summit, Defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk presented the new doctrine as well as Ukraine’s Strategic Defence Bulletin, which stresses that “future membership in NATO and the EU continued to be the main priorities of Ukraine’s foreign policy.”16 After NATO expressed concerns about the status of Ukraine’s democratic development in light of the so-called Gongadze affair,17 President Kuchma issued yet another decree in July 2004 that removed preparations for NATO membership from the doctrine.18 After the 2004 Orange Revolution, President Yushchenko once again altered Ukraine’s policy, reaffirming interest in joining the MAP and NATO and reinstating the provisions in favor of joining the EU and NATO in the country’s Military Doctrine. On that basis, NATO and Ukraine launched an “intensified dialogue” on membership in April 2005, and military activities proliferated.

To date, three major projects have been carried out in Ukraine using NATO/PFP trust funds. The first, completed in 2003 in Donetsk, destroyed 400,000 anti-personnel landmines. Another, led by the Netherlands, was established in Khmelnitsky in January 2006 for the retraining and resettlement of decommissioned military officers. The third, for which the agreement was signed in June 2006, is the largest, allocating €25 million over 10 years to destroy 1,000 man-portable air defense missiles, 1.5 million small arms, and 133,000 tons of munitions.19 Surplus weapons and ammunition are a serious security issue. Ukraine maintains roughly 16,000 tons of liquid propellants and nearly 760,000 tons of surplus ammunition, of which 480,000 tons have expired their storage terms and must be disposed of.20 In 2004, 92,000 tons of ammunition exploded at a depot in the southern Zaporizhia region, spraying debris and shells and destroying buildings in nearby villages.21 To deal with such crises, the NATO-Ukraine 2006 Action Plan established a special National System of Coordination and Cooperation with NATO.

In 2008, Ukraine maintained about 600 service personnel in peacekeeping operations; it had 185 service personnel in KFOR and 2 liaison officers (and 150 policemen) in the UN Mission in Kosovo, and provided 43 personnel to support NATO’s training mission in Iraq.22 In December 2006, President Yushchenko authorized the Ukrainian navy to participate in Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean Sea, and in early 2008 sent 10 Ukrainian peacekeepers to serve with the Canadians in Afghanistan. In an apparent effort to win further support from Washington, President Yushchenko announced in April 2008 that Ukraine will also send 15 peacekeepers to Iraq.23

Despite this extensive record of military cooperation, it became abundantly clear in the 4 months of “Orange” factions’ squabbling after the March 2006 parliamentary election that integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions, and specifically into NATO, was not a high priority for most Ukrainians, but was instead becoming an increasingly divisive issue for the country. Yushchenko, who supported Euro-Atlantic integration, emerged greatly weakened, while the Yanukovych-led PRU-Socialist-Communist governing coalition had little interest in convincing society of the importance of NATO membership. Some European members of the Alliance were disturbed by anti-NATO demonstrations that erupted against Sea Breeze military exercises in Crimea, the hardening of Russia’s position on Ukraine-NATO ties, and Yanukovych’s September 14, 2006, announcement to the Ukrainian-NATO Commission that Ukraine would suspend negotiations on membership, even though it would enhance cooperation with NATO.24 Days later, the Rada adopted a resolution supporting Yanukovych, stating that NATO membership would be decided only via national referendum.

In early 2007, public opinion polls indicated that most Ukrainians believed NATO was fomenting insecurity and showed opposition to joining the Alliance increasing to nearly two-thirds of the electorate.25
tient element of the pan-European security system,” adding that “Ukrainian and Russian officers, if they want, can familiarize themselves with the characteristics of these facilities and carry out verification.”27 But Prime Minister Yanukovych, who had put NATO on hold, openly warned that deployment near Ukraine could harm relations with Russia.

Since the September 2007 parliamentary elections, the new government has exerted little effort to build a national consensus on NATO. After Tymoshenko took over as prime minister once more in December, the new leadership—Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, and Rada Speaker Arseniy Yatsenyuk—again reversed Ukraine’s course on NATO membership, sending a letter (on January 16, 2008) to NATO requesting a MAP at the April 2008 Bucharest Summit. Predictably, the Russians responded with threats and another energy crisis, and when the Alliance convened in Bucharest, the Allies were divided and rejected MAPs for Ukraine (as well as Georgia). However, they “agreed that these countries will become members of NATO” at some point, adding that it was necessary to engage in “intensive engagement . . . at a high political level”28 to assess progress on their MAP applications.

In the aftermath of Bucharest, confusion reigned in Kyiv, Moscow, and among some NATO Allies as to what the Alliance really meant by the Bucharest Summit statement, particularly looking forward to NATO’s April 2009 60th anniversary summit. Some in Kyiv hyped the offer of eventual membership to mask their disappointment in not getting a MAP, while those in Moscow, who were opposed to further NATO enlargement, were energized to prevent Ukraine’s accession by dividing the Allies. Disunity in Ukraine was exacerbated by the events of August 2008 when Russia responded to Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s assertion of sovereignty over South Ossetia with a full-scale invasion and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s issuance of a doctrine claiming the existence of Russian “privileged interests”29 in the former Soviet space.

President Yushchenko (along with the three Baltic presidents and Poland’s Lech Kacynski) went to Tbilisi to render moral support and sought a Rada condemnation of the Russian invasion, but Tymoshenko instead criticized Yushchenko and broke from the coalition. Opposition leaders Yanukovych (PRU) and Symonenko (KPU) supported Russia and called for official Ukrainian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. After the government collapsed, Yushchenko again called for new elections, which will result in Ukraine’s fifth government since January 2005.

In sum, Ukraine remains schizophrenic and gridlocked. Some internal political forces, supported by external forces, want to pull Ukraine in a Euro-Atlantic direction, while others, also supported by external forces, want closer association with Russia and the CIS. Hence, Ukraine’s political leadership skids back and forth, contributing to internal instability and to the Ukrainian public’s confusion about NATO, in the process confirming legitimate questions in the minds of some NATO Allies about the depth of Ukraine’s commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration.

**NATO Influence**

At the outset of its existence as an independent nation, Ukraine faced daunting, even unique, defense reform challenges. With 47 million people, it was by far the largest of the former Soviet or Warsaw Pact states not to have inherited its own armed forces from the communist predecessor regime—it had to build a national security establishment from scratch. Lessons from transitions in states confronting less severe challenges suggest that continuity in leadership is necessary to stabilize and deepen defense reforms so they can take root. Yet this kind of continuity is precisely what Ukraine has lacked. The country has had nine defense ministers since independence, an average of one every 22 months (see table). As has already been seen, the deep cleavages over the country’s security orientation have been a major contributor to this instability. It should come as no surprise that the constant leadership changes have tended to retard defense reform and to contribute to politicization of the armed forces, turmoil in the ministry, and operational disasters.

The impact of this instability on defense reform is visible on a number of fronts, including the stop-and-go history of “Ukrainization” (replacing the Russian language and traditions of the military with Ukrainian ones), removal of corrupt officers,30 and decisions on defense production and procurement. Yet if internal and external pressures to move toward NATO membership have often been divisive and destabilizing, close military contact with the NATO countries through PFP and other mechanisms has nevertheless yielded a number of important defense reform benefits.

**Depoliticization.** Not the least important of these is the progressive depoliticization of the armed forces. In the early years, political leaders of all factions tried to use the military for partisan political advantage, as when Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetsky issued a memorandum urging members of the armed forces to vote for President Leonid Kravchuk in the 1994 presidential election.
A decade later, the norm had changed completely. When President Kuchma directed Defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk to order troops to support Kuchma’s chosen successor, Yanukovych, in the 2004 election, Marchuk refused. Kuchma fired Marchuk and reinstated Colonel General Oleksander Kuzmuk as minister, but to no avail, as Kuzmuk also refused to get the military involved in politics. Indeed, during the Orange Revolution at the end of 2004, Defense Minister Kuzmuk continued to hold the armed forces above politics, assuring demonstrators that the armed forces would not be used against the people, while his predecessor, Marchuk, also called on President Kuchma and Prime Minister Yanukovych to exercise good sense and ensure that there would be no bloodshed in Ukraine.

Civilianization. Simultaneously, after a series of fits and starts, Ukraine seems to have broken with the Soviet model of having a serving officer as minister of defense and settled instead into a pattern of civilian defense leadership. After Kuchma defeated Kravchuk for the presidency in 1994, he replaced Radetsky (the minister who had ordered military personnel to vote for Kravchuk) with Ukraine’s first civilian defense minister, Valerii Shmarov, in an attempt to gain control of the armed forces. But many military personnel lacked confidence in the civilian Shmarov, and the poor condition of the armed forces further contributed to his unpopular

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<th>Ukrainian Defense Ministers and Armed Forces</th>
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<tr>
<td>Defense Minister</td>
<td>Appointment</td>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>Size of Armed Forces*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel General Kostyantyn Morozov</td>
<td>August 1991</td>
<td>Oversees creation of Ukrainian armed forces; resigns over increasing Communist criticism</td>
<td>January 1, 1992:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ 900,000 total</td>
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<td>▪ 720,000 military</td>
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<td>▪ 180,000 civilian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel General Vitaliy Radetsky</td>
<td>December 1993</td>
<td>Slows “Ukrainization” and discourages political activities in armed forces</td>
<td>January 1, 2001:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ 415,850 total</td>
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<td>▪ 314,395 military (−57%)</td>
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<td>▪ 101,455 civilian (−43%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Valerii Shmarov</td>
<td>September 1994</td>
<td>First civilian; Kuchma appointment; continued military decline</td>
<td>January 1, 2003:</td>
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<td>▪ 390,015 total</td>
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<td>▪ 295,495 military (−6%)</td>
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<td>▪ 94,525 civilian (−7%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel General Oleksander Kuzmuk</td>
<td>June 1996</td>
<td>Forced to resign; lies about downing civilian airliner over Black Sea</td>
<td>January 1, 2001:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ 285,000 total</td>
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<td>▪ 210,000 military (−29%)</td>
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<td>▪ 75,000 civilian (−21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel General Volodymyr Shkidchenko</td>
<td>November 2001</td>
<td>Forced to resign; air show disaster and continued degradation of armed forces</td>
<td>January 1, 2008:</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>▪ 200,000 total</td>
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<td>▪ 152,000 military (−28%)</td>
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<td>▪ 48,000 civilian (−36%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yevhen Marchuk</td>
<td>June 2003</td>
<td>Second civilian; fired; refuses to order armed forces to vote for Yanukovych</td>
<td>January 1, 2005:</td>
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<td>▪ 285,000 total</td>
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<td>▪ 75,000 civilian (−21%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel General Oleksander Kuzmuk</td>
<td>September 2004</td>
<td>Return signals failed effort to politicize armed forces; calls for military neutrality in presidential election</td>
<td>January 1, 2006:</td>
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<td>▪ 139,000 total</td>
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<td>▪ 100,000 military (−43%)</td>
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<td>▪ 39,000 civilian (−43%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anatoliy Grytscenko</td>
<td>January 2005</td>
<td>Third civilian; stabilizes ministry; armed forces atrophy</td>
<td>January 1, 2007:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>▪ 200,000 total</td>
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<td>▪ 152,000 military (−28%)</td>
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<td>▪ 48,000 civilian (−36%)</td>
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ity. It was not until 2003 that another civilian was named to the position, the same Yevhen Marchuk who would be dismissed—and replaced by a general—for refusing to get the military involved in the 2004 election.

After the Orange Revolution, Yushchenko appointed Anatoliy Grytsenko as defense minister and Leonid Polyakov as first deputy minister. As former military officers with professional military educational experience in the United States and substantial exposure to Western models of defense management, both Grytsenko and Polyakov understood better than any of their predecessors what defense reforms and modernization tasks were necessary to enhance Ukraine’s interoperability with NATO. Under their mandate, the defense ministry exhibited signs of institutional improvement and friction with the General Staff moderated somewhat, although the armed forces continued to atrophy for want of resources. Grytsenko was succeeded as minister in December 2007 by Yuriy Yekhanurov, an economist with a background in industrial management, further solidifying the trend toward civilianization of the ministry.

Planning and Organization.

For the first decade, Ukraine’s force “planning” was nonexistent; underfunded defense budgets caused continuous “freefall” of the armed forces. It was only in November 2001 that Minister Volodymyr Shkidchenko introduced serious planning to the defense ministry. Shkidchenko had been the key author of Ukraine’s first real strategic document, State Program on Armed Forces Development and Reform, 2001–2005, calling for the transformation of Ukraine’s 310,000-man armed forces into a smaller force designed for limiting local conflicts and resolving emergencies on Ukraine’s territory. The country’s first comprehensive defense policy review, the Ukrainian Strategic Defence Review to 2015, was published in June 2003 on Yevhen Marchuk’s watch.

Improvement of the planning process at the strategic level was carried forward after the Orange Revolution, when, with NATO assistance, Deputy Minister Polyakov created a Defence Policy and Strategic Planning Department in the ministry that, for the first time, linked defense policy to plans. The influence of exposure to NATO was also evident in a series of organizational steps undertaken by Grytsenko and Polyakov. Based on lessons learned from participating in NATO expeditionary operations, Ukraine’s defense leaders reorganized the General Staff to fit assigned missions and to align the military command to NATO standards.

To rationalize the budget, Grytsenko subordinated the Department of Finance and the Department of Surplus Funds and Lands to himself. To retain and promote capable personnel, the Personnel Policy Directorate developed a personnel policy concept and built a database system to track English language–trained personnel—clearly something driven by recognition of the need to be able to work effectively with NATO forces. Finally, the General Staff formed a Joint Operational Command with responsibility to employ all combined armed task forces in Ukraine and overseas.

Challenges Remain

Notwithstanding the commendable and even remarkable advances that have been made, particularly considering the point from which the Ukrainian forces began in 1991, Ukrainian leaders are cognizant of how far they have to go before the country can function militarily on anything resembling a NATO level. The need for vastly improved operational capacity has repeatedly been highlighted by Ukrainian forces’ experience in operations with U.S. and other NATO forces. Ukraine needs to create more standing units, modernize equipment, and improve language skills, a point that was highlighted when a Ukrainian contingent in Iraq found itself under enemy fire and was unable to communicate in English with forward air controllers to request F–16 support. These shortfalls were recognized in the defense ministry’s 2006 and 2007 Target Plans for the armed forces, prepared in support of President Yushchenko’s February 2007 National Security Strategy of Ukraine, which stressed the need to improve interoperability under the ministry’s so-called NATO Action Plan.

The ministry’s main priorities were to reduce and reorganize the troops to better suit the threats faced by Ukraine. The most daunting challenges, however, would involve switching to an all-volunteer force by 2010 as mandated by the president, destroying surplus weapons and military equipment, updating and modernizing essential equipment, and harnessing technology to support Ukraine’s defense industry. Although Grytsenko placed a high priority on these issues, combat readiness continued to deteriorate because of chronic underfunding. In March 2007, Grytsenko noted that Ukraine’s first-line Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF) “would not be combat ready in one to two years when about 50 percent of the equipment will stop working.”

His options to solve the resources problem were limited by lack of funds. Although the law “On Defence of Ukraine” calls for the allocation of 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to defense, the defense ministry was consistently receiving only about half this amount or less between 2000 and 2005. As a result of these shortfalls, the ministry was not only unable...
to provide adequate resources for weapons repair and modernization for the JRRF, but declining operating funds also led to inadequate training for the force. Though the defense ministry had abandoned the practice of using outdated munitions for training after two major missile disasters in 2000 and 2001—including the downing of a Russian Tu-154 passenger aircraft over the Black Sea with a defective S–200 surface-to-air missile, killing all 78 aboard—Grytsenko was forced to resume this practice even for the most elite JRRF units in October 2006.

President Yushchenko’s mandate to move Ukraine to an all-volunteer force by 2010 also ran up against budget realities, ultimately becoming a political issue during the September 2007 parliamentary campaign, as Tymoshenko actually advocated accelerating the schedule to 2008. Grytsenko argued that this was impossible on the grounds that selecting appropriate personnel required a well-developed human resource policy, which simply did not exist. Despite the significant improvements in civilian oversight and management and in accountability and transparency during Grytsenko’s tenure, the constant need to accommodate ambitious plans to insufficient resources led to a steady decline in both the size and capabilities of the force during his tenure.

Grytsenko’s successor, Yury Yekhanurov, continues to face the same challenges that stymied his predecessors—to create an all-volunteer force, modernize its equipment, enhance its readiness, redress sociopolitical problems (such as inadequate housing), and prepare for NATO membership, all on a shoestring budget. Yekhanurov’s efforts to augment the 2008 defense budget, which was only 1 percent of GDP, unfortunately proved unsuccessful. Although the Russian invasion of Georgia has prompted plans for the addition of 2 billion hryvnias (approximately $375 million) in 2009 to upgrade existing and form new army units in the south and east, it remains to be seen if these plans will actually materialize.

External Environment Transformed

Domestic tensions between those Ukrainians who support closer ties to Russia and the rest of the CIS and those who favor integration with the EU and NATO have often resulted in Ukraine’s schizophrenic policies pulling in opposite directions. These internal pressures are aggravated and made more difficult to resolve by the profound transformation that has taken place in Ukraine’s external environment over the last decade.

A key element in this transformation is Ukraine’s increased strategic importance as an energy bridge. The country’s vulnerability to energy-related pressure, and the degree to which this vulnerability could exacerbate political instability, became evident in January 2006, when Gazprom, the world’s largest natural gas producer (half-owned by the Russian government), cut off gas supplies to Ukraine and then restored them subject to a doubling of the price. Since roughly 75 percent of Russian gas exports to Europe flows through Ukrainian pipelines, the cutoff affected not only Ukraine but its EU neighbors as well. Ukraine, which needs to meet its own domestic requirements, was caught between the EU and Russia, both of whom have an interest in safe transit of gas through Ukraine. When Prime Minister Yury Yekhanurov agreed to pay Russia nearly double the price it had previously paid for gas ($130 per thousand cubic meters, still less than half the European market price of $315), the Rada flexed its new constitutional powers, dismissed the government, and renewed political instability ensued.

These problems resurfaced in December 2007 when Tymoshenko took over as prime minister for the second time and moved to raise the pipeline transit fees charged to Gazprom. Gazprom responded by demanding repayment of $1.5 billion in debt and threatening to cut Ukraine’s domestic natural gas supply by 25 percent. At the same time, Russia sought to drive a wedge between Ukraine and the EU countries by reassuring Europeans that they would not suffer shortages as a result of Russian action against Ukraine. In March, Gazprom claimed that it had not received its money and cut supplies of Russian gas by 25 percent, and then by another 25 percent a day later. After Ukraine threatened to reduce gas deliveries to Europe, Russia and Gazprom, not wanting to further harm relations with the West, restored deliveries and signed an agreement holding prices steady at $179 per thousand cubic meters through 2008. This agreement, however, only deferred the issue. At the end of 2008, with Ukrainian elections looming, Prime Minister Tymoshenko was again in Moscow to negotiate the size of its debt (which Russia claims to be $2.4 billion in arrears) and 2009 price of gas (which Russia threatens to raise to more than $400 per thousand cubic meters).

How Ukraine ultimately resolves its internal debate over its strategic alignment is further complicated by the fact that the Euro-Atlantic community is itself divided over what it wants for Ukraine.
Ukrainians, who had argued that joining the relatively unpopular NATO would provide a pathway to membership in the much more popular EU. The same message of divisions among the Euro-Atlantic countries was further driven home in April 2008, when President George W. Bush failed to get the Bucharest NATO Summit to support Ukraine’s bid for a Membership Action Plan. The EU’s recent Stabilization and Accession Agreement (SAA) with Ukraine, in marked contrast to its SAAs with the Balkan states, offers no prospect for future membership. At the December 2–3, 2008, NATO Foreign Ministers session, NATO reaffirmed the Bucharest Summit decision, made note of Ukraine’s progress, but added that significant work remained; hence, it did not grant Ukraine a MAP. The foreign ministers, though, did amend the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, and agreed to provide further assistance to Ukraine, develop Annual National Programs to advance reforms, and augment the NATO liaison office in Kyiv.⁹

Last, but far from least, the strategic position of Ukraine’s powerful Russian neighbor to the north and east has undergone a transformation of its own. Given the fundamental sympathy for Russia felt by much of Ukraine’s population, Moscow’s renewed credibility as a major power would in itself tend to tug Ukraine in a Eurasian direction. In addition, however, Russia has become much more assertive and intrusive, thanks in part to the consolidation of autocratic power under Vladimir Putin as well as the strong Russian reaction to NATO enlargement, missile defense, and other perceived manifestations of Western aggrandizement.

The dilemma of how to deal with a resurgent Russia was crystallized by Moscow’s August 2008 invasion of Georgia. The invasion forced Ukrainian politicians to focus on the defense sector and reassess the country’s Military Doctrine, but did little to resolve the tension between Euro-Atlanticists and Eurasianists in the Ukrainian political elite. While the current government has responded by seeking to strengthen defense capabilities, including the deployment of air defense units in the Crimea and along the eastern border with Russia,⁵⁹ others feel the need to placate Russia.

Ukraine’s transformed external environment has aggravated its internal problems, which in turn have further complicated its external problems. Not only has the dichotomy between eastern autocratic and western democratic neighbors increased, so too has their willingness to meddle in Ukraine’s politics.

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Ukraine’s increased strategic importance as a natural gas bridge for both the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian communities combined with Russia’s renewed assertiveness in other former Soviet republics has resulted in increasing equivocation within NATO and the EU and exacerbated internal problems for Ukraine.

**The Challenge Ahead**

The prospects for Ukrainian membership in Euro-Atlantic structures thus remain uncertain, in part because of Russia’s opposition, in part because of ambivalence among NATO and EU members, and in part because of divisions within Ukraine itself. Given the cross-cutting pressures, it is understandable that Ukraine’s political leaders and society have yet to make a clear strategic choice. Ukraine cannot at this point make a firm decision in favor of Euro-Atlantic integration given Russia’s opposition—reinforced by periodic flexing of its military and economic muscle—and the Euro-Atlantic community’s own failure to clarify its objectives for Ukraine.

So where does Ukraine stand? On the positive side, in marked contrast to the autocracies that continue to rule most of the other former Soviet states, Ukraine has resoundingly shown that it prefers Euro-Atlantic-style democracy, as evidenced by repeated free and fair elections followed by orderly transfer of power between rival parties, a thriving open media, and vibrant institutions of civil society. On the negative side, Ukraine’s external environment has been transformed. During the 1990s, Russia was weak and more cooperative; now it is more competitive. The more the United States and some Allies promote NATO accession, the more Russia interferes, and the more the Ukrainian government is destabilized, further undermining its Euro-Atlantic options.

The challenge for the United States is to nurture Ukraine’s political stability and keep its Euro-Atlantic options open. This is difficult because the EU, which enjoys significantly greater Ukrainian domestic support, has clearly indicated that it is not yet ready for Ukraine. While Allies disagree over the timing of Ukraine’s MAP accession, due in part to the low popular support the Alliance enjoys within Ukraine, the April 2008 Bucharest Summit did provide a long-term membership horizon reiterated at the December 2008 foreign ministerial. But government stability is needed in Kyiv to reassure many skeptical European Allies and to build confidence among Ukrainian society.

Ukraine needs time to make a strategic choice that can muster a popular consensus within the country. At this point, assertive U.S. promotion of Ukrainian accession to NATO is counterproductive: it engenders divisiveness with some Allies, encourages Russian interference, and, most importantly, shifts Ukraine’s internal politics in an undesirable direction,
strengthening the hand of the Eurasianists at the expense of Euro-Atlanticists. The United States needs to foster a Euro-Atlantic orientation in Ukraine, but should exercise restraint in doing so. Thus, the United States should stress the language of the Bucharest Summit and promote NATO cooperation with Ukraine’s military independent of the issue of membership. Such cooperation has had positive effects on Ukrainian military reform, not only making the country a more credible candidate for eventual Alliance membership but also generating a constituency within Ukraine’s elite that is receptive to the Euro-Atlantic connection.

To achieve a Ukrainian political consensus on strategic direction, those leaders who favor Euro-Atlantic integration will have to navigate a number of upcoming challenges. First, since independence, the victorious coalitions and centrist opposition political parties have been unable to lay out a clear and politically compelling strategic rationale for membership in NATO or the EU. They seem to have thought that they could lead the country to membership and that consensus support would be generated as a result. If so, it clearly has not worked.

Second, since the Orange Revolution, even those elements that favor Euro-Atlantic integration have been more focused on the institutional power struggle between president and prime minister—a struggle contributing to chronic instability and reversals of policy direction—than on resolving the fundamental issue of the country’s strategic orientation. This instability, of course, further weakens the confidence in many NATO/EU capitals that Ukraine is a suitable candidate for membership.

Third, Kyiv needs to coordinate its outreach to its western EU neighbors—Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania—to promote a more effective, open EU policy toward Ukraine.

For its part, the Obama administration needs to recognize that its influence is limited, that it needs to act with restraint, and that it must closely consult with Allies. The United States is not an EU member, and many members see the U.S. promotion of Ukraine’s membership as interference. Hence, the United States should encourage Ukraine’s political leaders to follow the “non-aligned” EU example of Finland as it attempts to navigate between its Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian neighbors. This means the United States should openly support Ukraine’s place in the Euro-Atlantic community by actively promoting its military ties with the Alliance and EU neighbors. By placing a priority on nurturing Ukraine’s political stability, the United States will enhance its membership prospects if society ultimately decides to make a Euro-Atlantic choice.

Notes
1. Political Commentary, no. 1 (31), January 2006, International Center for Policy Studies, Kyiv. 4. The three other parties are former Prime Minister (and failed presidential candidate) Viktor Yanukovich’s Party of Regions with 186 seats, Oleksandr Moroz’s Socialist Party of Ukraine with 33 seats, and Petro Symonenko’s Communist Party of Ukraine with 21 seats.
5. Roman Woronowycz, “Ukrainian Troops Not Yet Ready to Serve As Peacekeepers in Kosovo,” The Ukrainian Weekly 67, no. 26 (June 27, 1999).
6. Ibid. Lieutenant Colonel Krivchenko noted that NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia provided Ukraine the opportunity “to raise the expertise of veterans and new recruits. . . .” [adding] a helicopter squad gets a month of training in two-to-three days in Kosovo.”
17. In fall 2000, journalist Georgiy Gongadze, who had been critical of the government, was brutally murdered. Reports of evidence implicating former President Kuchma, former Interior Minister Yuriy Kravchenko, and other Interior Ministry officers have circulated widely. Taras Kuzio has written on this; see “New Evidence of High-Level Involvement in Politically Motivated Murders in Ukraine,” The Ukrainian Weekly 71, no. 40 (October 5, 2003), and “Closing the Books on the Gongadze Case,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, no. 42 (March 2, 2005).
28 In February 2007, 64.1 percent of the population was opposed to NATO entry, up from 61.8 percent in November 2006, and 60 percent in August. Interfax-Ukr, Kyiv, March 12, 2007.
36 See Ukrajyna Moloda (Kyiv), March 21, 2002 (FIBS-SOV-2002-0252), General of the Army Radetsky is now Commandant of the National Defence Academy.
37 Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 1, 1994, 7.
40 In early 2006, Defense Minister Grytsenko claimed the General Staff rearrangement “will enable us to speed up integrationist processes in the Ukrainian Army.” Tatiana Ivchenko, “Kyiv Expects an Invitation to Join NATO by Late Spring,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), March 14, 2006. To accomplish this, the General Staff’s Main Directorate of Personnel (J1) now included the former Directorate for Welfare Policy and Social Support. It also established a Main Intelligence Directorate (J2) and Joint Support Forces, responsible for management of logistics within the armed forces, at the end of 2006, with plans to create a Support Forces Command (J4) by the end of 2008. The Main Operations Directorate (J5) was now tasked to develop plans to deploy armed forces and new training policies. The defense ministry also made efforts to improve the organizational structure and personnel strength of the Main Directorate for Defence Planning (J5). See figures 3.18, 3.19, and 3.20 in White Book 2005: Defense Policy of Ukraine (Kyiv: Ministry of Defence, 2006), 38–40, and annex 4, figure 2, White Book 2006, 89.
41 Interview with Jim Greene, Head of NATO Liaison Office, Kyiv, in Washington, DC, January 3, 2008.
43 Ukraine withdrew its contingent, but has provided a new group of 45 Ukrainians to train police and border troops in Iraq. Personal interview with senior defense official, Kyiv, April 6, 2005.
44 He also noted that within the next 5 years most of the air force’s fighter aircraft, missiles, and launch systems will be obsolete and that more than 60 percent of the antiaircraft artillery had been in use for more than 20 years. See “Ukraine’s Armed Forces: Whither Reforms?” ICPS Newsletter, No. 10 (357), March 19, 2007. These problems were evident even during Defense Minister Marchuk’s tenure in 2003–2004, when roughly 60 percent of the armored personnel carriers on their way to participate in peacekeeping operations broke down.
45 “Training plans for 2006 and 2007 called for 400 trained crews to fly 35,000 hours, maintaining an annual minimum-maximum of 90 to 120 flight hours. In reality, fuel supplies of only 40 percent meant that JRRF pilots averaged only 70 hours in 2006, and Main Defense Forces pilots only 23 hours. See “Army: General Overview of the Current Situation in the Ukrainian Armed Forces,” Defense Express (Kyiv), November 1, 2007.
46 The armed forces had been funded at roughly 50 percent of the minimal required funding during 2000–2002 (Ukrainian hryvnyas [UAH] 2.08 to 3.07 billion), and up to 60 to 70 percent during 2003–2004 (UAH 4.17 to 5.16 billion). In 2005, personnel costs alone consumed 81.5 percent of the defense budget, leaving only 12 percent for training and modernization, and 6.5 percent for weapons, equipment, and infrastructure. For the first time in 2005, its UAH 6.01 billion allocation almost met the full appropriation. See chapter 10, “Funding of the Armed Forces,” White Book 2005, 99–100. According to Ivan Marko, director of the defense ministry finance department, the army was only allocated 67 percent of the total planned budget as of September 18, 2006. Instead of proportional distributions, 40 percent of the budget was allocated in the fourth quarter, and roughly UAH 500 million was unable to be spent. In addition, the UAH 840 million from the sale of military camps and UAH 176 million from military property never materialized. See Valentin Badrak, “Ukrainian Armed Forces: Budget Turmoil,” Zerkalo Nедели 36, no. 645 (September 29, 2006), available at <www.nn.ua/2000/2000/54993>. Although the 2007 defense budget allocated UAH 9.13 billion (1.33 percent GDP), in reality the defense ministry received only UAH 8.071 billion (1.18 percent GDP). See annex 1, “Defense Ministry Budget Implementation 2007,” White Book 2007, 103.
47 Funds dispersed for JRRF training were only 55.6 percent of the 2005 plan, 55.5 percent for 2006, and only 48.9 percent for 2007. See table 4-1, White Book 2007, 42.
48 Ibid. For example, all of Ukraine’s MIG-29 8–73 air-to-air missiles and 95 percent of the ground-to-air (Strela and Igla) antiaircraft missiles had expired in 2003. At the end of 2006, 60 percent of the Mi-24 helicopters and 32 percent of the Mi-8s were depleted.
49 Total force strength declined to 221,000 (165,000 military and 56,000 civilian) at the end of 2006, and 200,000 (152,000 military and 48,000 civilian) at the end of 2007. See Petro V. Kanana, “Ukraine and NATO Membership,” presentation at Washington, DC, Reagan Center Conference, October 17–18, 2006.
52 Final Communiqué, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels. NATO Press Release (2008/153), December 5, 2008, paras. 18–19.
53 According to Deputy Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Ihor Romanenko, a new air defense and antiaircraft missile regiment had been formed at the end of 2007 in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, adding that new regiments needed to be created on the left bank of the Dnieper. See Fedir Oryshchuk, Kyiv Post, August 21, 2008.

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