CHINA’S GROWING ROLE IN UN PEACEKEEPING

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CHINA’S GROWING ROLE IN UN PEACEKEEPING

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Over the past twenty years China has become an active participant in UN peacekeeping, a development that will benefit the international community. Beijing has the capacity to expand its contributions further and should be encouraged to do so. China’s approach to peacekeeping has evolved considerably since it assumed its UN Security Council (UNSC) seat in 1971, when it rejected the entire concept of peacekeeping. Now, with over 2,000 peacekeepers serving in ten UN peacekeeping operations worldwide, China’s motivations for supporting and participating in peacekeeping have led it to adopt a case-by-case approach that balances those motivations against its traditional adherence to non-intervention. This pragmatic policy shift paves the way for China to provide much-needed personnel as well as political support and momentum for peacekeeping at a time when both conflicts and peacekeeping operations are becoming more complex. China’s involvement also further binds it to the international system.

Demand for blue helmets far outpaces supply, and shows no sign of abating. Concurrent to the sharp increase in peacekeeping missions since the end of the Cold War, Western countries have been withdrawing or reducing their commitments. While continuing to provide robust financial support to UN peacekeeping, they send far fewer personnel. Although China’s financial support for peacekeeping remains modest, it is now the second largest provider of peacekeepers among the five permanent members of the UNSC. While it does not currently provide combat troops, its provision of civilian police, military observers, engineering battalions and medical units fills a key gap and is important to the viability and success of UN peacekeeping operations.

China’s increasing role reflects changed foreign policy priorities as well as pragmatic considerations. Multilateralism has become central to China’s efforts to project its influence abroad, pursue its interests and cultivate its image as a “responsible great power”. Participation in peacekeeping serves these ends as a relatively low-cost way of demonstrating commitment to the UN and to international peace and security. It has also served to counter fears of China’s growing power – the “China threat” – by deploying military personnel for peaceful ends.

While China’s expanded role in peacekeeping is welcomed by the UN and many countries, there are some concerns. China’s support for problem regimes in the developing world has fed suspicions that Chinese peacekeeping is primarily motivated by economic interests. In fact, China’s economic and peacekeeping decision-making tracks operate separately, and tensions between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), military and economic actors ensure that there is still no overall strategic approach to peacekeeping. Another concern is that in several cases, China has sent peacekeepers only after giving support to actors that aggravated the situation. While true of all major powers, meaningful political support for peacekeeping should involve a more strategic approach to promoting stability earlier on.

At the same time, China’s relationships with difficult regimes may well benefit UN peacekeeping efforts. China can bring to the table valuable political capital and economic leverage, in some cases even encouraging host countries to consent to peacekeeping operations, as seen in Sudan. The exposure China gains to conflict situations and to UN working methods through peacekeeping operations is also likely to encourage it to become more active in conflict resolution in the future.

Beijing is cautiously considering calls by the UN and many Western countries, including the U.S., UK, Canada, Norway, France and Sweden, to increase its contribution to peacekeeping. While China benefits from its involvement in peacekeeping, particularly in terms of helping its military and police professionalise, train and gain valuable field experience, there are several constraints on its capacity to do more. Although willing to shoulder more of the responsibilities for international peace and security, it worries about overstepping the boundary between responsible and threatening. There are also practical difficulties in training personnel, particularly in the necessary language skills. A further limitation is the division along different branches of the Chinese government on the issue of peacekeeping and the extent of Chinese engagement.
Overall, China’s growing role is helping to fill the growing shortfall in capacity and resources. The lack of available and qualified police for peacekeeping is one area in which China is already making a significant contribution. As a low-cost and effective means of contributing to international peace and stability, China should be encouraged to continue increasing its participation in peacekeeping, and the UN and Western countries should continue to provide support to and encourage China in its peacekeeping efforts.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

**To the Government of the People’s Republic of China:**

1. Ensure political support to UN peacekeeping, by playing a more active role in responding to contemporary peacekeeping challenges, both in terms of the continuing development of UN peacekeeping doctrine in the Security Council and the development and review of specific UN peacekeeping mandates.

2. Take a more strategic rather than reactive approach to peacekeeping on the Security Council, supporting earlier and more effective intervention.

3. Increase significantly financial, material and personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping.

4. Enhance regional and international cooperation and sharing of expertise on peacekeeping training for police, combat troops and non-combat troops, including with regard to language training.

5. Encourage cooperation and joint programming between the Civilian Peacekeeping Police Training Centre in Langfang and the People’s Liberation Army Peacekeeping Training Centre in Huairou.

6. Establish a dedicated peacekeeping affairs office under the bureau of international organisations in the MFA for the purpose of developing and coordinating peacekeeping policy, and managing communication between relevant government bodies and between Beijing and the permanent mission to the UN in New York.

**To the United Nations Secretariat:**

7. Identify gaps or problems in peacekeeping missions that China’s troop deployments or material contributions can solve, as its deployment of non-combat units has already done.

8. Provide technical assistance to enhance Chinese peacekeeping training and capacity, and identify potential bilateral partners to provide such assistance.

9. Encourage the application of qualified Chinese military, police and civilian officials for positions at all levels in UN peacekeeping missions and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

10. To United Nations Member States:

    11. Western member states should reaffirm political and practical commitments to peacekeeping to bring them into line with financial commitments, paying particular attention to troop and police contributions, leading by example in their encouragement of China’s efforts.

    12. Publicly ask China to increase its military and police personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping operations.

    13. Consult regularly with China at the highest level on conflict situations and areas of shared strategic concern, and ways in which peacekeeping missions can achieve common goals in those areas.

    14. Enhance peacekeeping-related assistance to China, including military-to-military exchanges and language training programs for peacekeeping personnel.

**Beijing/New York/Brussels, 17 April 2009**
I. INTRODUCTION

Upon assuming its seat in the UN Security Council in 1971, the People’s Republic of China was firmly opposed to all peacekeeping actions on the basis that they constituted interference in countries’ internal affairs, violated state sovereignty, and were nothing more than manifestations of great power politics. Since 1989, however, China has sent more than 10,000 peacekeepers on 22 peacekeeping missions, with a rapid surge taking place in the past six years. In 2000, China deployed fewer than 100 peacekeepers, but the years thereafter have seen a twenty-fold increase. China currently has over 2,000 personnel in the field serving in UN peacekeeping operations, second to France among the five permanent members (P-5) of the Security Council and fourteenth among 119 troop-contributing countries. Its political support for UN peacekeeping missions has also evolved considerably, and its previous staunch adherence to non-interference has ceded considerable ground to a pragmatic, interest-driven approach.

China’s growing contributions are taking place in an increasingly complex and challenging environment for peacekeeping. UN peacekeeping has expanded significantly in the last eight years, with expenditures ballooning from $2 billion to nearly $8 billion per year. The demand for peacekeeping missions continues to grow. At the end of 2008 the Security Council authorised 3,000 extra peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), the largest peacekeeping operation currently deployed, and at the beginning of 2009 it approved a new mission in Chad (MINURCAT). Even as the African Union (AU)-UN hybrid mission for Darfur is still in deployment phase and does not have enough air support to carry out its mandate, the Security Council is considering authorising a 28,000-strong mission for Somalia.

Most critically, the UN has had to carry out peacekeeping in extremely challenging security environments. Since the end of the Cold War, as the nature and complexities of conflicts have changed, the strategic context for UN peacekeeping has also changed. In some cases, peacekeeping operations deploy where conflicts are still ongoing or peace is fragile, state authority is weak, and consent of the host government is either ambivalent or absent. Consequent reform of the UN peacekeeping system has attempted to address the inability of peacekeepers to effectively respond, with the Security Council increasingly giving UN peacekeeping operations robust mandates that allow peacekeepers to take all necessary action to protect civilians.

However, as seen with the crisis in eastern Congo in autumn 2008, the capacity of UN missions to respond to violence is limited, and fears of failure have prompted both the Security Council and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to undertake reviews of UN peacekeeping. Under-Secretary-General Alain Le Roy has said that 2009 will be a critical year for peacekeeping and that DPKO is today “operating far above the pace set by the Brahimi report of one deployment per year”. With some 112,000 field personnel serving in eighteen military deployments and numerous peacebuilding and political missions, the world body is struggling with “sheer overstretched”, as the gap widens between supply and demand, both for numbers and types of personnel.

Le Roy also noted the discrepancy in troop commitments across member states, and that DPKO continues to rely on a small group of countries for the bulk of troop contributions. “With increasing demands for ever more robust mandates, can the organisation man-
Traditional peacekeeping, complex peacekeeping, and peace enforcement

- Traditional peacekeeping

Traditional UN peacekeeping operations are deployed as an interim measure to help manage a conflict and create conditions in which the negotiation of a lasting settlement can proceed. The tasks assigned to traditional peacekeeping operations are essentially military in character and limited to monitoring, supervising and verifying ceasefires and early stage peace agreements, primarily in inter-state conflicts. Seen as a complement to diplomatic peacemaking, traditional peacekeeping operations are useful in helping to restore peace when the political process already has momentum. Traditional peacekeeping operations do not normally play a direct role in political efforts to resolve a conflict, which must be played by other actors such as bilateral partners to the parties, regional organisations or even UN special envoys. As a result, some traditional peacekeeping operations are deployed for decades before a lasting political settlement is reached between the parties.

China overcame its initial opposition to traditional peacekeeping and began to support such missions in the late 1980s, asserting that peacekeeping operations must be carried out under the authorisation and guidance of the Security Council (see Section II.D). The traditional model of peacekeeping, though rarely used in current practice, is closest to the Chinese conception of peacekeeping. Chinese official policy is based upon the three basic underlying principles of traditional peacekeeping: voluntary consent of all parties to the conflict to the mission’s activities; the impartiality and neutrality of the peacekeepers; and the minimum use of force, only as a last resort or in self-defence. However, in practice, rather than being restricted by those principles, it considers each mission on a case-by-case basis (see Section IV).

- Multi-dimensional peacekeeping

The transformation of the international environment since the end of the Cold War has given rise to a new generation of “multi-dimensional” UN peacekeeping operations. These operations typically deploy in the aftermath of violent internal conflict and may employ a mix of military, police and civilian capabilities to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement.

The core functions of a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation extend beyond traditional peacekeeping to include tasks such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, organising and supervising elections, assisting in the implementation of constitutional or judicial reform, restructuring and reforming the security sector and providing humanitarian relief. These operations make up the majority of the new generation of peacekeeping operations, routinely containing elements from Chapter VII, including “taking necessary action” to protect civilians.

China has expressed discomfort with the principle of complex or multi-dimensional peacekeeping. The Chinese permanent representative to the UN routinely warns that these types of peacekeeping missions should not be taken as a precedent, but rather considered as exceptions to the limits of traditional peacekeeping. However, in practice, China has not only supported but also contributed to multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions, including UNAMID (Darfur), UNMIS (Sudan) and MONUC (Democratic Republic of Congo). And despite its views on the importance of state sovereignty, China has supported and participated in transitional administrations, such as MINUSTAH (Haiti). (See Section II.E.1.)

- Peace enforcement

Peace enforcement involves the application, with the Security Council authorisation, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorised to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council

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7 Alain Le Roy, speech before the General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping, meetings 206 and 207, 24 February 2009.
9 Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2008), p. 120.

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has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security Council may use, where appropriate, regional organisations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority.

China’s position on peace enforcement operations shows a similar dissonance between rhetoric and practice as seen with multi-dimensional peacekeeping. While Chinese policy elites have expressed considerable concern over the West’s “new interventionism” in Kosovo and Iraq, China’s actual position on peace enforcement operations has been far more nuanced and pragmatic. It supported the resolutions authorising IFOR and KFOR in Bosnia and peace enforcement operations in Somalia in the early 1990s. Although it opposed the first Gulf War, China abstained and allowed Resolution 678, authorising member states to use all necessary means to restore international peace and security after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, to pass. Despite its opposition to intervention in Kosovo and damage to its embassy in Belgrade, China has supported every operation in Kosovo since, including peace enforcement operations (see Section IV.B).

II. CHINA’S CHANGING ATTITUDE

A. PRE-1971: CONDEMNATION

In the years before the Chinese seat at the UN was handed over from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China, Beijing expressed strong opposition to all peacekeeping operations and acrimony toward the UN. China viewed the UN primarily as an instrument for the U.S. and USSR to expand their respective Cold War spheres of influence. It harboured a special distrust of the UN ever since the 1951 Korean War, where there were direct clashes between Chinese and UN forces, and the General Assembly adopted a resolution branding China an “aggressor”. Condemnation of UN activities peaked in 1965: in addition to several statements disparaging the organisation that year, a government publication termed the General Assembly’s establishment of the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations a plot by the U.S. to “convert the United Nations into a US-controlled headquarters of international gendarmes to suppress and stamp out the revolutionary struggles of the world’s people”. Beijing’s objections to international interventions have a long history and remain an important element of Chinese foreign policy today. After coming to power in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party’s foreign policy promoted the concept of “peaceful coexistence”, based on five principles, including non-interference in

12 Then Foreign Minister Chen Yi stated at a press conference, “The United Nations has long been controlled by the United States and has today become a place where two big powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, conduct political transactions. This state of affairs has not changed although dozens of Afro-Asian and peace loving countries have made no small amount of efforts in the United Nations. China need not take part in such a United Nations”. Peking Review, no. 3 (1965), pp. 11-12.

13 The special committee was established by the General Assembly on 18 February 1965 to conduct a comprehensive review of all issues relating to peacekeeping. It reports to the General Assembly on its work through the Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization) and comprises 124 member states, mostly past or current contributors of peacekeeping operations. Other member states, as well as the European Union (European Commission), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), participate as observers. “UN General Assembly and Peacekeeping”, United Nations, at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ctte/CTTEE.htm.

14 The article continued that UN peacekeeping operations until then had always “protected the interests of imperialism and undermined the efforts of the peoples to win freedom and independence”. Peking Review, no. 10 (1965), p. 15.
the internal affairs of other states and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty.\footnote{The three remaining principles of the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” (和平共处五项原则) are mutual non-aggression, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceable co-existence with other countries, regardless of political system.} While these five principles were subordinated to Mao Zedong’s support for revolutionary insurgencies in the 1960s and 1970s, with the Deng Xiaoping era, Beijing refocused on the principles of non-interference and respect for state sovereignty. Deng exemplified Chinese strategic thinking when he urged the country to “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capabilities and hide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership”.\footnote{At a Security Council meeting discussing the deployment of the UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II) to the Suez Canal on 25 October 1973, China’s then ambassador to the UN, Huang Hua, stated that China was “not in a position to veto the dispatch of peacekeeping forces, China’s representative to the UN, Huang Hua, stated that China was “not in a position to veto the draft resolution” because of the “requests repeatedly made by the victims of aggression”. Kim, China, the United Nations and World Order, op. cit., p. 241. China did exercise its veto twice during this period for non-Taiwan related matters, on 25 August 1972 to block Bangladesh’s membership of the UN, and on 10 September 1972, together with the USSR, to block amendments to a resolution condemning the violation of the 1967 ceasefire in the Middle East. Neither veto involved peacekeeping matters.}

Chinese reluctance to be seen to criticize or interfere has been reinforced by China’s view of itself as a victim of hegemonic predation by stronger colonial powers over the past century and a half, a period termed by Chinese historians as the 150 years of invasion, humiliation and loss of sovereignty.\footnote{Orville Schell, “China reluctant to lead”, YaleGlobal, 11 March 2009.} The resulting aversion to intervention persists to this day as a potent force in both popular consciousness and the mindset of policymakers. In the view of many Chinese policymakers, if they were to actively censure other countries, would that not be an invitation for other countries to intrude on Chinese affairs?\footnote{Ibid.} With the exception of issues involving Taiwan,\footnote{22 China chose to abstain or simply not participate in voting, thereby allowing Security Council resolutions to go forward. It was during this time that China created a “fifth voting style” whereby it would be present for – but not participate in – the vote. The practice, which continued into the 1980s,\footnote{23 At a Security Council meeting discussing the dispatch of the UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II) on 25 October 1973, after registering China’s continued opposition to the dispatch of peacekeeping forces, China’s representative to the UN, Huang Hua, stated that China was “not in a position to veto the draft resolution” because of the “requests repeatedly made by the victims of aggression”. Kim, China, the United Nations and World Order, op. cit., p. 241. China did exercise its veto twice during this period for non-Taiwan related matters, on 25 August 1972 to block Bangladesh’s membership of the UN, and on 10 September 1972, together with the USSR, to block amendments to a resolution condemning the violation of the 1967 ceasefire in the Middle East. Neither veto involved peacekeeping matters.} China chose to abstain or simply not participate in voting, thereby allowing Security Council resolutions to go forward. It was during this time that China created a “fifth voting style” whereby it would be present for – but not participate in – the vote. The practice, which continued into the 1980s,\footnote{24 There are usually four types of voting behaviours in the UN Security Council: (1) voting for, (2) voting against, (3) abstention and (4) being absent and refusing to participate in voting. China, however, would be present during the UNSC voting process but not participate in the vote.《中国重返联合国之初》[“The Early Days after China’s Return to the UN”], 《中国新闻周刊》[China News Week], 19 September 2005, at www.chinanewsweek.com.cn/2005-09-25/1/6364.html. 《中华人民共和国史稿》[Study of Modern China], vol. 13, no. 6 (November 2006). China identified itself with the developing world by evoking common historical experiences and similarity of views about UN peacekeeping operations as an act of superpower “power politics”, a pretext deployed to justify U.S. or Soviet intervention in the affairs of small states. See Yeshi Choedon, “China’s Stand on UN Peacekeeping Operations: Changing Priorities of Foreign Policy”, China Report, vol. 41, no. 1 (2005), pp. 39-57; and Pang Zhongying, “China’s changing attitude to UN peacekeeping”, International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, no. 1 (Spring 2005), p. 88.}

B. 1971-1980: OPPOSITION AND NON-PARTICIPATION

Upon joining the UN in 1971, China was largely inactive in peacekeeping, still condemning peacekeeping operations\footnote{When attending its first budgetary review meeting in the UN on 9 October 1972, China’s representative said, in reference to UN peacekeeping, “The Chinese delegate opposes the expenditures for this item in the UN, we will also not assume any responsibilities”. 钟龙彪 [Zhong Longhu], 王俊 [Wang Jun] 《中国对联合国维和行动的认得与参与》 [“China’s Understanding of and Participation in UN Peacekeeping”], 当代中国史研究 [Study of Modern China], vol. 13, no. 6 (November 2006).} and refusing to contribute.\footnote{25 Yun He, “China’s Changing Policy on Peacekeeping Operations”, Institute for Security & Development Policy, Asia Paper, July 2007.} In addition to having a closed-door policy, China was embroiled in the Cultural Revolution, and to a certain extent, felt indebted to other developing countries for their help in restoring its seat at the UN.\footnote{25 Yun He, “China’s Changing Policy on Peacekeeping Operations”, Institute for Security & Development Policy, Asia Paper, July 2007.} More importantly, China saw itself as ideologically aligned with the Third World, opposed to Western imperialism and colonialism, and a defender of the Third World nationalist movements that had rolled across Asia and Africa. It was therefore strongly opposed to any third party actions – including peacekeeping – within newly independent countries, arguing that they constituted interference in internal affairs and violated their state sovereignty and territorial integrity.

With the exception of issues involving Taiwan, China chose to abstain or simply not participate in voting, thereby allowing Security Council resolutions to go forward. It was during this time that China created a “fifth voting style” whereby it would be present for – but not participate in – the vote. The practice, which continued into the 1980s,\footnote{24 There are usually four types of voting behaviours in the UN Security Council: (1) voting for, (2) voting against, (3) abstention and (4) being absent and refusing to participate in voting. China, however, would be present during the UNSC voting process but not participate in the vote.《中国重返联合国之初》[“The Early Days after China’s Return to the UN”], 《中国新闻周刊》[China News Week], 19 September 2005, at www.chinanewsweek.com.cn/2005-09-25/1/6364.html.} allowed it to honour the
principle of non-interference and maintain good relations with developing countries. This behaviour was also a precursor to its current practice of abstaining on select Security Council votes.  


In the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping’s opening and reform policy led to a significant foreign policy shift. China introduced its “independent foreign policy of peace”, marking the abandonment of its ideological struggle with the West and prioritising peaceful relations with the world. It began to re-evaluate the UN’s importance in its foreign policy, and concluded that it would benefit from participating in global and regional institutions, as they facilitated a favourable international environment for its economic development. China joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and began to play a limited role in peacekeeping, offering some political and financial support, although it did not offer peacekeepers for another decade.

Its first declaration of support for a UN peacekeeping operation was a vote in favour of Security Council Resolution 495 authorising the extension of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1981. Prior to the vote, the Chinese representative declared, in consideration of “the changes in the international arena and the evolution of the role of UN peacekeeping operations”: “From now on, the Chinese government will actively consider and support such UN peacekeeping operations as are conducive to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the preservation of the sovereignty and independ-

26 China abstains from selected Security Council votes, allowing them to pass, but providing reasons for its refusal to endorse the resolution. Three significant resolutions in which China abstained were Security Council Resolution 929, which established the mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), Resolution 940 establishing the U.S.-led multinational force in Haiti and Resolution 1706 expanding the mandate for the mission in Darfur.

The independent foreign policy of peace (独立自主的和平外交政策, duli zizhu de heping waijiao zhengce) was adopted during the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. As a China analyst noted, “‘Peace’ means that China began to formulate its foreign policy from the viewpoint of whether it is beneficial to international and regional peace, instead of the viewpoint of pursuing military superiority, while ‘independence’ means that China began to formulate its foreign policy according to its national interests and the common interests of peoples of all the countries in the world”. Xia Liping, “China: A Responsible Great Power”, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 10, no. 26 (February 2001), p. 18. Cited in Yin He, “China’s Changing Policy on Peacekeeping Operations”, op. cit.

29 This included those retroactively assessed from 1971 to 1981. Peacekeeping dues are assessed separately from UN dues.
32 See Chih-Yu Shih, China’s Just World: The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy (Boulder, 1993), p. 188.
33 Ibid.

A year later Beijing began paying UN peacekeeping dues and sent a fact-finding mission to the Middle East to study peacekeeping operations. Throughout the 1980s, in contrast to the “fifth voting style” of the previous decade, China participated in Security Council votes. While mostly abstaining, its voting style was still more active than the “fifth voting style”, as it started to provide explanations for its abstentions. This approach has been characterised as “cooperation by acquiescence”, or “inaction is the best action”. According to one analyst, this move reflected a change in China’s perception of UN peacekeeping operations, now viewed through a functional rather than an ideological lens.

D. 1988-2000: RISING PROFILE

In November 1988, China became a member of the General Assembly’s Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations. Five months later, Chinese Ambassador Yu Mengjia called on the international community to give “powerful support” to UN peacekeeping. In 1989, China sent its first team of twenty civilian observers to join the UN Namibia Transitional Period Aid Group to oversee a general election. The next year, China sent military observers to the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in the Middle East, marking the beginning of its official participation in UN peacekeeping operations. In 1992 and 1993, China played a key role in the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), supporting the mission financially and politically, and sending two PLA engineering units.
E. 2000-PRESENT: ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

1. Personnel contributions

China’s deployment of a civilian police contingent to the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in early 2000 marked a new era for its participation in peacekeeping. Significantly, this operation was a UN-led transitional administration, where the UN effectively served as the government of the territory, directly undermining the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference. As an executive police mission, UNTAET authorised Chinese police officers to carry light weapons and patrol in a foreign country for the first time. China’s support for and participation in this mission demonstrated a significant softening of its attitude towards sovereignty and non-interference.

That same year, Chinese officials applauded the reforms proposed in the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (otherwise known as the “Brahimi report”) to strengthen peacekeeping and “the active measures taken by the UN Secretariat in this regard”. They voiced support for report recommendations such as the issuance of clear mandates, facilitation of rapid deployment, information gathering and analysis, and consultation with troop-contributing countries.

In 2001, China sent five police officers to the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and one year later formally joined the standby arrangements mechanism. In 2002, it supported the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and in 2004 sent one police officer. Six months later, China sent 218 personnel contributions 2003-2008” and Appendix C, “China’s UN Peacekeeping Personnel Ranking Among all UN Member States”.

The dispatch of a twelve-person police contingent to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in April 2004 was a significant move given China’s opposition to the U.S.-led NATO war in Kosovo in 1998 and the bombing of its embassy in Belgrade in 1999 by NATO forces. It was all the more significant given the executive authority of UNMIK, as in Timor-Leste, contrasting with China’s explicit support for state sovereignty. Later that year, China sent a 125-person police unit to Haiti, its first dispatch of a formed police unit (FPU), and the first time it sent peacekeepers to a state with which it had no diplomatic relations. China had previously been unsupportive of the Haiti mission and, as in Timor-Leste and Kosovo, it was an executive police mission.

Since 2003, a rapid surge has taken place in China’s contributions to peacekeeping operations. Starting with a contribution of 120 military and police personnel in 2003 (44th place), the number steadily climbed to 359 (27th) in 2004, 1038 (16th) in 2005, 1060 (16th) in 2006, and 1861 (12th) in 2007.42 As of December 2008, China had 2,146 officers and soldiers, including military observers, liaison officials, staff officers and engineering officers serving in eleven UN peacekeeping operations around the world. As a result, it now ranks fourteenth among all UN members, second only to France within the P-5, with the UK ranked 41st, Russia 44th, and the U.S. 67th. In fact, China and France have alternated in occupying the position of top P-5 contributor several times over the last year.

37 The Brahimi report was commissioned to comprehensively review all facets of UN peacekeeping in response to concerns of many UN members that the organisation lacked the adequate management and financial systems to support the sharply increased number of peacekeeping operations and peacekeepers. UNIS/GA/1733, 9 November 2000, at www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2000/ga1733.html.
38 China is able to provide one UN-standard engineering battalion, one UN-standard medical team and two UN-standard transport companies. However, it should be noted that the Chinese planning data sheet has not yet been submitted to the UN Standby Arrangements System, nor has Beijing voiced support for report recommendations such as the issuance of clear mandates, facilitation of rapid deployment, information gathering and analysis, and consultation with troop-contributing countries.37
40 In November 2008, the ninth peacekeeping team from China to MONUC arrived in the DRC. China first began participating in UN peacekeeping missions in the DRC in 2003. The 218-person group, comprised of both engineers and medical staff, has worked at building and maintaining water and power facilities, roads and airports as well as work in hospitals. China also has sixteen military observers in MONUC.
41 Armed with riot control equipment ranging from batons, shields, pepper sprays and water cannons to sniper guns, light machine guns and armored personnel carriers (APC), the FPU has strong operational capabilities and can perform various duties that generally neither individual police officers nor military troops can/should do. Yin He, “China’s Changing Policy on Peacekeeping Operations”, op. cit.
42 See Appendix B, “China’s Total UN Peacekeeping Contributions 2003-2008” and Appendix C, “China’s UN Peacekeeping Personnel Ranking Among all UN Member States”.
43 See Appendix A, “Chinese Contributions by Peacekeeping Mission”.
44 See Appendix D, “Top Troop Contributors to UN Peacekeeping”.
 Despite this development, China still lags behind the top troop-contributing countries for UN peacekeeping: Pakistan (11,135), Bangladesh (9,567), India (8,963) and Nigeria (5,908) as of December 2008.\footnote{Ibid.} Chinese peacekeepers’ performance in the field has received generally positive, if mixed reviews.\footnote{Crisis Group interviews, UN staff, New York, 18 September 2008.} According to accounts of those who served alongside Chinese police, they are highly professional, well trained and able to work effectively in difficult operational environments.\footnote{Ibid.} Chinese medical teams and equipment are state of the art, with separate facilities for contemporary and Chinese traditional medicine.\footnote{Ibid.} Chinese peacekeepers are compared favorably with some of the traditional troop-contributing countries, particularly in that their motivations are not monetary remuneration.\footnote{Ibid.} Chinese medical teams and equipment are state of the art, with separate facilities for contemporary and Chinese traditional medicine.\footnote{Crisis Group interview, New York, 7 January 2009.} Chinese peacekeepers are compared favorably with some of the traditional troop-contributing countries, particularly in that their motivations are not monetary remuneration.\footnote{Crisis Group interview, New York, 7 January 2009.} Chinese peacekeepers are compared favorably with some of the traditional troop-contributing countries, particularly in that their motivations are not monetary remuneration.\footnote{Ibid.} Nor have Chinese peacekeepers been the subject of any scandals.\footnote{Ibid.}

 However, observers have frequently criticised the propensity of Chinese troops to segregate themselves from other peacekeepers as well as the local population.\footnote{Crisis Group interview, New York, 19 September 2008.} This tendency, also noted of other countries’ contingents, can prolong the time necessary to begin to contribute to the mission. Observers also claim that Chinese troops fulfill their tasks well but rarely take any initiative.\footnote{Crisis Group interview, New York, 7 January 2009.} Perhaps their most notable deficiency is language skills. One UN official remarked about Chinese peacekeepers in the field, “They have a very strong work ethic, are professional and very committed. The one area where they are often hampered is language and English in particular. On a day-to-day basis they operate well in missions, but during meetings and planning, they can’t contribute much. I imagine they could make useful contributions, were it not for this language barrier”.\footnote{Crisis Group interview, New York, 24 February 2009.} UN officials welcome expansion in personnel contribution, but have expressed hopes that China will significantly increase its support.\footnote{DPKO is trying to engage both China and Russia in particular to play stepped up roles in peacekeeping. Crisis Group interview, Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for UN Peacekeeping Operations, 8 January 2009.} During his November 2007 visit to Beijing, former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno asked China to increase its contribution, particularly in the area of “force enablers”, non-combat units such as logistics, medical and engineering. He also said he hoped to see both an infantry battalion and air transport units one day.\footnote{“Top UN peacekeeping official heads to China to push for greater contribution”, UN press release, 16 November 2007, at www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=24697&Crl=peacekeeping&Cr1.} In response to such requests, Chinese officials and analysts temper expectations by arguing that China is a regional (not global) power, and that it is still a developing country.\footnote{Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 9 October 2008.} While China will continue to contribute to peacekeeping and take more responsibility for conflict resolution, they stipulate that this will only be done in accordance with its own agenda and capacity.\footnote{Ibid.} China has not yet contributed combat troops (see Section V.B.1.c); and has been unenthusiastic about providing air transport units.\footnote{Crisis Group interview, New York, September 2008.} However, its decision to deploy its navy in December 2008 as part of a multilateral effort to help combat piracy off the coast of Somalia is a significant step.\footnote{Ibid.}

\section{Financial contributions}

While still minimal compared to other P-5 countries, China’s financial contributions to peacekeeping have also increased. Growing from $2.5 billion in the financial year July 2000 to June 2001, the UN peacekeeping budget is now nearly $8 billion a year, inexpensive for over 110,000 personnel.\footnote{Crisis Group interview, New York, 24 February 2009.} China’s contribution to the...
peacekeeping budget grew from around 0.9 per cent throughout the 1990s, to 1.5 per cent by December 2000, and was just above 3 per cent by 2008. In comparison, for 2008–2009, the U.S. will contribute nearly 26 per cent of the DPKO budget; the UK, 7.8 per cent; France, 7.4 per cent; and Russia, 1.4 per cent. As a share of gross domestic product (GDP), these contributions amount to approximately 0.02 per cent of GDP for the UK and France, 0.01 per cent for the U.S., 0.006 per cent for Russia, and 0.005 per cent for China.

0.5 per cent of global military spending (estimated at $1.232 trillion in 2006). When costs to the UN per peacekeeper are compared to the cost of troops deployed by the U.S., other developed states, NATO or regional organisations, the UN is by far the least expensive. The cost of one month of U.S. military operations in Iraq, around $4.5 billion, is equivalent to what the UN spent on its eighteen peacekeeping missions in all of 2007. James Dobbins, “A Comparative Evaluation of United Nations Peacekeeping”, testimony presented before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, subcommittee on international organisations, human rights and oversight, 13 June 2007, p. 11, at www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND_CT284.pdf. A survey by Oxford University economists found that international military intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is the most cost-effective means of preventing a return to war in post-conflict societies. A study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office estimated that it would cost the U.S. approximately twice as much as the UN to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to MINUSTAH (in Haiti) – $876 million – compared to the UN budgeted $428 million for the first fourteen months of the mission. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War”, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University, 26 March 2004 and “Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti”, U.S. Government Accountability Office, report to the subcommittee on oversight and investigations, committee on international relations, House of Representatives, GAO-06-331, February 2006, p. 7; cited in United Nations Peacekeeping Factsheet, at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/factsheet.pdf.

See Appendix E, “Top 20 Providers of Assessed Contributions to the UN Peacekeeping Budget”. See Appendix F, “Western Countries’ Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations 2000-2008”; Appendix D, “Top Troop Contributors to UN Peacekeeping”; and Appendix G, “Troops Deployed in UN and Non-UN Operations by Countries with the Largest Militaries and P-5 Countries”.

U.S. contributions to UN missions fell from a peak of around 28,000 under UNITAF (Somalia) to around 4,500 under UNOSOM II (Somalia) and a mere handful thereafter. The British contribution to UN missions dropped from approximately 9,000 in 1995 (including 8,000 in Bosnia) to 594 in December 2000. Likewise, the French contribution decreased from over 8,000 in 1995 to 498 at the end of 2000. Alexander J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “The West and Contemporary Peace Operations”, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 46, no. 1 (2009), p. 44.

Western governments have justified their comparatively small contributions to actual UN peacekeeping in recent years in three ways: (1) Problems associated with the International Criminal Court (ICC): Since 2002, Washington has argued that its personnel in overseas missions could be the target of politicised prosecutions by the ICC. In 2002, the United States reduced the number of military observers in UN missions unless the host state guaranteed them immunity from ICC prosecution. In 2002, Washington has argued that its personnel in overseas missions could be the target of politicised prosecutions by the ICC. In 2002, the United States reduced the number of military observers in UN missions unless the host state guaranteed them immunity from ICC prosecution. (US Congress, 2002). (2) The West’s capacity for rapid deployment and robust capabilities: The UK argued that since it is one of the few states that can provide troops capable of conducting robust, “first-in” expeditionary missions in “challenging circumstances”, it “would expect to play a lesser part in enduring operations where many other countries can contribute”, such as UN operations (UK Ministry of Defence, 2003). (3) Western contributions to non-UN missions: Some Western governments, including France, Germany, Canada and the U.S. refuse to distinguish between UN and non-UN operations when calculating their contribution to peace operations. They therefore regularly
states have reduced their contributions to UN operations, they have deployed tens of thousands of troops under the auspices of organisations such as NATO, the OSCE and coalitions of the willing. While it is too early to evaluate the impact of this shift away from UN operations on international peace and security, it has certainly negatively affected the UN’s status as the principal authority for the deployment of armed peace operations. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, former head of DPKO, suggested that Western personnel contributions to UN peace operations are “inadequate. We need a lot more. If UN Blue Helmets only come from a certain part in the world, our position weakens because it does not give a strong political signal.... We are glad that NATO participates in peacekeeping. But that should not mean that the involvement to the UN decreases.”71 Western troops also offer certain “niche” capabilities to UN peacekeeping.72 As a means of addressing the situation, Morton Abramowitz and Thomas Pickering have recommended that each of the P-5 countries contribute 5,000 troops to peacekeeping operations.73

Taking into account the above, and analysing global troop availability against troops deployed in both UN and non-UN operations, Asia emerges as the only region in the world currently capable of sustaining a major increase in the deployment of uniformed personnel for UN peacekeeping. Only 60 countries worldwide possess the number or quality of forces necessary to initially staff and sustain UN peacekeeping missions, and, in 2006, 42 were already contributing troops to either UN or non-UN operations.74 Apart from China, only four other countries have more than one million active troops: the U.S., India, Russia and North Korea. Moreover, China has only the UN through which to contribute to peacekeeping, not the regional or NATO option. Chinese engagement in UN peacekeeping also has the potential to influence the contributions of other P-5 and major troop-contributing countries.75 Conversely, increased Western support for UN peacekeeping operations is also likely to encourage greater Chinese contributions.76

According to DPKO officials, the type of peacekeepers contributed by China – enablers77 and police – fill an important demand in peacekeeping operations. Enablers are the crucial specialised units and equipment that enhance the ability of a force to move and operate. They include army engineers and logisticians, fire, French and Italian peacekeepers were made available, marking the first sizeable deployment of Western troops to a UN peacekeeping operation since the war in Bosnia.77

The absence of developed nations poses certain challenges to peacekeeping operations, as more complex mandates require specialised capacities (ie, heavy-lift aircraft, army engineers and logisticians, command-and-control and intelligence gathering). “Call the blue helmets: can the UN cope with increasing demands for its soldiers?” The Economist, 4 January 2007; Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Key Challenges in Today’s UN Peacekeeping Operations (Washington DC, 2006), at www.cfr.org/publication/10766; and “Future Challenges of UN Peacekeeping”, UN Association of Canada, 2007, www.unac.org/peacekeeping/en/pdf/academic_publication/chapter10.pdf. A gesture like the U.S. decision to airlift UN troops into Darfur late last year emphasises that Washington has higher-order assets readily available and the UNIFIL (Lebanon) reinforcement in 2006 shows that Europe is capable of power projection. Within weeks of the August cease-
field hospitals and nurses, demining units, and the like.\textsuperscript{82} Yet such fully-formed engineering, medical and transport units are difficult to source, partly because they are costly to equip and train.\textsuperscript{83} Specialised units for policing and restoring infrastructure and social services are also in high demand given the demands of present-day mandates in which rebuilding and reconstruction of societies is a core task.\textsuperscript{84} China should therefore be encouraged to continue to provide these units.

4. Political support to peacekeeping

There is also an important political dividend gained by China’s participation. For peacekeeping to succeed, solid, sustained and dedicated political support from key countries is required. The presence of troops on the ground is one of the best ways to vest a country with an interest in the success of a peacekeeping operation.\textsuperscript{85} The major presence of French, Italian and Spanish troops in Lebanon (UNIFIL), for example, arguably raised the stakes for all parties to the conflict, compared with UNAMID’s earlier composition.\textsuperscript{86} The presence of Chinese peacekeepers in Sudan has led Beijing to invest diplomatic resources into protecting its peacekeepers, pushing for UNAMID’s full deployment, and advocating for a viable political process (see Section IV.A). Deployment of personnel on the ground binds it to the practical and political success of that mission.\textsuperscript{87}

China’s military, economic and political relationships with some countries in conflict differ qualitatively from relations with those countries and the West.\textsuperscript{88} Such relationships can provide Beijing with unique potential influence over, as well as insight into, the intentions of the leaders – including in the military and intelligence communities of these countries.\textsuperscript{89} Some analysts assert that no major military, social, demographic or environmental conflict can be multi-

laterally mediated without at least tacit Chinese consent or cooperation.\textsuperscript{90} As China’s global engagement grows, so will its potential for influence in countries which may in the future host peacekeeping operations.

China does, however, insist that all peacekeeping operations be carried out under the authorisation of the Security Council,\textsuperscript{91} a position consistent with the prevailing international view on peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{92} China has not participated to date in non-UN Security Council authorised peace operations, unlike other P-5 countries. And of particular worry to its leaders has been the West’s “new interventionism” exercised in Kosovo and Iraq,\textsuperscript{93} which they believed set dangerous precedents.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{82}Donald C.F. Daniel, “Whither Peace Operations?”, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{83}These specialised units are normally smaller, higher quality, better educated and therefore a higher-cost part of a military. Courtney Richardson, “Explaining Variance in Chinese Peacekeeping Policy: International Image and Target Audience Concerns”, unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New York, 18 February 2009.

\textsuperscript{84}Crisis Group interview, UN official, New York, 9 January 2009.

\textsuperscript{85}Crisis Group interview, New York, 3 January 2009.

\textsuperscript{86}Crisis Group interviews, New York, 2 and 4 January 2009.

\textsuperscript{87}Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 20 October 2008.


\textsuperscript{89}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{91}Unilateral intervention goes to the heart of Chinese concerns about actions perceived to be interference in the internal affairs of other states. Within the Chinese context, intervention (干预, \textit{ganru}) generally signifies that an operation has been authorised by the UN Security Council while interference (干涉, \textit{ganshe}) has a very pejorative connotation and implies that an operation is a unilateral and coercive action that has not been authorised by the UN Security Council. Thomas Weiss, “Contemporary Views on Humanitarian Intervention and China: ‘The Responsibility to Protect’”, International Intervention and State Sovereignty, Beijing China Reform Forum, 2003; and Ian Taylor, \textit{China’s New Role in Africa} (Boulder, 2008), pp. 267-290.

\textsuperscript{92}The effectiveness of the global collective security system, as with any other legal order, depends ultimately not only on the legality of decisions but also on the common perception of their legitimacy. Gareth Evans, \textit{The Responsibility to Protect}, op. cit., p. 139. See also Erik Voeten, “The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force”, \textit{International Organization}, vol. 59, no. 3 (2005), p. 527. It is well recognised that the most important asset of a UN peacekeeping operation is its international legitimacy. “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine)”, United Nations, DPKO, department of field support, 2008, at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Document_ENG.pdf.


\textsuperscript{94}Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, speech at the 54th Session of the UN General Assembly, 20 November 2000, available
III. MOTIVATIONS

China’s peacekeeping behaviour is motivated by diverse interests, from multilateralism and image building to more traditional concerns such as isolating Taiwan and securing its investments.

A. PROMOTING A MULTILATERAL AGENDA

China sees involvement in multilateral institutions as a non-threatening way of promoting its national interests and projecting its influence abroad. Multilateralism has been a regular part of China’s foreign policy lexicon since the mid-1990s.101 Starting in 1998 the leadership proposed the “New Security Concept”, which focused on security through cooperation in international affairs, resolving disputes through dialogue, and enhancing economic interaction.102 By 2003, this policy was gradually subsumed into a comprehensive national strategy of peace, development, and cooperation known first as the “peaceful rise” and then as the “peaceful development” policy.103 Both policies are rooted in the premise that good relations with other countries will enhance China’s power.104

Initially, multilateralism was China’s answer to the shift in the global balance of power from two superpowers to one superpower and multiple powers. Starting with NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia, China worried about increasing unilaterality and looked for ways to counter U.S. hegemony.105 While dissatisfied with the growing ability of the U.S. to determine the course and outcome of international affairs, China lacked the means to curb U.S. might alone, and therefore invested in multilateralism.

More recently, China’s leaders have acknowledged that the country has been a beneficiary of the UN system and economic globalisation, which brings with it an obligation to take responsibility in international affairs, the initial goal of checking American power having been superseded.106 China’s promotion of multilateralism serves its interests by preserving a peaceful external environment for economic growth, and assuring its neighbours and the world of its peaceful intentions even as its power increases (see next section).

China has found that peacekeeping is a visible and effective way to meet its obligations to the UN and further its multilateral agenda. Its involvement in the decision-making process for peacekeeping operations provides it with the opportunity to use its influence to protect and pursue its interests. The Security Council is seen as a place where China can project power and rally international support to balance U.S. actions, using the body’s monopoly on legalising the use of force in international interventions. Moreover, increased involvement in peacekeeping provides an opportunity for

At the foreign affairs ministry website, at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18058.htm; and Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, “Peace, Development and Cooperation – Banner of the New Era”, speech at the Em-
China to place more personnel in the UN, boosting its presence in and influence over the organisation and its activities.\(^{102}\)

However, while China endorses multilateralism to better serve its own interests, it is not willing to subject itself to certain rules and norms that restrict its freedom of action. Like other great powers, China is willing to deviate from multilateralism when its core interests are at stake. And as a latecomer to multilateralism, China is still undergoing a process of “socialisation”.\(^{103}\)

One example of China’s selective multilateral engagement is its treatment of the responsibility to protect (R2P). Although it endorsed the concept at both the 2005 UN World Summit and in Security Council Resolution 1674 in 2006,\(^{104}\) its officials have been reluctant to apply the concept in practice.\(^{105}\) Officials refuse to consider that it has any link to peacekeeping.\(^{106}\) This reflects the belief that any operational, as opposed to conceptual, commitment to R2P would oblige China to intervene in certain situations, constraining its ability to continue to define and pursue its interests on a case-by-case basis (see Section IV).\(^{107}\) Over time, however, participation in multilateral institutions and multilateral working environments helps to change perspectives, preferences and understanding of interests.\(^{108}\) For example, Chinese officials adopted more cooperative and self-constraining commitments to arms control due to increasing interactions with international security institutions.\(^{109}\)

B. DESIRE TO BE SEEN AS A RESPONSIBLE POWER

China’s multilateral foreign policy orientation is the backdrop to its desire to be seen as a a 负责任国家 (fu zeren guojia), “responsible power”, or 负责任大国 (fu zeren daguo), a “responsible great power”.\(^{110}\) Peace-
keeping is a relatively low-cost way of demonstrating that China is committed to upholding international peace and security, and showing that recent growth in its military power is not inherently threatening. It fears a backlash against its growing global role and potential damage to its strategic and economic relationships with the West, should its behaviour be perceived as threatening international peace and security, as the spread of “China threat” theories suggests.

Participation in peacekeeping has been a public relations success. It has given the PLA an important boost domestically and helped massage its image internationally. In contrast to consistent negative media commentary on Chinese foreign policy that appears in the West, China’s peacekeeping efforts have received only praise. UN agencies and host governments have repeatedly expressed appreciation for China’s dispatch of peacekeepers. Both UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and UN Deputy Secretary-General Asha-Rose Migiro have praised China for its contribution to UN peacekeeping efforts around the world. China’s role has been labelled as vital to their success by the U.S. State Department, and Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has commented on the quality and professionalism of the Chinese contingents. Peacekeeping also features in several bilateral dialogues between China and Western countries, which praise China for sending peacekeepers and urge increased contributions.

China ensures that all positive messages are also played to their full value domestically. The government

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mission area; a peacekeeping training course or seminar is hosted or attended; as well as when government officials make any relevant statements. For example, an official at the Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the defence ministry was quoted as saying that Chinese peacekeepers represent China as “messengers of peace”, specifying that “to win hearts and minds, you need to devote your own hearts and minds, and that is exactly what our peacekeepers are doing”; Su Qiang and Le Tian, “Peacekeeping – a rising role for China’s PLA”, China Daily, 24 July 2007.
126 Some military officers have expressed appreciation for being able to work with U.S. officers in the very few locations in which they are deployed. Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 28 October 2008.

C. OPERATIONAL BENEFITS

China’s participation in peacekeeping gives its armed forces the opportunity to gain some of the technical skills and knowledge necessary for force modernisation, which has been a focus for China’s armed forces in recent years. In the words of high-ranking military officials, “active participation in the UN peacekeeping operations is an important avenue to get adapted to the needs of the revolution in military affairs in the world and enhance the quality construction of the army”. Most Chinese forces are outdated in terms of technology and management and, as one observer noted, not compatible with the most advanced international forces. Some military officers have stated a preference for deployments in countries where advanced militaries are present.

Given the PLA’s limited ability to operate in areas distant from its own territory, and its lack of operational and combat experience, peacekeeping operations provide the army with important on-the-ground experience. Peacekeeping provides the armed forces the rare opportunity to operate abroad in challenging conditions at strategic distance. This is considered more valuable than any type of training. Some jealousy has been expressed regarding the combat experience U.S. troops are gaining in Iraq and Afghanistan. The mul-
tiple deployments of peacekeepers in Africa are also creating a team of operational experts on Africa. In addition, the PLA finds that UN peacekeeping provides them with some much-needed internal leverage in a perceived resource competition with the PLA Navy as the focus shifts from ground forces to upgrading navy capabilities.\(^{130}\)

Although they are not deployed as combat troops, Chinese military officers also acquire leadership experience and knowledge of how to integrate military and civilian activities.\(^{131}\) According to the 2008 Chinese Defence White Paper, peacekeeping deployments have provided practical experience for Chinese security forces and have helped improve their responsiveness, riot-control capabilities, coordination of military emergency command systems and ability to conduct military operations other than war at home (which would include, for example, the 12 May 2008 earthquake in Sichuan province).\(^{132}\)

This is true not only for military officers, but also police officers, who learn alternative policing techniques from foreign police forces such as the use of force, crowd control, community outreach and humane treatment.\(^{133}\) This is particularly the case in executive police missions, where Chinese police carry light weapons, and have the authority to arrest and detain. Participation in peacekeeping also allows China to test and refine systems and equipment in the field. Medical units are able to test mobile operating theatres and field ambulances, while other units are able to test communications equipment and light arms.\(^{134}\)

Finally, peacekeeping operations provide China the opportunity to observe other nations’ capabilities in deploying missions, including operational practices and working methods.\(^{135}\) Traditionally, the armed forces have avoided extensive interactions with foreign militaries, but as the country becomes more integrated into the international community, PLA officers are becoming more comfortable with the practice.\(^{136}\) Soldiers consistently report that they learn a great deal from contact with foreign militaries.

### D. PROTECTION OF CHINESE INTERESTS ABROAD

While peacekeeping operations complement China’s greater economic interests, the argument that its involvement is solely intended to promote economic investments – especially resources in Africa – is too simplistic. While China has indeed sent peacekeepers to countries with resources of interest to it – such as Liberia (timber), the Democratic Republic of Congo (minerals) and Sudan (oil)\(^{138}\) – it has also sent peacekeepers to areas with few or no natural resources, such as Western Sahara (MINURSO), and the Middle East (UNIFIL and UNTSO). Economic investment comes before intervention rather than vice versa, indicating that economic interests prompt a reaction rather than underpin a strategic approach from the outset.

Furthermore, the characterisation of the government in Beijing as a unified and coordinated entity, a “China, Inc.”, does not accurately describe the policymaking process\(^{139}\) or recognise the rapidly changing nature of China’s foreign policy. Chinese policymaking involves complex tensions between central state actors and their own bureaucracies and competing agendas, as well as between increasingly diverse, multi-tiered regional and local actors in the various countries concerned.\(^{140}\) Ten-

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\(^{130}\) The PLA sees peacekeeping as a “growth industry” for the army as technology plays an ever greater role in the context of modern warfare, prioritising the role of the navy and air force. Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 17 March 2009.


\(^{133}\) Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 21 February 2009. See also Bonny Ling, “China’s Peacekeeping Diplomacy”, op. cit., pp. 1-3. See also notes 103 and 109 on socialisation in the international system. While existing studies have only covered socialisation among foreign policy practitioners to date, there is no reason why similar processes of mimicking, social influence and persuasion could not also occur among peacekeepers.

\(^{134}\) Drew Thompson, “Beijing’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations”, China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, vol. 5, no. 11 (10 May 2005).

\(^{135}\) Ibid; and Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 17 October 2008.


\(^{137}\) Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 28 October 2008.


sions between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), military and economic actors strain the policy formulation process. 141

China’s economic and peacekeeping tracks operate separately, with decisions carried out by actors operating in a vertical manner. 142 The government bodies that oversee peacekeeping and commerce are separate, and overarching authorities only become involved to mediate between these interests where they conflict, not to coordinate between them. When operating and investing abroad, companies are regulated and overseen by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). Peacekeeping is overseen by the office of UN peacekeeping affairs and office of foreign affairs in the general staff department of the Central Military Commission/Ministry of National Defence, the office of peacekeeping in the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The differing interests and objectives, and bureaucratic competition between MOFCOM and the MFA, have so far kept peacekeeping and overseas investment efforts from strategically converging, at least in Beijing. 143

The fragmented nature of Chinese policymaking results in tension between China’s support for peacekeeping and its wider behaviour. Initially, Beijing appears to underestimate the political risks of its economic investments in places like Sudan and the DRC, only to shift approach later on, sending peacekeepers to clean up messes that it has aggravated or helped to create. 144 Its substantial political and material support to UN peacekeeping in Sudan, for example, was preceded by political and economic support that shielded the regime from international pressure to stop the Darfur conflict (see Section IV.A).

In 2008, China’s $9.25 billion deal for copper and cobalt with DRC President Joseph Kabila emboldened him 145 to ignore calls from UN officials and the West to act with restraint in the conflict with Laurent Nkunda’s rebel forces in North Kivu and in his heavy-handed management of political opponents and human rights activists. 146 The U.S. and Europe then exacerbated the situation by emphasising their own commercial interests to Kabila, rather than censuring him for launching irresponsible military campaigns in the east or his government’s poor governance record. 147 When the Nkunda insurgency began to accuse China of promoting bad governance in the DRC through government contracts detrimental to the Congolese people’s interests, envoy Liu Guijin was sent to Kinshasa and Kigali to engage in direct mediation between Rwanda and the DRC. He called on both sides to cooperate to resolve the conflict, insisting to Kigali in particular that Nkunda’s accusations against China had to be stopped. 148 This Chinese pressure on Kigali contributed to a radical shift of Rwandan policy, as Kigali decided to withdraw its support to Nkunda, who had become a liability, and replaced him with a more docile leadership. China also contributed 218 additional peacekeepers when the UN Security Council called on a 3,000-troop increase for MONUC in early November. 149

There has been increasing disquiet in the Chinese government about the diplomatic fallout of overseas

141 Crisis Group Report, China’s Thirst for Oil, op. cit.
144 This reactive approach to peacekeeping is common among the major powers and has been the subject of much criticism from UN officials, who have advocated for a more strategic approach.
investments in places like Sudan.\textsuperscript{150} Indeed, tension between foreign policy objectives and the interests of corporate actors has been an important feature of the international policy landscape ever since the “go out” strategy in 1999.\textsuperscript{151} Diplomatic actors complain about the influence exerted by commercial actors over the policymaking process. According to one official, “There is a need to change how companies think, and then the policies will change, too”.\textsuperscript{152} But corporate actors are also slowly coming to see that countries racked by internal conflict, while providing certain strategic and commercial advantages, also carry serious risks. Conflict affects the export of goods, access to raw materials and the ability to repay loans and investments. In addition, Chinese citizens working in conflict-prone countries are increasingly at risk, as seen in recent attacks and kidnappings.\textsuperscript{153}

While Beijing has taken some important steps, meaningful political support for peacekeeping should involve a more strategic approach to promoting stability earlier on. While UN operations sometimes suffer from vague or inappropriate mandates that prevent them from following consistent and sustained strategies in-country, in several instances, weak mandates have been drafted to alleviate Chinese concerns.\textsuperscript{154} It is hoped that in the long run, China will be more interested in promoting viable mandates that make deployments more effective.\textsuperscript{155} Many in Beijing’s official circles already accept that China’s global role vis-à-vis developing countries is not to simply defend them against what it defines as Western interference, but also to promote these countries’ long-term stability and responsible behaviour.\textsuperscript{156} Some also believe that China may become more convinced of the need for robust mandates after having its troops serve in a combat capacity.\textsuperscript{157}

China also increasingly recognises the importance of peace and security to protect its interests. For example, because of its oil investments, China is also invested in the peaceful resolution of the Darfur and Abyei crises and successful CPA implementation in Sudan.\textsuperscript{158} Its investments in the DRC also give it an incentive to ensure resolution to the crisis in North Kivu. While its role in conflict resolution, as a means to protect those interests abroad, is still at a nascent stage, China considers peacekeeping as a relatively safe way in which it can actively promote peace and stability without straining its diplomatic and other resources. However, even such involvement has the potential to nudge China toward greater familiarity with crisis management and conflict resolution, with a view to playing a larger role in the future.

\section{E. One-China Policy\textsuperscript{159}}

China’s most important national security issue is Taiwan. The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and any other country is conditional upon its acceptance of the one-China policy and severance of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. While the one-China policy continues to be of high importance in Chinese foreign policy, its use in the context of peacekeeping has diminished over the past decade.

The only peacekeeping-related vetoes that China has exercised at the UN Security Council have been against the establishment and extension of UN peacekeeping missions in states that had diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In January 1997, China vetoed the extension of a peacekeeping operation in Guatemala due to its relationship with Taiwan.\textsuperscript{160} In February 1999, China also cast its vote against extending the mandate

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\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
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\textsuperscript{151} The need to better reconcile business interests with foreign policy goals for the country led to the leadership convening the Politburo, government ministers, ambassadors, provincial governors, party secretaries, officials from state-owned enterprises and senior PLA officers at the August 2006 Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, the largest foreign policy gathering in recent years. Participants discussed how the behaviour of companies abroad risked damaging the country’s image, the need to establish a more coherent grand strategy and how to strengthen soft power. Crisis Group Report, \textit{China’s Thirst for Oil}, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
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\textsuperscript{152} Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 3 April 2009.
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\textsuperscript{153} Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 20 October 2008.
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\textsuperscript{154} See fn. 196.
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\textsuperscript{155} Crisis Group telephone interview, UN official, New York, 1 February 2009. For example, see the cases of Sudan and Haiti in this paper.
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\textsuperscript{156} A more active role by China in influencing mandating procedures as a rising troop-contributing country, however, is not likely to be welcomed by the countries that currently contribute the bulk of peacekeeping personnel.
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\textsuperscript{157} Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 3 April 2009.
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\textsuperscript{158} Ibid. In addition, while Liu Guijin has made an effort to downplay suggestions that China mediate between Chad and Sudan, it clearly has a stake in resolving the conflict between the two countries, both recipients of Chinese political and military support since Chad abandoned relations with Taiwan in August 2006.
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\textsuperscript{159} According to the one-China policy (一个中国政策, \textit{yige zhongguo zhengce}) there is one China, of which mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan all form a part.
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of a mission in Macedonia. While the Chinese representative did not explicitly refer to Taiwan, Macedonia had just established diplomatic relations with it.

China pressured Liberia to switch its diplomatic recognition by threatening to block a $250 million budget for the UN peacekeeping troops in the country. After Liberia switched its relations to Beijing in 2003, China deployed more than 500 peacekeepers to support the UNMIL in Liberia and sent a generous aid package.

A much less heavy-handed approach was used in Haiti. On 30 April 2004, China voted for Resolution 1542, which authorised the establishment of the MINUSTAH. In September 2004, it dispatched a 125-person formed police unit (FPU) as well as another five civilian police officers. This was not only the first time China dispatched a police unit to a peacekeeping mission, but also the first time China sent peacekeepers to a UN member state with which it did not have diplomatic relations and, moreover, that maintained official ties with Taiwan.

Haiti remained unmoved by Beijing’s support of peacekeeping operations. The interim Haitian president, Alexandre Boniface, continued to make plans for an official visit to Taiwan in July 2005 and pushed for Taiwan’s membership in the UN. Nonetheless, in June 2005, the Chinese permanent representative spoke in favour of the extension of MINUSTAH. Its strategy appeared to recognise the benefits of a less punitive and more incentive-based strategy in Haiti.

One analyst noted that China participates in peacekeeping to gain more influence and establish positive relationships so that a post-conflict government will be more likely to establish relations with China, and not Taiwan. Another Chinese analyst has noted that China’s participation in UN peacekeeping, particularly in Africa, gives Taiwan “less room to breathe”. But a more important consideration than isolating Taiwan in the case of Haiti was avoiding the damage to China’s image that would have resulted from a veto and the resulting public condemnation.

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163 Liberia’s acting foreign minister told the Taiwanese ambassador to Liberia, Chen Yeong-cho, that his government’s decision to establish ties with Beijing was the result of intense pressure from the UN and neighbouring countries. Huang Tai-lin, “Taiwan says goodbye to another ally”, *Taipei Times*, 13 October 2003.
167 Boniface’s visit to Taiwan was eventually cancelled due to concern for its impact on the continuation of the UN mission.
168 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 3 September 2008.
169 赵磊 (*Come for Peace – Analysis of China’s Peacekeeping Operations in Africa*), 中央党校 [Central Party School], *外交评论* [*Foreign Policy Commentary*], no. 94 (February 2007).
170 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 29 December 2008.
IV. PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

China’s underlying motivations for participation in UN peacekeeping are chipping away at the foreign policy principles that have traditionally guided Chinese policy and practice. Beijing refers to three core guidelines when deciding whether to authorise and participate in peacekeeping. The first two are principles underpinning traditional peacekeeping operations advocated by former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold: consent of the host country and the use of force only in self-defence. To these, Beijing adds the support of regional organisations. It has historically used these principles to translate non-interference into a seemingly principled stance in Security Council deliberations.

However, China’s stance is being eroded in favour of its pragmatic pursuit of the motivations above. It is now qualifying the application of these peacekeeping principles to such a degree that it can no longer be said that they guide Beijing’s decision-making on peacekeeping. This flexible approach allows Beijing to resolve the tension between its traditional principles and contemporary motivations in peacekeeping.

A. HOST COUNTRY CONSENT

Since its entry into the UN, consent of the host country government has been a key Chinese prerequisite for peacekeeping operations. China has historically regarded governments as the sole legitimate representatives of sovereign states. The position is consistent with the principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs and Beijing’s discomfort with anti-government forces in many developing countries. In practical terms, this position has allowed Beijing to maintain good relationships with governments that are potential hosts of peacekeeping missions.

China has often invoked the absence of host country consent as justification for withholding its endorsement of peacekeeping operations. During the Rwandan genocide in 1994, China abstained on Security Council Resolution 929 authorising a French-led multinational force (so-called “Operation Turquoise”) to use “all necessary means” to bring the Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) up to strength; the Chinese UN representative noted that the cooperation and consent of the parties to the conflict for the action authorised by the resolution were not guaranteed. Once the mission went forward and consent of the parties was secured China did not oppose subsequent votes extending UNAMIR’s mandate. China insisted on host country consent whether the government was Habyarima-
na’s genocidal regime or General Paul Kagame’s RPF-led government of transition which took power in July 2004.

In the 1999 bloodshed in East Timor, it was only after the Indonesian government acquiesced to the mission that China voted in favour of the Security Council resolution establishing UNTAET to “provide[s] security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor”. China’s UN representative, Qin Huasun, stated that China was “gravely concerned over the continuing violence and resulting humanitarian crisis” and “the deployment of any peacekeeping force should be at the request of the Indonesian Government and endorsed by the Security Council”. China placed great emphasis upon host country consent in this instance, as the conflict was within its own region, where many countries share China’s historical aversion to intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

In Darfur, although China initially used the concept of Sudanese consent to peacekeeping to thwart and delay the deployment of such an operation, by mid-2007 it helped secure the government’s consent to a peacekeeping operation. When the situation in Darfur spiralled out of control in 2004, China’s primary goal was to maintain good relations with the government of Sudan. China used its position on the Council to substantially shield Khartoum from targeted sanctions and other punitive measures by insisting that the conflict was an internal matter and on government consent to any peacekeeping operation. In the period leading up to the adoption of Resolution 1769 in July 2007, China consistently abstained on all major resolutions, serving to lessen their weight and undermine their chances of implementation. These abstentions (along with those of Russia, Qatar, Algeria and Pakistan) sent a powerful signal of international division to the government of Sudan and delayed the deployment of a robust force capable of protecting civilians in Darfur.

As time went on, however, Beijing had to balance its relationship with Khartoum with international constituencies who saw it as the protector of a government that was hindering international assistance to a worsening humanitarian situation. In late 2006, China started encouraging the Sudanese government to accept a three-phase deployment of a peacekeeping force. On 13 September 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao stated that he was “very much concerned about stability in Darfur” and reiterated his support for sending in peacekeepers. Beijing also summoned Sudanese presidential assistant Nafie Ali Nafie to explain the deterioration of the conflict. Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong was reported to clarify that the UN mission in Darfur would not undermine the position of the Sudanese government and recommended starting “constructive negotiations” on the possible shape of this operation. On 15 September 2006, China’s UN ambassador, Wang Guangya, said that his government had been “pressing” Sudan both in Beijing and Khartoum.

During the 16 November 2006 high-level consultation on Darfur in Addis Ababa, Ambassador Wang made important behind-the-scenes interventions to secure the Sudanese government’s agreement to the plan. President Hu Jintao raised the issue with his Sudanese counterpart, Omar al-Bashir, at the November 2006 China-Africa summit and publicly urged the Sudanese government to find a settlement to the issue and improve the humanitarian situation. During his February 2007 visit to Khartoum, Hu privately pressed Bashir to comply with his commitments to the UN/AU hybrid force deployment. Briefing the Security Council on Hu’s visit, Ambassador Wang explained: “Usually China doesn’t send messages, but this time [it] did”. When Khartoum started backtracking on the deal, China expressed private and public discontent.

Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun then encouraged adoption of the three-phase plan during his April 2007 visit. When the Sudanese Foreign Minister Lam Akol
announced on 16 April 2007 that the government had accepted the UN/AU “heavy support” package, it was widely recognised that China had “played a pivotal role in brokering the agreement”. 187 By the end of May, China announced that it would send a 275-member engineering unit to take part in the second phase of the UN/AU plan.

Then, on 31 July 2007, the last day of China’s Security Council presidency, the Council authorised the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to support implementation of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement. China went to great lengths to ensure that the text was finalised and adopted under its presidency. This allowed it to eliminate certain tough provisions, such as the threat of new sanctions and references to the arms embargo and the UN Panel of Experts. (But the final resolution also demanded the cessation of aerial bombings and authorised protection of aid workers and civilians under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which permits the use of military force to deal with threats to international peace and security.) 188) China has since deployed 315 military engineers to UNAMID. 189 The initial deployment was delayed by a month due to protracted negotiations with Sudanese officials over a Chinese request to deploy a small number of force protection unit military personnel along with its peacekeepers, which was, in the end, rejected. 190

The role China played in securing the Sudanese government’s consent to the operation, and the presence of its troops on the ground, have given it a vested interest in the success of the mission. 191 The biggest challenges faced by UNAMID are the obstruction of deployment and lack of a peace agreement since the 2006 agreement collapsed. 192 Nearly twenty months after its creation, UNAMID is barely at two thirds of its deployment target and has had a minimal impact on improving the security situation. Beijing has appealed to the Sudanese government to push forward full deployment 193 and urged action on the political process. 194

However, China’s state-centric approach limits its effectiveness in pushing for a political settlement and its ability to deal with non-state actors who target it. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) demanded that China withdraw from the region and directly threatened the security of its peacekeepers following its October 2007 attack on Chinese oil interests in southern Kordofan. After the U.S. condemned threats to the safety of peacekeepers, JEM muted its threats, but other rebel groups have made clear their opposition to China’s involvement in Sudan’s oil sector. 195 On 18 October 2008, nine Chinese oil workers from China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) were kidnapped and five subsequently killed in southern Kordofan. 196


191 This interest goes beyond China’s need for stability in the country for its investments. Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 1 November 2008.
192 Following the 14 July 2008 indictment of President Bashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC), Sudan’s level of cooperation with UNAMID improved, in a thinly-veiled attempt to garner international political support for a UNSC resolution to suspend the process.
193 Liu Guijin urged Sudan to remove obstacles to full deployment of UNAMID after a visit to Darfur, saying, “First, the Sudan government should cooperate better with the international community and demonstrate greater flexibility on some technical issues. Next, anti-government organizations in the Darfur region should return to the negotiating table”.
195 “China calls to push forward Darfur peace process”, Associated Press, 20 July 2007; “Ambassador: China to continue to seek solution to Darfur issue”, Xinhua, 6 May 2008; “Chinese envoy calls for pressing Darfur rebel groups to restart talks”, Xinhua, 25 February 2008; and “Envoy: China’s influence on Darfur issue should not be overestimated”, Xinhua, 7 March 2008; China also made a donation of $500,000 in March 2008 to the Trust Fund for the AU-UN joint mediation support team for Darfur, and its special envoy for Darfur attended negotiations in Sirte, Libya, but only as a gesture of support. Dan Large, “China and the Contradictions of ‘Non-interference’ in Sudan”, op. cit.
196 Dan Large, “China and the Contradictions of ‘Non-interference’ in Sudan”, op. cit.
197 The kidnappers made no ransom requests, and demanded that Chinese oil companies leave the region. “Kidnappers kill 5 Chinese oil workers”, Reuters, 28 October 2008; and “Ninth kidnapped Chinese oil worker in Sudan killed”, Xinhua, 1 November 2008. China has encountered similar prob-
The JEM’s threats to Chinese troops in Sudan are part of a much wider pattern of resistance to peacekeepers, going beyond the Brahimi report’s fairly limited conception of spoilers. It is likely that we will see the level, and sophistication, of this type of resistance increase.197 As China lacks direct contacts with several such groups, it relies on the U.S. and other countries to deal with them.198

The lack of such contacts hinders efforts at conflict resolution where non-state actors have a stake in the conflict, or where governmental authority is fragmented among a number of parties. China has started to adapt its state-centric approach to deal with a diversity of actors in conflict situations to protect its interests. Beijing started expanding ties with the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) in 2005, and has since strengthened the relationship through bilateral visits, provision of assistance to post-conflict reconstruction in the South, and the opening of a consulate-general in Juba.199 The bulk of Chinese oil fields are in the South, which could secede under a self-determination referendum planned for 2011.

Beijing has shown interest in the fate of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), expressing concern at the October 2007 announcement by the SPLM that it was withdrawing cooperation with the National Congress Party in the government.200 This refocused international attention on the future of the peace agreement, underlining how Darfur had overshadowed important issues pertaining to the North–South peace framework. China also extended a $3 million grant to Sudan for North–South unity in November 2008.201 And given its ability to maintain close relationships with both the North and South, some Western diplomats are already expecting that China will play a significant role in mediation in the context of the 2011 referendum to avoid another civil war.202

The outcry over Darfur has also heightened China’s awareness of the complexity of the various voices that shape international policy and how they operate. China has learned that governments can do nothing to temper the positions of advocacy and lobbying groups, and that the best way to deal with them is to reach out to them directly.203 The proactive approach of diplomats such as Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun and Special Envoy Liu Guijin in engaging many of the diverse lobbies involved in the Darfur issue is unprecedented in Chinese foreign policy. China is also growing more sophisticated in its dealings with non-state actors in other contexts, such as its engagement with ethnic groups along its border with Myanmar.204 As peacekeeping missions increasingly encounter problems from non-state actors and other spoilers, China’s willingness to adapt its state-centric approach and engage with them demonstrates a more pragmatic approach to conflict resolution.

### B. USE OF FORCE ONLY IN SELF-DEFENCE

While China’s stated position is that the use of force in peacekeeping can only be in self-defence, it has deviated from this in practice. Its current position is that force is to be used as a last resort and with Security Council authorisation. In explaining its abstentions and threatened vetoes on resolutions before 2000, China argued that using military force would add to the difficulties of reaching an eventual settlement, resulting in more harm than good.205 In an analysis of sixteen resolutions from 1992 to 1999 authorising use of force operations under Chapter VII,206 China abstained on seven on the grounds of opposition to the use of force.207

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197 This will have implications for force protection, already a significant issue for China. See fn. 190. Crisis Group interview, New York, 1 February 2009.
199 Crisis Group Report, China’s Thirst for Oil, op. cit. See also Dan Large, “China & the Contradictions of ‘Non-interference’ in Sudan”, op. cit.
200 Dan Large, “China and the Contradictions of ‘Non-interference’ in Sudan”, op. cit., p. 103.
On the other nine, despite its stated opposition, use of force was deemed acceptable under various conditions such as, “the consent of the party was obtained”,208 “it was at request”,209 “it was a unique situation”,210 or “it was a humanitarian situation”.211

China also voted in favour of peace operations in Somalia in 1992, which were authorised to use force under Chapter VII, although insisting that they were “exceptional” measures in view of the unique situation there and should not constitute a precedent.212 The United Task Force (UNITAF) was a coalition operation with the U.S. as the pivotal country, and the second UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) was commanded by the UN. In November 1990, through abstention, China also allowed Resolution 678 to pass, which authorised member states to use all necessary means to restore international peace and security after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.213 Beijing was in a difficult situation, given its disagreement with the invasion and reluctance to see the U.S.-led coalition attack Iraq. Following the end of the first Gulf War, China sent twenty military observers to the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM). One of the reasons for allowing such invasive operations was its reluctance to be seen as obstructionist by hindering humanitarian assistance.214

After 1999, Beijing has had to balance its reservations about the use of force with increasing international attention to humanitarian concerns.215 Since 1999 it has not opposed the use of force in peacekeeping mandates if host country consent and Security Council authorisation were obtained. It often requests, however, that such positions not constitute a precedent.216

China now participates in complex peacekeeping missions that permit the use of coercive action, including military force. In the UN-authorised multinational force in East Timor (INTERFET), the mission was permitted to “take all necessary measures” to restore peace and security, as are the missions in Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone and the DRC, all of which have included Chinese peacekeepers.217 Beijing cites the impossibility of having a single criterion for the use of force and has advocated a case-by-case approach.218

Beijing’s position on the use of force by coalitions of the willing and “pivotal states” has also shifted.219 While abstaining from resolutions that subcontracted peace enforcement tasks to pivotal states, in the cases of Rwanda, Haiti and Bosnia, it did not abstain from the resolutions authorising either the Implementation Force (IFOR) or Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia in 1995, even though these were robust peace support operations run by NATO. But it has supported every peacekeeping operation since, including those with peace enforcement tasks carried out by pivotal states.220

C. INVOLVEMENT OF REGIONAL ACTORS

China strongly supports an enhanced role for regional organisations in peacekeeping, provided that those missions are authorised by the Security Council.221

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216 Ibid.
217 The UN mission in the DRC (MONUC), for example, established in 1999, has a robust mission statement that includes “forcibly implementing” a ceasefire and “using all means deemed necessary” to protect civilians and improve security. In that role, it has not shied away from fighting, even with helicopter gunships, taking sides with the government, and pursuing and arresting individuals indicted by the ICC.
218 “Given the varying causes and nature of crises, it is both unrealistic and hugely controversial to formulate a one-size-fits-all rule or criterion on the use of force. Whether to use force or not should be decided by the Security Council in light of the reality of conflicts on a case-by-case basis”. “Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms”, op. cit.
220 Stefan Staehle, “China’s Participation in the United Nations Peacekeeping Regime”, op. cit., p. 44. The pivotal states in question were France for Rwanda, the U.S. for Haiti and the U.S. and Europe for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
221 “While the role of the Security Council is essential to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa, regional organizations, such as the African Union, have a deep understanding of regional issues, and can play a greater role in maintaining peace and stability in Africa….The two sides should form a synergy based on each other’s strengths, founded on equality, mutual respect, complementarity and mutual benefit. That partnership should also be based on a predictable, sustainable and flexible framework”. Statement
China argues that regional organisations have “a unique political, moral and geographical advantage in handling conflict prevention and resolution” in their particular region. China’s former ambassador to the UN, Zhang Yishan, argued that greater support to African regional organisations, where the majority of peacekeeping missions occur, should be a top priority in peacekeeping reform. This practice of support to regional organisations applies primarily to Africa and Asia, although China has supported other regional initiatives. Such a stance is in line with UN policy and practice, particularly given current demands on peacekeeping.

Chinese representatives regularly refer to the positions of regional organisations as justification for both thwarting international action and being more proactive than usual. The AU’s request for peacekeeping in Sudan was an important condition, for example, for Chinese political and material support. In addition to sending its own peacekeepers, China has financially supported AU peacekeeping in Darfur. Despite its general hostility to sanctions, Beijing supported the establishment of a sanctions committee in Sierra Leone after the AU endorsed it, citing the position of African countries. And while China was originally opposed to the use of Chapter VII language in Resolution 1679 (2006) authorising the deployment of a joint AU-UN technical assessment mission to Sudan, it ended up voting in favour on the basis of its political support for the African Union, and because the draft was cosponsored, among others, by all three African states on the Security Council. China also approached AU countries to ask for a formal request for Chinese assistance in counter-piracy efforts off the coast of Somalia two weeks prior to joining the mission.

For the past two years, China has been vocal in calling for a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia. The key to its support for such a mission, despite the lack of a peace to keep and the reluctance of Russia, France and the UK to deploy troops, is the regional push behind it. When pressed on why it would support the...
keeping operation in circumstances under which China has previously argued that peacekeeping cannot be effective, an official reasoned that the AU was requesting this UN peacekeeping operation, and that to refuse would demonstrate selectivity given that an operation was established in Sudan based on such a request.233

China also relies on the positions of regional organisations to thwart international action. This practice has been very useful when such organisations support the non-interventionist approach preferred by China and therefore prevent its isolation on key issues.234 A key reason for the Chinese veto of a 2007 Security Council draft resolution on Myanmar was ASEAN’s lack of support for the resolution and its conviction that Myanmar was not a threat to international peace and security. In vetoing the draft resolution, Ambassador Wang Guangya noted, “None of Myanmar’s immediate neighbours, ASEAN members or most Asia-Pacific countries believed that the current situation in Myanmar posed a threat to regional peace and security”.235 After the shooting of monks in Rangoon in September 2008, China’s critical statements on Myanmar in the Security Council and UN Human Rights Council mirrored ASEAN’s growing exasperation over the situation.236

232 The official Chinese perspective maintains that the deployment of peacekeepers should not be viewed as a panacea for all conflicts nor should peacekeepers be deployed when there is no peace to keep. Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, 20 October 2008 and 9 January 2009.


234 China’s aversion to being alone in the opposing camp is linked to its desire to minimise the opprobrium costs of its actions. Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, op. cit., pp. 131, 136.


236 In past years, there has been a correlation between ASEAN and China’s actions on Myanmar. When large-scale public protests broke out following an unannounced hike in fuel prices on 15 August 2007, Beijing began to quietly urge the generals to exercise restraint. After Singapore’s Foreign Minister George Yeo, the chair of ASEAN, wrote to the government expressing the group’s “revulsion” at the violent repression of demonstrators and “strongly urged Myanmar to exercise utmost restraint and seek a political solution”, China supported an 11 October Security Council statement and a 2 October resolution in the UN Human Rights Council deploiring the violence against peaceful protesters. It pressured the Burmese government to receive the UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari and grant him access to senior generals and Aung San Suu Kyi. Chinese officials continue to hold that there is no legal justification for sanctions as the situation in Myanmar never constituted a threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII. Crisis Group interviews, Bangkok, 26 January; Yangon, 1 February 2009. See also Stephanie Kleine-Ahlebrandt and Andrew Small, “China’s New Dictatorship Diplomacy: Is Beijing Parting with Pariahs?”, op. cit., pp. 48-50.

237 On 11 July 2008, China vetoed a Security Council draft resolution calling for sanctions on Zimbabwe, including a travel ban and assets freeze on President Robert Mugabe and twelve other individuals. China was joined by Russia, South Africa, Libya and Vietnam in objecting to the draft.

V. KEY AGENCIES IN CHINESE PEACEKEEPING

The Chinese government’s internal processes for deciding to participate in peacekeeping and deploying personnel are complex. There are significant differences among the agencies concerned in their perceptions of peacekeeping and enthusiasm for Chinese involvement. Further growth in China’s peacekeeping role may well require efforts to improve coordination.

A. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

In New York, when the UN Security Council approves the creation of a peacekeeping mission, DPKO starts to plan a senior leadership team and seek financial, personnel and supply contributions from member states. Upon receiving such a request, the Chinese permanent mission to the UN reports back to MFA.239

At the MFA, the department of international organisations and conferences and the regional department covering the conflict area will research the issue and then make a recommendation on the level, type and length of participation, if any, to the State Council and the Central Military Commission.

The State Council then consults with the Central Military Commission on the proposal and the composition of peacekeepers. In China’s military structure, the actual military forces are under the authority of the Central Military Commission rather than the Ministry of National Defence (MND). The MND only has four departments: the general office, foreign affairs office, peacekeeping affairs office and conscription office. In peacekeeping matters, the MND is responsible for coordination between the military branch and the foreign policy circle, rather than being the actual decision-maker.

The Central Military Commission, China’s top military organ, is comprised of four main departments: the general staff department, the general logistics department, the general armaments department and the general political department, and oversees the seven military regions under the People’s Liberation Army (Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu). It decides which military region will be assigned to a given peacekeeping mission.

The Ministry of Public Security (the commanding authority of the People’s Armed Police and Civilian Police), in consultation with the Central Military Commission, will select the police force to join peacekeeping missions already approved by both the State Council and Central Military Commission. Once such decisions are made, the Chinese permanent mission in New York (particularly its military staff) negotiates the logistical and operational details of China’s participation with DPKO. China is a very tough negotiator when developing and agreeing to the memoranda of understanding that govern all countries’ peacekeeping deployments, but it is correspondingly known to make great efforts to respect the agreement on the ground.240 In such negotiations, in recent years China has put significant emphasis on force protection.

The decision-making process on participation in peacekeeping is highly contentious as it pits the diverging interests and competing priorities of the various agencies against one another. The process is fraught with friction both in New York and Beijing.241 The MFA is the most active body in promoting greater Chinese involvement in peacekeeping given its mandate of ensuring that China’s international interests are served and that it projects a positive image abroad. However, for the military, peacekeeping is not a top priority in relation to its overall mandate of maintaining national security.242 The debate between the MFA and the military on peacekeeping exposes deeper internal divisions that China must resolve as it continues on its path towards becoming a global power: the debate between China’s increasing international responsibility as a rising power and its traditional principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs. The divergence between the agendas of military and diplomatic actors is common in most countries, as is the difficulty foreign ministries encounter in asserting their positions with generally more powerful defence institutions sceptical of multilateralism.

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239 Of course, informal consultations between DPKO and potential troop-contributors take place earlier, as the Secretary-General is always asked by the UNSC as to whether there are likely potential contributors. But Beijing and its bureaucracy are not mobilised until a formal request is received from New York.

240 Crisis Group interviews, UN officials, 8-9 January 2009.

241 The MOU negotiation process in New York, for example, exposes important differences in approach between the MFA and the PLA. Crisis Group interviews, New York and Beijing, January 2009.

242 It took the MFA two months to convince the PLA to send a naval fleet to Somalia as part of the multinational operation against piracy. Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 19 January 2009. For more information on the tensions between the MFA and PLA in the context of China’s multilateral diplomacy, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, op. cit.
B. MAIN CONTRIBUTING AGENCIES

China has made substantial contributions of “force enablers” (troops from the PLA) and police (from the People’s Armed Police, PAP). The two primary contributing agencies are the PLA and the public security ministry. While combat troops have not yet been part of China’s peacekeeping contributions, statements from PLA officials, offers to deploy combat troops in Lebanon, efforts to protect engineering units in Sudan and the PLA Navy’s deployment to the Gulf of Aden indicate that they are likely to be in the future.

I. People’s Liberation Army

a. Contribution

The total number of PLA peacekeepers deployed since China began participating in UN missions now exceeds 10,000. The majority are units of enablers, who have responsibility for engineering, medical, transportation, logistics and communications. These contributions are considered an asset by the UN military command because they are lacking in many peacekeeping operations.

China started providing military officers to peacekeeping operations in 1991. Military observers and officers are assigned to posts as individuals and are therefore more easily appointed and dispatched than formed units. As China’s interest in peacekeeping has increased, so too has the calibre of both the civilian and military officers provided for peacekeeping operations. In August 2007, Major General Zhao Jingmin was appointed as force commander of the Western Sahara peacekeeping mission (MINURSO) and became the first Chinese national to serve in that role.

b. Attitude towards peacekeeping

The PLA has proven a willing participant in peacekeeping, notwithstanding conflicting attitudes among its leaders. Some support peacekeeping for the benefits listed below, others oppose it for ideological reasons, while others see it as a low priority.

As noted above, the PLA benefits from the unique training and operational experience provided by peacekeeping missions to enhance its technical skills and promote force modernisation. It also enables the PLA to assess the capabilities of other militaries and creates opportunities for military exchanges and cooperation. Some in the older generation are ideologically opposed to all forms of foreign intervention, reflecting the PLA’s traditional concerns for territorial consolidation and internal stability within China itself. In addition, they believe that the primary focus of the PLA is to maintain the security of the nation’s periphery by building a deterrent armed force and actively modernising China’s armed forces. Many in the PLA are also reluctant to send troops overseas when there are important tasks at home. For some of them, peacekeeping is of marginal importance.

While it still has a long way to go in terms of transparency and engagement, the PLA’s participation in peacekeeping is a sign of its increasing openness.

243 See footnote 79.
244 China’s armed forces are made up of the PAP, the active and reserve units of the PLA, and the people’s militia, all of which are directed by the Central Military Commission under the leadership of the Communist Party of China’s Central Committee. The People’s Armed Police Force, which falls under the direct jurisdiction of the public security ministry and is not part of the PLA, is tasked with maintaining internal security and social order. The active forces of the PLA make up China’s standing army, and are responsible for defensive combat and helping to maintain social order. Reservists receive military training in peacetime and help to maintain social order, and in wartime are incorporated into the active service. The militia perform combat service support and defensive operations, and help to maintain social order.
245 “中国军队已累计派遣维和军事人员超过一万人次” ([“Chinese military has sent more than 10,000 military personnel for peacekeeping”], Xinhua, 30 June 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2008-06/30/content_8462303.htm. See Appendix F, “Chinese Contributions by Peacekeeping Missions” for PLA and PAP contributions to current peacekeeping missions. PLA peacekeepers come from six of China’s seven military regions. Each region takes responsibility for a particular deployment: the Beijing military region deployed to Liberia; Lanzhou region to the DRC; Chengdu to Lebanon; Nanjing and Shenyang to Liberia; and Jinan to Darfur. The Guangzhou region has carried out the majority of the transportation logistics for Chinese peacekeepers to Lebanon.
249 Within the PLA are both pro- and anti- “engagement with the West” factions, but the PLA is generally dominated by what one Chinese academic calls “conservative nationalism”, the key tenets of which are preserving territorial integrity, national unity, internal stability, and a conservative and defensive military posture focused on “consolidating what it has under its control rather than acquiring what it has claimed”. See Nan Li, “PLA Conservative Nationalism”, in Stephen J. Flanagan and Michael E. Marti, The People’s Liberation Army and China in Transition (Washington DC, 2003).
252 The PLA continues to be the most opaque and conservative institution in China and Beijing significantly under-reports its defence expenditures. See “Senior PLA officer: China’s military power no threat to any country”, Xinhua, 6 March 2008, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/63672
Indeed, today’s PLA is far more open and active in international military exchanges and cooperation than in the past.\(^\text{253}\) Chinese officials in charge of peacekeeping affairs are increasingly visible at international security seminars and conferences. Service in a peacekeeping mission is seen as one way of furthering one’s career, which was not the case in previous years.\(^\text{254}\) The promotion process for military officers now places a high value on officers’ relationships with military personnel from other nations, and on officers’ first-hand exposure to and understanding of foreign military cultures.\(^\text{255}\)

International exchanges on peacemaking and security not only provide an opportunity to learn from others, but also assist with integration into the international community.\(^\text{256}\) China’s participation in multilateral security organisations and bilateral activities helps to increase military transparency, and may also encourage the development of a greater regional peacekeeping capacity in partnership with other Asia-Pacific countries.\(^\text{257}\) The PLA’s own military training centre for peacekeepers – an army equivalent to the police’s Langfang peacekeeping training centre – is scheduled to open in Huairou, near Beijing, in June 2009, a sign of a sustained, long-term commitment to committing troops and improving the quality of those troops.\(^\text{258}\)

\[\text{Page 28}\]

\[\text{Crisis Group Asia Report N°166, 17 April 2009}\]

\[\text{China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping}\]

**c. Combat troops**

The possibility of China contributing combat troops to serve under a UN flag is a subject of increasing speculation. While no official policy prohibits the provision of combat troops to peacekeeping missions, China has not yet deployed such troops. The reasons are several. China is wary of being perceived as too assertive by the West or other developing countries, and overstepping the line between appearing responsible and threatening.\(^\text{260}\) The leadership is mindful that the sight of PLA combat troops operating outside its territory might fuel the mistrust of those who remain sceptical of its intentions and provide further support to “China threat” theories.\(^\text{261}\) Indeed, that China’s troops do not engage in combat but rather provide “softer” security and engineering functions – training local police, providing public security, reforming security and legal processes, building camps, and digging wells – might invoke a softer image of Chinese power.\(^\text{262}\) Another concern is that the capabilities and preparedness of its combat troops, or lack thereof, might be exposed.\(^\text{263}\) It is also possible that the more blurred relationship with host country consent that could result from deploying combat troops might give Beijing pause.\(^\text{264}\)

Within China, the belief that benefits accrued from participation would outweigh the drawbacks is gaining traction.\(^\text{265}\) In the first international media interview held on the defence ministry premises in November 2008, Major General Qian Lihua, the head of foreign affairs, said that China hopes to start sending combat troops “soon”.\(^\text{266}\) A month later, China sent naval ships to join an international fleet in the waters off Somalia in the first active deployment of its kind outside the

\[\text{See footnote 113.}\]

\[\text{See note 103 and 109 on socialisation in international institutions.}\]


\[\text{The Tragedy of Great Power Politics}\]

\[\text{Asian Survey}\]

\[\text{Financial Times}\]

\[\text{Source: 260 Crisis Group interview, New York, 19 September 2008.}\]

\[\text{261 See footnote 113.}\]

\[\text{262 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 3 September 2008.}\]

\[\text{263 See note 103 and 109 on socialisation in international institutions.}\]


\[\text{265 The Tragedy of Great Power Politics}\]

\[\text{Asian Century}\]

\[\text{Financial Times}\]

\[\text{Source: 260 Crisis Group interview, New York, 19 September 2008.}\]

\[\text{261 See footnote 113.}\]

\[\text{262 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 3 September 2008.}\]

\[\text{263 See note 103 and 109 on socialisation in international institutions.}\]


\[\text{265 The Tragedy of Great Power Politics}\]

\[\text{Asian Century}\]

\[\text{Financial Times}\]

\[\text{Source: 260 Crisis Group interview, New York, 19 September 2008.}\]

\[\text{261 See footnote 113.}\]

\[\text{262 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 3 September 2008.}\]

\[\text{263 See note 103 and 109 on socialisation in international institutions.}\]


\[\text{265 The Tragedy of Great Power Politics}\]

\[\text{Asian Century}\]

\[\text{Financial Times}\]
Pacific region. Notably, China has already offered combat troops to the UN. When Security Council Resolution 1701 raised troop numbers in southern Lebanon to 15,000, China offered 1,000 combat troops (only months after one of its peacekeepers was killed in a UN observatory post during an Israeli bombing raid). In the end, offers from countries with other logistical advantages were accepted by the UN instead. And as previously noted, China insisted on sending its own combat troops alongside its engineering force in the Sudan, a battle that it eventually lost.

China’s ability to deploy significant numbers of troops over long distances is also constrained by its lack of airlift and sealift capacity. As noted above, China has not indicated any immediate plans to offer PLA airlift support to UN peacekeeping operations. UN requests for helicopters have been declined for a number of reasons, including language barriers between Chinese pilots and other mission staff, the reluctance of the PLA to reveal the technological level of its helicopters, and the expense and risk involved in deploying such significant military hardware.

2. Police

a. Contribution

Both PAP and civilian police are deployed to UN peacekeeping operations, either as units or individuals. Over the past eight years, China has sent more than 900 police to missions in East Timor, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Haiti and Sudan. Among these, Chinese participation in Haiti has been the largest (648 in total, including 625 anti-riot police), and East Timor the longest (from 2000-2008).

b. Selection and training

Throughout the years, the police have implemented strict criteria for selection of peacekeepers and invested heavily in their training. In August 1998, the Central Party School issued “Suggestions on the Selection of Civilian Police to Participate in UNPKO”, formally initiating training for civilian police in peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping personnel training facilities for civilian police have since been established in Langfang, Hebei province, and Nanjing. The Civilian Peacekeeping Police Training Centre in Langfang is the largest peacekeeping personnel training centre in Asia. China states that it is committed to sending “the best of the best” as peacekeepers.

Indeed, admission to Langfang is highly competitive: in 2004, of 500 police officers qualified to take the entrance exams, less than 60 officers passed. To qualify, individuals must possess a bachelor’s degree, English proficiency, five years’ experience in the field of public security with strong professional skills, two years’ driving experience and familiarity with UN rules and regulations. Candidates then undergo physical and psychological tests and a three-month training course to equip them for their peacekeeping tasks. According to the Public Security Bureau, the Chinese police train for the following tasks: maintaining law and order (crowd control, VIP protection, hostage rescue), training local police, reconstructing the local legal system, assisting in law enforcement, protecting civilian rights and assisting in humanitarian relief efforts.

Given the increasing relevance of international human

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268 Crisis Group interviews, New York, 15 November 2008; Beijing, 19 February 2009. See also “China ups Lebanon force to 1,000”, BBC News, 18 September 2006; 中国原想派一支装甲兵参加联合国驻黎维和部队["China had first planned to send military troops to participate in United Nations peacekeeping mission in Lebanon"], Xinhua, 28 September 2006.
269 Ibid; Crisis Group interview, New York, 7 January 2009.
270 See footnote 190. Force protection is an increasingly important issue for China, which it is addressing in the context of other peacekeeping missions.
271 Ibid. This could of course change in the future. As seen, China deployed its navy to the coast of Somalia in line with related UN resolutions on combating pirates off the Somali coast, the first time the Chinese navy carried out escorting missions outside Chinese waters. “China to send navy to fight Somali pirates”, Xinhua, 18 December 2008.
274 张慧玉 [Zhang Huiyu], 《透视中国参与联合国维和行动》 [“A Survey of China’s Participation in Peacekeeping Missions”], op. cit.
 rights and humanitarian law to mission mandates, these areas warrant a particular training focus.\textsuperscript{280} The candidates then take a UN-administered exam, which three out of four candidates pass.\textsuperscript{281}

c. Attitude towards peacekeeping

The Chinese police have demonstrated a higher level of enthusiasm and fewer concerns over participation in peacekeeping than their military counterparts. Not only is the deployment of a police force in peacekeeping operations generally considered less sensitive than that of a military force, but the police officers themselves are reportedly more open to such assignments.\textsuperscript{282} The primary task for armed police in peacekeeping is to work with local police, making it less likely that they will be involved in confrontations with other forces. This also implies fewer concerns about revealing their capabilities.

The police force benefits considerably from participation in UN peacekeeping operations. According to the public security ministry’s deputy director for international cooperation, “The participation in UNPKO by Chinese police helps to build the professional and diligent image of Chinese police. It also helps us to modernize our ideas, principles, management structure and technologies through field operations. We are able to strengthen our skills in international law enforcement, build human resources in enforcement cooperation, and expedite the reform of our team.”\textsuperscript{283}

The police force has also been more enthusiastic than the military with regard to international cooperation and exchanges. The attention and emphasis upon the Langfang training centre is one example. The centre regularly receives delegations from the UN and various countries,\textsuperscript{284} and has organised numerous international seminars on training and education of peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{285} Such a training centre could easily be replicated by other major troop-contributing countries to improve the quality and quantity of police available for UN missions. In September 2006, China and the DPKO hosted joint seminars to develop training modules for formed police unit training.\textsuperscript{286}

C. CONSTRAINTS

Despite the significant potential China presents in terms of numbers,\textsuperscript{287} it has already exhausted its supply of competent English speakers.\textsuperscript{288} For many years, rural


\textsuperscript{281} 《中国维和警察 8 年出动 1373 人次覆盖全球》[“Chinese police have sent 1373 peacekeepers to 7 missions in the past 8 years”], 法制日报 [Legal Daily], 12 October 2008, at http://news.cctv.com/china/20081012/101957.shtml.

\textsuperscript{282} Langfang has welcomed delegations from DPKO, the U.S., UK, Germany, Canada and Norway. The centre has also sent delegations and instructors to the UK, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Italy, Thailand and East Timor for visits, training and seminars. “A Brief Introduction to China Peacekeeping CivPol Training Center”, Guangdong provincial public security department, 28 March 2007, at www.gdga.gov.cn/ztbd/whjc/xbpx/t20070328_130119.html.


\textsuperscript{284} Yin He, “China’s Changing Policy on Peacekeeping Operations”, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{285} Although China has almost 2 million police, the average police-to-population ratio in China is extremely low: averaging eight or nine officers to every 10,000 population, in contrast to Western countries which number between 25 and 70.

\textsuperscript{286} Elaine Jeffreys, China, Sex and Prostitution (New York, 2004), p. 153.

\textsuperscript{287} Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 17 October 2008. UN peacekeepers are required to speak either French or English. English is the preferred language, however, for reasons pointed out by an official of the British Council, which offers
youth and unemployed urban populations were targeted for military recruitment, and so the majority of China’s military personnel do not have college degrees. However, in 2008 the defence ministry issued directives shifting the focus to college students and graduates. These new recruitment standards should expand the pool of potential peacekeepers by increasing the proportion of military personnel with prior English language skills.

Another important measure is to provide English training for existing personnel. For several years, the PLA has been in discussions with the UK regarding assistance in English training for peacekeepers. PLA representatives have been sent abroad to attend English training courses in Estonia, with the aim that these individuals would return to China and build a self-sustaining curriculum in English training. The UK assisted in the establishment of English training courses for the PLA’s peacekeepers and has encouraged the PLA’s top officials to visit and make use of the PAP’s Langfang training centre, given its already-established English language training curriculum. However, top PLA staff in charge of peacekeeping have yet to visit Langfang.

China’s contributions to peacekeeping are also restricted by practical matters of political, military and bureaucratic capacity, competition and coordination. A significant increase would require serious and long-term advance planning by the various actors involved as well as a more unified approach. Some efforts have been made to enhance cooperation between different government bureaus involved in peacekeeping. PLA-PAP joint integrated training for peacekeepers has been organised in Nanjing, for example. The PLA also held its first major meeting on peacekeeping in June 2007, during which senior representatives from the PLA and the foreign affairs, finance and public security ministries discussed ways to improve the selection, preparation and deployment of peacekeeping troops. Such inter-agency cooperation could be institutionalised through the establishment of a dedicated peacekeeping affairs office under the bureau of international organisations in the MFA. Such an office could develop and coordinating peacekeeping policy, and manage communication between relevant government bodies and between Beijing and the permanent mission to the UN in New York.

At the same time, while the key decisions will remain internal to China, the UN and concerned countries can play an important role in helping shape its calculations. While the foreign ministry is the most supportive of peacekeeping, it is rarely able to assert its position over more powerful actors such as the military. Traditional norms of sovereignty and non-intervention will continue to play an important role in decision-making. The final arbiter remains the top leadership. The UN and countries interested in stepping up China’s peacekeeping role should therefore deliver consistent messages at the highest political levels. China needs to be asked, and asked in a very public way. This action not only provides support to the most progressive internal actors, but also serves public relations purposes, as Beijing does not want to be seen as forcing itself on the global stage. Similarly, China will be more willing to contribute to peacekeeping endorsed by regional organisations, and when its actions do not set off alarm bells in developing country capitals or cause significant problems in its other relationships.

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290 Ibid. Bilateral cooperation on capacity building and training has extended beyond language training. For example, senior military officers participated in peacekeeping training activities with the French foreign affairs ministry in 2003, with the understanding that participants would set up self-sustaining training activities upon their return to China. These activities allow Chinese peacekeepers to learn from security forces with a wealth of experience in peacekeeping operations, improving both their skills and capacity to work together with other security forces, and should be further expanded.

291 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 28-29 October 2008; and Gill and Huang, “China’s Expanding Peacekeeping Role: its Significance and the Policy Implications”, op. cit.
292 Ibid.
293 Gill and Huang, “China’s Expanding Peacekeeping Role: its Significance and the Policy Implications”, op. cit.
294 Crisis Group interview, UN official, New York, 3 September 2008; Western diplomat, Beijing 11 February 2009.
VI. CONCLUSION

China’s increasing interest and participation in peacekeeping is a positive development for the UN and international community. Its changing attitudes are tied to recognition of the importance of stability and prosperity promoted by the UN’s system of collective security. China knows that in order to play a more active role in that system and to protect its interests, it needs to use the tools of the UN collective security system, including peacekeeping. Chinese integration into the system, and willingness to take on greater responsibility, is strengthening that system and allaying some of the concerns about the destabilising effects of China’s rise.

In light of continued larger and more complex peacekeeping missions, China has the potential to deploy precisely the types of peacekeepers that UN missions are presently lacking. With China’s troop contributions come invaluable political support for peacekeeping operations in the Security Council and a willingness to use its unique relationships with some governments in conflict areas to broker acceptance of peacekeeping. In limited cases, China appears to be moving toward greater engagement in resolving the underlying conflicts that give rise to the peacekeeping mission. In addition to an increase in material and personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping, China should be encouraged to work alongside the UN and other leading peacekeeping contributors to develop a peacekeeping policy and improve the effectiveness of mandates, as well as become more active in the work of the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations. If China is to become an integral player in peacekeeping, it should also enhance its financial contributions in line with its rising economic strength.

China will proceed at its own pace in increasing its capacity to contribute to peacekeeping operations. Given the importance it still places on sovereignty and non-interference, its wariness of stoking fears of the “China threat”, and varying degrees of enthusiasm among the actors involved, the UN and Western governments should make explicit requests for further contributions.

In addition to encouraging increased Chinese participation, Western governments, and especially those of P-5 countries, should also recommit to peacekeeping operations financially and politically, but especially in terms of troop contributions. In particular, U.S. support for UN peacekeeping operations is likely to encourage greater Chinese contributions. Both of these moves would make China more comfortable with increasing its participation and encourage it to contribute as many troops as it has the capacity to. For its part, China should respond favourably to such requests, and put in place measures to rapidly increase its capacity to deploy troops. A significant increase in peacekeeping participation at the request of the UN would present a unique opportunity for China to showcase the sincerity of its commitment to building a harmonious world and playing the role of a responsible great power.

In advocating peacekeeping missions or encouraging a greater Chinese role in conflict resolution, Western governments and UN officials should be mindful of China’s peacekeeping motivations and principles. In particular, they should also direct their advocacy of peacekeeping operations and conflict resolution goals toward the relevant regional organisations. The support and cooperation of regional organisations is likely to improve the chances of a successful UN peacekeeping mission, while simultaneously improving the chances of Chinese support for any Security Council resolution authorising or revising such a mission.

Beijing/New York/Brussels, 17 April 2009
APPENDIX A

CHINESE CONTRIBUTIONS BY PEACEKEEPING MISSION

- UNMIK, Kosovo: 18 police
- UNTSO, Middle East: 2 military observers
- UNIFIL, Lebanon: 343 troops
- UNMIT, Timor-Leste: 21 police, 2 military observers
- MINUSTAH, Haiti: 143 police
- MINUSO, Western Sahara: 12 military observers
- UNMIL, Liberia: 563 troops, 4 police, 2 military observers
- UNOCI, Côte d’Ivoire: 7 military observers
- MONUC, Congo: 218 troops, 16 military observers
- UNAMID, Darfur, Sudan: 321 troops
- UNMIS, Sudan: 444 troops, 18 police, 12 military observers
APPENDIX B

CHINA’S TOTAL UN PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTIONS, 2003-2008

No. of personnel

Military observers  Civilian police  Troops

APPENDIX C

CHINA’S UN PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL RANKING
AMONG ALL UN MEMBER STATES

Source: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
## APPENDIX D

### TOP TROOP CONTRIBUTORS TO UN PEACEKEEPING

*As at 31 December 2008*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number Deployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pakistan</td>
<td>11,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Bangladesh</td>
<td>9,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. India</td>
<td>8,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Nigeria</td>
<td>5,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Nepal</td>
<td>3,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Rwanda</td>
<td>3,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ghana</td>
<td>3,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Jordan</td>
<td>3,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Uruguay</td>
<td>2,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Italy</td>
<td>2,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Ethiopia</td>
<td>2,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Egypt</td>
<td>2,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. France</td>
<td>2,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. China</td>
<td>2,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. South Africa</td>
<td>2,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Senegal</td>
<td>1,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Morocco</td>
<td>1,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Indonesia</td>
<td>1,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Benin</td>
<td>1,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Brazil</td>
<td>1,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Spain</td>
<td>1,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Kenya</td>
<td>980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Malaysia</td>
<td>936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Argentina</td>
<td>893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. United Kingdom</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. Russia</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67. United States of America</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX E

TOP 20 PROVIDERS OF ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN PEACEKEEPING BUDGET

As of January 2008

Source: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Department of Public Information
APPENDIX F

WESTERN COUNTRIES’ CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 2000-2008

TROOPS DEPLOYED IN UN AND NON-UN OPERATIONS BY COUNTRIES
WITH THE LARGEST MILITARIES AND P-5 COUNTRIES

Sources:
http://isidapp.dndc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/man0.pdf
ISAF (NATO-Afghanistan) (estimate) http://www.nato.int/isaf/docs/epub/pdf/isaf_placements_090112.pdf
KFOR (NATO Kosovo) http://www.nato.int/kfor/strctn/tns/placements/kfor_placements.pdf
Indian Air Force http://indianairforce.nic.in/
Bosnia/Herzegovina with EUFOR BiH http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=145&Itemid=62
APPENDIX II

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 130 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired by the former European Commissioner for External Relations Christopher Patten and former U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

Crisis Group’s international headquarters are in Brussels, with major advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based as a legal entity) and New York, a smaller one in London and liaison presences in Moscow and Beijing. The organisation currently operates nine regional offices (in Bishkek, Bogotá, Dakar, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, Nairobi, Pristina and Tbilisi) and has local field representation in eighteen additional locations (Abuja, Baku, Bangkok, Beirut, Cairo, Colombo, Damascus, Dili, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kathmandu, Kinshasa, Ouagadougou, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria, Sarajevo, Seoul and Tehran). Crisis Group currently covers some 60 areas of actual or potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Russia (North Caucasus), Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine; in the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Gulf States, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen; and in Latin America and the Caribbean, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti and Venezuela.


March 2009
APPENDIX I

CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA

CENTRAL ASIA

Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul, Asia Briefing N°45, 16 February 2006 (also available in Russian)
Central Asia: What Role for the European Union?, Asia Report N°113, 10 April 2006
Kyrgyzstan’s Prison System Nightmare, Asia Report N°118, 16 August 2006 (also available in Russian)
Uzbekistan: Europe’s Sanctions Matter, Asia Briefing N°54, 6 November 2006
Kyrgyzstan on the Edge, Asia Briefing N°55, 9 November 2006 (also available in Russian)
Turkmenistan after Niyazov, Asia Briefing N°60, 12 February 2007
Central Asia’s Energy Risks, Asia Report N°133, 24 May 2007 (also available in Russian)
Uzbekistan: Stagnation and Uncertainty, Asia Briefing N°67, 22 August 2007
Political Murder in Central Asia: No Time to End Uzbekistan’s Isolation, Asia Briefing N°76, 13 February 2008
Kyrgyzstan: The Challenge of Judicial Reform, Asia Report N°150, 10 April 2008 (also available in Russian)
Kyrgyzstan: A Deceptive Calm, Asia Briefing N°79, 14 August 2008 (also available in Russian)
Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure, Asia Report N°162, 12 February 2009

NORTH EAST ASIA

China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?, Asia Report N°112, 1 February 2006 (also available in Korean)
After North Korea’s Missile Launch: Are the Nuclear Talks Dead?, Asia Briefing N°52, 9 August 2006 (also available in Korean and Russian)
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