Russia’s Perspectives on International Politics: A Comparison of Liberalist, Realist and Geopolitical Paradigms*

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The purpose of this article is to examine Russian perspectives on international politics. This study will focus on the following questions: What are the characteristics of the Russian understanding of major changes in international politics since the collapse of the Soviet Union; and, what are the implications of Russia’s perspectives on international politics for IR theory in the post-Cold War era?

There are two approaches to analyzing Russia’s perception of international politics. The first focuses on mapping foreign policy orientations in Russia and their influence on official Russian foreign policies. The second analyzes elites’ and masses’ perceptions of the general dynamics of international politics rather than foreign policies.

When we examine discussions on the orientations of Russian foreign policies, we discover a number of different schools. Scholars adopt different criteria for categorizing Russian foreign policy orientations. This categorization ranges from two orientations (Westernism / Eurasianism),¹ three (Liberalist or Atlanticist or Liberal internationalist / Pragmatic Nationalist or Eurasianist / Patriotic Nationalist or Derzhavniki),² four (Pro-Westernist or Moderate Liberalist / Centrist or Moderate Conservatives / Neo Communist / the Extreme right Nationalist),³ to even five (Expansionists / Civilizationists / Stabilizers / Geo-

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3 Alexei G. Arbatov, “Russia’s Foreign Policy Alternatives,” International Security 18:2 (Fall 1993), pp. 9–14; Alexei G. Arbatov, “Russian Foreign Policy Thinking in Transition,” in Vladimir Baranovsky, ed., Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda (Oxford University Press, 1997), Ch. 7; Leszek Buszynski, Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War (West-
economists / Westernizers according to geopolitical thinking in this case).  

These studies greatly contributed to delineating and distinguishing the “ideal types of foreign policy orientations” in discussions of Russian foreign policies and to analyzing how such differentiations influenced Russian foreign policies. They also contributed to identifying the ideological roots of Russian foreign policy thinking by revealing the struggles and competition among foreign policy groups in Russia.  

It is true, however, that most of the existing studies on Russian foreign policy have concentrated mainly on identifying the uniqueness of Russian foreign policy in terms of actions and strategies rather than extending the understanding of foreign policy orientations to that of Russia’s perspective on general international politics. Yet analyzing foreign policies alone may not be sufficient to fully understand Russia’s perspectives on general international political dynamics. In this regard we can question the relationship between foreign policy studies and IR studies.

While there have been scholarly disputes on the mutual relationship between studies on foreign policies and international politics, the two are generally regarded as being separate. The difference between them was especially confirmed by such scholars as Kenneth Waltz and generally accepted by other scholars of international politics.  

However, if studies of international politics are compared to drawing a whole “forest,” foreign policy analysis can be likened to describing “trees.” In this respect, the two approaches can be regarded as being independent and complimentary.

Theories on foreign policy mainly focus on various aspects and sources of a state’s behavior in the international arena, and thus have strength in explaining the rational or irrational behavior of states, considering various working variables in the policy making process. International political theories, on the other hand, focus on analyzing rational behaviors of a state with the strict assumption of “rationality,” adopting as small a number of variables as possible. That is why a state is regarded as a “unitary actor,” with interactions among various interest groups in domestic politics put aside. Accordingly, while the-
ories on foreign policy present complex realities, theories of international politics offer a succinct description of national behaviors with limited variables. Therefore, the latter may provide a more macro-outlook on the performance of a state in the international arena than the former, and the former can provide a more detailed description of a state’s behavior than the latter. These kinds of complementarities should be taken into account in explaining a state’s perspectives on international politics.

What is important to understanding Russian perceptions of international politics is to know, for example, the influence of external threats on Russian foreign policy and its self-image and perception of its prestige in the changing international environment. The various orientations of Russian foreign policy must not be understood only as an outcome of domestic political divisions and pluralism, because they may also be a product of external threats and shifts in international politics and of a changing self-image toward the outside world through the politics of identity.\(^7\) **Hence, it may be necessary to bring Russian perception of international politics to the surface, because this perception lies behind phenomenal approaches to Russian foreign policy.** Bringing Russian perception of international politics to the surface means understanding efforts to build international political theories in Russia. Therefore, this theory building approach to Russian foreign behavior reveals a meaningful distinction absent from existing studies on Russian foreign policy. It requires a clear distinction between international politics as “practice” and as “perception.” Russia’s international politics as “practice” is based on strategic intention and a judgment of capability that comes from recognition of its own identity, and it is expressed through its “foreign policies.”

Yet such a simple analysis of foreign policy can hardly encompass the whole essence of international politics that Russia accepts and projects. Rather, along with the Russian “practice,” an effort to understand international politics as “perception” must be added. Hence, the theory-building process of Russia’s behavior can provide a more comprehensive explanation of Russia’s foreign policies, combining the studies of Russian perspectives on international politics as practice and as perception complementarily.

For this task, we need to understand the ways of thinking that Russians have historically developed to ponder over the world and Russia’s position in it. The results of Russian scholars’ historical and philosophical thinking of Russia’s worldview and identity have accumulated under the term the “Rus-

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sian Idea,” and, in a sense, Russian history can be interpreted as the process of searching for the Russian Idea. The most obvious attempts to catch the essence of “Russian Idea” can be found in the works of Russia’s prominent thinkers and scholars such as P. Chaadaev, V. Odoevskii, I. Kireevskii, A. Khomiakov, K. Aksakov, N. Danilevskii, A. Herzen, K. Leont’ev, F. Dostoevskii, V. Soloviev, E. Trubetskoi, P. Savitskii, V. Il’in, N. Alekseev, G. Florovskii, P. Bitsilli, L. Karsavin, N. Berdiaev, S. Frank, N. Gumilev and others. Since the famous controversy between the “Slavophiles and Westernizers” of the 1840s, three significant traditions of the way to think about Russia have formed: westernizer-atlanticist group, slavophile-nationalist group, geopolitical-eurasianist group. These traditions have continuous effects on the political process and foreign policy itself.

The scholars and political figures, who belong to the westernizer-atlanticist tradition, argue that priority should be given to collaboration and even integration with the West and the international community. These attitudes towards Russia’s place in the world and its internal arrangements are supplemented by a strong Western orientation in foreign policy. They would not regard the West as an adversary, but rather as a partner in the creation of a new world order. According to their opinion, the West and Russia now have the same values – democracy, a market economy, and human rights – and may soon be all threatened by migration, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, and even military aggression from the developing countries in the South.

The westernizer-atlanticist drive of the Gorbachev and Yeltsin periods has evoked an intellectual reaction similar to that of the Slavophiles in the late nineteenth century: an inquiry into the special character of Russia and into Russia’s distinct and special role in world history as a bridge between East and West; a concern about descending into the materialist void of Western culture; and doubts about the wisdom of relying on Western models or Western assistance in the process of reconstructing Russia. The reaction is characterized by a nationalist desire to recapture the greatness of Russia and a dissatisfaction with its secondary role in world affairs. Notions of Russia’s pursuit of an independent role consistent with its great power heritage play a very significant role in this perspective. This tradition is linked to the realist thinking of Rus-

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sian foreign policy. However, according to this perspective, Russia can be a reliable partner only if the West treats her as a great power holding a suitably privileged position.

Since Nikolai Danilevskii, a strong tradition of geopolitical thinking has been at play in the formation of Russia’s perspectives on international politics and its foreign policy. Notions of Russia’s mission which stem from its geopolitically intermediate position between the West and the East are the basis for this tradition. However this tradition gained more and more resolute characteristics and was linked to the imperialist and isolationist thinking. However, a more moderate and revised version of this Eurasian perspective had been forming in the circle of politicians and scholars in the controversies around the Russia’s foreign policies. Those who subscribe to this point of view affirm Russia’s possibilities and need to balance between East and West as well as the desire to be a dominant great power in world politics as a result of its geographical position and mixed cultural heritage.

The three traditions of thought relating to Russia’s worldview and its identity offer the starting point for further study of Russian perspectives on international politics. Currently, Russia is going through the difficult process of establishing its own perspective on international politics. Thus, this article searches for the pattern of Russian perspectives in formation, in order to illuminate the Russian way of thinking on the nature of international politics in the post-Cold War era. In addition, the implications of different perspectives for theory building in international politics will be examined.

**Russian Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity**

Unique features of Russia’s perspectives on international politics as practice can be obtained quite clearly through the investigation of the debates on Russian foreign policy orientations.

First, Russian foreign policy has been framed out of identity politics among different political factions under highly politicized conditions. Structural changes in international politics in the 1990s complicated internal reforms in Russia and the aggravation of socio-economic conditions due to the rapid reforms intensified conflicts between conservatives and progressives in Russian domestic politics. Unfortunately, the aspirations of Russian reformist elites to make Russia strong could not reconcile with the conservative tendency the nation showed during the worsened economy in that period. The disharmony at that time raised a serious question about “Who are we Russians?” This led to conflicting evaluations of Russian identity, which caused a fundamental shift in domestic sources for foreign policies. This transformed

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Russia’s perspectives on international politics, which brought about changes in its foreign policy orientation. The pro-Western liberalist foreign policy led by Andrei Kozyrev faced strong resistance from patriotic nationalists. This patriotic nationalism was triggered by NATO’s expansionist policy externally and internally by Russian society’s conservative response to the liberal reform measures.

Evgenii Primakov, then the newly-appointed foreign minister, tried to redefine and strengthen Russia’s national interest by shifting the foreign policy priority from the West toward the East. Such a foreign policy shift with its anti-Western tendency included strengthening the near-abroad policy, continuous attempts to form a trilateral alliance with India and China, and a strategic partnership with China. However, the policy turned out to be ineffective, putting Russia on a journey of great controversy in search of a genuine identity and national interest. With the end of “the Russian lost decade,” V. Putin as the new leader of the twenty-first century took up the task of filling the wide gap between wishful thinking and grim reality in Russian foreign policy. Russia under Vladimir Putin employed a pragmatic approach to redefine what to adopt or reject, while compromising with the reality of the situation.

This development in Russian foreign policy correlates with the pattern of controversy among the three forms of thought in defining the identity and national interest of Russia and its foreign policy orientations: West-oriented Liberalism, Pragmatic Statism, and Tradition-oriented Nationalism. Each of these forms of thought proposed divergent Russian foreign policy lines, based on different diagnoses of Russian identity and its mission. In the process of foreign policy formation and politics of identity in Russia, these schools have articulated quite successfully their own ways of thinking about Russian foreign behavior. The debates among them also provide good windows to observe Russia’s perspective on international politics. Conceptually, micro-level analysis of foreign policy and macro understanding of patterns of perspectives on international political dynamics are distinct, but the former renders some help in understanding the latter in reality.

Second, in the process of its development, Russian foreign policy has gradually formed a compromising pattern of thinking about foreign behavior. We need to put forward more detailed dynamics of identity politics in the area of the ideologically oriented foreign policy disputes in Russia.

Russian diplomacy, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been transformed according to the Kozyrev doctrine, the Primakov doctrine, and the Putin doctrine. These epochal features are defined as “Americano-centrism,” the “Multi-polar Alternative,” and “Integrationism” by V. Nikonov, or as “Liberal

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Pro-Western Liberalism played a major role in defining Russian foreign policy under the A. Kozyrev doctrine, adopted in the first term of President Yeltsin, which defines Russia’s identity as one of the agents in the West-/US-centered system of liberal democracy and the market economy. Significant challenges to this pro-Western foreign policy came not only from outside, or the expansion of NATO, but also from internal changes that brought more fundamental changes to Russian foreign policy. This change should be understood within the cultural and institutional context of Russian society, since this framework determines the conceptualization of “national interest” and/or the formulation of diplomatic and security policies.

A number of studies of official comments or mainstream discourses in Russia about NATO expansion show that Russian elites and people do not consider it a serious threat to Russia. That means exogenous factors were not crucial to security concerns in Russia. Rather, the NATO expansion was a reflection of Russian domestic politics related to matters of prestige, status, and identity. As pointed out in Alexander Wendt’s “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relation Theory,” the international factor – namely NATO expansion, had forced Russia to redefine its national identity with a changed perception of the outside world, which in turn led to a redefinition of national

12 V. A. Nikov, “Resursy i prioritety vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” A. V. Torkunov et al., eds., Sovremennye mezhdunarodnye otnoshenii i mirovaia politika (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 2006), pp. 729–743; Tsyganov, Russia’s Foreign Policy.

13 For exemplary documents of Russia’s diplomatic policy, see: “Osnovy kontseptii vneshnei politiki Rossii” (April 28, 1993).


interest. This means changes in Russian foreign policy reflect shifts in its perspectives on international politics first.

Criticizing intensively Western-oriented values, the new elite group in Russia justified the altered Russian foreign policy line with a regressive reflection on Russian tradition. The epistemic basis to support this “newly invented identity” has been drawn from Russia’s tradition as a major power, its geopolitical positions as a continental power, pride in its unique culture, and its distinguished tradition of a socialist alternative to western capitalism.

The emergence of the Primakov doctrine could be understood within this context. The anti-Western orientations in foreign policy, called the Primakov doctrine, were a serious attempt to restore Russia’s lost identity and prestige as an empire, and they implied a meaningful shift in diplomatic orientations seeking for, at least rhetorically, a strong Russia. Yet it failed to produce any substantial outcomes as well as major shifts in policies of western countries, because of the wide disparity between wishful thinking and the actual capability of Russia. Its desired identity as a strong power, even though supported domestically, was completely disregarded by the “Others,” namely the West. Recognition by the “Others” seemed possible only through a harmonious concert of the West and Russia. That is, working on an idea was one thing, and its application to real policy was another. This limitation forced Russia’s foreign policy to consider another readjustment.

The Putin government released a series of official documents reflecting such diplomatic readjustments. The major shift of Russia’s perspective on international politics can be found in these materials, indicating that the new strategies were based on realism and pragmatism. Contrary to the “rhetorical” Primakov doctrine, this pragmatic diplomacy set goals based on a realistic estimation of Russia’s capability. The September 11 terrorist attack and the War on Terrorism provided Russia with timely opportunities to restore its damaged pride and status. In other words, Moscow could improve its own image as a

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17 With regard to this change, see: Jeff T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
18 For example, see: “Konseptsiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii” (January 10, 2000); “Voennaia doktrina Rossiskoi Federatsii” (April 21, 2000); “Konseptsiia vneshnei politiki Rossiskoi Federatsii” (June 28, 2000). For materials on the discourses of foreign policy elite group at that time, see: V. Putin, “Rossiia na rubezhe tysyacheletii,” Nezavisimaiia Gazeta (December 30, 1999); V. Putin, Zaiazenie prezidenta RF (September 24, 2001); I. S. Ivanov, Vneshniaia politika Rossii i mir: Stat’i i vystupleniia (Moscows: MGIMO, 2001); I. S. Ivanov, “Rossiia v miroboi politike,” Mezdunarodnaia zhizn’ 5 (2001).
cooperative partner with the US on the matter of global terrorism, no longer a junior partner of the US under A. Kozyrev nor a rhetorical anti-American balancer under E. Primakov, and so promoted its enhanced status as a strong power.

Yet it seems as though Russian foreign policy under Putin is a compromising one, for its perspective on international politics is to combine Western-oriented liberalism and the tradition-oriented nationalism, depending on domestic and foreign conditions. If external conditions are favorable to Russia to cooperate with the US and the West, its West-friendly image would manifest, but if conditions change, a different image of Russia will be projected.19 Although President Putin during his first term emphasized strengthening cooperation with the West, stressing a European identity,20 this did not mean unconditional West-orientated foreign policy. This compromising stance was confirmed in Putin’s second term, in a discourse that re- emphasized a multipolar world order and an obvious countercheck against the US unilateralism. This is characteristic of Russia’s policy toward Eurasia since 2005 and toward the West since 2007.21

Table 1. Types of Russian perspectives on International Politics Based on Foreign Policy Orientation

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<tr>
<th>philosophical world-view</th>
<th>Atlanticism</th>
<th>Realism</th>
<th>Eurasianism</th>
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<td>West-oriented liberals</td>
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<td>Tradition-oriented nationalists</td>
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<td>Pragmatic statists</td>
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<td>politician</td>
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<td>M. Gorbachev</td>
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<td>foreign policy orientation</td>
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<td>Globalism</td>
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<td>Cooperation with the West</td>
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<td>Great power balancing</td>
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<td>Isolation from the West / Confrontation against the West</td>
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<td>IP perspective pattern</td>
<td>Convergence pattern</td>
<td>Pragmatic pattern</td>
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<td>=&gt;&gt; Compromising pattern</td>
<td>(influence &amp; int’l prestige)</td>
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21 For documents that demonstrate the shifts in Russia foreign policy and perspective on international politics during Putin’s second term, see: “Sovmestnaia deklaratsiia Rossiskoi Federatsii i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki o mezhdunarodnom poriadke v XXI veke” (July 1, 2005); “Deklaratsiia glav gosudarstv – chlenov Shankhaiskoi organizatsii sotrudnichestva” (July 5, 2005); “Sovremenyi mir i Rossiia,” Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’ 1–2 (2007), pp. 50–94. For the recent changes of Russia’s relations with the West, see: Dmitri Trenin, “Russia Redefines Itself and Its Relations with the West,” The Washington Quarterly (Spring 2007).
The characteristics of Russia’s perspectives on international politics, which can be obtained by reviewing the process of foreign policy debates and the politics of identity in Russia, can be summarized as in Table 1. The results help us to understand the domestic roots of Russia’s perspectives on international politics. If we examine the evolution of Russian foreign policy perspectives, the convergent perspective, based upon a liberalist approach, was dominant in the early age of reform, and a compromising perspective was formed after dialectic interactions with a divergent perspective, based upon conservative traditionalism.

As a result, the Russian perspective on international politics was constructed with fluctuations in the process of dramatic shifts in the post-Cold War era in both international and domestic politics. It is now in the process of balancing between a new liberalist perspective and a revived traditionalist perspective, in order to reach a compromise of its Sonderweg with general, dominant rules in international politics. In this regard the opportunistic character of the Russian compromising way of thinking on international politics can be understood as a result of the stabilization of its realistic foreign policy orientation. Russia’s compromising character seems to share similarities with the realism paradigm, a dominant IR theory in the West.

**Russian Perception of the Changes of International Order**

As seen above, our observation of Russian perspectives on international politics as a basis of Russian foreign policy, shaped through the process of seeking its own identity, provides a useful groundwork for a more systematic analysis of Russia’s perception of the international order. There have been many attempts to understand this perception of international politics by going beyond the analysis of Russian international politics as “practice.” Some scholars like E. Pozniakov have tried to tap any possibility to establish Russian perspectives on international politics, acknowledging the impossibility of universal international political theories.

Recently, some Russian scholars of international politics have been making diverse attempts to theorize Russian international political perspectives.

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23 He has been writing on this issue since the 1980s. For his important works, see: E. A. Pozniakov, Filosofia politiki (Moscow, 1994). For an attempt to organize the Russian perspective on international politics from the Eurasian geopolitical viewpoint, see: A. G. Dugin, Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii (Moscow, 2000).

24 For study focusing on general theory of international politics, see: A. P. Tsygankov, Teoriia mezhduarodnykh otnoshenii (Moscow: Gardarinki, 2003); A. D. Bogaturov, A. H. Kosola-
Despite ideological differences among these studies, they attempted to systematize implications of Russian foreign policy disputes for international studies by going beyond analyzing actions and strategies of Russian foreign behavior. Such an attempt resulted in highlighting the importance of the problem of Russian perception of the international order and the issue of Russian identity in explaining the Russian perspective on international politics. The main issue, on which we concentrate here, is a matter of “international or world order.” How do Russian scholars acknowledge the changes, challenges and opportunities of a newly formulating world order in the post-Cold War era?  

**Russian Scholars’ Analysis of Post-Cold War International/World Politics**

One of famous Russian *mezhudunarodniki* (IR specialists), A. Salmin, who tries to analyze modern and contemporary international changes, explains the transformation of international order since the World War II, the so-called “Yalta system,” by dividing it into four phases. He distinguishes the world of empires-winners in 1945–1950; the bipolar world in the 1950s that did not last long; the weakening bipolarity during the late 1950s to the mid 1980s; and the major shift of Perestroika and the collapse of the USSR as could be seen from the mid-1980s. Especially, he regarded the fourth period of changes as a period of seeking a new world order from a new institutional and neo-liberal perspective. 

Generally, the shift of an international order from one to a new one accompanies a major war or revolution. Although the collapse of the Yalta system was peaceful, contrary to the general discussion, it also involved common symptoms of a shift in the international order: a large-extent of geopolitical

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25 Prior to this argument, I want to distinguish the usage of international order and world order. Russian scholars use the term “world order” more often than the term “international order,” for they are getting used to a global strategic thinking since the Communist system. But recently they have begun to use these terms differently; “international order” describes those who emphasize nationalist or realist thinking, and “world order” describes those who emphasize global unity. This issue of terms reveals the difference of recognition on international politics.


change; temporary disorientation that affected both winners and losers due to the loss of the competitor; reorganization of powers, coalitions and alliances; increased regional conflicts; regime changes, and the advent of new states. This instability stimulated a more comprehensive shift in the domestic politics of each nation to include the rise of political extremism and offensive nationalism, religious intolerance, increased tensions in racial and religious disputes, and increased immigration.

With these symptoms of a transition period, the most important feature of the change in post-Cold War international politics came from the disputes over the “legitimacy of humanitarian intervention” and “illegality of authoritarian regime.” In particular, there is a sharp controversy among UN, US, and other major powers on such vital issues as humanitarian intervention in the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation, a reparatory attack on terrorism, preemptive strikes and so on, which leads to an altered framework of alliance or cooperation on a global level. These issues of humanitarian intervention and the illegality of authoritarian regimes are considered by many Russian scholars as significant factors that affect the major powers’ activities in current international politics, although they cannot be fully accepted from a viewpoint of international law, because of their violation of the principle of sovereignty.28

Yet A. P. Tsygankov considers the current unstable international system to be a good opportunity to promote the progress of international order. The biggest challenge in this era of change comes from the enhanced recognition of the indivisible unity of the world,29 and the biggest problem is the absence of an alternative world order to deal with the current international disorder. A new world order should be founded and realized over or beyond the existing international order, which is the main challenge of international politics in transition today.

Another feature of international studies by Russian scholars in the post-Cold War era can be found in the expectation of a new cooperative and integrative world order. There have been continuous discussions among Russian scholars on the new modeling of the international order, which could materialize global integrity in the transitional period of international order since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It seems that most of the Soviet/Russian scholars expect international law and international organizations to play a central role in formation of a new international order. Scholars such as Grigorii Shakhnazarov showed such a great interest in the role of international organizations such as the UN to the point that he considered the UN as a prototype of world government in the future.30

29 Tsygankov, Teoriia mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii, pp. 483–484.
Another discussion on an alternative world order within Russia might be drawn from observations on the developments of regional integration. E. Pozniakov and I. Shadrina, for instance, proposed that regional communities could be a basic unit to organize a confederation of states in the future. Yet neither the world itself nor the nations in it were prepared to meet the expectations for the development of a “global confederation of nation-states or regional communities” or “world government.”

More realistic arguments can be found, besides these improbable prospects, from the idea of a “general world committee.” The western scholarly group argues that the US, Japan, the EU and the USSR, or other regional powers could formulate a polycentric administrative structure based on their collective leadership. If China were to be included after solving its domestic problems of politics and democratization, it would be possible to organize a “general world committee.” Although many scholars agreed with this possibility, A. Bovin retorted that nation-states, searching to maximize their egoistic national interests, are unlikely to submit their sovereignty to the delegation of international society.

In Search of a New World Order

These various expectations for a “New World Order” became weakened with the decline of Russian influence after collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the US as a sole super power. Among US scholars there was a serious academic division regarding the next world order. Academics divided between optimists encouraged by the triumph of liberal democracy on a global scale and pessimists stimulated by the eruption of chaos and anarchy with a new type of clash based upon differences in culture, religion and civilization. Such positional differences can be seen among Russian Scholars as well.

N. Zagladin, taking an optimistic view, admitted Russia had become a cooperative actor for a stable world order, sharing values with the West, and pointed out that the anti-Western elite group in Russia interrupted this global cooperation for the future of international order.

On the contrary, many scholars suspect that the West maintains a geopolitical strategy to weaken Russia and enhance its influence by weakening the UN and expanding NATO. G. Diligenskiy, for instance, expressed a negative

33 A. E. Bovin, “Mirovoe soobshchestvo i mirovoe pravitel’stvo,” Izvestiia (February 1, 1988).
opinion about the possibility of establishing a democratic order on a global level and the growth of civil society across the world, as western scholars expect. Their concern is in particular about the expansion of western culture. Strong criticisms were raised about the imperialistic strategy and cultural expansionism of the West, especially the US. They contend that such a strategy is inadequate to meet the demands of the era in search for a new world order.

The division of opinions between new world order-seeking globalists and traditional international order-supporting realists is also reflected in Russian perspectives on international politics. Not all these arguments, however, recommend Russia’s path to anti-Westernism. Rather, many scholars oppose the confrontation with the West based upon anti-Western values, arguing that Russia has shared common values with the West over a long period of interaction. They also emphasize preserving Russian values and interests in time of incorporation into the world economy and maintaining cooperation with the West. The moderate or compromising character of Russia’s perspective on international politics is functioning here again.

Analysis and the Future of International/World Order

With regards to the future of the international or world order, many Russian scholars take a negative view of the unilateral global leadership of the US, despite its dominance on military, economic, political and cultural soft power. Forecasts for the future of the international order vary according to their perspectives on international politics as shown below.

First, based on the liberalist paradigm, it is argued that the degree of institutionalization of international structures can be a crucial barometer to foretell the future of the new world order.

Concerning the feasibility of a global governance center as a future prototype of world government, Mark A. Khrustalev argues that the cooperation structure of the G7 can take the role of global governance center, which recognizes the fact that the international order is formulated and developed on the basis of the values and civilization of the West. Yet, it is true that the predictions on global governance center formation have begun to lose influence because of internal conflicts within the G7 structure. Disputes between the US and European countries can arise at any time within the current G7, and

moreover, a Russia-added G8 would be more fragile than ever before. “Two Europes,” stitched within the G8 structure, contains the dual possibility of mutual cooperation and mutual confrontation. It is generally agreed, however, that the G8 structure can provide global leadership as a center of the “New World Order,” if common interests could be found between the two Europes – EU and Russia.

According to N. Zagladin, international anarchy can be overcome by the formation of a “new unitary space” that promotes integrating tendencies through interaction among various international actors.39 This is in line with the position that a new space for production and capital flow, emerging from regional community (e.g. EU, NAFTA) formation and TNC activities, could promote the unity of the world order. Such an optimistic stance on the stabilization of international or global order through reinforced global governance is gaining more and more support within Russia, as well as in the West. Yet most of them support this with caution because of the difficulty in constructing a fairly functioning governance structure. For this reason, it has also been argued that in order to establish a fair global governance structure, it is necessary for the world order to achieve a sustainable democratic constitutionality, and it especially requires efforts to establish global civil society.40

The main point of this global order issue involves a debate on globalization.41 With the end of the Cold War, a global transition began to occur under the US initiative, to shape common rules around international trade and finance with the motive of “globalization.” The attempt of the US Superpower to create a unitary world faced several challenges, which included destabilization of the Weapon of Mass Destruction control system, the limitations of spreading the American standard of democracy, difficulties in establishing universal norms of a world market economy, increased cultural and racial conflicts, the rise of China, challenges from the Islamic world, and the uncertainty of multilateral governance building. Facing these challenges, the US, for most Russian scholars, has reached its limit in capability as the hegemonic power to take a leading role in establishing a world order without the assistance of other major powers. The US’s attempt to form a new global order declined during the Bush administration, especially after September 11. The US switched its policy toward a unilateralism-based orientation. One Russian scholar said, “the US has ceased globalization,” pointing out the change in US attitude.42

In sum, scholars under the influence of the liberalist paradigm keep their eyes on the development process of global society standing on economic inter-

41 V. B. Kuvaldin, “Globalizatsiia i novyi mirosporadiadok,” Torkunov, Sovremennye mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, pp. 89-105.
42 Author’s interview with Nikolai Kosolapov, Director of the department of research on international political issues at IMEMO on December 19, 2006.
dependence and democratic rules, emphasizing the importance of broadening the recognition scope toward the whole world beyond exclusive nationalism. They argue for Russia’s participation in efforts to form and strengthen this new world order.

Meanwhile, scholars of the realist paradigm utilize concepts like the structure of polarity and configuration of political powers in international politics to forecast the future international order, acknowledging the existence of hierarchy in an international order that has survived all the waves of globalization in the post-Cold War era.

Scholars such as S. Rogov or K. Sorokin support the multi-polarity argument that was firmly shaped in Russia during the 1990s. They assert that a kind of multi-polar order, with several co-existing poles of power, such as the US, EU, China, and Russia, is forming today following the end of the bipolar structure.⁴³ According to them, interactions among these powers determine and shape the multi-polar structure of power configuration in the contemporary world. The principles of states’ behavior under the structure of a multi-polar international order would be similar to those of the European concert system in the nineteenth century. This Russian perspective on international order is well reflected in the “Declaration on multi-polar world and formation of new international order” that Russia and China announced in 1997 and 2005 (see fn. 21).

What kind of actors would constitute poles in the multi-polar world, according to Russian realist views? Regarding multi-polarity in international politics, Russian scholars indicate there should be an agreement on the principles of a universal world order at least among the world’s major powers, represented by the US, EU, Russia, and China. These major poles are regarded as formed by major states that have the intentions and capability to be independent centers of power in the post-Cold War world. This shows that Russia expects and hopes to be a major pole in the world order, at least from the statements produced by some Russian scholars.

There exist criticisms as well, however, that this multi-polar structure cannot properly reflect the reality of the US’s dominance in international politics. It implies an acceptance of the US’s status as the super power, as well as its global leadership. Yet most Russian scholars think that the US cannot determine all aspects of the international order.

Facing this criticism, some Russian scholars propose a pluralistic unipolarity that combines multi-polar traits with unipolarity. According to this argument, the world of broken bipolarity cannot be managed solely by the US, so the US should build up its leadership based on cooperation with alliances like the G7, which is estimated to have enough power to mitigate US ambition, al-

though it cannot be a match for US military power.\textsuperscript{44} \textbf{Another view in Russia is} to describe this tendency by the similar but different terms “global democratic world” or global “\textit{Pax Democratica}.”\textsuperscript{45} \textbf{This position emphasizes the role of collective leadership in the international order, entrusted by a global democratic society, regarding the central axis of international order as representative nations of a democratic world.} These terms such as “global democratic world” or global “\textit{Pax Democratica},” emerged together with Putin in Russia, gradually replacing the use of the term, “multipolar unipolarity.” \textbf{It could be said that through the use of such new terms, Russian scholars demonstrate the changes in Russian perceptions of international politics. That means the arguments have become more vocal that the US is facing limits in applying its power in international affairs, while Russia and China have restored or gained power in countering the US, and the EU is gradually enhancing its own independent voice and influence.}

One of the most worrisome factors in this kind of realist argument about international collective leadership would be the issue of China. The formation of an international collective leadership led by the US is settled as a \textit{de facto} reality of international politics, but is \textit{de jure} rejected by China. Even though China is rising as a major pole of international order, based on rapid economic growth and military influence in the region, it has not been accepted within the structure of international collective leadership. Rather, Russian scholars consider China to be maintaining the position of checks and opposition against the US-led formation of a world order and to be inviting Russia to cooperate with the Chinese position. It is true that Russia does not fully agree with the US’s initiatives. Russia’s strategic concern plays a factor here. How Russia, as one of the G8 member states, could harmonize its position as a member of an international collective leadership and its relations with China as a newly emerging pole would be one of the key questions for the future of international order.\textsuperscript{46}

After all, some Russian realists also display opinions close to a structure of moderate or compromising way of thinking. According to Russian realists, there are two streams in international order: on the one hand, unilateral globalization or hegemonization based on unilateral American norms with less support of international society, and on the other hand, the attempt to shape a multi-polar world order resisting the US’s unilateralism and acknowledging the world from a perspective of diversity. The latter was derived from the responses of major powers to problems brought about as the US abandoned a policy of agreements, coordinating positions of the world’s major powers, based on the post-Cold War policy to construct a new international order by

\textsuperscript{46} Bogaturov, “Sovremennyi mezhdunarodnyi poriadok,” pp. 75-76.
consent. These two streams alternately appear in terms of coexistence and conflict.\(^{47}\)

Thus, Russian scholars are expecting that the “multi-polar unipolarity” would characterize the next world order as a result of interaction between the US’s attempt to hold unilateral hegemony and response of challenging powers rising at regional levels. They have geopolitical and geoeconomic strategies competing continuously, and continue to compete for energy resources and regional spheres of influence or power not only with the US but also with each other.\(^{48}\) According to Russian scholars, it seems that the attempt at multi-polarity will gain power gradually over the framework of a unilateral hegemonic system and bipolar rivalry of power politics. With these multi-polar traits, some important issues in managing world order are building a collective consent system for “global responsibility” to deal with nontraditional issues like the development of underdeveloped countries, migration, ethnic entanglements, and religious conflicts.

Besides these two exemplary positions, many Russian scholars discuss the international order in relation to “American Imperialism.”\(^{49}\) Most of them are strongly influenced by traditionalist thought rooted in the geopolitical paradigm as well as Marxist traditions. They tend to interpret the changes of the post-Cold War international order in accordance with geopolitical patterns formed historically among the major powers. The structure of their arguments is not greatly different from those of classical geopolitics.

They share the common belief that the peculiarity of Russian civilization as a continental power is in discord with that of Western civilization and ocean power. They support the separation of Russia from the West, emphasizing an independent national developmental path and a tradition of Russian civilization that is fundamentally distinguished from the Western developmental path. They stress the recognition of a bipolar international order, based on the bisectional bi-hemisphere world view, divided into “Atlanticism” – the ideology of sea power represented by the Anglo-Saxon nations, and “Eurasianism” – the ideology of continental power represented by Russian, German, and Chinese scholars. They assert the isolation from the Western developmental path or offensive expansionism of Russian power, warning that unconditional acceptance of western orientations, ignoring the traditional and historical, geopolitical conditions of Russia on the map of global civilizations, would ruin Russian values and threaten Russia’s existence.

Traditional nationalists, refusing to accept the Western developmental model and in opposition to pro-Western tendencies, maintain that Russia

\(^{47}\) Bogaturov, “Sovremennyi mezhdunarodnyi poriadok.”

\(^{48}\) I. G. Tiulin, “Novye tendentsii v rossiiskikh issledovaniakh mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii,” Torkunov, Sovremennye mezhdunarodnye otnoshenii, pp. 48-65.

\(^{49}\) For example, see: A. Dugin, Osnovy geopolitiki (Moscow, 1997).
should restore its “Derzhavnost,” – the tradition of Empire and “strong state” since Tsarist Russia, and seek a national developmental model based on the peculiarity of Russia’s tradition. Therefore, the tradition of Soviet thinking and geopolitical tradition that Russia has sought since Tsarist Russia becomes an important factor in identifying their own thoughts on international politics.

They argue that not only the expansion of NATO but also the spread of the US’s influence towards the Eurasian continent are violating the inherent interests of continental powers like Russia. They also maintain that Russia should be a powerful balancing power against the West-initiated formation of an international order or the US-led unipolar hegemonic system. For this, the strategies of strengthening national power around military build-up and spreading anti-Western ideology should continue. Furthermore, according to them if it is not allowed, Russia should pursue the strategic goal of maintaining its prestige and status as a strong power, even through the alliance with an anti-Western or anti-Oceanic power. Also, Russia should maintain its leading role as a continental power and its prestige as a global actor, by retaining geopolitical influence and by utilizing a countermeasure of territorial expansion.

Status of Russia in the Changing World

How does Russia recognize its status in the changing World? Russian elite groups maintain the view that in the process of forming a multi-polar world it would be difficult for Russia to take a role as an organizer or a coordinator in charge of major role in the new order, because of its limited internal resources and capability. If economic conditions improve with the domestic stability continued under/after the Putin administration, according to them, Russia will take on a role as an “opportunist coordinator” based on its recovered influence. This prediction is mostly conditional, and the role of the opportunist coordinator can be considered as the goal of Russia, executing a pragmatic foreign policy based on pragmatic realism as the Russian government has shown.

Russia retains its key position supporting the democratic attempts to derive the universal principles of state behavior in the process of forming a new

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50 In this regard, it is worthwhile to pay attention to the discussion on the “sovereign democracy” of Russia. In a February 2006 speech, Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s deputy chief of staff and main ideologist, laid out much of the vision of “sovereign democracy,” and it was further elaborated in detail in the brochure “Osnovnye tendentsii i perspektivy razvitiia sovremennoiRossii.” On the meaning of the “sovereign democracy,” see: Masha Lipman, “Putin’s Sovereign Democracy,” Washington Post (July 15, 2006); Ivan Krastev, “Sovereign Democracy – Russian Style,” (November 15, 2006), http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutionsovernment/sovereign_democracy_4104.jsp; Andrei Okara, “Sovereign Democracy: A New Russian Idea or a PR Project?” Russia in Global Affairs 5–3 (2007). On the commencement of this idea, see: Vladislav Surkov, interview by Elena Ovcharenko and Larisa Kaftan, Komsomol’skaia Pravda (September 28, 2004), www.kp.ru/daily/23370/32473/print/.
world order. If the US pursues the establishment of a democratic world order, Russia would cooperate actively, but if the US continues its unilateral policy against the universal, consensual international order, Russia would have to check the US in alliance with other major powers.51

Russia’s position can be observed from its duality of keeping a cooperative attitude with the US in the field of the War on Terrorism, environmental issues, and space development, but maintaining an opposing attitude in the field of Iranian or North Korean nuclear issues, the Middle East issues and the construction of the US military bases in Eurasia such as in Central Asia. Although some criticize Russian policy of this kind as “Opportunism” or “Hypocrisy,” the Russian position could also be viewed as having internal and logical consistency.

If we summarize the features of the three main-stream paradigms on the international/world order in Russia, we can organize a scheme as shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Positions on International/World Order in Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Basis of Thinking</th>
<th>Type of Order</th>
<th>Main Axis of Order</th>
<th>Type of Perspective on IP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global Order</strong></td>
<td>Sociological institutionalism</td>
<td>World government / Confederation of states</td>
<td>UN / Regional Communities</td>
<td>Convergent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collective leadership</td>
<td>G8 / NATO</td>
<td>Compromising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unitary governance space</td>
<td>Global Governance</td>
<td>Divergent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Order</strong></td>
<td>Political structuralism</td>
<td>Unipolarity / Multi-polar Unipolarity</td>
<td>US / Europe, Russia, China</td>
<td>Convergent / Compromising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-polarity</td>
<td>Regional Powers</td>
<td>Divergent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geopolitical Order</strong></td>
<td>Geopolitical traditionalism</td>
<td>Sea-based power Hegemony / Balance between Sea-based and Continental Power</td>
<td>US + NATO / Russia-China-India (Iran)</td>
<td>Convergent / Compromising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-regionally decentralized system</td>
<td>Regional Powers</td>
<td>Divergent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

51 Regarding this issue, the ‘anti-US alliance’ argument, often discussed in Russia, was about Russia-China-India, Russia-France-Germany, and Russia-Iran-Iraq. Recently, a cooperative structure among Russia, China, and India has increased the feasibility of this argument.
The various questions raised in Russian international studies discussed above could be useful as academic discussion topics in the future to understand their implications for general international political theories. These can be largely divided into questions on international political environments and questions on actors in international politics. And these factors of international studies can be aggregated into the form of a theory of international politics.

To begin with, the questions raised by the issue of international political environments are as follows.

First is the question of how Russia recognizes post-Cold War international politics. This question is about Russia’s “perception of the world,” including questions on stability and instability in international politics on the one hand, and on the other hand suggesting a question on a unique or new peculiarity of post-Cold War international politics that Russia acknowledges. Here the question of what are the sources of instability or stability is important. (Question 1)

The second question is whether the “international/world order” exists, as Russia acknowledges in post-Cold War international politics. If so, the question of the foundation of order and its ordering principles must follow. (Question 2)

Next, we can raise the following questions in relation to the issue of actors in international politics. First, there is the question of who or what the “main subject or mechanism” is on the international stage. This question about “recognition of the major actor” on the one hand can raise another question about the Russian perception of “strong power,” defined in regards to state-centered thinking. On the other hand, for Russian scholars who argue for a decline of the nation-state as an actor, it would be a question of what other kind of entity would be an initiating axis to form an international order. (Question 3)

Second, there is a question about the “pattern of interaction” among actors on the international stage. This can be specified as a question of how actors like Russia identify themselves in international politics, as well as a question of what rules of the game have been mutually accepted among actors. (Question 4)

Understanding how the above-analyzed three paradigms form Russia’s perspectives on international politics will provide comprehensive answers to these questions from Russia’s point of view and create the basis of Russia’s international political theory-building efforts.52 When we organize the responses

52 Furthermore, these questions could be utilized again as significant tools for building a theory of international politics in general and, at the same time, as criteria to assess general theories of international politics. Many tasks still remain, however, for a full-scale theorization, although these analyses on basic perspectives on international politics could provide a foundation for theorizing in international politics. In particular, discussion of the interaction between behavior and structure is one of the important topics in international political theories, as can be seen in the structuralist arguments. And questions on regional order and its relations to international politics is also an important question that challenges theory building in the twenty first century.
of the three paradigms of Russian’s international political thinking into these questions, accepting the risk of over-simplification, the results can be organized as shown in Table 3.

Table 3. A Summary of Russian Perspectives on International Politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Globalism [liberalist paradigm]</th>
<th>Internationalism [realist paradigm]</th>
<th>Traditionalism [geopolitical paradigm]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1 Sources of (in)stability</td>
<td>Asymmetric threat</td>
<td>Hegemonic Ambition</td>
<td>West’s/Sea-based power’s imperialist intention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violation of basic human rights</td>
<td>Power transition</td>
<td>Cultural imperialism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorism, WMD</td>
<td>Terrorism, WMD</td>
<td>Non-traditional threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2 Order</td>
<td>Globalizing order</td>
<td>Multi-polar order</td>
<td>Multi-/Bi-polar order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West-leading liberal democratic &amp; market system</td>
<td>International competition and cooperation</td>
<td>Competition between civilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3 Main subject</td>
<td>Civilized States vs. Non-democratic states</td>
<td>Leading Sates (P5, G8)</td>
<td>Civilizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IO (UN, NATO) / INGO</td>
<td>IO (UN, OSCE)</td>
<td>Sea-/Land-based power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4 Identity</td>
<td>Leading Western civilized states</td>
<td>Eurasian Great Power</td>
<td>Land-based Great Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game rules</td>
<td>Global standard</td>
<td>Mutual understanding</td>
<td>Specific Civilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unity in diversity</td>
<td>National interest</td>
<td>Geopolitical thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Zero-sum competition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hence, international political studies in Russia can be said, after having repeated diverse differentiation since the collapse of the Soviet Union and quickly acquiring the academic fruits of western international studies, to have a relatively stable internal tendency in forming Russian perspectives on international politics. Furthermore, the three main paradigms that emerged in the process of forming Russian perspectives on international politics are building an internal consistency in recognition of both international political theory building and foreign policy theory building.

As we can understand from these results, various points and arguments have been raised in Russia regarding foreign policy and the international/world order. How could the characteristics of the Russian perspectives on international politics be organized through this examination and what are the communication points between Russian perspectives on international politics and western IR theory?

Above all, after examining the arguments of Russia’s perspectives on international politics, I would like to point out that Russia is a normal country. The truth is that Russia has been incorporated into the robust global knowledge structure in which it can interpret from its own positions and has carefully acquired diverse types of thought, which have evolved in the course of international political fluctuations. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that different powerful nations can also have such divergent features in perspectives on international politics as Russia has. In this respect, we can organize
the characteristics of the Russian perspective toward international politics as follows.

First, it seems that the Russian perspective on international politics takes an open-minded approach toward the argument on global cooperation, based upon the tradition of globalism formed around the world, and keeps considering Russia’s responsibility and role within the global unity newly being formed. In particular, Russia continues to ponder how to articulate its interests in a globalizing world under the tradition of globally scaled thinking that comes from the Soviet era. Some of the scholars, deeply affected by the liberalist or institutionalist paradigm of international politics also keep displaying their interests in an international political order of “unity in diversity.”

Second, there is a very vigorous argument about the structure of power-centered polarity among Russian scholars under the tradition of internationalism. This shows that many Russian scholars are inclined towards a traditional realist thinking that mainly focuses on changes to the international order with shifts of the power structure of international politics. Hence, the dominance of realist thinking in Russia seems to be more intense than in the US or the Western world.

Contrary to this intensity, however, Russian realism seems to have a more conciliatory character. The reason for this might be related to Russia’s status in international politics that Russia recognizes. It appears that Russia is strongly conscious of its in-between (or intermediate) position among the leading hegemonic powers to form an international/world order represented by the US, the West and the opposition powers. The current mainstream in Russian perspectives on international politics involves a strategy that seeks a Russian role between the two, maximizing Russian national interest. This conciliatory or opportunistic character in the Russian realist perspective toward international politics is working both to build support and draw criticism for Russia.

Thirdly, we include the assessment of the role of Russian scholars who are under the tradition of traditionalism. Many of the western critics recognize these discourses within Russia to be very dangerous. The role of such discourses, however, is very limited. Rather, we can determine that they played a positive role, to some extent, in the process of mitigating the overly-intensified globalist thinking in Russia right after the end of the Cold War and shaping the new Russian identity. Moreover, since their outward bellicosity was a reaction to the rapid downswing of Russia’s international influence, it would be more objective to consider its fundamental characteristic as defensive or protective rather than as offensive. This explains why their goals have something in common with that of realists in that they seek to preserve Russian influence and restore its prestige.

In addition, I just want to add some points on the correlation between the theoretical attempts to understand Russia’s foreign policy and Russian understanding of international politics. The attempts to understand theoretically Russia’s foreign policy reveal great interest in the relationship between foreign
policy and international politics. Especially as a field of foreign policy studies of Russia, we could examine such debates on Russia’s identity as a way to understand Russia’s perception not only of international political changes but of domestic changes. However, international political studies in Russia seem to have less interest in the actors than the issue of structure in international politics. Therefore, the work of theorizing Russia’s foreign policy that naturally focuses on actors can play a partial complementary role in the theorization of Russian international politics. The arguments on Russian foreign policy of the Western-oriented liberals provide various materials for views of international political theorists under the tradition of globalism, those of tradition-oriented nationalists about those under the tradition of traditionalism, and those of pragmatic statists about those under the tradition of internationalism.

In sum, we find that the process of Russia’s adaptation to the drastically changed international/world politics has developed Russia’s unique perspectives, which are nonetheless inter-communicable with the foreign academic community as well, based upon their own tradition of worldview and self-consciousness. Russia’s westernizer-atlanticist tradition, slavophile-nationalist tradition, and geopolitical-eurasianist tradition have developed into a liberalist paradigm, realist paradigm, and geopolitical paradigm respectively after the collapse of Soviet Union. And these paradigms, even though they have more than a little difference in detail, have developed quite similar ways of thoughts on international/world politics to contemporary western IR theory. Furthermore the uniqueness of Russian IR thinking can contribute to the development of a general international political theory, providing the international academic community with its peculiar way of pondering various constructive subjects such as worldview and self-consciousness, identity politics and foreign policy, civilizations and region building, intermediate role and community building, geo-strategy and its deconstruction.
Russian Pipeline Diplomacy: A Lithuanian Response

GEDIMINAS VITKUS

The period 2006–2007 could possibly mark the beginning of a new stage in the development of international relations and the international system. While it would be difficult to identify an event as distinct and significant as September 11, 2001, there was a series of less significant occurrences, which, having been lined up in succession, do produce another emerging image of the world and Europe, where an ever-increasing role is played, not by terrorism, but by threats to energy security.

In recent years, this problem has become particularly urgent in Europe because of a change in the policy of Russia. Russia’s conflicts with its nearest neighbors, Belarus and Ukraine, over gas and oil prices, show its aspirations to eliminate transit countries from participating in oil and gas processing and transportation. Russia’s attempts to hinder, in every way possible, the implementation of alternative pipeline projects, which circumvent Russia, the development of a more uniform European Union energy policy, and many other less significant factors, testify that energy issues in modern Europe are becoming a part of their new agenda. It is not so much of an economic policy of the states, but a part of Russia’s foreign and security policy.

In my opinion, this change is illustrated by Mr. Vytautas Naudužas, vice minister of the economy and former Lithuanian ambassador to Turkey, when he suggested, at one of the numerous conferences on energy issues in Vilnius, on May 10, 2007, that in the case that political slogans were removed from the foreign policy of the European states, its essence would truly become competition for energy security.¹

It is quite natural in Lithuania for those who are closely associated with energy supplies from Russia, where these political changes are significantly felt, to openly discuss them. While many European countries still cherish certain illusions about Russia, the Lithuanian politicians and the general public do not. Due to specific historical experiences, Lithuanians do not harbor any doubts whatsoever that Russia will make attempts to employ its new advantages that have emerged because of a considerable increase in energy source prices. Not for economic development, not for the welfare of its people, but for political dominance and revenge for the lost Cold War. Consequently, the energy and pipelines business developed by Russia during recent years is seen in quite a different context.

A separate discussion could be held on the causes and the probable consequences of such changes in the policy of Russia. However, we will leave this for another study since the primary objective of this paper is not Russia, but Lithuania and its response to the current reality. Right now, we will only point out that the response of Lithuania is analyzed with the assumption that the country should be ready for the worst scenario, i.e., for interruption of the supply of any energy sources from Russia. Therefore, this paper focuses primarily on the Lithuanian energy infrastructure in the three key energy areas: the oil, gas, and electricity sectors. First, the paper surveys the genesis of the Lithuanian energy infrastructure and the infrastructure qualities predetermined by it. Then, how this infrastructure changed throughout the past fifteen years is examined. Finally, the challenges in the concrete sectors and the response, generated by the government of Lithuania and society in this change-affected situation, are identified.

In addition, it is important to keep in mind Lithuania’s efforts to develop and increase the share of indigenous and renewable energy resources (solar, wind, biofuel etc.) in the total energy balance of the country. However, this type of energy resource in 2005 constituted only 10.8 percent of the total balance. The target of the recent Lithuanian National Energy Strategy is to reach a share of nearly 20 percent in the primary energy balance by 2025. Because of the rather limited size of this kind of energy supply and its still-limited importance for national energy security, the paper deals exclusively with oil and gas supply from Russia, as well as the closely associated electricity generation.

Oil

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ownership of former state property passed to individual Soviet republics that became independent. In Lithuania, all of the most significant objects of energy infrastructure passed to the government, who, in turn, established public companies to manage this property. This is how the company Lietuvos energija was established and came to administer the entire electric economy, including the Ignalina atomic power plant. The newly established company Lietuvos dujos took over all gas supply and distribution infrastructure. The third company was the oil-processing enterprise, Nafta, situated in Mažeikiai. This was the starting point from which further reforms and reorganizations ensued. Now, we will discuss each sector separately.

The main infrastructure of the oil sector in present-day Lithuania was essentially developed during the years of Soviet occupation. In 1964, the State Oil and Chemical Industry Committee of the USSR started to consider the idea of an oil refinery in Lithuania. In 1970, a location in the northwest of Lithuania

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about ninety kilometers from the Baltic Sea ports Klaipėda and Ventspils was approved as the site for the refinery. After a long construction, the first refining complex was put into operation in 1980.

The design capacity of the Mažeikiai refinery is 15 million tons of crude oil per year. In order to utilize the refining capacities more efficiently, the Mažeikiai refinery was also designed to process other feedstock including gas condensate, fuel oil, and middle distillates. The primary refinery feedstock was supposed to be the crude oil shipped either by the trunk pipeline system or by railway from Russia. For this reason, as early as 1966, the construction of trunk crude oil pipelines in Lithuania started. Finally, in 1979, the year before the refinery came into operation, the Novopolotsk – Biržai – Mažeikiai crude oil pipeline and the Biržai pumping station on the Novopolotsk – Ventspils crude oil pipeline were completed. This pipeline, crossing Lithuanian territory, became the northern branch of the world’s longest oil pipeline, Druzhba. The diameter of this pipeline was either 1,020 mm or 1,220 mm.

“Druzhba” means “Friendship,” alluding to the fact that the pipeline was intended to supply oil to the energy-hungry western regions of the Soviet Union, to its “fraternal socialist allies” in the former Soviet block, and even to Western Europe. It was constructed in 1964 to transport oil from central Russia to points in the West over a distance of some 4,000 km. Today, it is the largest principal artery for the transportation of Russian (and Kazakh) oil across Eu-
rope. The pipeline begins in Samara in southeastern Russia, where it collects oil from western Siberia, the Urals, and the Caspian Sea. It runs to Mozyr in southern Belarus, where it splits into northern and southern branches. The latter branch runs south into Ukraine, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The northern branch crosses the remainder of Belarus to reach Poland and Germany. The Mažeikiai refinery in Lithuania and Ventspils oil terminal in Latvia is connected to the main pipeline by the branch pipeline from Bryansk Oblast.

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The Lithuanian public experienced the weaknesses characteristic of the Lithuanian energy infrastructure right after the decision of March 11, 1990, by the parliament of Lithuania. They declared the restoration of the independent state and its separation from the then still-existing Soviet Union. Since Mikhail Gorbachev was not interested in open military aggression against the disobedient republic, he resorted to an energy blockade, thus making the Lithuanian parliament revoke its decision. On April 18, 1990, Moscow interrupted the supply of energy resources and raw materials to Lithuanian industry and transport, although the population could still buy these products in small quantities for their personal needs in neighboring Latvia, Belarus, and the Kaliningrad Region. The Mažeikiai oil processing enterprise was forced to stop operation and suffer the ensuing consequences for the industry, particularly for the transport system.

The energy blockade against Lithuania lasted only three months, coming to an end due to the ever-increasing political struggle and competition in Moscow itself. Yet this short blockade left an indelible print on the Lithuanian political elite, as if programming them to seek, at all costs, for Lithuania to obtain oil in other ways, without depending on Russia who at whim could resort to an energy blockade again.

Developing an alternative possibility to supply oil to the Mažeikiai oil processing enterprise became the first implemented energy project of the independent Lithuania. It was the beginning of the operation of the Būtingė oil import/export terminal. According to the project, the complex of the Būtingė terminal would consist of a crude oil pipeline, which connects the facility with the Mažeikiai refinery, onshore terminal equipment and tanks at Būtingė, an offshore pipeline, and a single-point mooring buoy. These units form the onshore and offshore parts of the terminal.

Although the significance of the project was unarguable, its implementation was very complicated for several reasons. First of all, it was necessary to persuade the political opposition and a doubting populace that it was a good idea. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, relations with Yeltsin’s Russia became decidedly better, and the supply of oil to Mažeikiai was renewed. Therefore, many people doubted whether it was still advantageous to take up
such an expensive project. Still others proposed reconstruction of the Klaipėda small-capacity oil export terminal or make an agreement with Latvians in case of the necessity to pump oil to Mažeikiai through Ventspils, instead of building a new and expensive infrastructure. Finally, the Latvian “Greens” loudly voiced their opposition to the construction of the oil terminal in Būtingė on the grounds that, in case of an emergency at the terminal, the Latvian seaside would be the most affected.

Another major obstacle was the concentration of sufficient financial resources for the implementation of the project. However, in the end, after the government made the decision to finance the construction at the expense of the Mažeikiai oil processing enterprise, work on the terminal began. It was a particularly risky decision since, during the next two years following the construction of the terminal that started in 1995, the Mažeikiai oil processing enterprise not only worked very inefficiently, but was almost at the point of bankruptcy. Just a decade ago, with comparatively low world oil prices, import through the Būtingė terminal would have been detrimental; therefore, many people believed that with the decreased probability of an oil blockade by Russia, the construction of the terminal was a dead loss.

Obstacles and high cost notwithstanding, the project was finally completed. In 1998, the marine terminal in Būtingė was completed and put under the ownership of the Mažeikiai refinery. The first tanker was loaded in Būtingė in the summer of 1999, and it took onboard a shipment of crude oil from the Rus-
sian company Yukos. The terminal can export up to 14 million tons of crude oil per year. As an import and export terminal, it is capable not only of exporting crude oil but also of accepting import cargoes. The Mažeikiai refinery, by taking over the ownership of the marine terminal, also committed itself to maintaining the environmental safety of the facility.

Yet the successful implementation of the Būtingė project dictated its own price. The government had to decide on selling the shares of the Mažeikiai oil processing enterprise. As early as 1995, the state-owned enterprise was reorganized into the joint stock company, Mažeikių nafta, with approximately 90 percent of shares remaining in the hands of the government and the other 10 percent distributed among the employees.

However, after the government decided to sell a portion of the Mažeikių nafta shares, it turned out that the decision was not easy to carry out. Even though the government wanted to sell the enterprise, because it had yet to be profitable, it did not want to sell the facility (or rather give it away) to just anyone. It especially did not want to sell it to the Russians because of the consequences of the aforementioned blockade. Selling shares to the Russians would have defeated the entire purpose of the construction. Because if the Russians had control of the Būtingė terminal, the construction of which required so much effort, they would control the network of oil pipes running through the territory of Lithuania and connected to Mažeikių nafta since 1998 as well. Finally, at the end of 1999, 53 percent of the total shares of the Lithuanian oil complex and the rights of the enterprise operator were sold to a U.S. company named Williams.

Unfortunately, expectations of revival and profitable operation of the Mažeikių nafta, associated with the coming of Americans to the Lithuanian oil sector, were met only in part. Although Williams undertook modernization of the enterprise, they failed to ensure a sustainable and uninterrupted supply of oil via the current pipe network from Russia. The Russian company Lukoil, whose proposal to buy Mažeikių nafta the government of Lithuania had rejected, did everything in their power to essentially impose on Lithuania an undeclared oil supply blockade. The long-lasting negotiations between Williams and Lukoil bore no fruit. Russians and Americans failed to find a common language, and Williams decided to withdraw and sell their portion of the Mažeikių nafta shares.

In the end, it was a Russian company that became the buyer of the shares in 2002. Yet it was not Lukoil, but a company named Yukos who bought the shares. Strange as it might seem, the Lithuanian government decided not to oppose this transaction. Today, however, when the story of Yukos relations with the Kremlin is common knowledge, this occasions no surprise. Yukos managed to manifest itself as a company independent of the Kremlin and demonstrated that its foreign investment was aimed at economic benefit only and not at any political objectives. As was demonstrated by further events, Williams consistently kept to this standpoint. Thus, in 2002, Yukos purchased 53
percent of Mažeikių nafta shares from Williams and also took over the rights of the enterprise operator alongside the commitments. Since Yukos had its own oil resources and could supply the enterprise with raw material, the Mažeikių nafta, after a long interval, in 2003 began to operate profitably, and became one of the key taxpayers to the budget of Lithuania.

Yet those in power in Russia ruined the successful activity of the enterprise because of repressions against the operational command of the Yukos company. In 2003, the Russian authorities detained and imprisoned the head of the enterprise, the liberally disposed businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky, having accused him of tax evasion and cheating. Finally, the accounts of the company were seized; the assets of the enterprise were sold (or, to be more exact, requisitioned) in Russia. Thus, by false means, Yukos was brought to bankruptcy and had to sell its assets also including Mažeikių Nafta abroad since the conflict with the power bodies of Russia precluded a sustainable supply of raw materials to the enterprise.

At the close of 2005, several enterprises clashed in the competition for Yukos and Mažeikių nafta shares belonging to the government of Lithuania: the Russian and British enterprise TNK–BP, the consortium of Russian Lukoil and American ConocoPhilips, the Kazakh-owned KazMunaiGaz, and the Polish PKN–Orlen. Finally, the Polish company who had offered the highest bid won the competition. Although the then government of Lithuania, and personally Prime Minister Algirdas Brazauskas, were skeptical about the Polish investor having no owned oil resources, the Yukos decision to sell the enterprise to the buyer offering the highest price came out on top. Meanwhile, Russian companies, using political pressure, had expected to acquire the enterprise for a very low price, as was the case with Yukos assets in Russia. The success of the transaction can be attributed to the determined position of the Polish authorities who consistently sought to ensure energy-related independence from Russia. Present-day Poland is the only country in the region that did not permit Russian companies to break into its energy markets. Therefore, the takeover of the Mažeikių nafta was strategically important for Poland in order to restrict the impact of Russian companies in the region.

The response from Russia was not long to come, however. This happened well before the completion of the sale and purchase transaction. Since August of 2006, Russian pipeline monopoly Transneft suspended supplies to Lithuania’s Mažeikių nafta refinery and the Butingė export terminal. The official reason for the oil supply suspension was a pipeline leak. Transneft’s president denied that the shutoff had any political element. However, the halt in oil supplies came just weeks after the Polish company PKN Orlen sealed a deal with the going-bankrupt Russian oil group Yukos to buy the Mažeikių nafta complex, apparently to the annoyance of Moscow who wanted this facility to

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be sold to a Kremlin-loyal Russian company. The international rating agency Fitch Ratings noted that Russia’s move to cut oil supplies to a major Lithuanian refinery could be political. However, the Lithuanian government was clearly wary of antagonizing Russia and creating a worse situation. Therefore, it initially rejected reports that Russia would seek to retaliate for the halt in oil supplies to Mažeikių Nafta and PKN Orlen. Nevertheless, Russia’s intentions at this point remained uncertain, but the fact of the matter was that regardless of the motive behind the supply disruption, the status quo was in neither Lithuania’s nor PKN Orlen’s favor. Since that time, the Mažeikių nafta refinery has been buying oil from world markets with deliveries through a sea terminal, but this dramatically reduces profits. Since 2006, the Mažeikių nafta refinery has incurred losses of 55 million Euros.4

In October 2006, Lithuania offered Transneft help in fixing the pipeline, but the offer was rejected, with the Russians insisting they were on schedule with the repairs. “The schedule stipulates that the technical investigation should be completed by February or March next year. After we understand what caused the problem, we can determine how to fix it,” the Transneft vice president said at the time. However, nothing has really happened until now.

Finally, Lithuania decided to use EU leverage in order to solve the issue. Despite the fact that the government did not join Poland in blocking Russia-EU negotiations on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, Lithuania openly appealed to the European Commission to step up pressure on Russia concerning the Druzhba pipeline. “We believe that there will be a possibility to use stronger wording about the supplier’s reliability within the context of Druzhba blockade,” said Lithuanian prime minister Kirkilas. “It is our opinion that the wording must be about ‘a reliable supplier’,” noted the PM. According to him, the wording that the EU leaders have now is not very strong. It looks as though his appeal was heard.

During his visit to Lithuania in March 2007, the president of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, told the Lithuanian parliament that he shared the country’s concern over Russian supply of crude oil. “I want once again to tell you that the Commission fully shares the concerns that the position, with respect to the stopping of oil supplies through the Druzhba pipeline to the Mažeikių nafta refinery that ceased in July last year, is not clear, and the flows have not been re-established. I strongly uphold the principle that energy trade must follow normal commercial practices only, and this is very important to underscore, and in fact, I have been saying this to the Russian authorities. I am ready to raise this issue again in the next European Union and Russian summit on 18 of May, if necessary, and we hope this matter will be properly addressed by all the parties involved.”5 However after a cold and unsuccess-

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again, regarding the problem with Lithuania over the Druzhba pipeline – it is not the EU that created this problem! **We are telling the Russians we can repair it, we can pay for it, but it is not happening.**

Whatever the outcome of the next Mažeikių nafta blockade by Russia, even the most adamant opponents of the marine terminal Būtingė, which was completed a decade ago, now acknowledge that though it was then very expensive, the decision adopted was strategically good because it essentially resolved the problem of energy security in the area of oil economy. Although it remains uncertain how long Russia is going to play its political games and whether it will in general channel all oil flows through its own ports, it is possible for Mažeikių nafta to obtain raw material from other sources and remain operational. Unfortunately, this cannot be said about the gas sector.

**GAS**

Natural gas “business” within the territory of Lithuania dates back to 1961. Since that time, Lithuania was connected to the Soviet pipeline system by the two gas pipelines from Belarus Invantsevichy – Vilnius and Minsk – Vilnius. Since that time, the gas supply to the entire country has been carried out systematically. Branches of gas pipelines were laid leading to Kaunas in 1962, to Šiauliai in 1964, to Klaipėda in 1968, etc. On the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the length of the laid gas pipelines exceeded 1,000 km and the network of gas pipelines covered two thirds of the entire territory of Lithuania (Figure 3).

As was mentioned above, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Lithuanian gas sector became the property of the state but, naturally, it remained a 100 percent dependent on supplies from Russia. As long as Yeltsin’s Russia did not set imperial objectives for itself and followed a rather liberal foreign policy, gas supply to Lithuania experienced no major problems. This was also positively facilitated by the beginning market economy reforms. Alongside the main supplier Gazprom, other enterprises, including intermediaries established in Lithuania, engaged in supplying gas. Those intermediaries would buy gas from Gazprom, yet they did this in Russia and could therefore get gas cheaper, at average Russian prices. Afterwards, the intermediaries sold the gas in Lithuania at slightly higher prices. Notwithstanding, the price offered by them was by 1–2$ lower than that of the public company Lietuvos dujos. Thus, businessmen, who used their private initiative and managed to find a common language and evidently to share their profits with tough and powerful Gazprom managers, soon amassed great riches and became well-known and

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influential people in Lithuania, though with doubtful reputations.

Probably the most typical example of such a businessman was the founder of the populist Labor Party, Viktor Uspaskich, who had recently applied for political asylum in Russia. His offshore company Jangila, established in 1993 would buy gas from the Gazprom $8 cheaper than it sold the same gas to Lietuvos dujos. Among other intermediaries trading in natural gas, it is necessary to mention such enterprises as Stella Vitae, established in 1996, through which two thirds of Russian gas used to be supplied. This enterprise used to buy gas from the Gazprom $2.50 cheaper than the selling price. Thus, Stella Vitae would earn approximately 30 million dollars a year just for mediation. Mr. Rimandas Stonys and partners established the private company Dujotekana that currently remains the strategic partner and intermediary of Gazprom in 2001. At present, in the Lithuanian press, Stonys is considered to be almost a key figure in ordering and organizing all political scandals that have broken out in the country during recent years.

Figure 3. Map of the Lithuanian Gas Grid


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Thus, the business of gas trade became one of the least transparent, hardly manageable situations in Lithuania because businessmen of doubtful moral reputation turned into too-influential backstage actors who, having surplus money and financial levers of uncertain origin, can exert influence on political parties, their election campaigns, and finally the decisions adopted by legislators. Although during recent years, the Lithuanian press abounds in reports on illegal activity of this type, no court cases or legal prosecutions have taken place so far.

In 2002, in order to make the gas sector more transparent and to attract new investment, the government of Lithuania decided to privatize the state-owned enterprise Lietuvos dujos. Bearing in mind the complicated privatization experience of Mažeikių nafta, the government of Lithuania decided not to reject a Russian investor this time, but to follow the precedent that all interested parties should be evaluated and that the interests of Western, Eastern, and Lithuanian capital should be taken into consideration while seeking maximum benefit for the state. Finally, these shareholders became the owners of Lietuvos dujos: 38.9 percent – E.ON Ruhrgas International AG (Germany); 37.1 percent – OAO Gazprom (Russia); 17.7 percent – the Lithuanian National Property Fund; and 6.3 percent – individuals and legal entities.

The model chosen in Lithuania for the privatization of Lietuvos dujos was followed by different commentaries, but it was met by no strict opposition, even to sell to Gazprom. Everyone understood that a refusal to sell part of the shares to Gazprom on the political grounds that this company was too closely associated with the state power in Russia would be too risky since, unlike the oil business, Gazprom after Vladimir Putin came to power became a monopolist in the gas supply business and any intermediary companies would have been to no avail. It is also known that after Putin’s protégé Alexei Miller was appointed to Gazprom, he eradicated corruption in the Russian concern and instituted an order that gas was to be sold to all Gazprom customers at the same price. Therefore, the business of intermediation was destined to fail. On the other hand, the injection from Gazprom was partly balanced by German capital, which at least theoretically had to outweigh the influence of Gazprom and be more interested in the economy than politics.

In part, these expectations were met because, since the privatization of Lietuvos dujos, gas supply to Lithuania was uninterrupted with the exception of the disorders that surfaced during the conflict between Russia and Belarus in 2004. At that time, after Russia cut the gas flow to Belarus, Lithuania did not receive any gas either, because the gas pipeline link with Latvia had not yet been arranged.

But, on closer scrutiny, it is easy to notice that in the opinion of certain mass media, the impact of Gazprom on Lithuania obviously abuses business interests. The first example of this is the enterprise intermediary of gas trade Dujotekana headed by the aforementioned Stonys. The very existence of Dujotekana is an oddity that can hardly be grasped by common sense because
Dujotekana purchases gas in Russia at the same price as Lietuvos dujos and earns its profit from the 30–32 percent of the mark-up applied to Lithuanian users. Yet, with Gazprom support, Dujotekana not only acquires huge profits but also has large finances that it can use for lobbying or some other influence on the political process. Attempts of individual politicians or political forces to curb the excess profit of Dujotekana have been unsuccessful so far and have often turned into political scandals during which initiators of the amendment of the Natural Gas Law used to be compromised. This was widely discussed in the Lithuanian press though all generalizations should be accepted with strong reservation; however, even from the officially published campaign finance information, it is possible to learn that Stonys is one of the most generous supporters of the political parties and political leaders, making it reasonable to think that those schemes are not altogether concocted.

On these grounds, the conclusion could be drawn that although Gazprom precluded the possibility of different intermediaries benefiting from reselling gas and then gaining sufficient resources to create confusion in political life, and later, at a higher level, Gazprom itself took over this scheme for profiting and concentrating of excess profit resources in order to later actively meddle in the political life of the country. Thus, it seems that at this point, energy security should be forgotten and the simplest counter-intelligence should take over. Therefore, one way or the other, it seems that so far, only the independent mass media are seriously engaged in protecting Lithuania from the realization of corrupt schemes.

Certainly, the political confusion associated with the gas sector had an inevitable negative impact on the possibility of making strategic decisions related to gas supply diversification solutions or on Lithuania not only as a gas user, but also as a state seeking and consolidating the status of a gas transit intermediary. After Gazprom was included among the shareholders of Lietuvos dujos and became the entity controlling the pipe supplying gas through the territory of Lithuania to the Kaliningrad exclave, it is hard to believe that a project beneficial for Lithuania but detrimental to the interests of Gazprom could be implemented in Lithuania. A good example of such an attempt is the so-called “Amber Pipeline” project (Figure 4).

It is common knowledge that as early as 2004, at the initiative of the Polish national gas company PGNiG, an idea was born to connect the gas pipelines of the Baltic countries into a common network Amber Pipeline, which had to become a straighter, cheaper, and more rational alternative to the gas pipe-
line that Putin’s Russia and Schröder’s Germany planned to build on the Baltic seabed circumventing the Baltic States and Poland. In the spring of 2006, the prime ministers of the Baltic States approved this four-state project, alongside the centralized gas depository/storage facility to be built in Latvia, and the possibility of building a liquid natural gas import terminal, most probably in Latvia as well. Poland planned to build a similar terminal in Gdansk. Yet the project, for whose implementation attempts were made to obtain the support of the European Union, encountered a boycott of the major gas companies of the Baltic States whose shareholder is Gazprom. These companies refused to contribute even as much as the financing of the preparation of the project feasibility study, which would also have been in part financed by the European Union. Without the participation of these companies, the project is hardly conceivable.

Although the Lithuanian Ministry of Economy has not yet altogether discarded this idea, it believes that at present, when Russia and Germany have al-
ready agreed on laying the gas pipeline on the Baltic seabed, the project Amber Pipeline has no chance of being implemented in the near future. According to the director of the Lithuanian Energy Institute, Jonas Vilemas:

At present, the most feasible plan for ensuring energy security in supplying ourselves with gas is to cooperate with Latvia, to make arrangements concerning the joint gas depository/storage and start serious discussions on whether it is worth building a gas import terminal. If a terminal is built, laying of the gas pipeline through the Baltic countries would not be so important. However, the provisional estimate indicates that this terminal would cost about 200 million Euros. It is doubtful that some private company would agree to invest without firm state guarantee. On the other hand, the presence of such a gas import terminal would preclude Russia from endlessly increasing prices of the gas supplied and blackmailing countries by threatening to cut supply. In essence, the terminal would be a back-up facility, but at the same time, it would be paying for energy security. Therefore, it is understandable that the state will have to pay for safeguarding from such a political risk, just as was the case when the Būtingė terminal was being built.11

This is the standpoint of one of the Lithuanian energy think tank leaders. The government seems to be ready to accept this standpoint because in its own opinion, it regards the joint Russian and German project Nord Stream, designed for laying gas pipelines on the Baltic seabed, particularly negatively. It is well known that on November 30, 2005, the North European Gas Pipeline Company was created in Switzerland by Gazprom (51 percent), BASF AG (24.5 percent), and E.ON AG (24.5 percent) to engineer, construct, and operate the offshore part of the pipeline. But the official Lithuanian as well as Polish stance on the Nord Stream gas pipeline is negative. According to the Lithuanian government, the pipeline does not improve security of supplies or integration of isolated markets, let alone serious environmental risks. Concerning the environment, it is important to keep in mind that the Baltic seabed is littered with dumped chemical weapons, other munitions, and ship wrecks dating from the Second World War and is home to sensitive submarine defenses built during the Cold War. Corresponding concerns were expressed by Sweden, Finland, and Estonia.

The concerns of Lithuania and the other countries mentioned above are understandable. Look at the Figure 4. It is obvious that the construction of Nord Stream would give Russia the ability to put pressure on transit countries (for lower transit charges or for other reasons) by threatening to switch gas volumes from the pipelines passing through their territory to Nord Stream. However, none these concerns was supported by the European Commission. The Commission says that Russia, of course, may blackmail transit countries like Poland or Lithuania, but this could occur if both pipelines Yamal-Europe and Nord Stream are not being used to their full capacity. Since there have

11 Quoted from Audrius Bačiulis, “Gintarinio dujotiekio miražas [Mirage of the Amber Gas Pipeline],” Veidas, 28 (13 July 2006), p. 27. (in Lithuanian)
been no suggestions to date that the Russians would do this, the Commission is supporting the project and still thinks that environmental issues could be settled by careful investigation of the seabed in detail.

Thus, in the gas sector, Lithuania and other Baltic States and also Finland remain totally dependent on Russia. Therefore, this sector is the most vulnerable. As opposed to the oil sector, where the situation is better, the gas sector not only remains as the link causing the most problems, but also has no realistic hope of change for the better.

Electricity

Excluding all small electric power plants, the first major project of electricity energy in Lithuania was the Kaunas hydro-electric power plant built in 1959. With a total capacity of the four generators of 101 MW, the hydro-electric plant put an end to the large spring floods that used to cause extensive damage to Kaunas. Yet a rapid increase in the consumption of electric energy in the 1960s indicated that neither medium-size thermal, nor diesel-powered electric power plants, nor the Kaunas hydro-electric power plant, already in operation then, would be able to satisfy electric energy needs.

Therefore, a decision was made to build between Vilnius and Kaunas a large thermal electric power plant that was later called Lietuvos elektrinė. This structure became the largest and main thermal electric power plant in Lithuania. Unit #1 of the plant was launched in 1962, and the last one, Unit #8, in 1972. When its construction was completed in 1972 with the eighth unit, the power plant reached its full capacity of 1,800 MW. In 1973, the plant produced 90 percent of the total annual electric output generated in Lithuania. The fundamental fuel for Lietuvos elektrinė was crude oil; the back-up fuel was natural gas.

With the rapid expansion of the industrialization of Lithuania, a shortage of energy was felt again. Therefore, the Soviet government decided to build a powerful atomic power plant of regional significance in Lithuania in order to satisfy the needs not of Lithuania only, but also those of Belarus and Latvia. The site chosen for the construction was in Ignalina, an area near the intersection of the administrative boundaries of Lithuania, Latvia, and Belarus.

It was planned to equip the power plant with RBMK-1500 water-cooled graphite-moderated channel-type power reactors. The Soviet-designed RBMK-1500 reactor is the most powerful reactor in the world with an electrical power capacity of 1,500 MW. These are the same type of reactors as used at the Chernobyl power plant.

Preparations for the construction started in 1974. Unit #1 came online in 1983. Unit #2 was completed in 1986; however, even though it was originally scheduled for launch in 1986, its commissioning was postponed for a year because of the Chernobyl accident. Also, the construction of Unit #3 was suspended. Thus, though it was originally planned to build four reactors, only
two were built and launched. Construction of the final two was interrupted by the start of the democratization process in the Soviet Union and the emergence of the green movement. This movement put up fierce opposition to further expansion of the plant immediately. Therefore, the third reactor, though completely built and needing just filling up with fuel, stopped short of launching. In 1989, it started to be dismantled. As for the fourth generating unit, it was discarded with the beginning of the foundations.

Notwithstanding these circumstances, the Ignalina atomic power plant, even with only two reactors, became the most powerful electric energy generator in the entire region. The total capacity of the two reactors of the Ignalina atomic power plant was 2,700 MW. At that time, Ignalina could produce much more electricity than was regularly necessary and was only fully utilized during rush hours. Therefore, it was planned to solve that problem by building a special back-up pumped storage plant.

The construction of Kruonis Pumped Storage Plant started in 1977 and was not completed until 1992, already after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Kruonis Plant was designed to work in pump mode and by using surplus electricity, to pump water from the lower water body to the upper one. At present, the capacity of the plant is 800 MW. When the water reservoir is full, the plant can generate 800 MW for five hours.

These are the main electricity generating capacities of Lithuania. In addition, the parallel electric network links should be mentioned as well. Joining electric power plants by electric networks produces a considerable economic effect because, in an energy system, in order to ensure its reliable functioning, it is necessary to maintain a relatively smaller reserve than in an individual electric power plant. A larger number of electricity consumers, receiving electricity from the common network, ensure more stable loading for electric plants and they can thus operate more economically in comparison with an individual plant. In electric power plants of a large energy system, electric units of a greater capacity can be installed, as they are considerably more economical than small ones. This is how the energy system ensures a reliable supply of electricity at a lower price.

The largest Lithuanian electric power plants were connected with high-voltage electric transmission lines as early as 1960. In 1962, when the first 330-kV Šiauliai – Jelgava (Latvia) electric supply line began operation, the Lithuanian energy system was interconnected with the Latvian energy system. In 1964, the 330-kV Vilnius – Minsk electric supply line and the 330-/110-kV Vilnius regional substation also began operation. Consequently, the Lithuanian power system was interconnected with the Belarus power system. Finally, when the 330-kV electricity supply line Kaunas – Sovetsk began operation, the Lithuanian power system was interconnected with the Kaliningrad power system by a 330-kV line. As a result of these projects, the Lithuanian energy system became fully and completely incorporated into the Soviet Unified North-West Energy System, which was controlled by the Unified Administration Post in Riga.
In 1991, during the collapse of the Soviet Union, the heads of the energy and electrification industrial corporations of the republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia declared that the energy systems of the Baltic countries refused to be economically subordinate to the Soviet North-West joint energy system and would participate in common operational work only. Certainly, it was only a formal juridical act and not a practical measure that in any way changed the current situation. Both the economic and technological logic meant that it was senseless to destroy a functioning reliable energy system for the sole reason that the territories connected to it have become separate states.

On the other hand, from the point of view of energy security, the situation was obviously ready for correction because Lithuania, by further participating in the common technological process of the unified energy system of the Baltic States and the CIS, not only lost the possibility of selling surplus electricity to other countries of the European Union, but was also too dependent on the political and technological processes of other Eastern European countries. Consequently, the first problem that needed to be solved was the building of electricity links with Poland and the Scandinavian countries, thus joining the electricity network of Europe and of Scandinavia.

Despite how it may seem, the joining turned out to be far from easy. Even fifteen years after the restoration of independence in the Baltic countries these links are non-existent. A myriad of reasons can account for this, starting with the inability of decision makers to ensure sufficient political and financial support for the implementation of these expensive projects, and finishing with the lack of interest of separate interest groups in Scandinavia and Poland to open their electricity markets for cheap electricity energy from the Baltic States, or even from the entire energy system of the former Soviet Union.12 Therefore, on one or another pretext, crucial decisions would be postponed whereas projects already under implementation would mysteriously collapse. The final result was, from the point of view of the energy system, that the Baltic States, though having become members of the European Union in 2004, still remained in the old post-Soviet space. The issue started to be addressed only after it was acknowledged as a problem of the entire European Union and given the necessary impetus by the European Commission, which in the “Green Paper – A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy” published on March 8, 2006 claimed that the Baltic States “remain an ‘energy island,’ largely cut off from the rest of the Community” and urged the states to solve

12 Jacekas Komaras, “Lenko pozicija: kodėl nėra elektros tilto į Vakarus? [The Position of the Pole: Why There is No Electricity Bridge to the West?],” Lietuvos rytas, 14 April 2006 [http://www.lytras.lt/?id=11422625581141696756&view=4], 2008.3.27 (in Lithuanian); Ramunė Sotvariénė, “Energetinę laisvę smaugė ir Rytai, ir Vakarai [Energy Freedom was throttled by both – East and West],” Lietuvos rytas, 11 June 2007. (in Lithuanian)
Due to the support of the European Commission, as many as three electricity link projects of the Baltic States were planned: Estonia – Finland, Lithuania – Poland, and Lithuania – Sweden. These projects are now in different stages of implementation. The first and the smallest was implemented at the beginning of 2007 when the small 350-MW-capacity link of Estonia with Finland, Estlink, came into operation. The Estlink submarine cable connected the Harku 330-kV converter station outside Tallinn and the Espoo 440-kV converter station near Helsinki, linking, for the first time in history, the electricity markets of the Baltic States and the Nordic countries. Partners in the Estlink project are Lietuvos Energija (Lithuania) and Latvenergo (Latvia), with each owning 25 percent of the joint venture shares, Eesti Energia (Estonia), owning 39.9 percent of shares, and Finnish companies Pohjolan Voima and Helsingin

Figure 5. Baltic Electricity linking Strategy

Source: Lithuanian Ministry of Economy

these problems in order of priority.\(^\text{13}\)

Energia owning the remaining 10.1 percent.

Meanwhile, the second link project Poland – Lithuania is still in the initial stage of implementation and according to preliminary evaluation, the project can be finished by 2012–2015. Interconnection of the power grids involves construction of a 154-km high-voltage (400-kV) double-circuit power transmission line from Alytus (Lithuania) to Elk (Poland). Project implementation is estimated to cost 237 million Euros of investment: 71 million Euros in Polish territory and 166 million Euros in Lithuanian territory. In order to ensure transmission capacity and cross-border flows, it is necessary to reinforce not only Lithuanian but also Polish domestic power grids. This will require additional investments: 371 million Euros in Poland and 95 million Euros in Lithuania. Reinforcement of domestic grids must be self-financed by the project parties. Reinforcement of domestic power grids in Poland and Lithuania will be conducted in stages. The project has been included in a priority list of European Union projects. The European Commission has designated a coordinator responsible for the project’s implementation – Professor Wladyslaw Mielczarski.\textsuperscript{14}

And finally, the third project Lithuania-Sweden is still in its early stage. In February 2008, Lietuvos Energija (Lithuania) and Swedish transmission system operator Svenska Kraftnät completed a feasibility study for construction of a power interconnection between Lithuanian and Swedish power grids. The results of the study show that interconnection between systems is feasible and would be economically reasonable in terms of technical, economical, and legal aspects. According to preliminary evaluation, investments in the project would approximately total 516 million Euros if a 700-MW cable was to be constructed or 637 million Euros if a 1000-MW cable was to be constructed. The project could be implemented until 2015. The feasibility study for interconnection of Lithuanian and Swedish power systems has evaluated the possibility to interconnected transmission grids of both countries by the construction of a 350-km submarine cable across the Baltic seabed. The study results note that if a wind park was to be constructed in the Baltic Sea, it would be possible to connect it to the cable, but in this case, the cable capacity should reach 1000 MW. Otherwise, the cable capacity could be 700 MW. The 1000-MW power bridge Lithuania – Sweden would create possibilities not only for interconnection of power systems, but also for development of renewable power sources in both countries.\textsuperscript{15}

Thus, the issue of the electricity links of the Baltic States with the energy systems of Scandinavia and Europe has finally moved from a dead end. This


achievement is particularly important when keeping in mind that the largest energy-generating object in Lithuania, the Ignalina atomic power plant, is scheduled to be completely closed by 2009. This is provided for in the Act on the Accession of Lithuania to the European Union. The underlying reason for this agreement is the fact that the Ignalina atomic power plant employs reactors of the same type as the atomic power plant in Chernobyl. Although both Lithuania and the international community had made considerable investments in ensuring the safety of the plant, during Lithuania’s accession negotiations, the European Union adopted a particularly categorical attitude and refused to make any concessions in regards to the Ignalina atomic power plant, even though it generates as much as 80 percent of the electricity of the country and considerably reduces the energetic dependence of Lithuania on oil and gas imports. Therefore, in spite of a certain political opposition in Lithuania, the first reactor of the Ignalina atomic plant was closed in 2004 and the second will follow in 2009.

The closure of the Ignalina atomic power plant is not such a great catastrophe if the electricity sector of Lithuania is treated in an isolated manner. The head of the largest thermal power plant Lietuvos elektrinė, Pranas Noreika, claims that Lithuania inherited from the former Soviet Union a much more powerful electric energy production system (5,450 MW) than it needs right now. So, even if the Ignalina atomic power plant is stopped (loss of 2,700 MW), Lithuania would still retain 3,540 MW of the capacity. A total of 1,800 MW would come from Lietuvos elektrinė, 800 MW from the Kruonis hydroaccumulative electric power plant, and 940 MW from other smaller electric power plants. Consequently, after the closure of the first unit of the Ignalina atomic power plant, the country did not experience any major changes; only electric energy export decreased. In the worst scenario, i.e., if the second unit is closed, Lietuvos elektrinė would take over the job of the Ignalina plant in sixteen hours.  

However, it should be kept in mind that, although the electricity generated at Lietuvos elektrinė would ensure a stable and reliable supply of electric energy and would compensate for the closure of the Ignalina plant, the electricity produced there would be more expensive and would completely depend on an uninterrupted supply of gas. Therefore, the government of Lithuania, taking this into consideration as well as the inevitable growth of electric demand in the future, has started the groundwork for the construction of a new atomic power plant according to the new National Energy Strategy adopted by the Seimas (parliament) of the Republic of Lithuania. Certain, Lithuania by itself would not be able to carry this financial burden, but the economies of

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the three Baltic States could cope with the project. Furthermore, this is highly feasible because Poland has expressed an unambiguous interest in joining the project.

CONCLUSIONS

The Lithuanian energy infrastructure was essentially established in the ‘60s, ‘70s, and ‘80s of the last century. This infrastructure was rather impressive and had quite a few advantages. Among the advantages, impressive capital investments should be mentioned, which made it possible to easily transport oil and gas from Russian enterprises to Lithuania, to process oil, produce marketable oil products, and to control the surplus of electric energy that could be used for export.

Yet alongside the advantages, the infrastructure created had a number of drawbacks. The underlying reason for these was the fact that in one way or another, it was meant to serve the interests of the Soviet Union and not those of Lithuania. Those key drawbacks continue to manifest themselves even today. These are gas dependence on Russia’s supply, the absence of electricity network links with other European countries, and finally, serious problems because the system was designed to function under the conditions of planned but not market economy.

Certainly, today’s developments make it possible to think that if the energy infrastructure had been created under conditions inherent to the independent state and not under occupation, it would have been more rational and better balanced. This is in part confirmed by the implementation of new infrastructure development projects during the several past years.

The greatest progress in this respect has undoubtedly been made by the oil sector. This sector, in spite of the undeclared blockade pursued by Russia, is continuing to successfully function due to the Būtingė marine oil import and export terminal built in 1995–1998. The investment that was once politically risky and had painful financial repercussions for the Lithuanian budget today has proven to be a success from both the financial and geopolitical standpoints and it guarantees a large portion of the energy security of Lithuania.

The electric energy sector should rank second as to the progress made. Although many problems should have been solved a long time ago, the building of electric networks links in 2006 and 2007 between the Baltic States, Scandinavia, and Poland should be considered a substantial achievement. A similar reason for optimism is the construction project, which is gaining momentum, of a new atomic electric power plant, the significance of which for the energy security of the Baltic States region can hardly be overestimated.

Finally, as proven by this study, the gas sector remains the one causing the most political problems. In this case, a complete dependence on the Russian Gazprom’s supplies is the weakest link in the chain of Lithuanian energy security. Certainly, it is possible to expect that the gas supply from Russia will not be cut due its shareholding in Lietuvos dujos itself. Yet the circumstance that Lithuania and other Baltic countries cannot purchase gas from other sources makes them dependent on Russia’s dictates and whims. Keep in mind that, in the energy arena today, power and influence, but not profit, are of the utmost importance. The situation remains unfavorable, whereas the projects (the “Amber Pipeline,” the liquefied gas terminal in Latvia, or linking with Polish gas pipelines), as a way out of this situation, so far remain solely as theoretical possibilities whose realization is complicated, not only for the objective but also for the subjective reasons resulting from Gazprom’s backstage influence on Lithuania’s political processes.

It is clear that Lithuania cannot solve its own energy security problems without the participation of its neighbors and the European Union. Therefore, further perspective on the development of Lithuanian energy security will clearly depend on political developments in Russia and also on how the European Union, circumventing Russia, will manage to implement alternative pipeline-laying projects, such as the gas pipeline Nabuco or oil pipeline Odesa – Gdansk.
«Христианский вопрос» в годы русско-японской войны 1904–1905 гг., или планировала ли Япония сделать христианским государством? (по материалам мировой печати)

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В годы войны 1904–1905 гг. перед Японией и Россией встал комплекс масштабных идеологических проблем и вытекавших из необходимости их решения практических политических вопросов, которые приобрели широкое общественное звучание и необычайную остроту. Центральной среди них явилась задача собственного позиционирования в христианском и нехристианском мире с сопутствующим идеально-политическим «наполнением» и организационным обеспечением, а также шаги, направленные на популяризацию своей страны в глазах христианских народов при одновременном стремлении максимально дискредитировать соответствующие меры и сам «образ» противной стороны. Для нехристианской Японии война особенно актуализировала вопрос о статусе и реальном положении «своих» и зарубежных христиан на ее территории и в этой связи – об общем содержании и ситуативных изменениях собственной внутренней и зарубежной пропаганды с акцентом на межконфессиональную тематику. В то же время, перед японскими пропагандистами, работавшими с западной аудиторией, была поставлена задача нейтрализовать пугало «желтой угрозы» на мировой арене, затушевать представление о войне как столкновении христианской страны с языческой с тем, чтобы не допустить объединения против себя христианских государств в любой форме и предотвратить перерастание локального дальневосточного конфликта в мировой. В общем, речь шла как о создании во многом «выдуманной реальности» в виде некого идеологического конструкта, так и о внедрении его в сознание западного сообщества. Непростая сама по себе, еще больше эта задача осложнялась необходимостью параллельно вести пропагандистскую кампанию в странах Востока, в содержательном плане совершенно отличную от адресованной Западу.

Поскольку в том или ином разрешении «христианского вопроса» Японией была заинтересована не только Россия, но и большинство других христианских великих держав, дискуссии о нем и вокруг него велись, главным образом, на страницах мировой печати. Одновременно пресса явилась главным «полем», на котором развернулись основные идеально-пропагандистские баталии как равно самих конфликтующих сторон, так и всех других участников этой полемики. Она же в решающей степени формировала мнение международной общественности о России и Япо-
Российская пропаганда во время русско-японской войны (1904–1905 гг.) невелика. На сегодняшний день положение историографии самого «христианского вопроса» в годы войны 1904–1905 вей христианства и их миссионерской деятельности в странах Востока, материалы тогдашней мировой печати.


яние самого японского общества в годы войны;⁶ имеется значительный комплекс работ по истории религиозных учений Японии и ее идеологии тех лет.⁷

В новейшей исторической литературе отмечена необходимость тщательного изучения социо-культурных факторов, сопутствовавших войне, как с точки зрения рассмотрения самого этого вооруженного конфликта, так и с позиций его восприятия последующими поколениями, включая историков.⁸ Несмотря на это, исследований, которые были бы специально посвящены рассмотрению места и роли «христианского вопроса» в японо-русском идеально-пропагандистском столкновении времен войны, в исторической литературе нет. Как уже отмечалось в историографии,⁹ «желтая угроза» воспринималась на Западе в разных ипостасях, или составляющих – как гипотетическая возможность его прямого завоевания соединенными силами азиатов (в первую очередь, Китае в союзе с Японией), как экономическая экспансия Азии в мировом масштабе (именно ее французский аналитик Alexandre Ular именовал «пан-монголизмом»), либо как реализация лозунга «Азия для азиатов», которая угрожала колониальным владениям западных метрополий. Однако такой компонент «желтой опасности», как «пан-азиатизм» – миф, понимавшийся на Западе как идеологическое, культурное и религиозное порабощение христианской цивилизации нехристианской, до сих пор изучен недостаточно. Данная статья является попыткой восполнить этот пробел в изучении русско-японского конфликта начала XX в., другими словами – проследить столкновение на идеально-пропагандистском поле двух «выдуманных реальностей».

На рубеже XIX–XX вв. в светских и религиозных кругах Запада звучали предсказания скорой добровольной христианизации Японии, причем

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ряд публичных внутри- и внешнеполитических акций самого официального Токио времен русско-японской войны превратил эти ожидания почти во всеобщую уверенность. В этой связи автор настоящей работы поставил перед собой и более частную задачу – попытаться дать ответ на вопрос, вынесенный в подзаголовок данной статьи, именно: насколько вероятным было превращение Японии начала XX в. в христианское государство?

**ХРИСТИАНСТВО В ЯПОНИИ ПРЕДВОЕННОГО ПЕРИОДА**

Христианство начало распространяться в Японии во второй половине XVI в. Несмотря на гонения, которые сопровождались массовыми избиениями христиан и разрушением их храмов (в XVII в. принадлежность к этой религии рассматривалась в Японии как государственное преступление и жестоко преследовалась), со временем христианство достигло здесь значительных успехов. В 1873 г. японское правительство, которое, как заметил историк Китагава, «не испытывало никакой любви к христианству», из политических соображений сняло официальный запрет на его исповедование в Японии, Конституция 11 февраля 1889 г. провозгласила в стране свободу вероисповедания. Плоды «миссионерского служения» христианских проповедников зрило проявились к рубежу XIX–XX веков. В предвоенный период и в годы самой русско-японской войны в Японии функционировали общины и миссии различных ветвей христианства.

Если в 1880 г. в Японии насчитывалось всего 30 тысяч христиан, то к началу войны 1904–1905 гг. одних ортодоксальных католиков здесь было уже порядка 90 тысяч, десять тысяч из которых проживали в столице, где был воздвигнут собор Св. Троицы. В 1891 г. существование этой общины утвердил папа Лев XIII – с епископатом в Токио и семинарией в Нагасаки. К концу века на территории Японии работало более тысячи иностранных миссионеров, действовало 300 христианских церквей. Ассоциации христиан были представлены в центральных органах государственного управления и обладали законодательно закрепленным правом владеть и

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управлять недвижимостью, включая земельную собственность. В те же годы появился Евангелический союз Японии, активно действовала ассоциация молодых христиан – YMCA. Толерантное отношение местных властей, а, главное, успехи в миссионерской деятельности дали повод главе местных ортодоксальных католиков, епископу Mugabure, в 1904 г. заявить, что, по его наблюдениям, «верхние классы японского общества все более и более склоняются к христианизации своей страны».

Епископ южного Токио англичанин William Awdry, к тому времени проживший в Японии уже восемь лет, на страницах С. M. S. Japan Quarterly констатировал, что среди «ведущих государственных деятелей, военных и моряков» Японии также «немало христиан». Один из германских миссионеров тогда же подсчитал, что при набранных в этом отношении темпах спустя полтора столетия Япония естественным образом превратится в поголовно христианскую страну.

Само начало русско-японской войны как, объективно, конфликта нехристианского государства с христианским потенциально заострило вопрос о положении христианства в Японии в идеально-политическом плане, но на деятельность агентов западного течения в нём в целом не отразилось. В 1904 г., в разгар войны новый глава Святейшего престола, Пий X, преобразовал токийский католический епископат в архиепископство, а в Осаке, Нагасаки и Хакодатэ учредил собственные епископаты. В марте 1904 г. в Киото прошел патриотический митинг на тему: «Русско-японская война и христианство», большинство участников которого, католики и протестанты, выступили в поддержку войны. Критика войны с пацифистских позиций в среде японских христиан западного толка раздавалась, но шла «вторым планом», главным образом – в печатных выступлениях Утимура Канзо. В 1904 г. в Саппоро была возведена методистская церковь (одна из первых каменных построек в городе), спустя год в Иокогама состоялось освящение нового здания англиканской церкви, которая была построена на собранные в Японии средства, в июне 1905 г. законено строительство.

18 The Japan Times, March 11, 1905, № 2414, p. 3.
тово епископальной церкви в токийском Сибазаки-чо. В мае 1905 г. императорская чета пожертвовала YMCA 10 тысяч иен «за отличную работу в армии» ее санитаров, просветителей и других добровольцев,19 тогда же в Арима состоялась годичная конференция американских баптистов, на которой были представлены все их девять японских «пунктов» (от Отару на севере до Симоносэки на юго-западе страны), а в церкви токийского Азабу – аналогичное собрание канадской миссии методистов.20

Восточная ветвь христианства начала распространяться в Японии значительно позднее западной – со второй половины XIX в. Первая православная церковь была открыта в 1858 г. при русском консульстве в Хакодатэ, в 1875 г. состоялось рукоположение в священнический сан первого японца, самурая по рождению21 и синтоистского священнослужителя по прошлой деятельности Павла (до крещения в 1868 г. – Такума или Такумаро) Савабэ. Гонения не обошли православных христиан – в 1872 г. власти Хакодатэ и Сэндай начали их притеснять, но, по распоряжению Токио, вскоре прекратили преследования. Император Японии, сообщал из Токио иеромонах Владимир (В.Г. Соколовский) в редакцию Московских ведомостей в 1879 г., относится к православию весьма благосклонно.22 В 1888 г. С.О. Макаров, в недалеком будущем крупный российский военно-морской деятель, посетив Японию на корвете «Витязь», в частном письме тепло отзывался об обедне в токийской духовной миссии, на которой ему выпало побывать и которую на японском языке и для японской паствы при двух хорах японских певчих служил японец о. Павел Сато. Рассуждая о перспективах христианства в Японии, будущий вице-адмирал и командующий русской Тихоокеанской эскадрой высказал предположение, что «к характеру и образу правления» этой страны более других подходит именно православие:

«Католицизм едва ли может быть принят Японией, ибо он нейдет к жизни этой страны и ее нравам. Для японского народа латинский язык совершенно чужд, а высшие государственные сановники не пожелают связывать себя подчинением верховному вождю, проживающему на противоположном конце земного шара... Протестантское вероисповедание имеет больше шансов на успех, но государственные люди Японии не могут не видеть, что это вероисповедание поведет к распадению на

19 The Japan Times, May 7, 1905, № 2461, p. 2. Это акция была явно рассчитана на пропагандистский эффект – например, матросам легендарного броненосца “Микаса”, пострадавшему во время разрушительного пожара на судне осенью того же года (броненосец взорвался и затонул в Сасэбо), императорская семья пожертвовала втрое меньшую сумму.
20 The Japan Times, May 29, 1905, № 2480, p. 6; June 23, № 2502, p. 6.
21 По данным Наганава Мицуо, первыми новообращенными православными японцами в основном были самураи из клана Сэндай экономически слаборазвитой провинции Тохоку.
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секты... Православное вероисповедание не влечет за собой подчинения какому-нибудь духовному лицу, не проживающему в самой стране, равно как оно не ведет и к вмешательству постороннего политического элемента в государственном отношении. С точки зрения политической, нам русским безразлично, примет ли Япония православие или нет. Наша программа заключается в том, чтобы совершенно не вмешиваться во внутренние дела дружественной нам соседки... Православие может дать Японии живую внутреннюю силу и упрочить в ней консервативные принципы, столь необходимые для прочности ее благосостояния в будущем. Как друзья японцев, мы могли бы радоваться всякому шагу их в этом направлении. Для нас было бы приятно и лестно иметь соседку, единоверную с нами, но не наше дело тянуть ее в эту сторону».

Корреспондент Макарова, опустив имя автора, но с его ведома опубликовал его письмо в центральной российской прессе, затем оно вышло отдельной брошюрой и, по свидетельству современника, «получило довольно большое распространение особенно в церковных сферах彼得бургского общества».

Спустя два года, в своей «Исторической характеристике» Японии знаменитый русский философ Владимир Соловьев предрекал «нужду» этой страны не в буддизме, а именно в христианстве. «Японский народ вообще все больше и больше близится к принятию христианства, – вторил ему в самом конце XIX века исследователь православного миссионерского движения С.А. Архангелов, – ...будущее, таким образом, подает надежды на торжество православия в Японии».

На «восприимчивость и живость к христианству» японцев указывал и один из ближайших сподвижников епископа Николая.

Так начал зарождаться миф о вероятной (или даже неизбежной) христианизации Японии в будущем. В последующем появлении и широком распространении этой «выдуманной реальности» в мире немалую роль сыграл и сам официальный Токио – из сиюминутных, конъюнктурных политических соображений.

Если в 1871 г. православных японцев было немногим более ста, в 1876 г. – чуть более тысячи, в 1880 г. – шесть тысяч, то к началу русско-японской войны их число приблизилось к 30 тысячам, по всей стране они образовали 260 общин. Собственностью японской православной церкви был монументальный храм Христова Воскресения вместимостью в полторы тысячи верующих, построенный в 1884–1891 гг. на холме Суругадаи в центре столицы, 96 церквей по всей стране, несколько школ и училищ в Токио, Киото, Осака и Хакодатэ, семинария, иконописная мастерская, в

23 Цит. по: Шуберт К. Адмирал С.О. Макаров // Книга о Порт-Артуре. Дайрен, 1940. С. 84–86.
24 Там же. С. 82.
26 Архимандрит Андроник. В Японии. С. 91.
27 Архимандрит Андроник сообщает, что его постройка обошлась русской казне в без малого 350 тыс. руб. – См.: Там же. С. 81.
которой, отучившись в Италии и Петербурге, работала японка Ямасита Рин (в крещении Ирина), и типография. В 1880–1912 гг. миссия издавала двухнедельный Сэнкё Синпо [«Православный вестник»], а в 1892–1907 гг. – женский литературно-просветительский ежемесячник Уранисики [«Скромность»] и Син-кай [«Духовное море»].

Формально православные общины Японии были независимы от официального русской церкви, но их руководитель Николай Токийский одновременно являлся начальником русской православной миссии и в этом качестве был так же подотчетен в своей деятельности петербургскому Святейшему Синоду, как католические иерархи Ватикану. Хотя сто пятьдесят тысяч христиан (по общему счету) составляли всего треть процента населения 45-миллионной Японии с ее 20-миллионной армией буддистов и синтоистов, усилия христианских миссионеров получили высокую оценку современников-единоверцев. «История героической борьбы русских миссионеров и достигнутые ими результаты, – писала в 1904 г. нью-йоркская газета Public Opinion, – могут соперничать с нашими протестантскими и католическими миссиями».

РПЦ и оценки ее деятельности на Дальнем Востоке зарубежной общественностью

По мере обострения интересов великих держав на Дальнем Востоке в деятельности православных миссионеров и священнослужителей в регионе западные аналитики все чаще начали усматривать не только конфессиональную, но и культурно-политическую составляющую с далеко идущими и потенциально опасными последствиями. По выражению той же американской газеты, они явились «одним из главных факторов цивилизаторской деятельности России» в отношении азиатских народов. По мнению сторонника дальнейшей территориальной экспансии США, сенатора от штата Индиана А. J. Beveridge’a, в этом именно и заключалась опасность «русского наступления» на Восток (этому вопросу он посвятил одноименную книгу, вышедшую в марте 1904 г.). Ничто в большей степени

29 Николай Токийский (1836–1912) – из семьи сельского дьякона (согласно прижизненно и неоднократно опубликованным данным, выходец из древнего княжеского рода, до пострижения князь И.Д. Касаткин-Ростовский). Окончил Смоленскую духовную семинарию и Петербургскую духовную академию. В монашестве (1860) Николай. В качестве православного миссионера впервые приехал в Японию (в Хакодатэ) в 1861 г., с 1870 г. начальник православной миссии, в 1872 г. переехал в Токио, с 1880 г. епископ, с 1906 г. архиепископ. В 1970 г. причислен к лику святых как Св. Николай Японский. За полвека своего миссионерского служения обратил в православие свыше 30 тысяч японцев.
30 Цит. по: The Japan Times, April 2, 1904, № 2128, p. 5.
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ни не доказывает «постоянства русской оккупации Маньчжурии», писал сенатор после посещения России и Маньчжурии, «как появление здесь русских церквей»; «в этом – ключ к объяснению успехов России в колонизации Востока». Его книга получила значительный общественный резонанс не только на Западе, но и в Японии.

Отмечая застальный догматизм и религиозную нетерпимость официальной русской церкви, ее «гнилость и коррумпированность», современные иностранные наблюдатели характеризовали ее как неотъемлемую часть архаичного российского истэблишмента (церковь в России возглавляет сам император, не уставали напоминать читателям газеты), подчеркивали ее стремление, опираясь на власть, насильственно русифицировать «инородцев» и представителей других, неправославных конфессий внутри самой империи. 

Порочность такой практики сознавали и в самой России. «Закон гражданский ... вместо охранения Церкви, только растлевает ее духовную целость, – говорил видный представитель либерального лагеря М.А. Стахович на миссионерском съезде в Орле в сентябре 1901 г. – Если Церковь верует в свою внутреннюю духовную силу, то не нуждается она в содействии земной силы... Во имя Церкви надо высказать, что насилие над совестью бессовестно».

В следующем году в столичных церковных кругах открыто заговорили о необходимости отделения церкви от государства, весной 1905 г. обращение части петербургского духовенства к митрополиту Антонию на этот счет напечатал даже Церковный вестник. 17 апреля того же года «с высоты престола» было объявлено о необходимости прекращения преследований по религиозным делам (на «неуклонное соблюдение властями заветов веротерпимости» впервые указывалось еще в царском манифесте от �� февраля 1903 г.). Однако сама церковь с трудом поспевала за новыми веяниями, религиозной догматики они вообще не коснулись.

В годы войны масла в огонь критики официального православия и опасений, связанных с его миссионерской деятельностью на Дальнем Востоке, подпали воинствующие ортодоксы, которые со страниц клерикальной печати (в газетах Странник, Русский паломник и др.) писали

о «распространении православия по всему миру» как о миссии, возложенной на Россию «свыше». В своем послании «возлюбленным чадам», опубликованном в начале 1905 г., Святейший Синод подчеркивал, что «Россия ведет с язычниками кровопролитную войну за свое историческое призвание насадительницы христианского просвещения на Дальнем Востоке». Эти и подобные суждения находились в резком противоречии со взглядами руководителя японских православных, который в годы войны призывал свою паству «молиться Богу, чтоб Он даровал победы вашему императорскому войску, благодарить Бога за дарованные победы, жертвовать на военные нужды, кому придется идти в сражения, не щадя своей жизни сражаться не из ненависти к врагу, а из любви к вашим сограждам». Это свое февральское (1904 г.) «окружное письмо» православный токийский епископ направил и «во все редакции здешних газет».

Выступления руководителей российской православной церкви попадали в мировую, а затем и в японскую прессу, еще более компрометируя РПЦ и всю Российскую империю в глазах как западного сообщества, так и подданных микадо.

«Даже сейчас, во время войны, русская православная церковь, основанная в Токио царским Святейшим Синодом, терпима и защищена и русский о. Николай проводит обычную церковную службу с японской паствой. В то же время, клерикальная газета Русский паломник учит своих читателей за Уралом, что “японский император есть Антихрист” и что “поэтому задача Святой Руси воевать с ним”, - писал весной 1905 г. знаменитый американский исследователь Восточной Сибири George Kennan, в годы войны работавший в Токио корреспондентом Outlook. – ... Какую страну в таком случае следует считать цивилизованной и христианской – Японию, которая терпимо относится к церкви и защищает ее от ее врагов в собственной столице, или Россию, называющую микаодо “Антихристом” и призывающую своих граждан именем Бога истреблять японцев – “ханаанцев двадцатого века”?», цитировал он Церковный вестник.

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35 Новое время. 15(28) января 1905. № 10367. С. 5.
37 Характерно, что в светской России такая позиция японского православного архипастыря нашла понимание. «Мы должны благоговейно приветствовать святителя, который поднялся над злобою этого дня не во имя государственного безразличия, которым болеют у нас иные в России, - писал в октябре 1904 г. консервативный Русский вестник, - а во имя любви к своим духовным детям (православным японцам), во имя деятельной христианской любви, требующей самоотвержения». - Драганов П. Русский язык в японских учебных заведениях и русские писатели в японском переводе // Русский вестник. Т. 293. Октябрь 1904. С. 452–453.
38 См.: The Japan Times, September 8, 1904, № 2264, p. 6.
39 The Japan Times, April 2, 1905, № 2432, p. 4. Перепечатка из Outlook.
Схожим образом ситуацию комментировали и религиозные деятели Запада. В докладе «Величайшая война в мире», прочитанном в мае 1904 г. на годичном конгрессе пресвитерианских обществ в Чикаго, преподобный W. I. Darby (по газетному отчету) «сказал, что победа Японии будет большим благом для христианства и цивилизации, поскольку она входит в цивилизацию дольше и увереннее, нежели Россия».40 «Почему наши симпатии находятся на стороне язычников, а не братьев по вере? ... Что, по христианской идее, связывает людей? Имя, раса или кровь?» — спрашивал себя питтсбургский Methodist Recorder в августе 1904 г. и, напомнив о притеснениях евреев в России, отвечал: «В основе взаимной притягательности наций лежат разум и высокие нравственные чувства», присущие не России, а Японии.41 «В прямом, проявленном в ходе предвоенных переговоров, в самообладании во время оскорбительных дипломатических провокаций, наконец, по поставленным перед собой целям и по гуманному и внимательному отношению к своим пленным, — подхватывал ту же ноту Colombo Observer, — Япония проявила себя более христианской страной, нежели Россия, и заработала больше симпатий людей доброй воли, чем ее огромный противник».42 На то же в качестве одного из важнейших моральных приобретений первого года войны в англоязычной японской печати обратил внимание преподобный J. H. De Forest, многолетний баптистский миссионер в Эндане.43 Логическую точку в рассуждениях на эту тему поставил John H. Nykes, с 1870-х годов представитель американского Библейского общества в странах Востока. В мае 1904 г. на заседании Генеральной ассамблеи Объединенной пресвитерианской церкви в Гринвилиле (штат Пенсильвания) он заявил: «Япония, хотя и не осознает, сражается за христианство. От ее успеха или неудачи зависит успех или неудача англо-саксонского начала (principle). Где развивается Union Jack и звездно-полосатый флаг, там есть гражданская и религиозная свобода. Там же, где управляет Россия, миссионерская и библейская работа затруднена, даже опасна».

41 Цит. по: The Japan Times, August 12, 1904, № 2241, p. 6.
42 Цит. по: The Japan Times, July 31, 1904, № 2231, p. 5.
43 The Japan Times. February 4, 1905, № 2385, pp. 3, 6. До этого в японо- и англоязычных периодических изданиях, выходивших в Японии, De Forest доказывал, что Россия «употребляет религию для укрепления оков тирании и невежества» и что русское христианство как «слуга деспотизма» «есть обман и позор христианского имени».
44 Цит. по: Накамура (сост.). Дневники Святого Николая Японского. Т. 5. С. 41–42.
45 Цит. по: The New York Times, May 27, 1904, № 16972. Комментируя подобные высказывания протестантских миссионеров и их печатных органов, даже такой искренний почитатель Японии, как немецкий врач Эрвин Бэльц нашел их «положительно омерзительными»: «Из этих самых уст мы слышали ad nauseam (до отвращения. — Лат.), что только христианская нация может проявлять высокие моральные качества. Теперь те же лицемеры готовы, будучи христианами, приветствовать языческое государство». Более одобрительно доктор Бэльц отзывался о католических миссионерах

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В общем, появление российского актора на дальневосточном конфес-
сиональном «поле» и его очевидные успехи в странах Дальнего Востока
по многим причинам не внушали особого оптимизма ни политикам, ни
религиозным деятелям Запада. По мысли авторов цитированных высказа-
ваний, их предостережения должны были всерьез обеспокоить Токио.
Несмотря на это, практических шагов со стороны японского правительс-
тва в предуказанном направлении не последовало, скорее наоборот.

Политика Токио в «христианском вопросе» в Японии и в Корее

С началом русско-японской войны посланник барон Р.Р. Розен и все
сотрудники российского дипломатического представительства выехали
из Японии, но начальник православной миссии отказался выполнить рас-
поряжение Святейшего Синода и пожелал остаться, «находя невозмож-
ным оставлять японскую православную церковь без епископа».

В первые месяцы вооруженного конфликта русская пресса сообщала о разрушении
японцами православных церквей как в Маньчжурии, так и в самой Япо-
нии, например, – близ Иокогамы в ночь на 21 марта 1904 г.

Утеснения православных местными властями и стычки с населением отмечались по
всей стране: в марте – в Яманаси (непрерывные допросы и выяснения, «не
изменники ли и русские шпионы они?»), в Минато (толпа едва не разру-
шила здешнюю церковь) и Исиномаки (камнями разбиты стекла храма), в
апреле – в Каяма (разрушен дом христианина, а сам он избит) и т.д.

По словам современного японского историка, правительство с тревогой на-
блюдало за накалом патриотических страстей внутри страны, понимая,
что «рост ксенофобной активности» может нанести вред дружелюбному
отношению к Японии западного сообщества.

Однако вскоре ситуация изменилась. В конце апреля в беседе с не-
названным газетой «видным представителем одного из христианских ис-
поведаний» премьер-министр граф Кацура Таро заявил, что «японское

в Японии, которые «в целом с сожалением взирают на успехи Японии». – Toku Baelz,
ed., Awakening Japan: the Diary of a German Doctor: Erwin Baelz (Bloomington and London,
45 Цит. по: Энциклопедический словарь Брокгауза и Ефрона. Т. 81. СПб., 1904. С. 790.
46 Новое время. 25 марта (7 апреля) 1904. № 10078. С. 2.
47 Исследователь японской православной церкви Наганава Мицуо выяснил, что пер-
вую попытку спровоцировать самого владыку Николая на участие в шпионской «ис-
тории» японские власти предприняли еще в декабре 1903 г. Как и все последующие,
50 По сведениям о. Николая Токийского, собеседником премьера тогда выступил пер-
вый японский методистский епископ Хонда Ёити, член Евангелического союза Япо-
нии. – Накамура (сост.). Дневники Святого Николая Японского. Т. 5. С. 75.
правительство гарантирует свое покровительство всем вероисповеданиям и «иностранным миссионерам» и «иностранным миссионерам война не угрожает никакой опасностью». «Настоящая война, – пояснил глава токийского кабинета, – не есть война между христианством и язычеством и религиозные вопросы не играют в ней никакой роли».

Это заявление министра-президента сразу перепечатали Japan Daily Mail, а затем и протестантские газеты Японии. В майском (1904 г.) интервью газете Kokumin премьер высказался на этот счет более подробно:

«Среди множества вещей, особо беспокоивших меня с началом русско-японской войны, ... были коллизии, которые происходят из расовых и религиозных различий между моими соотечественниками и иностранными миссионерами и которые могли помешать правительству осуществить свои дейстивительные намерения, а нации достичь намеченных ею целей.

По этой причине кабинет через министра внутренних дел предписал местным властям обеспечить должную защиту русским в нашей стране.

министр просвещения, со своей стороны, также направил соответствующие указания провинциальным органам образования».

Комментируя эти высказывания, редакция японской газеты призвала «всех соотечественников-христиан, иностранных миссионеров и священнослужителей» поверить данным обещаниям, отбросив «сомнения и опасения».

Позднее, выступая в нью-йоркском, барон К. Канэко эти опасения токийского кабинета сформулировал более определенно: «Мы начинали эту войну, ... ясно понимая, что будем сражаться не с одними московитами, но, под влиянием их возмутительных росказней, нам будут противостоять религиозные и расовые чувства. Ни одна нация еще никогда не была вовлечена в столь душераздирающий конфликт» – Цит. по: The Japan Times, April 26, 1905, № 2451, р. 6.

Канэко Кэнтаро (1851–1945) – из самурайской семьи, барон (1900), виконт (1907), граф (1934). В 1871–1878 гг. учился в США (в Гарварде), с 1880 г. секретарь японского Сената (Genroin), участник разработки Конституции 1889 г., в 1885–1886 гг. личный секретарь премьер-министра Ито Хиробуми, с 1890 г. член Палаты пэров парламента. В 1898 г. министр сельского хозяйства и торговли, в 1900 г. министр юстиции Японии. С февраля 1904 г. по октябрь 1905 г. по заданию своего правительства находился в США со специальной пропагандистской миссией, участник мирных переговоров в Портсмуте. Широко публиковался в зарубежной англоязычной печати, дал огромное количество интервью, часто выступал с публичными речами перед американской аудиторией, прочитал в США свыше ста лекций.

Граф Кацура имел в виду февральский (1904 г.) циркуляр министра внутренних дел, в котором заключалось требование «обращаться с русскими, оставшимися в Японии, совершенно так же, как в мирное время, воздерживаться от всяких грубостей в отношении к ним и от всякой неприязни». – Цит. по: Накамура (сост.). Дневники Святого Николая Японского. Т. 5. С. 29.

Цит. по: The Japan Times, May 6, 1904, № 2157, р. 6.
глава японского кабинета дал корреспонденту англоязычной токийской газеты Japan Times. Указав на реально существующую в его стране свободу совести и вероисповедания, граф Кацура от своего и микадо имени вновь подчеркнул, что происходящий конфликт «не есть война за превосходство одной расы или религии над другой», и гарантировал, что притеснений на религиозной почве в стране не будет допущено.55

Действительно, в результате принятых властями мер, православные церковнослужители и верующие перестали подвергаться преследованиям, в Токио, Хакодатэ и других японских городах беспрепятственно действовали их храмы. В письме, опубликованном в Новом времени 13 июня 1904 г., епископ Николай констатировал, что японское правительство делает все, чтобы и он сам, и его паства находились в безопасности и могли чувствовать себя спокойно. В столице, сообщил он, здания миссии денно и нощно охраняют полиция и жандармерия, провинциальные власти получили предписание Токио действовать в том же духе. «Спасибо полиции, что охраняет Миссию», – отметил в своем дневнике глава японской православной церкви. – ... Вообще, японское Правительство делает все, что только можно, для охраны Миссии».56 Правда, на православных японцы повсеместно продолжали смотреть как на чужаков, и в глухих деревнях, вне пределов досягаемости властей, если они, хотя только по религиозным соображениям, отказывались молиться за победу японского оружия традиционным способом, односельчане их жестоко избивали.57

Письмо владыки Николая в петербургскую газету с видимым удовлетворением перепечатали и японская англоязычная пресса.58 Одновременно она продолжала пристально следить за настроениями в Ватикане, посвящая их анализу пространные статьи.59 Сам Святейший престол зашел подчеркнуто нейтральную и миролюбивую позицию. По сообщению Petit Parisien, в беседе с токийским епископом Пий X подтвердил, что за несколько дней до начала военных действий «употребил все свое влияние, чтобы убедить царя поддерживать мир в духе Гаагской конференции, инициатором созыва которой он был», однако Николай II вежливо, но твердо ответил, что война «уже неизбежна».60 В годы самой войны Ватикан выступал с призывами к ее скорейшему окончанию. 15 сентября 1905 г., через несколько дней после подписания Портсмутского договора, Пий X направил в Токио своего специального представителя (портландского

56 Накамура (сост.). Дневники Святого Николая Японского. Т. 5. С. 7, 19.
59 См., напр.: “Has the Pope a New Policy?” The Japan Times, August 4, 1904, № 2234, p. 4; “The Vatican and Japan,” The Japan Times, August 12, 1904, № 2241, p. 5. Перепечатка из Public Opinion.
60 Цит. по: The Japan Times, August 12, 1904, № 2241, p. 5.
епископа O’Connell’a) для принесения микадо поздравлений с «великодушным миром» и благодарности «за обращение с римскими католиками в Японии».

В бытность в Токио папский посланник получил для передачи в подарок Ватикану право собственности на земельный участок площадью в 30 тысяч цубо специально для постройки на нем католического храма.

Военные власти Японии также демонстрировали уважительное отношение к христианству, хотя и строго административное – «на экспорт». Например, православных судовых священников, попадавших в плен вместе с экипажами русских военных кораблей, как правило, отправляли на родину. Весной 1904 г., в ответ на «духовные запросы» собственных военнослужащих-христиан в маньчжурскую армию из Токио были направлены шесть американских и британских миссионеров-евангелистов и шесть японских христианских священников, о чем граф Кацуро не преминул сообщить во всеобщее сведение в своем упомянутом выше майском интервью англоязычной газете. Власти не препятствовали распространению библейских текстов в переводе на японский язык среди японских солдат и в самой Японии (см. Рис. 1). После оккупации Кореи японскими войсками здешние западные миссионеры, несмотря на обеспокоенные призывы своих правительств, отказались покинуть страну, поскольку, как выразилась в частном письме из Сеула женщина-миссионер американка Eva H. Field, японские военные, пусть даже только подчиняясь армейской дисциплине, ведут себя «как настоящие христианские джентльмены».


61 Цит. по: The Japan Times, September 15, 1905, № 2574, p. 3.
62 The Japan Times, November 21, 1905, № 2629, p. 2. Один цубо равен 3,3 кв м.
63 Первоначально японские военные планировали послать в Маньчжурию только буддийских и синтоистских священников. Чтобы в состав этой группы вошли также и христиане, потребовалось вмешательство британского посланника и хлопоты министра иностранных дел (См.: The New York Times, June 25, 1904, № 16997, p. 2). Эту подробность граф Кацуро в своем интервью опустил.
Зато корейская туземная печать, ранее выказывавшая сочувствие обеим конфликтующим сторонам (в январе 1904 г. Корея официально заявила о своем нейтралитете), с прибытием японских оккупационных войск, по словам современного американского исследователя Andre Schmid’a, не только стала выступать «с энергичными призывами к региональному и расовому единению, на чем настаивала Япония», но и начала освещать войну «как конфликт белой России против желтой Японии, от исхода которого зависит, выживут желтые народы или будут уничтожены». Как видим, адресуясь азиатской аудитории, японская пропаганда оперировала совершенно иными, чем на Западе, категориями. Исходя из этих постулатов, перед расстрелом заподозренных в шпионаже в пользу России или в диверсиях корейцев, независимо от их религиозной принадлежности, японские солдаты распилили на крестах, а фотоснимки этих сцен оккупационные власти тиражировали – в назидание и устрашение, конечно, не западной, а азиатской аудитории (см. Рис. 2). В ответ корейские патриоты демонстративно принимали христианство. Один из активистов антивоинского движения Yi Ilsik был арестован японской жандармерией в середине марта 1905 г. близ французской католической церкви Сеула, где, став католиком, поселился под христианским именем. После насильственного превращения Кореи в японский протекторат в ноябре того же года, отмечают современные российские исследователи, здешние японские власти способствовали активизации деятельности буддийских монахов в Корее, дабы противопоставить буддизм не только христианству, но и национальным верованиям – тонхак. Антизападной направленности туземная печать, контролируемая Японией, продолжала придерживаться в впоследствии: «Сегодня

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66 Возможно, в этом сказалось и влияние средневекового японского обычая распинать перед казнью уголовных преступников.
67 *The Japan Times*, March 16, 1905, № 2418, p. 3.
68 Тягий Г.Д., Пак В.П. Национальная идея и просветительство в Корее в начале XX века. М., 1996. С. 32–33.
Дмитрий Павлов

раса борется с расой», писала сеульская газета Tai Kan Nippo в сентябре 1907 г., призывая соотечественников верить своим почти единоплеменникам-японцам, а не белым – представителям «враждебной расы».

**КОНТРПРОПАГАНДА ПЕТЕРБУРГА И РЕАКЦИЯ ЗАПАДА**

Российские дальневосточные представители от лица подkontрольных им органов англоязычной региональной печати также широко распространяли снимки распятых казненных, сделанные японцами в Корее, но рассылали их в редакции газет, в общественные и религиозные организации уже христианских стран, сопроводив их следующим язвительным комментарием на английском языке:

«Утонченный японский призыв к поддержке и сочувствию, обращенный ко всем нациям “желтой угрозы”, против европейской цивилизации и особенно христианства. Эти казни были совершены 15 сентября 1904 г. в Сеуле японскими властями. Фотографии сделаны японским фотографом из Чемульпо, где их можно купить за несколько центов».

Одновременно российская пропаганда стремилась убедить своих сограждан и весь христианский мир в несовместимости христианских морально-этических ценностей как с внешне «озападненной» Японией, так и со всей ее исконной культурной традицией. Пока в петербургских салонах спорили, можно ли считать Японию цивилизованной страной в европейском смысле и не является ли конфликт с ней войной «против культуры», в проправительственной печати распространялись представления о том, что японская государственность основана на «языческой идее, что император есть Бог», а вся культура островной империи не более, чем «манерность, вымученность и экзотичность», заимствованные у соседнего Китая («в способности копировать японцы не имеют себе подобных») и не одухотворенные гуманными идеалами христианства.

«Япония, в которой четверть века назад закон предписывал распиливать неоплатного должника на части бамбуковой пилой; в которой до сих пор семейная женщина стоит на столь же низкой ступени, как у кафров; которая только 35 лет тому назад выскочила из тисков самой бессмысленной и самой грубой теократии... Япония и культура!»,

– патетически восклицало Новое время в 1904 г.

70 Архив внешней политики Российской империи (АВПРИ), ф. 14 (Китайский стол), оп. 491, д. 2985, л. 25. Фотографии казненных корейцев, распятых на крестах. Типографская печать.
71 См.: Сыромятников С. Заметки писателя // Новое время. 21 марта (3 апреля) 1904. № 10074. С. 3.
72 Новое время. 7(21) мая 1904. № 10121. С. 2.
На страницах российской периодической печати русские публицисты делились собственными впечатлениями от посещения Страны Восходящего Солнца, выступали с обзорами книги “Things Japanese” (1890) В. Н. Chamberlaine’a, сочинений E. Satow’a, Rein’a, Анри Дюмолара,73 Г. де-Воллана, В.Г. Астона и других иностранных дипломатов, ученых, путешественников и исследователей Японии. С сочувствием, а нередко и с симпатией отзываясь о самой стране и простых ее жителях («мы воюем не с народом, – писала С. Смирнова. – Наш враг – это японская интеллигенция, это юристы, профессора, журналисты, военные и депутаты. Это потомки тех самураев, которые... оставшиь не у дел, занялись политикой»74), русская консервативная и националистическая пресса акцентировала не приглядные стороны их жизни – отсталость, бедность и болезненность населения, высокую продолжительность рабочего дня, приниженность японской женщины, которая, по словам той же Смирновой, «занимает такое положение, что представляет скорее домашнюю утварь», широкую эксплуатацию детского труда и т.д. Японская пресса в полемику по этим вопросам с русской не вступала. Но когда в феврале 1905 г. некто «Миссионер», сославшись на лекцию в Mound City (штат Иллинойс) американской женщины-миссионера, вернувшейся накануне из Японии, в письме редактору поинтересовался, верно ли, что японские «отцы продают своих дочерей в возрасте 14 лет», «окреститься стоит пять долларов», а девочки-няньки в день «получают всего 1/20 часть цента (один rin)»,75 Japan Times после недельного раздумья ответила большой редакционной статьей под названием «Две прогрессивные нации. Статус их женщин». Сравнивая их положение «по обеим сторонам Тихого океана» (т.е. в США и Японии), автор статьи признал неполноправие японских женщин, но выразил надежду, что японцы-мужчины, «при своем удивительном умении...
соблються (adaptability) к современным условиям», с течением времени «обеспечат прекрасному полу своей страны равенство по европейскому образцу», Конфессиональных вопросов газета тогда сочла за благо не касаться.

«Европа не хочет видеть того, что наша война с Японией есть столкновение двух взаимно-непонимающих и подчас даже взаимоисключающих культур», – писало Новое время в передовице одного из своих январских (1905 г.) номеров. Ссылаясь на оценки профессора английской литературы Токийского университета Lafcadio Hearn’a (американца греческого происхождения), который именовал себя «японским поэтом» и которого сами японцы считали «наиболее компетентным “выразителем” (spokesman) Японии в англоговорящем мире» газета заключала:

«Под внешним лоском улыбок, церемоний и приседаний она [японская культура] хранит кровожадные инстинкты, не смягчаемые ни нашей этикой, ни какой бы то ни было национальной гуманной религией. Торжество японизма будет ужасным ударом для самых священных благ европейского уклада».

Российские православные деятели характеризовали традиционные японские верования как «жалкое», «мрачное» и «глупое идолопоклонство». На плакатах для простонародья русские солдаты часто изображались ведомыми в бой православным священником с высоко поднятым крестом в руках; вверху лубка помещалась фигура Спасителя, благословляющего с небес «христолюбивое воинство». С началом войны в светской российской печати проправительственного толка стали появляться рисунки с изображением поединка некоего, осененного нимбом, христианского рыцаря-европейца (в котором, впрочем, легко угадывался почитаемый в православном мире Георгий Змееборец) с драконом стилизованного монголоидного облика – символ грядущего торжества «светлого» христианства, предвозвестника Россией, над «темным» языческим миром во главе с Японией (см. Рис. 3). Таково было графическое отображение цивилизационной миссии, выполняемой Россией на Дальнем Востоке якобы в интересах всего христианского мира. Во внутрироссийской пропаганде «языческий японизм» выполнял ту же функцию, что антиамериканский антисемитизм в годы Второй мировой войны в самой Японии, как и там.

76 The Japan Times, March 1, 1905, № 2405, p. 4. Предвестником этой публикации явился обширный материал о японском женском образовании, который официозный англоязычный токийский альманах поместил в ноябре 1904 г. См.: The Russo-Japanese War [Tokyo], November 1904, № 5, pp. 567–583.
77 The Japan Times, December 21, 1904, № 2349, p. 6. Работы Hearn’a выходили и в России в русском переводе.
78 Новое время. 15(28) января 1905. № 10367. С. 4.
79 См., напр.: Архимандрит Андроник. В Японии. С. 72, 74.
превратившись в часть ультранационалистической официальной риторики, права, с выраженной религиозной (православной) окраской.

Официальные представители России в государствах Запада призывали оказать поддержку их стране уже по одному тому, что она является «великой христианской нацией. Весной-летом 1904 г. в реальности «желтой угрозы» христианскому миру со стороны Японии американскую публику безуспешно убеждали посол граф А.П. Кассини и публицист и издатель князь Э.Э. Ухтомский, прибывший в Новый Свет со специальной пропагандистской миссией (свое североамериканское турне он начал в Канаде); в июне с лекцией на ту же тему в лондонском Central Asian Society выступил ветеран российской журналистики, нововременский обозреватель Г.С. Веселитский-Бождарович (псевдоним «Артус»). В этом духе свою и зарубежную общественность «подогревали» и сообщения российских военных властей из Манчжурии. В мае 1904 г. мировую печать облетела сенсационная телеграмма, напечатанная в газете The Times, March 17, 1904, № 37344, p. 3 (Отчет о публичном выступлении в Нью-Йорке российского генерального консула Лодыженского).


81 Весной-летом 1904 г. в реальности «желтой угрозы» христианскому миру со стороны Японии американскую публику безуспешно убеждали посол граф А.П. Кассини и публицист и издатель князь Э.Э. Ухтомский, прибывший в Новый Свет со специальной пропагандистской миссией (свое североамериканское турне он начал в Канаде); в июне с лекцией на ту же тему в лондонском Central Asian Society выступил ветеран российской журналистики, нововременский обозреватель Г.С. Веселитский-Бождарович (псевдоним «Артус»). В этом духе свою и зарубежную общественность «подогревали» и сообщения российских военных властей из Манчжурии. В мае 1904 г. мировую печать облетела сенсационная телеграмма, напечатанная в газете The Times, March 17, 1904, № 37344, p. 3 (Отчет о публичном выступлении в Нью-Йорке российского генерального консула Лодыженского).

граммам генерала В.Е. Флуга. Ссылаясь на сведения русских разъездов и сообщения иностранных миссионеров, генерал-квартирмейстер полевого штаба наместника утверждал, будто в Tapadziatsi, в 160 милях к северо-западу от Мукдена под влиянием японской пропаганды китайцы готовят массовое побоище всех христиан: «Эти события должны коснуться не только России, но всего цивилизованного мира, поскольку есть основания опасаться, что восстание охватит и остальную часть Китая». Хотя и до, и после этого в Китае действительно случались убийства католических и протестантских миссионеров (редко по религиозным мотивам), предсказанная Флугом резня, к счастью, не состоялась.

В общем, в годы войны российская пропаганда стремилась превратить «христианский вопрос» в важный компонент жупелла «желтой угрозы» всей западной цивилизации. Использование этого культурного стереотипа не имело в виду организацию какого-либо нового «крестового похода» против Японии или его подобия – объединить усилия западных держав в борьбе с «желтой опасностью» официальный Петербург явно не рассчитывал, но вызвать к себе симпатии христиан или, как минимум, их сочувствие, очевидно, стремился. Однако даже в чисто идейном плане сколько-нибудь заметного успеха российской пропаганде добиться не удалось, хотя, по свидетельству Times, «народившись в Петербурге с началом войны», «пугало желтой угрозы» было затем «с готовностью подхвачено Берлином», а в феврале 1904 г. «достигло и Парижа». Как раз накануне местная Figaro утверждала, что с Японией нельзя обходиться как с европейской – т.е. христианской – нацией, а в будущем она может «стать угрозой для Европы». В марте Berliner Tageblatt выступила со статьей, в которой (в пересказе нововременного обозревателя) говорилось: «Война ставит на карту престиж не России, а всей Европы – ставит его на карту не в Японии, а во всей Азии. И победа Японии была бы ужасным ударом для всей белой расы». Несмотря на такое единодушие, при сложившейся расстановке сил на международной арене об объединении христианских стран или даже их части против Японии не могло идти и речи. Максимум, чего в действительности могла опасаться островная империя даже в случае невероятного успеха российской пропаганды – это торгового бойкота со стороны европейских континентальных держав. На практике не случилось и этого.

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84 Например, в июле 1904 г. в Han-kow были убиты католические миссионеры епископ Verhaeghen с братом (The New York Times, July 25, 1904, № 17022, p. 1), в ночь на 12 апреля 1905 г. недалеко от Hangchow грабители смертельно ранили священника E.V. Kennedy (The Japan Times, April 28, 1905, № 2453, p. 6), в ноябре того же года в Лиенчоу провинции Куанхунг при невыясненных обстоятельствах погибли четверо американских миссионеров (The Japan Times, November 4, 1905, № 2615, p. 3.) и т.д.
85 The Times, February 18, 1904, № 37320, p. 3.
86 А.С. О слепоте английской политики // Новое время. 17(30) марта 1904. № 10070. С. 2.
В то же время, англоговорящий Запад, в первые месяцы войны охваченный ярым японофильством, в тайне опасался чрезмерного усиления Японии, а в ее военных успехах и активном проникновении в Корею и особенно в Китай ощущал потенциальную угрозу своим экономическим и политическим интересам. Высказывались тревоги и косвенного порядка. По свидетельству обозревателя Spectator, даже в стане верного союзника Японии, в Великобритании, многие были обеспокоены тем, что «первая в истории победа азиатского государства над западной державой» послужит примером для колониальных народов и в итоге приведет «к восстанию по всей Индии».  

В этой связи бывший британский губернатор Пенджаба указал на безрассудство «радоваться поражению европейской державы от рук азиатской армии». Ведущий внешнеполитический анализ в влиятельного британского общественно-политического альманаха Fortnightly Review, писавший под псевдонимом “Calchas”, еще в марте 1904 г. призывал общественное мнение своей страны осознать, что в случае «решительного успеха Японии, “желтая” а не русская угроза станет на повестку дня всех великих держав за пределами Британской империи».

Дальнейшие триумфы японского оружия на суше и на море отозвались на Западе еще большим ростом интереса к проблеме «желтой угрозы» в разных ее ипостасях, включая “христианский вопрос”, и в различном толковании. «Неожиданная демонстрация Японией своей военной мощи в ходе войны, – фиксировала в мае 1905 г. Kokumin, – вызвала апокалиптические тревоги на Западе». В публичных устных выступлениях и на страницах крупнейших органов уже не только французской и немецкой, но также английской и американской печати о ней заговорили журналисты, обозреватели, видные политики, деятели культуры. «В случае


88 Цит. по: Marks, “‘Bravo, Brave Tiger of the East!’,” p. 625.


уксеха, – объяснял барону К. Сузэмуцу91 корреспондент Review of Reviews в августе 1904 г. смысл одолевавших западноевропейцев опасений, – Япония объявит Китай, и 400 миллионов китайцев, организованные и вы- мушенные русские, провозгласят Азию для азиатов, и что тогда делать Европе?».92 Во французских газетах появилась карикатура, на которой был изображен вооруженный самурайскими мечами японец, крадущий- ся к безмятежно спящим западноевропейским лидерам – один русский царь с револьвером в руке стоял настороже. С наиболее пессимистиче- ским прогнозом о послевоенных судьбах японских христиан в печати вы- ступил преподобный George Washington. На страницах Living Church этот парижский священник предрекал «вселенское бедствие»: «если победит Япония, это станет триумфом язычества; если она будет побеждена, не- избежны самые безжалостные в истории гонения последователей Христа – тысячи христиан будут умерщвлены, а все иностранные миссионеры изгнаны из пределов Японской империи».93 Эти тревоги совпали с оче- редным всплеском опасений «желтой угрозы», поразившим французскую печать осенью 1904 г.94

«ХРИСТИАНСКИЙ ВОПРОС» В ПРОПАГАНДЕ ТОКИО В ВОЕННЫЕ ГОДЫ. МИФ О ХРИСТИАНИЗАЦИИ ЯПОНИИ

В самом Токио более всего стремились избежать превращения рус- ско-японской войны в мировую на базе страха Запада перед все той же «желтой угрозой». Еще на заседании 30 декабря 1903 г. члены японского кабинета министров высказывали опасение, что в случае, если к Японии в войне присоединятся Россия, и другие западноевропейские страны на вмешательство в конфликт на стороне России.95 Поэтому уже в ходе самой войны апокалиптическим предчувствиям западля японская зарубежная пропаганда, с одной стороны, противопоставила настойчивые указания на духовную близость япон- ской культуры и западной цивилизации (барон К. Канэко неоднократно

91 Сузэмуцу Кэнчо (1855–1920) – барон (1895), зять премьер-министра маркиза Ито Хи- робуми, начиная журналистом газеты Nichi-Nichi, в 1878–1886 гг. работал в японском посольстве в Лондоне, одновременно участь в Кэмбридже. С 1890 г. депутат японского парламента, с 1896 г. член Палаты пэров, в 1898 г. министр коммуникаций, в 1900 г. министр внутренних дел Японии. С февраля 1904 г. по февраль 1906 г. по заданию своего правительства находился в Великобритании с пропагандистской миссией. Размах его пропагандистской деятельности в Европе не уступал масштабам работы барона К. Канэко в США.
92 Цит. по: The Japan Times, August 23, 1904, № 2250, р. 4.
93 Цит. по: The Japan Times, October 14, 1904, № 2294, р. 6.
заявлял в печати, будто на Дальнем Востоке Япония «сражается в интересах англо-американской цивилизации», а не в своих собственных и опровержение тезиса о войне Японии с Россией, как о столкновении христианского государства с языческим, а с другой – стремилась всячески «дистанцировать» свою страну от Срединной империи. На страницах Review of Reviews барон К. Сузэмацу подчеркивал отличия своей страны от Поднебесной, а бывший посланник в Петербурге Курино Синъитиро в интервью New York Times указал, что Китай рассматривает Японию в качестве своего «традиционного врага». «Те, которые пугаются признаком “желтой опасности”, – заявил он же в беседе с корреспондентом Berliner Tageblatt, – очевидно не знают о той глубокой пропасти, которая разделяет две главные ветви желтой расы. Китай считает Японию своим смертельным врагом и когда почувствует себя достаточно сильным, он прежде всего нападет на нее». В статье в San Francisco Call барон Канэко отметил, что никакой «желтой угрозы» Западу от Японии не может исходить вообще, поскольку «мы как нация быстро продвигаемся в сторону христианства». Популяризация этих представлений составила главное содержание первого этапа деятельности японской пропаганды, адресованной Западу, в разработке христианской тематики. Этот этап длился примерно до середины лета 1904 г.

Касаясь положения христиан внутри самой Японии, японские официальные представители в своих бесчисленных речах, статьях, интервью и других публичных выступлениях без уста (и не без успеха) развили вышеприведенные программные заявления японского премьера по религиозным и конфессиональным вопросам. В марте 1904 г. на страницах North American Review посол К. Такахира писал, что «в Японии, как и в других странах мира, непоколебимо гарантирована свобода вероисповедания», в апреле в речи в лондонском Конституционном клубе барон К. Сузэмацу подчеркнул, что христианство воспринимается в Японии «с большой толерантностью», это же в мае в интервью нью-йоркской World, а в июле Brooklyn Eagle вновь отметил К. Канэко; тогда же (в июле) в беседе с корреспондентом Neue Freie Presse японский посланник в Вене Макино Нобуаки сообщил, что в его стране «христиане имеют равные права с буддистами», что недавний спикер нижней палаты японского парламен-

96 The Japan Times, July 26, 1904, № 2226, p. 4. Правда, точку зрения К. Канэко на этот счет публично оспорил посол Японии в США Такахира Когоро.
98 Цит. по: Новое время. 9(22) февраля 1904. № 10033. С. 3.
99 Цит. по: The Japan Times, April 7, 1904, № 2132, p. 6.
101 The Japan Times, June 14, 1904, № 2190, p. 6 (Отчет о речи барона К. Сузэмацу «Проблема Дальнего Востока» в Конституционном клубе Лондона 27 апреля 1904 г.); The Japan Times, June 23, 1904, № 2198, p. 6 (Полный текст этой речи К. Сузэмацу).
102 The Japan Times, May 8, 1904, № 2159, p. 5.
Дмитрий Павлов

tа (имелся в виду Катаока Кенкити, умерший осенью 1903 г.) был протестантом, а сам он «близко знаком с христианином, который занимает пост президента Верховного суда» Японии. В марте 1905 г. - вновь Канэко (в речи на заседании одного из американских исторических обществ):

«Когда началась война, Россия заявила, что это конфликт между христианством и язычеством. Это страшные слова. Если следовать этой логике, христианские нации должны завоевать языческий мир. Нас называют язычниками, но эти язычники сделали много богоугодных дел, тогда как на счету у России достаточно ужасных поступков, которые выразили язычники никогда не решились бы совершить (Аплодисменты)».

Для разъяснения мировой общественности вопроса о положении христиан внутри самой островной империи на Запад были направлены видные христианские деятели-японцы – Ибука Кадзиносукэ и епископ Хонда Ёити.

Широко разрекламированный курс Токио на веротерпимость также внес важную лепту в создание образа Японии как европейски цивилизованного, религиозно свободного и духовно близкого Западу государства. При этом истолкование «желтой угрозы» получило несколько неожиданный поворот. 16 мая 1904 г. в токийском парке Сиба состоялся многоголый митинг в присутствии мэра японской столицы Озаки Юкио и токийского губернатора барона Сенгэ. Накануне митинга из протестантов и буддистов был составлен комитет его устроителей-promoters (29 человек) и 126 активистов-supporters.

В последний вошли семь западных миссионеров, десять православных японцев (с ведома епископа Николая, который «не нашел ничего против, так как и в самом деле война не имеет религиозного характера: мы же пользуемся полной свободой проповеди»), представители титулованной знати. Согласно газетному отчету, среди двух тысяч рядовых участников митинга были деятели разных религиозных сект, как зарубежных, так и японских. Один из выступавших, буддийский активист преподобный Оути Эйран, указал, что термин «желтая угроза» «применим к монголам, но не к японцам или китайцам» – «монголы, проникнутые идеями европейской цивилизации, не представляют собой никакой желтой угрозы, западным державам следует опасаться русских как наследников древних монголов».

Православные также

103 Цит. по: The Japan Times, July 19, 1904, № 2220, p. 4.
104 The Japan Times, April 1, 1905, № 2341, p. 6.
106 Накамура (сост.). Дневники святого Николая Японского. Т. 5. С. 69 (запись от 11/24 апреля 1904 г.).
получили возможность произнести речь, которая была встречена рукоплесканиями. Программа и текст резолюции митинга были загодя представлены на заключение премьер-министра, который, прочитав, одобрил их от своего и микадо имени; «значит, настоящий митинг – прямо дело Правительства», – заключил в этой связи владыка Николай. Отпечатанная по-японски и по-английски, резолюция была единогласно принята собравшимися, которые, по сообщению православного епископа, «изливались в речах самоуслаждений и плесканиях часа три». 24 мая в Уэно состоялось повторное собрание «представителей религиозных сект», на котором депутат парламента христианин Эбара Сороку, буддистский деятель Мураками Сэншо, преподобный Курода Синдо и прочие «известные представители религиозного мира» рассказали о «конференции» недельной давности.

Работу обоих межконфессиональных собраний широко осветила японская англоязычная печать, сам факт их проведения без замедления превратился в сюжет и внутрияпонской пропаганды:

«В свободе вероисповедания мы, пожалуй, более развиты, чем любое европейское государство, – прозвучало в речи графа Окума Сигэнобу, произнесенной 28 мая 1904 г. на встрече студентов и преподавателей двух десятков столичных вузов. – В этом мы следуем путь Америки. Удивительный пример представляет собой недавно состоявшийся митинг представителей разных религиозных верований Японии, буддистов и христиан, включая даже православных, которые приняли совместную резолюцию – вещь, вероятно, невозможная даже в Америке».

Параллельно, но уже без всякой огласки, премьер-министр дважды принял в своей резиденции Василия Ямада, доверенное лицо православного епископа. Беседа, которая состоялась 8 мая, была посвящена вопросу нападений на православных в Каяма, причем граф Кацура, выразив свое сожаление на этот счет, пообещал сделать все «к усмирению язычников». На встрече 23 мая премьер одобрил подготовленный Ямада под его (Кацура) диктовку текст обращения к японским православным относительно гольского племени» граф С. Окума выступил еще весной 1904 г. – Цит. по: Русский вестник. Т. 291. 1904. Июнь. С. 784.

Окума Сигэнобу (1838–1922) – граф, один из виднейших государственных деятелей Японии эпохи Мэйдзи. Дважды (в 1898 и 1914 гг.) премьер-министр, в разные годы министр иностранных дел, финансов, сельского хозяйства и торговли; основатель и лидер Партии прогрессистов – одной из наиболее влиятельных политических партий Японии конца XIX – начала XX вв.; основатель и в 1907–1914 гг. президент Университета Васэда.

108 Накамура (сост.). Дневники Святого Николая Японского. Т. 5. С. 81 (запись от 3/16 мая 1904 г.).

109 Tam же. С. 80–81.

110 The Japan Times, May 27, 1904, № 2175, р. 3.

111 The Japan Times, May 29, 1904, № 2177, р. 2.
но характера текущей войны. Кацура распорядился отпечатать тысячу экземпляров этого обращения и разослать по японским православным церквям в качестве прямого свидетельства, что, как записал в дневнике о. Николай, «высшее центральное Правительство не имеет никакой неприязни к Православной Вере в Японии и что ему желательно, чтоб и весь народ так относился к ней».

Едва известия о состоявшихся в Токио массовых религиозных митингах достигли внешнего мира, западная печать затрубила, что Япония стоит на пороге учреждения государственной «про-христианской церкви». Об этом написали американские Public Opinion и Globe, британские Churchman и Watchman, лондонская Central News сообщила, что на токийском митинге было «постановлено основать японскую христианскую церковь по образцу английской». В распространении этих слухов, вероятно, свою роль сыграли и вышецитированные заявления японских зарубежных представителей, в свое время широко растиражированные. «Не исключено скорое появление указа об учреждении национальной церкви», – утверждал токийский корреспондент лондонской Daily Telegraph. Ссылаясь на сведения из Лондона, петербургское Новое время прокомментировало эту новость как «сенсацию», отметив попутно, что «учреждение такой церкви не основывается на религиозной почве, но обнаруживает желание теснее сблизиться с европейскими нациями и парализовать начинающиеся в Европе опасения паназиатизма. Учреждением собственной христианской церкви Япония будто окончательно разорвет с азиатами и сделается европейской нацией. Замысел хорошо рассчитан для обеспечения популярности между англо-саксами».

Процитировав известия, расспространенные западной печатью, японская официозная англоязычная газета без лишних церемоний назвала их «образчиком абсурда», который в мире «говорится и пишется о нашей стране».

Последнее общественно значимое мероприятие японского правительства в разработке «христианского вопроса» внутри страны было проведено в разгар лета 1904 г. 16 июля в Саппоро, «по образцу недавно проведенного в Токио», состоялся двухчасовой митинг, в котором приняли участие губернатор Хоккайдо барон Сонода, крупные чиновники городской администрации, представители торгово-промышленного мира, профессора здешнего Сельскохозяйственного колледжа, несколько японок «высших классов», делегаты от близлежащих городов (Отару, Иванай, Асахигава и др.), синтоистские, буддистские и христианские священно-

112 Накамура (сост.). Дневники Святого Николая Японского. Т. 5. С. 76, 84.
113 Цит. по: Русский вестник. Т. 293. 1904. Октябрь. С. 453.
114 Новое время. 4(17) мая 1904. № 10118. С. 1.
115 The Japan Times, July 3, 1904, № 2207, п. 6.
лужители, всего – более двух тысяч человек. Христиан представляли английские, американские, канадские и японские священники и паства; присутствия православных газетный отчет не зафиксировал. «Под гром оваций» участники митинга единогласно приняли резолюцию, в которой говорилось:

«Несколько лет назад в Японской империи была провозглашена свобода вероисповедания. Вопреки этому, а также несмотря на то, что настоящая война с Россией ведется исключительно с целью обеспечить безопасность нашей родины и мир во всем мире, есть люди, которые утверждают, будто это война между расами и религиями. Поэтому мы, представители людей, исповедующих разные вероучения, по собственному почину и с полным единодушием выражаем свой протест и заявляем, что эта война не имеет отношения ни к расам, ни к религии; мы горячо молимся, чтобы возможно скорее восстановились мир и процветание».

Если не считать некото��рых сокращений и незначительной редакторской правки, это был текст резолюции токийского митинга двухмесячной давности.

Между тем, вызвав неподдельный интерес и большие надежды в западном клерикальном сообществе, идея христианизации островной империи уже зажила «своей жизнью». В церковных кругах принялись на все лады обсуждать этот план, строить догадки, высказывать собственные наблюдения и делать заключения порой вселенского масштаба. Так, президент американской Объединенной теологической семинарии Ch. C. Hall, приветствуя христианизацию Японии, заключал, что, таким образом, человечество является свидетелем рождения нового, «восточного типа христианства», в общении с которым традиционному христианству следует переходить от «диктата к сотрудничеству». Другие высказывались пессимистически – в докладе Правления иностранных миссий, который в конце мая был представлен годичной конференции методистов в Вашингтоне, говорилось: «Имеющее хождение мнение, будто Япония превращается в христианскую страну, далеко не соответствует действительности. Здесь все еще преобладают идолопоклонничество, суеверия и атеизм». Токийский епископ Awdry, хотя и одобрил идею христианизации в принципе, но, уловив настроения светских властей, советовал единоверцам не подталкивать микадо к «государственному крещению», дабы дальнейший рост японского влияния на Востоке не был окрашен в чуждые азиатским народам христианские тона и чтобы не оскорблять патриотических чувств самих японцев. Если иностранцы будут слишком

116 The Japan Times, July 22, 1904, № 2223, p. 3.
117 Полный текст программы токийского митинга и принятой им резолюции см.: Накамура (сост.). Дневники Святого Николая Японского. Т. 5. С. 79–81.
118 The Japan Times, July 5, 1904, № 2208, p. 4. Перепечатка из Public Opinion.
часто говорить о том, что «прогресс Японии явился результатом христианского обучения или следствием реализации западных идей», предостерегал он, они тем самым «уцеляют японский патриотизм».

«Пришел день сказать о Японии: “Это нация, не имеющая религии”», — торжествовал баптист De Forest, имея в виду духовную эволюцию жителей страны от традиционных верований к христианству.

Наблюдение епископа Mugabure относительно намерения «верхних классов японского общества» христианизировать свою страну, опубликованное в августе 1904 г., мы уже приводили.

В общем, вопрос о якобы официально планируемой христианизации Японии начал выходить из-под контроля Токио, а его дальнейшая разработка с участием «своей» и зарубежной христианской общественности грозила и вовсе поставить правительство перед фактом. Осознав это, оно стало спешно отыгрывать назад. И само правительство, и пресса Страны Восходящего Солнца внезапно потеряли интерес к теме японской веротерпимости. Во второй половине 1904 г. газеты сосредоточились на перепечатке материалов западных газет, посвященных настроениям в католических и протестантских кругах Запада, специальным богословским вопросам, событиям из истории западной церкви и т.п.

Президент гэно маркиз Х. Ито, заявив, что смотрит на религию «как на предмет совершенно ненужный для жизни народа», как на суеверие и «источник слабости наций», публично выразил удовлетворение тем, что в Японии «почти всеобщим» сделалось «стремление к свободомыслию и атеизму».

Судя по сообщениям токийской печати, на всеяпонском совещании («конференции») губернаторов, прошедшем в конце февраля – начале марта 1905 г. в Токио, религиозная тематика вообще не затрагивалась. В этом заключался курс японской пропаганды в «христианском вопросе» на протяжении второго этапа ее деятельности, который продлился до рубежа 1904/1905 гг.

Отношение японских властей к «христианскому вопросу» на заключительной стадии войны можно проследить по характеру и тематике выступлений перед западной аудиторией официальных японских зарубежных пропагандистов. В декабре 1904 г. в британском Independent Review появилась большая статья К. Сузумасу под названием «Религии в Японии».

120 The Times, August 19, 1904, № 37477, p. 9.
121 The Japan Times, February 4, 1905, № 2385, p. 6.
123 Цит. по: Русский вестник. Т. 293. 1904. Октябрь. С. 454.
Христианство барон в ней даже не упомянул, ведя речь исключительно о конфуцианстве, буддизме и синтоизме, но в качестве типичного явления отметил, что в этической и нравственной стороне любой религии японец видит «в значительной степени одно и то же». Следующая и тоже декабрьская статья неутомимого Сузману в англо-американской печати (The Nineteenth Century), которая называлась «Истинный смысл хара-кири», заканчивалась такими словами:

«Самоубийство в любой форме несовместимо с западными представлениями о добре и зле и ни в коем случае не поощряется. Однако для нас на Востоке могут сложиться условия, при которых оно может быть оправдано, полностью или частично».

Выступая в феврале-марте 1905 г. в лондонской Школе экономики, токийский профессор Окакура Ёсисабуро отличие «жизненной философии» японцев «от всех ныне существующих западных наций» обосновал тем, что его соотечественники «с незапамятных времён управляются наследниками Солнца (Sun-Goddess)». Затем японский лектор подобно синтоистскому проповеднику сообщил британским экономистам, что сын этого божества «послал своего внука вниз на землю управлять Японией, а правнук Дзимму основал императорскую династию, которая правит страной непрерывно вот уже 2 500 лет», из чего, между прочим, следовало, что японская государственность намного древнее европейской. В его изображении, рядовые японцы, «воинственные от природы, всегда были по-солдатски просты и руководствовались философией прямого действия», почему Япония и «не породила самобытных мыслителей». В общем, японцы, с его точки зрения – изначально люди «не того калибра, чтобы ожидать появления среди них Канта или Шопенгауэра». Пафос выступления Окакура состоял в противопоставлении всего жизненного уклада своих соотечественников западноевропейским стандартам, начиная с представлений японцев о женской красоте и кончая устройством и обстановкой их жилья (внутреннее убранство европейского жилья, заметил он, «довольно отвратительно на наш вкус»). Отдавая, вместе с тем, должное влиянию на Японию эпохи Мэйдзи западных идей, включая «учение Иисуса Христа» («наш мыслительный прожектор сегодня направлен на Европу и Америку в поисках тех новых идей для последую-

125 The Japan Times, January 24, 1905, № 2376, p. 4 (Перепечатка из Nineteenth Century).
126 Окакура Ёсисабуро (1868–1936) – профессор-филолог, специалист по английскому языку, младший брат видного японского искусствоведа и публициста, поборника пан-азиатизма Окакура Какузо (1862–1913). В 1905 г. по приглашению Лондонского университета прочитал в Лондоне цикл лекций о «духе Японии». В том же году эти лекции были опубликованы в виде книги с восторженным предисловием знаменитого английского писателя Дж. Мередита и с авторским посвящением старшему брату.
щего развития, которые мы ранее привыкли черпать из Китая и Индии»), лектор, тем не менее, подчеркнул, что христианство «в узко-церковном» (sectarian) смысле в сознании нынешних японцев помещается «где-то между национальными верованиями» и «современным агностицизмом, или научным монизмом».

Одновременно с выступлениями Окакура Ёсисабуро в западной печати появилось несколько трудов его брата Какузо, который с февраля 1904 г. совершал лекционно-коммерческое турне по США и Западной Европе. По словам его биографа M.W. Steele’a, книги Окакура-старшего «пользовались широкой популярностью, а его идеи оказали большое влияние на восприятие японской культуры на Западе». Ещё в июле 1903 г. вышла его работа о влиянии на японское и все азиатское искусство буддизма, которая до конца 1905 г. выдержала три англоязычных издания; идейное содержание книги передал американский обозреватель, который свою рецензию на нее озаглавил: «Азия, матерь идей».

В своей следующей работе («Пробуждение Японии», ноябрь 1904 г.) Окакура Какузо прямо писал о проникновении в Японию западных влияний как о «черном дне Азии», о том, что «сердце Старой Японии еще громко бьется» и т.п.

В общем, западному читателю и слушателю недвусмысленно давалось понять, что христианская тематика уже не находится в центре внимания официального Токио, а христианская и традиционные японские этика, нравственность, философия, религиозная догматика и сам жизненный уклад весьма и весьма различаются. При этом, как мы могли убедиться, в пропаганделе, рассчитанной на западного потребителя, тема японской самобытности развивалась крещендо. Заметка, помещенная в январе 1905 г. на первой полосе Japan Times под заголовком: «Французские миссионеры помогают русским», сигнализировала, что подобные «вольности», о которых властям было известно давно, впредь правительство терпеть не намерено.

Таким образом, к середине 1904 г. положение христиан в Японии стабилизировалось, угрозу сочувствия западных стран христианской России со всеми его неприятными последствиями японская пропаганда в основном смогла нейтрализовать и, тем самым, блокировать любые практические шаги в деле их гипотетического объединения на почве религиозной общности в отражении «желтой угрозы». И в России, и на Западе это пугало оставалось достоянием горстки теоретиков, публицистов и политиков – большинство современников либо отзывалось о нем саркастически,
либо хранило равнодушное молчание, и в этом сказалось как воздействие японской зарубежной пропаганды, так и курс на веротерпимость внутри самой остроняной империи. Не удивительно, что деятельность японских зарубежных пропагандистов получила на родине высокую оценку и была щедро вознаграждена — К. Суэмацу и К. Канэко стали членами гэнро, а в 1907 г. еще и виконтами.

В КОНЦЕ ВОЙНЫ И СРАЗУ ПО ЕЕ ЗАВЕРШЕНИЮ

Весной 1905 г., когда исход войны в пользу Японии был уже, фактически, предрешен, тон и смысл печатных выступлений токийских пропагандистов, в том числе по конфессиональным вопросам, вновь заметно изменился; официальная пропаганда начала четвертый и заключительный этап своей деятельности. Разговор стал более откровенным, пошел на равных, исчезли «фигуры умолчания» и расхожие пропагандистские клише военных лет. В мае 1905 г. на страницах Deutsche Revue барон К. Суэмацу рассуждал о том, как изменятся взаимоотношения Запада и Востока по окончании войны. Указав, что, победив, его страна становится в один ряд с великими державами, он писал:

«Япония в этой связи чувствует большую ответственность и всегда будет стараться поддерживать хорошие отношения с Западом», почему «опасаться ненависти к нему со стороны Японии не следует»; «вопрос о религиозных различиях следует рассматривать точно таким же образом. Азиаты не имеют предубеждений в отношении любой религии. Они никогда не станут проявлять враждебности к западным людям в связи с религиозными различиями. Поэтому если Запад не будет демонстрировать своего презрения к азиатам по расовому и религиозному признакам, никаких осложнений не возникнет».

Тогда же в Токио стали раздаваться все более настойчивые требования «военного вознаграждения» и разного рода уступок со стороны как западных стран, так и, главным образом, поверженной России. В ответ, призывая соотечественников не зарываться и «соотносить свои права и интересы с правами и интересами других держав», редактор японоязычной Kokumin подчеркнул:

«Благодаря своим подвигам, Япония встала вровень с величайшими державами Европы и Америки, и никто теперь не может позволить себе ее игнорировать; однако, в расовом и религиозном отношениях, в своих обычаях и традициях, во всем, что относится к сфере человеческого существования и образа жизни, равно материальной и интеллектуальной, мы не имеем с ними ничего общего. В мире мы одиноки».

133 Цит. по: The Japan Times, June 20, 1905, № 2499, р. 3.
Увещевания не подействовали. По итогам тяжелой, но победоносной войны японское общество, как и накануне конфликта доведенное до кипения пропагандой доморощенных «ястребов», жаждало получения внушительной контрибуции и, как минимум, передачи Японии всего острова Сахалин. Известие о подписании японской делегацией значительной части мирного договора в американском Портсмуте вызвало волнения в Осака, Кобэ, Нагоя, Иокогама, Химэдзи, Сасэбо, Каназава, Тиба, Киото и особенно в Токио. На другой день после подписания мира, 6 сентября 1905 г., в столице было введено военное положение, генерал виконт Сакуна Самина назначен «главнокомандующим обороны Токио», в помощь трем тысячам столичных полицейских в город были стянуты войска. Но это не остановило погромщиков, иностранные газеты сообщали (не исключено, что сгущая краски), будто японская столица находится в руках бесчинствующего плебса – «толпы ходят по городу и разбивают и жгут полицейские дома и будки ... в разных местах виделось зарево», – отметил 6 сентября очевидец в своем дневнике. В ходе кровопролитных уличных боев были сожжены и разгромлены полицейские участки, резиденция министра внутренних дел, редакция проправительственной Kokumin, храмы и другие сооружения христиан, как выразилась Japan Times, независимо от их «сектантской принадлежности»: в Комагата-чо – американская церковь, в Сибадзаки-чо – недавно отстроенная методистская церковь преподобного Т. Миура, в Ёкокава-чо – церковь и школа французской духовной миссии пастора J. Balette’a, всего, по скромным оценкам, – от 8 до 10 христианских церквей и молельных домов в токийских районах Асакуса и Хондзё.

Казалось, что начинают сбываться самые мрачные предчувствия Запада. Гнева разъяренной толпы не смог избежать ни смотритель христианской часовни в Такэ-чо, который, забаррикадировавшись, выкинул белый флаг, ни прихожанин христианского храма Кати-мати (в Ситая),

135 Цит. по: The Japan Times, September 16, 1905, № 2575, р. 3.
136 Накамура (сост.). Дневники Святого Николая Японского. Т. 5. С. 264.
137 Британский посланник в Токио Sir Claude MacDonald по горячим следам извещал Foreign Office, что в ходе беспорядков 5–6 сентября «были совершены нападения на несколько церквей, из которых одна-две были уничтожены». При этом он счел необходимым подчеркнуть, что «бунт никем не принял антииностранных или анти-миссионерских форм» (Цит. по: The Russo-Japanese War, 1904–5, Compiled & introduced
кричавший погромщикам, что владелец церковной постройки воевал в Маньчжурии. Здания православной миссии в Токио спасла только прибыли дополнительного охранного отряда в сто с лишним человек; в эти же дни американско посольство охраняло 400 солдат, французское – 80, британское – 50. О масштабах произошедшего разгroma говорят убытки пострадавших миссий – от 25 до 50 тысяч иен, количество жертв, по официальным данным, составляло порядка 2 тыс. человек, включая 17 убитых бунтовщиков и 400 (по другим данным – 500) раненых полицейских. В первый же день беспорядков полиция арестовала не менее 200 погромщиков, а всего – 2 тысячи человек, 87 из которых (в большинстве молодых ремесленников и рабочих) впоследствии были осуждены. В ноябре 1905 г. по этому же делу за решетку была отправлена группа депутатов японского парламента, в том числе Коно Хиронака, спикер Палаты представителей. На восстановление 219 разрушенных токийских полицейских будок казна отпустила около 80 тысяч иен.

В Англии, по признанию британской печати, токийский бунт «произвел тяжелое впечатление»; New York Times констатировала, что в «действиях погромщиков очевидна антиамериканская тенденция», поскольку они сожгли американскую церковь и угрожали Е. Н. Harriman’у – американскому железнодорожному магнату, который находился в Токио с деловым визитом и вечером 6 сентября под охраной отряда солдат возвращался в американское посольство с банкета, который в его честь устроил в своей резиденции министр финансов барон Сонэ Арасукэ. Произошедшие беспорядки, предположила газета, «предвещают длительные сложности в американо-японских отношениях», в связи с чем американская печать высказывала свое «глубокое сожаление»; посланник Гриском выразил по этому поводу официальный протест. Немецкая пресса вообще посвятила под сомнение цивилизованность японцев. Попыткой сгладить тягостные впечатления Запада стало новое печатное выступление епископа Awdry, который, указал, что «христианство и цивилизация» «еще в


138 “Burning of the Churches,” The Japan Times, September 8, 1905, № 2568, p. 3.
139 The Japan Times, September 11, 1905, № 2570, p. 2. Эти суммы соответствуют 1–2 миллионам современных долларов США.
140 The Japan Times, November 11, 1905, № 2621, p. 2.
141 Цит. по: The Japan Times, September 11, 1905, № 2570, p. 3.
143 Цит. по: The Japan Times, September 12, 1905, № 2571, p. 2.
очень небольшой степени влияют на международные отношения», всю ответственность за произошедшие беспорядки, фактически, возложил на мировое сообщество. Параллельно Евангелический союз Японии провел собственное расследование обстоятельств погрома и пришел к заключению, что действия толпы «не были результатом подстрекательства к ненависти по отношению к иностранцам или к христианской религии».

Вскоре японская печать стала утверждать, будто в результате токийских погромов «небольшие повреждения» получили «одна-две христианские церкви», а пострадавшим миссиям тот же Евангелический союз порекомендовал воздержаться от требования компенсации понесенных убытков. Едва утих токийский скандал, как на Западе снова вспомнили и публично заговорили о желательности добровольной христианизации Японии – в ноябре 1905 г. на церковном конгрессе в британском Дочестере об этом вслух мечтал викарий Лидса преподобный Bickersteth.

Заключение

В годы русско-японской войны в рамках общей полемики по проблеме «желтой угрозы», которая развернулась в мировой прессе, столкнулись две «выдуманные реальности». Первая, российского происхождения, хотя и получила некоторый отклик на Западе (в основном в Германии и Франции), была воспринята мировым сообществом в целом вполне адекватно, именно – как искусственно и политически небескорыстно раздуваемый миф. Официальная российская пропаганда в союзе с консервативной прессой стремилась убедить сограждан и весь христианский мир в реальности «желтой угрозы» и несовместимости христианских морально-этических ценностей с лишь внешне «озападненной» Японией, но мало преуспела в этом даже внутри своей собственной страны; руководители РПЦ безуспешно призывали единоверцев осознать русско-японский конфликт как столкновение христианства с язычеством. Иностранье наблюдатели фиксировали отсутствие в российском обществе антипатий к японцам. New York Times не обнаружила в Петербурге «ни сколько-нибудь широкого антияпонского настроения, ни расового антагонизма» даже в феврале 1904 г., когда в российских городах в связи с началом войны проходили массовые патриотические манифестации; военный корреспондент Times в 1905 г. констатировал, что «русские так же безразличны к расовым различиям, как и британцы».

В послевоенной России, по признанию поэта Валерия Брюсова, выражение «желтая опасность» «успело

145 The Japan Times, September 15, 1905, № 2574, p. 6.
147 См.: The Japan Times, November 28, 1905, № 2634, p. 6.
пошлиться и принять комический оттенок».  

Предчувствия грядущей катастрофы для японских христиан, которые посетили некоторых публицистов и религиозных деятелей Запада, также не вышли за рамки газетных спекуляций. Таким образом, пугало «языческого японизма» как часть российской официальной риторики не сработало ни во внутрироссийской пропаганде, ни за пределами империи. Представления о цивилизационной миссии России на Дальнем Востоке, выполняемой якобы в интересах всего христианства, также не получили в мире сколько-нибудь ощутимых сочувствия и поддержки.

Для нехристианской Японии война с Россией актуализировала вопрос о статусе и реальном положении «своих» и зарубежных христиан на ее территории и в этой связи – об общем содержании и ситуативных изменениях собственной внутренней и зарубежной пропаганды с акцентом на межконфессиональную тематику. Перед пропагандистами, направленными на Запад, правительство поставило задачу нейтрализовать возможные опасения «желтой угрозы» на мировой арене, затушевать представление о войне как столкновении христианской страны с языческой с тем, чтобы не допустить объединения против себя христианских государств в любой форме и, таким образом, предотвратить перераспределение локального дальневосточного конфликта в мировой. Так родилась и была пущена в ход «выдуманная реальность» в токийской редакции, причем, в отличие от ее российского аналога – весьма успешно.

За годы войны японская пропаганда, рассчитанная на западного потребителя, прошла несколько этапов. В ходе первого (длившегося до середины 1904 г.) особо подчеркивались духовная близость японской и «англо-американской» цивилизаций (в интересах последней Япония якобы и вступила в войну с Россией), «исконный» и «извечный» японо-китайский антагонизм и толерантное отношение к христианству в самой Японии, которая будто бы в скором времени намерена окреститься. Информация о массовых митингах представителей разных конфессий, проведенных японским правительством в мае-июле 1904 г., была широко растиражирована и еще больше подхлестнула надежды Запада на скорую христианизацию островной империи. Этим ожиданиям не суждено было сбыться, но главная цель Токио – укоренить в христианском мире образ Японии как страны, духовно близкой Западу, – тем не менее, оказалась достигнута.

Поэтому второй этап (до конца 1904 г.) прошел под знаком потери интереса японского правительства к проблемам веротерпимости. Объявив планы христианизации Японии газетной «уткой», более к общественно-му обсуждению межконфессиональных вопросов внутри страны Токио в годы войны не обращался, вероятно, посчитав их исчерпанными – надобность в продолжении официального мифотворчества в этом направле-

Дмитрий Павлов

нии отпала. К тому же, в ходе реализации курса на укрепление позиций Японии на Востоке идеи христианолюбия и мирного сосуществования религий должны были с неизбежностью отойти на второй план, уступив лидерство пан-азиатским лозунгам, уже пущенным в ход в Корее.

На протяжении третьего этапа (до весны 1905 г.) японская пропаганда, адресованная Западу, главный упор делала уже на культурно-религиозной самобытности своей страны, а когда исход войны в пользу Японии стал очевиден, вообще отбросила прежние клише. На заключительном (4-м) этапе ее деятельности сюжет о духовном родстве Японии с западной цивилизацией окончательно исчез из пропагандистского репертуара. Погромы христианских церквей в Токио 5–9 сентября 1905 г. воочию показали конъюнктурный, верхушечный и сугубо утилитарный характер официального японского христианолюбия годичной давности.

«Усвоение так называемой западной цивилизации в течение тридцати лет не может обозначать приобретения органических способностей, которыми японский мозг ранее не обладал, – писал в самом конце XIX в. тонкий знаток и большой поклонник Японии Hearn, к тому времени уже ставший подданым мицадо. – … Такие превращения не совершаются на протяжении одного поколения ... Все, что Япония смогла так превосходно выявить, она создала без перевоплощения своего “я” ... Страна остается тем же, чем была: ее лицо почти не изменилось при всех переменах эпохи Мэйдзи».

С утверждениями Hearn‘а перекликаются наблюдения японских историков. «Вестернизиция эпохи Мэйдзи, – отмечают авторы официозной «Истории японской культуры», – воздействовала только на интеллектуалов и средний класс. Крестьяне и обнищавшие бывшие самураи, которые составляли свыше 80% населения, … массами обратились к синтоизму ..., не находя утешения ни в буддизме..., ни в христианстве, которое пришло как часть западного влияния».

Вестернизиция и модернизация, добавляет Наганава Мицуо, «затронули лишь внешнюю сторону жизни японцев. В глубине души они остались приверженцами буддистских и синтоистских идей, причем конфуцианство новый правящий класс возродил в качестве официальной идеологии».

Оптимизм методистского епископа Хонда в отношении «перспектив будущего» западной христианской церкви в Японии не оправдался, хотя количество ее последователей-японцев постепенно увеличивалось – к 1909 г. одних протестантов здесь насчитывалось около 75 тысяч.

155 Ohata, Ikado, “Christianity,” p. 293.
Усилиями обеих сторон – и японской, и русской – упования на широкое распространение в стране православия, высказанные в свое время С.О. Макаровым, в годы войны также были похоронены. По окончании войны в духе макаровских идей японские православные сделали попытку идейно обосновать возможность «встроить» свою церковь в японскую систему государственной власти, но успеха не достигли. Вместе с тем, в послевоенные годы японское православие продолжало, хотя медленно, но развиваться – на момент смерти владыки Николая в 1912 г. эта церковь имела в своем распоряжении один кафедральный собор в Токио и восемь меньших, 276 простых церквей, две семинарии и свыше 34 тысяч человек паствы. С окончанием эпохи Мэйдзи японское православие вступило в полосу длительного упадка.

Христианизация Японии не могла состояться, но мечта о гармоничном соединении и плодотворном взаимодействии традиционной японской культуры с западной цивилизацией оставила глубокий след в духовной жизни Японии и получила отражение в ее изящной словесности. Герой рассказа Акутагава Рюносукэ «Носовой платок» обнаруживает в кодексе бусидо «черты, сближающие его с христианским духом стран Америки и Европы», и усматривает в их взаимопроникновении путь для вывода японской культуры из «духовного упадка»; в эссе «Похвала тени» Танидзаки Дзюнитиро рассуждает о том, как самобытный Восток может воздействовать на «формы политической и религиозной жизни, на искусство, на экономическую деятельность» Запада.

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Poisoning the Proletariat: Urban Water Supply and River Pollution in Russia’s Industrial Regions during Late Stalinism, 1945–1953

Donald Filtzer

INTRODUCTION: WATER SUPPLY, URBAN SANITATION, AND EVERYDAY LIFE

Water supply is part of a tightly-knit sanitary nexus formed by housing conditions, sewerage, waste removal, and access to clean water. The interconnections here are more or less obvious and well discussed in the historical literature, especially of Victorian Britain and Wilhelmine Germany. Most hinterland Russian cities had very limited sewerage systems. Only in Moscow did a majority of residents live in buildings with sewerage; everywhere else, including very large cities such as Gor’kii, Sverdlovsk, Cheliabinsk, and Molotov (Perm’), most people had to use outhouses which emptied into cesspits or crudely dug ditches. This created enormous problems of waste removal, and for most of the year human and animal excrement was left to wash away during the rain or the spring thaws into local rivers. Even sewerage did not always help, because most cities discharged their raw sewage into rivers and lakes with at best inadequate treatment, and in most cases with no treatment at all. These discharges, together with the sewage and industrial wastes discharged by factories, made rivers unsafe to use as drinking water or to bathe in, both locally and in all communities downstream. To this extent the Soviet Union shared a common history with other societies that underwent industrialization and urbanization. Cities tended to expand water supply faster...
than they installed sewerage. They tended to expand sewerage systems faster than they built sewage plants to disinfect the sewage and neutralize hazardous chemicals, or water treatment works to purify the water taken from local water sources before putting it back into the water supply. All of this had enormous repercussions on public health, perhaps most graphically dramatized in the cholera epidemics that affected France, Britain, and Germany throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. In terms of sanitation, the Soviet Union lagged some 30 to 50 years behind its Western European counterparts, but their respective relationships between sanitary reform and general improvements in public health sharply diverged. During the postwar period the USSR attenuated the impact of sanitation-dependent diseases (tuberculosis, pneumonia, gastro-enteric infections) on general and infant mortality, but it did this not via housing and sanitary reform (the route followed in Western Europe and the United States), but by compensating for the absence of sanitary reform through the application of stringent public health measures and modern medical advances, such as immunization and antibiotics.

In terms of water supply, the issue has two equally important dimensions to it. The first involves people’s access to water and what this meant for their health, hygiene, and domestic labour. Apart from the obvious risk of disease, the absence of clean running water greatly increased the burdens of domestic toil. Most urban residents in the postwar RSFSR did not have indoor running water, but had to haul water up from street pumps or wells. Basic domestic tasks, such as laundering clothes and bed linen, maintaining minimal levels of hygiene for adults and children, cooking, washing utensils after meals, not to mention fetching and carrying the water itself, required significant expenditures of time and energy. When added to other claims on energy – long hours of heavy physical labour; working in under-heated factories; living in under-heated buildings; walking long distances to work because public transport was inadequate – the lack of indoor piped water contributed to a situation where individual daily calorie requirements substantially exceeded what the typical daily diet could provide. The second dimension, of course, is pollution, and it is this that forms the theme of this article. We shall focus on three key issues: efforts to curb industrial pollution prior to World War II; postwar anti-pollution legislation and obstacles to its enforcement; and the different patterns of water pollution in large cities versus small industrial towns. The source base is mainly from the files of the State Sanitary Inspectorate (Gosudarstvennaia San-


tarnaia Inspeksiia, or GSI), which had responsibility for overseeing all aspects of public health, including urban sanitation, water supply, adherence to anti-pollution legislation, food safety, housing, public bathhouses, and epidemic control.5

PREWAR ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL RIVER POLLUTION

Stalinist industrialization placed tremendous pressure on the urban infrastructure. There was a mass influx of new workers into cities, towns, and new workers’ settlements, but the regime channelled almost all new investment into building and equipping factories, and almost nothing into making urban environments safe and comfortable for their inhabitants. This was most obvious in terms of housing, as workers crowded into corners of communal flats, bunked down in factory premises, or in hastily constructed barracks and dormitories, often with little or no heating and very little sanitation. Those older cities that had a limited sanitary infrastructure soon found it overwhelmed. We need to remember, however, that in cities like Ivanovo the nature of the housing (a mass of private, single-storey, wooden buildings) meant that there was almost no sanitation at all. In the new towns and cities created by industrialization, such as Magnitogorsk in Cheliabinsk oblast’, the situation was, not surprisingly, even worse.6 By the end of the 1930s the impact that industrialization was having on the country’s rivers and lakes was beginning to attract attention, not, one suspects, because of the hazards this posed to human health, but because of the economic damage it was causing, both to the fishing industry and to industry proper. In May 1937 the regime issued a decree which in theory, at least, placed severe restrictions on industrial discharges of pollutants. It forbade all enterprises from discharging harmful substances within the sanitary protection zones surrounding water supplies or within the boundaries of populated areas. Enterprises either had to discharge their wastes into urban sewerage

5 The GSI came under the USSR and Republican Ministries of Health, but the USSR GSI has its own collection (fond 9226) in the State Archive of the Russian Federation – Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, hereafter referred to as GARF. This fond contains inter alia a number of oblast’ and city reports for the RSFSR, plus a few Republic-wide (but no local) reports for Ukraine. The most consistent run of Russian city and oblast’ reports is in GARF’s Reading Room 2, which holds documentation for the RSFSR. These all bear the letter “A” before the fond number. From 1951 the detailed local reports became the responsibility of the Sanitary-Epidemic Centres [Sanitarno-epidemicheskie stantsii, or SES] after the latter were made organizationally independent of the GSI. With few exceptions, the oblast’ GSI reports then concern themselves mainly with internal organizational matters. Although analogous to the Medical Officers of Health (MOH) in Britain, the GSI/SES material is not as rich in detail and analysis, although this varied from one locality to another.

systems (where such existed), or build waste treatment plants to neutralize
the effluent prior to discharge into a water course. They were given six years,
from 1937 to 1942, to implement these measures. We need to point out here a
basic flaw in the decree’s logic. Since most Russian cities either had no sewage
treatment plants, or plants that could only cope with small volumes of waste,
the discharge of factory wastes into urban sewers would not have eased the
problems of pollution. A classic example would be Kazan’, where a number of
tanning and felting factories, hospitals, public buildings, and workers’ settle-
ments discharged untreated or primitive treated wastes into the city’s sewer-
age system. Insofar as this system then transported these wastes out of the city
to discharge points along the Kazanka and Volga rivers and downstream from
the intake for the city’s water supply, it brought some measurable, although
limited relief to the local population. What it did not do, however, was pro-
tect the rivers themselves. From the point of view of river pollution, a factory
connected to the Kazan’ sewerage system was little different from the large
number of other Kazan’ factories which simply released their wastes directly
into the Volga, the Kazanka (a Volga tributary), or Lake Kaban. In fact, so
many enterprises were dumping their wastes into the Kazanka (in some cases
upstream from the city water supply) that it had become impossible to measure
the total quantity of the pollution.8

I have chosen Kazan’ as an example, but in fact there was nothing special
about that city. In the year or so prior to the German invasion health officials in
the RSFSR had become alarmed at the state of Russia’s rivers. One river of spe-
cial concern, naturally enough, was the Volga, which ran from Yaroslavl’ down
to Gor’kii, then eastwards to Kazan’, then down to Kuibyshev, and eventually,
of course, down to the Black Sea. Heavy pollution was already noticeable at
Yaroslavl’, not far from the river’s source. Around Gor’kii, pollution from the
large paper combine in Balakhna (Gor’kii oblast’) rendered the Volga unus-
able as a source of clean water by the population living in settlements along
its banks. The pollution was so strong that the rather limited treatment works
in Gor’kii and other nearby Volga towns could not cope with it. Moreover,
the scale of the pollution caused by the Balakhna combine was daunting. It
left a layer of minute fibre particles several centimetres thick on the river bed,
and extended over a distance of 100 to 200 kilometres downstream. This, we
should bear in mind, was just one polluting factory among literally hundreds

7 Decree of the Central Executive Committee of the Council of People’s Commissars of the
USSR, 17 May 1937, “O sanitarnoi okhrane vodoprovodov i istochnikov vodosnabzheniia
[On the sanitary protection of water supplies and sources of water supply]” (No. 96/834),
discussed in E. I. Smirnov, Meditsina i organizatsiia zdrowookhraneniia (1947–1953) (Moscow,
1989), p. 171. Smirnov does not, however, outline the decree’s specific provisions. These
are from a draft of a report prepared sometime in early 1941 on the failure to implement it
within the RSFSR, in GARF, f. A-482, op. 47, d. 157, l. 96.
8 GARF, f. A-482, op. 47, d. 157, l. 50–50ob., 52
which discharged untreated industrial wastes into the Volga. The major impact was on fish, since fish are especially vulnerable to cellulose fibres. Every year there were mass fish kills along the Volga and its tributaries, and the GSI warned that the fishing industry which depended on these rivers was on the brink of ruin. Nor was this a problem just for the Volga river network. Chemical pollution was depleting oxygen levels to such an extent that in winter fish were dying of oxygen starvation in the Oka, Kliaz’ma, Northern Donets, Dno, Viatka, “and other” rivers.\(^9\)

The Urals presented a somewhat different set of problems. Many of its large industrial centres (Sverdlovsk, Cheliabinsk, Nizhnii Tagil, Zlatoust, and Serov, among others) were badly located from the point of view of the efficient organization of water supplies. Many of them were sited along the upper reaches of Urals rivers, so that the organization of adequate water supplies required special hydrological planning and investment. This flew in the face of the entire logic of Stalinist industrialization, which had placed exclusive emphasis on the development of large-scale industry at the expense of the water infrastructure. The situation was compounded by the slow flow rate of many rivers, which made dilution and dissipation of untreated discharges more difficult. The more or less unbridled release of faecal and industrial wastes into the region’s rivers – almost all of it without any prior treatment – posed obvious health risks to populations. It also made the Urals a classic illustration of a problem already observed during Britain’s industrial revolution: the pollution of rivers by factories lying upstream rendered them unusable even for industrial purposes by factories lying downstream. Urals factories were finding it harder and harder to acquire water of sufficient quality to carry on production, and were going to find it harder still in the future, given the region’s rapid industrial development and population growth. So, too, were enterprises in the Kuzbass, a bit further to the east in Western Siberia. The coke-oven products factory in Kemerovo had so polluted the River Tom’ that factories located even hundreds of kilometres downstream from Kemerovo could not use its water.\(^10\)

Irrespective of public health issues, it was now obvious that the uncontrolled pollution of Russia’s rivers was jeopardizing industrialization, in particular the surge in military investment during the years leading up to June 1941. Yet a review of implementation of the 1937 decree shows two things. First, much of the construction that enterprises were to undertake in order

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\(^9\) GARF, f. A-482, op. 47, d. 157, l. 94–95.

\(^10\) GARF, f. A-482, op. 47, d. 157, l. 45 (Urals); op. 47, d. 154, l. 92 (Kemerovo). Regarding Britain, Wohl cites this passage from the Royal Commission on River Pollution, in 1867: “Manufacturers pollute the water for each other until the streams have to be abandoned for all but the coarsest purposes of trade, and clean water has to be purchased from waterworks companies, or must be sought at great cost in well-sinking and boring, to which must be added the charges for extra steam-power. In some cases the manufacture and dyeing of finer sorts of goods has been necessarily abandoned.” Wohl, *Endangered Lives*, p. 237.
to implement the decree was due for completion only in 1941; another, even larger proportion was scheduled to be finished only in 1942. Thus, even if everything had proceeded trouble-free, the war would have stopped the work dead in its tracks. Secondly, in reality, the work did not proceed trouble-free. There was a whole raft of commissariats and enterprises that had made little or no progress. An analysis of the reasons why progress was so slow is very revealing. It shows, among other things, that we need to analyze water pollution within the larger context of the political economy of the Stalinist system as a whole.

I can illustrate this point by producing a small table, itself adapted from a much larger table and accompanying documentation in one of the GSI archive files. The table charts the progress made by seven major industrial centres (six of the regions in my comparative case study, plus the city of Leningrad) in fulfilling their 1940 targets for constructing sewerage systems and waste treatment installations. It also lists the reasons why these plans went unfulfilled.\(^\text{11}\)

Anyone familiar with the system of Stalinist “planning” will recognize the difficulties most of these projects encountered. One was the lack of funds. Because industrial commissariats considered these projects to be of low priority, they would approve them in the plan, and even authorize the design work, but would not allocate funds for the actual construction. A second obstacle was the shortage of building materials, and in one case, also of labour power. A third was the lack of coordination in the “planning” process – the essential planlessness (besplanovost’) of the Stalinist economic system.\(^\text{12}\) This operated

\(^{11}\) GARF, f. A-482, op. 47, d. 154, l. 1-5, 15-18ob., 64-64ob., 92.

\(^{12}\) The argument that the Stalinist economy was planless, rather than planned, dates back to the very beginning of the five-year plans in the late 1920s. The Menshevik exile journal, Sotsialisticheskii vestnik [Socialist Herald] (until 1933 based in Berlin) noted that the Stalinist plans lacked any internal coordination between the essential components of the production process; targets were imposed from the top, without any attempt to calculate whether the resources needed to fulfil these targets actually existed. The emphasis on high tempos and target-maximization within each production unit made coordination and integration of the different links within production impossible. Constant bottlenecks and shortages were the inevitable result. The Trotskyist Oppositionist, Khristian Rakovskii, writing from internal exile, advanced a similar argument, but attributed the breakdown of the plans to two further factors: the intense pressure on the working class through speedup and a catastrophic fall in living standards; and the huge amount of defective production that such high tempos produced – defective production which circulated through the entire economic system, reproducing the defects at each stage in the production process. For a fuller discussion of these early critiques see Donald Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialization: The Formation of Modern Soviet Production Relations, 1928–1941 (London, 1986), pp. 35–44. Some mainstream Western economists arrived at a similar view after World War II. Eugene Zaleski showed that the five-year plans never functioned as operational documents (most were approved only after they were already allegedly underway), and even the operational plans had little connection to actual economic policy. Eugene Zaleski, Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth, 1933–1952 (London, 1980). More recently Paul
## Sewage and Waste Treatment Construction at Major Industrial Enterprises, RSFSR, 1937–1940, as of March 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Reasons Not Fulfilled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>Hook up a number of railway stations, food processing plants, and some heavy industry enterprises to the city’s main sewage collector.</td>
<td>Completed – in fact, completed installation and connection of 16 units, against a plan of 9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ongoing work on the construction of treatment works at two textile mills feeding into the Rublevskii and Cherepovets water supplies serving Moscow city.</td>
<td>Work due for completion only in 1941, but was behind schedule. Cause not given.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ongoing work on treatment facilities at three factories in Mytishchi, in Moscow oblast’, but which had a pumping station serving Moscow city.</td>
<td>Work due for completion in 1941 and 1942, but behind schedule. Funds were allocated but had not been fully utilized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow oblast’</td>
<td>Karbolit factory, Orekhovo-Zuevo, Moscow oblast’: Construct phenol-neutralization plant; construct sewage collector; connect collector to factory sewerage system.</td>
<td>Work on both installations could not be finished because the factory could not obtain essential equipment or building materials and because of changes imposed on the factory’s construction plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leningrad</td>
<td>Most scheduled work involved renewing or reconstructing the already-existing sewerage system.</td>
<td>Progress unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Construction at several factories not yet joined to the city system.</td>
<td>Still in the design stage – no construction scheduled to begin during 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sverdlovsk</td>
<td>Verkhne-Isetskii Iron and Steel Works: draw up technical designs for sewerage and treatment plant.</td>
<td>No funds allocated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sverdlovsk linen-spinning factory. Connect the factory to the city sewerage system.</td>
<td>Work completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polevskii cryolite factory (non-ferrous metallurgy): Construct treatment plant.</td>
<td>Work halted due to labour shortage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Degtyarka copper mine. Construct treatment plant.</td>
<td>Designs approved, but work not yet started, despite being scheduled for completion in 1940.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pervoural’sk Novotrubnyi iron and steel works: Construct phenol-removal installation, to be completed in 1940.</td>
<td>Design approved and allocated building materials for the work, but could not begin work because the construction area still had barracks on it, which could not be removed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zyuzel’skie copper mines. Complete waste treatment plant by 1940.</td>
<td>Completed and started up a neutralization unit, but had not started work on construction of treatment plant to remove copper from waste water.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uralmash zavod: Complete design work on phenol-removal unit and start construction by 1940.</td>
<td>Design work finished and building materials acquired, but start of construction delayed until 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemerovo</td>
<td>Coke-oven products factory to build a city-wide sewerage system. In conjunction with two other factories, also to build factory sewerage systems and treatment (phenol-removal) plants, to neutralize factory wastes before they enter the city system.</td>
<td>Funds allocated for the city system, but no funds allocated for the factory systems or the special treatment plant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gor’kii city and Gor’kii oblast’</td>
<td>Gor’kii motor vehicle factory: Build a sewage collector and treatment plant by 1940.</td>
<td>No funds allocated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Krasnoe Sormovo heavy engineering factory: Connect the factory to the city sewerage system during 1939-1941.</td>
<td>Had used all funds allocated and completed “preparatory” work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Balakhna paper combine: Construct treatment works to treat both faecal wastes and industrial wastes by 1940.</td>
<td>No funds allocated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Balakhna cardboard factory: Construct treatment works by 1940.</td>
<td>No funds allocated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaroslavl’</td>
<td>Yaroslavl’ motor vehicle works: Rebuild sewage collector during 1940.</td>
<td>Work completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Krasnyi Perekop textile factory: Connect the factory to the city sewerage system during 1937-1940.</td>
<td>Work completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazan’</td>
<td>Linen combine: Connect the factory to the city sewerage system during 1937-1940.</td>
<td>Could not complete the work because it depended on the prior completion of a sewage collector. Work on the collector had not yet started.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

at both macro- and micro-level. Typical of macro-level planlessness was the Urals. The region had no general plan for the utilization of water resources. Each individual commissariat determined the needs of its own enterprises, and these in turn carried out any work, for example, on waste treatment facilities, to meet only their own local needs. There was no attempt to coordinate the work done by one factory with that being done by any other. Where the quest for clean water was concerned, enterprises were in competition with one another, and the success of one district in locating and collecting adequate supplies could leave others with water shortages. As for the discharge of industrial wastes, as we have already seen, there was no coordination of discharge points or waste treatment. One factory’s discharges posed a hazard to factories downstream.13

If we turn to the micro-level, we see a graphic illustration in the Karbolit factory in Orekhovo-Zuevo, in Moscow oblast’. A look back at our table shows that the factory had two projects to complete: construction of a phenol-neutral-

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rization unit, to detoxify its high volume of phenol discharges into the Kliaz’ma River; and construction of a factory sewerage system. Work on the phenol-removal unit began in 1939, and by 1940 they had finished the construction work and installed much of the equipment. The plant could not actually go into operation, however, because it still lacked some essential equipment: a boiler; a refrigerator; two pumps; and four motors. The Glavk responsible for supplying this equipment claimed it had no planning authorization to produce or deliver it. As of May 1941 – just a month before the German invasion – the factory had effectively abandoned work on the unit, even though it needed just this small number of items to begin functioning. All the investment in its construction and outfitting had effectively been wasted.\footnote{GARF, f. A-482, op. 47, d. 154, l. 16.}

Similar difficulties beset the sewerage system. Construction of the system, and of the pumping station needed to move the sewage from the collector to the sewerage network, had gone relatively smoothly, but then came to a halt because the factory could not obtain the last bits of pipe, a pump, 900 metres of high-voltage cable, lubricants, and 150 cubic metres of gravel. However, the factory eventually solved these problems, and with both the materials and the labour power needed to finish the project now on hand, it came up against a new obstacle. It could not extend the sewerage system to include the factory’s workers’ settlement or essential communal buildings (bathhouse, creche, and kindergarten) because this required construction of a separate pumping station, which had not been included in the 1941 plan. If this was not bad enough, the Orekhovo-Zuevo City Soviet then stepped in and raised the stakes. They would not allow the factory to begin using its new sewerage system until it had built a new pumping station for the city itself. There may have been a valid logic to this move, insofar as the added sewage coming from the factory may have overtaxed the undoubtedly limited capacity of the city’s sewerage system. Whether a justified demand or not, the factory could not carry out this work: it could not lay hold of the cement, the gravel, the timber, the metal, the rubberoid, or a host of other materials needed to build the station, and had no chance of doing so at any time during 1941.\footnote{GARF, f. A-482, op. 47, d. 154, l. 17, 18, 18ob., 64.}

What we see, therefore, is that river pollution in the prewar period had several inter-locking causes. One was the weakness of sanitary infrastructure. Few cities had comprehensive sewerage systems, and those that did merely collected the sewage and discharged it downstream, below the point where the town or city took its water supply. There was little or no attempt to treat it prior to discharge. A second was the impact of forced industrialization. The regime devoted all its resources to rapid industrial growth (with a commensurate growth in population centres), but made little or no investment in sanitary infrastructure. The latter simply could not cope with the vast amounts of pollution factories and urban populations were now generating. Here the
Soviet Union presented a picture typical of Britain or Germany in the mid- to late nineteenth century. Factories discharged their waste into open waterways without prior treatment, and in so doing created major risks for public health and for industrial production itself. Thirdly, once the regime became alarmed at the problems its own policies had created, it attempted to compel enterprises and their commissariats to instal anti-pollution equipment – but these attempts largely failed. And this is the most interesting aspect of the problem. The 1937 law had so little effect because it fell victim to the entire logic of Stalinist planlessness. Industrial commissariats and enterprises applied the same calculus to waste treatment as they did to investments in labour safety. These were of minor importance compared to the need to boost production, and so had little or no priority when it came to allocating funds, building materials, equipment, or labour power. Even where a commissariat or enterprise might actually commit resources, as in the case of Karbolit, the whole effort could still turn out to be wasted because they could not acquire the last bits of material or machinery needed to finish the job and allow these installations to go into operation. This was a problem endemic to the Stalinist system, and it affected all areas of production. The Soviets had a special word for it: “incompleteness” (*nekomplektnost’*).  

**Postwar Legislation: The Political Economy of Evasion**

Understandably, the war took a terrible toll on all sanitary infrastructure, including water supplies. In the occupied territories there was massive damage to pipe, pumping stations, and sewage and water treatment plants. What was not physically destroyed in the fighting decayed due to neglect. In the hinterland regions infrastructure also suffered through neglect and lack of investment, and from the fact that in cities like Gor’kii, Sverdlovsk, and Cheliabinsk, this now-weakened infrastructure had to sustain much larger populations. Even if the depreciation of plant and equipment had been less than it was, water quality would still have deteriorated because industry no longer produced essential chemicals, instruments, or parts, including: water gauges, chlorinators, cylinders for liquid chlorine, taps, valves and stopcocks, water pumps, spare parts for water treatment equipment, and coagulants for decontaminating chemical pollutants. Nor were the shortages simply material. Water supplies, waste treatment, and water purification plants required skilled engineers, technicians, and maintenance staff. Their numbers had fall-
en during the war, but at least in the early postwar years there was no effort to train their replacements.\textsuperscript{18}

The postwar situation was therefore the product of the interaction between structural and conjunctural factors, factors compounded, or rather reproduced on a larger scale, by the renewed emphasis on the rapid restoration and expansion of industrial output at the expense of investment in infrastructure. A draft report compiled in early 1947 by A. Lavrov, a Deputy Chief Sanitary Inspector in the All-Union GSI and their expert on water resources, gave this summary of the state of the rivers in the Moscow, Central Industrial, and Urals regions:\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{Moscow and Moscow Oblast’ – The Moscow River and the Kliaz’ma:} The Moscow River, from Moscow down to where it emptied into the Oka, had become just a gutter, and dangerous to both people and livestock. The Kliaz’ma was polluted from Shchelkovo down to where it left Moscow oblast’, to such an extent that as far away as Vladimir oblast’ it was unsuitable for human use, a situation unchanged since at least 1937.

\textbf{Gor’kii and Gor’kii Oblast’ – The Oka River and the Volga:} The Oka and Volga rivers converged at the city of Gor’kii, which depended on both rivers for its water supplies. Pollution of the Oka in the region of Dzerzhinsk in Gor’kii oblast’ posed a threat to one of the Gor’kii water supplies. (We discuss this in more detail in the next section.) \texttt{The Volga around Balakhna and Sormovo posed “serious obstacles” to Gor’kii’s other water supply, which fed its Zarechnaia districts. Lavrov claimed that “an analogous situation” existed on the Volga upstream from Gor’kii at Yaroslavl’, and downstream around Saratov, Kuibyshev, and Stalingrad.}

\textbf{Sverdlovsk and Sverdlovsk Oblast’ – The Neiva, Tagil, Chusovaia, and Iset’ Rivers:} The Neiva, from the Neivorudnianskii Pond to the Neiva Pond, could not be used as a source of drinking water or for domestic use in workers’ settlements or population centres, due to excessive pollution by salts of copper, zinc, and iron – all washed into the river by mine runoffs. Waste waters from mining had also “colossally” polluted the Tagil, whose toxicity was now so great that along a large stretch it had become a dead river, in which all forms of life had disappeared. Concentrations of copper and zinc salts vastly exceeded all permissible standards and had “totally wiped out the river’s macro- and micro-fauna and flora.” Needless to say, the river was unfit for domestic or drinking water supply. The Chusovaia, from its upper waters to Bilimbai, was badly polluted by industrial wastes coming from the North-Polevskii industrial area. Pollutants included “colossal quantities” of fluorine, sulphuric acid,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{tabular}{@{}l}
\textsuperscript{18} GARF, f. 9226, op. 1, d. 1010, l. 100–101. \\
\textsuperscript{19} GARF, f. 9226, op. 1, d. 1010, l. 93–94. I provide a more complete discussion of these and other rivers in these regions in an unpublished conference paper, “Environmental Health in the Regions During Late Stalinism: The Example of Water Supply,” (University of Wales, May 2005), available as PERSA Working Paper No. 45 [at www.warwick.ac.uk/go/persa].
\end{tabular}
\end{footnotesize}
copper salts, iron salts, and chromium. The concentration of fluorine was four times permitted levels. The river was unfit not only as a source of drinking water, but also as a source of water for industrial or technical use. For example, in the winter of 1943, in the area around Revda, a “massive” number of steamship boilers went out of service because of the “impermissibly high content” of sulphuric acid in the water. The Iset’, starting at the city of Sverdlovsk and for over 100 kilometres downstream, could not be used as a water supply for drinking or domestic washing. It was, in Lavrov’s words, no more than a “receptacle for the waste waters of industrial enterprises.”

Perhaps prompted by this situation, as well as an equally serious crisis with water supplies in Ukraine,\(^\text{20}\) in May 1947, almost exactly 10 years after the major prewar decree, the regime passed new legislation in an effort to compel industry to curb toxic discharges. Note that the emphasis here was on industrial pollution. The pressing problem of how to stop cities and towns from discharging untreated human waste into open waterways received less attention, at least until the early 1950s.\(^\text{21}\) Factories were encouraged to reduce the volume of harmful products (including sewage) in their discharges in three main ways. First, improved technology might reduce the number and volume of harmful by-products of production processes. Secondly, factories might capture more of these by-products for recycling, primarily through traps and filters. Thirdly, whatever they could not capture they were expected to neutralize in treatment plants before releasing their waste waters. The new decree, together with follow-up orders and decrees in 1948, 1949, and 1950, compelled industrial ministries to instal treatment equipment in their enterprises and to halt the discharge of untreated wastes into open bodies of water by no later than 1950. The worst-polluting ministries were given the tightest time frame. The iron and steel, non-ferrous metallurgy, chemical, agricultural machinery, cellulose and paper, textile, armaments, and light industries, were in theory required to erect water treatment installations in each and every one of their factories by the end of 1947. Factories in areas with exceptionally bad pollution, most notably Kemerovo oblast’, were given until the end of 1948 – no doubt in

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\(^\text{20}\) For Ukraine see GARF, f. 9226, op. 1, d. 779, l. 23-35ob., 72-75; d. 838, l. 67-83; and d. 924, l. 57-80.

\(^\text{21}\) Sewage and water treatment were mainly the job of the local soviets, and although local GSI inspectors grasped its importance, the reality was that local soviets had inordinate difficulties acquiring funding for actual construction. For examples see, GARF, f. 9226: op. 1, d. 798, l. 34ob. (Gor’kii); op. 1, d. 693, l. 62 (Sverdlovsk oblast’). GARF, f. A-482: op. 47, d. 4937, l. 36-37 (Moscow oblast’); op. 49, d. 1628, l. 68 (Magnitogorsk); op. 47, d. 4925, l. 183, and op. 49, d. 1610, l. 11 (Ivanovo oblast’); op. 47, d. 7685, l. 94 (Yaroslavl’ oblast’). Industrial enterprises were accountable for “local” sewage generated by the factories themselves and the workers’ settlements attached to them; in some towns where one enterprise or industrial ministry dominated the town’s activities, the enterprise might have responsibility for the entire system. One good example was the iron and steel combine in Magnitogorsk.
recognition of the daunting scale of the task. Given what we know about the fate of the 1937 decree and about the Stalinist system in general, it should come as no surprise that these timetables proved more or less fictitious. So, too, did the timetables specified in later decrees. According to data cited by Lavrov in December 1948, that is, 18 months after the May 1947 decree, of 181 factories that were due to build treatment works, only 20 per cent had actually done so. Around a quarter were in various stages of construction – although as he later noted, this did not necessarily mean that the units were anywhere near completion. Just under a quarter (22 per cent) were still in the design stage. Another 25 per cent had designs in hand, but construction had either not started or was only just getting under way. Finally, 12 factories had done absolutely nothing. Just under three years later, in August 1951 (that is, 18 months after the decree of February 1950), Boldyrev, the head of the USSR GSI, reported that of 356 enterprises ordered to construct treatment works (15 on the original list of 371 were later exempted), one third (114) had done so on time, work was still going on at just over one third (123), but the remaining one third had not even started, including 88 which were to have finished the plants and put them into operation before the end of 1950. Significantly, some of the worst polluting industries were the also the worst offenders: half of all chemical factories affected by the 1950 decree, and two-thirds of factories in the paper and woodworking industry had taken no steps whatsoever even to initiate design work much less do any construction.

The question is, what factors and forces worked to create such massive non-compliance?

Christopher Burton has argued in great detail that one of the main obstacles to effective control over water pollution was the scientific community’s ideological adherence to two faulty scientific theories, namely the idea that rivers were self-cleaning, and the concept of maximum allowable concentrations of toxins (predel’no dopustimye kontsentrazii). The first – which was by
no means an idiosyncrasy of Soviet environmental science—mistakenly held that powerful rivers could dilute even massive quantities of toxins and thereby render them harmless. The second ignored the facts (a) that even small amounts of toxins build up over time in aquatic flora and fauna, as well as in humans, and (b) that toxins often interact with one another to produce greater and/or longer-lasting hazards. The fallibility of both of these theories was manifestly obvious to local GSI inspectors, who cited countless cases where levels of pollution had grown so great as to overwhelm the “natural” processes of self-cleaning. Whether they actually believed in the theory and saw these as genuine exceptions, or whether they thought it was bogus and were using their counter-examples in a more subversive way, I do not know. It must certainly have been difficult to believe in self-cleaning when the discharges from a single factory like the Nizhnii Tagil coke-oven products factory could kill off fish and other fauna in the River Tagil over a distance of 200 to 300 kilometres.

Burton makes a very strong case, but what I want to emphasize here are the behavioural and structural reasons for these laws’ failure. At one level, there is plenty of evidence that ministries and enterprises deliberately avoided implementing the decree. One large defence factory in Kemerovo oblast’, which each day discharged 100,000 cubic metres of contaminated waste water into its local river, including 4.5 tons of nitrocellulose, brazenly claimed there was no need to neutralize the latter, and therefore also no need to build a treatment facility. This was a more or less general phenomenon. During 1948 a host of major ministries (light industry, timber, paper and cellulose, and textiles industries, and the Southern Region oil industry) petitioned the USSR Council of Ministers with requests to have at least some of their enterprises exempted. One Glavk (the hydrolytic industry) sought an exemption until 1952, on

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26 The idea of “self-cleaning” had dominated thinking in Victorian Britain, not the least because it provided industrialists with a perfect justification for indiscriminately discharging their hazardous wastes into the country’s rivers. Wohl, Endangered Lives, p. 238.

27 GARF, f. 9226, op. 1, d. 693, l. 71-72. The example is from 1945. Even during the war, the GSI in the city of Kazan’ could remark about the Kazanka River, “In its lower reaches the Kazanka River has, for all practical purposes, been turned into an open sewer, and any talk about the natural self-cleaning process is simply impossible.” GARF, f. A-482, op. 47, d. 2328, l. 117.

28 GARF, f. 9226, op. 1, d. 951, l. 69-70, 78-80. Nitrocellulose is an explosive used in ammunitions manufacture, but there remains no clear consensus on its hazard as a water pollutant. The only clearly established danger is that in high enough concentrations it kills fish – a major concern of the GSI. In this sense it is similar to the role that phenol played in the postwar Soviet discussions of industrial discharges. There was widespread concern, if not alarm, about it, but the main immediate hazard is to fish, to which it is highly toxic. Phenol in low doses is used today in cough medicines. For nitrocellulose, see [www.pesticideinfo.org/Detail_Chemical.jsp?Rec_Id=PC37277].
the grounds that the problem of pollution “had been insufficiently studied” (a plaint with an interesting modern-day echo in debates over global warming). Other ruses were much cruder. A ministry might fail to authorize the work (thus letting the factory off the hook), or might authorize it and then not issue any funds, thus fulfilling the law on paper but ensuring that nothing would be done in practice. All this was aided and abetted – at least in the eyes of the All-Union GSI – by the weakness of local GSI inspectors. Either they were easily intimidated by local enterprises and too afraid to press for enforcement, or hampered by their own lack of information. Thus, in the case of the defence plant in Kemerovo oblast’, cited above, the GSI actually had no knowledge of what pollutants the factory generated – it had to ask the parent ministry to provide this information, something akin to asking the tobacco industry to volunteer all the evidence that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer.

Behind such wilful circumvention lay a much more complex range of structural factors that made these decrees unworkable. One was built into the very nature of Soviet anti-pollution legislation: enterprises paid a special tax for releasing toxic discharges into waterways; in effect, this provided an in-built incentive to ignore the law, since for many enterprises it was cheaper and easier to pay the fine every year than to divert scarce investment resources to the construction of waste treatment plants. This conformed to the general

29 GARP, f. 9226, op. 1, d. 950, l. 177–178. A similar example in the Ministry of the Metallurgy Industry is in GARP, f. 9226, op. 1, d. 951, l. 54. For years the iron and steel combine in Magnitogorsk, which had responsibility for the city’s sewerage system, was in dispute with the GSI over whether or not it had to build a modern treatment plant. The combine had been given a deadline to complete the plant by July 1952. It claimed that not only was a treatment plant unnecessary, its design and construction would take at least three years. Significantly, the combine appealed not to the GSI, but directly to I. F. Tevosian, Deputy Chair of the USSR Council of Ministers, who passed the matter to Boldyrev, head of the All-Union GSI. Boldyrev dismissed the combine’s protest as groundless and insisted that it finish the work more or less on schedule, not the least because the existing methods of sewage treatment (filter beds and absorption) in Magnitogorsk left the town extremely vulnerable to high disease rates. GARP, f. 9226, op. 1, d. 1142, l. 45–47. We do not know how this dispute ended, but it is worth pointing out that Magnitogorsk had had one of the highest rates of infant mortality in the RSFSR: 16.5 per cent of all live births in 1950, and 9.7 per cent in 1951. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki [RGAE], f. 1562, op. 329, d. d. 4703, l. 188 (1950); GARP, f. A-374, op. 14, d. 1702, l. 16 (1951).

30 GARP, f. 9226, op. 1, d. 951, l. 54; d. 1142, l. 25.

31 GARP, f. 9226, op. 1, d. 951, l. 44–52, 69. One of the interesting things about the first of these documents (on l. 44–52), is that it casts the work of the local Sanitary Inspectors in a rather different light from their own local reports. In the latter the inspectors portray themselves as diligent, dedicated, and highly conscientious sanitary physicians, whose enforcement powers may have been limited, but who used them as best they could. This was not always the perception of their superiors in Moscow, who here accuse them of being too cozy with factory managers.

32 This issue comes up constantly in the documentation. For an indicative reference, see GARP, f. 9226, op. 1, d. 950, l. 179. I discuss it in more detail at the end of this section.
calculus that informed ministerial and enterprise decisions: enterprises would only build and instal treatment plants if it brought them direct economic benefit – as when the oil industry installed traps to recapture oil for reprocessing. What damage their discharges did to other factories (or to people) was of no concern to them.\textsuperscript{33}

Yet even if ministries acted in good faith and tried to abide by the decree, they found themselves blocked by other obstacles. The Soviet Union still did not have any standard designs or protocols for constructing waste treatment plants, nor any lists of standard parts and equipment. Most ministries would not know what equipment they would need, and much of it (specialized pumps, pipe work of the correct size) the economy did not manufacture. The same applied to the preliminary design work, which tended to be done with inordinate delays and then, when design organizations delivered their plans to the construction organizations, the latter found the plans to be incomplete. If, after all these difficulties, a factory nevertheless managed to build a treatment plant, it could then discover it had no one competent to operate it. Lavrov claimed that local GSI inspections in Ukraine found that many treatment plants were being operated so incompetently that they were doing more harm to the environment than if they had not existed in the first place.

It might be tempting to think that this complex of problems were all inheritances of the war, and thus confined to the early postwar years. By late 1951 it was clear that this was now a permanent state of affairs, and moreover, one institutionally sustained by Gosplan itself. The country still did not manufacture sufficient quantities of pipe or crucial parts, such as Raschig rings, without which treatment plants could not operate. If work passed beyond the design stage, construction work fell hopelessly behind schedule, not the least because industrial construction projects took priority. Ministries still did not issue funds to their factories to allow them to build treatment plants. More insidiously, enterprises paid out millions of roubles a year in tax for releasing untreated waste water. The iron and steel combine in Magnitogorsk paid out 12 million roubles in tax during 1950, and had already paid out another 4 million during the first three months of 1951 (an annual rate of 16 million roubles and a 33 per cent increase over 1950). Yet its parent ministry, the Ministry of the Iron and Steel Industry, refused to sanction the money for it to build a waste treatment plant. The same was true of the giant Kuznetsk Iron and Steel Combine in Kemerovo oblast’ and the Kemerovo coke-oven products factory. They even included the cost of the tax in their annual budgets. The iron and steel combine set aside 3.5 million roubles a year as a specific budget item for this. It is worth reflecting on this fact, because it means that Gosplan must have included this

\textsuperscript{33} This was well articulated by Lavrov in his address to the Second Inter-Departmental Conference on Questions of Coordinating Scientific Research Work in the Field of Cleaning Industrial Waste Waters, held on 6-7 December 1948. The discussion in the following paragraphs is taken from his survey, found in GARF, f. 9226, op. 1, d. 950, l. 173–182.
cost in the factory’s annual plan – at the same time as elsewhere Gosplan was deliberately refusing to include in local plans the funds for treatment works. The point was that no matter how high the tax (which was in effect a fine), in reality this cost the enterprises nothing, since the money was now part of their centrally-approved budget. If there were any need of evidence of just how seriously the Stalinist system took the problem of water pollution, we have it here.34

**LARGE CITIES VS. SMALL TOWNS**

In his path-breaking book, *The Destruction of Nature in the Soviet Union*, Ze’ev Wolfson notes that one of the most serious causes of river pollution was Soviet agriculture, primarily through its careless use of mineral fertilizers, followed closely by its misuse of agricultural pesticides, gasoline, diesel fuel, and lubricants.35 In the period I am dealing with in this paper, a period which predates the massive expansion of the chemical industry under Khrushchev, the main focus of concern was industry. The damage caused by the large industrial cities was obvious, and I have detailed some of this in the paper cited above, in footnote 19. This was true even in Moscow. During the postwar years Moscow had invested heavily in building sewage and water treatment plants in the north of the city, to capture the already polluted waters of the Moscow River where it fed the reservoirs from which Moscow took its water supply. At this point the SES claimed that the Moscow River was a “conditionally clean” river. After flowing through Moscow, however, the river had picked up enough industrial and faecal pollution to render it unfit for bathing.36

Moscow was in many ways exceptional, insofar as it was generally able to protect the water supply of its own population, while generating enormous hazards for the towns of Moscow oblast’ and beyond. Other large industrial cities displayed a somewhat different pattern. If we look, for example, at the

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34 GARF, f. 9226, op. 1, d. 1142, l. 24–26. In 1951, the USSR Ministry of the Food Industry issued funds for finishing the design work for treatment plants at Lithuania’s sugar refineries. Gosplan of the Lithuanian SSR, however, did not include these funds in the plan of the Republic’s Sugar Trust. Thus no design work was done in 1951.


36 GARF, f. A-482, op. 49, d. 7373, l. 139. The bacterial pollution was by far the more serious hazard. Levels of industrial pollutants were high, but still far below those found prior to treatment. The general bacteria count, however, was virtually indistinguishable from raw sewage. The coliform titre, a measure of the number of intestinal bacteria per millilitre of water was 25,000 per ml. This was 90 per cent better than raw sewage, but still very, very high. By way of comparison, the permitted number of e-coli per millilitre of water in the United States is zero. Irina Mikhailovna Belova, “Eksperimental’nye issledovaniia ef-fektivnosti biologicheskoi ochistki bytovvykh stochnykh vod ot vozbuditelei kishechnykh infektsii,” *Candidate Dissertation* (Moscow, 1953), pp. 79–87, 114.
three Urals industrial metropolises included in my comparative case studies – Sverdlovsk, Cheliabinsk, and Molotov – for a considerable period they, too, managed to maintain adequate quality drinking water for their own populations, while contributing substantially to the poor and often unsafe drinking water in the towns of their surrounding oblasti. Unlike Moscow, however, they had difficulty sustaining this situation over time, because as industrial recovery proceeded during the postwar years water quality substantially worsened. The classic illustration of this would be Molotov.

Molotov’s water problems had a long history. Even before the war, average daily consumption was only 39.5 litres per person, and in the immediate postwar period only around 40 per cent of its population had access to water supply. As with some other Soviet cities, Yaroslavl’ being one of the more graphic examples, Molotov’s water supply was compromised by the fact that its main pumping station was situated just below the discharge points of massive amounts of pollution into the Kama River by a whole range of large industrial enterprises (the Molotov engineering works, a chemical plant, an iron and steel works, a handful of coke-oven products factories, and a petroleum depot). The local GSI characterized the Kama River inside of Molotov as “very like a complex chemical solution which, as they say, ‘contains the entire Mendeleev system’.” Yet for all this the city water supply met basic standards because Molotov, unlike the vast majority of industrial towns and cities, was able to put its water through the full cycle of treatment: chlorination, sedimentation, filter beds, and coagulation. Coagulation was one of the great Achilles heels of Soviet water systems. It was an essential step in removing chemical, as opposed to biological, wastes from water sources, yet the coagulants themselves were in very short supply. Molotov, however, had the good fortune that one of its chemical plants produced ferrous hydroxide – a coagulant – as a byproduct of the manufacture of sulphuric acid.37

By 1954 the situation had changed dramatically for the worse. There were a number of reasons for this. Up to this time the city had relied on treating the water at the intake point for its main supply – there was little effort to curb the original sources of the pollution by reducing and/or decontaminating the discharges from the city’s factories. Thus the Kama River supply – the most important in the city – was having to deal with untreated discharges from no less than 28 different large-scale enterprises, 16 of which released their waste water directly into the Kama, and 12 of which discharged into tributaries of the Kama. The pollutants included dyes, phenols, chlorides, nitrates, petroleum residues, chromium, tin, lead, and cyanide compounds. It was only in 1953 that the City Executive Committee approved plans to build treatment works at 12 of the city’s industrial enterprises (that is, at less than half of the main sources of pollution), but as of 1954 only two of these had actually started any construction work. The city now faced a major water crisis. Since the early 1950s it had

37 GARF, f. A-482, op. 47, d. 3431, l. 11–18; the quotation is from l. 12.
already had to cut back on the process of coagulation. If in the early postwar years it coagulated regularly, from 1951 onwards it coagulated only during the spring and summer, mainly because the ferrous hydroxide they used as the coagulant proved ineffective in hard water at very cold temperatures, especially when, as it turned out here, it was also of poor quality. The only way that the city could have brought the water back to acceptable standards would have been to halve the amount of water treated at the pumping station. The dilemma was rather clear cut: the city now supplied up to 60 per cent of its population with water from a central supply (an increase of 50 per cent since 1947), but the quality of the water was substandard; it could provide clean water only by dramatically reducing the amount of water available.38

The situation in the large cities differed fundamentally from that in small industrial towns. In terms of water quality they were in an infinitely worse situation, an issue I discuss in the article cited above in footnote 2. Perhaps less obvious was the fact that they were some of the worse polluters of waterways. Especially in the Urals, but not only there, the Soviet Union was littered with small and medium-sized towns, sometimes little more than villages, dominated by one or two large industrial enterprises, or even small factories (especially dangerous were food processing plants, especially those handling animals). These were capable of doing extraordinary amounts of damage. In some cases they could be more of a danger than the large cities, because these towns were least likely to have sewerage or treatment facilities, and their local soviets or sanitary inspectors were least likely to be able to pressurize the industrial ministries to make the required investments.

We can illustrate this by following the course of the Kama River, the main waterway in Molotov oblast’. Long before it reached Molotov oblast’, the Kama would already have received substantial pollution from its larger tributaries. One of these was the Chusovaia, one of the major rivers in Sverdlovsk oblast’ whose dismal state at the end of World War Two we have already described. The Chusovaia had its source just north of the city of Sverdlovsk, whence it flowed westwards for some 600 kilometres, and eventually fed into the Kama. In 1945 and 1946 the state of the Chusovaia was still catastrophic. Already at its source it was polluted by fluorine, sulphuric acid, oil, alkanes, and slag from copper mines, a cryolite factory, and an iron and steel works along two of its tributaries, the Zheleznianka and the Severushka. Then, as the Chusovaia flowed through the area around Revda, it acquired still more of these same pollutants, thanks to the copper mines around Degtyarka, the metallurgical works in Revda itself, and the copper smelting plant in Sredne-Ural’sk. As the Chusovaia made its way westwards through Pervoural’sk it picked up chromium salts, phenols, and an assortment of different resins from a dinas brick factory, a chemical plant, and the Novo-Trubnyi iron and steel works. The early postwar GSI reports cited a number of protective measures designed to

38 GARP, f. A-482, op. 49, d. 8862, l. 9–12, 14, 17, 23–24, 30–34, 36–38.
curb the discharges of phenol and fluorine – measures that had relatively little success because of shortages of lime, needed as a coagulant. The GSI also warned that along parts of the river the contamination had reached a point where neither industry nor people could use the water.\footnote{GARF, f. 9226, op. 1, d. 693, l. 63–69, and d. 736, l. 73–84.} By 1953 it was clear that these measures had produced little effect – either that, or new sources of pollution had simply cancelled them out. Each day factories situated along the Chusovaia’s shores \textit{pumped into it “tens of thousands of cubic metres”} of copper compounds, iron, phenol, resins, various acids, and other organic compounds.\footnote{GARF, f. 9226, op. 1, d. 1249, l. 27.}

As the Kama ran through Molotov oblast’ and Molotov city itself, the sources of contamination multiplied. The main culprits were paper mills in Krasnokamsk and Krasnovishersk; chemical works and a paper mill in Solikamsk; more chemical plants and a power station in Berezni; iron and steel works in Chusovoi, Chermoz, and Dobrianka; \textit{two large coal fields around} Kizel and Gubakha; and last but not least the chemical and engineering works in Molotov city itself, which I have already described. The paper mills were especially hazardous, because in addition to chemicals they also discharged cellulose fibres which killed off fish by blocking up their gills. The effluent from the soda factory in Bereznik was said to be so toxic that even at dilutions of 500,000 to 1 it was still killing off fish and microorganisms. The fish kills were of some significance, as they jeopardized the oblast’ fishing industry – not to mention the risk to anyone who ate those fish which managed to survive.\footnote{GARF, f. 9226, op. 1, d. 899, l. 56–60, 291–300. GARF, f. A-482, op. 47, d. 6345, l. 255–257. Significantly, the latter report (l. 257) commented only on the economic damage done by the fish kills, and not their potential implications for public health.}

Because we associate the Urals and Western Siberia with heavy industry, the above portrait may not be surprising. Yet the story varies only in degree from the less industrialized oblasti, of which Gor’kii oblast’ is a good example. Gor’kii oblast’ was primarily agricultural, but it nonetheless contained a number of industrial towns of roughly 20,000 to 30,000 inhabitants, and one city, Dzerzhinsk, of considerable size (139,000 residents) and economic significance.

The oblast’ was home to a vast range of industries. Paper, chemicals, building materials, agricultural machinery, iron and steel, electric power, food, and light industries all had enterprises there, and most were located on, or very near to, open bodies of water, ranging from the Volga and the Oka, to smaller tributaries (the Riazanka, Arzinka, and Chugunka, \textit{being the most important}). Irrespective of the diversity of what they produced or where they were located, they all had one thing in common: they dumped their waste waters either totally untreated, or treated only in rudimentary and unsatisfactory fashion.\footnote{GARF, f. A-482, op. 47, d. 6335, l. 65.}
Let us start with Dzerzhinsk. The city was located on the Oka, not far from Gor’kii. Its most important industry was chemicals. Its largest chemical works was the Kalinin Chernorechensk Chemical Combine, whose existence was so secret that the GSI reports could refer to it only obliquely. In 1946 it discharged an average of 85,000 cubic metres of waste waters a day into the Oka, including 34 tons of chloride salts and 42.5 tons of sulphates. The factory had no treatment facility whatsoever. By 1947 the volume of discharges had risen by nearly 50 per cent, to 115,000 cubic metres a day. The other chemical plants in Dzerzhinsk contributed smaller, but still considerable amounts to the overall pollution – in 1946 their combined discharges came to 60,000 cubic metres a day. The Oka was a powerful river, and according to the then prevalent theory of “self-cleaning,” it should have been able to cope with this kind of pollution. The fact is, however, that it could not. If in 1946 sanitary experts raised the alarm that the number of fish in the Oka below Dzerzhinsk was sharply declining, by 1947 they claimed that fishing in the river had virtually ceased. In some ways this seemed more alarming than the fact that the pollution from Dzerzhinsk was also threatening the water supply of Gor’kii city.43

Dzerzhinsk, admittedly, was a proper city. The other sources of river pollution in Gor’kii oblast’ were not. The industry that attracted the most attention here was paper. Balakhna had a population in 1948 of 18,800, but another 33,600 lived in surrounding workers’ settlements attached to its various factories, the two most important of which were the paper combine and its cardboard factory. There was another cardboard factory in the town of Kalinin. The main pollutant from the Balakhna paper combine was wood fibre. The factory actually provided some treatment of its wastes, but their overall volume was so great that even after trapping some 70 per cent of the fibre, it still discharged around 30 tons of it, plus another 500 cubic metres of sulphite ash, into the Volga each and every day. In the area around the factory the Volga was unusable for drinking water. The pollution extended several tens of kilometres downstream. Thus one its first victims was the cardboard factory, located 7 km downstream from the paper combine, insofar as the remaining fibre in the water made it difficult to purify enough Volga water for the domestic use of the cardboard factory’s own workers. Needless to say, it was no longer possible to fish along this part of the river, primarily because of massive growth of the fungus, _Leptomitus Lacteus_. The discharges from the cardboard factory into the Volga were on a much smaller scale, a “mere” 10,000 cubic metres of waste water per day – but it was all completely untreated. The cardboard factory in Kalinin was a relatively small enterprise, but it fed into a similarly small river, the Vol, which the GSI characterized as “a bedraggled tributary” of the River Vetluga. The weak flow of the Vol meant that it was impossible to dilute or wash away the pollution. On the contrary, it had become “putrid, with a dark

colour,” totally devoid of fauna, and with fish able to survive only in its lower reaches.\textsuperscript{44}

The Vetluga had other small tributaries that were equally in peril and perilous in turn. Again, the problem lay in relatively small factories which, however, produced highly toxic discharges. A tar factory along the Belen’kaia, for example, released only 1.5 cubic metres of waste water an hour, but these contained an array of organic compounds, including acetone, methylated spirit, phenols, and tar, which turned the bed and both banks of Belen’kaya totally black, while the water itself was completely brown and covered in a chemical film. All this ran into the Vetluga.\textsuperscript{45}

The town of Bor (total population 24,000, including its workers’ settlements) was home to the Maksim Gor’kii glass factory. The town of Vyksa (population 32,000) was the site of an iron and steel works. What linked them was the pollution from their gas generators, a source of contamination rarely discussed in other local GSI reports. The process of gas generation produced chemicals which, even in small quantities, were highly toxic: phenol compounds, tars and resins, and acetic acid. Both factories discharged their waste water not into the Volga (at least not directly), but into lakes or ponds with underground connections to the Volga. Both factories had converted their respective receptacles into “dead” bodies of water. The local pond at Vyksa had a number of population settlements on its banks, but the water was so poisoned that no one could use it. The pollution from the Bor glass works was said to have killed off fish along the Volga over a stretch of 20 kilometres.\textsuperscript{46}

Finally, we should mention the damage done by branches of production we might not immediately associate with river pollution, notably food processing and hides. The oblast’ had a number of starch factories, which operated only for three months of the year following the potato harvest, that is, from October to December. These months saw massive fish kills, and the water was so contaminated that no livestock could drink it. Even more damaging were the leather factories, which released lime, fleece, bristle, sodium chloride, soda ash, hydrochloric acid, and sulphuric acid. These went into the Riazanka river, and although they caused only “occasional” fish kills, they had destroyed all crustacean life.\textsuperscript{47}

The above data are all from 1946 and 1947. By 1954 there appears to have been some improvement in both the Oka and the Volga, at least insofar as the SES now claimed that water samples only “sometimes” exceeded permitted limits – although these, as we know, could be far higher than what was actually safe. To the above noted range of toxins, however, they now detected lead and cyanide (although they could find no obvious source for the latter). The

\textsuperscript{44} GARF, f. A-482, op. 47, d. 4914, l. 105–106, and d. 6335, l. 66.
\textsuperscript{45} GARF, f. A-482, op. 47, d. d. 6335, l. 67.
\textsuperscript{46} GARF, f. A-482, op. 47, d. 4914, l. 111–112, and d. 6335, l. 70.
\textsuperscript{47} GARF, f. A-482, op. 47, d. 6335, l. 68–70.
main difficulty was the continued slow pace of construction of waste treatment plants. The Balakhna paper combine, the Bor glass works, and the chemical plants in Dzerzhinsk still had not gone past the design stage. Neither they, nor any of the other large enterprises in the oblast’ still without treatment works had begun actual construction during 1954, a full seven and one-half years after the May 1947 decree. What of those factories that had done something in this interval? The main progress had been in the leather factories at Bogorodsk. They now had equipment that removed anywhere from half to 90 per cent of their waste products, yet they were still discharging effluent containing fats, chromium, sulphates, dies, and calcium.48

Despite its mainly agricultural economy, Gor’kii oblast’ therefore made a major contribution to the destruction of two major rivers, the Oka and the Volga. The poisoning of Russia’s rivers was not a Urals problem. It was part and parcel of the Stalinist industrial economy.

**Conclusion**

There are a number of conclusions we can draw from the material we have presented here. The most obvious, perhaps, is that the prehistory of what Murray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly called “ecocide”49 really begins here, in the very essence of Stalinist industrialization, in particular its fetishization of industrial growth and “plan fulfilment” at the expense of the people who laboured to fulfil these plans. The economic damage of river pollution was enormous: it destroyed the ecosystems of these water sources; it did serious damage to the machinery of industrial enterprises and to the river boats that hauled goods and raw materials. The contamination of rivers caused inordinate misery and hardship to communities that relied on them for their water supply. As we have seen, already in the early postwar period, there were significant stretches of rivers where neither people nor livestock could use the water. However, when referring specifically to the late Stalin period we must be careful not to overstate the extent of the damage already done. The wholesale poisoning of the USSR’s rivers that we were to witness in the 1970s and 1980s had not yet occurred – most sections of most rivers were still probably reasonably clean. What is crucial here is that the policies and behaviours that were to produce the later catastrophe were now already definable.

To a certain extent the Soviet Union was repeating the experience of nineteenth century Britain and Germany. The more rapidly industrialization proceeded, the worse the rivers became. Yet the Soviet Union was not Victorian Britain and it was not Wilhelmine Germany. Its planners and scientists knew perfectly well what damage they were causing and what technology they need-

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48 GARF, f. A-482, op. 49, d. 8835, l. 7-8.
ed in order to reduce the hazard, if not eliminate it altogether. Stalinist investment priorities made it impossible to act on this knowledge. Gosplan and the Council of Ministers would allocate funds for factories and production shops, but not for waste and water treatment plants – even when their own legislation required their construction.

The other great impact, much more difficult to assess, was on public health. What, if any, damage did these dirty rivers do to people, either immediately or over the long term? I am not qualified to deal with the question of the long-term health problems, but in the short term we can make some approximate assessments. As we have stressed in several places in this paper, water supply was part of a larger complex of sanitary issues that affected both the quality of people’s lives and their health and life prospects. One of the better measures of this is infant mortality, which is generally accepted as an accurate indicator of a society’s overall state of public health and well being. We know that infant mortality in Russian cities remained high after the war, although with the exception of the famine year of 1947, it was lower than prewar levels. One of the causes of high infant mortality was lack of access to clean water in cities where general sanitation was also poor. This proved especially dangerous during the food crisis of 1947, when many babies died because their mothers could not breastfeed, could not buy milk in state stores or on the kolkhoz market, and therefore had to resort to substitute foods made with unsafe water. A closer look at regional data shows that after the crisis of 1947 new patterns emerged. Overall, infant mortality in the cities of the RSFSR fell, but it fell unevenly. In Moscow, where the regime had concentrated its postwar efforts on sanitary reform and protecting the water supply, infant mortality dropped very fast and very far. Infant mortality in the other industrial regions did not show such dramatic improvement, and in the cities and towns of Cheliabinsk, Molotov, and Sverdlovsk oblasti it persisted at close to 1947 levels until the early 1950s. A large gap opened up between the survival chances of a baby born in Moscow and a baby born in nearby Moscow oblast’, and especially a baby born in the Urals or Kemerovo oblast’. Even when infant mortality began to fall in these regions, it fell much more slowly than in Moscow: right up to the mid-1950s a baby born in the industrial towns of the Urals or Kemerovo oblast was roughly twice as likely to die during the first year of life as a baby born in Moscow city. What we see here is that infant mortality was highest in precisely those industrial regions where sanitary reform was slowest. Insofar as water supply formed a crucial part of this sanitary nexus, we can say that the poisoning of the rivers, and the failure to provide proper sanitation and water supply in general, took a heavy toll. This was indeed a poisoning of the proletariat. The long-term impact on adult proletarians may be difficult to measure; but its impact on their newborn children was not.50

Housing Partnerships, ZhAKTy, or Housing Trusts? A Study of Moscow’s Housing Management System, 1917–1937

MATSUI YASUHIRO

This article traces the changing process of the housing management system in Moscow during the period spanning twenty years from the 1917 Revolution to 1937. Through the work, the study attempts to modify a fixed image of great transformation from the NEP to Stalinism at the end of the 1920s, and further add some new findings to recent arguments surrounding the public sphere that existed under the Stalinist regime.

Generally speaking, housing is a vital need for ordinary people, almost equivalent to eating. In the twentieth century, the need for housing prompted welfare states to carry out their public housing policy oriented toward the populace. It is common knowledge that the Soviet state, presumably a type of welfare state, also focused on solving the problems around workers’ residences, through confiscation and redistribution of private houses immediately after the Revolution and further construction of new residences for workers. However, housing supply under the Soviet regime continued to be a major bottleneck that frustrated the improvement of daily services. In particular, in the 1930s, when industrialization and urbanization advanced dramatically, the housing situation took a drastic turn for the worse. Trying to find even a room in an apartment, like procuring basic foods, became a crucial and difficult task for each family.

Social historians, who have directed their interest toward daily life under Stalin, naturally investigated the actual conditions of Soviet housing. In so doing, the kommunalka (communal apartment) became a main focal point for them. In this type of Soviet housing, each family occupied a room of an apartment and had the use of certain common facilities such as kitchen, toilet, bath, and so on. The situation inevitably created conflict among residents in terms of securing privacy and use of common facilities. While police authorities utilized the situation of mutual surveillance in living spaces to collect information, there were also some citizens willing to denounce their neighbors to the authorities for the purpose of acquiring a better living space. The struggle to

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survive at the residence level and the mechanisms of the regime’s rule were common in “extraordinary” ordinary life under the Stalinist regime.  

However, my concern lies in another area. This study approaches the much more public issue of the management of each house, not the conflicts among residents pursuing individual- or family-oriented interests. What housing management system did the Soviet authorities design? Whom did they entrust with the management of each house in practice? In so doing, to what degree did the residents themselves participate in the management work? This is a subject that most social historians have thus far not fully considered. As a matter of fact, in the early Soviet period, ZhAKTy (zhitishchno-arendnye kooperativnye tovarishchestva), house-leasing cooperative partnerships, which started to be organized in 1924 and were liquidated in 1937, became the main housing management units. Although the directorate of ZhAKTy elected by the cooperatives’ members, with support from personnel such as janitors and accountants employed by ZhAKTy, was supposed to play a key role in administrative work, other members were also expected to take an active part in this work. In some cases, residents themselves appear to have performed self-management of houses and even constructed a local community at the residence level. If that were the case, it may lead to reconsideration of “the public” under Stalin.

In fact, some scholars have recently started to discuss various aspects of the public sphere and the relationship between the public and the private in Soviet-type societies, sometimes paying attention to the ZhAKTy system in terms of this issue. In particular, J. Obertreis’s book is considered to be the most valuable. Using the term “public sphere (öffentlichkeit)” as an analytical tool that enables making visible a sphere mediating between politics and everyday life, she analyzed Soviet housing policies and organizations (ZhAKTy), and residents’ life-world in Leningrad in 1917–37. I have also been

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working on similar subjects without any knowledge of her book because of the linguistic obstacle, and examined some local community activities performed by ZhAKTy and residents such as childcare services and out-of-school work for children, especially the little-known community business of canteens in the 1930s. This approach, by showing the existence of the micro-public sphere in the local community, in other words by shedding light on some cases where collectively realizing public values was attempted from below on the basis of residents’ communality, might be a challenge to the traditional understanding of Stalinist society as an object of mass mobilization from above and to social historians’ core understanding of houses as a battleground in which a selfish survival game among residents unfolded.5

This article, which basically follows the viewpoint mentioned above, although sharing some issues and the conceptual framework of the public sphere with Obertreis’s work, could also be unique in that it focuses on Moscow’s housing management system. For Moscow in the 1920s was working on a different form of housing management from the ZhAKTy, one that was more strongly controlled and supervised by municipal housing authorities, and it was not until March 1931 that the ZhAKTy system was finally introduced, about five years later than in Leningrad and other cities.6 Moscow’s distinctive line and delay in transfer brought about acute disputes and controversies among housing officials and housing cooperatives’ leaders and activists. While Moscow’s housing authorities criticized the ZhAKTy, arguing that they were unnecessarily dependent upon residents’ self-activity (samodeiatel’nost’) that mantled their collective’s pursuit of self-interest, potentially hampering the Soviet industrialization project, ZhAKTy supporters viewed Moscow’s form of housing management as a manifestation of bureaucratic thinking. Put simply, the controversy was related to which form of housing management would be more adequate in a Soviet state promoting socialist construction, administrative control or self-management by residents. At the end of the 1920s, in Moscow, the former position was on the brink of gaining a victory against the latter, yet a swing back took place, and in the end, the latter, the ZhAKTy, became the main housing management units in March 1931, although they once again provided a path of direct control by local soviets in October 1937.

Thus, an examination of the zigzagging process of Moscow’s housing management system can illustrate the continuous aspect of Soviet history in


the 1920s and 1930s in a more insightful manner than the case of Leningrad presented by Obertreis.7

**FOUNDATION OF HOUSING PARTNERSHIPS, 1921–1924**

On August 20, 1918, declaring a decree on the liquidation of privately owned real estate in urban areas with a population exceeding one thousand, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee officially confirmed for local soviets the confiscation of housing with real estate. Following this decree, on November 1, 1918, the Moscow Soviet, which had already seized over 4000 large-scale houses in Moscow by the end of 1917, decided to municipalize housing and land bringing in a monthly income of over 750 rubles, and further extended the boundary of municipalization to small-scale houses whose management their owners had abandoned. During this period, the Moscow government set up departments of housing and land (zhilishchno-zemel’nyi otdel) at the city level, district branches at the raion level, and housing committees (domovye komitety) or janitors (komendanty) at the residence level in order to manage housing and distribute living space to the working class.8

A series of housing measures implemented by the Bolsheviks, coupled with the great number of people who left Moscow as soldiers or as a result of the food shortage, temporarily improved the housing conditions of the people who had lived in the corners of rooms and in barracks in the pre-revolutionary period, at least in terms of the average living space per capita, which rose from 7.3 m² in 1915 to 9.3 m² in 1920. On the other hand, however, the deterioration of housing deepened due to lack of maintenance and repair. First, an injunction against rent increases during World War 1 along with rising inflation depressed apartment income and led to a lack of incentive to do any repairs. This trend was exacerbated during the Revolution and War Communism because of the complete loss of monetary value. As a result, around 25 percent of the living space in comparison with the prewar level, about 40,000 apartments, was supposedly lost during the continuing war.9 The housing administration introduced after the Revolution further damaged the housing situation. Since housing authorities arbitrarily decided upon occupation and eviction of residents and prohibited the residents themselves from implementing such without the permission of the authorities, it was difficult to instill a positive attitude toward housing preservation and repair without providing any assurance that they could continue living there. Although a supervisory commission

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7 Obertreis, Tränen des Sozialismus, p. 407.
8 Kommunal’noe khoziaistvo 19–20 (1927), pp. 119–122; Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, Tom 25 (Moscow, 1932), p. 447; Zhilishchnoe tovarishchestvo 10–11 (1923), p. 7. In this article, the term “house (dom or domovladenie)” signifies a housing unit or complex that had an address number, such as No. 18 Gor’kii Street, and sometimes consisted of multiple buildings.
(nabliudatel’naia komissiia) whose members consisted of residents was to be set up at each house, I am unable to find any evidence of its effective functioning. Thus, at the beginning of the 1920s, when the civil war ended and the advent of a housing shortage was predicted with the return of ex-residents to Moscow, it became necessary to introduce a new housing management system to prevent housing degradation and promote new housing construction.

One of the new housing policies in the wake of the introduction of the NEP in March 1921, based on the decision of the All-Russian Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) on December 28, 1921, was the return to ex-owners of small houses municipalized during War Communism. This return of housing was expected to promote repair work using owners’ own money. In Moscow, the new policy finally started in 1923, applicable to houses holding less than five apartments and left in a state of ruin.10 Another policy intended to promote housing repair was to strengthen residents’ active participation in housing management in exchange for some type of incentive. By adopting a directive on housing management on August 8, 1921, confirming that housing repair was the residents’ obligation, the Sovnarkom worked out a new policy to provide stable accommodation for a given period for residents or residents’ collectives who contributed to restoring deteriorating houses and housing infrastructure such as water, electricity, gas, central heating, and so on.11 Following this new policy, on September 3, 1921, the Moscow Soviet adopted a directive on the foundation of housing partnerships (zhilishchnye tovarishchestva), residents’ organizations responsible for managing and maintaining the houses in which they lived.12

According to official procedures, housing partnerships were established on the initiative of the residents themselves. The procedure for foundation and registration started by submitting a written petition for the establishment of a housing partnership with the signatures of over three fifths of the residents, a list of all residents, and certificated documents providing a summary of the subject house to Moscow’s housing authorities (Moscow Administration of Real Estate [Moskovskoe upravlenie nedvizhimogo imushchestva], hereafter MUNI, and its district [raion] branches, RUNI). Within one week of registration, the residents would hold a general meeting and elect the directorate and inspection commission of the housing partnership. Afterwards, an on-the-spot investigation would be conducted by the authorities, and a lease contract for the subject house would be concluded between a representative

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11 Zhilishchnye zakony: Sistematicheskiy sbornik zakonov SSSR i RSFSR, vedomstvennykh materialov i postanovlenii po g. Moskvo i Moskovskoi oblasti na 15 maya 1931 g. (Moscow, 1931), pp. 516–517.
of the directorate and the authorities. As of December 10, 1921, around three months after the announcement of this directive, the authorities had received 525 petitions. Among these, 256 cases completed the official procedure, 181 were under investigation, and 88 were rejected because of failure to satisfy the prescribed conditions. A journal that reported the actual situation of the registration procedure attributed the delay to the fact that the directive had not been publicized among the population.

After the initial delay, however, the number of housing partnerships skyrocketed. The total went from 4468 in October 1922 to 8358 on July 1, 1924, which was approximately 30 percent of all houses (domovladeniiia) in Moscow, in which over half the population of the city lived. Further, toward the beginning of 1927, the total number reached 11,000, which was equivalent to around 40 percent of the houses in Moscow. The reason for the rapid growth in the number of partnerships is explained by the effectiveness of the incentives. The opening essay of the journal, Zhilishchnoe tovarischestvo, first published in September 1922, noted that “it was the assurance and benefit given to the members of partnerships of not being evicted, the right to sublease apartments based on agreement, and so on that operated as a great incentive.”

In short, the incentives consisted of two aspects. One is that residents were given dwelling assurance for a fixed period. According to the directive of the housing partnerships, administrative measures concerning occupation and eviction thus far exercised arbitrarily by the authorities were excluded. Compulsory eviction was eventually enforced mainly on residents who repeatedly disturbed communal life and was executed upon approval by two thirds of the participants in a general meeting of the housing partnership and through a legal, not administrative, process. This directive and the model charter sanctioned on October 5, 1921 determined the maximum period of a leasing contract to be six years. However, since the guideline stipulated that the authorities could not refuse a demand for contract renewal proposed by a partnership, as long as adequate housing repairs had been made, this may have made it possible to create among residents a sense of responsibility, as a party, for maintenance and management of housing.

Another incentive is that the right of distribution of living space among residents was placed in the hands of each housing partnership. Although housing partnerships were required to transfer 10 percent of the living space of leased housing to the authorities, they were able to distribute the remaining space among residents in a self-managed manner. If vacant space was produced by residents moving out, housing partnerships had the right to allocate the

16 Zhilishchnoe tovarischestvo 1 (1922), p. 3.
space to a member waiting in turn to acquire the space, and in the case of surplus space, after having distributed the defined space norm per capita (8.2 m² in the early 1920s), it was possible to rent the space to a nonmember, even to NEPmen, to expand their own financial standing.\textsuperscript{17}

Naturally, these incentives and rights were accompanied by certain obligations. Housing partnerships were required to pay rent to the authorities, maintain their houses by continual repair work on their own, and collect rent (kvartplata) and part of the repair costs from the residents. It is doubtful that the housing partnerships in those days completely fulfilled all the defined functions, but it is certain that they appeared as a new actor in Soviet society of the NEP era. The acquisition of a legal personality as a housing partnership made it possible to obtain financing from banks and perform housing repairs.\textsuperscript{18} If residents positively wished to improve their housing situation and did not spare any effort, it became possible to do so. The establishment of housing partnerships is seen as an attempt congruent with the framework of the NEP, which aimed at activating economic and social initiatives.

However, the Bolsheviks, promoting this policy, were caught in a dilemma. As the NEP revived part of the former elite and rich people, the transfer of housing management to residents and partnerships probably paved the way for the intrusion of “non-working people” into directorates. At first, the membership of housing partnerships was not restricted and all adults could enter. The reason that membership restrictions were not imposed based on social class was due to the expectation of bringing in money and management skills from the ex-elite and rich. Nevertheless, as it was reported that non-working people were eagerly engaged in occupying directorates to maintain their own larger space, the issue of restricted membership was laid on the table for consideration. After all, the new model charter revised in March 1924 deprived non-working people of the right to membership, although they still had the right to live there.\textsuperscript{19} During the same period, when elections for new directorates and inspection commissions were held throughout Moscow, a strong campaign was launched to elect workers and party members. As a result, the so-called proletarianization of directorates and inspection commissions proceeded.\textsuperscript{20}


\textsuperscript{18} Kommunal’noe khoziaistvo 20 (1923), p. 16.


\textsuperscript{20} According to an analysis of 3,599 housing partnerships whose election results had already been clarified as of May 1924, 52 percent of the directorate and inspection commission members were blue-collar workers, 42 percent, white-collar workers, 3 percent, students, 2 percent, independent professionals, and 1 percent, craftsmen. See Kommunal’noe khoziaistvo 10 (1924), p. 11.
Judging from the above, housing partnerships that were required to autonomously manage and maintain houses were undoubtedly put under the control of the housing authorities. Housing partnerships were often mentioned as “auxiliary organizations” of the authorities, “not cooperative,” or “one half cooperative and the other half administrative” in comparison with the ZhAKTy. That status is endorsed by the direct and formal relationship between the authorities and partnerships as follows. It was an institution introduced by a decision of the Moscow Soviet Executive Committee on May 3, 1923 that directorates and inspection commissions had to be approved by MUNI, and in particular cases, one third of the members had to be replaced by candidates that MUNI recommended. This was presumably contrived from the need to maintain the class composition of directorates and inspection commissions, to enable the authorities to secure firm control over housing partnerships.

**ZIGZAGGING AROUND THE TRANSFER TO ZHAKTY, 1924–1931**

*The Introduction of ZhAKTy*

This form of housing partnership extended to other cities in the Soviet Union. Against the backdrop of the successful development of the NEP, however, a new movement emerged to promote ZhAKTy, a new type of housing organization, more empowered in terms of management and more independent of the authorities. The thrust seems to have come from several ministries including the NKVD and the People’s Commissariat on Health, which were respectively concerned with housing organizations. Their representatives collaborated to form an organizational bureau of housing cooperatives, and the First All-Union Congress of Housing Cooperation was held on December 13 and 15, 1923. A draft of the decree compiled and proposed by the bureau in this congress anticipated the basic framework and contents of a decision of the All-Union Executive Committee and Sovnarkom, “On housing cooperation,” dated August 19, 1924. An essay summarizing this congress gave some appraisal of the role that housing partnerships had played in renovating houses for two years, yet put clear emphasis on the need to transfer to housing cooperatives, arguing that they could be “the most adequate form for self-activity of working people.”

As indicated in Lenin’s article entitled “On cooperation,” since the introduction of the NEP, some Soviet leaders came to expect good performance

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from a variety of cooperatives, especially in the fields of agriculture and trade. At the thirtieth Communist Party Congress held in May 1924, A. Andreev, who reported on “On cooperation,” referred to Lenin’s article and extolled the meaning of cooperative movements, and further mentioned some activities of housing cooperatives. According to him, since the central and provincial governments alone could not undertake the many activities to solve the great lack of housing, “it is a combination of various organizations’ efforts that should play a fundamental role.” Housing cooperatives were anticipated as “a better form” for the purpose.26

Under these circumstances, the decision of the Soviet government on August 19, 1924, “On housing cooperation,” was published. Declaring that the Soviet state “supports the development of housing construction and the most effective use of existing housing facilities on the basis of self-activity developed by a wide range of the working masses,” the decision promoted the establishment of housing cooperatives comprising the following forms: 1) house-leasing cooperative partnerships (ZhAKTy); 2) workers’ house-construction cooperative partnerships (rabochiezhilishchno-stroitel’nye kooperativnye tovarischhestva: RZhSKTy); and 3) general civil (obshchegrazhdanskie) house-construction cooperative partnerships.27

Since no one raised any objection to promoting housing construction cooperatives, here I deal with ZhAKTy alone, comparing them with housing partnerships. According to an explanation from the juridical perspective, housing partnerships, on the one hand, were legal persons in public law, whereas on the other hand, ZhAKTy were those in civil law. “[The two] are not the same...as the subjects of rights and self-sufficient units in the economy.”28 Under Article 8 of the decision mentioned above, ZhAKTy gained more opportunities to expand their financial standing compared to housing partnerships, through levying of initial money deposits from members, although not over 20 rubles, as well as entrance fees and monthly apartment rent, and subleasing non-living space in the form of commercial facilities and offices. Also, by expanding each member’s share of responsibility for the cooperative’s debt to five times that of each initial deposit (Article 11), ZhAKTy acquired a better chance of extracting a larger amount of money from banks.29 Furthermore, in addition to the extension of monetary stock, the capability of ZhAKTy concerning distribution of living space was enhanced. While housing partnerships had to transfer 10 percent of the living space to the housing authorities after concluding the rental contracts, ZhAKTy were exempted from this obligation.30

26 Trinatsatyi s’esz RKP(b). Mai 1924 goda: Stenograficheskii otechet (Moscow, 1963), pp. 429.
However, taking into account the severe lack of housing in Moscow, the Sovnarkom RSFSR decided on November 21, 1924 to continue with an additional 10 percent confiscation by the authorities in Moscow alone regardless of the form of housing organization. And, by decree of the Moscow Soviet on September 29, 1923, prior to the introduction of ZhAKTy, housing partnerships in Moscow were already allowed to rent from the housing authorities entire houses including non-living space and to earn additional money by subleasing any or all of the space. Therefore, it is difficult to find a clear difference between the two types of housing organization, at least in Moscow.

What was the greatest point distinguishing ZhAKTy from housing partnerships? It was the absence of a housing official’s direct control over the directorates and inspection commissions, which had been embedded in the housing partnership system. As mentioned before, housing partnerships needed official approval for the composition of their executive organs, sometimes accompanied by partial substitution. This control mechanism was not introduced into the ZhAKTy system. Therefore, ZhAKTy institutionally reinforced an aspect of self-management, pushing official control into the background. And the fact that the maximum period of the lease contract under the ZhAKTy system was extended from six to twelve years may also have led to the strengthening of their autonomous management and residents’ initiative.

Those who energetically pushed the transfer from housing partnerships to ZhAKTy especially emphasized that ZhAKTy, more than housing partnerships, would make it possible to foster among the residents themselves a sense of responsibility as parties of the housing management and thereby mitigate the worsening housing degradation. They expected that residents living in ZhAKTy would make considerable effort in the form of offering their own money and time into improving their housing environment. “When a much broader working population fully understands the differences [between housing partnerships and ZhAKTy]..., they will direct their energy into organizing strong housing cooperations, which will lead their work on the housing crisis to success.” In so doing, the keyword was “self-activity” of residents. In terms of self-activity, ZhAKTy were supposed to be superior to housing partnerships. Supporters of ZhAKTy argued that housing partnerships and ZhAKTy “are different from each other in their legal position, and moreover, are in exact opposition [in terms of self-activity]. In the former, self-activity

31 Kommunal’noe khoziaistvo 24 (1924), p. 63; Lu. A. Katkovskii, Zhilishchno-arendnye i zhilishchno-stroit’nye kooperativy: spravochnik po zakonodatel’stvu v voprosakh i otvetah (Moscow, 1936), p. 45. In exchange for submitting 10 percent of the space, monetary compensation was also permitted.
32 Zhilishchnoe tovarishchestvo 15–16 (1923), p. 28; 2 (1924), p. 3.
33 Sobranie zakonov i rasporiazhenii 5 (1924), p. 66.
34 Kommunal’noe khoziaistvo 21 (1924), p. 34.
of residents is extremely limited and used as an auxiliary resource to support administrative apparatus (MUNI) in the operation of housing management. In the latter, self-activity plays a dominant role, all housing cooperative buildings are based on it, and housing administration appears only as a counterpart to the contract, maintaining its authority to supervise ZhAKTy and make certain claims only within the framework of the lease contract.”

In addition, some advocates seem to have held the idea that ZhAKTy based on residents’ self-management and self-activity would open the road to Socialism, and further, to Communism. Although it was published in 1929 in the midst of the controversy surrounding the introduction of ZhAKTy in Moscow, an article from Zhilishchnaia kooperatsiia, a central journal by two promoters of ZhAKTy, the All-Union Council of Housing Cooperation (VŠZKh) and the All-Russian Central Union of Housing Cooperation (Tsentsrozhilsoiuz), stressed the historical meaning of ZhAKTy, citing a remark by ZhAKTy supporter A. P. Smirnov, vice chairman of the Sovnarkom RSFSR, that “the form of workers’ self-control in houses in future will become the highest, because Communism will be moving toward it” and attaching to it the phrase, “There is nothing for us to add to it.” In their opinion, flourishing housing cooperatives would be conducive to the realization of a self-control-type socialism. In fact, as ZhAKTy were expected to develop a variety of “cultural and daily living work (kul’turno-bytovaia rabota)” at the residence level, being guided by slogans such as “emancipation of women from housework” and “collectivization of daily life,” housing cooperative activists attempted to construct a new way of life suitable for a new socialist society through residents’ self-activity and cultural and daily living work. It is thought provoking that the first chairman of Tsentsrozhilsoiuz was Lu. Larin, a key person who drove the movement of collectivization of daily life during the Cultural Revolution in 1928–31.

The decree of the Soviet government “On housing cooperation” itself not so much shared this revolutionary ideal as promoted the transfer to ZhAKTy from the pragmatic viewpoint of encouraging residents’ initiative in overcoming the housing crisis. In any event, as of October 1, 1925, around one year after the publication of the decree, in the RSFSR, the number of ZhAKTy reached 24,304 and occupied around half the living space of all municipalized houses. In Leningrad, the second capital of the Soviet Union, the movement was reportedly delayed at first. However, with a campaign developed during the period from November 1 to December 15, 1925, the transfer to ZhAKTy

35 Zhilishchnaia kooperatsiia 4 (1924), p. 11.
37 Zhilishchnaia kooperatsiia 7 (1925), p. 55. On housing cooperatives as a foothold of collectivization of daily life, see Lu. Larin, Zhilishche i byt: zhilishchnyi vopros v rekonstruktivnyi period (Moscow, 1931).
38 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomii (RGAE), f. 7754 [Vsesoiuznyi sovet zhilishchnoi kooperatsii], op. 1, d. 1, l. 16; Zhilishchnaia kooperatsiia 2 (1926), p. 35.
accelerated, and finally, in the course of 1926, over 90 percent of the housing partnerships, which covered about 80 percent of the municipal housing in Leningrad, became cooperatives, and Leningrad came to be known as the “Mecca of cooperation.”

**Moscow against ZhAKTy**

Under these circumstances, Moscow stubbornly stood out against this policy. The Moscow Soviet and MUNI had consistently disapproved of ZhAKTy, from the time the draft of the decree on housing cooperatives was presented in late 1923. One reason for this was that there was no major difference between housing partnerships and ZhAKTy, apart from the name “cooperative” attached to the latter, especially in Moscow where housing partnerships had already acquired the right to sublease non-living space, while they had to provide housing authorities with 10 percent of the living space even after introducing the ZhAKTy system. Moreover, housing partnerships had originated in Moscow and were firmly established there. The residents themselves as well as the housing authorities most likely considered the new policy unnecessary. On the other hand, Moscow’s position left some room for doubt that “if nothing changes intrinsically, why do the Moscow Soviet, MUNI, and housing officials categorically refuse to change the signs?”

Moscow’s housing authorities presumably objected to ZhAKTy because of apprehension over the loss or weakening of their control over housing management at the residence level. As analyzed later in detail, they were apt to consider the limitation of residents’ participation in management more favorable. This attitude may have derived from a characteristic of bureaucrats in general who adhere to their capability, yet there were other reasons. The housing authorities insisted that they needed to be concerned about the allocation of living space in favor of workers, bearing in mind the much more serious housing situation in Moscow and the need to secure a conduit of direct control over each housing directorate to curtail the influence of non-Soviet elements, the proportion of which was supposedly larger in Moscow. An article pointed out another reason for Moscow’s objection, arguing that the housing partnerships provided the housing authorities with considerably more arbitrary space than ZhAKTy because MUNI could unilaterally cancel lease contracts with housing partnerships, although not with ZhAKTy, without judicially confirming infringement of contract.

Moscow’s position on this issue was clarified when the NKVD RSFSR and Tsentrozhilsoiuiz worked out a strong line of applying their policy in

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40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

Moscow. This line responded to the decree of the Russian Sovnarkom dated May 21, 1926, “On some measures concerning housing management.” The decree requested that the NKVD come up with a directive on the transfer of housing partnerships to the model charter of ZhAKTy, “taking into account the opinion of the local [soviet] executive committee.” Based on this decree, on December 19, 1926, the NKVD issued a directive on the procedure for transfer, expecting its fulfillment in Moscow starting October 1, 1927. The plan, however, triggered vehement objection from Moscow, in particular because the Tsentrozhilsoiuuz announced the directive as if it had already been decided, without any discussion among those concerned, leaving the Moscow Soviet completely in the dark. The Presidium of the Moscow Soviet issued a special statement that the directive of the NKVD had been presented “without any agreement of the Presidium of the Moscow Soviet” and that “the transfer of the housing partnerships of Moscow city to the cooperative’s charter was not scheduled, much less ready by the present time, and there was no direction with respect to the time of the transfer,” and furthermore, on December 23, 1926, declared the following decision:

Housing management of Moscow city, through the existing form of administration, is basically restored, and is pouring considerable income from commercial facilities into the budget of the Moscow Soviet, which is completely directed toward housing construction for workers. The special conditions of Moscow, as a capital of the Soviet Union experiencing a formidable housing shortage, require unweakened and direct guidance on housing management from the side of the Presidium of the Moscow Soviet. The experience in other cities of transfer of housing partnerships to the cooperative’s charter showed, according to the opinion of responsible workers, that it was unsuccessful and only caused an increase in expenditure on housing management and administration and delayed restoration of housing. It is to be admitted that the transfer of housing partnerships in Moscow city to the cooperative’s charter is managerially and politically inadequate.

This decision clearly shows the harsh evaluation of the ZhAKTy system by Moscow’s authorities and their preference toward direct control over housing management. On December 28, 1926, five days after the decision of the Presidium of the Moscow Soviet, the Sovnarkom RSFSR admitted that “the announcement of the directive by the NKVD was inadequate,” and moreover, proposed to solve the issue of transfer “through agreement between local executive committees and local housing [cooperative] unions.”

**The Introduction of Housing Trusts in Moscow**

Extracting a certain concession to their position and running in parallel with the process, Moscow authorities embarked on the introduction of a new

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form of housing organization distinct from both the housing partnerships and ZhAKTy. This was an attempt to establish housing trusts (domovye tresty). In the course of the controversy and dispute surrounding ZhAKTy, Moscow selected the alternative of moving from housing partnerships not to ZhAKTy, but to housing trusts.

The housing trust was a type of housing organization in which multiple houses were bundled under the direct control of MUNI and RUNI. They were generally established based on large-scale houses and commercial facilities. A crucial difference between housing partnerships or ZhAKTy and housing trusts was that the former had directorates and inspection commissions elected by residents, while the latter did not; therefore, self-management and residents’ participation in housing management including distribution of living space was institutionally weakened. Residents’ self-activity, emphasized in housing partnerships and ZhAKTy, was pushed into the background in housing trusts. As a means of residents’ involvement in housing management, supervisory commissions (nabliudatel’nye komissii) selected in residents’ general meetings and comprising three to seven residents were expected to be set up. Yet the task of these commissions was sharply limited to the role of observer. Management of each house was assumed to be conducted by a housing janitor (komendant or upravdom) charged with looking after several houses and dispatched by housing administrations (domovye upravleniia) under housing trusts.44

The introduction of the trusts must have been a new means for the authorities to maintain conventional control over municipal housing in Moscow. However, a new explanation regarding the effective accumulation of capital for the construction of new houses was added. Considering information about surplus money stored at profitable housing partnerships not being put into funds for new housing construction, but in some cases being spent on excessive repairs or facilities of existing houses, the authorities started to contend that housing trusts under their direct control would become a stable circuit for stocking surplus money.45

A project for organizing housing trusts was implemented in November 1926 under the name “Sub-department of [housing] exploitation (P/otdel eksploatsii)” attached to MUNI. Under this sub-department, 15 large-scale profitable houses located in the city center were bundled. The total living space was 126,698 m², non-living space, 97,202 m², and the number of commercial facilities, 668. The sub-department managed them through five housing administrations and reportedly achieved excellent results during the initial one-year “experiment.” Some articles reported that the amalgamation brought about a dramatic reduction (around 25 percent per 1 m²) in labor costs and expenditure for housing services such as cleaning and garbage collection. Furthermore, the gross rental income coming in from apartments

45 Zhilishchnaia kooperatsiia 7 (1926), pp. 5–6.
and commercial facilities reached 4,224,556 rubles, 74.28 percent of which was sublease rent from the latter. After subtracting the rent for non-living and living space to MUNI – the former was 2,759,437 rubles and the latter was 97,685 rubles – around 1,370,000 rubles allegedly remained as cash in hand.46

Before long, Moscow’s experiment appeared to obtain partial sanction from the Russian government. On July 11, 1927, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Sovnarkom RSFSR issued a decree “On the organization of trusts for administration of municipalized houses” and approved the transfer of part of the municipal housing to the control of the newly organized housing trusts with conditions attached: houses under direct control of municipal housing authorities and newly constructed houses alone shall be transferred to trusts; houses rented by ZhAKTy shall be transferred to trusts only in cases where ZhAKTy do not wish to renew their contracts with the authorities or where they have committed a breach of contract.47 Even though the decree did not clarify how to deal with the housing partnerships in Moscow, some of them, especially large-scale houses, began to be incorporated into housing trusts.

When the restoration of the national economy was considered to have been completed in the middle of the 1920s, the next task of industrialization and the related extension of monetary resources surfaced. Thus, a campaign was launched for the “regime of economy” as a means for capital accumulation. The new form of housing organization promoted by Moscow matched the flow of the campaign, and moreover, may have acquired policy legitimacy by demonstrating that housing trusts led to expansion of the monetary basis for new housing construction.

Renaming this sub-department of exploitation as housing trusts, Moscow further pushed the movement and, at the same time, attempted to solidify the theoretical grounds for trusts in the process of controversy with cooperatives in the latter half of the 1920s, ranking the trusts as “the highest form” of housing management.48 Moving away from their previous position in support of housing partnerships against ZhAKTy, the housing authorities in Moscow came to understand that both housing partnerships and ZhAKTy were antiquated housing organizations that would be unable to respond to the present and coming needs. For example, an article entitled “Housing partnerships, ZhAKTy or Trusts” published in 1929 at the peak of the dispute contrasted the former two with the third, and argued that “while housing trusts are an especially centralized and statist form of housing administration (tsentralizovannaia gosudarstvennaia forma upravleniiia domami), housing partner-

ships and ZhAKTy are distinguished from trusts by their own character of predominance of public self-activity (obshchestvennaia samodeiatel'nost’),” and further insisted that the “so-called public form (obshchestvennaia forma) of housing administration is unable to fully satisfy state requests” in terms of halting housing degradation and satisfying current requests for industrialization. “To the housing organizations are directed not general requests for supplying housing stock consisting of municipalized houses for working people [in general], but concrete requests for distribution of space strictly in accordance with the needs of developing industry. In this situation, the role and meaning of housing cooperatives (housing partnerships and ZhAKTy) in the operation of space allocation are declining more and more...” Given that “developing industry of the country, first of all, requires living space” and “priority in this case should be given to workers and white-collar workers in industry and transport;” “the state is obliged to grasp the work of distribution of space in its own hands... Therefore, the controversy surrounding which form, housing partnerships or ZhAKTy, responds more to the present needs, is more theoretical than practical and effective. A statist form of housing administration best meets the present needs and policy... The road to development of a national economy requires the transfer of administration of housing management directly to state organizations.”

As shown in this paper, the position that emphasizes administrative control from above as opposed to the cooperative principle and residents’ self-activity had been consistently expressed in Moscow’s official remarks. However, an article entitled “Problems of Housing Trusts” published in February 1927 during the early promotion of housing trusts was very conspicuous in its critical attitude and low estimation of cooperatives and their self-activity. “The collective form (kollektivnaia forma) of housing administration cannot be the final ideal at all. Now that housing management has already been restored, further residents’ self-activity is unnecessary in the work of housing restoration. In cases where housing management is not only restored, but is also beginning to provide some profit, collective administration is redundant and residents’ self-activity could become an obstacle to the accumulation of money stock for new housing construction.”

Put simply, these statements are equivalent to saying that the collective form of housing management and self-activity are invisible cloaks to hide residents’ private or egoistic interests.

In sum, Moscow seized on the one hand housing partnerships and ZhAKTy as a collective or public form of housing management and on the other hand housing trusts as a centralized and statist form, and thus decided to focus predominantly on the latter at the time of industrialization. Therefore, in answer to the question of whether to select housing partnerships or ZhAKTy, the better form for Moscow would be the one that was easier to control, which

was housing partnerships. In short, the transfer of housing partnerships to ZhAKTy was out of the question. “An attempt to replace housing partnerships with ZhAKTy is a violation of the right of local soviets to control housing management and accomplish forms of housing administration based on centralization and rationalization...”51 Yet Moscow admitted that housing partnerships should be kept for the time being, since it would be impossible to immediately extend housing trusts to all municipal housing in Moscow.52

**Housing Cooperatives Approaching Moscow**

As readily expected, housing cooperatives’ leaders and activists felt some apprehension about “the extremely dangerous blow” that the trusts might bring to the development of housing cooperatives, and strongly criticized the housing trusts as only producing “administrative delay (volokita) and bureaucratism,” which “we experienced during War Communism.”53 The criticism of “bureaucratism” thrown at housing trusts was consistently found in statements by supporters of housing cooperatives. As an example, at a conference of cooperatives’ activists from Leningrad held on September 5, 1927, the following resolution was adopted including the keyword of bureaucratization:

> Mass transfer to trusts, that is, transfer to an administrative form of management through komendanty, would deprive the working people of fundamental stimulus to participate in management and to be closely and directly concerned with the work of maintenance and restoration of housing stock, thereby producing the danger of bureaucratization... and elimination and weakening of the public basis (obschestvennaia osnova) in housing management.54

However, responding to the emergence of industrialization policy and the development of a campaign for the economic regime, and reasonably anticipating that certain demerits could be brought by firm refusal without any compromise or alternative, the conference continued the resolution as follows:

> At the same time, taking into account the extremely important task of creating flexible housing stock in preparation for the influx of workforce..., the conference considers it necessary to adopt appropriate measures. In so doing, [we] must not halt in front of some curtailment of the rights of ZhAKTy... to possess living space over an average standard [per capita]. The emptied space of these ZhAKTy should be transferred to housing stock to satisfy the needs mentioned above.55

53 Zhilishchnaia kooperatsiia 18 (1926), p. 3.
54 Zhilishchnaia kooperatsiia 18 (1927), p. 33.
55 Ibid.
As seen in this resolution, housing cooperatives showed some signs of flexibility concerning their authority to distribute living space under ZhAKTy. And the attitude was not limited to Leningrad, but reflected a new position of the Tsentrozhilsoiuiz, which had reportedly already been adopted as of May 1927. As a result, a new decree was issued by the Sovnarkov RSFSR on November 15, 1927, “On measures of housing management in urban areas,” which stipulated that part of the capability to distribute living space should be transferred to city soviets. According to a commentary on this decree, the draft on which the decree was based was drawn up by leading members of housing cooperatives, in whose constituencies Iu. Larin, chairman of the Tsentrozhilsoiuiz, was included. Furthermore, the decree included another significant provision. To strengthen control over ZhAKTy, it stipulated modification of the model charter of housing cooperative unions that had built a network of ZhAKTy at the district or city level, and gave the cooperative unions the capability to practice reelection prior to the term of directorates and inspection commissions through convening general meetings of members. Employing a remark from another commentary on this decree, the provision presented the idea that “the same method of reelection as had been applied in Moscow’s housing partnerships,” that is, the partial exchange system of directorate, should be introduced between ZhAKTy and cooperative unions, as between housing partnerships and MUNI.

In this manner, ZhAKTy were gradually approaching the institutional framework of housing partnerships, partly losing their initial autonomy. According to the judgment of housing cooperatives’ leaders, however, such a compromise should have contributed to securing the position of ZhAKTy in the housing management system as a whole. While the decree issued on November 15, 1927 reduced the sphere of capability of ZhAKTy, it was supposed to reconfirm their position as seen in some clauses of the third chapter entitled “On the Reinforcement of the Juridical Position of Housing Cooperations.” Those clauses stipulated that the minimum term of contract to be concluded between ZhAKTy and housing authorities was to be no less than nine years, and the contract could not be terminated without juridical judgment of breach of contract by ZhAKTy. Although it seems to only clarify some previously stipulated provisions, a commentary on the decree evaluated it highly, arguing that “this decree is a great acquisition for housing cooperations. It fixes not only the still-acquired position, but also opens enormous opportunities for further successful development.” That evaluation may concern the intention of housing cooperatives’ leaders to mitigate discontent spreading on the spot.

58 Zhilishchneaia kooperatsiia 17 (1927), p. 2.
Yet before the thrust of housing trusts, for housing cooperatives to secure a footing would have been significant. In addition, the cooperatives’ approach to the institutional framework of housing partnerships may have been an attempt to lower some hurdles in promoting the transfer of housing partnerships to ZhAKTy. At the third session of the All-Union Council of Housing Cooperation held on January 13, 1928, with many voices warning against housing trusts, a resolution was adopted stipulating that the Tsentrozhilsoiuiz reach an agreement with the Moscow Soviet, and “draw representatives of the Moscow Soviet into the present work of reviewing the model charter of ZhAKTy.”\(^{59}\) This was understandably an attempt at problem solving by reducing the differences between the two institutions.

The second step of the cooperatives’ side in approaching the Moscow housing authorities is related to the enlargement of housing management units, that is, the merger of housing organizations, including ZhAKTy. This was distinguished from simple criticism of trusts by presenting a position that understands the emergence of housing trusts not so much in opposition to ZhAKTy, but rather as an attempt to overcome the inefficiencies of small-scale housing organizations.\(^{60}\) The survival of ZhAKTy also naturally motivated this position. Among the cooperatives’ activists there was not only a skeptical attitude toward the evaluation of more efficient housing trusts, but also objections that ZhAKTy, in which members of the directorate were working without payment, were *more economical*;\(^{61}\) however, the opinion that overcoming the small-scale character of housing organizations would enhance efficiency gained general consensus.\(^{62}\) By early 1927, the project of consolidating housing management units including ZhAKTy had started in all urban areas in the RSFSR. In Moscow, the MUNI embarked on the merger of housing partnerships based on the decision of the Moscow Soviet dated February 23, 1927, and by the end of March 1928, 500 housing partnerships had been consolidated into 89 units.\(^{63}\)

*From Housing Partnerships through Trusts to ZhAKTy*

Thus, the emergence of housing trusts, coupled with the industrialization drive and the economic regime, invited a somewhat more flexible stance among

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62 However, there was some dissent against the merger on the grounds that it might cause further disturbances on site; it would not be economical; it is an illusion that the merger would make it easier to acquire money for repairs; and so forth. See *Kommunal’noe khoziiastvo* 19–20 (1927), pp. 138–139. In any event, the surrounding dispute, about the more cost-beneficial form of housing management, was not so much based on objective evaluation as a kind of discourse tactic used to present one’s superiority against the other.
housing cooperatives’ leaders and reduced the difference in institutional setting between ZhAKTy and housing partnerships. However, in spite of the closer approximation of the systems, there is no doubt that the basic strands of the relationship between Tsentrozhilsoiuiz/VSZhK and MUNI had been colored by conflict. While MUNI viewed ZhAKTy as “consumer organizations” giving priority to cooperatives’ members, and therefore having “petty bourgeois” nature, housing cooperatives criticized the introduction of housing trusts as the appearance of bureaucracy and low estimation of residents’ self-activity.64 This controversy reached its peak in 1929 and both main journals repeatedly exchanged sharp words, which is perhaps why housing trusts did not spread in Moscow. Consequently, the transformation of housing organizations did not advance.

Under these circumstances, the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate (RKI) RSFSR that proceeded with the investigation of housing trusts in Moscow in 1929 presented a new policy decided on June 20, 1930, which became a turning point. The decision, positioning trusts as the basic form of housing administration in Moscow, proposed complete transfer to trusts. Yet at the same time, it also added the experimental introduction of ZhAKTy in one district in Moscow. According to an article commenting on the decision, the new policy stemmed from the “superiority of trusts over other forms of housing administration,” especially by “successfully conducted management activity.” It reported that housing trusts in Moscow had generated a profit of 4,899,265 rubles in the 1928–29 fiscal year. On the other hand, the investigation also observed some defects. In particular, there was concern over “weakness in drawing the public (obschestvennost’), that is, residents into management activities.” This led to “not always sufficient service to residents and delay of realization of residents’ needs.” Hence, the defects pushed forward the partial introduction of ZhAKTy. Immediately responding to the RKI decision, the Moscow Soviet accelerated the transfer of municipalized houses to trusts and at the same time by a decision of the Presidium on August 21, 1930, selected Zamoskvorech’e raion as the object for conducting an experimental introduction of ZhAKTy.65

Thus, Moscow’s housing system encountered fluctuations. As of October 1, 1929, there were 71 residential sites (dvorovye uchastki) with living space of 207,000 m² under 15 housing trust administrations. After the decision, as of January 1, 1931, the number of these sites skyrocketed to 5514 with 4,762,900 m² under 200 administrations. This means that the amount of living space increased 20 times. Since the entire municipal housing living space in Moscow was about 10 million m², nearly half was administered under trusts. On the other hand, during the same period, the number of housing partnerships (including ZhAKTy) decreased from 12,100 to 600 with 10,919 residential sites


and living space of 4,287,000 m², coupled with the results of the merger as well as transfer to trusts. Consequently, at the time, housing trusts exceeded housing partnerships in terms of living space.66

On the other side, in Zamoskvorech’e raion, which was divided into two, Zamoskvorech’e and Lenin raions, after the reorganization of Moscow’s districts in 1930, the experiment started. By early 1931, 88 ZhAKTy were reportedly established. Since the merger of housing partnerships had already advanced and 1833 houses had been incorporated under 86 housing partnerships, the experiment was performed in such a way as to follow the movement of the previous merger and in addition, seize the available 73 houses under trust.67

However, apart from two raions, as the introduction of trusts was extending from large-scale houses with a higher proportion of commercial space, in other words with a small number of residents, to middle- or small-scale houses, some initial shortcomings of the trusts were eventually recognized among the population. As early as late 1930, many complaints surrounding the transfer to trusts began to be reported. In residents’ meetings held at various places in Moscow, considerable criticism was directed toward the housing trusts and merged housing partnerships. Finding fault with “estrangement of housing apparatus from residents, bureaucratism, disorder, continuous degradation of housing funds, dearth of residents’ activities, lack of political and cultural work at residences, etc.,” participants reportedly insisted that “a means of overcoming the crisis – is to break up the existing unwieldy housing organizations.” Since strong criticism was being directed toward the trusts, ZhAKTy surfaced as the only remaining alternative for a housing organization. One report noted the atmosphere of a meeting held in Sokor’niki raion, where a representative from RKI was unable to present persuasive data for endorsing the rationality and economy of trusts, and thus the vast majority of participants approved a resolution to “liquidate trusts and establish ZhAKTy.” Furthermore, the Moscow City Party Committee joined in this trend. The decision of the committee loudly denounced a main housing authority of Moscow by name, contending that “MUNI completely mistakenly conducted the reorganization of the housing administration, massively centralized the administration, and enlarged the housing management in a series of raions, which led to the practice of poor management... and the worsening of residence service.” A leader of MUNI, referring to the fact that “thousands of voters’ mandates (nakazy) demanding change and improvement of this [housing] system came to the Moscow Soviet” during the period of Soviet election campaigns, admitted that the promotion of trusts in 1930 “turned out unsuccessfully.”68

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Thus, via repeated zigzagging, a new opportunity again visited Moscow. A decision of the Moscow City Party Committee and Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet dated March 14, 1931, “On the reorganization of the administration of housing management,” critically summarized the results of the promotion of trusts and merger of housing units, pointing out that “extraordinary centralization in housing administration and lack of concrete guidance in housing management led in practice to poor management and irresponsibility in housing, the worsening of service to residents, and weakening of self-activity and initiative of residents themselves in housing administration.” Based on this estimation, the decision ordered the reorganization of Moscow’s housing administration as follows: Among all municipal housing, houses including large-scale commercial facilities such as the former Miur and Meriliz department stores shall be incorporated into the Kitai-Gorod trust directly controlled by MUNI; houses holding living space of over 1000 m² shall be administrated by housing trusts under district soviets (not beyond 45 percent of the total living space of the municipal housing); the remaining housing fund (over 55 percent), apart from houses fixed by government offices or leased to state organs and enterprises, shall be transferred to under the “direct control of residents of their houses... by organizing ZhAKTy.” In sum, almost all houses under the housing partnerships and a considerable number of houses held by the housing trusts were to be transferred to newly organized ZhAKTy.⁶⁹ Thus, Moscow was positioned in the same institutional framework as other cities including Leningrad.

Since this decision also meant basically setting up one ZhAKT per house, it presented a clear idea of setting up housing organizations by residents to the extent possible and once again promoting residents’ participation in housing management. In this respect, the decision aimed at reversing the driving force that had expanded the housing administration units and their distance from residents themselves. However, this decision was not immediately accomplished, as was so often the case in the policy process under the Soviet regime. Although a series of operations concerning the transfer should have been concluded by April 25, a Moscow newspaper reported some delay of transfer by introducing the actual situation in various places where residents’ meetings had not yet been held, where directorates had not yet been elected, and so on. In particular, the most serious problem was that ZhAKTy were organized not for each house, but for housing units comprising dozens of houses. Therefore, the Presidium of the Moscow Soviet Executive Committee had to issue an additional decision commanding “determined decentralization and closing of housing to residents” and “liquidation of enlarged units of ZhAKTy.”⁷⁰ As a result of the additional measures, by April 1932, about a year

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⁷⁰ Rabochaia moskva, April 19, 1931, p. 3; May 5, 1931, p. 4; May 16, 1931, p. 4. In Lenin raion, which had already proceeded with the introduction of ZhAKTy, 49 ZhAKTy were divided into 1662 units during the period from April to June 1931. See Zhilishchnaia kooperatsiia 9–10 (1932), p. 19.
after the initial decision, 14,272 ZhAKTy holding 16,172 houses (*domovladeniia*) and 1,567,215 people with a total living space of 6,736,285 m² had been set up in Moscow. Since the municipal residential sites (*dvorovye uchastki*) in Moscow totaled 19,120 with living space of 10,328,900 m² as of January 1, 1931, if leaving aside a time lag of over one year and the difference between the two terms used, it would mean that the ZhAKTy system had seized around 65 percent of the living space of Moscow’s municipal housing.\(^{71}\)

**ZhAKTy in Moscow, 1931–1937**

The decision dated March 14, 1931 provided Moscow’s housing system with a new framework that continued until 1937. Most municipal housing was administered by ZhAKTy and housing trusts. Non-municipal housing including dormitories and barracks were placed under the control of government agencies, state enterprises, and various other organizations, and partly the workers’ house-construction cooperative partnerships (RZhSKTy) that managed the houses that they constructed or renovated in the same way as ZhAKTy. The following provides a brief sketch of ZhAKTy, housing trusts, and RZhSKTy in 1930s Moscow.\(^{72}\)

ZhAKTy, the scale of which in April 1932 is mentioned above, retained their position as the main housing organization in Moscow until 1937. As of January 1937, the number of ZhAKTy was 14,827 with 1,623,200 residents, slightly exceeding the 1932 figures. As the living space under ZhAKTy amounted to 7,497,100 m² as of April 1936, this also exceeded the 1932 figure. According to a survey of total ZhAKTy in Moscow carried out throughout 1932, among the 8838 ZhAKTy that responded to inquiries by August 1933, 11.5 percent held living space over 1000 m² and 66 percent held 500 m² or less.\(^{73}\) On the whole, these figures endorsed the policy decision of March 1931, whereby municipal houses holding living space over 1000 m² would be administered under the trusts. In short, ZhAKTy managed small- or middle-scale houses.

On the other hand, housing trusts acquired many large-scale, well-equipped houses in terms of communal facilities.\(^{74}\) The housing trusts in Moscow were divided into two forms: city housing trusts and district housing trusts. City housing trusts had 179 housing administrations (*domoupravleniia*) with 538 buildings (*stroeniiia*) as of January 1, 1936. The total living space was 1,047,004 m², one seventh that of ZhAKTy, and residents numbered 181,700. In short,

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\(^{71}\) *Kommunal’noe khoziaistvo* 6 (1931), p. 15; Tsentral’nyi arkhir goroda Moskvy (TsAGM, byvshii Tsentral’nyi munitsipal’nyi arkhir Moskvy: TsMAM), f. 1495 [Moskovskii gorodskoi soiuz zhilishchnoi arendnoi kooperatsii: Mosgorzhilsoiuz], op. 1, d. 1, l. 45.

\(^{72}\) For a similar sketch, Shimotomai, *Moscow under Stalinist Rule*, pp. 114–118.

\(^{73}\) TsAGM, f. 1495, op. 1, d. 49, ll. 6, 24–25; d. 1135, l. 148; d. 829, l. 90.

\(^{74}\) *Vecherniiia Moskva*, January 1, 1934, p. 2; TsAGM, f. 1289 [Moskovskiaia gorodskaia rabochekrest’ianskaia inspeksiia i moskovskiaia gorodskaia kontrol’naia komissia VKP(b)], op. 1, d. 432a, l. 3.
the average living space and number of residents per housing administration surpassed 5000 m² and 1000 people, respectively. With respect to district housing trusts, the only available data is the figure of 878 houses (doma) held in 1932 or 1933, although the number of residents and total living space under district housing trusts is supposed to have been higher than those of city housing trusts.

There is also little data on RZhSKTy. According to one report, 112 RZhSKTy were operating in Moscow in 1931, including 55 housing cooperatives owning their houses. The total number of cooperative members was 186,000 as of October 1, 1931, among which around 54,000 members, only 29 percent, had acquired their own living space. As of January 1, 1937, there were 395,000 RZhSKTy members throughout the Soviet Union, but 138,900 were still awaiting acquisition of space.

The paucity of information prevents a detailed explanation of the housing management system in 1930s Moscow. Instead, I provide the following overview of the actual situation of housing management under ZhAKTy. While the main journal on housing cooperations frequently applauded the activities of exemplary ZhAKTy, archival materials provide a more multifaceted perspective. For example, an investigation of all Moscow trusts and ZhAKTy in May 1932 reported the “unsuccessful situation” of housing management as follows: frequent turnover of janitors, disorganized management, ignorance on the part of directorates in terms of residents’ demands, weak resident participation in management of trusts, indifference to housing administration by party factions and members, inadequate repair work, and so forth. Furthermore, an investigation of 15 ZhAKTy conducted by instructors of the Moscow City House-leasing Cooperative Union (Mosgorzhilsoiuz) in the same period draws our attention to its analytical approach and conclusion. The most interesting point is the presentation of its conclusion, whereby the 15 ZhAKTy are classified into three categories: 1) large-scale ZhAKTy with several paid personnel; 2) middle-scale ZhAKTy with a few personnel partly paid or holding another position; 3) small-scale ZhAKTy where the directorates perform considerable public duties without paid personnel. The conclusion was that a magnitude of residents and income or the existence of paid personnel did not assure the success of ZhAKTy activities. Regardless of scale, some ZhAKTy performed better and some did not. Finally, the report argued that the performance of ZhAKTy depended on “the election of persons to directorates and sub-commissions.”

In short, the human factor – who and what types of people were elected – was

75 TsAGM, f. 490 [Glavnoe upravlenie zhilishchnogo khoziaistva], op. 1, d. 2, ll. 41ob.-42; d. 3, l. 53.
76 TsAGM, f. 1289, op. 1, d. 662, l. 43.
77 TsAGM, f. 1289, op. 1, d. 388, l. 29; RGAE, f. 7754, op. 1, d. 116, ll. 18, 21.
78 TsAGM, f. 1289, op. 1, d. 387, ll. 78–84.
79 TsAGM, f. 1495, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 32–34ob.
most significant. The notion could be considered simple common sense, yet it may also be the point on which to focus to gain a deeper understanding of Stalinist society. Although the phenomenon where directions from above are not always fulfilled at the bottom was observed broadly and everywhere under the Soviet regime, in this case of housing management, one of the reasons that policy from above concerning the establishment and promotion of ZhAKTy in Moscow was achieved in a different manner at the bottom was the human factor at the residence level, that is to say, the quality of human networking and mutual trust among residents and their representatives, or if using a term popularized by the political scientist, Robert Putnam, the accumulation of “social capital” in each house.\(^8^0\) This viewpoint could lead to the perception that the attitude of residents and their representatives toward the common project of housing management, in other words, their sense of civic responsibility, was indispensable even, or especially, under the Stalinist regime and it played a key role in the performance of ZhAKTy.\(^8^1\)

Here, I introduce two individual cases. The first is ZhAKT No. 397 located in Krasnaia Presnia raion. According to a record compiled on October 31, 1932 by the inspection brigade, the house under ZhAKT No. 397, built in 1910, comprised three stone buildings with four floors and was well equipped with communal facilities including central heating and baths. Judging from the fact that the number of apartments and rooms was respectively 36 and 186 with living space of 3210 m\(^2\), it belonged to the category of large-scale ZhAKTy. Total monthly income was estimated to be about 2000 rubles. The number of residents, heads of households, and ZhAKT members was 631, 174, and 155, respectively. Having this many non-members was also very often seen in other ZhAKTy. The records show that the administrative work in this ZhAKT was deficient, confirmed by the complete absence of general meeting protocols. This problem was closely related to inactivity of the directorate, almost all of whose members belonged to the party except for one housewife. The record states that “the directorate does not conduct any practical activities with respect to housing management and administration with the exception of some meetings, although these are held extremely rarely.” In fact, several paid personnel administered this ZhAKT. “A janitor was shouldering the entire workload, for which the directorate side hardly provided any necessary support.” The janitor had worked there since February 1932 and earned 200 rubles a month. In addition, this ZhAKT employed two accountants (in all, 250 rubles) holding other positions, a sweeper (90 rubles), a cleaning woman (70 rubles), and a boilerman (130 rubles). In addition to a critical remark about overpayment of personnel, the inspection brigade pointed out various other problems in terms of housing management: unauthorized financial admin-


\(^{81}\) On this viewpoint, see also Matsui, “Stalinist Public or Communitarian Project?”
istration such as excessive payment for garbage collection and misallocation of water charges; low frequency of general meetings; no setting up of sub-committees such as for cultural and daily living needs; absence of cultural and daily living facilities such as laundry and kindergarten; and so forth. The inspection brigade concluded that the Mosgorzhilsouiu must intervene in this affair and undertake reection of the directorate and inspection commission of ZhAKT No. 397.82

The second case, ZhAKT No. 8 set up at No. 86 Gor’kii Street, is based on a petition signed by the head of the directorate and sent to the Moscow City Party Committee.83 The petition is not dated, but it was included in a file of documents dated 1932–1933. ZhAKT No. 8 had 120 residents (87 adults) including 67 cooperative members. While ZhAKT No. 8 was not categorized as large scale or financially solid, it was awarded for its significant activities at the Congress of All-Russian Housing Cooperatives. The petition emphasized that a majority of residents had actively participated in the work of the ZhAKT. By virtue of such strong resident involvement, ZhAKT No. 8 stopped employing a janitor, proudly noting that “except for a sweeper, a cleaning woman, and a boilerman (in the winter season), we have completely transferred to housing administration on a voluntary basis (v poriadke obshchestvennosti).” In short, an attitude corresponding to the mindset of self-managed ZhAKTy was observed among the directorate and cooperative members. However, the chairman of the directorate raised a serious problem. The transfer “ought to have enjoyed maximally lively reverberation and palpable support mainly from the side of the housing and communal administrations, yet actually, we have encountered the opposite phenomenon.” The petition insists that the administrative organs’ bureaucratic responses created a predicament for the ZhAKT’s activists.

We have already indicated that at the present, [our] ZhAKT’s work is mainly based on the public and this is right. In the composition of the directorate are included good activists, who so often bear the excessive burden of their job and hold public obligations one after another in addition to the work of the ZhAKT. Therefore, they can only do the work of the ZhAKT late in the evening or on holidays... While the work of the ZhAKT has been restructured and strengthened, the housing authorities leading and supporting ZhAKTy have not been restructured because the organizations concerned (sub-district housing unions, housing trusts, and others) do not operate on the standard holidays. Therefore, the ZhAKT leaders have no opportunity to systematically maintain an active connection [with their organs] and to solve many problems. [We] are obliged to ask our workplace superiors for permission to spare work time in order to visit various organizations concerning ZhAKT work. During the month of June alone, the directorate chairman and secretary each spent 15 hours of work time on ZhAKT work. Such a situation cannot be approved. This is all taking place because those concerned have not restructured their

82 TsAGM, f. 1289, op. 1, d. 387, ll. 18–33.
83 TsAGM, f. 1495, op. 1, d. 2, ll. 52–62.
work in accordance with the working conditions of ZhAKTy.... At Registration Bureau No. 2 of Oktiabr’ raion, the process for issuing ordinary certificates and ration books is organized in a terrible manner. People frequently stand in line for several days, and then receive insufficient instructions. People are forced to rush around trying to obtain various certificates, documents, and so on. The bureau officials’ attitude toward visitors is rude and careless. Our active housewives, who do all the work concerning ration books on a voluntary basis (v obshchestvennom poriadke), have been reduced to tears by vituperation and discourtesy.

It can be seen from these two cases that the performance of housing management by ZhAKTy first and foremost depended on the human factor. However, in Stalinist society, where ordinary people had to spend hours, sometimes days, to acquire daily basics including food, coupled with the bureaucratic ineffectiveness of the Soviet administration, the self-management of housing through ZhAKTy was a harsh experience that imposed a heavy burden on the residents. While self-activity of residents was continuously demanded, there was a conspicuous absence of any support mechanism to strengthen the micro-public sphere.

On the other hand, cases of arbitrary or despotic management by directorate chairmen, as well as their inactivity as in the case of ZhAKT No. 397, are recorded in archival files: a chairman who lost his authority after repeated incidents of drunken, violent behavior including wife beating; a chairman who allocated extensive space to his relatives; a chairman who misused funds to repair a friend’s space; and so forth. In the last case, which was disclosed in 1936, a general meeting to denounce the chairman was held with the participation of Bandi, chairman of the Mosgorzhilsoiuz. Criticizing him because “he was a good chairman only for himself and those closest to him,” the decision was made to call for criminal prosecution.84 There were most likely countless incidents of despotic chairmen or directorates besides the cases mentioned above.

In sum, while ZhAKTy in 1930s Moscow were in some cases a kind of micro-public sphere accompanied by active participation of residents, they were in general battlegrounds where survival games unfolded.

LIQUIDATION OF ZHAKTY, 1937

On October 17, 1937, a decree was issued by the Central Executive Committee and Sovnarkom USSR, “On maintenance of housing funds and improvement of housing management in cities.”85 The decree was in fact a death sentence for the housing cooperative movement, as it ordered the

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84 TsAGM, f. 1495, op. 1, d. 86, l. 159; d. 364, l. 55; d. 851, II. 11-45.
liquidation of all ZhAKTy and almost all RZhSKTy. Although details of the policy process for this decree remained ambiguous, the decree itself clearly expressed the Soviet government’s perception of the actual situation of housing administration.

Housing administration and legislation, which regulate housing construction and distribution and use of residences, retain the detrimental remains of the period of national economy, when local soviets were obliged to transfer their authority concerning housing management and distribution and use of living space to individual residents’ collectives – ZhAKTy – because of organizational and managerial weakness. As a result, instead of state distribution and use of houses to be practiced through local soviets, for the most part, state housing funds are basically seized by small residents’ collectives, which are uncontrolled by, and independent of, local soviets and have only been formally consolidated into housing cooperative unions… As a result, instead of state distribution and use of houses to be practiced through local soviets, for the most part, state housing funds are basically seized by small residents’ collectives, which are uncontrolled by, and independent of, local soviets and have only been formally consolidated into housing cooperative unions… As a result, instead of state distribution and use of houses to be practiced through local soviets, for the most part, state housing funds are basically seized by small residents’ collectives, which are uncontrolled by, and independent of, local soviets and have only been formally consolidated into housing cooperative unions... As a result, instead of state distribution and use of houses to be practiced through local soviets, for the most part, state housing funds are basically seized by small residents’ collectives, which are uncontrolled by, and independent of, local soviets and have only been formally consolidated into housing cooperative unions...

Housing legislation, which has permitted the expenditure of state capital for cooperative housing construction and has transferred houses constructed by the state to respective citizens’ groups (housing construction cooperatives), and which has also permitted the transfer of houses belonging to the state and constructed by state enterprises and organs for direct administration and use by respective citizens’ groups (ZhAKTy), was conducted during the period of 1924–1930, when local soviets and state enterprises were unable to secure proper administration of housing funds.

As indicated in the decree, the Soviet government, by stressing dysfunction of most ZhAKTy, completely condemned the existing housing management system, the institutional and juridical framework of which was basically constructed during the NEP period. The notion that this form of housing cooperative was introduced due to weakening of local soviets, which originally were to directly control municipal housing, almost exactly repeated what the Moscow housing authorities had contended with ten years earlier. The tone elicited a sense of crisis in that housing cooperative organizations were inadvertently permitted to treat municipal houses that were state property as if they were privately owned. Issuing the decree would be closely related to the adoption of the Stalin Constitution at the end of 1936, which declared a victory for Soviet Socialism based on socialist property.86

The decree outlined a new housing management system: ZhAKTy and housing cooperative unions would be abolished; RZhSKTy would be similarly dealt with, except those that could repay their loans of state funds within six months; local soviets would directly administer all houses under ZhAKTy, trusts, and RZhSKTy; for this purpose, local soviets would organize housing

86 I thank Prof. Akira Uegaki for drawing my attention to the feasible relation between the decree and the Stalin Constitution.
administrations (*zhilishchnye upravleniia*), to be set up one per district, up to two in large districts in Moscow and Leningrad; the respective house or houses would be managed by janitors (*upravdomy*), to be appointed by housing administrations; janitors would be set up one per alley for 10–15 small-scale houses, while large-scale houses with living space over 3000 m² or more than 500 residents would have their own janitor; rental contracts, the maximum term to be five years, would be concluded between the janitor and heads of households (*s’emshchiki*).

It is no surprise that the Soviet newspapers and journals quoted only those residents who responded favorably to the decree, and yet in their voices some valid arguments for the government decision were suggested. For example, one resident emphasized that directorate chairmen who had their own job during the day and tackled housing management work as a public obligation had no time to consult with upper housing unions and organs or to fulfill difficult tasks such as procurement of construction workers and repair materials. On the other hand, the liquidation of housing cooperatives was unexpected, in particular for district activists, and an atmosphere of demobilization and stagnation spread among them. Yet Tsentrozhilsoiuiz and Mosgorzhilsoiuiz, which were also destined to be abolished in the near future, immediately criticized their attitude and pressed them to do the final work, warning that individual responsibility would be pursued.

Although the transfer of houses under ZhAKTy and trusts should have been finished by December 10, 1937 and those under RZhSKTy, by December 15, the usual delays and zigzagging were reported. Afterwards, 36 housing administrations were established under 23 district soviets in Moscow, to which all municipal housing was transferred, including almost all the houses under RZhSKTy. The conclusion of new rental contracts between appointed janitors and heads of households started on April 1, 1938. This operation also had some problems, as at the end of 1938, the contract procedure had reportedly started again. However, 800,000 contracts were concluded as of May 1940 and the transfer process was basically finished.

During the restructuring of the housing system, barely 16 house-construction cooperatives remained, but afterwards, the number gradually increased. This means that housing cooperatives survived. Yet house-leasing cooperative partnerships, ZhAKTy, were completely abolished by the decree of 1937 and were not revived during the subsequent history of the Soviet Union. Replacing rental contracts between housing authorities and ZhAKTy, the janitors as agents of housing administrations, in short, the Soviet state, and

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88 TsAGM, f. 1495, op. 1, d. 1165, ll. 1–6.
89 *Rabochaiia moskva,* November 27, 1937, p. 4; November 29, 1937, p. 4; March 30, 1938, p. 4; December 16, 1938, p. 1; Moskovskii bol’shevik, May 17, 1940, p. 4; May 24, 1940, p. 3.
90 Moskovskii bol’shevik, August 23, 1940, p. 3.
the residents themselves as the two parties of the rental contract faced each other directly, not via housing organizations. ZhAKTy, although severely limited in terms of autonomy and authority, continued to be a unique presence throughout the 1920s and 1930s, as a kind of intermediate corporation positioned between state and citizens. Therefore, the liquidation of ZhAKTy might be viewed as a symbolic final establishment of state Socialism.\(^9\)

**Conclusion**

The zigzagging process of Moscow’s housing management system traced in this article provides an opportunity to reconsider Soviet history of the 1920s and 1930s, in other words, the long-discussed issue of the dramatic transition from the NEP to Stalinism. As the rapid industrialization and wholesale collectivization of agriculture that started at the end of the 1920s is called a “revolution” from above, the border between the 1920s and 1930s is rightfully seen as a great threshold in Soviet history. However, housing management appears to have proceeded along a different path. Cooperative housing management introduced under the NEP cut through the border and continued until 1937. In spite of the fact that in Moscow, along with the birth of industrialization policy, administrative control over housing was about to achieve a victory against cooperative management including housing partnerships as well as ZhAKTy, after all, in March 1931, Moscow also decided to join the policy of other cities including Leningrad. It is not unfeasible that the cooperative housing management system, which took into consideration residents’ initiatives and their private and collective interests based on the mindset of the NEP, extended its influence in the 1930s. It must be noted, however, that the housing situation changed greatly with the end of the NEP. Proletarianization was promoted not only in the membership of housing partnerships and cooperatives, but also in the composition of residents through enforced removal of non-working people from municipal housing. Even though the idea of transferring the right of property itself to ZhAKTy was presented in the mid-1920s, somewhere along the way, it disappeared.\(^9\) The capability of ZhAKTy to distribute living space among members was curtailed in October 1927, while they were mandated to control their residents regarding the administration of passports and ration books and mobilize them to attend public festivals and memorial events such as the October Revolution and May Day.

Nevertheless, it is significant that this system, in which cooperative members elected a directorate to handle housing management with residents’ participation, was maintained until 1937. The decree of 1937 deprived residents’

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91 For similar remarks, see Orberteis, Trünen des Sozialismus, pp. 6, 407.
92 KPSS v rezolutsiiakh i resheniakh s’ezdov, konferentsi i plenunuov TsK, Tom 3 (Moscow, 1984), pp. 400-402; Zhitishchnaia kooperatsiia 14 (1925), pp. 1-2; 15 (1925), pp. 8-9; 16 (1925), pp. 5-10.
organizations of even limited autonomy, considering them as actors infringing socialist property. Thus, a state monopoly on housing was basically accomplished. Newly appointed janitors were positioned as follows: “Janitor – this is a representative of Soviet power, the Soviet state. He is obliged to secure and reinforce public and socialist property as a sacred and inviolable basis of the Soviet regime...”93

One reason for the survival of the cooperative housing management system may be attributed to the dual character of Stalinism. While seeking total control and mobilization, from above, of human and material resources, at the same time, it welcomed initiative, self-activity, and active participation from below and attempted to channel this into socialist construction projects. This matches the view that Stalinism was not only repressive, but also productive in its power to subjectivize the people.94 However, another explanation appears vital to understanding the dualism of Stalinism. Since total state control of all aspects of social life would be impossible in practice, in the end, the state is obliged to depend on social and public initiatives from below to maintain social life and realize various values, including communal services. Although housing cooperatives could not fulfill their function as expected and inevitably brought their private and collective interests against the authorities’ direction into the work, some ZhAKTy had played such a public role in the 1920s and 1930s. Therefore, as reported in contemporary newspapers, the liquidation of ZhAKTy caused some decline in community activities at the residence level.95

93 *Zhilishchnoe khoziaistvo* 2 (1938), p. 6; 3 (1940), p. 1. Since the perception of the late 1930s, especially the year 1937, as a great turning point in Soviet history has been shared by most historians, my argument cannot be considered original at this point. However, the purpose of this article is to show that the form of the cooperative, whose role in economic and cultural development came to be positively reevaluated by some Bolshevik leaders such as Lenin in the process of transfer from revolutionary radicalism of War Communism to the NEP, survived the era of renewed radicalization of revolution from above since the end of the 1920s, despite the fact that in Moscow, the form of housing cooperatives was on the brink of being discarded under the industrialization drive. In short, the year 1937 for the housing cooperative movement should be seen as the final abandonment of the NEP, rather than as a sort of Great Retreat (Nicholas S. Timasheff).


95 *Rabochaia moskva*, May 23, 1938, p. 4; July 10, 1938, p. 4; January 26, 1939, p. 3; *Moskovskii bol’shevik*, May 20, 1939, p. 2.
Mobilization of Non-titular Ethnicities during the Last Years of the Soviet Union: Gagauzia, Transnistria, and the Lithuanian Poles

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Post-Soviet states spent their formative years in a struggle for statehood. The emergence of unrecognized states is one of the most extreme examples of this struggle. Four secessionist polities, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, have gained de facto independence from their host countries, but their independence has not been recognized by the international community, and confrontations with the host states continue. Diplomatic initiatives have barely produced feasible solutions, but, on the other hand, massive bloodshed had not occurred after the ceasefires in 1992–94 until the South Ossetian War in August 2008. The international community, including influential powers, then lost interest in these conflicts, which began to be regarded as “frozen and forgotten.” However, the South Ossetian War demonstrated that these conflicts could be “unfrozen” at any moment and, therefore, should not be “forgotten.”

The unrecognized states in post-Soviet territories originated from non-titular ethnicities’ collective actions targeted at defending their culture and language. For this purpose, they tried to strengthen or even create anew a territorial autonomy, which they regarded as the most reliable legal guarantee against titular groups’ assimilative policy. One might find this motivation in a number of “hot points” in the late-Perestroika Soviet Union: Abkhazia and South Ossetia of Georgia, Crimea of Ukraine, Transnistria and Gagauzia of Moldova, the “Polish” districts of Lithuania, and the Narva-Sillamae region of Estonia.

Having caused large-scale conflicts, these collective actions produced different outcomes even before the end of the Soviet regime. Four of them crystal-

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1 The Russian government recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on August 26, 2008.
3 “Titular nation” is an official term of Soviet and other socialist nationality policies, which means a nation representing a certain administrative unit and sub-national government.
4 For example, territorial units with autonomous status were granted more deputies in the union and republican parliaments.
lized as de facto independent states; some did not go further than autonomy within the host countries (Gagauzia and Crimea), and the others abandoned their request for territorial autonomy (Lithuanian Poles and Narva-Sillamae). Applying resource mobilization theory, this paper analyzes the reasons for this diversification, despite the similarities that these movements revealed at the initial stage. I explain the diversification of de facto independence of Transnistria, a compromise – autonomy of Gagauzia, and the complete failure of Lithuanian Poles. This paper focuses on a relatively early period, since late-1988, when the autonomy movements became visible, until mid-1990, when Transnistria created the basic state structures and proclaimed independence from the Moldovan SSR.5 This focus is explained by my view that the different outcomes of autonomous movements were predetermined by the initial conditions that they faced.

Although there were more than one hundred ethnicities in the Soviet Union, only in the eight cases listed above did non-titular ethnicities and sub-national governments attempt to create or strengthen their territorial autonomy. Incapable of organizing large-scale mass movement, which might affect decision-making at the union republic levels and in Moscow, and therefore regarding their own ethnic and regionalist mobilization as costly and risky, small ethnicities and regions became self-assertive only when the leaders found that the benefits of mobilization surpassed its cost. According to Charles Tilly, passing this threshold may take place, most likely, as a result of the minority leaders’ interactions with the government and other contenders.6 Tilly lists at least four motives for collective action: shared interests (advantages and disadvantages resulting from their interactions with other groups); common identity and organizational integrity; available resources under collective control; and the opportunity or threat that these collective actions face.7 Among these motives, Tilly makes much of resources, while Sidney Tarrow appreciates opportunity as the main determinant that diversified ethnic and democratic mobilization in the late-Soviet period.8 According to him, opportunities for drastic social change bestow resource-poor actors the possibility to organize a new social movement.9 This view seems to explain why Lithuanian Poles and Gagauzians began to mobilize themselves, when the anticipated cost of this mobilization seemed to surmount these groups’ capacity.

5 In September 1991, Gagauzia and Transnistria abandoned their policy, aimed at autonomy within the Modovan SSR, and began to request their complete separation from it (but not from the USSR).
7 Ibid., p. 84.
9 Ibid., pp. 18, 96.
Collective actions require organizational infrastructure, such as face-to-face communities, social networks, and institutions.  

10 This role was played by the United Council of Work Collectives (OSTK) and Gagauz Halki (the Gagauz People) in Transnistria and Gagauzia respectively, and by Šalčininkai and Vilnius District Soviets for Lithuanian Poles. The local and republican Soviet elections in 1990 endorsed these organizations with the legitimacy to speak in the name of the nationalities and regions they represented. Among these organizations, OSTK in Transnistria, unifying industrialists and workers, had the greatest access to economic resources of the region to be used for collective actions. As Tilly notes, this collective control of resources was a crucial prerequisite for gaining the loyalty of followers.

12 The first section describes the similarities that these movements had at their initial stage, while the second section scrutinizes why these movements became diversified. The toughest extreme of this diversification, Transnistria, left few options to the host government of Moldova, other than military ones, in 1992.

**Similarities at the Early Stage of Mobilization**

Charles Ragin identified three major motives for ethnic mobilization: developmental, reactive, and competitive. Taras relies on Ragin’s theory to analyze titular ethnicities’ movements in union republics. In my view, Ragin’s theory is applicable to non-titular groups, as well. For example, ethnic mobilization intensified when titular and non-titular groups competed for the same rewards, such as language dominance and titular status in a territory. Three cases analyzed in this paper shared this competitive motive. In all cases, competitions around language policy caused by the titular group’s attempt to make their language the only state language provoked the non-titular group’s resistance. The non-titular group, disappointed by the adoption of the republican language law, tried to create a territorial autonomy in which the non-titular ethnicity would become a majority.

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10 Ibid., p. 21.
11 Gagauz Halki was officially registered as a juridical person on October 26, 1989. The Moldovan Council of Ministers canceled this registration in 1990, when Gagauz activists proclaimed the formation of the Gagauzian Republic directly subordinated to the USSR, bypassing the MSSR. See Archiva Națională a Moldovei (ANM), f. 2848 [Guvernul R.S.S.Moldova Hotărîrea], in. 22, do. 535, pp. 214–216.
12 Tilly, *From Mobilization*, pp. 70, 78.
The First Phase: Towards Cultural Autonomy

The titular and non-titular groups began to confront each other, when the former, dominant in the Lithuanian and Moldovan Supreme Soviets (parliaments), tried to adopt a language law determining not only the official but also the monopolizing status of the titular language. On June 3, 1988, Lithuanian intellectuals organized Sąjūdis (Reform Movement of Lithuania) with the slogan of “glasnost, democracy, and sovereignty” in the building of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences in Vilnius. A core proposal of this movement was to recognize Lithuanian as the governmental (official) language, which would be realized by the “Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR on the Use of the State Language of the Lithuanian SSR,” adopted 25 January 1989. Moldovan intellectuals started to follow this Baltic harbinger in September 1988, when sixty-six Moldovan intellectuals published an open letter, requesting a language law to make Moldovan using Roman script the governmental language. This request was realized by the “Law of the Republic of Moldova on the Functioning of the Languages Spoken in the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic,” adopted on August 31, 1989.

In December 1988, both Lithuania and Moldova established special commissions under the aegis of the Supreme Soviets and republican Academies of Science to deliberate the language legislation. Non-titular groups objected immediately. In December 1988, many precinct (aplinka) Soviet sessions and regional branches of the Polish Union in Lithuania (Związek Polaków na Litwie, hereafter ZPL) and Social-Cultural Association of Poles in Lithuania in Šalčininkai and Vilnius Districts, where the majority of the population were Lithuanian Poles, requested that Polish be bestowed the same status as Lithuanian, as well as constitutional protection for Polish speakers. Local Polish intellectuals, many of whom belonged to these organizations, initiated this movement.

In Moldova, Russian speakers composed the core of the non-titular opposition. In December 1988, members of the Moldovan Academy of Sciences, mainly Russophone intellectuals, established a political organization named

16 Руссу И.Г. Заметки о смутном времени. Кишинёв, 1999. C. 1. This action followed Estonia’s precedent. Linguistically, Moldovan is hardly differentiated from Romanian, but until 1989, Moldovan was written in Cyrillic script and thus artificially separated from Romanian.
17 Aplinka was a mezzanine territorial unit between district (raion) and village, specific to the Lithuanian SSR. For example, Vilnius District consisted of twenty-seven aplinka, while Šalčininkai – fourteen. Tarybu Lietuvos enciklopedija vol. 4 (Vilnius: Vyriausioji enciklopejių redakcija, 1988), pp. 151–152, 545–546.
18 Lietuvos Valstybės Naujasis archyvas (LVNA), f. 42 [Lietuvos Lenkų Sąjūdos (LLS) perduodamų dokumentų sąrašas], ap. šar, b. 92, l. 1.
19 Днестровская Правда. 01.05.1989; 09.05.1989; 25.05.1989.
“Interclub” for the protection of the Russophone population. Remarkably, Interclub activists were recruited from not only Transnistria, but also Gagauzia. Before long, these Gagauzian activists became the torchbearers of the Gagauz autonomous movement.

Along with the activists associated with Interclub, Gagauz Halkı intellectuals steadily intensified activities for cultural revival of the Gagauz people from April 1988. However, it was only in May 1989 that the penetration of the concepts of self-determination and minority rights into public awareness induced the Gagauz community to request making Gagauz the official language in Gagauz-dominant districts. Before this moment, the Gagauz community was no more than a subgroup of the “internationalists” opposing Moldovan “nationalism.”

The insignificant percentage of the population with a command of the titular group’s language was a reason that not only Russian-speakers but also Gagauzians and Lithuanian Poles were against the language law and requested to retain the spheres of life in which Russian could be used officially. According to the Soviet Census of 1979, only 0.1 percent of the Gagauz had a command of Moldovan (Romanian) as their first language and 6.3 percent as their second language, while 6.8 percent had a command of Russian as their first language and 68.4 percent as the second. Thus, the number of persons with a command of Russian was much more than that of Moldovan (Romanian). This circumstance was similar to that of the Lithuanian Poles. According to the Soviet Census of 1989, 5.0 percent of Lithuanian Poles had a command of Lithuanian as their first language and 15.5 percent as the second, while 9.2 percent had a command of Russian as their first language and 57.9 percent as the second.

The Second Phase: Toward Territorial Autonomy

Non-titular groups’ opposition to the language law intensified ethnic conflicts. They elaborated a project to build a territorial autonomy for the purpose of strengthening their political voice against titular groups. Of the three cases, Lithuanian Poles acted first in this activity, launching their autonomous project as early as January 1989. This was a reaction to the Language Decree promulgated on January 25, 1989, which disappointed Lithuanian Poles by its lack of legal guarantee of the usage of Polish even in dominantly Polish districts. As a result, the notion of forming a special legal status (autonomous region) to protect their own interests became popular among Lithuanian Poles.

It was at this turning point that the USSR’s Convention of People’s Deputies was convened in May 1989. Autonomists regarded this event as a golden

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opportunity to articulate their minority rights.\textsuperscript{24} In this month, a number of territorial units around Vilnius and other city Soviets adopted resolutions demanding territorial autonomy,\textsuperscript{25} while Gagauz Halki began to request the creation of their own autonomous republic. On May 21, 1989, Gagauz Halki held a mass meeting in Comrat to request the Moldovan Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers to introduce the Gagauzian Autonomous SSR as a constituent of the MSSR.\textsuperscript{26} In contrast to Lithuanian Poles, who did not use the term “republic,” Gagauz Halki underscored that they desired an autonomous “republic,” not an autonomous region. In Transnistria, collective actions for territorial autonomy started several months later, after the political strikes organized against the Moldovan language law did not produce the expected result.\textsuperscript{27}

This law, adopted by the Moldovan Supreme Soviet on August 31, 1989, caused protests in Transnistria, Gagauz and other parts of Moldova. After August 21, mainly Russophone employees organized political strikes against the law in large cities, such as Ribnița, Tiraspol, Tighina (Bender), Chișinău, Edineț, Orhei, Belți, and Comrat.\textsuperscript{28} Remarkably, in this wave of strikes Transnistrian autonomists created the United Council of Work Collectives (OSTK), selecting Igor Smirnov as its chairman. Although strikes continued until September 22,\textsuperscript{29} the Moldovan Supreme Soviet refused to rescind the language law and, unexpectedly for strikers, the protracted standoff of industries began to damage the regional economy.\textsuperscript{30} These unsuccessful strikes made their organizers seek a more effective way to secure their interest and rights; territorial autonomy was the answer to this question.\textsuperscript{31}

The Unity (Edinstvo), which had developed from the Interclub,\textsuperscript{32} did not play an important role in this quest for territorial autonomy. Unity struggled to realize bilingualism in Moldova, requesting to make Russian the language for inter-ethnic communication.\textsuperscript{33} This policy is closer to the bilingualism policy pursued by the Soiuz group at the union level.\textsuperscript{34} Workers of non-titular back-

\textsuperscript{24} Днестровская Правда. 05.25.1989.
\textsuperscript{25} Сребраковский, Полacy в Litewskiej, p. 299.
\textsuperscript{26} Постановление I-го съезда гагаузского движения “Гагауз халкы.” Комрат, 1989.
\textsuperscript{27} Днестровская Правда. 10.17.1989.
\textsuperscript{28} Днестровская Правда. 29.08.1989; Смирнов Игорь. Жить на земле. М., 2001. С. 27.
\textsuperscript{29} Бабилунга Н. В., Бомешко Б. Г. Приднестровский конфликт: исторические, демографические, политические аспекты. Тирасполь, 1998. С. 23.
\textsuperscript{30} Смирнов. Жить на земле. С. 29.
\textsuperscript{31} Днестровская Правда. 17.10.1989. Igor Smirnov, who continues to be the official leader of Transnistria today, writes in his autobiography that the experience of striking led to the idea of creating an autonomous republic.
\textsuperscript{32} Unity held its founding meeting on July 8, 1989, at which Interclub liquidated itself to become Unity. Чего добилось “Единство.” С. 2.
\textsuperscript{33} My interview with Petr Shornikov, writer and former member of the Supreme Soviet of MSSR, in Chişinău on June 21, 2004.
\textsuperscript{34} The members of Soiuz in Moscow and Unity in Moldova kept close relations and exchanged opinions. My interviews with Iulie Brohin, entrepreneur and former representative of Soi-
ground, largely Slavic speakers from across Moldova, not necessarily from the left bank, supported Unity.

REASONS FOR DIVERSIFICATION

As surveyed above, there had been significant resemblances between the three movements, which however began to diverge in mid-1989. This section examines possible reasons for this diversification.

Demography

Transnistria, Gagauzia, and the Polish Districts of Lithuania (Figure 1) cover approximately 4200, 3600, and 3200 square kilometers respectively. In terms of populations, however, they reveal a tangible difference: Transnistria under Socialism – about 750,000, Gagauzia – 295,000, and Polish Districts of Lithuania – 134,000. Moreover, Transnistria was the most urbanized and had large cities, such as Tiraspol with a population of 202,900, Tighina (Bender) – 144,000, Slobozia – 112,100, Ribnița – 96,600, Grigoriopol – 54,000, and Camenca – 36,600. By contrast, in Gagauzia even the largest city of Comrat had a population of 26,100, Ceadîr-Lunga – 23,200, and Vulcănești – 17,600. The Polish Districts of Lithuania were even more rural; the “cities” of Šalčininkai, Švenčionys, Trakai, and Širventos Districts had populations of 134,000, 132,000, 112,000, and 106,000 respectively.

uz, in Moscow on February 02, 2005; with Petr Shornikov in Chișinău on February 12, 2007.

Nemenčinė, and Ėišiškės had populations of 6,500, 5,600, and 3,800, respectively. The concentrated urban population was very important for organizing a social movement systematically. Lacking this condition, Lithuanian Poles’ autonomy movement was defused among precinct (aplinka) Soviets in the Šalčininkai and Vilnius Districts. Counter-factually, it might be possible to assume what could have happened, if Vilnius City, which had belonged to Poland from 1920 to 1940, had played an active role in the Polish autonomous movement. However, Vilnius was severely de-Polonized after the Soviet Army’s occupation of Lithuania; ethnic Polish intellectuals left the new capital. Consequently, Lithuanian Poles, as an absolute minority in Vilnius City, were not capable of resisting Sąjūdis, which developed mainly in Vilnius.

The situation was slightly more advantageous for the Gagauzian autonomous movement, which found its social basis in the cities with the demographic dominance of Gagauzians, such as Comrat, Ceadîr-Lunga, and Vulcâneşti. Gagauzian autonomous activists often visited rural districts to consolidate the ethnic community. Not surprisingly, in Transnistria major industrialized cities, such as Tiraspol, Tighina (Bender), Slobozia, and Ribniţa, became footholds of the autonomous movement.

The Soviet regime requested from ethnic groups demanding autonomy a certain population size, dense (according to Soviet terminology, “compact”)

**Figure 2. Transnistria and Gagauzia**

- PASSR (PMSSR) -
  ① Transnistria
  ②—⑥ Gagauzia
  ②—④ Districts partaking in the budget of the Gagauzian Republic
  ⑤—⑥ Districts rejecting to partake in the budget of the Gagauzian Republic

36 1989 metų visuotinių.
inhabitance, and social development. In this sense, Transnistria was the most legitimate but peculiar unit to be granted autonomy. Its peculiarity was that the population was composed of three ethnicities, Moldovans, Russians, and Ukrainians, all roughly equal in number.

It was a repeatedly questioned issue whether the ethnic Gagauz community had achieved the level that allowed for a new autonomy.\textsuperscript{37} Several researchers who worked in Moldova and other union republics answered this question affirmatively.\textsuperscript{38} For example, Mikhail Guboglo, a Gagauzian ethnologist working at the Institute of Ethnography of the USSR's Academy of Sciences, argued that the Gagauz had sufficiently developed ethnic peculiarities, a relatively large population (about 160,000), which moreover lived in densely populated areas, the potential for economic independence, and a political desire for self-determination.\textsuperscript{39}

Gagauzian activists argued that their community fulfilled the requirements for autonomy even more than the existing autonomous republics. According to a report submitted by a special commission to the Moldovan Supreme Soviet, the alleged 3600 square kilometers of the anticipated Gagauzian autonomous territory was larger than the 3000 square kilometers of the Adjara Autonomous Republic of the Georgian SSR, and the regional population of Gagauzia amounted to 295,000, larger than 278,000 of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic of the Azerbaijan SSR.\textsuperscript{40} This comparison, however, was not entirely fair. To make the Gagauzian territory as large as 3600 square kilometers, one had to include all five districts of southern Moldova (Figure 2). If one regarded these districts as composing the Gagauzian territory, however, ethnic Gagauzians composed only 44 percent of its total population, which did not confirm the assertion that the Gagauz lived densely in that territory. Other sources stated that the demographic weight of Gagauzians in the future autonomous Gagauzia would amount to approximately 86 percent.\textsuperscript{41} However, to achieve this density, the autonomous Gagauzia would have to be smaller than 1900 square kilometers.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{37} Советская Молдавия. 01.02.1990; О создании Гагаузской Автономной Советской Социалистической Республики в составе Молдавской ССР (Уточненный вариант). Комрат, 1989.
\bibitem{39} Губогло М.Н. Истопин И.Ю. Экспертное заключение № 14043 по вопросу о создании национальной государственности гагаузов в СССР. М., 30.11.1989.
\bibitem{40} Материалы комиссии президиума Верховного совета МССР по изучению запросов народных депутатов СССР и других обращений по созданию автономии Гагаузского народа. Комрат, 1990.
\bibitem{41} Тадевосян Э.В. Экспертное заключение по вопросу о создании национальной государственности гагаузов в СССР. М., 1989.
\end{thebibliography}
Outside Co-ethnics and Protectors

Another important factor for the diversification of autonomous movements was the non-titular groups’ relations with their compatriots (co-ethnics) and protectors beyond state borders.

The history of the Rzeczpospolita and interwar Poland (1920–40) resulted in the existence of a significant number of Polish speakers in the border territories of Belarus, Ukraine, and Lithuania. In 1940, when Poland was partitioned by the USSR and Germany, a large number of Poles were incorporated into the USSR. However, the post-communist Polish government was quite unwilling to commit to the human rights issues of Polish minorities beyond its Eastern borders. Among others, the Polish government regarded the Lithuanian Poles as a Sovietized Diaspora, any support of which might possibly benefit the Soviet Union. This apprehension intensified when the Lithuanian Poles requested the creation of the so-called “Eastern Polish SSR” in the boundaries of the USSR, instead of pursuing the reunification with Poland. Boleslav Daškevic, an ethnic Polish intellectual in Lithuania, maintains that the Lithuanian Poles are not Poles, but a sort of “Polonia,” which means Poles in Diaspora.

The northwestern part of Belarus, with Grodno as its center, had the largest Polish population in the Soviet Union. The number of ethnic Poles in Belarus amounted to more than 500,000, twice the number of ethnic Poles in Lithuania. Ethnic Poles in Belarus launched their movement for cultural autonomy earlier than their Lithuanian co-ethnics. In July 1988, Belarusian Poles requested to increase Polish schools and Polish-speaking mass media, and to import more books and newspapers from their “homeland.” However, Belarusian Poles were not ardent for territorial autonomy. The Belarusian authorities were less nationalistic than the Lithuanian authorities, and therefore did not provoke tensions with the non-titular population.

The Gagauz inhabit the border between Ukraine and Moldova. They originated from the immigrants in South Ukraine and Bessarabia during the eighteenth and nineteenth century. The Russian Empire tried to colonize these regions promptly by inviting Gagauzian and Bulgarian colonists. Unlike Lithuanian Poles, the Gagauz have never had co-ethnic foreign governments as their patron. Linguistically, the Gagauz are close to Turcic nations, while

43 My interview with Boleslav Daskevich, Administrative Director of Šalčininkai region self-government and former member of central committee of Šalčininkai District Soviet, in Šalčininkai, Lithuania, on February 1, 2007.
44 Srebrakowski, Polacy w Litewskiej, p. 123.
45 LVNA, f. 10 [Lietuvos Persitvarkymo Sąjūdžio 1988–1990m. nuolatinio saugojimo dokumentai], ap. sar, b. 25, l. 85–86.
46 Булгар Степан, История и культура Гагаузов. Комрат, 2006.
they have been Christianized by Orthodox Church. In other words, the Gaga-
uz could expect support neither from the Turkic nor Muslim world in their op-
position to the assimilative policy of the Moldovan government. This isolation
made the Gagauz tough and realistic, and they eventually obtained territorial
autonomy in December 1994. Stepan Kuroglo states that, for the lack of any co-
ethnic political entities in the world, the Gagauz feared their ethnic extinction
and therefore wished to have a political entity for their future.47

Although Gagauzians inhabit in southern districts of Odesa Oblast of
Ukraine, the mainland of the Gagauz is Moldova. Only 20 percent of the whole
Gagauz population lives in Ukraine, while 80 percent lives in Moldova. In con-
trast, 48 percent of the all ethnic Poles of the western part of the Soviet Union
live in Belarus, 32 percent – in Ukraine, and only 20 percent – in Lithuania.48
This demographic distribution implies that even if ethnic Poles failed in creat-
ing territorial autonomy in Lithuania, their ethnic bulk, inhabiting less nation-
alistic Belarus, would survive. The Gagauz in Moldova could not but feel more
serious responsibility for the whole transnational Gagauz community than
their co-ethnics in Ukraine. Gagauzian intellectuals thought that Moldova was
their last fortress.49

Transnistrians justified their secessionism by regionalist (not nationalist)
ideology. The Transnistrian population is composed of 39.9 percent of Moldo-
vans, 28.3 percent of Ukrainians, 25.4 percent of Russians, and 6.4 percent of
others.50 The ethnic compositions of the three largest cities, more relevant than
the countryside for autonomous movement, were as follows.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Ethnic Compositions of Large Cities of Transnistria</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moldovan</td>
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<td>---------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tiraspol</td>
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<td>Tighina (Bender)</td>
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<td>Ribnița</td>
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Thus, even in Tiraspol Russians did not compose the largest group. More-
over, citizens of these cities were more mindful of class, not ethnic, divisions.51
This is why the autonomous leaders raised the slogan of “internationalism”

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47 My interview with Stepan Kuroglo, writer and former member of central committee of
48 Srebrakowski, Polacy w Litewskiej, p. 123.
49 Gagauzian intellectuals in Ukraine mainly lived in Odesa, spatially separated from Mol-
dova. This made it difficult for Gagauzian intellectuals in Ukraine and Moldova to cooper-
ate. Interview with Bulgar, writer and former representative of Gagauz Halki, in Chișinău
50 Бабилунга, Бомешко. Приднестровский конфликт. С. 34.
51 Днестровская Правда. 11.05.1989; 13.05.1989.
and “anti-nationalism.” Because of this ethnic composition, Transnistria potentially has two protectors, Russia and Ukraine. This situation is particularly threatening for Moldova since a significant portion of Transnistrians have obtained Russian or Ukrainian citizenship, which means that Russia and Ukraine may pretend to “protect their citizens” in cases of human rights violation. Transnistrian actors (both authorities and opposition) have been in position to use left-bank Moldovans tactfully in their interactions with the Right Bank. For example, Moldovanist historians in Transnistria contribute their papers to the Moldovan Communists’ journals dedicated to Moldovanist ideology.

It is difficult not to notice the advantageous situation of Transnistria. Lithuanian Poles faced a reluctant protector (Polish government) and a reluctant larger community of co-ethnics in Belarus, who were satisfied with the less nationalistic government. Gagauzians had become ardent autonomists because they could not count on their co-ethnics in Ukraine, but they do not have any foreign protector. Transnistria could potentially count on Russia and Ukraine in its confrontation with Moldova and continues to exploit the population’s ethnic ties with the neighboring countries.

**Industrial Potential**

The local economy of the Polish districts of Lithuania was based on food processing, distillation, and baking in Šalčininkai, dairy in Nemenčinė, as well as the leather industry in Eišiškės. In the early period of the autonomy movement, the Soviets ruled by Lithuanian Poles had already suffered from budgetary deficits, though this was a universal phenomenon for all local budgets of Lithuania. In 1990–92, many collective and state farms faced bankruptcy in Šalčininkai District, failing in the adaptation to market economy. The proximity of Polish districts to Vilnius City forced small local industries to be involved in unequal competition with the capital’s industries. According to documents of the Šalčininkai Aplinka Soviet, the Soviet anticipated revenue of 11,500 rubles from collective farms in 1990, but this estimate had lost meaning by the end of 1989, because the collective farms paid no rubles to the local budget. All localities of Šalčininkai and Vilnius Districts shared this dismal fate. The industrial and budgetary collapse was the real reason for the failure of the Polish autonomous movement.

The Gagauzian economy relied on agricultural industry, too. Most “cities” were entrepots of agricultural products. There were wineries and dairies

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52 Днесовская Правда. 04.07.1990.
53 Moldovanism is a position in history, linguistics, and other humanities that argues for the distinctiveness of Moldovans from Romanians. Vladimir Voronin came to power, hoisting this ideology.
54 Тарыбу Литувос енциклопедиа (Vilnius: Vyriausioji enciklopeiju redakcija, 1988).
55 My fieldwork and interviews with local inhabitants in Šalčininkai on February 1, 2007.
56 Lietuvos Respublikos Alytaus apygardos Archyvas (LRAA), f. 2057 [Lietuvos Respublikos Šalčininkų rajono, Šalčininkų aplinkės taryba ir viršaitis], ap. 1, b. 5, 1. 21.
in Comrat, and wineries and a cigarette factory in Ceadîr-Lunga.\(^{57}\)

Transnistria had strong industry, incomparable with Southeast Lithuania and Gagauzia. Transnistria as an unrecognized state has survived to this day because of this industrial potential. Having no more than 13 and 17 percent of the territory and population of the Moldovan SSR, Transnistria accounts for 37 percent of Moldovan industry\(^{58}\) and 90 percent of the power supply.\(^{59}\) Steel production has been the leading industry of Transnistria. The Moldovan Steel Works in Ribnița started to work in January 1985, equipped with newest technologies at that time, and continues to contribute to the state budget by earning foreign currency. Other leading industrial giants were power plants located in Dubâsari and Kucurgan. As mentioned above, they used to supply 90 percent of Moldova’s power and continue to respond to the needs of the right bank. The Transnistrian authorities often use this advantage as a card in negotiations with Moldova. There were other industries that were internationally competitive and capable of earning foreign currency in Transnistria: for instance, the leather industry (mainly producing shoes) in Bender, and cognac distillery and winery in Tiraspol.

Transnistria exported its products to CIS countries, especially neighboring Ukraine. Even today, Ukraine desperately needs Transnistrian industry.\(^{60}\) Transnistria’s economic ties with Ukraine, Russia, and other CIS countries favor its de facto independence. Two international railways, three trunk gas pipelines, two international highways pierce Transnistria.\(^{61}\) It was extremely disadvantageous for Moldova that Transnistria is potentially capable of intercepting transportation from Russia and Odesa’s port. Actually, in August 1991, when the Moldovan government arrested Igor Smirnov and Stepan Topal, the Gagauz leader, the Women’s Association in Transnistria blocked the two international routes and forced the Moldovan government to compromise.

**Changes in the Main Actors**

As described above, national intellectuals guided the autonomous movements in all three regions at an early stage. However, initiators of the movements gradually changed. In Lithuania, deputies of the Šalčininkai and Vilnius District Soviets and ethnic Polish members of the CPSU in these districts advocated for territorial autonomy.\(^{62}\) In contrast, ethnic Polish intellectuals, who

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58 Бабилунга, Бомешко. Приднестровский конфликт. С. 19.
59 Another source states that 98.5 percent of power came from Transnistria. Jeff Chinn and Steven D. Roper, “Nation-building and ethnic mobilization in the Soviet successor states: The case of Moldova,” Center for International Studies (St. Louis University of Missouri, 1993), p. 16.
60 This was a reason that Leonid Kuchma, the former Ukrainian president, was reluctant to solve the Transnistrian conflict.
largely belonged to the ZPL, bet on cultural autonomy. In addition, the activities of ZPL, the largest and most trusted party among the masses of Lithuanian Poles, were limited to Vilnius City. In contrast to Transnistria, few laborers, industrialists, and collective farm chairmen participated in the movement, because of the undeveloped industry in the ethnic Polish districts.

Gagauzia showed a sign of the transfer of hegemony, since 1988 to mid-1989 leading members of Gagauz Halki were intellectuals, but later the local branch of the trade union, headed by Stepan Topal, began to play a leading role, when Gagauz Halki expanded its membership. The first assembly of Gagauz plenipotentiaries, held in November 1989, declared the formation of the Gagauz Autonomous SSR as a constituent of the Moldovan SSR and selected Topal as the speaker of the Supreme Soviet of this new autonomous republic.

In Transnistria, laborers in heavy industry, who were members of the trade union, played a leading role from the beginning of the autonomous movement. During the strikes in August-September 1989, the newly born OSTK established its influence on the left-bank population. During the “founding” elections in November 1990, OSTK candidates enjoyed significant opportunities to be elected as local and republican (Moldovan) deputies in Transnistria.

Though support for the autonomist candidates was universal for all three regions, only OSTK could keep the public on its side. The Šalčininkai and Vilnius District Soviets lost public support after the January Incident (Sausio įvykiai) of 1991, in which fourteen citizens were killed by the Soviet troops near the Vilnius TV tower. Not only Lithuanians, but even Russian and Belarusian minorities of Lithuania stood against this brutal action, and Lithuanian Poles no longer found it advantageous to support the union authorities. Gagauz Halki lost public support, approximately when the Soviet Union collapsed, because it could not “pay any reward” to its supporters. After the local elections in 1990, Gagauz Halki and Gagauzian autonomy could not meet the public’s expectations for a higher living standard, because of its poor budget. In the same fateful months, Transnistria succeeded in consolidating its regional budget to promote material conditions of the population. The active victimiza-


64 Резолюция митинга представителей трудящихся города Комрат и южных районов Молдавской ССР, проведенного по инициативе исполнкома народного движения “Гагауз халкы” (“Гагаузский народ”), в соответствии с решением №6 исполнкома Комратского городского Совета народных депутатов. Комрат, 04.06.1989.


66 The November elections were held to form the Transnistrian state institutions after the declaration of “independence” on September 2, 1990. 81.3 percent of the OSTK candidates were elected. Днестровская Правда. 29.11.1990; 21.11.1990.
tion of the casualties in the conflict in Dubăsari in November 1990 unified Transnistrians against the Moldovan authorities and Popular Front.

**Budgetary Separatism**

According the testimony concerning “anti-governmental” movements by Lithuanian Poles at the Vilnius prosecutor’s office, Henrikas Knezis, vice-president of the Vilnius Gas, the ethnic Polish district Soviets hardly had influence on local workers and industrialists in their districts and, therefore, faced difficulties in composing local budgets. A stenograph of a session of the Šalčininkai District Soviet, held at the beginning of 1991, confirms this situation; the association of medics in the district was ready for strikes if the delay of wages continued. Another deputy remarked that the liquidation of wage delays will consume the whole budget allocated for the period by September 1991. Thus, as early as 1991, the Šalčininkai District Soviet faced a grave budgetary crisis. It is conventional knowledge that the autonomous movement of Lithuanian Poles collapsed after the attempted August coup of 1991, because its activists were accused of supporting the coup. However, my survey of local budgets reveals that the Polish autonomous movement, sooner or later, would have come to an end for lack of money, irrespective of the political event in Moscow.

The Gagauz autonomists self-proclaimed the establishment of the Gagauz ASSR in November 1989, and then “raised” its status to the republic of Gagauzia in August 1990. Behind this façade, however, Gagauzia suffered a deep budgetary crisis, no less serious than the one that Lithuanian Poles faced. The republican budget depended on donations from industrialists sympathizing with the idea of Gagauz autonomy, but the government could not formalize these donations as state taxes, collectable in a systematic manner. As a result, some entrepreneurs paid “taxes” to both the Moldovan and Gagauzian governments, while others only paid the Moldovan government.

To exploit the industrial potential of the region for consolidating its budget, the Transnistrian government attempted to realize an economic secession from the Right Bank beginning in the earliest months of the autonomous movement. For example, there emerged an idea to combine Transnistria with Odesa

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67 It was a coincidence that the three victims of this incident represented the ethnicities composing Transnistria (Moldovan, Russian, and Ukrainian). The authorities organized their state funerals. After the military conflict in 1992, Transnistrian historians published a pamphlet on this event: Бабилунга Н.В., Бомешко Б.Г. Дубаасары: кровоточаща рана Приднестрровья. Тирасполь, 1993.

68 Lietuvos Respublikos Generalinės prokuratūros organizuotų nusikaltimų ir kuopcijos tyrimo skyrius, Baudžiamoji byla Nr. 09-2-060-93, Tomas. 3, p. 169.

69 Lietuvos Respublikos Generalinės, Tomas. 3, p. 170.

70 Lietuvos Respublikos Generalinės, Tomas 6, p. 268.

71 Interview with Olga Radova, writer and former representative of the Gagauz Women’s Association, in Comrat on February 4, 2004.
Oblast of Ukraine to create a free economic zone immediately after the OSTK took shape.\(^\text{72}\) In his autobiography, Igor Smirnov also confirms the existence of a plan for economic secession as early as August 1989. Economists from Moscow helped to elaborate this plan during the August strikes.\(^\text{73}\) This plan noted that the first step toward economic independence was to create a central bank owned by the Transnistrian government.\(^\text{74}\) In February 1991, the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet decided to organize a central bank of Transnistria and, at the same time, to form a regional budget separate from the Moldovan one.\(^\text{75}\) The Moldovan government checked this move for a while, but in April 1991, the Transnistrian authorities created a governmental bank as a regional branch of Moscow’s Agroprombank.\(^\text{76}\) The budgetary separation was completed after the violent conflict in Tighina (Bender) in September 1992.\(^\text{77}\)

Gagauzian autonomy tried to follow the Transnistrian model of budgetary and financial secession. In August 1991, Gagauz president S. Topal visited Moscow and asked the directorate of Agroprombank, which already had opened its Transnistrian branch, to repeat this effort in Gagauzia.\(^\text{78}\) This proposal was realized in mid-1992. The next step of the Transnistrian model was to separate the state budget from the Moldovan one. For the budget year of 1993–94, the Gagauz government tried to create its own budget, based on the three districts of Comrat, Vulcănești, and Ceadîr-Lunga (Figure 2). This attempt was stillborn,\(^\text{79}\) however. Since the Gagauzian government could not pay wages to public servants, Ceadîr-Lunga’s governor, Dmitri Kroitor, decided to secede from the Gagauzian budget as early as the beginning of 1994. After the Ceadîr-Lunga District seceded, the Moldovan government allotted generous financial support to Kroitor and resolved the budgetary problem in Ceadîr-Lunga. This is one of the reasons that the Gagauz authorities found no alternative but to accept the Moldovan government’s plan of autonomization of Gagauzia as a constituent of Moldova in December 1994.

**Conclusion**

This paper scrutinized the reasons for the differing outcomes of the autonomist movements in Transnistria, Gagauzia, and the Lithuanian Polish districts. An important finding is that we should pay much more attention to Transnistria’s economic secession, accelerated during 1989–91, in contrast

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\(^\text{72}\) Днестровская Правда. 16.09.1989.  
\(^\text{73}\) Смирнов. Жить на земле. С. 59.  
\(^\text{74}\) Днестровская Правда. 28.12.1990.  
\(^\text{77}\) My interviews with Petr Shornikov in Chişinău on February 12, 2007.  
\(^\text{78}\) Днестровская Правда.15.08.1991.  
\(^\text{79}\) Interview with S. Bulgar.
to Gagauzia and the Lithuanian Polish districts. Researchers seem to have been too focused on the political and legal processes that resulted in the breakup of the Soviet Union, and on the problems of conflict regulation that followed. However, the real issue was economic self-sustainability. Among the three cases, only Transnistria was blessed with this condition, and it was only Transnistria that the host government found no other way but to reintegrate by force. The Lithuanian Poles and Gagauz proved to be more negotiable because of their economic weakness.

Researchers tend to think that since the autonomous movements by Lithuanian Poles and Gagauzians were driven by their ethnic grievances, the host governments could contain them by guaranteeing their minority rights. This interpretation is questionable. As this paper demonstrates, the Gagauz leaders had exactly the same plan for budgetary secession as their Transnistrian colleagues had. The Gagauz leaders could be contained only because they lacked the resources to organize effective collective actions aimed at this plan. Something similar can be said for Lithuanian Poles.

Another, non-economic factor that determined the fate of the separatist regions was the existence or non-existence of the actors and institutions to control and direct economic resources, if they existed at all, toward collective targets. In this sense, Transnistria was in a more advantageous position than Gagauzia and the Lithuanian Polish districts, because only Transnistria had loyal industrialists, reliable outside protectors and co-ethnics, demographic balance among the ethnicities composing the state, and operative leaders capable of reacting to the titular group’s offences in a timely manner (the “opportunity” factor according to Tilly and Tarrow’s definition). Overall, economic potential and a well-organized political regime have determined the feasibility and viability of the de facto independence of secessionist regions.