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Contents

Editor's Note 5

Special Report

Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolfo /
Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images and Idea 7

Research Articles

Marketa Geislerova /
The Role of Diasporas in Foreign Policy: The Case of Canada90

Atsushi Yasutomi and Jan Carmans /
**Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Post-Conflict States:
Challenges of Local Ownership 109**

Nikola Hynek /
**Humanitarian Arms Control, Symbiotic Functionalism
and the Concept of Middlepowerhood 132**

Denis Madore /
**The Gratuitous Suicide by the Sons of Pride: On Honour
and Wrath in Terrorist Attacks 156**

Shoghig Mikaelian /
**Israeli Security Doctrine between the Thirst for Exceptionalism
and Demands for Normalcy 177**

Comment & Analysis

Svenja Stropahl and Niklas Keller /
**Adoption of Socially Responsible Investment Practices
in the Chinese Investment Sector – A Cost-Benefit Approach 193**

Richard Lappin /
Is Peace-Building Common Sense? 199

Balka Kwasniewski /
American Political Power: Hegemony on its Heels? 201

Notes on Contributors 207

CEJISS Contact Information. 208

Editor's Note:

In readying the content of Volume 1 Issue 2 of CEJISS, I was struck by the growing support this journal has received within many scholarly and professional quarters. Building on the success of the first issue, CEJISS has managed to extend its readership to the universities and institutions of a number of countries both in the EU and internationally. It is truly a pleasure to watch this project take on a life of its own and provide its readers with cutting-edge analysis of current political affairs. I would like to take this opportunity to thank our readers for their constructive criticism, comments and continued support.

Much has changed in the 6 months since CEJISS was first launched. I would like to introduce this issue with a brief commentary regarding the tense atmosphere currently clouding Israeli-Syrian relations. There is growing concern of clandestine, actual or potential WMD procurement in the greater Middle Eastern region, which has (rightly) attracted the attention of scholars and policy makers.

On 6 September 2007, it was reported that Israeli air force jets violated Syrian airspace, and after being engaged by Syrian anti-aircraft batteries were forced back to more friendly skies. Since the initial reports were made public, it has become clear that Israel's actions were not accidental but rather part of a deliberate strategy to deal with potential Syrian nuclear weapons (or materials) acquisition, purportedly from North Korea. Two important issues have been raised: firstly, the continued dangers of WMD proliferation in the Middle East and, possible ways of countering such proliferation.

While Israel's nuclear programmes have been the subject of much debate – especially as Israel refuses to allow IAEA inspectors to assess its nuclear sites and capabilities – the fact remains that Israel is a (largely) responsible state in which there are many checks and balances to prevent the deployment of WMD in a wanton manner. Unfortunately, in most other Middle Eastern states such checks and balances are absent. This compounds the problem of WMD development as regimes which control internal and external security policy without significant oversight are likely to utilise WMD (particularly nuclear weapons) as a strategically deployable weapon instead of adopting (as most other nuclear states have) a strategic view of WMD as residual; not a security mantle-piece.

If the accusations levelled against Syria – regarding its acquisition of nuclear weapons (or material) from North Korea – are accurate, then it confirms the worst fears of Israeli (and international) security analysts: that despite intense international pressures and investigations which attempt to dissuade WMD development and smuggling, such weapons may be acquired with relative ease.

Israel's military reaction to the Syria acquisition was a necessary and even encouraging response. It demonstrated a willingness to unilaterally respond to a nuclear provocation with maturity. It targeted non-civilian sites and focused its attention only on the source of danger. The deployment of special ground forces which directed Israeli warplanes to their target was dangerous though

demonstrated that when intelligence is accurate there is no need to shoulder a burden of military occupation: WMD can be removed with prudent and measured military deployments. Israel's actions may have many in the US questioning the Bush Administration's true motives for Operation Iraqi Freedom, as suspected sites may have been neutralised without decapitating Iraq's leadership which has led to one humanitarian crisis after another. This is not to suggest that Israel's actions conform to international law, for in fact they violated many international laws and protocols. Additionally, unilateralism is dangerous and should not become a standard in international interactions. However, when faced with an identifiable, clear-and-present and substantial threat, there may be no other reasonable action besides the physical deployment of force. Such deployments must however be selective. They must never target civilian (or dual use) facilities or expand to include targets of opportunity.

The Israeli action will undoubtedly have long-term regional and international security implications and may (hopefully) signal to other states seeking WMD that there are important costs to consider when contemplating developing or acquiring (through other means) such weapons. While international organisations should continue to play a central role in preventing WMD proliferation, until such organisations retain the physical means to compel the abandonment of illicit weapons programmes, it is up to the members of international society to use soft power when possible and hard power when needed to curtail WMD proliferation.

While Israeli-Syrian relations are not further explored in this issue (though contributions on this subject are welcome for future issues), it does contain some interesting and important articles related to international relations and security. Thanks to the cooperation of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, CEJISS has the opportunity to republish a special report detailing Iraqi Insurgent media. This report will prove very useful for those interested in the situation in Iraq and its international dynamics. Additionally, this issue contains articles related to security sector reform, humanitarian arms control, the role of diasporas in the formation of foreign policies, changes to Israeli security and a philosophical account of political/religious martyrdom. I sincerely hope that you enjoy this issue and look forward to your comments.

Yours truly,
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Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images and Idea

How Sunni Insurgents In Iraq And Their Supporters
Worldwide Are Using The Media¹

Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolfo

1. Key Findings

- **Sunni insurgents in Iraq and their supporters worldwide are exploiting the Internet to pursue a massive and far-reaching media campaign.** Insurgent media are forming perceptions of the war in Iraq among the best-educated and most influential segment of the Arab population.
- **The Iraqi insurgent media network is a boon to global jihadist media,** which can use materials produced by the insurgency to reinforce their message.
- **Mainstream Arab media amplify the insurgents' efforts,** transmitting their message to an audience of millions.
- **The insurgent propaganda network does not have a headquarters, bureaucracy, or brick-and-mortar infrastructure.** It is decentralized, fast-moving, and technologically adaptive.
- **The rising tide of Sunni-Shi'ite hate speech in Iraqi insurgent media points to the danger of even greater sectarian bloodshed.** A wealth of evidence shows that hate speech paved the way for genocide in Rwanda in 1994.
- **The popularity of online Iraqi Sunni insurgent media reflects a genuine demand for their message in the Arab world.** An alternative, no matter how lavishly funded and cleverly produced, will not eliminate this demand.

¹ Copyright © 2007. RFE/RL, Inc. This document is reprinted with permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., Washington DC 20036. The original report is available at the Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty website. Please see: www.rferl.org/insurgentmediareport

- **There is little to counter this torrent** of daily press releases, weekly and monthly magazines, books, video clips, full-length films, and even television channels.
- **We should not concede the battle without a fight.** The insurgent media network has key vulnerabilities that can be targeted. These include:
 - A lack of central coordination and a resulting lack of message control;
 - A widening rift between homegrown nationalist groups and Al-Qaeda-affiliated global jihadists.

2. Introduction

Sunni insurgents in Iraq and their supporters and sympathizers worldwide are pursuing a massive and far-reaching media campaign that includes daily press releases, weekly and monthly magazines, video clips, full-length films, and even television channels. *Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images and Ideas* casts light on this crucial yet understudied factor in the battle to shape perceptions in Iraq and the Arab world. The report surveys the products, producers, and delivery channels of the Sunni insurgency’s media network; examines their message; and gauges their impact.

The report shows that media outlets and products created by Sunni insurgents, who are responsible for the majority of U.S. combat deaths in Iraq, and their supporters are undermining the authority of the Iraqi government, demonizing coalition forces, fomenting sectarian strife, glorifying terrorism, and perpetrating falsehoods that obscure the accounts of responsible journalists. Insurgent media seek to create an alternate reality to win hearts and minds, and they are having a considerable degree of success.

But insurgent media also display vulnerabilities. The lack of central coordination impedes coherence and message control. There is a widening rift between homegrown nationalist groups and the global jihadists who have gathered under the banner of **Al-Qaeda in Iraq**. Moreover, insurgent media have not yet faced a serious challenge to their message on the Internet.

The popularity of online Iraqi Sunni insurgent media reflects a genuine demand for their message in the Arab world. An alternative, no matter how lavishly funded and cleverly produced, will not eliminate this demand. But this does not mean we should concede the battle without a fight. The vulnerabilities of insurgent media remain to be exploited.

2.1 Two Days in Iraq

Presented primarily in Arabic on an array of websites unknown to most Americans and Europeans, Iraqi insurgent media hover at the margins of mainstream reports in the form of a “claim of responsibility on an insurgent website”

or a “video posted to a jihadist forum.” Such marginal references fail to convey the scope and significance of an effort that encompasses daily press releases, weekly and monthly magazines, video clips, and even full-length films.

The extent of the insurgent media network is clearly evident in coverage of the events of March 25 and 26, 2007. By the violent standards of today’s Iraq, they were unexceptional days (see Figures 1 and 2). In central Baghdad, a suicide car bombing killed two Iraqis, while a roadside bomb in the capital claimed the life of a police officer. A mortar attack killed one in Al-Iskandariyah, 50 kilometers south of Baghdad. Four U.S. soldiers died in a bombing in Diyala Governorate, and another in an attack in Baghdad.

But those events are only half the story – the half told by news agencies, newspapers, television channels, and official statements. Iraq’s Sunni insurgency, the motley collection of armed groups fighting to evict U.S. forces and supplant rival domestic claimants to rule Iraq, had its own story to tell about what took place on March 25 and 26. Posted to sympathetic websites on the Internet, the insurgents sang the praises of their self-proclaimed quest to rid Iraq of foreign “crusaders” and domestic enemies.

The following are excerpts from some, but by no means all, of the statements issued by Iraqi insurgent groups on operations they claim to have carried out on March 25 and 26:

- The **Al-Fajr Media Center** reported on March 27 that “the ‘God Bless Its Men’ forces of the Islamic State of Iraq detonated a truck loaded with explosives near a gathering of crusaders in the Al-Bu Hayat region south of the city of Al-Hadithah in Al- Anbar Governorate, completely destroying four Humvees, killing 15 crusaders, and seriously wounding another 20. This took place on March 26, praise be to God. These operations were carried out in the course of the Raid to Avenge Honor² announced by Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State of Iraq.”
- The **Just Vengeance Brigades** announced on March 27 that “the Lions of Truth from the Just Vengeance Brigades struck a group affiliated with the army of Muqtada the Filthy³ with a Katyusha rocket in the Hayy al-Adil neighborhood near the Al-A’imma Husayniyah. This took place at 11:00 in the morning on March 25.”
- The **Mujahidin Army** announced on March 27 that “at 8:30 in the morning on March 25, a four-wheel-drive vehicle belonging to one of the companies that supplies the crusader bases north of Baghdad was destroyed by a blast from an explosive device planted on the side of the Samarra-Baghdad highway, killing and wounding those inside it” (see Figure 3).

² Islamic State of Iraq/Al-Qaeda (ISI/Al-Qaeda) announced the raid in March 2007 in retribution for the reported rape of a Sunni Iraqi woman identified as Sabrin al-Janabi by Shi’ite police officers in February 2007 (see Section 7.2, The Sabrin al-Janabi Case).

³ Lit. “muqtada al-qadhiri,” a disparaging pun on the name of Muqtada al-Sadr, the radical Shi’ite leader.



Figure 1. An Iraqi boy passes by a damaged house after a mortar attack in Baghdad, March 26, 2007 (epa)



Figure 2. A British soldier takes position during a patrol in Al-Basrah, March 26, 2007 (epa)

- **Ansar al-Sunnah** announced on March 26: “Guided by God, the Highest and the Powerful, your heroic brothers, lions of the Allies, on this day, March 26, at 12 noon, were able to attack a convoy of crusader forces using light and medium machine guns and RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades]. This took place in the door- and window-makersarea on the right side of Mosul.⁴ By God’s grace, the attack led to the destruction and burning of a vehicle and the death and wounding of those in it. The brothers withdrew safe and sound, praise be to God” (see Figure 4).
- The **Al-Fajr Media Center** reported on March 27 that “a brave, daring brother, one of the heroes of the Islamic State of Iraq, a member of the Martyrdom-Seekers Brigade... set out on Monday, March 26, and plunged his explosives-laden car into a command post of the American crusader army at the Jerusalem intersection in the Al-Mafriq district of Diyala Governorate. Our heroic brother cried out, ‘Allahu Akbar,’ and detonated the car... killing more than 11 soldiers of the Idolatrous Guard⁵ and destroying two Bradley armored fighting vehicles belonging to the American crusader army and killing and wounding those in them” (see Figure 5).



Figure 3. A March 27, 2007, press release from the Just Vengeance Brigades

⁴ The right bank of the Tigris River, which divides Mosul, has a predominantly Sunni Arab population.
⁵ Lit. “al-haras al-wathani,” a disparaging pun on “al-haras alwatani,” the National Guard.



Figure 4. A March 26, 2007, press release from Ansar al-Sunnah



Figure 5. A March 27, 2007, press release from ISI/Al-Qaeda distributed by the Al-Fajr Media Center

2.2 The War of Ideas

Much has been written about the war of ideas in the years since September 11, 2001. The 2003 war in Iraq, and the subsequent fate of the U.S.-led effort to remake that country, only sharpened the polemic. The two visions of Iraq presented above—one by the international media establishment, and another by the uncoordinated collective efforts of Iraqi insurgent groups—are a reflection of the daily skirmishes that take place not only on the battlefields of Iraq, but also in the ongoing struggle to direct the flow of information that shapes perceptions in the Arab world.

This report brings Iraqi insurgent media from the margins to center stage so that outsiders without a command of Arabic can glimpse the “other half” of what is happening in Iraq as it is presented by the other side. Section 3 surveys the media products created by Iraqi insurgents and their ideological allies inside and outside of Iraq. Section 4 examines the main producers of insurgent media. Section 5 looks at the delivery platforms of Iraqi insurgent media, from websites to print. Section 6 looks at the target audience, accuracy and coherence, message and ideology, and tendencies and trends in Iraqi insurgent media.

The report also includes two brief case studies:

- 1) a “day in the life” of Iraq’s insurgent media, highlighting the media products offered up by insurgents and their sympathizers on April 22, 2007; and
- 2) the coverage insurgent media provided of the Sabrin al-Janabi rape case as an example of the role insurgent and allied jihadist media play in inflaming Sunni-Shi’ite tensions in Iraq.

The report is intended for policy-makers, researchers, media professionals, and all other interested individuals. Its primary purpose is to make available

to a broad segment of readers material that might otherwise be inaccessible. Its authors hope that by doing so they will generate a lively and informed discussion of the war of images and ideas in Iraq, the Arab world, and beyond, and how we in the United States might wage it more effectively.

3. Products

At the heart of the insurgents' media endeavor are the products they create and distribute.

These run the gamut from simple press releases to slickly produced films. This section of the report surveys the range of those products, dividing them into two broad categories: text and audiovisual materials. The survey includes not only products created by Sunni insurgents fighting in Iraq, but also texts and audiovisual materials produced by groups and individuals sympathetic to the insurgency.

3.1 Texts

Insurgents have been quick to embrace the latest technological advances to produce and distribute their media products, but text remains central to their media endeavor. Text materials have a number of advantages for insurgents beyond ease of production and distribution. The written word everywhere remains the preferred medium of record and authority. For insurgents, who are eager to present themselves not as ragtag bands of guerillas, but as the tip of the spear of a far larger and more significant movement, the creation of a body of written materials is a crucial indicator of the insurgency's durability and seriousness.

Texts are also the traditional medium of ideological discourse, another important component of the insurgency. While insurgent groups represent a variety of ideological platforms, hard-line Islamist rhetoric has come to predominate. As a February 2006 report by International Crisis Group⁶ concluded, "[V]irtually all [insurgent groups] adhere publicly to a blend of Salafism⁷ and patriotism, diluting distinctions between foreign jihadis and Iraqi combatants..." This remains true today, as the numerous text products created by insurgents and sympathizers clearly show, although the actual commitment of individual insurgent groups to global jihadist ideology is questionable (see Section 6.3, Message and Ideology).

⁶ *In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency*, February 15, 2006, International Crisis Group (<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3953>).

⁷ Salafism refers to a movement that takes the first three generations of Muslims ("al-salaf al-salih," or "the virtuous ancestors") as an ideal community and espouses what one might call a "radically traditionalist" approach to personal behavior, and even political systems. Jihadist Salafists endorse violent means to restore the early Islamic community's perceived way of life in the modern world. For more on Salafism, see *Understanding Islamism*, March 2, 2005, International Crisis Group (<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3301&l=1>).

3.1.1 Statements

The basic unit of insurgent media textual production is the statement, usually no more than one page in length. These can be divided into two basic genres. The vast majority of insurgent statements are, in effect, press releases announcing the conduct of an “operation” against coalition military forces, Iraqi government forces and institutions, or Shi’ite militias. A smaller number of statements clarify the positions of insurgent groups on political issues.

The sheer volume of statements issued by insurgent groups is striking. Forums and “news” sites such as **World News Network** aggregate statements and organize them, frequently with logos included to ease the identification of the insurgent group associated with each statement. In March 2007, for example, two websites, **World News Network** and **Mohajroon**, a jihadist forum with a special section for insurgent statements, together posted nearly 1,000 statements issued by 11 insurgent groups (see Figure 6).

3.1.1.1 Operational Statements

As noted above, statements fall into two basic genres: operational press releases and general statements. Most operational statements announce successful attacks on coalition forces, Iraqi government forces, and Shi’ite groups and militias. A smaller number of composite operational press releases provide an overview of operations conducted within a certain period of time or in a specific geographic region. Some announce text and audiovisual publications.

In form, insurgent operational statements strive to convey credibility by mimicking press releases issued by official organizations elsewhere. They bear the official logo of the issuing group even when they appear on Internet forums. The texts are formulaic and do their best to appear factual, providing the time and location of an attack, target, a brief description of the fighting, and damage estimates, from killed and wounded “enemies” to an enumeration of equipment destroyed.

A side-by-side comparison of an April 12 press release from the U.S.

Statements by Iraqi insurgent groups in March 2007*	
Group	Total number of statements
Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI)	249
Ansar al-Sunnah	196
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI/Al-Qaeda)**	162
Mujahidin Army	143
Shield of Islam	89
Jaysh al-Fatihin	39
Jaysh al-Rashidin	33
Just Recompense Brigades	26
Islamic Front of Iraqi Resistance (JAMI)	14
Jihadist Brigades of Iraq	12
1920 Revolution Brigades	3
Total	966

*Source: **World News Net** and **Mohajroon** (aggregated). Statements that may have been posted elsewhere were not included in this table, which is intended to demonstrate the general media profile of the insurgent groups on two specific websites. Because press releases sometimes appear several days after the operations they announce, attacks claimed in these statements span a period that began before March 1 and ended before March 31.

Proclaimed in October 2006, the **Islamic State of Iraq is the latest iteration of **Al-Qaeda in Iraq** (see Section 4.1.1, Islamic State of Iraq). The group is referred to in this report as **ISI/Al-Qaeda**. Other insurgent groups tend to refer to **ISI/Al-Qaeda** as **Al-Qaeda in Iraq**. The terms are used interchangeably.

Figure 6. The “statements” section of the *Mohajroon* Internet forum



Figure 7. A side-by-side comparison of a U.S. Defense Department press release and a press release from ISI/Al-Qaeda

military and a “news report” issued by ISI/Al-Qaeda the same day and posted to World News Network illustrates the extent to which insurgents attempt to reproduce the form of official press releases while adjusting the content to serve their own purposes (see Figure 7).

The genre divisions are fluid. An operational press release announcing an attack may also express a political position on a topical issue, or it may contain a link to a video record of the attack. Moreover, not all operations are easily classified. An insurgent group may carry out an attack on a U.S. convoy or a mixed convoy of U.S. and Iraqi government forces. Targets are not always indicated. Nevertheless, most statements fall into a number of general categories. The breakdown of insurgent group statements in March 2007 on page 15 provides an overview of how insurgent groups present their activities.

The fluid nature of the insurgent media network renders definitive conclusions problematic. In the absence of a centralized system for collecting and distributing insurgent press releases, we cannot be sure that the monthly totals are anything more than approximate. Evaluating the veracity of the information contained in press releases is even more problematic (see Section 6.2, Accuracy and Coherence). Nevertheless, a number of preliminary conclusions emerge.

What the press releases represent is the image of themselves that insurgent groups would like to present—who, why, how, and how often they attack, and what results they claim to achieve. The resulting picture may not correspond to reality on the ground, but it is the picture the Sunni Iraqi insurgency paints of itself in its own words.

Against this backdrop, it is noteworthy that an insurgency that emerged to combat a foreign occupying force now claims to direct the majority of its attacks against fellow Iraqis.

While the largest single group of March 2007 press releases (357) detail attacks on U.S. and coalition forces, statements describing attacks on Iraqi government forces (296) and Shi’ite militias (143) come to 439, or more than half of the total number of single-attack statements (see Figure 8).

Press releases in an ongoing insurgency generally do not provide explicit reasons for carrying out attacks. But the rhetoric employed by virtually all Sunni insurgent groups suggests an implicate reason. Unlike the rhetoric of nationalist insurgencies, the Sunni insurgency in Iraq is surprisingly uniform in its use of religious rhetoric to describe its enemies.

The vast majority of the statements issued in March 2007 use religion-based, pejorative code words for the targets of attacks.

U.S. and coalition forces are called “crusaders” and “worshippers of the cross.” Iraqi police are “apostates.” Iraq’s National Guard is the “Idolatrous Guard.” The Shi’ite **Imam**




Figure 8. In March, 2007, insurgent statements that claimed a single “operation,” attacks against Iraqis outnumbered attacks against U.S. forces

Breakdown of statements issued by Iraqi insurgent groups in March 2007 on World News Network and Mohajroon*									
Group	Operations against U.S. forces	Operations against Iraqi government forces	Operations against Shi'ite groups and militias	Operations against Kurdish targets	Mixed operations	Composite operational statements**	Publication announcements (audio, video, and text)	Topical statements	Totals
IAI	80	105	47	0	9	6	1	1	249
Mujahidin Army	132	4	0	0	0	2	2	1	141
1920 Revolution Brigades***	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
ISI/Al-Qaeda	13	40	3	6	9	74	0	15	161
Jihadist Brigades of Iraq	8	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	12
Ansar al-Sunnah	44	90	37	6	3	2	5	4	192
JAMI	13	0	0	0	1	0	13	1	14
Jaysh al-Rashidin	26	0	0	0	1	0	4	1	32
Just Recompense Brigades	0	15	11	0	0	0	0	0	26
Shield of Islam	20	37	30	0	0	0	0	0	87
Jaysh al-Fatihin	21	0	15	0	2	0	0	1	39
Totals	357	296	143	12	25	83	25	28	

*It should be stressed that the breakdown tells us about the media impression insurgent groups created in March 2007 with their statements rather than the actual activities they may have carried out during the month. Moreover, a lag of several days sometimes occurs between the date of a claimed operation and the date of a press release. As a result, statements issued in March 2007 described operations carried out roughly from late February through late March.

**Operations described in composite statements were not included in the breakdown of operations provided in the first three columns of this table, which is intended to convey the overall impression statements would make on a visitor to the forum(s) where they were posted, rather than provide an exhaustive analysis of all claimed operations.

***The 1920 Revolution Brigades posts fewer statements than other insurgent groups. While the lack of statements by the group in the above chart reflects information available on the two websites used to collect the sample, statements by the group are available on other websites.

Al-Mahdi Army—named after the Mahdi, or redeemer, whose coming is supposed to herald the end of the world—is referred to as the “Army of the Antichrist.” Shi’a are termed “rejectionists” for their supposed rejection of true Islam. Thus, insurgents’ rhetoric implies that they fight U.S. and coalition forces because they seek to impose Christianity on Iraq, government forces because they have turned their backs on Islam, and Shi’a because they are heretics.

This explicitly religious framing of the conflict in Iraq renders insurgent rhetoric virtually indistinguishable from the rhetoric of the global jihadist movement.⁸ Foreign jihadists have flocked to Iraq, but it should be recalled that Iraq has never had a robust domestic Islamist, let alone jihadist, movement. Moreover, there is no evidence that jihadist ideas hold any great appeal for Iraq’s Sunni population, which provides the bulk of the insurgency’s rank-and-file fighters. Nevertheless, jihadist rhetoric is the rule, not the exception, in most of the statements issued by Sunni insurgent groups, whatever their declared ideological beliefs may be.⁹

It is perhaps no accident, then, that the most media-savvy and politically vocal insurgent group is also the most openly jihadist. **ISI/Al-Qaeda**¹⁰ is the latest iteration of an organization founded by Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and commonly known in the West as **Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia** or **Al-Qaeda in Iraq**. It issued 162 statements on **World News Network** and **Mohajroon** in March 2007, surpassed only by the **IAI** and **Ansar al-Sunnah**. Yet **ISI/Al-Qaeda** amplified its media presence by issuing a large number of composite statements (74), far more than any other group, with each one claiming responsibility for several attacks in specific regions within a set period of time (see Figure 9). Some of these composite statements summarize previously issued press releases on individual operations; others do not. While this makes it difficult to estimate the total number of operations for which **ISI/Al-Qaeda** claimed responsibility, it creates a media impression of an organization with fighters numbering in the tens of thousands, capable of carrying out intense, geographically dispersed activities.

⁸ The global jihadist movement is defined here as the constellation of groups that espouse the ideology promoted by Al-Qaeda. In its barest outlines, this ideology posits a worldwide struggle between faith and unbelief, the need to return to the ways of the “righteous ancestors” (“al-salaf al-salih”), the legitimacy of violence to achieve political aims (jihad), the permissibility of killing Muslims who have knowingly strayed from the faith (takfir), and the necessity of targeting the United States and Israel as the leaders of a global movement to destroy Muslim identity and subjugate Muslim lands.

⁹ The use of religious rhetoric to justify a cause is not new to Iraq. Beginning with the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq war, and again following the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein employed Islamic rhetoric as a means of justifying state policy and unifying the population against outside enemies. For more see: Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, second edition, Westview Press, 2004, p. 297.

¹⁰ See RFE/RL Newswire, October 16, 2006.

As befits the group’s self-aggrandizing appellation, **ISI/Al-Qaeda** also employed the most sweeping rhetoric. **ISI/Al-Qaeda** purports to control the governorates of Al-Anbar, Baghdad, Ninawah (Mosul), Diyala, Salah Al-Din, Kirkuk, and parts of Babil and Wasit. Acting as a “state,” **ISI/Al-Qaeda** issued statements through its “Ministry of Information.” In line with this approach, **ISI/Al-Qaeda** put out more topical statements (15) than all other groups combined (see Section 3.1.1.2, Topical and Analytical Statements).

Finally, in keeping with its openly jihadist profile, **ISI/Al-Qaeda** was the only insurgent group to make frequent and consistent references to “martyrdom-seeking operations,” or suicide attacks. In March statements, **ISI/Al-Qaeda** claimed responsibility for four suicide attacks against Kurdish targets, two against Shi’ite militias, 25 against Iraqi forces, six against mixed targets, and six against U.S. forces, for a total of 43 suicide attacks.

3.1.1.2 Topical and Analytical Statements

Topical statements differ from operational statements in that they speak to issues broader than military operations (see Figure 10). Most topical statements are political, addressing issues within the Iraqi polity, although an important subgroup details changes within individual insurgent groups and relations between insurgent groups. Longer topical statements provide an analytical perspective on current events or important issues. We present below an overview of the major topical statements issued by insurgent groups in March 2007.

- The **1920 Revolution Brigades** issued three topical statements. One statement, released on March 26, rejected media reports that “jihadist groups”



Figure 9. Insurgents take pains to create visually engaging materials—on the left, an ISI/Al Qaeda summary of operations for March 2–15, 2007; on the right, an ISI/Al-Qaeda map of operations for March 2–8, 2007



Figure 10. Topical statements by the IAI, ISI/Al-Qaeda, and Mujahidin Army

might engage in dialogue with the “so-called Iraqi government.” Another mourned the death of a military leader. A third mentioned condolences offered by the IAI, the Mujahidin Army, the Jihadist Brigades, and Jaysh Muhammad al-Fatih on the death of the 1920 Revolution Brigades military leader.

- **Ansar al-Sunnah** issued four topical statements. A long statement on March 29 warned that the “crusader and Safavid¹¹ enemies” have reached a “dead end” and are using various ruses, such as the Baghdad conference in early March,¹² to dissuade Iraqis from their duty to fight a jihad. Another statement denied reports that several insurgent groups, including Ansar al-Sunnah, had joined forces. Another chastised two members of Ansar

¹¹ “Safavid” refers to the Safavid dynasty in Iran, which ruled from 1502 to 1722 and established Shi’ism as the state religion of Iran. In radical Sunni usage, “Safavid” is a disparaging term for Shi’a, implying that their true allegiance is to Iran.

¹² Representatives from Iraq’s neighboring states, the permanent five members of the UN Security Council, the Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference met in Baghdad on March 10 to discuss Iraq’s security. See *RFE/RL Newline*, March 12, 2007 and *Iraq: Views Of Security Conference Reflexy Sectarian Divide*, Kathleen Ridolfo, RFE/RL, May 13, 2007 (<http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/3/48A73746-F04A-40FC-9A63-94EC071111B5.html>).

al-Sunnah for participating in talks with other insurgent groups without obtaining formal permission to do so. A fourth statement, billed as a “special report” on March 12, condemned U.S. efforts to engage insurgent groups in negotiations.

- **Jaysh al-Rashidin** issued one topical statement. The group’s March 7 “politival analysis” discussed a meeting between Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and a group of former Iraqi Army officers, condemning it as a U.S.-sponsored attempt to garner support for the Iraqi government.
- **Jaysh al-Fatihin** issued one statement, signed by the group’s “official spokesman,” Abu al-Hasan al-Basri, and posted to **Mohajroon** on March 22. It hailed Russian President Vladimir Putin’s address at a security conference in Munich on February 10 as a sign of declining U.S. influence and warned “the mujahidin”¹³ not to allow others to reap the fruits of their coming victory in Iraq as took place, in the writer’s view, in the aftermath of the successful jihad against Soviet occupiers in Afghanistan.
- **JAMI** issued a single statement on March 5 on the upcoming security conference in Baghdad, condemning it as an attempt to drum up support for the U.S. occupation on the part of the “so-called Iraqi government.” The statement dismissed the Iraqi government as an Iranian-influenced Shi’ite clique dominated by “racist, sectarian parties and militias.”
- **ISI/Al-Qaeda** issued 15 topical statements in March, more than all other insurgent groups combined. The titles indicate not only the general tenor of the group’s politival pronouncements, but also the group’s attention to its image in the media, with numerous denials of news agency reports and Iraqi government statements:
 - March 1: *The Collapse Of The Al-Maliki Plan*
 - March 1: *Ministry Of War Announces The Beginning Of The Raid To Avenge Honor*
 - March 2: *The Islamic State Of Iraq Denies The [Reported] Arrest Of 30 Of Its Sons In Al-Saqlawiyah*
 - March 5: *On Al-Maliki’s Meeting With Officers Of The Former Iraqi Army*
 - March 6: *The Islamic State of Iraq Denies The Truth Of A Report On The Arrest Of One Of Its Leaders*
 - March 9: *Denial Of The Killing Of 12 Soldiers Of The Islamic State Of Iraq*
 - March 9: *Denial Of News Agency Reports On The Return Of Some Of Those Who Were Liberated*

¹³ Lit., “those who fight the jihad” (sing., “mujahid”). A rough English translation of the term as it is used here would be “holy warriors.”

- March 9: *A Gathering Of Hypocrites¹⁴ And Quislings*
- March 10: *Continuing Lies Of The Safavid Government*
- March 11: *On The Conferences Of The Enemies of God*
- March 15: *The Islamic State Of Iraq: Program And Fundamentals*
- March 19: *Denial Of A Report On The Arrest Of One Of The State's Commanders*
- March 22: *Clarification On The Latest Events In Amiriyat Al-Fallujah*
- March 22: *Denial Of A Report On The Arrest Of The Ministers Of War And Oil*
- March 28: *Details On The Raid In The City Of Mosques [Al-Fallujah] Today*

It is important to note that at the level of topical statements, insurgent media products become intermingled with statements by sympathizers who are not themselves directly connected with the insurgency. This takes place

for two reasons: 1) the Internet forums that serve as the major distribution channel for insurgent statements (see Section 5.1.3, Forums and Message Boards) are primarily jihadist in outlook and post a wide variety of materials, including statements by prominent figures in the jihadist community, and 2) many of those figures address issues related to the Iraqi insurgency, and often respond to specific statements by insurgent groups.

More importantly, topical statements also reflect divisions within the insurgency. An April 5 statement by the IAI illustrates both the intermingling of insurgent and jihadist media, and a sharp polemic between two leading insurgent groups.¹⁵



Figure 11. The first page of the IAI's 4,500-word statement on April 5, 2007, criticizing ISI/Al-Qaeda

¹⁴ The term “munafiqun,” generally translated as “hypocrites,” refers to individuals who converted to Islam at the time of the Prophet Muhammad (570–632) but did not profess true Islam. Radical Sunnis use the term today to describe Muslims they do not accept as Muslims. In context, the term refers to Sunnis who recognize the Iraqi government.

¹⁵ For more, see: Al-Qaeda Tactics Lead To Splits Among Insurgents, Kathleen Ridolfo, RFE/RL, April 17, 2007 (<http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/04/ca95fafc-1e70-450aa4bf-9417b05caa3c.html>).

The **IAI** statement (see Figure 11), which ran to nine pages and 4,500 words, criticized **ISI/Al-Qaeda** for inflexible extremism, outright banditry against civilians, and attacks on insurgent groups that refuse to swear allegiance to the putative state. The Kuwait-based radical cleric Hamid al-Ali, who is sympathetic to the jihadist wing of the Sunni insurgency but not directly affiliated with any specific group, had issued a fatwa on April 4 that was similarly critical of **ISI/Al-Qaeda**, questioning the wisdom of proclaiming a “state” in the absence of recognized prerequisites for statehood. Participants on jihadist forums treated both statements as part of the same debate, with some seeing the appearance of two closely timed statements criticizing **ISI/Al-Qaeda** as evidence of possible cooperation between Hamid al-Ali and the **IAI**.

The subsequent course of the debate sparked by the **IAI** statement presented more examples of intermingling between insurgent group statements and contributions from representatives of the larger global jihadist movement. We list below some of the responses that appeared on major jihadist Internet forums to show the interchange between insurgent groups and jihadist thinkers, the rapid unfolding of polemics in the Internet, and the differences between insurgent groups revealed by the debate (see Section 6.3.2, Ideology and Section 6.4.3, Rift Between Nationalists and Jihadists):

- April 4: Hamid al-Ali issues a fatwa criticizing **Al-Qaeda in Iraq** for announcing the establishment of the **Islamic State of Iraq** in October 2006.
- April 5: The **IAI** releases a statement lambasting **ISI/Al-Qaeda** for extremism and violent methods in dealing with other insurgent groups. The statement specifically rebutted points made by **ISI/Al-Qaeda** leader Abu Umar al-Baghdadi in a March 13 audio statement.
- April 5: Jihadist writer Lewis Atallah posts an article criticizing the **IAI** for its statement.
- April 6: Jihadist thinker Atiya Allah posts a detailed, critical commentary on the **IAI** statement. Atiya Allah’s commentary is released by the **Al-Fajr Media Center**, which is affiliated with **ISI/Al-Qaeda**.
- April 6: The administration of the **Al-Boraq** jihadist forum posts its position on the **IAI** statement, coming out on the side of **ISI/Al-Qaeda**.
- April 6: The **Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF)**, an **Al-Qaeda**-affiliated organization, posts a statement on Hamid al-Ali’s fatwa.
- April 7: The administration of the **Mohajroon** jihadist forum posts its position on the **IAI** statement, expressing support for **ISI/Al-Qaeda**.
- April 7: Hamid al-Ali issues a new statement clarifying and reinforcing the points he made in his April 4 fatwa.

- April 7: The **Call for Global Islamic Resistance Center** posts a statement to forums calling for unity in the dispute between the **IAI** and **ISI/Al-Qaeda**.
- April 8: **GIMF** issues a statement responding both to Hamid al-Ali and the **IAI**; the statement also promises a response from **ISI/Al-Qaeda**.
- April 11: *Al-Jazeera* interviews **IAI** spokesman Ibrahim al-Shammari, who reiterates the **IAI**'s criticisms of **Al-Qaeda in Iraq**.
- April 12: **Ansar al-Sunnah** releases a statement on the "current situation."
- April 15: **GIMF** posts a statement on the danger of "fitna."¹⁶
- April 16: Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, leader of **ISI/Al-Qaeda**, issues a statement on the gains and losses of four years of "jihad" in Iraq, rebutting the **IAI**'s criticisms.

3.1.1.3 Programmatic Texts

Insurgent groups also produce programmatic texts outlining their basic aims and beliefs. Groups that maintain dedicated websites usually post these under the heading "our creed" or "our program". For example, the **IAI** has a section titled Our Program on its site; the **Mujahidin Army**'s site has a page titled Meet Us; and **JAMI**'s site and the **Jihadist Brigades**' site have sections titled Who We Are. Other programmatic statements are posted periodically to sympathetic sites. **ISI/Al-Qaeda**, for example, issued a written summary of a March 13, 2007 audio statement by its leader, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, that was posted to jihadist forums on March 13 under the title Program and Fundamentals.

3.1.1.4 Inspirational Texts

Inspirational texts pursue the dual purpose of attracting new supporters and further motivating existing supporters. Given the fluidity of genre boundaries within the myriad products emanating from the insurgency, virtually all products perform an inspirational function. Two specifically inspirational genres can be isolated from the general mass of insurgent media products. They are martyr biographies and poetry.

3.1.1.4.1 Martyr Biographies

A long-established fixture of jihadist literature, the biographies of martyrs present the lives of ideal, and usually idealized, holy warriors for emulation by others. The most common subjects of martyr biographies are either well-known fighters who have perished for the cause or lesser luminaries whose lives

¹⁶ "Fitna" refers to strife within the community of Muslims.

illustrate the dedication, piety, and courage that martyrs are supposed to possess.

Biographies of the best-known martyrs are sometimes lavish affairs. Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, the most famous jihadist to have died in Iraq, was the subject of a downloadable “encyclopedia” that includes not only numerous materials on the Jordanian militant’s life, but also a complete collection of his statements, essays on his beliefs and influence, and statements on the jihad in Iraq by Osama bin Laden. Formatted as a 7.7-megabyte self-contained mini-browser, the “encyclopedia” provides users with a table of contents and convenient graphics interface.

The development of martyr biographies illustrates the growing professionalism of the insurgent media network. In May 2005, a participant in a jihadist Internet forum posted a collection of 430 biographies of martyrs in Iraq culled from newspaper accounts, forum posts, and transcribed “wills” recorded by suicide bombers before their final attacks.¹² Formatted simply as a Microsoft Word document, the biographies are uneven in length and tone, and the overall impression of the collection is somewhat chaotic (see Figure 12).

A collection titled *Stories Of The Martyrs Of Mesopotamia*, though undated, appears to have been published later. Produced by the **Mujahidin Shura Council**, it is formatted more elaborately, with a full-color cover, graphic logos, and a background for each page (see Figure 13). Moreover, some of the martyrs who



Figure 12. A 2005 collection of “martyr biographies” culled from newspaper accounts, forum posts, and transcribed statements by suicide bombers



Figure 13. The cover of a book with “martyr biographies” issued by the Mujahidin Shura Council



Figure 14. The evolution of the biography of Abu Ahmad al-Karbuli, from a single-line entry in a 2005 collection of “martyr biographies” (left) to a two-page text in what appears to be a later compilation (right)

appeared in the collection in May 2005 as single-line entries, such as Abu Ahmad al-Karbuli, are the subjects of multi-page texts in the **Mujahidin Shura Council** collection (see Figure 14).

The development of “martyr biographies” demonstrates not only a trend toward increasing professionalism, but also a greater desire to exert message control. If early collections used materials from various sources, or simply provided lists of names, more recent compilations feature longer texts composed specifically by and for insurgent groups. The **Al-Furqan Institute for Media Production’s** periodical series of martyr biographies illustrates this tendency (see Section, 3.1.2 Periodicals).

3.1.1.4.2 Poetry

A number of insurgent websites contain poetry lamenting Iraq’s sufferings under occupation and urging resistance. Poetry is rarely presented in textual form, however, although the website of the **Jihadist Brigades** contains a number of poetic texts. Most poems serve as the words for songs, and this study examines them in Section 3.2.4, Songs.

The online Salafi library created by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a Jordanian-Palestinian cleric famed as the mentor of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and currently jailed in Jordan, contains 29 poems about the occupation of Iraq (see Figure 15). The website, titled *Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad* [Pulpit of Monotheism and Jihad] is no longer functional, but its contents can be downloaded from a number of other sites for installation at home with full functionality.

Hamid al-Ali, a Kuwait-based radical cleric who is sympathetic to the insurgent cause and frequently addresses related issues, has at times made topical statements in poetic form. After *Al-Jazeera* aired an interview with a Sunni woman identified as Sabrin al-Janabi,¹⁷ who claimed to have been raped by Iraqi police, Al-Ali posted a poem on his website (see Figure 16) casting the issue in harshly sectarian terms. He asked, “Who has given the filth power over our Iraq so that the Magi¹⁸ should be raised high and made rulers?” (see Section 7.2, The Sabrin al-Janabi Case).



Figure 15. Poems about Iraq on the *Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad* website



Figure 16. A poem by the Kuwait-based radical cleric Hamid al-Ali about the alleged rape of a Sunni woman by Shi'ite police officers

3.1.2 Periodicals

A number of insurgent groups and sympathetic media units produce monthly and weekly publications. These are usually posted to forums through free upload/download services¹⁹ as both Microsoft Word and Adobe Acrobat documents. The more sophisticated periodicals are professionally laid out and feature lavishly formatted covers, full-color photographs, and charts

¹⁷ According to an investigation ordered by Sunni-Arab Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, Sabrin al-Janabi, by her own admission, is a Shi'ite. This was published on the Sunni-led Iraqi Islamic Party's website. Despite this, Sunni-Arab insurgents have carried out attacks to avenge the "Sunni" woman's honor, including the killing of innocent Shi'ite civilians. See: *RFE/RL Newsline*, February 26, 2007. For the original statement by the Iraqi Islamic Party in Arabic, see: <http://www.iraqiparty.com/statements/statement148.htm>.

¹⁸ A derogatory reference to Iranians, implying that they are still Zoroastrian fire-worshippers and not true Muslims.

¹⁹ These services allow Internet users to upload large files to share with other users, who can then download the files. Examples include; sendspace.com and archive.org, two sites frequently used to distribute insurgent (and jihadist) materials.



Figure 17. The cover of *Al-Fursan*, a magazine published electronically by the IAI

and graphs. We present below an overview of the major periodicals produced by Iraqi insurgent groups and sympathizers.

3.1.2.1 Al-Fursan

The IAI has produced 12 issues of *Al-Fursan* [The Knights] (see Figure 17). The magazine, which appears on a more or less bimonthly basis, is in full color with numerous photographs. Issue No. 11, which appeared in January 2007, consisted of 39 pages and boldly announced on its cover, “In 2006, the Mujahidin of the Islamic Army Harvest 6,064 Americans.” Issue No. 10 ran to 64 pages and opened with

six pages of graphs breaking down the results of the group’s military operations over the previous six months (see Figure 18).

We present below an overview of the contents of issue No. 10, which is dated Ramadan 1427 (corresponding to September 22, 2006):

3.1.2.2 Hasad al-Mujahidin

Ansar al-Sunnah has produced 41 issues of *Hasad al-Mujahidin* [Mujahidin Roundup], a more or less monthly publication (see Figure 19). *Hasad al-Mujahidin* is a relatively simple affair consisting primarily of summaries of **Ansar al-Sunnah**’s operational press releases on military operations. It occasionally reproduces documents, such as the ID cards of executed “spies” and other “enemies” (see Figure 20) but has virtually no photographs. Issue No. 39 was 25 pages long, and issue No. 38 was 32 pages long. The following are the contents of issue No. 39, dated February 2007:

3.1.2.3 Sada al-Rafidayn

The **Global Islamic Media Front** has produced 33 issues of *Sada al-Rafidayn* [Echo of the Two Rivers, a reference to the Tigris and Euphrates],

which bills itself as a “weekly bulletin on the news and affairs of jihad and the mujahidin in the Islamic world” (see Figure 21). The bulletin is simple in

Article Title	Notes
Victories of Ramadan and the Program of Empowerment	One-page editorial
Statement 11 of 2006	By the military leadership of the IAI
Statement 12 of 2006	By the military leadership of the IAI
Overview of Military Operations in the First Half of 2006	Charts and graphs
Thousands of American Soldiers Flee to Canada	Article on the collapsing morale of the American home front
Groups of the Afghan Jihad: the development of their tactics as inspired by the Iraqi example	
American Spokesman: Losses at Camp Al-Saqr Reached Millions of Dollars	A U.S. spokesman confirms losses from an attack on a forward operating base in Iraq
Woodward: American Forces Face Four Attacks an Hour	Arabic translation of a statement by American journalist Bob Woodward

Article Title	Notes
Meeting of the Issue: Interview with the official spokesman of the IAI	Includes questions from participants in the Al-Boraq Internet forum
Memoirs of a Mujahid: The Tough Test...and Strength from God	Story of a “mujahid” who escaped from detention at Camp Bucca
Belief: Strength in the Face of Adversity	Religious inspiration on the problems of Iraq
Islamic Law: Sincerity and Dedication	
Poetry: O, You Who Have Blamed Our Youth For Their Jihad	
Strategic Analysis: Leading Men toward Becoming Heroic Leaders	By Ahmad al-Shaybani, a field commander of the IAI
Media: Jihadist Media in Iraq... a New Victory	Article on the importance of media to insurgent operations
Islamic Studies: The Life of Martyrs	
Islamic Studies: Ibn Taymiyyah on Takfir	Article on takfir, the act of pronouncing a Muslim an unbeliever (kafir), as seen by the medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyyah.
Islamic Studies: Islamic Groups Between Praiseworthy Perfection and Condemnable Extremism	
Islamic Studies: Excerpts from the Jihadist Program	
Military Studies: Military Doctrine and Principles of War in Islam	
Story of a Martyr: Sniper on the Road of Death	Experiences of a sniper who killed U.S. forces
The Oasis	Inspirational vignettes and thoughts
Images from the Jihad of the Prophet’s Companions: Military Instructions from Caliph Umar bin Al-Khattab	
Political Analysis: Implementation of the New Middle East project in Iraq	On the purported U.S. project to dominate the Middle East
Hot Topics: Jewish-Kurdish Relations	
Scholarship and Jihad	



Figure 18. A graph detailing IAI military operations in the first half of 2006; taken from the December 2006 issue of *Al-Fursan*

format, consisting primarily of operational press releases from various insurgent groups. It does not have pictures. Issue No. 29 contained 35 pages, while issue No. 30 contained 34 pages. Both appeared in March 2007. The following are the contents of issue No. 30:

3.1.2.4 Biographies of Notable Martyrs

The **Al-Furqan Institute for Media Production** has produced 34 issues in the series *Biographies Of Notable Martyrs*. The format is simple, with an illustrated cover followed by bare text. Issues vary in length, with some consisting of the biography of a single individual

Article Title	Notes
Editorial: Excerpts from Address by Shaykh Abu Abdallah al-Hasan Ibn Mahmud	Address by the head of Ansar al-Sunnah
Overview of Previous Operations	Brief descriptions of military operations, primarily from December 2006
Attacks, Ambushes, and Assaults on Command Posts	
Bombardments	
Executions of Spies and Apostates	
Sniper Operations	
The Courage of a Boy or the Bravery of a Man	Story of a young warrior
Summary of the Harvest	Statistics on enemies killed and equipment destroyed

Article Title	Notes
Statements Released on Saturday, March 24, 2007	Statements from ISI/Al-Qaeda, the IAI, Shield of Islam, Just Vengeance Brigades, and Jihadist Brigades
Statements Released on Sunday, March 25, 2007	
Statements Released on Monday, March 26	
Statements Released on Tuesday, March 27	
Statements Released on Wednesday, March 28	
Statements Released on Thursday, March 29	
Statements Released on Friday, March 30	
Some of the Operations Videotaped This Week	Internet addresses for downloading three videotaped attacks
Quotes in the Media	Quote by Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi: "One must beware of those who become involved in these quisling agencies. For them, we have nothing but the sharp sword. Between us are nothing but nights and events that turn the heads of boys gray."



Figure 19. The cover of *Hasad al-Mujahidin*, a magazine published electronically by *Ansar al-Sunnah*



Figure 20. The ID cards of an “employee of the crusaders” and a member of the Imam al-Mahdi Army, a Shi’ite militia; *Ansar al-Sunnah* claimed in issue No. 39 of *Hasad al-Mujahidin* to have killed both



Figure 21. The cover of *Sada al-Rafidayn*, a magazine published electronically by the Global Islamic Media Front.




Figure 22. The cover of *Biographies of Notable Martyrs*, a periodical published electronically by the Al-Furqan Institute for Media Production

who died fighting in Iraq and others featuring more than one biography. Two recent issues—Nos. 30 and 31—bore the logos of both **Al-Furqan** and **ISI/Al-Qaeda** on the cover (see Figure 22).

Issue No. 31, released in early April, 2007, is 13 pages long and contains the biographies of four Egyptians who were among “the first delegations of martyrdom-seekers to Iraq.” Issue No. 30, titled *The Devoted Son*, presents a father’s narrative of his son, identified as an Egyptian named Aqil, who was one of the first foreign “martyrdom-seekers” to go to Iraq. The highly personalized account tells the story of an educated young man who gains access to jihadist circles through the Internet, travels to Mosul in Iraq, works in **Al-Qaeda’s** media unit in Al-Fallujah under the direction

of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, and finally blows himself up near a group of American soldiers. Like other narratives in the series, the portrait is didactic and idealized, depicting foreign suicide bombers in Iraq as paragons of virtue and examples for imitation.

3.1.2.5 Related Jihadist Periodicals

3.1.2.5.1 Sawt al-Jihad

Sawt al-Jihad [Voice of the Jihad] first appeared in September 2003 as Al-Qaeda’s premier online magazine dedicated to “affairs of jihad and the mujahidin in the Arabian peninsula.” Since then, 30 issues have appeared, although the magazine went on a two-year hiatus before the appearance of issue No. 30 in February 2007 (see Figure 23). *Sawt al-Jihad* focuses on Al-Qaeda’s efforts in Saudi Arabia, but it occasionally touches on issues related to the jihadist wing of the Iraqi insurgency.

An apparent shift in the magazine’s position on the insurgency in Iraq reflects the increasing importance of Iraq to the global jihadist movement, of which *Sawt al-Jihad* is a prominent mouthpiece. For example, *Do Not Go To Iraq* by Muhammad bin Ahmad al-Salim (No. 7, December 2003) urged Saudis not to go fight in Iraq but rather to fight the Americans in Saudi Arabia first. The most recent issue (No. 30, January 2007), however, contained an



Figure 23. The cover of *Sawt al-Jihad*, an electronically published global jihadist magazine



Figure 24. The cover of *Sada al-Jihad*, a “monthly jihadist journal” published electronically by the Global Islamic Media Front

eight page article titled *Iraq, Yesterday and Today*, which lauded the efforts of foreign fighters in the cause of the Iraqi insurgency.

3.1.2.5.2 Sada al-Jihad

The **Global Islamic Media Front** has published 14 issues of *Sada al-Jihad* [Echo of Jihad], which is described as a “monthly jihadist journal” (see Figure 24). The most recent issue appeared in March 2007. It contained a brief report on the online television channel *Sawt al-Khilafah* [Voice of the Caliphate], operated by **ISI/Al-Qaeda**. The previous issue (No. 13, February 2007), featured a lead editorial on the reported rape of a Sunni Iraqi woman by Shi’ite police officers (see Section 7.2, The Sabrin al-Janabi Case).

3.1.3 Books

Iraqi insurgents, who find themselves pitted against a professional foreign army and a variety of domestic opponents, have authored few books. Others,

Title	Author	Publisher	Pages	Date	Notes
<i>Media Jihad: a reading of jihadist media in Iraq</i>	Abd al-Rahman Sallum al-Rawashidi	Wikalat Haq	221	Spring 2007	A detailed, sympathetic study of jihadist media in Iraq
<i>Advice and Instructions for the Mujahidin in Mesopotamia</i>	Anonymous	Center for Islamic Studies and Research (Al-Qaeda)	68	1424 (March 2003-February 2004)	
<i>The Destructive Programs in Iraq and Their Important Role in the Modern Crusader War</i>	Abd al-Muhsin al-Rafi'i	Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad	43	August 2005	
<i>Iraq from Occupation to Liberation: reality of the crisis and prospects for a solution</i>	Sayf al-Din al-Ansari, Abu Ubayd al-Qarshi, Abu Ayman al-Hilali, Abu Sa'd al-Amili	Al-Ansar	73	June 2003	Collection of essays; the same authors contributed essays to an earlier collection on the September 11 attacks
<i>The Future of Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula after the Fall of Baghdad</i>	Yusuf al-Ayiri	Center for Islamic Studies and Research (Al-Qaeda)	68	July 2003	Author is a noted Saudi jihadist writer; he was killed in a shootout with Saudi security forces in May 2003
<i>Statements by Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, Part One: from April 19, 2005, to August 11, 2005</i>	Anonymous	Unknown	502	2005	Collection of nearly 1,000 statements by Al-Qaeda in Iraq
<i>Iraq and the Crusader Invasion: lessons and observations</i>	Abu Umar Muhammad bin Abdallah al-Sayf (Head of the Supreme Court in Chechnya)	Center for Islamic Studies and Research (Al-Qaeda)	52	Unknown	
<i>Announcement to the People of the Birth of the Islamic State</i>	Uthman bin Abd al-Rahman al-Tamimi	Al-Furqan (ISI/Al-Qaeda)	91	October 2006	Provides Islamic legal justification for Al-Qaeda's establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq in October 2006
<i>Examination of the Lessons of the War on Iraq</i>	Muhammad Abu Abdallah	Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat	39	July 2005	
<i>Martyrs of Mesopotamia</i>	Abu Abd al-Rahman, former administrator of the jihad section of the Al-Arab Internet forum	Unknown	176	2005	Biographical sketches of 431 “martyrs” in Iraq gathered from newspapers and the Internet
<i>Response to the Doubts of Rumor-Mongers on the Mujahidin in Iraq</i>	Al-Shihab al-Thaqib	Unknown	56	April 2007	
<i>Signs of the American Defeat and the Challenges of the Post-American Period</i>	Dr. Abd al-Aziz bin Mustafa Kamil	Internet site Sayd al-Fawa'id	39	Unknown	
<i>Stories of the Martyrs of Mesopotamia, Part One</i>	Abu al-Barra' al-Sharqi, Abu Abd-al-Malik al-Maqdisi, Abu Ayyub al-Najdi	Mujahidin Shura Council	98	Unknown	Biographical sketches of “martyrs”



Figure 25. Electronically published books on Iraq by insurgent supporters

3.2 Audiovisual

Iraqi insurgent groups and sympathetic organizations and individuals produce a wide variety of audiovisual products to trumpet the insurgency's achievements and advance its goals. These range from short video clips of attacks on U.S. forces and other targets in Iraq to recorded addresses by insurgent leaders to longer films on various topics of relevance to the insurgency. We present here an overview of the main categories of audiovisual products created by the insurgency and its supporters.

3.2.1 Videotaped Attacks

Just as the operational press release is the basic unit of insurgent textual production, visual records of attacks are the basic units of insurgent video production. The two genres are closely related, and insurgent groups some-

however, have compiled existing materials by and about the insurgency to create book-length texts. And leading thinkers in the global jihadist movement, which intersects with the insurgency at a number of key junctures, have dedicated lengthy works to the war in Iraq and its aftermath. Taken together, these works are part of a growing library of books that fall under the general rubric of insurgent media (see Figure 25).

The shortest of these works are perhaps more accurately classified as long essays, while the longest run to hundreds of pages. In general, books are under 100 pages. All are electronic publications, made available for downloading in Microsoft Word and Adobe Acrobat formats on websites sympathetic to the insurgency. We present in the table above a number of representative examples.



Figure 26. Stills from recent videos showing insurgent attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq

times issue operational press releases along with links to download a video record of the attack (see Figure 26).

Hundreds of videotaped attacks are available on the websites that serve as the primary distribution network for insurgent and pro-insurgency materials (see Section 5.1, The Internet). Generally ranging in length from a few seconds to 1–2 minutes, and in size from a few hundred kilobytes to 10 megabytes, attack videos follow a standard format. Opening credits identify the group responsible for the attack and provide brief information about the operation. A religious message is often included as well, either in the form of a quote from the Koran or an utterance of the Prophet, usually at the very beginning of the video clip. For example, a 52-second-long **Mujahidin Army** video begins with three captions (see Figures 27–29).



Most insurgent groups take care to “brand” themselves, placing their logos in a corner of the screen for the duration of the video. Video production units affiliated with a particular insurgent group, such as **Al-Furqan**, which produces videos of attacks by **ISI/Al-Qaeda**, also place their logos on the video clips they produce (see Figure 30). Captions in some videos, such as an **Ansar al-Sunnah** recording of an IED attack on a U.S. truck, are modeled on the captions that accompany news footage on cable news channels like *CNN* and *Al-Jazeera* (see Figure 31).

At the heart of each video clip is the filmed record of an actual insurgent operation. The most commonly recorded operation is an IED attack on U.S. forces, usually in a Humvee or Bradley fighting vehicle. In these video clips, a stationary camera films a stretch of road and captures the moment when



Figure 27. Screenshot reads: “I seek refuge in God from Satan the rejected,” a phrase commonly recited by Muslims throughout the world before they begin to read a sura (chapter) of the Koran



Figure 28. Screenshot reads: “Media Office for the Mujahidin Army, Video-Production Section, presents...”



Figure 29. Screenshot reads: “By the grace of God, the destruction of a Humvee belonging to American forces and the killing and wounding of those inside it with an explosive device in West Baghdad”

an IED destroys a passing vehicle. Other frequently recorded operations include sniper and mortar attacks. The most prized videos, judging by download statistics, are the downing of U.S. helicopters and sniper attacks in which a U.S. soldier is seen falling to the ground.

When insurgents appear in videos, as they do in mortar attacks, they are masked. One can also find videos—particularly ones where an insurgent is reading a press statement—where the insurgent’s face is blurred so as not to reveal his identity. Voices are sometimes audible, with numerous cries of “Allahu akbar” usually serving as the audio backdrop to pictures of insurgents firing mortars, detonating IEDs, or engaging in other military operations. Most videos,



Figure 30. Global video-production group logos



Figure 31. Still from an Ansar al-Sunnah video using “cable news” captions

however, use jihadist songs as a soundtrack (see Section 3.2.4, Songs).

Most attack videos are filmed from a single angle with a stationary camera and present images of middling quality, although some videos are of extremely high quality and considerably more sophisticated. A three-minute video of a suicide car-bomb attack by **Al-Qaeda in Iraq** against a U.S. military installation featured multiple camera angles, a voiceover providing details about the operation, and a closing dedication to Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Some videos contain sardonic captions, such as an IED attack against U.S. troops by **Al-Qaeda in Iraq** in which a subtitle announces “their last moments” as the video shows a group of U.S. soldiers in a truck seconds before the attack.

3.2.2 Films

Major insurgent groups and affiliated media-production units also release longer films to convey messages that are broader than attack videos allow and more direct than written statements. Perhaps the best-known insurgent films are the two titles in the Juba series, produced by **Al-Boraq** for the **IAI**. The two films detail the exploits of a legendary **IAI** sniper, known as “the sniper of Baghdad,” who purportedly killed hundreds of U.S. soldiers. The second film is available for downloading in a variety of formats on a dedicated website in English and Arabic (www.jubaonline.org) (see Figure 32).

Like attack videos, longer films generally begin with a title sequence identifying the media unit and/or insurgent group that produced the film. Title sequences generally include a religious quotation. Jihadist songs make up the soundtrack in most films, while voiceovers and captions comprise the narrative.

Films are announced and distributed on the same websites that make other insurgent materials available, with banner advertisements to publicize the release and provide a link for downloading (see Figure 33). The video files are normally distributed through free upload-download services in a variety of formats (Windows, RealPlayer, DivX) and four file sizes, ranging from high-quality (up to 500 megabytes) to mobile-phone



Figure 32. The website of Juba, the “Sniper of Baghdad”



Figure 33. Banners advertising new films; each banner advertisement links to locations where the films can be downloaded



Figure 34. A typical page with download addresses for a film showing the various file-size options: high-quality, medium-quality, low-quality, and mobile-phone quality

quality (less than 10 megabytes) (see Figure 34).

Films cover a variety of subjects but break down into a number of established genres. The most common of these are:

- Compilations of attack videos, frequently organized as a “greatest hits” collection. Examples include **Ansar al-Sunnah’s** Top 20 (7:16 minutes) and the Al-Hanein Internet forum’s *God’s Victory Is Near* (24 minutes), a compilation of March 2007 operations by various insurgent groups. **Ansar al-Sunnah’s** *Top 20* is organized as a “competition” between brigades within the insurgent group to determine who can carry out the most visually impressive attack against U.S. forces. The video’s stated intent is to create a spirit of “healthy competition” within and between insurgent groups (see Figure 35).
- Profiles of martyrs and insurgents. Examples include the **Monotheism**



Figure 35. The title of Ansar al-Sunnah’s Top 20, a compilation of videotaped attacks organized as a competition between brigades within the insurgent group to determine who can carry out the most impressive action against U.S. forces

and Jihad Group's 54-minute profile of the Palestinian militant and top aide to Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, Abu Anas al-Shami, who was killed in Iraq in 2004; the **Mujahidin Shura Council's** six-minute interview with Saudi fighters in Iraq; **JAMI's** *Wedding of the Martyrs* (see below); and **Jaysh al-Fatihin's** 69-minute *Abu al-Walid, Lion of Al-Khalidiyah* (see Figure 36).

- Detailed overviews of individual operations and campaigns. These videos follow a single operation from planning to execution, with video footage of all stages, and strive to underscore insurgents' professionalism and effectiveness. Examples include **Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia's** 34-minute *Raid of the Emigrants And Supporters* and the **Mujahidin Army's** 36-minute *Drawn Sword Raid* (see below). The 25-minute *Hunters Of Minesweepers*, produced by **Al-Furqan** for **ISI/ Al-Qaeda**, is a variant of this genre, detailing insurgent efforts to overcome hi-tech U.S. methods to fight IEDs (see below).
- Motivational films on the outrages and excesses committed by insurgents' enemies. While these initially concentrated on the actions of U.S. forces, the tone has become increasingly sectarian in recent years. Examples include **Ansar al-Sunnah's** 28-minute *Just Vengeance*, detailing the capture and



Figure 36. The titles of the Mujahidin Shura Council's biographical documentary about a former Al-Qaeda military commander in Iraq (top), *Drawn Sword Raid* (middle), and *Hunters of Minesweepers* (bottom)

execution of Shi'ite police officers (see below) and **Ansar al-Sunnah's** 16-minute *Assaults On Sunni Homes*, showing the destruction of Sunni residences in Baghdad by U.S. and Iraqi National Guard forces.

Films generally lack release dates, although they can usually be dated by the announcements posted to the sites where they are distributed. The representative films below are all recent, released in 2006 and 2007, shown in the table below.

3.2.3 Recorded Statements

Insurgent groups sometimes package statements by leaders and prominent figures as audio or video recordings. **ISI/Al-Qaeda** does this more frequently than other groups, a likely reflection of the parent organization's penchant for presenting its leaders' statements in audio and video form.

Recorded statements are similar in form to attack videos and longer films, beginning with a title sequence and then proceeding to the actual statement. Some recorded statements stress major points by interposing key quotations between the title sequence and the body of the address. For example, a videotaped statement by the "judge" of **ISI/Al-Qaeda** released in April 2007 begins with sound bites against a backdrop of **ISI/Al-Qaeda** fighters in action. Some statements are read by a moderator posed behind a desk. A "commentary" on the establishment of the **Islamic State of Iraq** in October 2006 even showed a spokesman seated in a computergenerated "newsroom" with a coffee cup on the desk behind him (see Figure 37).

The table above shows representative recent major statements produced by insurgent groups.



Figure 37. A "commentary" on the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq in October 2006; note the Mujahidin Shura Council logo on the wall, the Caliphate Voice Channel (CVC) logo in the upper right corner, and the computer-generated "newsroom"

3.2.4 Songs

Songs provide the soundtrack to many attack videos and virtually all longer films. In keeping with Salafi practice, male choirs perform songs without instrumental accompaniment. The tone is either martial, with gunfire and explosions audible in the background, or plaintive, with the former genre predominating.

The websites of some insurgent groups make available for downloading songs specifically focused on Iraq. The **JAMI** website, for

Title	Production	Length and Size (highest quality)	Notes
<i>Top 20</i>	Ansar al-Sunnah	7:16 / 108.6 mb	Top 20 recent attacks to “encourage rivalry among the mujahidin” and defeat the enemy
<i>Caravans of Martyrs</i>	Mujahidin Shura Council	59:52 / 610.6 mb	Lionizes “martyrs” in Iraq from an explicitly jihadist perspective, featuring statements by Osama bin Laden, interviews with fighters in Iraq, and images of training and attacks
<i>Hunters of Minesweepers</i>	Al-Furqan (for ISI/Al-Qaeda)	25:56 / 178.8 mb	A masked spokesman for ISI/Al-Qaeda describes how ISI/Al-Qaeda “specialists” have overcome U.S. forces’ use of signal disruptors to fight IEDs. The video strives to show that ISI/Al-Qaeda is successfully combating hi-tech U.S. efforts to defend itself against IEDs.
<i>Drawn Sword Raid</i>	Mujahidin Army	36:03 / 125.5 mb	Documents an ambush from final planning to execution
<i>Knights of Martyrdom</i>	Al-Furqan	39:21 / 268 mb	Profiles of “martyrs” who carried out suicide bombings in Iraq
<i>Wedding of the Martyrs</i>	JAMI	30:11 / 194 mb	Story of a group of insurgents who were killed in a clash with U.S. forces. Begins as a “movie” with intercut footage of U.S. military patrol and insurgents setting up an ambush.
<i>Harvest of the Defeated in Mesopotamia</i>	Al-Furqan (for ISI/Al-Qaeda)	41:29 / 137.8 mb	Lambastes the participation of Iraqi Shi’ite leaders in the political process. Opens with a quote from Osama bin Laden condemning Shi’ite collaboration with Americans and calling for jihad.
<i>Just Vengeance</i>	Ansar al-Sunnah	28:33 / 238 mb	Billed as part of the series <i>The Throbbing Vein To Ward Off The Hatred Of The Rejectionists</i> , the film’s full title is <i>Just Vengeance Against Those Who Violated The Honor Of Our Pure, Free Sisters</i> . It comes as an apparent response to the al-Janabi case (see Section 7.2, the Sabrin al-Janabi Case). It shows the capture, interrogation, and execution of Shi’ite police officers in Diyala Governorate (see Figure 44).

Title	Producer	Length and Size	Approximate Release Date	Notes
<i>The Mujahidin’s Commitment To The Safety Of Muslims</i>	ISI/Al-Qaeda	2:04 / 21.8 mb	April 13, 2007	This short film shows fighters from ISI/Al-Qaeda calling off an attack on a U.S. convoy because a car with Iraqi civilians is in the vicinity. Although the format is highly unusual, it can be considered a statement, since it comes as an apparent response to the IAI ’s criticism of ISI/Al-Qaeda for spilling the blood of innocent Iraqis (see Section 6.4.3, Rift Between Nationalists and Jihadists).
<i>To The Mujahidin Brothers</i>	Ansar al-Sunnah	18:25 / 7.5 mb	April 13, 2007	This audio address is a statement from Ansar al-Sunnah ’s leadership to other insurgents. It comes as part of the debate within the insurgency over the conflict between the IAI and ISI/Al-Qaeda (see Section 6.4.3, Rift Between Nationalists and Jihadists).
<i>I Speak On A Sign From God</i>	ISI/Al-Qaeda	28:07 / 13.5 mb	March 13, 2007	Audio recording of an address by ISI/Al-Qaeda leader Abu Umar al-Baghdadi
<i>Statement On The Attack On Sabrin al-Janabi</i>	IAI	17:32 / 45.6 mb	February 22, 2007	Audio recording against a video backdrop of a statement from the leader of the IAI on the reported rape of Sabrin al-Janabi (see Section 7.2, The Sabrin al-Janabi Case). The statement is read by “one of the mujahidin.”

example, offers a song in Iraqi dialect titled *Baghdad, You Are The Pride Of The Nation*. Most songs, however, are sung in standard Arabic intelligible throughout the Arab world and convey a general message extolling the virtues of jihad, lauding martyrs for their sacrifices, and denigrating perceived enemies. In fact, the majority of the songs used in insurgent films come from the larger body of songs produced by the global jihadist enterprise and do not mention Iraq at all.

Songs are much more than background music. With no musical accompaniment to obscure the clearly articulated lyrics, songs are the ideal conduit for an ideological message. The message is strikingly uniform and primarily jihadist.

Baghdad, You Are The Pride Of The Nation, sung in Iraqi dialect and available for downloading on the **JAMI** website, is an unusual example of nationalist text, a point underscored by the song’s understated, yet audible, musical accompaniment, which marks a departure from Salafi precepts. The melody and cadence are reminiscent of nationalist songs produced by the Saddam Hussein regime during the Iran-Iraq War. The song’s chorus states:

Baghdad, you are the pride of the nation. No harm or concern touches you. We are your men, the people of zeal. We redeem you with our blood and our life.

The song enumerates key cities where Iraqis have fought American forces—Al-Qa’im, Al- Hadithah, Mosul, and Al-Fallujah. And while it refers to the Americans as infidels—“In Al-Anbar we raised the banner, and not a single unbeliever is left in the province”—the tone is primarily nationalist, striving to show that a broad swath of Iraqis are resisting foreign occupation. The final verse is:

*This is my Iraq, with all of its young people,
That has roared and exploded like a volcano,
With its old people, its children, and its women,
Terrifying every American soldier.*

But most films, which are the most popular vehicle for songs, use jihadist, not nationalist, materials in their soundtracks. The following films use songs that are also employed in media products created by global jihadist groups:

The words to *Caravans of Martyrs* come from a poem dedicated to the memory of Abdallah Azzam, a Palestinian who was the teacher of Osama bin Laden and played a central role in bringing Arab volunteers to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The song begins:

Film	Songs Used
<i>Caravans Of Martyrs (Mujahidin Shura Council)</i>	<i>Every Day Caravans Of Martyrs Set Off For Paradise Destroy The Night's Dark Injustice</i>
<i>Hunters Of Minesweepers (Al-Furqan)</i>	<i>God Is Great</i>
<i>Drawn Sword Raid (Mujahidin Army)</i>	<i>The Swords Speak Advance, Hero The Lion-Cub Cried Out</i>
<i>Harvest Of The Defeated In Mesopotamia (Al-Furqan)</i>	<i>They Are Not A Part Of Ahmad's Nation</i>
<i>Top 20 (Ansar al-Sunnah)</i>	<i>Rise From Slumber</i>

*Every day caravans of martyrs set off for paradise with the approval
of God,
What can I say to describe their deeds— rhetoric is powerless and pens
run dry.
How great are the lions who filled the world with their exploits.
Each of them scorned life to become a mujahid with faith and courage
his weapon.*

Destroy Night's Dark Injustice urges listeners to “raise up the faith of Muhammad” and reminds them that they are the “army of Muhammad.” It closes:

*For Islam is power,
Jihad and courage,
Unity and brotherhood,
And the path of Muhammad.*

God Is Great, O Heroes makes specific mention of Al-Aqsa,²⁰ but only as a symbol of a larger struggle between the forces of Islam and unbelief:

*Stand strong, Aqsa,
The time of pride is coming.
We will smash the thrones of tyranny,
And will go to the battlefield like lions.
Cannon shots ring out on the battlefield
Along with the melodies of song.
For the houris²¹ are calling you to the battlefield,
Rush to paradise, O brave one.*

Swords Speak decries the current plight of the Muslim world and recalls past glories soon to be restored:

*They would not have desecrated our holy places had lions ringed them,
Vice and oppression have attacked, but where is the age of swords?
They forgot that we are proud and will defend ourselves like lions.
For it is we who trampled on horseback the thrones of foreigners.
It is we who built our palaces from skulls.
With whips we drove away the wives of Khosroe as booty.*

²⁰ The Al-Aqsa Mosque is part of Al-Haram al-Sharif, or the Noble Sanctuary, located in Jerusalem's Old City. The mosque, with its black dome, is one of the three holiest sites in Islam. The Mosque serves as a center for study and prayer. It is in this building that Friday prayers are held each week. The Noble Sanctuary also houses the golden-domed Dome of the Rock, which was constructed as a mosque to commemorate the Prophet Muhammad's Night Journey.

²¹ The houris are the virgins supposedly promised to martyrs in paradise.

Advance, O Hero employs a device much favored in jihadist rhetoric, combining imagery from the distant past and the immediate present. In this case, the blade of a sword is mentioned alongside the masks that cover the faces of militants in videos:

*Above the heads of the enemies,
Raise the poisoned blade.
Fill the universe with roars.
My motto is 'I will not be defeated.'
Artificial nations of the Christians,
The masked lion-cub has come.
I will crush you all,
For I swear by God.*

Arise From Slumber, a jihadist song used in the soundtrack to **Ansar al-Sunnah's** *Top 20* compilation of attack videos, heralds the violent awakening of a new generation of holy warriors:

*Rise from your slumber for Islam has returned.
We have marched in God's path and declared jihad.
We have returned with the machine gun and today we are leaders.
As individuals and as one, we have proceeded, an awakened generation,
Knowing no life other than battle and strife.*

Finally, *Strike The Long-Awaited Blow*, another popular jihadist song used in a number of films about the Iraqi insurgency, makes specific reference to **Al-Qaeda's** September 11 attack on the United States:

*Strike the long-awaited blow
And kill as many infidels as you wish.
Strike the long-awaited blow
And kill as many infidels as you wish.
Turn my lands into a grave
For the defeated armies of unbelief.
How great is the longing for Hattin²²
And the repair of the world and the faith.
How great is the longing for Hattin
And the repair of the world and the faith.
All of Palestine will be liberated
By the long-awaited black banners.
Destroy, destroy, do not make peace,
Repeat the glories of the raid on
Manhattan....*

²² Muslim forces commanded by Salah al-Din (Saladin) defeated the Christian crusaders at Hattin in 1187, paving the way for the Muslim recapture of Jerusalem later that year.

3.3 Conclusions

The impressive array of products Sunni-Iraqi insurgents and their supporters create suggests the existence of a veritable multimedia empire. But this impression is misleading. The insurgent-media network has no identifiable brick-and-mortar presence, no headquarters, and no bureaucracy. It relies instead on a decentralized, collaborative production model that utilizes the skills of a community of likeminded individuals.

In its adoption of this production model, the insurgent-media enterprise resembles the global jihadist media endeavor that was already in existence when a U.S.-led military operation toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Global jihadist media provided a blueprint for the creation of insurgent media, and the foreign jihadists who flocked to Iraq to fight in the wake of the invasion spearheaded the drive to create a media presence for the insurgency. While a jihadist agenda is by no means common to all or even most Iraqi insurgent groups, insurgent media overlap with jihadist media at numerous junctures, and, as we shall see, reinforce their message.

3.3.1 The Decentralized, 'Do-It-Yourself' Media Factory

An insurgency, and particularly an insurgency consisting of numerous groups with often competing agendas, can hardly maintain a geographically fixed, identifiable, centralized brick-and-mortar infrastructure for media production. Iraq's insurgents and their supporters have overcome this obstacle through the active use of communications technology, the development of a do-it-yourself building-block method of media production, and the acceptance of a certain amount of message diffusion.

The use of communications technology is in and of itself the least remarkable aspect of the insurgent media endeavor. The Internet is a ubiquitous and familiar feature of the modern world, and insurgents' active use of Internet technology to create and disseminate their media products is as unremarkable as their use of explosives to make bombs or the telephone to communicate with each other. For the purposes of media production, it is sufficient to note that Internet communications allow insurgents and their sympathizers to transmit whatever materials they need, from video footage to texts, to wherever they need, to as many people as necessary to produce anything from a press release to an hour-long film. At the same time, the use of Internet technology allows insurgents freedom of movement and anonymity that other media platforms do not.

More noteworthy is the fact that insurgents' willingness to forego a centralized brick-and-mortar production infrastructure and their reliance on the Internet as the primary distribution channel for their media products have led to the emergence of a decentralized, building-block production model in

which virtually any individual or group can design a media product to serve insurgent aims and goals.

As the preceding overview of insurgent media products shows, both text and audiovisual products begin with simple units and proceed to more complex creations. For text products, the basic building blocks are operational press releases and topical statements; for audiovisual products, footage of insurgent activities and statements recorded by prominent insurgents and sympathizers (see Figure 38). Of these building blocks, only the footage of insurgent activities and statements by insurgent leaders need be recorded on location in Iraq. One or more individuals working anywhere in the world can create everything else.²³




Figure 38. Most of the elements needed to produce a film are already available on the Internet

An individual with a link to an insurgent group can compose an operational press release anywhere. If the press release is based on fact, the individual need only receive a communication with the necessary information about the time, place, and specifics of an attack or event to write the press release and then post it to a dedicated insurgent website or sympathetic forum. If the press release is fiction, as is surely the case with the insurgency's more extravagant claims,

the task is even easier.²⁴ The same holds true for written topical statements.

In the case of short attack videos, only the footage of the actual attack need come from Iraq. Once an affiliated individual has received that footage and basic accompanying information, which can be transferred over the Internet or by mobile phone, he has only to add the insurgent group's logo, a short title sequence, and perhaps a soundtrack with a motivational song. He then uploads the resulting video product to a free upload-download site and posts an announcement to a forum. The video-editing software required to produce

²³ U.S. forces have on occasion reported seizures during raids of equipment that could be related to insurgent media production. For example, in a March 24, 2007, press release, MNF-Iraq reported the arrest of four individuals after soldiers discovered "a video camera and videotape in the vehicle's glove compartment showing the convicted individuals making impro[vised] explosive devices."

²⁴ It should be noted that insurgent groups maintain an organized system of spokespeople who are known to be responsible for issuing statements. While there is nothing to preclude other individuals from issuing statements using these spokespeople's names, those statements would almost certainly be disavowed by the group in question. Previous experience shows that insurgent groups regularly monitor forum websites and are aware of the material being posted by sympathetic users. They are also acutely aware of user public opinion and political and theological debates on forums. This was most recently apparent in the polemic that ensued in the wake of the IAI's criticism of ISI/Al-Qaeda.

such a video is cheap and readily available. More importantly, the only material needed from Iraq is the actual footage of the attack. All of the additional elements required to create a video clip—insurgent group logo, songs, etc.—are readily available on the Internet (although insurgency-affiliated individuals producing videos are likely to keep such materials in a personal archive).

The production of a longer film represents a somewhat expanded variant of the same process used to create an attack video (see Figure 39). *The Wedding of Martyrs*, a 30-minute film produced by **JAMI**, depicts an insurgent ambush of a U.S. patrol and the subsequent “martyrdom” of a group of insurgents in an engagement with U.S. helicopter gunships. The film’s producers ingeniously interweave footage of insurgents with footage of a U.S. patrol, the latter evidently recorded by U.S. forces and obtained by insurgents, perhaps from a televised documentary or Internet source such as youtube.com. The alternating clips of U.S. forces on patrol and insurgents mounting an attack, which likely document two separate incidents, create the cinematic impression of a single event viewed from multiple perspectives. The remainder of the film draws on downloadable elements of insurgent propaganda, from logos to footage of the “martyrs’” funeral to hagiographic biographies presented in text form with accompanying still and moving images.

Larger text products can be produced using the same do-it-yourself, building-block approach. A magazine, for example, can easily be fashioned from



Figure 39. Elements used in the production of the JAMI film *Wedding of Martyrs*: the group’s logo, footage of U.S. soldiers, downloadable songs, an address by an insurgent group commander, and footage of insurgents in action

existing press releases augmented with a vividly formatted cover featuring available photographs and graphic designs. Both *Hasad al-Mujahidin* and *Sada al-Rafidayn* employ this model. More complex magazines, such as the IAI's *Al-Fursan*, simply include a wider range of materials, such as topical statements and articles specially written for the magazine, as well as statistics gleaned from operational statements. Books, such as a 500-page compilation of **Al-Qaeda in Iraq** press releases from 2006, can be produced in the same fashion.

3.3.2 Intersections with Global Jihadist Media

The global jihadist movement exemplified by **Al-Qaeda** and its offshoots had a well-established media presence long before the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime and the emergence of Iraq's Sunni insurgency. The best-known examples of jihadist media are videotaped addresses by Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, but the jihadist product array encompassed numerous written statements, magazines, books, and video films. Internet forums were, and remain, the primary distribution channel for these products. The Iraqi insurgency adopted these genres of media production wholesale, as the preceding overview of insurgent products indicates. It also augmented them with products specifically suited to the dynamics of an ongoing insurgency such as daily press releases and short video clips of attacks.

The Iraqi insurgency's adoption of global jihadist media techniques resulted from a symbiotic process. Foreign jihadists, primarily linked to **Al-Qaeda**'s various iterations in Iraq, brought with them the media methods and practices already in the global jihadist arsenal. At the same time, new elements appeared in the context of the insurgency, such as daily press releases, which as noted earlier, appeared as a counter to Coalition Provisional Authority and U.S. military press releases and statements. Existing distribution channels took steps to accommodate these innovations. For example, jihadist Internet forums added sections specifically to post insurgent statements and press releases.

Global jihadist groups like **Al-Qaeda**, which already had a backlog of media experience, brought their ideology and experience with them to Iraq and imbued their new Iraq-focused media products with it. As Iraq's indigenous insurgents adopted the existing forms of global jihadist media in order to establish their own media presence, they also absorbed some of the content of jihadist media, although many Iraqi groups espoused ideological platforms closer to the traditional outlook of a national-liberation movement fighting to evict foreign occupiers.

The songs that make up the soundtrack to most insurgent video productions are a telling example of how this process works. While some specifically Iraqi "songs of resistance" exist, they are not as numerous, accessible, or effectively²⁵

²⁵ The most popular collections of jihadist songs are available in high-quality mp3 format on numerous websites.

produced as the many jihadist songs available online. This, it would seem, is why the bulk of insurgent video materials use jihadist, and not specifically Iraqi, songs in their soundtracks.²⁶ Thanks to the lyrics of the jihadist songs, the videos serve as a conduit for jihadist ideology.

In sum, virtually all insurgent media products, whether created by **Al-Qaeda in Iraq** or other groups, are extremely similar to global jihadist media products in form²⁷ and somewhat similar to them in content.

On the jihadist side, the symbiotic relationship with Iraqi insurgent media has a somewhat different significance. If insurgent media have benefited from the templates provided by preexisting jihadist media, global jihadists have reaped a propaganda windfall from the media products emerging from Iraq's Sunni insurgency. There are two reasons for this. First, the general context of the conflict in Iraq fits in perfectly with jihadist ideology, which posits a titanic struggle between the forces of unbelief, led by the United States, and the forces of faith, led by the mujahidin. Second, the images produced on a daily basis by the insurgency in the form of attack videos are grist for the jihadist propaganda mill, which relishes any and all depictions of "crusader" soldiers targeted in the Arab world.

Interestingly, this is not a two-way street. With the notable exception of **ISI/Al-Qaeda**, Iraqi insurgent groups avoid obvious association with the global jihadist movement. Even if their rhetoric overlaps with that of the global jihadist movement, insurgent groups generally do not display on their web pages images linked with **Al-Qaeda**, cite statements from Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri, or use media products created by **Al-Qaeda** and its offshoots. As the polemic between the **IAI** and **ISI/Al-Qaeda** in April 2007 showed, Iraqi insurgent groups such as the **IAI** and the **Mujahidin Army** hold a fair amount of animosity for **ISI/Al-Qaeda**, which they blame for hijacking and defaming the "honorable resistance" (see Section 6.4.3, Rift Between Nationalists and Jihadists).

Nevertheless, the core media products made available globally through the Internet by Iraqi insurgent groups, whatever their ideological orientation or stance on **Al-Qaeda**, are, it should be stressed, also effective propaganda for global jihadists and their sympathizers. This is especially true in light of Muslim views on **Al-Qaeda** attacks against civilians, which evoke strong

²⁶ Iraqi nationalist songs tend to evoke a memory of a specific historical period, whether it be the Ba'athist era or the monarchy. Songs written during the Ba'athist era would not be used by the insurgent groups studied herein, because they refer to an Iraq few would like to return to. Although Sunni Arab insurgents fight for a return to power, they do not advocate a return to Iraq as it existed under Saddam Hussein. Other nationalist songs are hard to come by, even in Iraq, and particularly difficult to find and use in an electronic format. One telling example of the use of Iraqi songs is the **Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi Brigades'** restyling of a Ba'athist era song (see Section 3.2.4, Songs). The melody is the same but the lyrics have been changed.

²⁷ For an extensive overview of jihadist imagery, see the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point's *Islamic Imagery Project* (<http://www.ctc.usma.edu/imagery.asp>).

شريط عداد القتلى الأمريكيان في العراق

لعرض شريط "عداد القتلى الأمريكيان في العراق" في موقعك قم بنسخ الكود التالي وضعه في صفحتك

```
<iframe name="bar"
src="http://almokhtsar.com/k.php" width="600"
height="64" >
</iframe>
```

قتلى الأمريكيان لهذا اليوم: 2 ||| قتلى الأمريكيان منذ نهاية الحرب 35280

These instructions, taken from a pro-insurgent website, show how to add a “news crawl” giving the latest “death toll” for U.S. forces in Iraq according to insurgents. The example above, from spring 2007, puts the tally for U.S. forces in Iraq at 35,280, roughly ten times the official U.S. death toll.

disapproval.²⁸ Arab respondents to a recent poll overwhelmingly supported attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq, however.²⁹ Thus, insurgent media products showcasing attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq reinforce an aspect of the jihadist message that is viewed positively in the Arab world. In this light, it seems entirely logical that jihadist forums, which are ideologically closer to **Al-Qaeda** than to most insurgent groups, are among the primary distribution channels for the text, audio, and video products created by virtually all insurgent groups across the ideological spectrum.

In sum, **Al-Qaeda** and its supporters identify with the Iraqi insurgents' main purpose, which is to drive foreign forces from Iraq, and can use media materials stressing this point to garner support. But Iraqi insurgents, as already noted, do not necessarily identify with the tenets of **Al-Qaeda** and the global jihadist movement.

²⁸ See *Muslim Public Opinion On US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda*, World Public Opinion.org (http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf).

²⁹ Ibid., “Majorities in Egypt and Morocco expressed approval for attacks on US troops in Muslim countries. Egyptians were those most likely to support such actions. Nine out of ten Egyptians approved of attacks on US military troops in Iraq (91%) and in Afghanistan (91%). Four out of five Egyptians (83%) said they supported attacks on US forces based in Persian Gulf states. Substantial majorities of Moroccans were also in favor of attacks on US troops in Iraq (68%), in Afghanistan (61%) and slightly smaller majorities supported attacks on those based in Persian Gulf states (52%).”

4. Producers

4.1 Iraqi Insurgent Groups

4.1.1 Islamic State of Iraq (ISI/Al-Qaeda)

ISI/Al-Qaeda was previously known as the **Mujahidin Shura Council**; **Al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers** (Tanzim Al-Qa'idah fi Bilad Al-Rafidayn); and the **Monotheism and Jihad Group** (Jama'at Al-Tawhid wa Al-Jihad). All three predecessor organizations were led by Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, who was killed by multinational forces in June 2006. The "establishment" of the **Islamic State of Iraq** took place in October 2006, in all likelihood as an attempt to "Iraq-ize" a group with a large and prominent contingent of foreign fighters.

- **Who they are:** Known in Western media as **Al-Qaeda in Iraq**, the **Islamic State of Iraq** by its own account was established in October 2006 as a counter to the Kurdish region and the Shi'ite south, and purportedly includes the **Mujahidin Shura Council** and other groups. The "state's" media wing pledged to impose Islamic law on the inhabitants of the areas it claims to govern. The group is led by Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, whom the Iraqi government claimed to have killed on May 1.³⁰ Although **ISI/Al-Qaeda** falls under the general ideological rubric of **Al-Qaeda**, it operates with considerable independence, and it is not at all clear that the **Al-Qaeda** central leadership, in whatever form it currently exists, is capable of exerting operational control or influence over **ISI/Al-Qaeda**.
- **Ideology:** **ISI/Al-Qaeda** adheres to a hard-line jihadist-Salafist ideology, including the strict imposition of Islamic law and a view of jihad as a global struggle between faith and unbelief.
- **Who they target:** The group has vowed to fight both multinational forces, Iraqi forces, and Shi'ite militias; it has also targeted civilians in several instances since 2003. It views the Shi'a as heretics.
- **Area of operations:** Al-Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah Al-Din, Ninawah, and parts of Babil and Wasit governorates.

Media Production Logo:



4.1.2 Mujahidin Army in Iraq

- **Who they are:** Active in Iraq since 2004, the group claims to comprise solely Iraqi fighters, some of whom once served in the Iraqi Army under Saddam Hussein. Its members, however, claim no loyalty to Hussein or the

³⁰ See *RFE/RL Newslines*, May 3, 2006.

Ba’ath Party’s “infidel creed.” The group’s official spokesman is Sheikh Abd al-Rahman al-Qaysi. It claims to reject national reconciliation or negotiations with the U.S. or Iraqi governments.

Al-Qaysi told Al-Jazeera television in a November 2006 interview that the founding members of the group were part of an underground religious movement prior to the 2003 war. They foresaw the fall of the regime and planned accordingly, seizing weapons and equipment from abandoned Iraqi Army positions.

- **Ideology:** A Sunni jihadist-Salafist group whose primary goal is to drive “occupation” forces from Iraq and install an Islamic government adhering to Shari’a law.
- **Who they target:** U.S. and Iraqi forces, and other “tools” of the occupation. Al-Qaysi has said that the group does not target civilians, including Shi’ite civilians.
- **Area of operations:** Baghdad, Al-Anbar, Diyala, and Salah Al-Din Governorates.

**Media
Production
Logo:**



4.1.3 Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI)

- **Who they are:** Purportedly established in 2002 before the U.S.-led invasion as an underground organization, the **IAI** was proclaimed in May 2003. The group, which is purely Iraqi, claims to be bigger than **ISI/Al-Qaeda**. It includes former members of the Iraqi Army not loyal to the Ba’ath Party. It supports negotiations with the United States if certain conditions are met, including a timetable for the withdrawal of troops, and recognition of the legitimacy of the resistance rather than the portrayal of fighters as terrorists. It claims to hold no hostility toward Iraqi Shi’a, but sees Iran as a major threat to Iraq. Spokesmen include Ibrahim al-Shammari, Ali al-Nu’aymi, and Imad Abdallah. Al-Shammari stated in an April 11, 2007, interview with *Al-Jazeera* that the group has killed approximately 25,000 U.S. and coalition soldiers.

- **Ideology:** The group’s primary goal is to drive coalition forces from Iraq. It also seeks to eliminate Iranian influence in Iraq. Only then, and once other conditions are met, will it seek the establishment of an Islamic state in Iraq based on Shari’a law.

- **Who they target:** Coalition and Iraqi forces and Shi’ite militias supported by Iran. The IAI says it does not target civilians, unless they are working in support of the United States, Iran, or the Iraqi government. It permits attacks on oil installations and other vital infrastructure.

- **Area of operations:** Although it claims to be everywhere in Iraq, the group mainly operates in Baghdad, Al-Anbar, Diyala, and Salah Al-Din governorates.

**Media
Production
Logo:**



4.1.4 Ansar Al-Sunnah Army (previously Ansar Al-Islam)

- **Who they are:** Ansar Al-Sunnah describes itself as an army of jihadists, scholars, and political and military experts dedicated to creating an Islamic state in Iraq. An outgrowth of the terrorist group Ansar Al-Islam, the army, established in September 2003, purportedly acts as an umbrella organization for several smaller jihadist groups. It is led by Abu Abdallah al-Hasan Ibn Mahmud. Comprised of both Iraqi and Sunni Arab (foreign) fighters, the group does not believe in “man-made laws” or democracy, and rejects negotiations with the United States and the Iraqi government.
- **Ideology:** The group seeks the establishment of an Islamic state in Iraq adhering to Shari’a law.
- **Who they target:** U.S. and Iraqi forces, including Kurdish peshmerga, and those that work for them, as well as Shi’ite militias.
- **Area of operations:** Mosul, Baghdad, Al-Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah Al-Din governorates.

Media Production Logo:



4.1.5 Iraqi Resistance Movement—1920 Revolution Brigades

- **Who they are:** A nationalist, jihadist movement established in June 2003, the group seeks to drive coalition forces from Iraq and establish a state upholding Islam and its tenets, including justice and no discrimination according to race, ethnic group, or religion. As the group’s name suggests, it is more nationalist-leaning than Islamist in outlook. The group, which includes former army officers, is an umbrella for more than a dozen “brigades.” Its creed vows to continue jihad until victory or martyrdom. The movement has denied numerous allegations of a connection to the Ba’ath Party. Its spokesman is Shaykh Abdullah Sulayman al-Umari.
- **Ideology:** To implement God’s law on earth and to rid Muslims of any and all deviations and non-Islamic practices.
- **Who they target:** U.S. and Iraqi forces and those working for them. It reportedly does not permit attacks on civilians or valuable targets such as electricity and oil installations, and does not permit attacks on schools. The group purports to have carried out more than 5,000 attacks in 2006, killing over 2,000 U.S. service personnel and injuring more than 7,000.
- **Area of operations:** Al-Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala governorates.

Media Production Logo:



4.1.6 The Islamic Front of Iraqi Resistance (JAMI)

The Islamic Front of Iraqi Resistance (JAMI) was established in May 2004 and comprises a mixture of former military officers and civilian fighters. The front's main military wing is known as the **Salah Al-Din Al-Ayyubi Brigades**.

Despite its name, **JAMI** is more nationalist than Islamist in outlook. Its key goal is to drive coalition forces from Iraq. As a policy, **JAMI** does not target Iraqi government personnel or installations, including the military. The group's attacks are aimed exclusively at coalition forces, and exhibit a fair amount of sophistication. While members of the group may possess superior fighting skills—due largely to its many former military officers—it does not appear to be particularly well-equipped. In March 2006, it issued a booklet on jihad in Iraq that stressed the need to take care of and safeguard weapons. It also warned against individual or small-group confrontation against the “occupier,” since the latter possessed military superiority.

JAMI's political wing has strongly criticized all post-Hussein governments, and has rejected offers of national reconciliation with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's administration. It has on occasion, however, stipulated the terms under which it would be willing to join a national-reconciliation initiative.

In May 2007 **JAMI** merged with **Hamas-Iraq**, a breakaway group of the **1920 Revolution Brigades**. The groups vowed to completely merge their political and military units.

4.2 Virtual (Transnational) Organizations

In the vast majority of cases, it is impossible to determine who actually creates the media products disseminated on the Internet. Products are almost always “branded,” however, bearing the logo and name of either a specific insurgent group (see above) or a “media center.” The latter are virtual organizations usually associated with a particular group, or groups, and serve to confirm the official status of a media product. In many cases, a product may be associated with both an insurgent group and a media center. For example, press releases issued by **ISI/Al-Qaeda** appear on the **World News Network**'s statements section marked with the **ISI/Al-Qaeda** logo. At the bottom of the actual text of the press release, a note indicates, “Source: Al-Fajr Media Center.” We present below an overview of the main virtual (transnational) media organizations associated with the creation and distribution of insurgent media.

4.2.1 Al-Sahab Institute for Media Production

Al-Sahab [Clouds] is primarily associated with **Al-Qaeda**'s central leadership and leading figures in the Taliban, and it produces audio and videotaped statements by such figures as Ayman al-Zawahiri (see Figure 40). **Al-Sahab**



Figure 40. A statement by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the number two figure in Al-Qaeda, produced by the Al-Sahab Institute for Media Production



Figure 41. The banner logo of the Al-Sahab Institute for Media Production

also produces videos showing attacks on U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan, including the series *Holocaust Of The Americans In Khorasan* and a magazine about the mujahidin in Afghanistan. **Al-Sahab's** products are usually of high quality, with DivX the preferred format, and frequently feature English subtitles. The subtitles, which are likely aimed both at English-speaking Muslims worldwide and journalists in English-language media, reflect the globally directed focus of the **Al-Qaeda** core. **Al-Sahab** products are normally distributed to forums through the **Al-Fajr Media Center** (see below) (see figure 41).

4.2.2 Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF)

The **Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF)** produces a variety of materials, including the monthly magazines *Sada al-Jihad* and *Sada al-Rafidayn*, as well as written materials and foreign-language translations of addresses by figures from **Al-Qaeda's** central leadership (such as a recent French translation of a statement by Ayman al-Zawahiri). **GIMF** also produced a French translation of an **Al-Furqan**-produced **ISI/Al-Qaeda** statement on the Baghdad security plan. **GIMF** is strongly sympathetic to **Al-Qaeda** and **ISI/Al-Qaeda**. Against a backdrop of disputes among leading insurgent groups since the **IAI's** early-April statement criticizing **ISI/Al-Qaeda**, **GIMF** has begun distributing articles as part of a series titled *Suppressing Strife In The Cradle*, apparently intended to bolster **ISI/Al-Qaeda's** position in its conflict with rival insurgent groups (see Figure 42).



Figure 42. The banner logo of the Global Islamic Media Front



Figure 43. A banner advertising a release from the Al-Fajr Media Center

4.2.3 Al-Fajr Media Center

As noted above, the **Al-Fajr [Dawn] Media Center** acts primarily as a distribution channel for products branded by **Al-Sahab**, **ISI/Al-Qaeda**, the **ISI/Al-Qaeda**-affiliated **Al-Furqan**, and other groups. For example, press releases issued by **Ansar al-Sunnah** on the **World News Network** are sourced to **Al-Fajr**. **Al-Fajr** occasionally appears in the guise of a production unit, as in an early-May release of a film announcing the “martyrdom” of **ISI/Al-Qaeda’s** official spokesman, Abu Abdallah Muharib al-Juburi. (see Figure 43).

4.2.4 Al-Boraq Media Center

Al-Boraq mainly focuses on text production, although the organization also runs a forum with a wide variety of statements and archived products by other media organizations. Recent **Al-Boraq** products include a slickly produced, Flash-format text version of **ISI/Al-Qaeda’s** announcement of its cabinet (see Figure 44). In October 2006, **Al-Boraq** released a much quoted



Figure 44. The ISI/Al-Qaeda announcement of its “cabinet of ministers” on April 20, 2007, produced by the Al-Boraq Media Center



Figure 45. The banner logo of the Al-Boraq Media Organization

essay on jihadist media titled *Media Exuberance*; the essay warns that jihadists must create legitimate, authoritative “brands” to release media products that can compete with the offerings of mainstream media such as *Al-Jazeera* and *CNN*. The **Al-Boraq** website (www.al-boraq.com) offers two basic sections, one with statements and media products from a variety of insurgent groups, and one dedicated to statements by the **IAI**. The site also includes archives of **Al-Sahab** and **Al-Furqan** releases (see Figure 45).

4.2.5 Al-Furqan Institute for Media Production

Al-Furqan is the primary media production center for **ISI/Al-Qaeda**. It produces virtually all **ISI/Al-Qaeda** films, audio and videotaped addresses, and the **ISI/Al-Qaeda**-affiliated periodical *Biographies Of Notable Martyrs*. An **Al-Qaeda**-affiliated center, **Al-Furqan** distributes its products to websites through the **Al-Fajr Media Center**.

4.3 Individual Producers

Thanks to the decentralized, “do-it-yourself” nature of the insurgent media enterprise (see Section 3.3.1, The Decentralized, ‘Do-It- Yourself’ Media Factory), virtually anyone can, in theory, create a pro-insurgent media product. In practice, this is discouraged. The **Al-Boraq Media Center** published a study in October 2006 titled *Media Exuberance*, warning that the ease of Internet-based media production is a threat to the credibility and authority of jihadist—and, by analogy, insurgent—media. Nevertheless, some prominent individuals are also producers of pro-insurgent media, as are contributors to jihadist forums.

4.3.1 Hamid al-Ali

The Kuwait-based radical cleric Hamid al-Ali is an example of an authoritative individual producer of pro-insurgent media products. He maintains a popular website (www.h-alali.net) with numerous materials on Iraq’s Sunni insurgency. For example, al-Ali posted a bitterly anti-Shi’ite poem to his website within hours of an interview by *Al-Jazeera* with a woman identified as Sabrin al-Janabi, who charged that she had been raped by Iraqi Interior Ministry personnel during a raid (see Section 7.2, The Sabrin al-Janabi Case). Al-Ali writes frequently on the threat of mounting Iranian influence. In

the recent conflict between **ISI/Al-Qaeda** and the **IAI**, al-Ali was critical of **ISI/Al-Qaeda**, and his position earned him the enmity of many pro-**Al Qaeda** contributors to jihadist forums.

4.3.2 Forum Contributors

Contributors to forums, from mainstream to jihadist, frequently comment on insurgent activities in Iraq. Some of these comments are sufficiently extensive and detailed to qualify as media products in their own right. The most popular of these are often posted to several forums and gain widespread distribution on the Internet.

5. Delivering the Message

Sunni insurgent groups are in armed conflict with Iraq's central authorities, a large U.S. military force, Shi'ite militias, and, at times, each other. This creates serious obstacles to the maintenance of the brick-and-mortar infrastructure needed to operate traditional print and broadcast outlets. As a result, insurgent groups prefer to use the Internet to deliver their message.

The Internet is more versatile than traditional delivery platforms because it can serve as a vehicle for those platforms in addition to Internet-specific information platforms like websites. A website can be used to deliver a newspaper to Internet users just as easily as it can be used to deliver a radio station or television station. Recognizing the Internet's dual-use potential as a vehicle for both Internetspecific and traditional delivery platforms, this section of the report looks first at Internetspecific insurgent media delivery platforms, and then at more traditional print and broadcast platforms. The division is largely theoretical. In practice, insurgents tend to use the Internet to deliver all of the media products they create, from text to moving images.

5.1 The Internet

Because websites are multi-layered, they do not lend themselves naturally to categorization. For example, an organization's official website may contain statements from the organization's leadership, a blog by a member of the organization, and a forum for users to discuss the organization's activities. Nevertheless, we have divided the websites that comprise online Iraqi insurgent media into four broad categories: dedicated websites, sympathetic websites, forums, and blogs. While the divisions are not mutually exclusive, they provide a thumbnail guide to the insurgent media presence on the Internet. Unless otherwise noted, all content on the websites surveyed here is in Arabic.

The insurgent web is not static. Like insurgent groups themselves, which merge, emerge, and sometimes vanish or break up, websites are dynamic.

Many websites associated with the insurgency exist for a period of time and then vanish, either because hosts remove them, governments block them, or their creators decide to change addresses. What is important to note is that no single website ever acts as the sole distribution channel for insurgent materials. All of the media products insurgents and their supporters create appear on numerous websites, and if any single website is blocked or closed, dozens, and sometimes hundreds, of others are available to carry the same materials. The existence of multiple websites to disseminate insurgent media products constitutes a built-in failsafe mechanism, and ensures that while the insurgents' message may not always reach the world through the same distribution channels, some channels always exist to carry it.

This report provides a necessarily static snapshot of the insurgent web. During the writing and publication of the report, changes have taken place in the dynamic world of insurgent and insurgent-affiliated websites. Where possible, we have noted some of these changes. Others will have taken place by the time you are reading this report. Nevertheless, this synchronic overview of websites here, which captures a situation that existed in April/May 2007, is a structurally accurate representation of the diachronic reality of the insurgent web, in which sites shift over time, but a mutable array of dedicated websites, sympathetic websites, forums, and blogs remains to make insurgent materials available to web users.

5.1.1 Insurgent Group Websites

Dedicated insurgent websites openly proclaim their affiliation with a specific insurgent group. By definition, Iraqi insurgent groups do not have an "official" presence in the form of a geographically fixed headquarters. They do, however, have a more or less official identity in the form of a name, logo, leader, and ideological platform (see Section 4.1, Iraqi Insurgent Groups). The dedicated websites they maintain reflect this, even when the sites themselves disclaim "official" affiliation with a group, as is the case with the website of **ISI/Al-Qaeda**.

Readers should bear in mind that insurgent groups are not static. Existing groups merge and sometimes disappear; new groups appear, as do larger formations consisting of several insurgent groups, such as the **Mujahidin Shura Council** and the newly announced **Front for Jihad and Reform**.³¹ The insurgency's Internet presence has reflected these shifts, and will surely continue to do so in the future.

³¹ The **IAI**, the Legal Commission of **Ansar Al-Sunnah**, and the **Mujahidin Army** announced the formation of a new front comprising the three groups in early May 2007. Within 24 hours of the announcement, the front had a dedicated website, banner, and logo. As of May 18, the website had only carried three statements by the front, though the three groups continued to release their usual volume of statements and videos on other websites and forums.

Finally, it is important to remember that a web presence is not the same as a presence on the ground. While some of the most important insurgent groups (see Section 4.1, Iraqi Insurgent Groups) also maintain relatively popular websites—**ISI/Al-Qaeda** and the **IAI**, for example—other groups that appear to be active on the ground do not have dedicated websites (such as **Ansar al-Sunnah**). By the same token, some of the websites detailed below belong to groups that may be largely media creations, with little or no real presence on the ground.

The following websites openly affiliate themselves with known Iraqi insurgent groups and serve as delivery platforms for the media products they create:³²

5.1.1.1 Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI)

The website of the **IAI** (www.iaisite.info) contains the following sections:

- A home page with press releases detailing the group’s most recent military operations, statements by its leaders and spokesmen, and other media products. Banner logos provide links to two recent films and the latest issue of the group’s magazine, *Al-Fursan* (see Section 3.1.2, Periodicals).
- Official Statements—contains statements released the previous day.
- Our Program—the group’s ideological platform.
- Video Releases—brings users to the sections of the Al-Boraq forum (www.al-boraq.com) with statements by the **IAI**.
- Contact Us—opens a form for submitting e-mail queries and comments.

The website does not have a search function. The link for Archive of Statements is inactive.

Registration data for the domain [iaisite.info](http://www.iaisite.info) as listed by [whois.net](http://www.whois.net):³³

Domain ID:D13662056-LRMS

Domain Name: IAISITE.INFO

Created On: 03-Jun-2006 21:07:10 UTC

Last Updated On: 12-May-2007 07:06:30 UTC

Expiration Date: 03-Jun-2009 21:07:10 UTC

Sponsoring Registrar: Intercosmos Media Group, Inc. (R152-LRMS)

Status: CLIENT DELETE PROHIBITED

Status: CLIENT TRANSFER PROHIBITED

Status: CLIENT UPDATE PROHIBITED

³² Unless otherwise noted, information on content and functionality was current as of May 14, 2007.

³³ Registration data for other sites mentioned in this report can be obtained by entering the domain name into the form available at www.whois.net.

Status: TRANSFER PROHIBITED
 Registrant ID: IMG-709656
 Registrant Name: ali sultan
 Registrant Organization: kabous
 Registrant Street1: oman muscat
 Registrant Street2:
 Registrant Street3:
 Registrant City: muscat
 Registrant State/Province: quram
 Registrant Postal Code: 118
 Registrant Country: OM

5.1.1.2 Mujahidin Army in Iraq

The website of the **Mujahidin Army in Iraq** (www.nasrunminallah.net) contains the following sections (see Figure 46):

- A home page with the latest news from Iraq, videotaped military operations, and group statements. The home page also contains a search function, interactive polls, a registration function, and a subscription function to receive e-mailed updates.
- Meet Us—description of the group and its ideological platform.
- Statements.
- Video—downloadable videos of military operations. It contains 11 videos, all dating from 2005.
- Koran—downloadable audio recordings of Koranic recitation.
- Hadith—utterances by the Prophet Muhammad.
- Sermons—downloadable audio recordings of sermons. These focus on jihad, with a number of sermons by Abdallah Azzam, a Palestinian who played a key role in organizing Arab volunteers who fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
- Flashes—19 downloadable Flash films. The focus is on propaganda materials illustrating the evils of the “occupation” and the sufferings of the Iraqi people. A representative title is *The Cry Of An Iraqi Child*.
- Images—actual images are not available.
- Songs—downloadable songs glorifying jihad.
- Contact Us—an online form for sending messages to the group.
- Your Comments—comments from users.

The links to Printed Materials, Articles, and Literature do not work.



Figure 46. The website of the Mujahidin Army

5.1.1.3 Islamic Front of Iraqi Resistance: Salah Al-Din Al-Ayyubi Brigades (JAMI)

The website of the **Islamic Front of Iraqi Resistance: Salah Al-Din Al-Ayyubi Brigades** (arabic.jaamiiraq.com) contains the following sections:

- A home page with local and world news, recent statements, articles, videos and images of recent military operations, and downloadable posters.
- Political Statements—28 statements dating back to 2004.³⁴
- Military Statements—87 statements dating back to 2004.
- Videotaped Operations—201 downloadable videos of military operations.
- Articles—28 articles. The most recent is *Poverty And Addiction Threaten Iran*.
- On the Islamic Legal Grounding of the Resistance—13 articles. The most recent is *Caution And Preparedness In Jihadist Activity*.
- Songs of the Brigades—six downloadable songs, nationalist in form and content.
- Slogan of the Brigades—an explanation of the symbolism in the group's logo.
- Images of Operations—170 images from the group's military operations.
- Posters—40 posters glorifying the group and, more generally, jihad in Iraq.
- Signatures—signatures for use by participants in online forums.
- Send Your Post—a form for submitting comments to the site.
- Who We Are—a short description of the group and its platform, dated December 22, 2006.
- Contact Us—online form for sending messages to the group.

All links are functional.

5.1.1.4 Jaysh Abi Bakr al-Siddiq al-Salafi

The website of **Jaysh Abi Bakr al-Siddiq al-Salafi** [Abu Bakr Al-Saddiq Salafist Army] (www.jaisha-bibaker.net) contains the following sections (see Figure 47):

- A home page with lists of the group's Most Beautiful Videotaped Operations (18 operations) and Latest Military Operations (over 50).



Figure 47. The website of Jaysh Abi Bakr al-Siddiq al-Salafi

³⁴ Statistics for this site reflect information current as of late March 2007.

- Videotaped Operations—a large archive of downloadable videos, all dating from 2005 and 2006.
- Military Harvest—links to Videotaped Operations.
- Military Publications—video compilations of the group’s military operations.
- Statements—two statements.
- Fatwas—responses to questions. Although the section’s title implies that the responses come from a jurist with Islamic legal qualifications, he is not identified.
- Koran—selected recitations from the Koran.
- Songs—11 songs glorifying jihad.
- Magazine—three issues of a magazine titled Echo Of The Mujahidin.
- Meet Us—a brief description of the group and its aims.
- Contact Us—online form for sending messages to the group.

As of May 14, 2007, the site was not functional. The web address carried a notice reading “This account has been suspended.”

5.1.1.5 Jihadist Brigades of Iraq

The website of the **Jihadist Brigades** (www.iraqiasaeb.org/asaeb2007/) contains the following sections (see Figure 48):

- A home page listing the group’s most recent statements on its military operations.
- Who We Are—brief description of the group’s beliefs and aims.
- Our Creed—long article on the group’s ideology.
- Military Statements—statements issued over the previous four-five days.
- Videotaped Operations—17 downloadable videos of military operations.
- Video Productions—non-working link to a film titled Tall Lances.



Figure 48. The website of the Jihadist Brigades of Iraq



Figure 49. The website of ISI/Al-Qaeda

- Political Statements—two statements, both dating to 2006.
- The Monthly Harvest—downloadable reports on previous months’ military operations, covers four months of AH 1427 (2006).
- The Annual Harvest—a list of military operations carried out in 2005.
- Articles—three articles, one on Shi’a and two on the Islamic resistance in Iraq.
- Audiovisual—12 jihadist songs.
- Poetry and Poems—three poems.
- Links—a list of jihadist web resources.
- Photo Album.
- Islamic Law of Jihad—an anonymous article on jihad from the perspective of Islamic law.
- Fatwas—three legal rulings, one of them titled *What Is A Spy And What Is The Ruling On Him In Islam*.

The site has a non-working link to an English version. All of the main links are functional.

5.1.1.6 Islamic State of Iraq (ISI/Al-Qaeda)

The website of **ISI/Al-Qaeda** (islamiciraq.modawanati.com) describes itself as a blog and states, “This site is a personal effort and is not the official site of the Islamic State of Iraq.” Nevertheless, the “blog” functions for all practical purposes as the official site of **ISI/Al-Qaeda**. It contains the following sections (see Figure 49):

- A home page with recent statements and video productions. As of May 14, 2007, the most recent statement was dated April 20, 2007. Atop the home page are two banner advertisements for films.
- Archive—empty, statements on the home page go back only to March 10, 2007.
- Photo Album—five images, including the logo of **ISI/Al-Qaeda**.
- Other Articles—recent statements by the group.
- Pictures of Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi.

Most links are functional, although the link to additional statements at the bottom of the home page does not work.

The **ISI/Al-Qaeda** site does not have its own domain. It is hosted by modawanati.com, an Arabic-language blog site.

5.1.1.7 Army of the Men of the Naqshibandi Order

The website of the **Army of the Men of the Naqshibandi Order** (www.alnakshabania-army.com) contains the following sections:

A home page with two videos, an interview with the group's official spokesman, Dr. Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi, from *Al-Zawra TV* (see Section 5.2.3, Television), and the group's eighth video release.

- Our Creed—article on the group's ideology.
- Our Jihadist Path—article on the group's understanding of jihad.
- Our Army—description of the group's armed units.
- Our Jihadist Operations (Videotaped)—links to 12 videotaped operations.
- Our Jihadist Operations (Unrecorded)—blank.
- Statements—four statements.
- Photo Library—86 images from the group's videos.
- Audio Materials—24 files, primarily poetry.
- Reading Material—four statements (same as Statements above).
- Contact Us—form for submitting queries and comments.

All of the main links are functional except for Snapshots for Cell Phones.

5.1.1.8 Jaysh al-Rashidin

The website of **Jaysh al-Rashidin** [Al-Rashidin Army] (www.theislam-sun.com) contains the following sections:

A home page with a short general article and a link to a film titled *Our Jihad Rebuffs The Ruse Of The Occupiers*.

- Videos—links to a large number of videotaped operations.
- Statements—operational statements.
- Jihad—fatwas on the conduct of jihad.
- Articles—three short articles.
- Spreading the Word and Guidance—three short articles.
- Know Your Enemy—three articles, including a short piece on fabrications by mainstream media.
- Fatwas and Legal Issues.
- Contact Us—a form for submitting queries and comments.

All of the links are functional except for a section called Between the Lines.

5.1.2 Sympathetic Websites

The following websites do not affiliate themselves with specific Sunni insurgent groups but are sympathetic to their cause and sometimes post insurgent media materials as well as original materials based on or inspired by insurgent sources.

5.1.2.1 Albasrah.net (www.albasrah.net)

The section on Resistance and Liberation reproduces some statements from insurgent groups and links to downloadable videos of their operations against coalition forces. The section is available in Arabic and English, but the Arabic is far more detailed and contains more materials specifically sourced to insurgent groups (see Figure 50).



Figure 50. The website of Albasrah.net

5.1.2.2 Iraqpatrol.com (www.iraqpatrol.com)

The section Field of Heroism details insurgent attacks against coalition forces and reproduces statements by insurgent groups claiming responsibility for military operations (see Figure 51).

5.1.2.3 Islammemo (www.islammemo.cc)

Although with rare exceptions **Islammemo** pointedly refrains from citing insurgent sources, or even referring to specific insurgent groups, it provides comprehensive coverage of attacks on coalition and Iraqi government forces. The site's hard-line anti-Shi'ite stance fits in with the general ideological profile of most Sunni insurgent groups, and its reports are often posted to forums and message boards that distribute the media products of Iraqi insurgent groups. In mid-April, the site was briefly unavailable; it reappeared in May.

5.1.3 Forums and Message Boards

Forums are by far the most popular and widespread means of delivering insurgent media products. Forums allow participants to post messages to which other participants can add their responses, making them a lively platform for disseminating insurgent media products and discussing insurgent activity. It should be noted that while discussions sometimes touch on strategy and tactics, participants are aware that forums are a subject of interest for intelligence agencies and researchers, and they generally avoid mentioning operational specifics. Most of the forums listed below are jihadist and pro-**Al-Qaeda** in their general outlook, although each one has its own focus and flavor. The list is representative but far from exhaustive. All of the forums are in Arabic unless otherwise noted.



Figure 51. The website of Iraq Patrol

5.1.3.1 Al-Tajdeed (www.tajdeed.org.uk/forums)

Al-Tajdeed is primarily a Saudi dissident forum with a jihadist tone. The focus is global, but participants frequently post statements and videos from Iraqi insurgent groups in the forum's section on Issues of the Muslim Community and Events of the Moment. This section contained 36,131 threads and 127,089 posts on May 30, 2007.

5.1.3.2 The Islamic Fluga [Al-Fallujah]

Forums (www.al-faloja.com/vb/) Named after the Iraqi city where U.S. forces battled insurgents, **Al-Fallujah's** section on Issues of the Islamic Community features regularly posted materials from insurgent groups. This section contained 4,037 threads and 14,243 posts on May 30, 2007.

5.1.3.3 Mohajroon (www.mohajroon.com/vb/)

Mohajroon is a password-protected jihadist forum, but the Statements section is open to all and offers a wealth of insurgent materials updated every few minutes. Insurgent statements and other media products are marked with the logos of the groups that produced them. The focus is broader than Iraq, with statements from organizations and groups spanning the globe, but Iraqi insurgent media products are the most numerous. The archive of Statements from the Mujahidin of Iraq included 11,560 threads and 42,452 posts on April 14, 2007, when the forum announced that it was ceasing operations. It has not been accessible since that date.

5.1.3.4 Al-Firdaws (www.alfirdaws.org/vb/)

The Statements and Reports section of **Al-Firdaws** provides a stream of constantly updated jihadist media materials, including offerings from Iraqi insurgent groups. This section contained 6,767 threads and 28,014 posts on May 30, 2007. Like **Mohajroon**, **Al-Firdaws** marks threads relating to a specific group with the group's logo. The forum contains a special archive of materials from the **Al-Sahab** video-production unit (51 threads), as well as a more general archive of media products from jihadist groups (106 threads).

5.1.3.5 Al-Boraq (www.al-boraq.com)

Al-Boraq is yet another extensive, frequently updated clearing house for insurgent materials. The forum has special sections for posted materials from the **Al-Sahab** and **Al-Furqan** video-production units, as well as the video-production units of **Ansar al-Sunnah** and the **Mujahidin Shura Council**. The archive of statements contained 6,385 threads and 31,057 posts in mid-May 2007. On May 30, 2007, **Al-Boraq**'s original URL became inactive and the site's administrators announced that it would be operating at 12.47.45.102/index.php and al-boraq.org.



Figure 52. The insurgent statements section of World News Network

5.1.3.6 World News Network (www.w-n-n.com)

World News Network is a message board—viewers cannot post comments. The Statements, Reports, and Releases section is a comprehensive and constantly updated overview of insurgent products, as well as jihadist media materials from elsewhere in the world (see Figure 52). This section contained 208 pages of statements, with approximately 60 statements per page, on May 30, 2007. **World News Network**

has an English section that is updated daily and consists primarily of statements from **ISI/Al-Qaeda**.

5.1.3.7 Al-Nusra (www.alnusra.net/vb/)

Al-Nusra has a special section for statements by **ISI/Al-Qaeda** and a general section for Statements and Releases of the **Mujahidin** (see Figure 53). On May 30, 2007, the former had 2,649 threads and 10,068 posts, and the latter 7,783 threads and 24,401 posts.

5.1.3.8 Ana al-Muslim (www.muslim.net/vb/)

Ana al-Muslim’s General section offers frequent discussions of issues relating to the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, although actual insurgent statements are only posted intermittently to this section. The forum’s overall tone is jihadist and pro-Al-Qaeda. On May 30, 2007, the General section contained 91,887 threads and 714,961 posts.

5.1.4 Blogs

5.1.4.1 Albayanat (albayanat.blogspot.com)

The News of the Mujahidin blog posts insurgent statements on a daily basis, often with links to downloadable video clips of attacks.



Figure 53. Statements from ISI/Al-Qaeda on the Al-Nusrah forum

5.2 Print and Broadcast

5.2.1 Print

While the bulk of insurgent text materials are distributed solely on the Internet, some materials are also made available in print form. We present below an overview of insurgent print production.

5.2.1.1 Newspapers

There are no newspapers specifically affiliated with insurgent groups.

5.2.1.2 Leaflets, Pamphlets, and Periodicals

Insurgent groups spread their message on the ground through statements in the form of leaflets plastered on walls, signposts, and in mosques.



Figure 54. A leaflet distributed by Ansar al-Sunnah in Baghdad in fall 2006



Figure 55. A leaflet distributed by ISI/Al-Qaeda in Mosul in April 2007



Figure 56. A leaflet distributed by Ansar al-Sunnah in Mosul in February 2007

Leaflets address a variety of topics and can include threats, warnings, or instructions to the local population on issues of compartment and the like. For example, the **Ansar Al-Sunnah Army** distributed leaflets in Baghdad’s Al-Jadiriya district in fall 2006 warning Sunni Arab university students and Shi’ite students not loyal to the militias to stay away from university campuses, as the army was about to undertake a mission to cleanse campuses of Shi’ite militias (see Figure 54).

Materials obtained by RFE/RL’s Radio Free Iraq correspondents in Baghdad and Al-Mosul illustrate an important difference between the statements made available on the Internet and the printed leaflets distributed within Iraq. The former are intended for an international audience and focus on the attacks carried out by insurgent groups and broader ideological issues. The latter are local in focus, as the following four leaflets from Mosul demonstrate:

- An April 5, 2007, leaflet signed by the Islamic Law Ministry of **ISI/Al-Qaeda** informs the residents of three villages outside Mosul that the group has decided to lift a blockade it recently imposed on the area (see Figure 55). The leaflet stresses that the blockade will remain in force on a number of other villages near Mosul.
- A February 31, 2007, leaflet signed by **Ansar al-Sunnah** in Mosul informs residents of Mosul that the group is not responsible for threats issued in its name by telephone and letters (see Figure 56). The group notes that it does

not use these means to issue threats and asks residents to inform it, through an email address provided in the leaflet, of those responsible so that it can punish them.

- A December 11, 2006, leaflet from the **Jihadist Truth Brigades** is titled *A Final Warning To Sheep Smugglers* (see Figure 57). The leaflet states that the smuggling of sheep to northern Iraq “and even beyond Iraq” is illegal and drives up prices, disturbing an already unsettled economy.
- An undated leaflet signed by the **Al-Faruq Umar bin al-Khattab Brigades** gives a final warning to the cellular-phone company Asia Cell for “cutting off and weakening the network in certain hotspots where truth strikes falsehood.” The leaflet warns that if Asia Cell fails to improve service in these areas, the brigades will “spill the blood” of Asia Cell employees and blow up its transmission towers (see Figure 58).

The four leaflets are noteworthy for more than their focus on purely local issues. They also illustrate the varied approaches of insurgent groups toward the local population. **Ansar al-Sunnah** leaflet reassures the local population that the group is not the source of unspecified threats, the **Jihadist Truth Brigades** leaflet warns smugglers that they are making life more difficult for other

residents by driving up prices, and the **Al-Faruq Brigades** leaflet directs a specific threat to the employees of Asia Cell.



Figure 57. A leaflet distributed by the Jihadist Truth Brigades in Mosul in December 2006




Figure 58. A leaflet distributed by the Al-Faruq Umar bin al-Khattab Brigades

The tone adopted by **ISI/Al-Qaeda** is strikingly different. While the leaflet informs residents of three villages that the group is lifting a blockade in order to ease their lives, the statement is imperious. After enumerating the villages that remain under blockade, the text states, “May the world know that we, sons of the Islamic State of Iraq, impose and lift blockades on any region we wish and at any time we wish.”

5.2.2 Radio

There are no known radio stations expressly affiliated with insurgent groups.

5.2.3 Television

5.2.3.1 Al-Zawra (Baghdad)

Al-Zawra is owned by Mish’an al-Juburi, a pro-Ba’athist agitator who once had close ties to Saddam Hussein’s son, Uday. Al-Juburi reportedly stole millions from Uday Hussein in the 1990s and joined the opposition, returning to Iraq after the fall of the Hussein regime.

Elected to parliament first in the January 2005 transitional election and later in the December 2005 election for a permanent government, al-Juburi was stripped of his immunity from prosecution in October 2006 amid accusations that he and his son had embezzled millions intended to pay for paramilitary forces to guard pipelines that run from Bayji through the Salah Al-Din Governorate to Baghdad.³⁵

It was at this point that Baghdad-based *Al-Zawra* television (see Figure 59), which was launched in November 2005, changed its format from an entertainment channel to a proinsurgency channel, broadcasting attack videos for the **IAI**, the **Mujahidin Army in Iraq**, **Jaysh Al-Rashidin**, **Jaysh Al-Fatihin**, the **1920 Revolution Brigades**, the **Naqshibandi Order Army**, and **JAMI**.

Its rhetoric is strongly opposed to the United States,




Figure 59. The logo of the Al-Zawra satellite television channel

³⁵ For more information, see the *RFE/RL Iraq Report*, February 6, 2006 (<http://www.rferl.org/reports/iraq-report/2006/02/6-100206.asp>).

Iran, and pro-Iranian Iraqi Shi'a. The channel also reflects al-Juburi's dislike of **Al-Qaeda in Iraq** and refuses to promote that group's operations or agenda.

Al-Zawra's Baghdad headquarters was closed in November 2006 for inciting violence following the Iraqi Tribunal's handing down of a death sentence against Saddam Hussein. The channel was back on the air in a matter of days via the satellite transmitter Nilesat. Al-Juburi has claimed in interviews that *Al-Zawra* still broadcasts from Iraq using a mobile satellite truck.

Rumors as to *Al-Zawra*'s location have abounded (Cairo, Irbil, Damascus, Paris, and even the Sunni imam Harith al-Dari's house) but none have been proven.

According to the U.S. State Department's 2006 Country Report On Human Rights Practices For Iraq, the Iraqi government in November recommended the continued closure of *Al-Zawra* "as well as a lawsuit against the owners and managers for airing training videos on how to build explosive devices, promoting calls to join terrorists and insurgent groups, and promoting killings and genocide against a large segment of the populace."

Egyptian authorities briefly stopped Nilesat from broadcasting *Al-Zawra* in late 2006 and closed down broadcasts altogether in February 2007; the channel continues to be broadcast via Arabsat.

5.2.3.2 **Al-Rafidayn**

The *Al-Rafidayn*³⁶ satellite channel is based in Cairo and broadcasts via Nilesat transmitters. Billed as an "independent" channel, *Al-Rafidayn* supports the Sunni Arab "resistance" and acts as the mouthpiece for the Muslim Scholars Association and its head, Harith al- Dari. The channel is critical of the United States and the Iraqi government, as well as Iranian interference in Iraq.

The channel reflects in its interviews and reporting the relationship between the Muslim Scholars Association and certain Shi'a critical of the U.S. and Iraqi governments including Ayatollah Jawad al-Khalisi.

Although the channel's staff has not been accused by the Iraqi government of inciting Iraqis to violence, they report on incendiary issues in a highly provocative fashion. For example, in January 2007, the channel ran a statement by the Muslim Scholars Association calling on former Iraqi Army commanders to prepare to liberate Iraq from the "occupation."

A frequent participant in *Al-Rafidayn*'s political talk shows is Iraqi pro-insurgent "political analyst" and former Ba'athist Nizar al-Samarra'i, who regularly touts the achievements of the "resistance" and the defeat of the U.S. project in Iraq.

Al-Rafidayn also reports frequently on the operations of the insurgent group **IAI**.

³⁶ A reference to Iraq's two rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates.

5.2.3.3 Al-Jazeera

The Doha-based, pan-Arab satellite channel has been an avid supporter of insurgents in Iraq since 2003. *Al-Jazeera* devotes part of its daily news coverage to Iraqi and **Al-Qaeda** insurgents through its broadcast of statements and videos by armed groups, as well as interviews with Sunni Arab insurgent leaders in Iraq. On April 11, 2007, *Al-Jazeera* conducted an hour-long interview with the spokesman for the **IAI**. In May 13, 2007, news broadcasts, *Al-Jazeera* covered an **ISI/Al-Qaeda** claim that it had captured three U.S. soldiers, played a tape by the **Mujahidin Army** showing the destruction of a U.S. Army Humvee, and detailed a statement by three insurgent groups blaming **Al-Qaeda** for the deaths of 12 of their field commanders.

5.2.3.4 Al-Firdaws (Caliphate Voice Channel)

Announced with considerable fanfare in a January 20, 2007, press release, the *Caliphate Voice Channel* (Sawt al-Khilafa in Arabic; the station’s logo identifies it as CVC) was conceived as an online television station to broadcast jihadist propaganda materials. According to the schedule included with the initial press release (see Figure 60), *CVC* broadcast a variety of jihadist materials, including “Selections of Jihadist Operations (Iraq)” and films by insurgent groups such as the **Mujahidin Army**, **Ansar al-Sunnah**, and the **IAI**. At present, *CVC* is no longer operating at the web address listed in the January 20, 2007, press release.

الأحد والاثنين (9-10 محرم)			
1- إعادة (خطاب) الجزء الأول 2- مختارات عمليات جهادية (العراق)	1- إعادة جهاد أكاديمي (الجهة) 2- مختارات عمليات جهادية (العراق)	1- إعادة (فادمون) لبك	1- أشرطة لله (معد الفرائي) 2- أشرطة مرتبة
الثلاثاء والأربعاء (11-12 محرم)			
1- الجهاد في تركستان	مختارات عمليات جهادية (أفغانستان) 2- عودة التاريخ جامع	1- مختارات عمليات جهادية (أفغانستان) 2- إعادة لكن لله ربي	1- أشرطة مرتبة 2- حبيب الروس 2
الخميس والجمعة (13-14 محرم)			
1- سوكون الدين كله لله 2- مختارات عمليات جهادية (العراق)	1- إعادة المغلقة 1+2 من حلقات الدعوة الإسلامية للمقاومة العالمية 2- أشرطة مرتبة	1- فيلم عشرة السنت 2- مختارات عمليات جهادية (العراق)	1- إعادة كأس العالم (صوت الخلافة) 2- مختارات عمليات جهادية (العراق)

Figure 60. The broadcast schedule of the online Caliphate Voice Channel

5.3 Conclusions

5.3.1 Reach and Impact

The reach of Iraqi insurgent media is global and seeks to promulgate a message that the resistance is conquering occupation forces in Iraq. **ISI/Al-Qaeda** has by far the largest reach and impact on would-be foreign fighters and its supporters, in part because of its ideology, which espouses a localized version of global jihad. The impact of its message across the Arab world can be seen in the numbers of Saudis, Egyptians, and Palestinians viewing their materials online (see Figure 61). It is also evidenced in the nationalities of foreign fighters detained in Iraq, with Palestinians being the exception, as they cannot easily travel and have not been found in large numbers in detention. It should also be noted that Syrian access to the Internet is heavily controlled by the state, and the number of Syrians viewing insurgent web pages is difficult to measure.

While it is impossible to gauge the full reach of the websites that distribute insurgent materials without access to internal administrative information, rough data obtained from alexa.com provide a general guide. As the accompanying graphs show, the most popular websites carrying insurgent and pro-insurgent materials are equal, and in some cases superior, in reach to many mainstream Arab media sites.

ISI/Al-Qaeda operates a sophisticated media machine that is more polished than those of homegrown insurgent groups. This could be due to a variety of factors, including its ability to make use of foreign financial support and professional graphic designers. They are able to outsource more easily than

home-grown insurgent groups, who are more likely to rely on support staff located inside Iraq. Nevertheless, all insurgent groups have their own media units responsible for promoting the groups' activities.

Home-grown insurgents are concerned primarily with the struggle for power within Iraq and do not see themselves as part of a larger, let alone global, movement (see Section 6.3, Message and Ideology). Nevertheless, their Internet-based media products reach a global audience and shape perceptions in the Arab world. While home-grown groups do not




Figure 61. Materials from alexa.com showing the reach of the Ana al-Muslim forum (expressed as the percentage of all Internet users who visit the site) and a geographical breakdown of visitors

have a policy of recruiting foreign fighters, they may receive financial support from abroad—from the Iraqi diaspora or from sympathizers in other Arab countries—and their media efforts would only benefit such activities.

5.3.2 The Amplification Effect

There are a variety of means for amplifying the insurgent message. Materials posted to insurgent group homepages are regularly picked up and posted to broader forums. A message or video posted to one forum is then reposted to other forums, thereby amplifying the message to potentially thousands of Internet users (see Figure 62). From there, mainstream Arab media access the materials and use them in their print and broadcast reports. For example, Al-Jazeera often runs video clips from insurgent attacks in its newscasts.

In an April 11, 2007, interview with the spokesman for the IAI, *Al-Jazeera* showcased the infamous *Sniper Of Baghdad* video both in the lead-in to the interview and preceding and following commercial breaks (see Figure 63). On May 13, 2007, a typical broadcast day, *Al-Jazeera* news coverage included an **ISI/Al-Qaeda** claim that it had captured three U.S. soldiers, a tape by the **Mujahidin Army** showing the destruction of a U.S. Army Humvee, and a statement by three insurgent groups blaming **Al-Qaeda** for the deaths of 12 of their field commanders.

Mainstream Arab dailies also serve to amplify the message of the Sunni insurgency by using insurgent press releases and statements as the basis for their coverage of events in Iraq.

The release of a particularly graphic video, such as **ISI/Al-Qaeda's** recorded execution of 20 employees of the Interior and Defense ministries, is often treated as an event in and of itself. Among leading Arabic-language newspapers, *Al-Quds al-Arabi* stands out for its sympathetic coverage




Figure 62. Following the trail, from the ISI/Al-Qaeda website to a forum to a newspaper website to Al-Jazeera



Figure 63. Al-Jazeera interviews IAI spokesman Ibrahim al-Shammari; note the obscured face and IAI website address

of the insurgency and corresponding use of insurgent materials. The Saudi-owned dailies *Al-Hayat* and *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* also refer to insurgent sources and materials but make a greater effort to distance themselves from the subject matter.

Additionally, individual supporters offer compilation videos pieced together from material widely available on the Internet, showcasing images such as attacks on U.S. and Iraqi forces, training camps, classes for insurgents, and armed insurgent presences on the street. Such images seek to convey a message that the insurgency is robust, active, and on the move in Iraq.

6. Analysis and Conclusions

6.1 Target Audience

Anyone with an internet connection can access insurgent media products directly. The delivery platform and nature of the material offered up by insurgents suggest that the primary target audience is young, technically savvy, educated, and often middle-class or above—a generation that will shape the future of the Arab world.

The dominant language of insurgent media is Arabic and the preeminent delivery channels are Arabic-language websites and discussion forums. Most of the audiovisual material is packaged in forms that require a high-speed Internet connection to download files running to several hundred megabytes (although smaller files are also available for users with dial-up connections). And because the bulk of audio-visual materials are available for downloading, not viewing online, they are best accessed at home, rather than from an Internet café, where downloading may not be advisable (because of surveillance) or possible (because of restrictions). Individual users can also reformat downloaded materials as DVDs or audiocassettes for local distribution.

Taken together, these factors point to a relatively well-defined profile for the average consumer of insurgent media products: A native speaker of Arabic with a strong interest in politics and access to a high-speed Internet connection. This consumer most likely resides in a Persian Gulf country, where high-speed Internet access is most widespread in the Arab world, and is probably a member of at least the middle class. Data collected from alexa.com on the geographical spread of visitors to the primary distribution sites for insurgent media support this, with the largest number of visitors to most sites coming from Saudi Arabia (although Egypt and the Palestinian territories are often high on the list as well).

Iraqis themselves, it should be noted, are not the apparent target audience for the insurgent media materials distributed on the Internet, although DVDs with insurgent films are available for sale in Iraq. Intermittent electricity throughout

Iraq and limited Internet access are the primary reasons for this.³⁷ Iraqis also have more pressing concerns. Evidence that insurgent groups treat Iraqis as a separate target audience is found in the printed leaflets distributed within Iraq




Figure 64. A diagram illustrating the distribution of insurgent media products from websites to consumers of mainstream media

³⁷ Given the state of infrastructure in Iraq, it is reasonable to assume that few Iraqis are viewing insurgent websites. As of mid-May 2007, RFE/RL's Radio Free Iraq reported that areas of the capital and some governorates were only receiving one hour of electricity a day. RFI's Al-Basrah correspondent reported on May 17 that the city had been without electricity for four days.

(see Section 5.2.1, Print), which adopt a different tone than materials created for global distribution and focus primarily on specific, local issues.

Within the community of “typical consumers,” two groups stand out (see Figure 64). The first are sympathizers who seek out insurgent materials on the Internet in order to obtain more details than they can find in mainstream Arab media. From the insurgent perspective, of course, sympathizers are important as a potential source of financial support. Recruitment appears to be of lesser importance to insurgent groups, some of which have stated that they neither need nor want foreigners to join the fight. Meanwhile, the group that makes the most active use of foreign fighters—**Al-Qaeda**, currently branded as the **Islamic State of Iraq**—seems to have little difficulty attracting foreigners to act as suicide bombers.

Just as important as potential financial backers are opinion makers, the second community within the “typical users” targeted by insurgent groups. These are the media professionals who create the content of mainstream Arab-language media. It is, of course, their job to follow and report on the media activities of insurgent groups. For the insurgent groups, making materials available to media professionals ensures that the insurgent message reaches a larger audience through the “amplification effect” of mainstream media (see Section 5.3.2, The Amplification Effect).

6.1.1 Failsafe Mechanisms

The active public participation on Iraqi insurgent websites and forums ensures that statements, videos, and other insurgent propaganda, once posted to a site, are replicated on other sites. This failsafe mechanism ensures that if one site is shut down or goes offline, the content of that site is not lost. It can be accessed on a variety of other sites, thereby guaranteeing constant visibility and a steady flow of information potentially to millions of users each day.

6.2 Accuracy and Coherence

Insurgent media do not strive for accuracy. Their purpose is not to inform, but rather to score points in a battle for hearts and minds in the Arab world. As such, they advance numerous unverifiable claims that target a sympathetic consumer who is unlikely to believe the competing claims of alternative official sources and mainstream media.

A good example is the total number of U.S. soldiers insurgent groups claim to have killed. According to the U.S. military, confirmed U.S. deaths in Iraq stood at roughly 3,380 as of May 8, 2007. Insurgent groups put forward various numbers, but generally claim to have killed 25,000–35,000 U.S. troops. The number is not accurate, but it is, roughly speaking, likely to be credible to a reader, viewer, or listener who is hostile to the U.S. presence in Iraq,

sympathetic to the insurgent cause, and deeply skeptical of information from U.S. official sources.

Coherence is not a strong suit of insurgent media. In part, this is a natural consequence of the decentralized, “do-it-yourself” production paradigm (see Section 3.3.1, The Decentralized, ‘Do-It-Yourself’ Media Factory). The same lack of centralization and “do-it-yourself” production model that render insurgent media resilient and abundant acts as an impediment to overall coherence. For example, each insurgent group advances its own claims about the number of U.S. troops killed; taken together, they provide only a rough tally.

6.3 Message and Ideology

6.3.1 Message

The basic message of Iraqi insurgent groups is simple—they are a serious military force that is confronting and defeating the U.S. military, the collaborationist Iraqi government and its military forces, and Shi’ite militias. Most groups, whether global-jihadist or nationalist in orientation, now view Iranian Shi’ite influence as the primary threat to Iraq, and they reflect this in their statements and operations, which are frequently directed against Shi’ite targets. The U.S. presence, while still an important target, now figures less prominently amid a general sense that the United States is preparing to pull its forces out of Iraq in the foreseeable future.

Beyond this general message, insurgent groups have not succeeded in advancing anything resembling a political program that would extend to their vision of a future Iraq. In part, this is a reflection of the number of groups that comprise the insurgency and the resulting lack of coherence in the insurgent media network. On a deeper level, however, it points to a serious weakness in the insurgency, which has rejected the current political process in Iraq but has been unable to articulate a meaningful alternative beyond armed struggle, with no clear aim beyond defeating U.S. forces, the current Iraqi government, and Shi’ite militias.

6.3.2 Ideology

Despite the prevalence of jihadist rhetoric among Iraqi insurgent groups, their political statements reveal two distinct ideological visions of the struggle they are waging. One vision is that of a global jihad, in which the battle for Iraq is only a part of a larger clash of civilizations. The other is that of a more traditional national-liberation struggle. Recent statements by the **IAI** and **Al-Qaeda** underscore the difference.

In an April 11 interview with *Al-Jazeera*, **IAI** spokesman Ibrahim al-Shammari clearly defined his group’s struggle in national terms. Interviewer Ahmad Mansur asked, “Do your goals include causing America to fail abroad

or does your goal relate only to Iraq?” Al-Shammari responded, “No, our goal is the liberation of Iraq from the occupation it is experiencing—the Iranian occupation and the American occupation....”

Al-Shammari described Iran’s influence in Iraq, which he termed an “occupation,” as “more dangerous” than the U.S. “occupation.” He also stated that he knows of no “Shi’ite resistance” to U.S. forces, suggesting that U.S. and Iranian interests largely coincide in their dual “occupations” of Iraq. Nevertheless, Al-Shammari refused to cast the conflict in Iraq in purely sectarian terms, asserting that the **IAI** does not target “innocent” Iraqis—those who do not collaborate with foreigners—whether they are Sunni, Shi’a, Muslim, or Christian. He also stressed that all **IAI** fighters are Iraqis, and that its ranks include no “Arabs” from elsewhere.

By contrast, a mid-April 2007 address by Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, leader of **ISI/Al-Qaeda**, advanced an entirely different vision. Summarizing gains and losses on the fourth anniversary of the fall of the Hussein regime, Al-Baghdadi stated, “Let everyone know that our aim is clear: the establishment of God’s law, and the path to that is jihad in its wider sense.” Earlier in the address, he made it clear that “the outlines of the gains and losses in the past four years” indicate that “jihad has been adopted as the primary solution to drive out the unbelievers and apostates from Muslim countries.”

That their goal extends far beyond Iraq is clear from a recent essay by the **Al-Qaeda**-affiliated writer Abu Mariyah al-Qurashi. In the essay, which summarizes the final work by Abu Umar, a Chechnya-based Saudi radical who was killed fighting with Russian forces, Abu Mariyah provides a rare glimpse of Al-Qaeda’s understanding of Iraq’s role in the global jihad. We quote the passage in full:

The jihad in Iraq is a great historic opportunity that the mujahidin and true scholars must seize and exploit. The defeat of the crusaders in Iraq has far-reaching, historic implications for the region and the entire Muslim nation. These include halting the overall crusader advance that aims to devastate the [Muslim] nation, evicting them from Iraq, cleansing that country of their filth and unbelief, and establishing an Islamic state in Mesopotamia. The defeat of the crusaders in Iraq has significant implications for aiding the mujahidin in Palestine and Afghanistan. For those who have spent decades bemoaning the fate of Palestine and the Al-Aqsa Mosque, and the inability to reach the Holy Land, the chance has come. For the Christian, Protestant, and Jewish Zionists are within arm’s reach in Mesopotamia. So take the battle to them, kill them, and inflict great harm.

Moreover, there are ramifications for the network of collaborationist statelets and their ilk that the crusaders established through the Sykes-Picot Agreement to safeguard their aims and objectives in the region, defend the Jewish state in Palestine, and maintain its borders against attempts to defend Al-Aqsa and help oppressed Muslims. Their ruling regimes will

experience a great shock, God willing, when they see their overlord and defender, the United States, crushingly defeated in Mesopotamia. Undermining these statelets is necessary to break the defensive ring around the Jewish state in Palestine and help Muslims there. This blow, God willing, could be the historic beginning of the end for these quisling statelets or, to be more precise, colonies, which have become forward bases for the crusader campaign against Islam and Muslims.

This global focus stands in direct contradiction to the stated aims of the more nationalist insurgent groups. Perhaps the best statement of the “nationalist” position came in a May 2 statement by the **IAI**, the **Mujahidin Army**, and the Legal Commission of **Ansar al-Sunnah** announcing the establishment of a **Front for Jihad and Reform**.

Though couched in the religious rhetoric employed by all Sunni insurgent groups, the statement refrains from using specifically jihadist terms like “crusaders” and “apostates,” preferring instead to employ the nonreligious terms “occupiers” and “collaborators.” More importantly, while describing the struggle in Iraq as a “jihad,” the statement defines its goals in national, not global, terms: “The complete and actual withdrawal of the occupiers in all their forms and the establishment of God’s faith...”

In an oblique criticism of **ISI/Al-Qaeda**, the statement stresses the need for moderation in matters of faith. The invocations that close the statement retain the national focus, asking God to “defeat the Americans and those who are with them and the Safavids and those who are with them.”

The statement and invocations make no mention of global aims or a broader jihad to remake the Arab-Islamic world. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the three signatories to the statement reject the legitimacy of the current Iraqi government and stress their refusal to take part in the political process as presently constituted.³⁸

6.4 Tendencies and Trends

The most notable trends in the development of Iraqi insurgent media are growing attention to the importance of the insurgency’s media efforts, an increasingly sectarian focus, and a widening rift between nationalist and jihadist groups.

³⁸ According to media reports, Iraqi and U.S. officials have met with nationalist-leaning resistance groups on a number of occasions. For more, see *Amman Talks Could Bring Political Breakthrough*, by RFE/RL freelance contributor Sumedha Senanayake, November 3, 2006 (http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=11&y=2006&id=B72EA5ED-56DD-4E4F-8106-033DE6814793), *Insurgent Groups Differ On Talks With Government*, by Kathleen Ridolfo, June 30, 2006 (http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=06&y=2006&id=4312C166-5C5C-4DD3-86D2-446E0316E743), and *Initiatives On Militias, Armed Groups Raise Concerns*, by Kathleen Ridolfo, RFE/RL Iraq Report, May 5, 2006 (<http://www.rferl.org/reports/iraq-report/2006/05/18-050506.asp>).

6.4.1 Attention to Media

The May 2, 2007, proclamation of the **Front for Jihad and Reform** signed by the **IAI**, **Mujahidin Army**, and Legal Commission of **Ansar al-Sunnah** appeals directly to “the people of the media, speakers and writers. They must tell the truth and cast their arrows at falsehood, for media is half of the battle.” **IAI** spokesman Ibrahim al-Shammari made a similar point in an undated interview posted to the **Muhaj-roon** forum in October 2006, saying, “If an opportunity arises to speak, even on foreign [satellite] channels, not only Al-Jazeera, I am ready, out of a desire to serve jihad in Iraq. As you know, we are in dire need of any media opportunity that will show the true face of jihad in Iraq.”




Figure 65. The cover of a 221-page sympathetic study of “jihadist media in Iraq” released by **Wikalat Haq**

A 221-page study of “jihadist media in Iraq” released by **Wikalat Haq** in spring 2007 is further evidence of the growing attention to the media component of insurgent efforts (see Figure 65). The study, which is strongly sympathetic to the Sunni insurgent cause, opens with the following quotation: “The leading lights of the jihadist media must recognize the importance of their role, for they are on the front lines just as the fighters are. A soldier cannot leave his trench, or else the enemy will attack him at his weak spot...”

The continuing stream of increasingly sophisticated media products distributed through failsafe Internet-based delivery channels comes as confirmation that insurgents are more aware than ever that they are engaged in a battle not just of bullets and bombs, but also a war of images and ideas. With Sunni insurgents fully conscious of the importance of media, and clearly skilled in the creation and distribution of information products, we must expect that their media endeavor will only grow in reach and sophistication.

6.4.2 Sectarian Focus

Against this backdrop of growing attention to media, the products themselves are more sectarian in focus than ever before. Insurgent groups treat the “Iranian threat” as a danger equal to or greater than the U.S. presence,

and insurgent statements claim responsibility for daily attacks against Shi'a-dominated branches of government and Shi'ite militias. While the political statements of nationalist groups such as the **IAI** eschew the rabidly anti-Shi'a rhetoric favored by **ISI/Al-Qaeda**, the distinction is often lost against the larger backdrop of sectarian violence and hate speech.

Recent films released by **Ansar al-Sunnah** and **ISI/Al-Qaeda** show graphic scenes of the Sunni insurgent groups executing Shi'ite employees of the Defense and Interior ministries (see Section 7.1, *A Day in the Life of Insurgent Media*). In both films, the executions are carried out in response to crimes allegedly committed by Shi'a against Sunnis, heightening a sense of mutually reinforcing sectarian reprisals. Another film by **Ansar Al-Sunnah** juxtaposes incendiary comments by Hazim al-A'raji, an aide to Shi'ite leader Muqtada al-Sadr, with footage of the gruesomely mutilated corpses of Sunnis. As al-A'raji urges "Shi'ite believers" to kill "loathsome Ba'athists" and "filthy Wahhabis" and assures the killers that they will go to paradise, the film's unmistakable message to Sunnis is that they face the gravest peril and must take up arms. The combination of hate speech and glorification of violence calls to mind disturbing parallels with the media campaign that preceded the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.³⁹

6.4.3 Rift Between Nationalists and Jihadists

Finally, the rift between nationalist and jihadist groups within the insurgency (see Section 6.3.2, *Ideology*) appears to be widening, with insurgent media reflecting the split. Against a backdrop of basic differences in ideology, with nationalist groups limiting their goals to Iraq and jihadist groups spearheaded by **Al-Qaeda** seeing Iraq as part of a global struggle, open conflict has become more common.

The polemic between the **IAI** and **ISI/Al-Qaeda** that began in early April 2007 was a watershed moment, bringing to light conflicts over approach and

³⁹ The role of the media and hate speech in the Rwandan genocide has been extensively documented. For examples, see *The Graves Are Not Yet Full*, Bill Berkeley, Basic Books, 2001; *Shake Hands with the Devil*, Romeo Dallaire, Random House, 2003; *Leave None To Tell The Story: Genocide In Rwanda*, Alison Des Forges, Human Rights Watch, 1999; *Conspiracy to Murder: the Rwandan genocide*, Linda Melvern, Verso, 2004; *The Media And The Rwandan Genocide*, Allan Thompson, ed., Pluto Press, 2007; Rwanda, *Les Médias Du Génocide*, Jean-Pierre Chrétien, Jean-François Dupaquier, Marcel Kabanda, Joseph Ngarambe, Karthala, 1995; *Broadcasting Genocide: Censorship, Propaganda And State-Sponsored Violence In Rwanda, 1990–1994*, Article 19, 1996. See also the case materials of the "media" trial in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in which Hassan Ngeze, Ferdinand Nahimana, and Jean Bosco Barayagwiza were found guilty of incitement to genocide and other crimes. The cases are currently under appeal. Trial materials are available at: <http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/Ngeze/index.htm> (Hassan Ngeze), <http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/Nahimana/index.htm> (Ferdinand Nahimana), and <http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/index.htm> (Jean Bosco Barayagwiza).

ideology that had simmered for months, if not years. The **IAI** statement sharply criticized **ISI/Al-Qaeda** for issuing baseless accusations against other groups, including the **IAI**; “threatening to kill members of the group [the **IAI**] if they do not swear allegiance to Al-Qaeda or its other names;” killing more than 30 members of the **IAI**, as well as members of the **1920 Revolution Brigades**, **Mujahidin Army**, and **Ansar al-Sunnah**; and killing unarmed Muslims and “soft targets” such as imams and individuals who issue the call to prayer.

The statement also leveled a direct challenge at the organizational model employed by **Al-Qaeda** not only in Iraq, but in other Arab countries, where various regional franchises now exist, such as **Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula** and **Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib**. The **IAI** appealed directly to Osama bin Laden, saying:

“He and his brothers in the Al-Qaeda leadership are responsible on Judgment Day for what is happening on account of their followers. It is not enough to wash one’s hands of their actions; one must also correct them. In the two collections of utterances of the Prophet by Abdallah bin Umar, the Prophet said, “Is not each of you a shepherd, and is not each of you responsible for his flock? The imam must look after his people, for he is responsible for them.” And Al-Faruq⁴⁰ says, “If a beast of burden should stumble in the mountains of Iraq or the Sham,⁴¹ then I would believe that God will call me to account for it and ask, ‘Why did you not make the road passable?’”

The gist of the criticism is that **ISI/Al-Qaeda** is out of control in Iraq, its parent organization is unwilling or unable to bring it to heel, and Osama bin Laden is failing to live up to Islamic standards of leadership. It is a charge that the subsequent polemic, which included responses from **ISI/Al-Qaeda**, failed to disprove, in large part because Osama bin Laden remained conspicuously silent throughout the debate.

The formation of a **Front for Jihad and Reform**, bringing together the **IAI**, **Mujahidin Army**, and Legal Commission of **Ansar al-Sunnah**, came as the formal expression of these groups’ differences with **ISI/Al-Qaeda**. On May 12, 2007, just days after the Front proclaimed its existence, it issued a statement charging **Al-Qaeda in Iraq** with killing 12 field commanders, “most of them from the **Mujahidin Army**,” and asking **Al-Qaeda** to surrender those responsible to the Front’s courts for judgment. While the long-term ramifications of this internal conflict are difficult to predict, insurgent media will provide an invaluable window on its future development, as well as on other trends and tendencies within and around Iraq’s ongoing Sunni insurgency.

⁴⁰ Umar ibn al-Khattab, the second of the four “rightly guided” caliphs (634-644).

⁴¹ Roughly equivalent to present-day Lebanon, Jordan, Israel/ Palestinian Territories, and Syria.

7. Annex: Case Studies

7.1 A Day in the Life of Insurgent Media: April 22, 2007

We survey here one day in the life of insurgent media – April 21. The overview provides a representative sample of the insurgent media products made available on April 21-22 across the delivery platforms enumerated in the report. Websites were accessed on April 22.

7.1.1 Insurgent Group Websites

7.1.1.1 Islamic State of Iraq

The group’s website featured an announcement and download addresses for an April 20 videotaped statement by **ISI/Al-Qaeda**’s official spokesman, proclaiming the formation of the State’s “cabinet.” As is usually the case with such offerings, the videotaped statement was available in a number of formats: high quality (53 megabytes), medium quality (8 megabytes), low quality (1.3 megabytes), mobile-phone quality (2.09 megabytes), and sound only (604 kilobytes).

The site also advertised a new film, dated April 20, titled *The Confessions Of 20 Men Affiliated With The Interior And Defense Ministries*. Produced by **Al-Furqan**, the six-minute film shows 20 men, all in uniform with IDs affixed to their chests, “confessing” to employment in the ministries of defense and the interior. A voiceover explains that **ISI/Al-Qaeda** captured men after the rape of Sabrin al-Janabi (see Section 7.2, The Sabrin al-Janabi Case) and gave the Iraqi government 48 hours to release Sunni women held in Interior Ministry prisons and surrender those responsible for the rape of Al-Janabi. The narrator announces that the deadline expired with no action taken and **ISI/Al-Qaeda**’s court sentenced the “apostates” to death under Islamic law.

The film closes with the execution. The men kneel in a line along the side of a road, blindfolded, while a single individual kills them by shooting them in the back of the head with a pistol. In a clear indication that the violence is being carried out as a “media event,” the execution is filmed from two camera angles; scenes recorded from one camera angle show both the gunman and the cameraman at his side who is recording close-up shots.

7.1.1.2 Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI)

The group’s website featured 11 press releases dated April 21, all of them covering operations conducted on April 19–20. They were titled (in translation):

- Shelling, bomb blasts, and sniper attacks against the occupiers and apostates in the city of Mosul

- Destruction of a Humvee belonging to the crusader forces in Al-Mushahadah district
- Killing of an American soldier by a sniper in north Baghdad
- Destruction of a transport vehicle for the Idolatrous Guard and killing of four in Salman Pak
- Killing of three members of the Apostate Army of the Antichrist in Al-Mada'in district
- Destruction of a vehicle belonging to the apostate Idolatrous Guard and the killing of three of them in south Baghdad
- Destruction of a pick-up truck belonging to Interior Ministry commandoes and the killing of two in Al-Latifayah
- Killing of three members of the apostate police with an explosive device
- Mortar strike against a group of the apostate Army of the Antichrist in Al-Mu'tasim district
- Mortar attack on the headquarters of the occupying American Army in Al-Mashru district
- Wounding of an American soldier by sniper in Al-Mushahadah district

7.1.1.3 Mujahidin Army

Although it was functional on April 22, the group's website did not feature any materials updated more recently than March 20 [2007].

7.1.1.4 JAMI

The most recently updated materials on the group's website dated to March 2007.

7.1.1.5 Jihadist Brigades of Iraq

The most recent operational statement on the group's website described an April 13 IED attack against Interior Ministry commandos that wounded two.

7.1.1.6 Army of the Naqshibandi Tariqah

The most recent material featured on the group's website was an April 1 statement on the possible unification of insurgent groups.

7.1.1.7 Jaysh al-Rashidin

The group's website featured an April 21 announcement of an IED attack against a U.S. Army Humvee and the "killing of those in it." The operational statement was accompanied by a downloadable 2.7-megabyte film lasting 30 seconds and showing an explosion at night. Available for downloading on the same page was a 56-megabyte, 10-minute film titled *Our Jihad Overcomes*

The Occupiers' Ruse, which shows an IED attack against a U.S. Humvee in Al-Dawrah and a missile attack against U.S. forces stationed at Baghdad Airport.

7.1.2 Forums

Many forums featured new and ongoing threads with insurgent materials on April 21. We survey two of the most popular forums. Sections featuring posted statements usually begin with a number of “fixed threads” on popular or noteworthy themes.⁴² The overview notes those as well.

7.1.2.1 Al-Firdaws

The forum does not record the exact times of posted threads. The following materials were dated April 21:

- **Ansar al-Sunnah** (marked “breaking news”): Some of the operations of your brothers, the lions of Al-Hadithah and adjoining areas
- **ISI/Al-Qaeda** (marked “breaking news”): Elimination of three leaders in the gangs of the Army of the Antichrist in Baghdad
- **Ansar al-Sunnah** (marked “breaking news”): More than 20 explosive devices in addition to a violent clash with the crusaders and apostates
- **ISI/Al-Qaeda** (marked “breaking news”): violent attack; death of one of the most prominent aides to the rotten bastard Ammar al-Hakim⁴³
- **ISI/Al-Qaeda**: News report for some southern districts of Baghdad Governorate
- **ISI/Al-Qaeda**: Martyrdom-seeking operation against a stronghold of the crusaders and apostates in Al-Saqlawiyah
- **ISI/Al-Qaeda**: Detonation of an explosive-laden vehicle against a crusader barracks in Al-Saqlawiyah district
- **ISI/Al-Qaeda**: News report for some parts of Al-Rusafah in Baghdad Governorate
- **Ansar al-Sunnah**: Destruction of a tank belonging to the Apostate Guard and the killing of two of its crew near the Al-Kurayat section in north Baghdad
- **Ansar al-Sunnah**: Some of the operations of your heroic brothers in Western district
- **Ansar al-Sunnah**: Destruction of a vehicle belonging to the commandoes and killing of two using an explosive-laden motorcycle in Al-Mada’in
- **Ansar al-Sunnah**: Execution of one of the apostates from the collaborati-onist police in Diyala

⁴² As new threads are posted to forums, they displace older threads. Administrators “fix” particularly important threads so that they remain at the top of the forum despite the addition of new threads.

⁴³ Shi’ite political leader described in the text as a “rotten Safavid heretic”.

- **ISI/Al-Qaeda** (marked “breaking news”): political statement titled *Collapse Of The Plans Of The Crusaders And Their Hangers-on*
Fixed threads available on April 22 were:
- **Al-Furqan** presents issue No. 32 of *Biographies Of Notable Martyrs*
- **Al-Furqan** presents the film *Confessions Of 20 Employees Of The Interior And Defense Ministries*
- **Ansar al-Sunnah** presents the *Top 20* [compilation of attack videos]
- **Al-Furqan** presents [the film] *The Blowing Up Of A Headquarters Of The Peshmerga In Mosul Governorate*
- **Ansar al-Sunnah** presents an audio statement by the leadership of the group **Ansar al-Sunnah**
- **Al-Furqan** presents an audio statement by our master, commander of the faithful, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi [head of **ISI/Al-Qaeda**]
- **Al-Furqan** presents [the film] *Some Of The Efforts By The Soldiers Of The State To Protect Their Brother Civilians*

7.1.2.2 World News Network

World News Network posted all of the materials noted above on **Al-Firdaws**. Also posted on April 21 were:

- **Mujahidin Army**: Missile attack on U.S. forces headquarters at kilometer 39
- **Mujahidin Army**: Destruction of a minesweeper with an explosive device in West Baghdad
- **Mujahidin Army**: Watch the destruction of a Humvee with a disguised explosive device in Al-Ramadi
- **Mujahidin Army**: Mortar attack on U.S. forces headquarters in Al-Fallujah

Fixed threads available on April 22 were:

- *The Nuclear Danger...Shelters and Reasons for Survival*: a packet of materials on the dangers of radiation and ways to survive the fallout from a nuclear attack, including an Arabic translation of an English text titled *11 Steps to Nuclear War Fallout Survival*
- **Al-Nusrah Campaign to Shelter the Palestinians of Iraq** presents *Where to Flee? Materials On The Plight Of Palestinians In Iraq*.
- **Elite of the Jihadist Media** presents the republication of a book on the doctrine of monotheism. Download links did not work.
- **Al-Furqan** presents *Confessions Of 20 Employees Of The Interior And Defense Ministries*
- **1920 Revolution Brigades**: *Position On The Occupation, Its Institutions, And Collaborators* (political statement)

- **1920 Revolution Brigades:** Statement on the latest address by the Amir of **ISI/Al-Qaeda**
- **Ansar al-Sunnah:** Clarification of the official source that distributes **Ansar al-Sunnah**'s statements (April 18)
- **Ansar al-Sunnah:** Denial of the defection of the group's legal section (April 18)

7.2 The Sabrin al-Janabi Case

Manufacturing Sectarian Strife On February 19, *Al-Jazeera* broadcast an interview with a woman identified as Sabrin al-Janabi. She explained in a short, tearfilled monologue that four Interior Ministry officers had raped her earlier that day after detaining her on suspicion of aiding insurgents. The alleged rape of a Sunni woman by Shi'ite officers set off a round of sectarian recriminations between Sunni politicians and Iraq's Shi'ite-led government.⁴⁴ For Sunni insurgents and their supporters, the incident was a propaganda godsend, and insurgent media used it to full effect.

In a good example of how the insurgent message reaches the world through a variety of interconnected platforms, a participant in the **Ana al-Muslim** forum, one of the most popular jihadist forums on the web (see Section 5.1.3, Forums and Message Boards), posted a news report from the hard-line Sunni news site **Islammemo** on February 20. The **Islammemo** report stated that the insurgent group **Ansar al-Sunnah** had distributed leaflets "in several Baghdad neighborhoods threatening swift revenge against the Safavids who attacked the Sunni woman Sabrin al-Janabi." Noting that the leaflets were affixed to the doors of several Baghdad mosques, **Islammemo**'s correspondent explained that they vowed revenge and described the incident as a rebuke to those who call on the "resistance" to stop targeting "national forces."

By February 21, pro-insurgency jihadist forums were boiling with discussions of the latest outrage allegedly perpetrated by Shi'a against Iraqi Sunnis. The same day, the Kuwait-based radical cleric Hamid al-Ali, who frequently addresses Iraq-related issues and is a strong supporter of Islamist elements within the insurgency, posted a poem on his website dedicated to Sabrin al-Janabi. The verses were bitterly sectarian, asking, "Who has given the filth power over our Iraq so that the Magi should be raised high and made rulers?" The poem appeared within minutes on virtually all jihadist forums.

The same day, the **IAI** released a written statement titled *Support For The Female Believers*, vowing that "sleep will not avail us, our eyes will not close, and life will be intolerable until we exact vengeance for every free woman whose chastity and dignity have been taken away." **JAMI** put out a statement

⁴⁴ For more, see *Iraq: Rape Case Highlights Sectarian Power Struggle* Kathleen Ridolfo, RFE/RL, February 21, 2007 (<http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/02/22896c39-741d-4f69-980a-6602e5162912.html>).

on February 20, saying that “they have released their filthy dogs to tear into the bodies of our daughters and sisters.”

On February 22, as **Islammemo** reported Sunni demonstrations in Iraq calling for revenge, **Al-Furqan** released a statement by Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir, official spokesman of **ISI/Al-Qaeda**. In an 11:50 audio recording, Al-Muhajir announced that **ISI/Al-Qaeda** had readied 300 “martyrdom-seekers,” including 50 individuals from the Al-Janabi tribe, for suicide attacks. Also on February 22, the **Albayanat** blog posted a message from the **Mujahidin Army** to the “free women of Iraq” saying that the rape had revealed the “true face” of the Iraqi government and promising revenge attacks.

All four insurgent groups filled their statements with bitterly anti-Shi’ite rhetoric, blaming the rape of Sabrin al-Janabi on the “grandsons of Ibn al-Alqami.” The term refers to a Shi’ite minister who allegedly connived in the Mongol sacking of Baghdad in the 13th century. Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi popularized it as a derogatory catchall for Shi’a in Iraq, and its widespread use by insurgent groups in 2007 points to his enduring influence as an instigator of sectarian strife.

Insurgent groups cemented the status of the Sabrin al-Janabi case as a propaganda cause celebre by dedicating military operations to her. **ISI/Al-Qaeda** announced the Raid of Vengeance for Honor, the **IAI** Support for the Female Believers, and the **Mujahidin Army** the Winds of Rage Raid. What other groups implied with rhetorical broadsides against the Shi’itedominated government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, **JAMI** stated openly, urging insurgents to target “first the forces of the regime and commandos of the Interior Ministry, and second the occupiers.”

The Role of Diasporas in Foreign Policy: The Case of Canada

Marketa Geislerova¹

Reflecting a subtle but profound shift in recent Canadian foreign policy priorities, the tsunami of last year, the chaos in Haiti, the exploding troubles in Sudan are not foreign-aid issues for Canada, they are foreign-policy priorities. They reflect our demography transformation from predominantly European to truly multinational. Problems in India and China and Haiti are our problems because India and China are our motherlands.

John Ibbitson (*Globe and Mail*, 5 August 2005)

Foreign policy is not about loving everyone or even helping everyone. It is not about saying a nation cannot do anything, cannot go to war, for example, for fear of offending some group within the country or saying that it must do something to satisfy another group's ties to the Old Country. Foreign Policy instead must spring from the fundamental bases of a state – its geographical location, its history, its form of government, its economic imperatives, its alliances, and yes, of course, its people. In other words National Interests are the key.

Jack Granatstein (*Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute Conference*, October 2005)

Societies around the world are becoming increasingly diverse. The myth of an ethnically homogeneous state that dominated international relations in the past century has been largely discarded. Propelled by a myriad of causes including, the nature of conflicts, environmental degradation and persistent economic and demographic gaps, people are on the move. While migration has been a constant trait of the international system for centuries, what is new today are

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globalisation-related factors that facilitate and at the same time transform this process. Accessible communications and transportation technologies not only permit people to travel and communicate with more ease than ever before, they also allow them to maintain multiple attachments, nurture new identities and pursue a range of activities across national boundaries. This increasingly open international environment provides fertile ground for the flourishing of diasporas – migrant communities striving to preserve their ethnic and cultural heritage and remain connected to their homelands and kin at large.

Canadian society is a reflection of these global trends. Immigration is growing in importance while the composition and characteristics of *New Canadians* are changing. The major source of immigration has shifted away from Europe and currently centres on Asia, which

Immigration is fuelling two-thirds of Canada's population growth and will likely become the only source of gains by 2030.

Canadian Census 2006

presently accounts for over 40% of newcomers. The majority of *New Canadians* are different from previous waves of immigrants, contributing to growing cultural diversity. They are also increasingly geographically concentrated and many remain intensely connected to their homelands and kin in Canada and abroad.

New immigrants tend to settle in Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec, concentrating in the provinces' largest cities. Toronto has one of the highest proportions of foreign-born inhabitants of all major urban centres in the world: 44% of its total population was born outside Canada. Meanwhile, Vancouver has the highest proportion of visible minorities of all urban areas in Canada, with one in three residents being Asian. Montreal was home to the third largest population of visible minorities among the 2001 census metropolitan areas.² According to a survey on ethnic diversity conducted in 2003, about half of Canadian population aged 15 years and older indicate that they have a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group. Moreover, about 63% of survey respondents who rate their ethnicity high in importance say that maintaining customs and traditions is important. These sentiments varied across and between groups and sometimes declined over time.³

In the recent past, diasporas have acquired more legitimacy and have become more effective in pursuing collective objectives. Experts attribute this development to two main reasons. First, many countries in which diasporas reside have recognised that ethnic minorities are a permanent and important part of their societies. Assimilation or suppression is no longer a viable strategy. Second, the intense and dense networks diasporas weave enable them to interact almost instantaneously through well established channels without

² Statistics Canada, *2001 Census: Analysis Series, Canada's Ethno-Cultural Portrait: The Changing mosaic* (Ottawa, January 2003).

³ Statistics Canada, *Ethnic Diversity Survey: portrait of a multicultural society* (Ottawa, 2003).

exorbitant costs and censorship. The enhanced effectiveness and newly acquired legitimacy have made diasporas more confident and assertive, propelling them to play an increasingly important role within and across national borders.⁴

The growing salience of diasporas, along with other non-state actors, has led some international relations commentators to lament the decline in the importance of the nation-state. Many also wallow in what they perceive to be a national identity crisis. This is partly due to claims that the trans-national activities which diasporas undertake compromise the coherence of state borders and that the attachments they feel toward their host countries are at best ambivalent. These sceptics assume that it is the interests of their homelands that diasporas maintain and strive to advance. They argue that the promotion of ethnically-based interests erodes the ability of resident countries to identify national priorities and in some instances may be down right subversive. Assimilatory immigration policies or the clamp-down on immigration are often the remedies they prescribe.⁵

Alternatively, enthusiasts have come to embrace diasporas as precursors of post-modern social and political systems. They posit that the process of migration and resettlement in the age of globalisation will continue to blur territorial and national boundaries, bringing a keen focus to identities based on other criteria than national affiliation. Rather than trying to stop the process by reasserting 20th century socio-political myths, governments should adjust their practices to affect outcomes in positive ways. Articulation of a multicultural foreign policy where diasporas are seen as aiding rather than hindering national interests would be an example of the latter approach.⁶

This paper explores some of the key pressure points that diaspora activities create for Canadian foreign relations and draws preliminary consequences for foreign and domestic policy. The paper reveals the extent to which globalisation has transformed the international system over the last several decades, bringing supra-state actors and identity to the centre of debate and practice. It analyses competing perspectives on the value of diaspora engagement in foreign policy, drawing on insights from a mature discussion in the United States. The views and concerns of practitioners are sketched out based on interviews with officials from Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT) and other governmental departments. The paper claims that diasporas are likely to increase their influence

⁴ Gabriel Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics At Home and Abroad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

⁵ Fears about the dilution of national identity and the end of the national interest are expressed by several observers, including Samuel Huntington in the United States and Greg Allan or Michael Bliss in Canada. See Samuel Huntington, "The Hispanic Challenge," *Foreign Policy*, March/April 2004 and "The Erosion of American National Interests," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1997; Allan Gregg, "Identity Crisis," *Walrus Magazine*, 1 April 2006, and Michael Bliss, "A Working Non-nation?" *National Post*, 24 March 2006.

⁶ Gabriel Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics At Home and Abroad*, p. 245. For a similar view, see: Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World* (New York: The Guilford Press, 2003) and Yossi Shain, "Multicultural Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1995.

in the future, posing some significant challenges for security and social cohesion but also offering new opportunities for multi-track, multi-cultural diplomacy.

Before embarking, several methodological notes are worth mentioning to lay bare the assumptions this paper makes about diasporas:

- Diasporas are fluid entities that ebb and flow depending on circumstances. While diaspora members by definition care about their homeland and kin, they may be active only on particular issues at a particular time.
- Diasporas have a self-ascribed membership. In other words, it is only the members themselves who can legitimately determine the parameters of their own identities and loyalties.⁷
- The objectives for which diasporas strive and the means they employ depend to a large extent on the reasons behind their displacement and longevity. Some diasporas are generated by a violent conflict while others may be motivated by economic causes. Some diasporas are modern while others are as ancient as the concept itself. Some are linked to established states while others are state-less.
- Diasporas are heterogeneous. The values, practices, goals and interests of their members may not only vary but may differ in fundamental ways. This is especially the case when the cause behind their re-settlement is an intra-state conflict. This makes any attempt at generalising assumptions and conclusions problematic. The conundrum has become especially pertinent in the recent past when terrorist acts perpetrated by a radical few were interpreted in ways implicating entire diasporas from countries with Muslim populations.
- The dichotomy between homeland and host land may be false. The terms suggest that diasporas have an immutable attachment to the country of origin and reside in their final destinations temporarily at the discretion of their “hosts.” This may be true for some, but not for others.

Engaging the Home Country

Trans-national Activities for Political Purposes

Diasporas engage in a range of trans-national activities for political purposes. Forcefully dispersed or conflict-generated diasporas are more prone to be politically engaged than diasporas whose members have moved for economic reasons or in order to improve their standards of living.⁸ While some of these

⁷ This view is promoted, among others, by Steven Vertovec, “The Political Importance of Diasporas,” *Migration Information Source*, 1 June 2005.

⁸ See for instance, Terrence Lyons, “Conflict-Generated Diasporas and Peace-building: A Conceptual Overview and Ethiopian Case Study,” paper presented at the University for Peace Expert Forum on Capacity Building for Peace and Development: Roles of Diasporas, Toronto, 19–20 October 2006.

activities support Canadian foreign policy objectives, others contravene them and may create security risks.

Diasporas are playing an ever increasing role in conflicts around the world. Two key reasons account for this trend: the overall decline in state support for insurgencies and the increase in ethnically-based conflicts.⁹ Experts agree that conflict-generated diasporas are more likely to engage in destructive actions that perpetuate and fuel conflicts. This is due to several inter-related factors, such as the trauma of exile, safe distance from the consequences of drastic actions, guilt and immutable perceptions about the conflict in question. Sheltered in prosperous democracies, these so called long-distance nationalists are well positioned to offer a range of resources their struggling kin at home may lack including money, weapons, shelter, combatants as well as tactical and logistical support. This is especially true when homelands are emerging democracies, failed and failing states or when they are in a midst of an independence struggle.

Canada is not exempt from such activities and some would argue that its multi-cultural make-up and open democratic environment make it particularly vulnerable to abuse by segments of diasporas motivated by homeland struggles. This is the case, for instance, when radical Somali-Canadians are recruited to Islamist militias mounting a civil war in Somalia under the banner of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) finance a bloody civil war in Sri Lanka with funds generated in Canada, or when those promoting a Sikh Khalistan attack national symbols associated with their perceived oppressors on the Canadian soil.

The involvement of diasporas in fuelling or perpetuating conflicts undermines international security and contributes to the persistence of failed and failing states. In some instances Canada's relations with homelands and their regions are affected, in others its relations with allies may be irritated. Legal and ethical conundrums arise in situations where Canadians end up fighting other Canadians, as is the case in Somalia where Canadian nationals backing the transitional government are pitted against those supporting the loose ICU coalition. The situation is bound to become even more entangled if other Canadians are called upon to intervene as a part of an international effort to stem bloodshed.

There are also significant domestic repercussions. Insurgents engaged in bloody struggles eventually return to Canada and may radicalize a new wave of extremists.¹⁰ Radical segments of diaspora often use organised crime to fund

⁹ RAND, *The Role of External Support in Insurgent Conflicts*, 2001.

¹⁰ The impact of combatants returning to Canada on diaspora radicalisation is an important subject of inquiry. According to Stewart Bell, Ottawa is concerned, for instance, that Somali-Canadians who joined hard-line Islamic militias in Somalia return to Canada and radicalize a new wave of extremists. See: Stewart Bell, "Somali-Canadians join African Taliban," *National Post*, 3 April 2007. The growing role of diasporas in terrorism and the role of war veterans returning to their host countries on radicalisation were also raised in a conference held jointly by RAND and the Center for Security Studies in Zurich on the Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism. See: Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, Andrew J. Curiel and Doron Zimmermann, *The Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism*, RAND, 2007.

their activities and to support their long-distance causes. Finally, troubles in far away places can easily spill over to host countries. The riots in France instigated by Algerians in support of Islamists fighting the militarily-controlled government in Algeria or the insurgency mounted by Kurds in Germany in support of their kin against Turkey, both in 1990s, are illustrative of this possibility.

Despite the growing role of diasporas in conflict, many trans-national political activities emanating from Canada are constructive. Many of them are facilitated by the ability of Canadians to hold multiple citizenships and therefore participate in their home countries' political processes. The following four types of diaspora activities actually complement Canadian foreign policy objectives that are linked to supporting freedom and security, democracy, rule of law, and human rights:

1. Diasporas can play a potentially transformative role in their homelands by transferring skills and know-how accumulated in host countries. This is especially the case when home countries are embarking on a transition to democracy after a period of authoritarian or totalitarian rule or following a conflict. Proponents of this process argue that the linguistic and cultural characteristics returning diasporas share with the residents of their homelands make the transfer more seamless.¹¹ Somalia serves as an example with several Somali-Canadians holding high-ranking positions in the transitional government aimed to bring Somalia back from the brink of a disaster.¹² The Haitian community in Canada also expressed the desire to institutionalise a repatriation programme to help reconstruction in Haiti.¹³ However sceptics point out that the seamless transfer of skills and know-how may be complicated by two re-entry challenges: first, returning expatriots may have lost touch with the reality on the ground and second; their return may be resented by those who remained behind under difficult circumstances.
2. Diasporas can strengthen pluralism around the world by promoting tolerance and respect for diversity. The desire of Gino Bucchino, a Toronto Doctor elected to represent the Italian diaspora residing in North America, to "bring Canadian values to the Italian political scene" is illustrative of this point.¹⁴

¹¹ This is the aim, for instance, of the Repatriation of Qualified Afghans program ran by the International Organization of Migration.

¹² At one point, 18 Canadians were part of the Somali Transitional Federal Government, including four Cabinet Ministers. The government leader thought of himself an "honorary Canadian." See Stewart Bell, "Canadians hold power in Somalia," *National Post*, 20 January 2007 and Margaret Wente, "When citizens go a'warring," *Globe and Mail*, 25 January 2007.

¹³ FOCAL, *Final Report: Conférence de Montréal avec la Diaspora haïtienne*, 10–11 December 2004.

¹⁴ Italian-Canadians acquired the ability to elect their representatives to the Italian parliament in 2006. Bucchino won a seat in the North and Central America district and is now representing 400,000 Italian citizens living in a riding that encompasses 16 countries, including Canada. See CBC News, "Canadian wins seat in Italian parliament," 12 April 2006.

3. Experts are exploring ways to harness diasporas as peace-brokers. For instance, a university professor at Lancaster University in the UK, Feargal Cochrane argues that the ability of diasporas to act as an integrative force has been underestimated and largely unexplored by theorists and practitioners alike. This is partly due to the prevalent view that diasporas are a part of the problem rather than a solution. Cochrane has been drawing lessons from the positive role Irish-Americans have had in building peace in Northern Ireland. Related issues were also the topic of a recent University for Peace conference in Toronto, Canada.¹⁵
4. Diasporas can promote human rights and democratic governance in authoritarian home countries. By monitoring and publicising human rights infractions, they can make homeland governments more accountable. However, effective diaspora involvement in trans-national political activities is often constrained by lack of resources. Refugees from authoritarian regimes are often focused on issues related to their re-settlement rather than their home country's human rights record. Moreover, mistrust generated by the regime at home may make such political action undesirable. These are some of the challenges facing the Colombian community in Toronto, for instance.¹⁶

Growing number of observers in Canada agree that diasporas give Canada a hidden advantage which is currently underutilised. They argue that trans-national activities often constitute a form of public diplomacy that shapes the image of Canada abroad and influences the ability of Canadian policy makers to achieve their objectives.¹⁷ Diasporas returning to their home countries to make positive contributions are seen by some as our best diplomats since they spread the "Canadian Creed" by applying knowledge, experience and values acquired in Canada.¹⁸ Diasporas' ties with home countries may also serve as vehicles to expanding and deepening Canada's relationships with the rest of the world. Finally, the integrative power that diasporas can wield helps resolve conflicts, promote democracy, strengthen human rights and ultimately, enhance international security. Proponents of deeper diaspora engagement argue that it is not only beneficial for foreign policy but also facilitates social cohesion, diminishing the desire of *New Canadians* to support far-away struggles and lost causes.

¹⁵ See University for Peace, "Capacity Building for Peace and Development: Roles of Diaspora, Final Report," Diaspora Conference 2006.

¹⁶ Pilar Fiano-Alcala and Luin Goldring, "A Colombian Diaspora? Characteristics, tensions and challenges in trans-national engagements," Diaspora Conference 2006.

¹⁷ Luin Goldring et al., "The Politics of Trans-national Ties: Implications for Policy, Research, and Communities," YCAR-CERLAC Workshop Report, 7-8 March 2003.

¹⁸ The word "creed" was borrowed from Yossi Shain who has written on diasporas in the U.S. and their role in spreading what he calls the "American Creed." Yossi Shain, "Multicultural Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1995.

Trans-national Activities for Non-political Purposes

Diasporas engage in a range of economic activities for non-political purposes. Among them, remittances, trade and investment are perhaps the most significant. These activities are pertinent to Canadian foreign policy inasmuch they alleviate poverty, contribute to economic development of poorer countries and make Canada more prosperous.

Remittances, or financial transfers from diasporas to their kin at home, are growing world-wide. In 2006, recorded remittances sent home by migrants from developing countries exceeded \$200 billion US dollars, up from \$193 billion in 2005 and more than double the level in 2001.¹⁹ Approximately 21% of landed immigrants remit money to friends or relatives abroad during their first two years in Canada. This translates into an average of \$62.9 million Canadian dollars or \$1966 per capita sent abroad each year.²⁰

The importance of remittances for poverty reduction in homelands has been well researched.²² In some countries, such as Somalia and Haiti, remittances provide a lifeline for the poor. In these instances, remittances are used to finance basic human needs, education, health and entrepreneurship.

Selected Facts about Remittances²⁰

- *Largest source of external finance for the developing countries as a group.*
- *Larger than foreign direct investment.*
- *More than twice as large as official aid received by developing countries.*
- *Exceed 10% of GDP in 22 developing countries*

On the one hand, remittances are more stable than private capital flows and may even be counter-cyclical relative to the country's economy. They alleviate credit constraints and may act as a substitute for financial development. On the other hand, remittances may reproduce and exacerbate social divisions, facilitate a brain-drain and may cause currency appreciation or lead to dollarisation of nascent market economies.²³ Some critics would add that rather than supporting collective development goals of poor countries, they simply fuel individual consumption. While some community-based remittances do exist, they are rare. Therefore, good policies in home and host countries are necessary to enhance their positive developmental effects.

¹⁹ Dilip Ratha, "Leveraging Remittances for Development," Paper presented at the Second Plenary Meeting of the Leading Group on Solidarity Levies to Fund Development, Oslo, 6–7 February 2007.

²⁰ Per Unheim, "New Data Sheds Light on Remittance Sending Patterns of Immigrants in Canada," *Focal Point*, March 2007, Volume 6, Number 2, p.3.

²¹ Dilip Ratha, *Leveraging Remittances for Development*.

²² Kathleen Newland and Erin Patrick, "Beyond Remittances: The Role of Diaspora in Poverty Reduction in their Countries of Origin," *Migration Policy Institute*, July 2004.

²³ Dilip Ratha, *Leveraging Remittances for Development*.

For many countries, diasporas are a source of trade and investment. By facilitating host to home country transfers of resources, goods and services, knowledge, technology and investment; trans-national entrepreneurship contributes to economic development in home countries. Many now have diaspora policies aimed at attracting investment from ex-patriots. China is a good example of this model, with 60% of incoming Foreign Direct Investment coming from the Chinese diaspora.

Trans-national businesses also bring benefits for the host country. They can bridge cultural and linguistic divides and facilitate Canada's economic activity around the world, generate new business, and ease socio-economic integration. The benefits of the bridging role are especially apparent when entering new markets such as those of China and India.²⁴ According to a recent study by the Asia Pacific Foundation, there is a positive relationship between the inflow of immigrants and bilateral trade. The study claims that in Canada, each 10% increase in immigrant inflow leads to a 1% increase in exports and a 3% increase in imports. For instance, between 1995 and 2004, each 1000 increase in the number of immigrants from China was associated with about a \$700 million increase in Canada's trade with China. Furthermore, nearly three-quarters of trans-national entrepreneurs have helped Canadian firms to do business in their home countries or home country firms to do business in Canada.²⁵

Entrepreneurs from diaspora networks also create businesses that generate opportunities and jobs for all Canadians. Finally, some argue that entrepreneurship offers an alternative way of immigrant socio-economic integration. This is because doing business in Canada requires the ability to navigate within the Canadian system and the financial independence achieved through successful entrepreneurship means *New Canadians* do not have to rely on social assistance programmes.

Trans-national political and economic activities occur at the backdrop of intense social and cultural linkages. These linkages may be based on family ties or kinship obligations and are facilitated by well established communication

More than 3 in 10 of the 9.1 million people who had family living in their homelands reported contact at least once a month during the past year. The level of contact varied across and among groups and declined over time.

The Ethnic Diversity Survey

networks. Peggy Levitt, a sociologist studying trans-nationalism at Harvard,

²⁴ See Wenhong Chen and Barry Wellman, "Canada in China: Doing Business at Home and Away," *Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada*, February 2007 and Prithi Yelaja, "Trade deal with India a natural fit for Canada," *Toronto Star*, 18 June 2007.

²⁵ Wenhong Chen and Barry Wellman, "Canada in China: Doing Business at Home and Away."

refers to these flows from host to home country as “social remittances.”²⁶ She posits that frequent contact between diasporas and their kin at home transforms both communities at the same time – remoulding ideas, behaviours and identities in ways similar, or perhaps even more efficient, to those of formal and informal repatriation schemes in time of reconstruction.

Some argue that Canada should capitalise on the bridge-building and wealth-generating role trans-national entrepreneurs from diaspora communities can play and call for the development of a diaspora policy. They say that Canada could also learn from countries like China or India and try to engage better its own growing “Canadian diaspora” living abroad, be it in Taiwan or the United States.²⁷

Engaging the Host Country

Diasporas: Legitimate Influence or a Parochial Capture?

Many diasporas complement their trans-national activities by exerting direct pressure on host governments through organised lobbies. The phenomenon is much more prevalent in the United States, where the power of the so called “ethnic lobbies” has been a subject of heated discussions in the past. American political scientist Thomas Ambrosio defines classical ethnic lobbies as “political organisations established along cultural, ethnic, religious or racial lines that seek directly or indirectly influence foreign policy in support of their homeland and or kin abroad.”²⁸ While comprehensive, the definition does not capture the reality that diaspora organisations are often driven by elites that may not fairly represent all their members. This is especially the case for new diaspora members who are impoverished refugees who find integration into Canadian society daunting and often rely on these organisations for their resettlement needs. In this context they may be subject to manipulation. Another point worth mentioning is that governments are reactive in engaging diasporas and therefore leave out silent “diaspora majorities.”

The degree of success that diaspora lobbies or organisations have in affecting foreign policy depends on the strategies they employ. In democracies diasporas may have a decisive voice in winning key electoral ridings. Elected officials may either belong to a diaspora community or represent a large diaspora-based constituency. In some instances, diaspora organisations may also serve as key coalition partners to political parties running for office. Once in power, such pre-election partnerships bear on attitudes, policy formulation

²⁶ Peggy Levitt, *Social Remittances: Migration Driven Local-Level Forms of Cultural Diffusion*, *IMR* Vol. 32 No. 4 (Winter 1998) p. 926.

²⁷ See, Kenny Zhang, “Recognizing the Canadian Diaspora,” *Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada*, Number 41, March 2006.

²⁸ Thomas Ambrosio, “Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy,” in *Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Praeger, Westport, 2002), p. 2.

and resource allocation. In Canada, commentators are increasingly wary of what they call “ethnic politics.” Indeed, in a recent newspaper article, Naresh Raghubeer argued that ethno-politics is poisoning Canadian democracy and warned about the dangers of “ethnic and religious vote-buying.” He went on to say that “the quest for votes means politicians are less willing to differentiate between moderates and extremists.”²⁹ Another consequence of the tendency on the part of some Canadian politicians to cater to ethnically-based interests is that homeland issues, including conflicts, may be increasingly reflected in government policies.³⁰

The appointment of Sergio Marchi – a Canadian of an Italian descent, as Canada’s Minister of International Trade in the late 1990s generated increased attention to bilateral relations between Canada and Italy and led to a myriad of diaspora-driven official events. The keen desire to strengthen ties between the two countries led some close observers to wonder about which country the former Minister actually represented.³¹ The electoral balance held by the Tamil diaspora in some ridings serves as another example of what some see as undue influence of powerful ethnic lobbies. Sceptics would argue that it was among the main factors explaining the lateness in the Government of Canada decision to add the LTTE to the list of terrorist organisations. Furthermore, the desire of some Members of Parliament to cater to their large Tamil constituencies has in the past contradicted Canadian policy toward the conflict raging in Sri Lanka by catering to Tamil separatist groups while ignoring protocol and concerns on the part of the Sri Lankan central government. The blindfold approach some politicians take when dealing with the Sikh community in Canada has also raised eyebrows. Many have ignored that some of their Sikh interlocutors openly revere fallen terrorists, including the suspected perpetrators of the Air India bombing.³² Visits to the Punjab, that have little to do with official business, have been made in the past, at the cost of our relationship with the Indian government.³³

Diaspora organisations also seek to shape the agenda of the media, public organisations and governments by drawing attention to pertinent issues, sharing information and providing policy oversight. In some instances, the ultimate goal of these efforts is to influence public opinion in order to gain wide-spread sympathy and backing. The LTTE was particularly successful in the

²⁹ Naresh Raghubeer, “How ethno-politics poisons democracy,” *National Post*, 31 July 2007.

³⁰ See, for instance: Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, “Domestic Demographics and Canadian Foreign Policy,” paper presented at the CDFAI Annual Conference, 31 October 2005.

³¹ Off the record interviews with officials from DFAIT.

³² Air India Flight 182 originated in Vancouver, stopped in Toronto and Montreal and was en route to India *via* London when a bomb went off on June 22, 1985. It was Canada’s worst mass murder, 329 people were killed. A second, linked bomb, which was planted in a suitcase on another Air India flight on the very same day, killed two baggage handlers when it exploded at Japan’s Narita airport. See CBC coverage of the Air India Bombing at <http://www.cbc.ca/news/airindia/>.

³³ Off the record interviews with officials from DFAIT.

past in using publicity and propaganda to galvanise international support for the Tiger cause while discrediting Colombo.³⁴ In another example, the Armenian Community in Canada has claimed a major victory when Prime Minister Harper did not back away from his commitment to recognise the deaths of an estimated 1.5 million Armenians in Ottoman Turkey in 1915 as genocide when he was in the opposition. In retaliation, the Turkish government recalled its ambassador to Canada, withdrew from a planned joint military exercise and cancelled a visit of Turkish Parliamentarians.

In rare instances, radicals within diaspora communities in Canada attempt to influence policy or raise awareness by resorting to violence. This was the case when Sikh terrorists blew up the Air India flight 182 in 1985 or assassinated the editor of the *Indo-Canadian Times*. Opponents of Sikh violence have been frequently intimidated or beaten, including the former British Columbia Premier and Liberal Health Minister Ujjal Dosanjh. Violence was used by Armenian extremists expressing their opposition to the Turkish government on several occasions. In 1982 the Turkish Commercial Councillor to Canada was paralyzed by Armenian nationalists at his Ottawa apartment. In the same year, a Turkish military attaché was assassinated while sitting in his vehicle at a traffic light. Three years later, a group of Armenian terrorists seized the Turkish embassy, killing a Canadian security guard. The latest threat of violence is perceived to come from radical Muslims associating themselves with the causes of Osama Bin Laden and other terrorist organisations. The link between their activities and diaspora politics is tenuous and highly contentious since these individuals often act on their own and appeal to ideological and religious causes rather than those based on national or territorial lines.

Stephen Saideman at McGill University points out ethnic lobbies can have disproportionately large influence in public policy for three key reasons: 1) advantages related to organising small groups, 2) unity facilitated by a narrow focus, and 3) apathetic majorities.³⁵ Their influence is further enhanced if they have mainstream support, access to government and a range of supportive relationships, including kin abroad. The factors that limit diaspora influence include: lack of political mobilisation, political repression by host states, fierce competition from rival groups or a focus so narrow that coalition building is impossible.

Many observers in the U.S. agree that ethnic lobbies play an important and sometimes even decisive role in the formulation of foreign policy. Recently, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt created a controversy following a release of a paper they co-wrote on what they argue is the great and undue influence of the Israel lobby on U.S. foreign policy.³⁶ It would seem that Canadian

³⁴ RAND, *The Role of External Support in Insurgent Conflicts*.

³⁵ Stephen Saideman, "The Power of the Small: The Impact of Ethnic Minorities on Foreign Policy," *SAIS Review*, vol. XXII, no. 2, Summer-Fall 2002.

³⁶ John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," *London Review of Books*, Vol. 28, No. 6, 23 March 2006.

foreign policy is more insulated from the pressure of diaspora organisations as well as other interest groups. Nevertheless, the benefits and pitfalls of engaged diasporas in the policy-making process are debated in Canada, much as they are in the U.S. This is especially true now, following the release of some of the 2006 Census data, which underline the importance of immigration for Canada’s growth and prosperity and the potential for minorities to assert their voices in Canada’s affairs more authoritatively.

Ambrosio summarises the U.S. debate in a dichotomy which posits diasporas either as “legitimate influence” or “parochial capture.” While the former category includes arguments in support of multicultural foreign policy, the later insists that ethnic engagement is detrimental to foreign policy formulation. Both arguments are summarised in the table below:³⁷

Diasporas as Legitimate Influence	Diasporas as Parochial Capture
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Multicultural foreign policy is a reflection of the liberal democratic ethos. 2. It respects the diversity of the United States. 3. It serves as a correction for historically “white” foreign policies. 4. It helps to resist the trend toward isolationism. 5. It spreads democratic principles throughout the world. 6. Ethnic identity groups can reinforce U.S. interests. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ethnic interest groups often put their own interests ahead of “American” interests. 2. They undercut the foundations of American democracy. 3. They may be agents of foreign (and possibly hostile) governments. 4. They promote an incoherent foreign policy. 5. They resist/prevent necessary changes in foreign policy. 6. Certain ethnic interest groups are too powerful. 7. They may get the United States involved in conflicts where no American interest is threatened.

Both views have resonance in Canada. Some Canadian academics would argue that diasporas, represented by ethno-cultural organisations, are comparable to narrow interest or pressure groups and are largely detrimental to the pursuit of a coherent national interest.³⁸ These observers point to the drawbacks of catering to ethnic interests and caution that such practice could have dire consequences for foreign policy. The proponents of diaspora engagement argue that they are legitimate actors on the Canadian political scene, forging

³⁷ Ambrosio, 200–201.

³⁸ Denis Stairs et al., “In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Insecure World,” *Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute*.

a new style of democratic governance. Their exclusion is seen as detrimental not only to the quality and effectiveness of foreign policy but also the cohesion of Canadian society.³⁹

Views from Within

Foreign policy makers at DFAIT have mixed views about the value that diaspora organisations bring to foreign policy. Many agree that their involvement raises the cost of decision making. This is especially the case when government policies differ from those promoted by diaspora groups. Officials are required to respond to criticism and manage potential public relations implications while navigating in a highly charged political environment. Policy makers consumed by finding solutions to complex ethnically-based conflicts expressed their frustration with lobby groups representing the conflicting parties, arguing that their engagement undermines Canada's position as an honest broker. From their experience, conflict-generated diasporas rarely contribute to peaceful, equitable solutions. Despite this caution, several policy makers insisted that diaspora oversight does make for a better foreign policy as long as it is adequately balanced.

A majority of those interviewed did not believe that diaspora organisations have a significant influence on the formulation of Canadian foreign policy, although they do sometimes shape the agenda by drawing attention to their concerns and causes. The small "r" realists pointed out that "it's the United States, stupid" and that the importance of Canada's relationship with its Southern neighbour subsumed foreign policy issues involving distant diaspora concerns. Others believed that diasporas may have important insights but qualified their statement by stressing the necessity of getting the whole picture. A sentiment that it is inevitable to engage diasporas in public policy within the framework of a multi-cultural society was also voiced along with the view that diaspora engagement can be used as a tool to send messages to targeted domestic and international audiences and help *New Canadians* better integrate into Canadian society.

The issue of the pressure that diasporas put on resource allocation by appealing to the Government's obligations toward Canadians traveling, visiting and living abroad was also broached. The implications of these obligations came to sharp relief in the recent evacuation of Lebanese Canadians from southern Lebanon. The attention and resources directed to addressing consular cases, including those of Maher Arar and Zahra Kazemi, were also, at least in part,

³⁹ Audrey Kobayashi, "Advocacy from the Margins: The Role of Minority Ethno-cultural Associations in Affecting Public Policy in Canada" in Keith Banting eds., *The Non-profit Sector in Canada: Roles and Relationships* (Kingston, Ont.: School of Policy Studies, 2000) and Lloyd Axworthy et al., "The Role of the Canadian Diaspora in Global Diplomacy and Policy-making," Paper prepared for the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, University of Winnipeg, December 2005.

garnered by diaspora pressure. The cost of the Lebanese evacuation in particular unleashed a public debate about Canada's multiple citizenship policy and its impact not only on Canada's resources but also the country's identity and social cohesion. Critics of the government policy asked whether "Canadians in passport only" should be entitled to the same bundle of benefits as those Canadian nationals who make their permanent home in Canada and regularly contribute to the state coffers.⁴⁰ To these rumblings, one high-ranking DFAIT official, now retired, retorted: "Canadians are Canadians, are Canadians."

Officials at the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) have worked with diasporas for development in the past in informal ways. They engage diasporas as development actors and policy stakeholders in three key ways: through supporting research, funding projects and promoting dialogue. Reflecting Canadian interests in Haiti, CIDA has recently launched a development initiative involving the Haitian diaspora. The initiative provides financial support to *Regroupement des organismes canado-haïtiens pour le développement* (ROCAHD), by financing volunteers (some of whom are Haitian but not all) and through the financing of nine projects run jointly by diaspora organizations and Canadian NGOs. Since these projects are in their initial stages, evaluation is not yet available. Officials admit that there are still many questions surrounding diaspora-based development policies. They are grappling with definitional issues and have sought lessons learnt from other countries. Concerns about fair access to programmes based on merit rather than "ethnicity" have also been expressed. However, they acknowledged that remittances and participation in policy dialogue are among the two biggest contributions the Haitian diaspora is currently making to foreign and development policy.

Multicultural Foreign Policy for the 21st Century?

Trans-national activities are diverse, increasing and difficult to manage. Some undermine Canadian foreign policy objectives while others complement them. A growing body of observers is advocating foreign policies that impede those activities that are harmful to international security and prosperity and to facilitate those that are beneficial. There is also a growing consensus that Canada is not capitalising on the positive roles diasporas could play in international relations as teachers, bridge-builders, diplomats, wealth-generators and peace-makers, wasting away what they would call a "hidden advantage." Instead, much attention and resources are dedicated to addressing security-related challenges some diasporas pose within open, multi-cultural democracies like Canada.

While it is difficult to measure the impact diaspora organisations have on foreign policy by directly engaging the Canadian government, it is clear that as diasporas become more represented in the governing structures their con-

⁴⁰ See Andrew Cohen, "Canadian in passport only," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 24 July 2007.

cerns push their way into the Canadian mainstream. Many of these concerns parallel Canadian interests abroad. However, when they do not, they present policy makers with a challenging balancing game, which often leaves them doubting whether diasporas are a legitimate influence or a parochial capture. Policy makers will come under increasing pressure to formulate policies that are responsive to the needs and concerns of diasporas without compromising Canada's overall security and prosperity. Care will also have to be taken that policies are well balanced, diaspora contributions evaluated in a regional context, and the interests of Canada's allies considered.

Trans-national activities will continue to blur territorial boundaries and diminish state monopoly over foreign relations. Foreign Ministries around the world, many of which are already seeing their influence in international relations diminished, are re-evaluating their role. Among the options they have before them is to harness the dynamic trans-national networks diaspora weave in order to become more relevant and effective. Facilitating and enhancing constructive activities diasporas undertake on behalf of their homelands and kin could strengthen Canada's multi-track diplomacy and make DFAIT more relevant to all Canadians.

Identities and loyalties will also likely continue to fragment, posing significant challenges for formulating foreign policies based on collective goals. Indeed, the rapidly changing demographic make-up of Canada has many Canadian thinkers pondering about Canada's destiny at the outset of the 21st century. Metaphors describing Canada's shifting identity abound. Just to mention a few, Yann Martel has sparked a lively debate when he referred to Canada as the "greatest hotel on Earth" upon accepting a Booker Prize in 2002. Since then Michael Bliss has called Canada a "working non-nation," Don Gillmor an "abstraction," Andrew Cohen a "virtual nation" and Allan Gregg a "no-name supermarket." These seemingly abstract sociological musings raise important questions about directions in Canada's foreign policy and point to future debates. The challenge for policy makers will be to bridge growing cultural divides so that collective goals can be set and national interests pursued as current demographic trends continue and trans-national activities intensify.

ANNEX 1

Selected facts about immigration and *New Canadians*:⁴¹

- Immigration to Canada is growing. Census data show that the proportion of population born outside of Canada has reached 18.4% – the highest level in 70 years. This makes Canada second only to Australia in terms of its proportion of foreign born inhabitants.
- The source regions are also changing. In the past decade, over 40% of all immigrants came from Asia, with China being the leading country of birth, followed by India, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Taiwan. Migration flows from Europe, the traditional source region of immigrants in the past, has been steadily declining. European immigrants come from Poland, United Kingdom and Romania. Other source countries include: Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Mexico, Somalia, Algeria and South Africa.
- *New Canadians* bring with them diverse cultures and religions that are quite different from the initial waves of predominantly European settlers. More than 200 different ethnic origins were reported in the Census question on ethnic ancestry.
- New immigrants and their descendants account for most of our visible minorities (soon majorities in big cities), with the Chinese being the largest visible minority group, followed by South Asians and Blacks. The proportion of individuals who identified themselves as visible minorities has grown, reaching 13.4%.
- New immigrants tend to settle in Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec, concentrating in the provinces' largest cities.
- Two thirds of new immigrants come in the economic-class category (67%). Family-class immigrants represented about 27% and the smallest proportion of new arrivals, about 6%, were refugees.
- High proportion of newcomers has university education and most reported knowledge of at least one official language.
- The majority of the newest immigrants tend to fall into younger working age brackets.
- Immigrants settled where they could join family and friends, however, job prospects are important for economic-class immigrants.
- Many *New Canadians* speak a non-official language at home.

⁴¹ Sources include: Statistics Canada, *2001 Census: analysis series, Canada's ethno-cultural portrait: the changing mosaic* (Ottawa, January 2003); Statistics Canada, *Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada: Process, progress and prospects* (Ottawa, 2003) and Statistics Canada, *Ethnic Diversity Survey: portrait of a multicultural society* (Ottawa, 2003).

ANNEX 2

Key Ethnic Diversity Survey findings:⁴²

- Half of the population aged 15 years and older indicated that they had a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group. These sentiments vary across and between groups and decline over time. Strong sense of belonging was reported by 78% of Filipinos, 65% of East Indians, 65% of Portuguese, 60% of French Canadians, 58% of Chinese and 56% of Italians.
- About 63% of survey respondents who had rated their ethnicity (other than Canadian) high in importance said that maintaining customs and traditions was important. Some ethnic groups, regardless of the number of generations in Canada, had a high proportion of those who had rated their ancestry highly and who also rated their customs and traditions as important. For example, 92% of Punjabis who rated their ancestry highly also rated their customs and traditions as important, as did 81% of Greeks, 79% of Filipinos and 76% of Jamaicans.
- Participation in groups or organizations was less common among the first generation of immigrants than among their descendants, but it increased over time. The first generation tended to have a higher participation rate in ethnic or immigrant associations.
- First generation of immigrants was more likely to vote the longer they are in Canada. Nearly 8 in 10 Canadians eligible to vote said they had voted in the last federal and provincial elections, while 6 in 10 said they had voted in the last municipal election. This was true regardless of the number of generations a person or their family had lived in Canada.
- Some immigrants feel occasionally uncomfortable or out of place because of their ethno-cultural characteristics. 13% said they feel so only rarely and 10% had such feelings most or all of the time.
- Visible minorities are more likely to feel uncomfortable or out of place. In total, 24% of all visible minorities in Canada said that they felt uncomfortable or out of place all, most or some of the time. Visible minorities may feel uncomfortable for a longer period of time than their non-visible minority counterparts after arriving in Canada.
- 86% of Canadians said they did not feel they had experienced any discrimination or unfair treatment in Canada because of their ethno-cultural background during the previous 5 years. 6% said they felt it rarely, 5% sometimes and 7% sometimes or often.
- One in five visible minorities reported discrimination or unfair treatment sometimes or often (20%), 15% said they experienced such treatment

⁴² Statistics Canada, *Ethnic Diversity Survey: portrait of a multicultural society* (Ottawa, 2003).

only rarely. Among visible minorities discrimination or unfair treatment does not seem to diminish significantly over time.

- Race or colour was the most common reason for perceived discrimination or unfair treatment.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Post-Conflict States: Challenges of Local Ownership

Atsushi Yasutomi and Jan Carmans¹

Introduction

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a vital measure for building sustainable peace in post-conflict states. Although the significance of SSR has recently gained recognition in peace-building literature, deeper understanding of what it entails has yet to be fully provided. Many experiences with SSR implementation in various post-conflict states illustrate the importance of local ownership – where local authorities participate in the reform programmes with the view to continue them independently, without the support of international donors – accompanies SSR efforts. In spite of this acknowledgement, there are not enough studies identifying the challenges that domestic and external actors face. Identifying these challenges makes it feasible to draw up policies and strategies for effective and efficient SSR implementation. This article identifies various challenges to building local ownership in SSR. This helps provide new resources for more effective strategies for future SSR activities in post-conflict states.

1. Conceptualising SSR

While the term Security Sector Reform has been widely used in the post-conflict peace-building context, further clarification is needed to reveal a larger significance. The OECD's Guidelines on Security System and Governance Reform defines security sector reform as;

[it] includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more

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consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.²

Nicole Ball wrote in 1998 that SSR must “integrate issues pertaining to internal security such as policing, administration of justice, and rule of law with issues relating to the armed forces, the intelligence service, paramilitary forces, and the civilian institutions responsible for managing and monitoring them.”³ Similarly Dyland Hendrickson and Andrzej Karkoszka define SSR as “an attempt to develop a more coherent framework for reducing the risk that states weakness or failure will lead to disorder and violence. It is the transformation of security institutions so that they play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for their citizens.”⁴

These definitions of security sector reform show that SSR has two different, but closely connected goals. The first one is to ensure that security sector authorities function effectively and efficiently. The second one is that these authorities have effective democratic oversight of the sectors’ functions. Hendrickson and Karkoszka refer to the first as the “operational effectiveness and efficiency aspect” and the second as the “democratic governance aspect.”⁵

Operational effectiveness and efficiency: Security forces in post-conflict states need to be reformed so that the security forces fulfil their functions. A professional force with clearly identified duties and missions has to be established, together with a clear chain of command. The size of the forces must correspond to the needs of the country and excess weapons must be safely disposed of while there must also be a downsizing of any surplus personnel. Other tasks include, among others, removal of excess weapons, removing surplus officers and commanders, modernising their weapons and other equipment and providing officers and soldiers with training and the necessary education in order to improve democratic oversight.

Democratic governance: Effective democratic, civilian control of the security sector is one of the key components to democratisation. In post-conflict states, clear democratic civilian control over the armed forces must be established so that the armed forces do not abuse their power by intimidating and blackmailing civilians. If the security forces become politicised, they can be a powerful instrument of one or more political groups which want to influence their rivals. The armed forces and other security forces including police and the gendarmerie could also attempt a coup d’état to topple the existing

² OECD, *Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice* (2000): 16.

³ Dyland Hendrickson and Andrzej Karkoszka, “The Challenges of Security Sector Reform,” in *SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, (Oxford University Press, 2002).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

government. Moreover, without appropriate democratic civilian oversight budgets may be misappropriated. Corruption amongst the border police can flourish thus allowing weapons and drug smuggling. Parliamentarians also need to be provided training opportunities on how to deal with public inquiries regarding defence policy, military spending and weapons procurement for the security forces and related ministries. Transparency over these issues must also be maintained so journalists, non-governmental organisations and concerned citizens may scrutinise the security forces and have adequate information regarding potential wrongdoing. Thus building a mechanism of good governance for managing and controlling these forces is a key security sector reform target.

SSR can be explained through drawing a piece of cake:




Chart 1 The security sector reform cake

Context: SSR originally stems from, and has been developed by international development donor communities which act as an instrument to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of security sectors based on the principle that a well-governed security sector is a tool for sustainable economic development. Since the 1990s, SSR programmes have based their efforts of democratisation on the post-communist states in East-Central Europe, and beyond. Much of these security sector tasks in both developmental and post-authoritarian contexts are also relevant in the context of post-conflict peace-building. In this environment the armed forces and other security forces are usually poorly-organised; their C³ (command, control and communications) establishments

are generally weak, their morale and doctrinal orientations often misguided breeding an atmosphere where internal corruption and human rights violations may occur; there are lots of small arms and light weapons (SALW)⁶ and profits from black and grey economy are used for illegitimate armed groups (e.g. rebels and guerrillas). Unemployed, former combatants often return to join such groups in order to survive. – [A: Represented as the cake dish]

Actors: The actors involved with SSR can be broadly categorised into two groups: external and local actors. The former includes donor communities (international organisations, individual countries, and international NGOs) that implement security sector reform policies in post-conflict states. The latter includes, amongst others, armed forces and other security forces, parliament, national governmental offices including the ministries of defence, of the interior, of justice and home affairs in post-conflict states. Civil society organisations, such as local NGOs, are also included. – [B: Represented as strawberries]

SSR goals in the three dimensions: As mentioned above (page 2), the tasks for security sector reform retain two chief goals: 1) making armed forces and other security forces function effectively and efficiently; and 2) building capabilities essential for democratic oversight and the management of the security forces. – [C: Represented as the icing on the cake] However, in order to ensure that security sector reform programmes are maintained, solid socio-economic reconstruction programmes must also be established. Thus, in addition to the above mentioned tasks SSR must fulfil, socio-economic reforms are the necessary means by which security sector reforms can be maintained in the long-term. – [D: Represented as the cake layer] Economic development in the post-conflict region is vital for security sector reforms as societal and economic instability – such as the failed reintegration of ex-combatants, the presence of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) and growth of black and grey economies in the region – jeopardises security sector reform programmes.

2. The challenges to local ownership in SSR

Local ownership in the context of SSR

According to Jens Narten *local ownership* is “the process and final outcome of the gradual transfer to legitimate representatives of the local society, of assessment, planning and decision-making, the practical management and implementation, and the evaluation and control of all phases of state-building [i.e. peace-building] programmes up to the point when no further external assistance is needed.”⁷ The difficulty of implementing security sector reforms

⁶ For definitions of small arms, see United Nations General Assembly, *Report of the Governmental Experts on Small Arms* (1997).

⁷ Jens Narten, Dilemmas of Promoting Local Ownership: Statebuilding in Postwar Kosovo (2006): 19–20.

in a post-conflict context is the presence and/or absence of interaction between external and local actors, namely the donor communities (international organisations and individual countries) that implement security sector reform policies in post-conflict states on the one hand; and the governments, parliament, judicial systems, the media and other civil society organisations of the post-conflict states on the other.

The question is to what extent local actors should be involved in peace-building operations. Simon Chesterman suggests that there are different levels in which local actors are involved in the peace-building processes;

- (1) External actors base their peace-building policies on their own analyses of the local needs while not getting involved with the local authorities. [minimum or no local ownership];
- (2) External actors promote local leaders (e.g. traditional leaders of villages and tribal units) and so participate as consultants with the local stakeholders over their peace-building strategies;
- (3) External actors promote local actors and participate in some peace-building implementation tasks (e.g. border control activities and national election committees);
- (4) Local actors participate in activities to enhance accountability of the peace-building activities (e.g. participating as ombudsman in the peace-building activities in the region);
- (5) Local actors participate in the decision-making processes of the peace-building operation under the supervision of the external actors;
- (6) External actors hand the power over to the local authorities. [maximum ownership]⁸

Decisions over which peace-building approach (often referred to as the “footprint”) is appropriate to the specific context should be taken according to an analysis of various factors and the actors involved. For example, the root causes of the conflict, the local people’s ability to change and the degree of international commitment that is available to bring about change.⁹ Sustainable post-conflict security sector reform depends on how the implementation strategy leads to local ownership. In other words, assessing how local actors may proceed with their reform tasks, free from external actors’ involvement, is essential. Agneta M. Johansson writes that a lack of meaningful local ownership can cause violence to break out again.¹⁰ Tania Höhe also discusses how a lack

⁸ Simon Chesterman, *You, the people: The United Nations, transitional administration and state-building*: 242.

⁹ Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *United Nations Peace Operations: Making War and Building Peace* (2006): 70.

¹⁰ Agneta Johansson, *Participatory action research in post-conflict situations* (2001). This document is available at: http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/johannsen_hb.pdf.

or failure of local ownership can contribute to a breakdown of the post-conflict reconstruction efforts.¹¹ When the footprint of an externally-led peace-building intervention is not in sync with local needs, the local population may become frustrated with, and suspicious of, the external donors.¹² Such a situation can become detrimental to the peace-building process.¹³

In Sierra Leone the government maintained effective control over the security sector, however this was only made possible by the presence of foreign security sector reform advisers stationed inside the country who drove reconstruction efforts. The reform effort slowed after their withdrawal. In Bosnia the donor communities were hesitant to provide the federal government responsibility over the security sector. Moreover, the ethnic divisions in Bosnia contributed to undermining local ownership at the state level too.¹⁴ The footprint under the UN missions in East Timor (UNTAET) was blindly copied from the cases of Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, resulting in a mismatching of the needs and expectations between the external actors and the local population.¹⁵

In order to establish local ownership, external actors have two broad tasks: planning and implementing security sector reform agendas in the appropriate manner and ensuring that local actors are well trained and have enough resources to continue the effort after the external actors' withdrawal.¹⁶ External actors' SSR plans and implementation policies need to be based on analyses of the domestic characteristics and the root causes of conflict unique to each country and the SSR programmes adopted must correspond to the local realities of the state.¹⁷ Local actors on the other hand must collaborate with the external security providers and advisers by giving appropriate feedback in order to retain financial as well as political backing for the security sector reforms.¹⁸ Of course not everyone is cooperative; internal actors who play as a spoiler become major obstacles to the reform effort. Often they are the internal elites who perceive that their interests are threatened and thus they often disagree over the sources of legitimacy.¹⁹ Other spoilers are groups of people who similarly believe that their immediate political and financial interests would be threatened by reforms and so they try to impede, if not halt the process

¹¹ Tania Höhe, "Developing local governance" in Junne, G. & Verkoren W. (eds), *Post-Conflict development: Meeting new challenges*: 59–72.

¹² Richard Caplan, *International Governance of War-torn Societies: Rule and Reconstruction* (2005): 180.

¹³ Jens Narten, op. cit.: 19–20.

¹⁴ Timothy Edmunds, *Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation* (2002): 13.

¹⁵ Simon Chesterman, op. cit.: 135.

¹⁶ Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, "Post-Conflict Societies and the Military: Challenges and Problems of Security Sector Reform," in *Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart (eds) (2005): 9.

¹⁷ Jane Chanaa, *Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects* (2002): 35.

¹⁸ Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, op. cit.: 9.

¹⁹ Ibid.

altogether through the use or threat of force to the security providers, local actors who cooperate with the external actors and the local people.

1. Mismatches over the means and goals between external and local actors

The first challenge to building local ownership in post-conflict states stems from the nature of a foreign intervention in the process of reconstruction. The potential to mismatch between external and local actors about their expectations, the implementation policies, the political and the financial interests of those involved with security sector reforms is nearly always present. The international donor community's interest is to maximise its efforts with the limited financial resources and personnel it has at its disposal and to withdraw from the operation as soon as possible. Implementation costs are high; consensus and support in each donor state tends to vanish very quickly; there may be a high security risk in the later stage (e.g. suicide bomb attacks against foreign intervention forces) particularly if the operations are prolonged.²⁰ On the other hand, local actors demand a quick transition in the expectation of a rapid improvement of the security in the country and great growth for the country's economy. This is compounded because some local actors may inhibit processes of change as such changes may reduce their personal political or economic authority. Thus, there is a clash between members of a local population and the external actors' policy where more pressure is put on local authorities to solidify the implementation of post-conflict reconstruction.

Secondly, local ownership is also compromised when security sector reforms are conducted in a strong "one-way" principle. There is a danger of foreign involvement undermining indigenous reform projects. This is particularly the case when security sector reform agendas are enshrined as a part of the post-conflict agreements and are set under the aegis of the international donor communities. External involvement in peace processes often exerts external influence on setting reform agendas so that externally driven approaches become less flexible and cannot readapt to the needs and conditions of the region. Nascent reform projects are jeopardised and reform processes may be hindered as a consequence.²¹ Kosovo and Bosnia are two examples where externally imposed SSR were shown to constrict sustainable reform.²² Reviewing these two cases, Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi assert that externally driven SSR must be coordinated alongside with local actors who

²⁰ Michael Brzoska and Andreas Heinemann-Gruder, "Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Under International Auspices," in *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, Alan Bryden and Heiner Hanggi (eds) (2004): 131.

²¹ Luc L.P. van de Goor, Eugenia Piza-Lopez, and Paul Eavis, op. cit.: 5.

²² Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi, "Reforming and Reconstructing the Security Sector," in *Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (eds) (2005): 34.

should be involved from the very outset of the reform programmes so that they could themselves continue with the reforms and so that the responsibilities of the external actors could be handed over gradually.²³ It is for these reasons that appropriate feedback must be given and adjustments made throughout SSR implementation.²⁴ External donors need to identify where the local political will for reform is the strongest. Therefore, the donor community must carefully evaluate to what extent the local political will is ready for reform.

2. Build and maintain legitimacy

The second challenge relates to the legitimacy of externally driven security reform efforts. It is crucial for external actors to have legitimacy on three different levels: legitimacy from local actors, from within the donor country and from the international community. It is vital that the local population consents to foreign involvement, especially when it comes to sensitive areas like the security sector. Without sufficient consensus among the domestic and the external actors, achieving success will be difficult. It is equally important that external donor states be granted legitimacy for involvement from within their own constituencies. If there is no domestic consent in donor states this would mean insufficient funding and personnel for the implementation of SSR activities. This would not only undermine the cohesion of the operations with other donor countries, but it would also cause the military and civilian staff on the ground to risk losing their funding and other resources for their activities. Furthermore, insufficient support from their own donor states would cause a decrease in the credibility of the operation as far as the local actors are concerned.

While UN-led operations generally enjoy popular mandates for intervention,²⁵ their legitimacy is often questioned over the current United Nations Security Council (UNSC)'s unbalanced representation. Moreover, the credibility of the UN-sponsored peace support missions are sometimes challenged because means are not, in all cases, sufficiently balanced according to the needs of the security sector.²⁶ Where the credibility of the UN-sponsored operations is low, it would be difficult to gain firm legitimacy for long-term interventions that aim at sensitive fields like that of security sector reform.

Ensuring that the operations are politically legitimate may become more difficult in post-colonial states where the memory of foreign domination is still fresh. For local authorities in such states, entrusting responsibility to the international peace-building organisations may not be easy even if elaborate

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Luc L.P. van de Goor, Eugenia Piza-Lopez, and Paul Eavis, op. cit.: 8.

²⁵ James Dobbins, et. al., *America's role in nation-building: from Germany to Iraq* (2003).

²⁶ David M. Law, "The Post-Conflict Security Sector," Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Policy Paper No. 14 (June 2006): 7.

accountability mechanisms are set into place.²⁷ It would be even more difficult for such states if the peace-building operations were carried out by a single state since it may even further decrease the credibility of the foreign involvement. In order to ensure that the operation is endorsed externally, peace-building operations must be accompanied by at least a minimum level of local ownership.²⁸

3. Operational coherence

The third challenge for building local ownership is to establish and maintain a sufficient degree of operational coherence between external and local actors. There is broad consensus among the external actors that achieving operational coherence is necessary to maximise the use of the limited funds available by identifying counterproductive interference and incompatibilities between the different actors' roles and by making the roles compatible.²⁹ Nevertheless problems arise when it comes to agreeing on how to implement policies.³⁰ Bruce D. Jones concludes that operational coordination fails when actors pursue conflicting intervention strategies, goals and means when it comes to peace-building operations.³¹ However, Roland Paris warns that too rigid international coordination could make peace-building operations less effective, thus he calls for some degree of flexibility within the coordinating mechanism so that individual agencies still have the freedom to adapt their programmes to the changing situation.³²

The problems related to achieving operational coherence in SSR can be discussed on two different levels: coherence among external actors and coherence between external and local actors.

1) Establishing coherence among external actors

Operational coherence among external actors becomes difficult when there is deep-seated disagreement over the specific objectives and priorities of the security sector reforms. This disagreement often has to do with various commercial as well as political interests of the donor governments involved in security sector reforms.³³ Second, connected with the first level, it is

²⁷ Richard Caplan, *International governance of war-torn territories: rule and reconstruction* (2005): 34.

²⁸ *Ibid.*: 180.

²⁹ European Centre for Development Policy Management, *EU mechanisms that promote policy coherence for development* (2006): 14.

³⁰ Jane Chanaa, *Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects* (2002): 60.

³¹ Bruce D. Jones, *The Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposition and Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars* (2002): 89–90.

³² Roland Paris, *International Machinery for Post-war State-building: Dilemmas of Coordination* (2006): 9.

³³ *Ibid.*: 56.

difficult to establish coherence when there is a lack of an overarching decision-making framework that coordinates the interests and priorities between the players.

The international community's commitment in Bosnia after the 1995 Dayton Agreement is a good example of this. There were security sector reforms put forward by various international and individual donors, yet there was no general agreement about the specific objectives of reform. The operations were based on a structure where five different international organisations (the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations (UN), and the European Union (EU)) were duplicating the functions rather than complementing each other.³⁴ As a result the generally accepted conflict resolution, institution building and the setting up of key security sector institutions were not driven for the security sector reform.³⁵

Cambodia is another example. The IMF and the World Bank were the direct financial sources for military reform programmes in Cambodia but their priorities clashed with the wider goals of SSR and the rehabilitation that UNTAC was coordinating. On the other hand the external actors dealing with security sector reform in the country focused their efforts on downsizing the armed forces and on reducing military spending.³⁶ This lack of coordination among the external actors undermined the internal security needs particularly in rural areas where most of the country's poor population resided.³⁷

2) Building operational coherence between internal and external actors

A further challenge is in regards to communication between external and local actors over setting the priorities for implementing security sector reforms.³⁸ Many scholars have pointed out that there is a gap between the policy and the practice due to a lack of understanding as to how external interventions can be carried out in a way that corresponds with the local political culture in the state.³⁹ Brzoska and Heinemann-Grüder point out that there is always a contradiction between the external actors who have the ability to implement change, the principles of the popular sovereignty and their accountability that

³⁴ Ibid.: 57.

³⁵ David M. Law, op. cit.: 8.

³⁶ Jane Chanaa, op. cit.: 58.

³⁷ Marina Caparini, "The Relevance of Civil Society," in *Security Sector Reform: Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation*, Clem McCartney, Martina Fischer and Oliver Wils (eds) (2004): 58.

³⁸ Tania Paffenholz, *Designing Transformation and Intervention Processes* (2004).

³⁹ Alan Bryden, "Understanding Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction," in *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (eds) (October 2004): 267.

is inconsistent with the external actors' policy.⁴⁰ A major reason for this is the gap between the principles of the external donors and the beneficiaries who by setting aside their domestic security needs endanger the security sector reform as a whole. Marina Caparini studying the case in the West Balkans maintains that there is a dilemma when there is a difference between the effective security sector reforms and the domestic security sector needs when the reform programmes have been externally imposed and the domestic political process has been sidestepped.⁴¹ After violent conflict, various political and societal legacies remain even after changes were brought about by the conflict and foreign military interventions. The difficulty for external actors is to measure how they may formulate reform plans and implementation policies in such a way that the reforms remedy such legacies.⁴² One solution is to assist local organisations aimed at civil society in facilitating discussions between the security, the armed forces personnel and the local population so that a sector that has traditionally been characterised by secrecy becomes more transparent. While both the concept and the practice of SSR has been externally driven, the local civil society's participation can help address this imbalance.⁴³

Chanaa discusses how external assistance in security sector reform has often overridden local processes since it failed to take local conditions into account.⁴⁴ Studying the successful example that local communities in South Africa that set up networks to enhance the local security and their initiatives was supported by external actors, Chanaa reaffirms that a much deeper understanding of the internally driven security reforms is necessary in order to bridge the gap between the external and local actors. Ideally, according to Chanaa, external actors should support already existing locally initiated projects.⁴⁵

4. Building individual and institutional capabilities in post-conflict states

To enhance the skills and knowledge of individuals and institutions in post-conflict states is another challenge to building local ownership for security sector reforms. The international community needs to promote training for the local population and institutions so they have the skills and knowledge necessary to continue peace-building efforts on their own in the future.⁴⁶ It is commonly observed that focusing on the short-term needs by outsourcing

⁴⁰ Michael Brzoska and Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, "Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Under International Auspices," in *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (eds) (October 2004).

⁴¹ Marina Caparini, op. cit.

⁴² Michael Brzoska and Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, op. cit.: 131.

⁴³ Alan Bryden, op. cit.: 269.

⁴⁴ Jane Chanaa, op. cit.; 65–66.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Luc Reyhler and Tania Panffenholz (eds), *Peacebuilding: A field guide* (2001): 277.

skilled foreign civil administrative staff and other experts tends to crowd-out initiatives of indigenous development of skills through joint projects with external actors.⁴⁷ Efforts to facilitate local ownership by training local individuals and institutions are vital for an eventual handover of power to the local authorities.

1) Parliamentary oversight

Parliamentarians play an important role in civil society by establishing democratic oversight over the security communities. One of their major roles in security sector reform is to set the defence budget. They are expected to be capable of examining budget estimates and inspect reports and analyses compiled by experts on issues concerning defence and security projects, measures for efficiency and rationalisation of the Defence Ministry and security-related institutions. Moreover, parliamentarians are expected to examine and report on policy initiatives (such as defence planning, reorganisation of the armed forces proposals for which equipment to purchase) that are put forward by the defence and other security-related ministries. They are to conduct inquiries into issues of special concerns regarding defence and security issues.⁴⁸

However, a lack of appropriately skilled parliamentarians may also make it difficult to examine budget spending and the budget projected for the future, so the defence ministry tends to take a *de facto* dominant role in decision-making on major defence and security issues and the parliamentarians play a symbolic role in legislative issues. This could remove the budgetary policy from democratic control. The same is true of defence and security policy. Without knowledgeable parliamentarians, particularly in parliamentary committees on defence, defence policies would be drafted mostly by the defence ministries themselves, providing a “free pass” to legislature without having lawmakers examine the prudence and possible effectiveness of such policies. This raises the question of how much democratic control there is of the defence policy because, for instance, the purchase of equipment and weapons can go unchecked and surplus personnel can be retained. This results in unnecessary redundant expenses.

Legacies from past conflicts hinder parliamentarians’ role in security sector reform. In many post-conflict states, the executive body reigns supreme particularly in the ministries of defence and interior. Consequently, bureaucrats maintain a culture of secrecy and often neglect the legislative body. On the other hand, in the legislative branch there is a tendency to oppose executive power even when it comes to insignificant matters.⁴⁹ This may result in a clash between the two bodies, making it difficult to proceed with security reforms.

⁴⁷ Richard Caplan, *op. cit.*: 241.

⁴⁸ Willem F. van Eekelen, *The Parliamentary Dimension of Security Sector Reform* (May 2003): 12.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*: 60.

Assisting parliamentarians' acquire necessary skills is a time-consuming task. Nevertheless a lot can be learned "on the job" when armed forces are cooperative and willing to provide the necessary information for the reforms. Other ways for parliamentarians to acquire new skills is through visits to parliaments of other states. They could also increase their knowledge by attending courses on security issues as sponsored by specialised non-government organisations, universities and the armed forces from donor countries.⁵⁰

2) NGOs and the media

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have greatly proliferated since the early 1990s and they have acquired a variety of skills that help them with various aspects of post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Their roles in security sector reform, as watchdogs and providers of information, are crucial. They can examine and evaluate the post-conflict reconstruction development to see, for example, if basic human rights are protected and whether there is a proliferation of SALW. They can help donor communities with the planning of progress reports and they can make suggestions for policy changes. Such reports can be presented to local governments and parliamentarians for future security sector reform planning. NGOs can also help narrow the gap between armed forces and the local population that had been exacerbated due to the past conflicts. In many post-conflict environments, local populations are fearful of abuses, NGOs can provide opportunities for forums and dialogues that can help build confidence between these two entities. NGOs, whose main activities are focused on providing aid, play an important function in consolidating the local and regional security in post-conflict states. Additionally, NGOs can help child soldiers by providing a basic living standard, opportunities for formal education and specialised counselling. NGOs can also help with ex-combatants' re-insertion into non-combat economic activities (e.g. construction, agriculture etc) which can play a crucial role in reducing the potential threat of ex-combatants taking up arms again.

The media may also play constructive roles. They can provide warnings about false and misleading information that was deliberately delivered by security communities so they could cover up scandals and other wrongdoing. They can raise public awareness of democratic oversight of security sector reforms. The media could do so by investigating and evaluating crucial security issues in the security communities and by suggesting policy alternatives. The media could also speak for the general public. For example, by providing media coverage on local security needs, on the proliferation of SALW and by reporting corruption by local police forces. The media could help raise consciousness over the progress of security sector reforms by the central government.

⁵⁰ Nicole Ball and Michael Brzoska, in *Voice and Accountability in the Security Sector*, Paper 21 (July 2002): 52.

However, the media in post-conflict zones needs to evolve to be able to fulfil such functions. Journalists and reporters often have only a limited knowledge about the defence and security issues and they are not familiar with how the media could influence the policy building process of the security sector.⁵¹ This requires that the media be trained and sponsored by specialised governmental and non-governmental organisations as well as universities so that journalists in these environments can be better informed and more skilled in investigative reporting and interviewing techniques. Changes are also necessary in the security communities as in the case of the relationship between the legislative and executive branches. Secrecy within the armed forces, the ministries of defence and other security-related fields, is a common obstacle for the media. In this context, as discussed in the following section, it is crucial to train the armed forces and other security forces so they can cooperate with the media.

3) Training the armed forces and other security-related officials

Training armed forces and other security-related officials is a vital task to help enhance local ownership of post-conflict security sector reforms. Training, in this context, refers mainly to educating them on democratic oversight. This may include courses on basic human rights, the principles of democratic civilian control over the armed forces and training designed to enhance accountability. These specific measures have been taken in many post-conflict states with the support of the international community. Exchange visits between the militaries of donor and beneficiary states are useful and the police and other forces could also carry out similar office-to-office missions. Special forums can be organised under the framework of multilateral and regional organisations in order to discuss security-related issues where specialists and trainers are involved.⁵²

Given the nature of security forces, which maintain a monopoly on the use of force, weak or non-existent democratic control could trigger military coups or the return of other forms of political violence. Military officers could control and manipulate more democratic officials. Conversely, the government could control and manipulate the armed forces in order to advance their particular political party objectives.⁵³

While training is vital for the promotion of democratic oversight over security forces, perhaps changes in attitude among the armed forces and other security officials is one of the most challenging tasks for post-conflict reconstruction. Ironically but understandably, democratisation of the armed forces and increasing the public's access to information related to the armed

⁵¹ Ibid.: 55.

⁵² Nicole Ball, "Good Practices in Security Sector Reform," in *Security Sector Reform*, Herbert Wulf (ed) (June 2000): 19.

⁵³ Laurie Nathan, "Reform in New Democracies," in *Security Sector Reform*, Herbert Wulf (ed) (June 2000): 23.

forces are generally least liked by the decision-makers in the armed forces in post-conflict states.⁵⁴ Their prestige and individual interests (e.g. access to power and money) may well be threatened as the result of the democratisation reforms. Hence, those who are unwilling to cooperate are major obstacles when it comes to security sector reforms in the armed forces. It is important for donor communities to identify the so-called “help agents” who are committed to security sector reforms and who cooperate with the donor countries and their reform programmes. The donor communities must encourage these agents so that they can play a leadership role in the long run.

5. Enhancing domestic and regional security

1) Enhancing security on the national level

The resurgence of violence in a post-conflict area would threaten the actors involved in the security sector reforms in various aspects. It would also be a threat to establishing local ownership. For this reason demilitarisation, demobilisation and the reintegration of former combatants in the post-conflict areas are important before SSR can be implemented. The reintegration process of ex-combatants into newly formed armed and other security forces and/or into the domestic economic activities is of great significance for the success of SSR. The DDR literature has highlighted that some ex-combatants, after having been demilitarised and demobilised, might not be able to be socially and economically reintegrated and they often return to their former activities as combatants as they remain unemployed. They are either re-hired by warlords or they form criminal groups like bandits and take part in other criminal activities as witnessed in, among others, Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia.⁵⁵ The failure of DDR efforts in a post-conflict area could lead to an influx of easily obtained weapons, particularly small arms; and armed groups could pose a security threat to internal security sector actors – governmental officers, politicians, civil society organisations among others. In Haiti, for example, UN-sponsored peace operations were not accompanied by more long-term DDR programmes and a reintegration of ex-combatants into newly-established police forces and into non-combat economic activities (e.g. agriculture). There were many ex-combatants who were not re-integrated and they posed a serious security threat to the local population and to the external donor actors. Their presence contributed to the instability in the country and slowed down the peace-building efforts as a whole.⁵⁶ Re-integration is one of

⁵⁴ Michael Brzoska, “The Concept of Security Sector Reform,” in *Security Sector Reform*, Herbert Wulf (ed) (June 2000): 11.

⁵⁵ Michael Brzoska, “Embedding DDR Programme in Security Sector Reconstruction,” in *Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (eds) (2005): 99.

⁵⁶ David M. Law, op. cit., 8.

the most difficult tasks of the DDR because post-conflict states' markets are usually impaired and the economy as a whole is still undergoing recovery.⁵⁷

Enhancing political security for local actors refers to keeping reform-oriented officers and officials in all branches of the country safe from threats posed by those who resist reform. Such spoilers could blackmail reform-oriented actors by, for instance, hiring ex-combatants who had been left out from the re-integration process.⁵⁸ For example, after President Slobodan Milosevic was replaced in the former Serbia-Montenegro the new president Vojislav Kostunica found it necessary to make tacit agreements between commanding officers and politicians in order to retain the support from the armed forces and replace a number of pro-Milosevic figures in the armed forces while avoiding attacks through blackmail from the opposition.⁵⁹

2) Enhancing security in the regional level

Security sector reforms are easily undermined if neighbouring states are unstable. If there is a variety of domestic and regional instability – including small arms smuggling, drug smuggling, organised crime and human trafficking (particularly of women as financial source for organised crime) – this could jeopardise the security sector reforms. Therefore, strengthening regional security is vital.⁶⁰ In areas where SSR efforts are making progress, domestic and regional instability may not only disturb the progress, but could also result in regression. Moreover, it could negatively influence efforts to nurture local ownership in SSR. Organised crime threatens the agents who help promote change (those engaged in security sector reform with the external donors) who are active in the armed and other security forces and they could be intimidated into giving up the reforms. They could also be blackmailed and so discouraged from confronting opposition groups which reject the need for change. In the same way criminal organisations could finance opposition groups to discourage the domestic reformers as well as external donor actors. The proliferation of SALW could create an atmosphere of danger and thereby lessen the prospect for stability and order throughout the area.⁶¹

Some hardliner military officers within the Indonesian Armed Forces that resisted East Timor's independence and UN-sponsored missions, continue to pose a threat and thus undermine the building of local ownership in East-Timor.⁶² In Kosovo, the settlement of various powerful groups, particularly the

⁵⁷ Charles T. Call, "Conclusion: Constructing Justice and Security After War," chap. in *Constructing Justice and Security After War* (2007): 384.

⁵⁸ Jane Chanaa, op. cit.: 37.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Alan Bryden, "Understanding Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction," op. cit.: 264.

⁶¹ Adedeji Ebo, "Combating Small Arms Proliferation and Misuse After Conflict," in *Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (eds) (2005): 139.

⁶² Jane Chanaa, op. cit.: 35.

former KLA, made peace fragile. Consequently, violence has recurred; spread locally and to surrounding regions, further complicating the security sector activities in Kosovo.⁶³

The extent to which security sector reform has been disturbed by external factors – regional conflicts, interstate rivalries and the smuggling of SALW and other illegal goods – has often been neglected.⁶⁴ To avoid this, Cawthra and Luckham point out that ensuring that reforms across the countries where security sector reforms are being carried out complement each other helps build confidence among the local and external actors involved in SSR.⁶⁵

Conclusion

Security sector reform is a vital measure for building sustainable peace in post-conflict states. Peace-building is a multi-dimensional process that requires comprehensive strategies for structural reform in the security, legal, economic and other spheres. Security sector reform is one such comprehensive strategy that focuses on reforms of the armed forces and on other security forces such as the police.

Security sector reform needs be implemented in such a way that local actors are able to continue with reform efforts after external actors have withdrawn their personnel. A number of case studies of SSR efforts in various post-conflict states have taught us the significance of establishing local ownership. However, problems arise over how best to proceed. The main reason for this problematic is the fact that there is no clarity regarding the agenda for building local ownership in security sector reform efforts.

Thus, five major challenges to local ownership for SSR operations were identified. The first one stems from a mismatch between the expectations and the implementation strategies for security sector reforms between the external and the local actors. Building local ownership becomes difficult when local actors have high expectations for rapid and drastic improvements from short-term operations. External actors, on the other hand, project SSR strategies for the long term thus results are slow to come and often not visible to local actors. At the same time, external actors do not often favour stationing forces and experts for long periods due to corresponding costs. Local ownership is difficult when SSR efforts are carried out in such a way that external actors neglect indigenous reform projects. Doing so may very well undermine programmes initiated by local actors that are better adapted to the needs of the people and the conditions of the region.

⁶³ David M. Law, op. cit.: 8.

⁶⁴ Dylan Hendrickson and Andrzej Karkoszka, “Security Sector Reform and Donor Policies,” in *Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart (eds) (2005): 38.

⁶⁵ Alan Bryden, “Understanding Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction,” op. cit.: 264.

The second challenge to building local ownership for SSR is to secure legitimacy for the implementation of SSR programmes. It is crucial for external actors to have legitimacy on three different levels: legitimacy from the local actors, from within the donor country and from the international community. It is vital that the local stakeholders have consent for reform particularly for sensitive areas like the security sector. Equally essential is that external donor states obtain approval for interventions from within their own constituencies. Insufficient domestic consent in donor countries would mean insufficient funding and a lack of the personnel required to successfully implement SSR activities. This would not only undermine the operational coherency with other cooperating donor countries, but it would also endanger the military and civilian staff on the ground, as their funding and resources would be disrupted. Furthermore, insufficient support from their own donor countries would make their operations less credible from the point of view of local actors. External donors need to receive a well-established political endorsement from the international community such as the UNSC.

The third challenge is to maintain the operational coherence of SSR activities among all actors involved. Operational coherence has to do with the coordination between the external actors who participate in the SSR activities and those who maintain their own separate interests, resources and priorities for interventions. The need for coordination is a common criticism; however, the lack of an overarching decision-making framework for such coordination among external actors is a more serious challenge. It is equally important to establish operational coherence between the external and local actors. In general, there has been a lack of understanding about policies and practices between external and local actors over how external interventions are to be carried out so they correspond to local political cultures. There has also been a tendency that externally driven SSR activities neglect the needs of the local communities because they have insufficient knowledge of the indigenous political developments.

Promoting training for local populations and institutions is important if the security sector reforms are to continue after external actors have withdrawn. Civil society organisations, such as NGOs, and the media, play an essential role in promoting local ownership in SSR. Their primary function is to provide democratic oversight over the armed forces and other security forces although access to defence and security information was restricted under former regimes. There is a strong legacy of secrecy among the military and security officers in post-conflict states and much of the information is classified to cover up corruption and the mismanagement of financial resources and protect those implicated in such acts. On the other hand, many civil society organisations have insufficient knowledge of security and defence issues and lack the necessary skills to scrutinise and research such issues. Education and training on both sides (civil societies and the security-related institutions) is necessary.

Additionally, external actors tend to help the statutory rather than the non-statutory security institutions and the civil management authorities rather than civil society organisations. This imbalance has contributed to preventing civil society organisations from growing in influence. Parliamentarians in post-conflict states have faced similar difficulties. Their primary role, examining the budget and ensuring transparency needs to be strengthened as their knowledge on defence and security issues is limited and it has made it difficult for them to conduct effective oversights into the ministries.

The fifth challenge is to enhance the domestic and regional security in post-conflict states. A resurgence of violence threatens all actors involved in SSR. When DDR efforts in the area fail then there is an excess of weapons and armed groups who are a security threat to the internal security sector actors such as governmental officers, politicians and other civil society organisations. Moreover it is important that the local reformers have political security. They are likely to be targets of blackmail by those who want to disturb reform programmes. It is essential to strengthen the security on the regional level. SSR can easily be undermined if neighbouring states remain unstable. Domestic and regional instability such as the illicit proliferation of SALW, drug smuggling, organised crime and human trafficking also jeopardise SSR. In order to reduce the risk, it is necessary to make sure that reforms across the countries where security sector reforms are being carried out complement each other.

The chart below presents major challenges that international donor communities as well as local actors face in constructing a regime of local ownership in security sector reform. With the identification of these challenges, the agenda for the actors involved in security sector reform in post-conflict states – local authorities and external actors alike – is to re-examine their policies and strategies for more effective and efficient implementation of security sector reforms so that the reforms would continue after the external actors have withdrawn.

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Humanitarian Arms Control, Symbiotic Functionalism and the Concept of Middlepowerhood¹

Initial Remarks on Motivation, or Why another Study on the Landmine Case?

Nikola Hynek²

This article arises from dissatisfaction with predominant accounts concerning changes in interactions between nongovernmental actors and governments in contemporary world politics, namely the image of a tension between so-called state-centric and transnational worlds. Specifically, it can be conceived of as a response to an ongoing stream of celebratory commentaries on the alleged victory of the transnational world over the state-centric one in what has been hailed by commentators as a paradigmatic case: the campaign to ban antipersonnel landmines.

The interpretation presented here can be seen as a corrective to what seems to be a universal generalisation of the nature of the relationship between governments and nongovernmental actors at both the theoretical and empirical levels. In an attempt to overcome this simplistic dichotomy, I make two arguments: firstly, counter to the popular perception that there is tension between the two ‘worlds,’ I argue that the landmine case suggests the emergence of a new type of functional-symbiotic relationship between key governments and nongovernmental actors. Secondly, while not denying the input of nongovernmental actors in the landmine case, it is suggested that a crucial moment enabling the landmine campaign to gain momentum was brought about by the

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emergence of a new type of reasoning by key governments, the Canadian one in particular. It was this change in governmental reasoning which provided an opportunity for nongovernmental involvement on the issue.

In order to examine the functional-symbiosis between governments and non-governmental actors,³ it is worth examining their interactions, in particular assessing the heuristic potential of the two approaches known as the *global-governance approach* and the *governmentality approach*. The former, largely influenced by (James N.) Rosenau, has, over the last fifteen years, served as the basis for major studies addressing the interactions between governments and non-governmental actors. This approach, however, raises a number of problems; in particular Rosenau's claim about the tension and power struggle between the two worlds. As a means of overcoming these shortcomings, the governmentality approach, originally devised by Michel Foucault, can be applied. It is precisely this dual ontology that will be contested: it is argued that the institution of political sovereignty, which is Rosenau's basic premise for his distinction between the two worlds, is an indeterminate criterion for explaining interactions between governments and nongovernmental actors insofar as there have been significant differences in ways of organising the exercise of sovereignty among various states. The main objective of this section is to propose a theoretical apparatus capable of analysing the main object of study, i.e. the changes in the interactions between some governments and nongovernmental actors.

Regarding the second argument, the governmentality approach is utilised for examining changes in governmental rationality in some states, most notably Canada, before and during the campaign to ban landmines. It will be argued that the functional-symbiotic relationship between the Canadian government and nongovernmental actors in the landmine case was a result of the shift from what is termed here the 'governmentality of organised modernity' to the 'governmentality of advanced liberalism'. It is argued that the institution of state sovereignty *per se* is an indeterminate explanatory criterion with regard to the landmine case since both of the above governmentalities can be distinguished from one another on the basis of different organisation and exercise of state sovereignty: while it was exclusively the government who exercised state sovereignty during the former, the latter allowed nongovernmental actors to participate in this conduct, thus effectively producing the joint exercise of political sovereignty.⁴

In the first instance, attention will be directed towards the concept of middlepowerhood and its political function as a legitimising factor behind the so-called 'New Diplomacy' through which Canada's exercise of political

³ The term 'nongovernmental actors' is used to refer to non-profitmaking and charitable organisations pursuing a common interest or common good on behalf of a wider community.

⁴ The terms 'state sovereignty' and 'political sovereignty' are used in this article interchangeably.

sovereignty, informed by the governmentality of advanced liberalism, was conducted. Afterwards, the shift in governmentalities will be demonstrated on the issue of production, funding and the use of knowledge about security. Figure 1 on page 156 is an illustration of these dynamics.

The scope of the fourth part, which represents an empirical analysis in the critical re-examination of the landmine case, focuses on the interactions of the Canadian government with various NGOs subsumed under the umbrella of the Mines Action Canada (MAC), which has itself been part of a wide transnational advocacy network, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). Specific attention will be paid to the period of 1993–1997; the period starting with the launch of the ICBL and concluding with the signature of the Ottawa Convention, though further developments and the consequences of the shift in governmentality are also outlined and reflected upon.

Foucault and the ‘New Wave’ of Friendly Theorising: Shifts in Governmentalities and the Creation of the Biopolitical Individual

The global governance approach is theoretically premised upon complex interactions between different types of actors at various levels of world politics. Changes in spheres of authority and reconfigurations of power are claimed to be two of the most important consequences of these unprecedented dynamics. Political power is reputedly being transferred from an eroding nation-state to so-called global civil society, and this process is seen as highly desirable as it makes world politics more democratic (Rosenau, 2002, 70–86; 1997, 308–10; 330–63; 1992, 1–29; 1990; for an application to the landmine case see Price, 1998; Mathew and Rutherford, 2003).⁵ The relationship between nation-states and nongovernmental actors can thus be viewed as a zero-sum game in which the gain of one side automatically means a loss for the other side (for an excellent analysis, see Sending and Neumann 2006).

The (now) classic text of such thinking, in terms of academic influence, is Rosenau’s *Turbulence in World Politics*. Here and elsewhere, the author claims that the nation-state is losing its power, and that in the near future world politics will, as a result, be characterised by the ‘bifurcation of macro global structures into what is called the two worlds of world politics’ (Rosenau, 1990, 5). He continues by arguing that the struggle between non-state actors and nation-states will continue, and ultimately produce a stalemate between two competing entities: ‘an uneasy *tension* between the two worlds would emerge as the fundamental condition of global politics’ (Rosenau, 1990, 447, 453–4,

⁵ For a similar argument, compare to Cronin (1999, 3–40). Put differently, since there is no logic of anarchy present (Wendt, 1992, 391–425), there is none for state sovereignty either (cf. Biersteker and Weber, 1996; Bartelson, 1995).

emphasis added). Rosenau's argument is reiterated by cosmopolitan democracy scholars, Held and McGrew (2002). These authors argue that global governance is characterized by predominantly horizontally stretched networks (global civil society) as opposed to the traditional, and largely hierarchical structures of nation-states, resulting in several infrastructures of governance with political authority being fragmented, complex, and overlapping (Held and McGrew, 2002, 1–24).

Rosenau's metaphor based on the ideas of rivalry (the transfer of power) and irreconcilability (tension between the two worlds) inevitably fails to account for the functional-symbiotic interactions between key governments and nongovernmental actors as they seem to have occurred in the landmine case. Therefore, a theoretically more suitable approach is needed, and this can be drawn from Foucault's scholarship on governmental rationalities, or governmentalities, which allows for the possibility of addressing the issue of functional-symbiosis between governmental and nongovernmental actors. This governmentality approach cannot be considered a substantive theory; rather, it is a theoretical approach which provides the user with a series of problems as well as techniques for solving them. The advantage over Rosenau's framework consists in the fact that the governmentality approach does not make any substantive claims, e.g. who are important actors, which level of analysis to focus on, or what has been the nature of interaction between actors, prior to the actual analysis of the issue (cf. Dean, 1999, 149). For this reason, it can be understood as a question-driven approach, subsumed under a broader category of interpretive-abductive approaches, dealing predominantly with "how" questions. The key term of the approach is that of *government*, in the sense of a socio-political function (Sending and Neumann, 2006), or as The Oxford English Dictionary (2002) instructs us, 'a particular system or method of controlling a country.'⁶ The term generally delineates any intentional and rational activity conducted by various actors who are using different techniques and forms as well as sources of knowledge in order to shape, affect or guide themselves, interpersonal relationships, or even societal relationships regarding the conduct of political sovereignty (Dean, 1999, 10–6, 259; Gordon 1991, 2–3). It is the organisation of *government* and its exercise of political sovereignty through diplomacy as its carrier within the realm of world politics that is the main interest of this article.

Although Foucault himself was largely focused on examining the concept of governmental rationalities within the confines of the nation-state, the scope of my analysis goes beyond national boundaries (cf. Larner and Walters, 2004, 1–20; Hindess, 2004, 23–39). Strictly speaking, the frontier as a source of exclusions must be transgressed since it gives rise to Rosenau's problematic

⁶ The above distinction between the two governmentalities also corresponds to the passage from disciplinary society to the society of (self)control, as suggested by Hardt and Negri (2000, 419 fn. 1) and Deleuze's (1988) interpretation of Foucault.

dual ontology. In other words, it is the practice of creating powerful dichotomies (1. inside, internal *Vs.* outside, external; 2. the state-centred world *Vs.* the transnational world) that is being contested (cf. Walker, 1993). However, transcending the border is not intended in any sense to imply a radically pluralist image of “anything goes”. The institution of state sovereignty still has its importance, mainly because it is nation-states that are the primary subjects of international public law. State sovereignty is, nevertheless, an indeterminate criterion in terms of explaining the dynamics between governments and non-governmental actors: it simply does not tell us much about the organisation of these interactions,⁷ hence this attempt to re-examine the landmine case by employing the Foucauldian governmentality approach. So how has *government*, as a socio-political function, been practically conducted within the realm of world politics as far as the landmine case is concerned?

The argument put forward is that contemporary transformations in world politics are transformations brought about by a shift in governmental rationalities, leading to changes in actors’ activities and the level of their autonomy and responsibility. To be specific, it can be observed that an increase in the autonomy, self-regulation and responsibility of nongovernmental actors is related to the transition from a governmentality of organised modernity to one of advanced liberalism.⁸ While the rationality of organised modernity has been manifest in attempts by governments to fit the interests of society as a whole to mechanisms of social welfare, the shift to the governmentality of advanced liberalism was quite the contrary. It was characterised by the employment of procedures and techniques through which individuals were recreated from originally passive political objects to active subjects and objects of *government* (Cruikshank, 1999, 19–47; Dean, 1999, 40–59; Gordon, 1991, 6–7, 35–47). During this transition, the techniques of command changed: while the governmentality of organised modernity was largely sustained through a network of *dispositifs*, ‘or apparatuses that produce and regulate customs, habits, and productive practices’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000, 23; cf. Deleuze, 1992, 159–67), the governmentality of advanced liberalism can be said to have achieved a similar effect through more subtle and appealing ways, in the sense of a democratic arrangement in which citizens can decide and make choices themselves. In

⁷ The adjective ‘neo-liberal’ does not, in this context, refer either to neo-liberalism as a political doctrine or to the set of constitutive macroeconomic rules known as the Washington Consensus. Here, neo-liberalism is not understood as a negative force, creating a number of social exclusions (Larner and Walters, 2004, 4), but rather as an art of *government* in which individuals are seen as effective and efficient political subjects (Burchell et al., 1991: ix).

⁸ An example of a study falling into the trap of considering middlepowerhood a normative ideal is Melakopides’s (1998) *Pragmatic Idealism*. The author puts forward a thesis about Canadian politicians allegedly respecting the concept of middle power and carrying out the work of its ‘content’, which Melakopides sees as created during the Golden Age, throughout the period between 1945 and 1995. Melakopides is consequently forced to produce a consistent story of CFSP, regardless of what the particular PM or ministers’ practices were like, thereby significantly skewing the account.

concrete terms, the discipline was let out from formal institutions, diffused through society and consequently internalised by citizens themselves; one can then think of it as biopower and the entire mechanism as *biopolitical* since it has been the bodies and brains of political subjects that have ‘regulate[ed] social life from its interior, following it, interpreting it, absorbing it, and rearticulating it’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000, 23–4).

Although Foucault (1991) refers to the former as the governmentality of welfare-state, this article follows Wagner’s (1994) term, governmentality of ‘organised modernity’, also used by Sending and Neumann (2006). It does so because the politics of welfare is but one particular institutional manifestation, though most probably the central one, of a deeper reconstitution of the role of the individual in the society. As this article shows, however, another example of the same shift was a redefinition of what counted as knowledge about landmines and who produced, supplied and funded it, and its subsequent institutional embodiment into the new diplomacy. With regard to the latter, this article prefers Rose’s (1993) term governmentality of advanced liberalism to the original one of neo-liberalism as coined by Foucault.⁹ The reason is nicely captured by Dean (1999):

[the neo-liberal governmentality] refer[s] to specific styles of the general mentality of rule [a]dvanced liberalism will designate the broader realm of the various assemblages of rationalities, technologies and agencies that constitute the characteristic ways of governing in contemporary liberal democracies ... While neo-liberalism might be characterized as the dominant contemporary rationality of government, it is found within a field of contestation in which there are multiple rationalities of government and a plurality of varieties of neo-liberalism (Dean, 1999, 149–50).

Subsequently, the governmentality approach poses three challenges to the global-governance approach. Firstly, that it is not useful to examine interactions between nation-states as a generic category and nongovernmental actors because it seems counterproductive due to the different experiences of various states. The focus is shifted, instead, onto an alternative agency of middle power, that is, the interactions between the Canadian government and the nongovernmental actors involved in the landmine case. Such a perspective puts greater emphasis on the political function of specific collective national identities (i.e. the self-constructed status), thereby avoiding the pitfalls of universal accounts associated with an examination of generic identities based on the institution of state sovereignty as its lowest common denominator (Ruggie, 1998, 14).

⁹ This method is typical of Welsh’s (2004) *At Home Abroad*, in which the author argues that the only way for Canada to reinvigorate her foreign and security policy is to move beyond the notion of middle power.

The second challenge is in regard to Rosenau's claim about the erosion of the nation-state and the tension between the two worlds. Specifically, I maintain that in certain states – for example, in Canada's case as a self-constructed middle power – the autonomy (including independent agenda-setting), self-regulation and responsibility of nongovernmental actors does not conflict with the interests of the Canadian government, but actually support it by enhancing the country's symbolic status and influence in world politics. Canada's involvement in the landmine case – both in terms of its governmental and nongovernmental actors – is a powerful example of how both entities cooperated in a functional-symbiotic manner.

Finally, the conceptualisation of power differs from Rosenau's perspective: although the governmentality of advanced liberalism can be seen as a kind of degovernmentalisation of the state (Rose, 1993, 296), this does not by any means imply Rosenau's transfer of power. Here, power is not understood as concentrated, possessive, stable and localized in the Weberian sense, but, instead, as a ubiquitous, relational, constitutive and spatio-temporally contingent phenomenon, defined in terms of the practical tasks of *government* (Gordon, 1991, 3). It is therefore argued that the landmine case was not an example of a *transfer* of power, but simply an increase in the responsibility and autonomous activity of nongovernmental actors.

The construction of the problematic of landmines and its subsequent institutionalisation into the ICBL by nongovernmental actors can usefully be considered in the context of the shift from the rationality of organised modernity to the one of advanced liberalism. To do this, it is necessary to look at changes of knowledge about security and thus investigate the government/nongovernmental-actor nexus. While the rationality of organised modernity is characterised by a tight bond forged between the government and knowledge about security, the rationality of advanced liberalism allows the dissolution of this bond, resulting in a situation where knowledge is being produced and subsequently supplied to the government by non-governmental actors. However, first it is worth giving some attention to what has been seen as a crucial condition for the successful implementation of the rationality of advanced liberalism in Canada's exercise of political sovereignty in the landmine case – the category of middle power as a legitimising factor of the so-called 'New Diplomacy'.

Middlepowerhood, the New Diplomacy and a Shift in the Typification of Knowledge about Security

An analysis of the discourse and political practices of Canada's post-Cold War foreign and security policy indicates the incorporation of advanced-liberal procedures into the concept of middle power. Yet there is nothing inevitable about the above combination: it is more a result of historical contingency than universal and linear development.

How has this link been forged and what has been its purpose? The answers to these questions are connected to the significance of middlepowerhood as well as the new diplomacy in the Canadian context. The association of Canada with the category of middle power has quite a long and interesting history. The notion came emerged as WWII was coming to an end: it was Canadian diplomat Humphrey Hume Wrong who devised the functional principle in the first place, and it was subsequently adopted by the Prime Minister of that time, Mackenzie King, for his own concept of middle power. Later, Canada's government unsuccessfully sought to insert a reference to a special category of middle power into the UN Charter at the San Francisco Conference of 1945. Despite the absence of formal recognition, the category of middle power, underpinned by active internationalism and the belief in multilateral practices within the UN, became the bedrock of Canada's Golden Age in foreign policy (1945–1957) (Chapnick, 1999, 73–82). As I have argued elsewhere (Thomsen and Hynek 2006), Canada's foreign and security policy had as its distinguishing feature, a notable discrepancy between political discourse, which has given the impression of linear and continuous progress, often achieved by references to the Golden Age and middle power, and practical policymaking as conducted by each Canadian government since the WWII onwards. It is the discursive continuity that has helped to form the perception of Canada as a country with a distinctive foreign and security policy, imbued with a normative ideal of middlepowerhood.

The suggested discrepancy between the linearity of discourse and the variability of policymaking concerning Canadian foreign and security policy is an important finding with respect to the methodology associated with middlepowerhood. Initially, it highlights the futility of examining Canadian involvement in world politics against the normative ideal of a middlepowerhood that is immutable in time.¹⁰ However, another available strategy, the dismissal of the category of middle power, is not seen as a viable alternative either since middlepowerhood has been playing an important legitimising function in the introduction of the country's various practices – most recently the new diplomacy based on the governmentality of advanced liberalism – thereby preserving the semblance of continuous and linear development.¹¹ However, a third strategy avoids both the pitfalls of the normative-idealist view

¹⁰ Although this point could raise a question about the possible cooption of nongovernmental actors by the government, or the Trojan horse phenomenon, available accounts (cf. Cameron et al., 1998, especially chapters 2, 3, 10–11, 19–21; for the case of small arms and light weapons, Krause, 2002, 258–9), as well as a series of personal qualitative interviews which I conducted with representatives of NGO community (MAC, Oxfam Canada and Physicians for Global Survival) and governmental officials at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa during April 2006, do not suggest this.

¹¹ An opinion poll from spring 1996 suggests the considerable influence of the MAC's mandate, since 73 per cent of Canadians – as opposed to 22 per cent of Americans – supported the total ban of APLs (cit. in Tomlin, 1998, 211 fn. 25).

of middlepowerhood as well as resisting the temptation to reject it altogether. It can alternatively be understood as a political category constructed by relatively autonomous decision-making circles immediately after WWII (Pratt, 1983–4), with its importance stemming from the positive endorsement of both the Canadian public and international society. The category of middle power is thus considered an *empty form* which needs to be – and has actually been – refilled again and again, hence Cox’s (1989, 827) assertion that ‘the middle power is a role in search of an actor.’

Although Foucault dates neo-liberal governmentality back to the 1970s, its manifestation in the theme of the present analysis could only be discerned after the Cold War was over. The reason for this delay lies in the fact that the ideological polarisation of world politics effectively created an environment where self-constructed middle powers, like Canada, Norway, or the Netherlands, were swayed by the bipolarity between the US and the USSR. Andrew Cooper (1997, 1–24) therefore speaks of middle powers as (ideological and military) followers of the US during the Cold War, as compared to their newly expressed functional leadership qualities in the post-Cold War era. This post-Cold War, niche-oriented ‘New Diplomacy’, discursively wrapped in a popular packaging of ‘middle power’, lies at the heart of the change of governmental rationality, and as such is characterised by the extent to which nongovernmental actors have a significant share in the process of *government*, or, in Foucault’s own words, in the exercise of political sovereignty (Foucault, 1989, 296). The distinction made earlier by Held and McGrew *between* horizontally stretched (‘truly’ democratic) networks of nongovernmental actors and vertically erected hierarchical structures of the nation-state does not hold water when the nature of the new diplomacy is examined (cf. Bátorá, 2005). While the diplomacy manifesting the governmental rationality of organised modernity was closely associated with exclusivity, hierarchy, a culture of secrecy, and one-way communication, the new diplomacy, on the contrary, reflects the governmentality of advanced liberalism by its inclusiveness, multistakeholder character, two-way communication based on the norm of transparency, and, last but not least, largely horizontal and functional-symbiotic interactions between governments and nongovernmental actors.

The chief advocate of the new diplomacy, the Canadian ex-minister of foreign affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, readily referred to alleged similarities between his new diplomacy and the diplomatic practices of Lester Pearson, the main protagonist of the Golden Age. Anyone seriously interested in governmental rationalities and diplomacy as its carrier in world politics should immediately reject such a parallel. Pearson’s diplomacy drew its strength from its exclusivity and secrecy, thus corresponding exactly with the main characteristics of the governmentality of organised modernity, whereas Axworthy’s was exactly the opposite: media-oriented, with radical public speeches, and a definite openness as well as the involvement of nongovernmental actors in both domestic decision-

making processes and international negotiations (Cooper, 2000, 9–10). In line with the suggestion that a self-constructed status matters, it appears that the category of middle power has, in Canada's case, served a useful, though contingent, function as a kind of discursive cement between completely disparate political practices associated with two very different governmentalities. Axworthy's intention was, in fact, to use the category of middle power, which had been highly popular among the Canadian public and the international community, as a legitimising factor for a radically new exercise of political sovereignty informed by the governmentality of advanced liberalism.

The character of the political involvement of the Canadian government in the landmine case, shaped by the rationality of advanced liberalism, was expressed in developing a new functional relationship between the Canadian government on the one hand, and nongovernmental actors as well as other governments on the other. It is useful at this point to analyse this shift against the background of the production of knowledge about security. I argue that although Cooper's macrostructural explanation gives us the sense of *why* it was impossible for Canada to embrace more advanced-liberal practices up until the 1990s (the ideological polarization; followership *Vs.* functional leadership), it provides us with little insight into *how* it was possible to exclude nongovernmental actors within this arrangement.

The governmentality of organised modernity typified the environment where knowledge about security was exclusively produced by, and bound up with, the government. Correspondingly, it was the government who monopolised the definition of what was and what was not knowledge about security. The direct consequence of this ideological polarisation was, therefore, a military-based conception of national security, which effectively closed the discursive space concerning possible alternative security concepts. The prohibition of nongovernmental actors' access to the production and definition of what counted as knowledge about security was then an inevitable corollary of this situation.

Unlike the governmentality of organised modernity, the governmentality of advanced liberalism rests on the premise that 'man appears in his ambiguous position as an *object* of knowledge and a *subject* that knows' (Foucault, 1974, 323, emphases added). Thus, the crucial change has been marked by the transfer of power execution (but not the power *per se*; power becomes de-centred) from the government to its citizens through which the citizen was constituted as an active political *subject*. This change in turn allowed for the emergence of the individual as the *object* of discourse, most notably through the articulation of an individual-centred human security paradigm at both the levels of practical policy-making and security studies. Finally, the departure from a narrowly defined, military-based concept of national security and the subsequent formulation of an individual-centred conception of human security, as promoted by the Canadian government, was the crucial moment in the opening of the discursive space about security. This was precisely what was needed to enable

the individual to become an effective and efficient political subject of *government* (Foucault, 1991), thereby exercising political sovereignty together with the government.


What can be observed in this development is the dissolution of two different bonds forged during the governmentality of organised modernity, namely, (i) a bond between the government and knowledge about security and (ii) a bond concerning conditionality between funding and a particular type of knowledge production. With regard to the first bond, knowledge about security in the new order was produced and subsequently supplied to the government to an increasing extent by non-governmental actors. These actors began to fill a newly open discursive space with the knowledge based on their own expertise, experience and interpretation of what counts as knowledge about security, and the government used this knowledge, at least in the landmine case and other humanitarian campaigns, as their own. The reason for this, from the advanced-liberal governmentality perspective, is apparent: the government now considered nongovernmental actors as the most efficient source of human-centred knowledge about landmines and, as a result of a changed economy of power manifest in the government's heightened sensitivity to this knowledge, the number of nongovernmental actors involved as well as the volume of the new knowledge increased.

As far as the dissolution of the second bond is concerned, after nongovernmental actors were enabled to enter the discourse about security, a functional-symbiotic relationship between the two entities was created: nongovernmental actors began supplying the government with their knowledge about security in exchange for receiving funding which effectively enabled them to conduct their further activities associated with knowledge production in large measure.¹² This dissolution, clearly the extension of the first one, can thus be conceived of as the termination of ideological conditionality between funding and knowledge production, as was known in the rationality of organised modernity during which the government was both the source of knowledge and of funding. Furthermore, the double dissolution also indicates for the governmentality of advanced liberalism a symptomatic increase in nongovernmental actors' autonomy and responsibility. Not only did these actors produce knowledge about landmines, but, most importantly, they managed to establish and frame the landmine issue as a humanitarian problem, in contrast to the previously dominant military perspective, and pass this perception to the Canadian government.

The functional-symbiotic relationship between the Canadian government and non-governmental actors can be graphically summarized as follows:

¹² The formal name of the CCW Convention is 'The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.'

Figure I. Governmentalities and Typifications of Knowledge about Security



Re-Examining the Landmine Case: An Empirical Analysis

This section offers empirical evidence, in this reinterpretation of the landmine case, for the argument that the nature of the relationship between governmental and non-governmental actors is one of functional-symbiosis. In concrete terms, it deals with changes in the nature of interactions between the Canadian government and nongovernmental actors subsumed under the umbrella group, MAC, which has itself been part of a wide transnational advocacy network ICBL. This re-examination refutes the claim of the majority of empirical studies on landmines (Horwood, 2003; Lint, 2003; Mathew and Rutherford, 2003; Williams, 2000; Thakur, 1999; Price, 1998) that this case was an unprecedented victory of the transnational world which allegedly challenged and pressurised the state-centred one. The aim of this section is not to provide the reader with a comprehensive descriptive account of the landmine case, but rather with an analysis of its key moments in respect of the establishment of a functional-symbiotic, Canadian government/NGO nexus between 1993 and 1997.

Nongovernmental actors producing alternative, human-oriented knowledge about landmines had already existed during the Cold War and the activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) can serve as an example of this (Maresca and Maslen, 2000). The importance of ideological depolarisation after the Cold War can therefore be seen in the fact that governments suddenly had, at least theoretically, more political space for independent action and expression of their innovative procedures. However, there were no real significant openings in the previously closed discourse on security immediately after the end of the Cold War. The activities of nongovernmental actors were therefore still largely isolated from the activities of governments. The most significant post-Cold War effort to solve the landmine crisis came from the NGOs active in demining and in providing medical help. In 1992 they established the ICBL, promoting the total ban of antipersonnel landmines (APLs) (English, 1998, 122) on the premise that the use of APLs was violating both principles of the 'Hague branch' of international humanitarian law, i.e. the principles of proportionality and discrimination (Mathews and McCormack, 1999).

The first significant – and, as later developments would show, cardinal – opening of security discourse for nongovernmental actors took place in Canada in 1993. Although Canada was one of a few countries financially supporting demining activities at the very end of the Cold War (ICBL, 2000), it was not until 1993 that the government's practices could be associated with the new advanced-liberal governmentality. A catalyst in this development was when, in 1993, the Liberal Party of Canada (LP) returned to government after nine years as the opposition party and made important changes to Canada's international and security policy. Their detailed and radical election programme, 'Creating Opportunities' (also known as the 'Red Book'), emphasized the fact

that ‘Canadians are asking for a commitment from government to listen to their views, and to respect their needs by ensuring that no false distinction is made between domestic and foreign policy’ (LP of Canada, 1993, 104–6). A crucial part linked to the opening of the security discourse for nongovernmental actors was acknowledged in the expressed need to have ‘a broader definition of national and international security’ (Ibid., 105–6). This shift corresponds to what Dean calls governmentality ‘programmes’, i.e. ‘explicit, planned attempts to reform or transform regimes of practices [which] often take the form of a link between theoretical knowledge and practical concerns and objectives’ (1999, 211).

After the landslide victory in the elections, the LP started to fulfil the election promise by transforming the decision-making process in terms of inclusivity concerning nongovernmental actors (Government of Canada, 1995, 48–9). In regard to the landmine case, the key nongovernmental actor which began to attend governmental meetings was the umbrella group MAC in 1995, including, for instance, Physicians for Global Survival, CARE, CUSO, Oxfam and Project Ploughshares (Cameron, 1998, 432). The reaction of the NGO community to this change of governmental rationality has been aptly summarised by Paul Hannon, Executive Director of MAC:

We had to learn, as NGOs, *how to work properly* ... you cannot do those things in the way it used to be *organised*, you know, like an anti-nuclear protest [during the Cold War]. You cannot do it with a mimeograph and a few things on a poster ... you cannot be ideological about these things, you have to go practical. And that is why you sometimes use business models; *you learn how to run an organisation*. That is the *most efficient way* how to do it ... You bring in people who are different from you, with different expertise, so good functioning NGO boards have lawyers on them, there are fundraisers, business people, human resources experts ... *We have learned that through painful way, you have to do it, that was the part of our sophistication* (personal interview by author, Ottawa, April 27th, 2006; emphases added).

The course of these meetings suggests that the MAC seized the opportunity to use them as a strategic forum for educating governmental officials within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) on landmines as a humanitarian concern (Cameron, 1998, 432–4; Warmington and Tuttle, 1998, 48–50).¹³ These meetings served as a zone of socialisation, and with the personal contribution of André Ouellet, the minister of foreign affairs at the time, functional connections, a new relationship and a new understanding of the issue started to emerge (Tomlin, 1998, 191–3).

Although Canada’s government changed its stance and embraced the call for a total ban of APLs, its attention, nevertheless, was still directed towards the

¹³ The first obstacle was overcome, very much in advanced-liberal governmentality fashion, by the inclusion of representatives of the MAC in Canada’s governmental delegation. The two entities thus literally exercised political sovereignty together.

1995 UN review conference of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).¹⁴ The government's stance on the landmine issue shifted thanks to MAC's framing of landmines as a humanitarian concern. However, this would not have been possible had the government not (i) *previously taken decisions regarding the participation of nongovernmental actors into the formal consulting process*, and (ii) *extended the general notion of what security was*. At the same time, government officials still believed in the appropriateness of UN multilateralism as a platform for bringing about this change. The development of the CCW conference soon showed, however, the impossibility of pushing Canada's radical proposal through. This was largely because the mechanism of the conference was still underpinned by the principles of the governmentality of organised modernity, as evidenced by the fact that NGOs were not permitted to attend negotiations, and also that governments needed to vote unanimously for any change to take place.¹⁵ Despite the fact that advocates of incremental arms control saw the amended II. Protocol to the CCW Convention as a success,¹⁶ progress was simply not significant enough for the delegation advocating the non-military, human security-oriented total ban of the entire category of weapons.

A catalytic event in the development of the landmine issue occurred in the middle of UN negotiations in January 1996, when Lloyd Axworthy replaced André Ouellet in his ministerial position. This change represented a boost to Canadian efforts as Axworthy was the most vociferous promoter of the new diplomacy. It was after Axworthy assumed office that the governmentality of advanced liberalism really came to the fore. Not only was the collaboration between the government and the MAC further deepened, but Axworthy also frequently invoked the concept of middle power to legitimate and justify his radical diplomatic methods (cf. Axworthy, 1997). Positive proof confirming the success of such legitimisation is to be found in the responses from focus groups and questionnaires that were held and circulated during the final conference in Ottawa in 1997 by the company EKOS Research Associates. The overwhelming majority of heads of states, PMs, and senior government officials, who were the subject of this inquiry, associated the success of the Ottawa process with the fact that it was being steered by a group of middle powers, most notably Canada (Cameron et al., 1998, 7–13).

Axworthy had already begun to form a group of like-minded countries led by middle powers Canada and Norway during the CCW Conference and it essentially comprised the countries which had previously imposed unilateral moratoria on export, sale, and transfer of APLs and, in some cases, had even

¹⁴ See the UN Disarmament Yearbook of 1997, pp. 105–106, for specific amendments.

¹⁵ The members of this informal coalition were Canada, Norway, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Switzerland, and Mexico.

¹⁶ I would like to thank Andrea Teti for this formulation.

completely destroyed their stockpiles.¹⁷ After Canadian hopes were dashed by the CCW Conference stalemate, it was the Canadian government, namely Lloyd Axworthy as its Minister of Foreign Affairs, and not the MAC as part of the ICBL, who redirected Canadian efforts to a non-UN fast track line with its own constitutive mechanism of self-selection, commonly referred to as the Ottawa Process. Explanations in Rosenau's vein fail to take into account the development of the Ottawa Process since the dichotomic representation of states and nongovernmental actors produces analytical blindedness to this phenomenon and these accounts have therefore limited value to the extent of being misleading.¹⁸

With respect to the advanced-liberal governmentality of the Ottawa Process, it was the funding of the participation of nongovernmental actors, the MAC, and more generally the ICBL, by governments of like-minded countries, especially self-constructed middle powers, that played an important role in the process of knowledge production and organisation. The Ottawa Process itself consisted of a set of meetings which were sponsored by and featured self-selected like-minded states on the one hand and NGOs subsumed under the ICBL on the other.¹⁹ The purpose of these meetings was to jointly propose, discuss, and agree on a legally binding instrument which would completely prohibit the entire category of APLs (cf. Cameron, 1998; Lawson et al., 1998). The two most important meetings were the ones organised in Norway in September 1997 and in Canada in December 1997. In respect of the former, not only did the Norwegian government sponsor activities which enabled ICBL to participate in knowledge production and sharing, but also, for the first time in the history of arms control, gave a nongovernmental organization (ICBL) an official seat in actual negotiations (Williams and Goose, 1998, 43). As to the latter, this was the actual conference where the previously negotiated and drafted treaty, the Ottawa Convention,²⁰ was signed by 122 governments.

The Canadian partnership between the government and the MAC, itself a manifestation of the advanced-liberal governmentality, did not come to an end, however, with the signing of the Convention. Since then the Canadian government has donated more than US \$130 million to support anti-mine-related activities. A significant portion has been specifically directed towards education programs and R&D concerning demining technologies, i.e. knowledge-related issues (ICBL, 2005; Maslen 2004, 149–51). The Canadian

¹⁷ As one highly-ranking official at the DFAIT put it, 'We had CDN \$2 million to run the Ottawa Process and we used it very specifically for [funding] conferences and meetings' (personal interview by autor, Ottawa, April 21st, 2006).

¹⁸ The formal name of the Ottawa Convention is 'The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.'

¹⁹ Canada's R&D donation concerning demining technologies in the period of 1997–2004 alone accounted for US \$15 million (ICBL, 2005).

²⁰ CIDA manages a part of the Canadian Landmine Fund, alongside the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Department of National Defence.

government has also created The Canadian Landmine Fund from which the majority of the above activities have been funded. Consequently, these new functional-symbiotic relations are reflected in the institutional discourse: to mention but two examples, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) emphasises the importance of working closely with Canadian and international NGOs in its effort to end the suffering caused by landmines (CIDA, 2006); and secondly, nowhere has the new governmentality of advanced liberalism been more noticeable than in the case of a charity focused on landmines, The Canadian Landmine Foundation (CLF). Established by Axworthy when he was still Minister of Foreign Affairs, this body has been the most important mine-related non-governmental fundraising organisation in Canada. Not only does the CLF stress the importance of the link forged between itself and the government, but it also reveals that the citizen Axworthy has been on its Board of Directors ever since (CLF, 2006).

Conclusion

Unlike the global governance approach aiming at providing a student of IR with universal explanations, the governmentality approach makes only limited generalisations and turns its attention to innovative political micro-practices rather than macrostructural transformations as sources of a change. Yet, it gives credit to macrostructural conditions of possibility, or in Hooper-Greenhill's (1989, 63) term conditions of emergence (here ideological depolarization after the Cold War), in regard to late manifestations of the change in governmentalities. Focusing on *specific* national identities then, namely the self-constructed category of middle power, is an integral part of this strategy of limited generalisation of findings, or as Price and Reus-Smit (1998, 272) put it, 'small-t' truth claims. What is needed, then, is an empirically more sensitive explanation than Rosenau's strategy of fixing the dual ontology of the state-centric and transnational worlds to the institution of state sovereignty. For Rosenau, all states are inevitably alike insofar as they are understood through their *generic* national identities with state sovereignty as the lowest common denominator. The implication is clear: since states are painted as similar to one another, he obviously cannot consider differences among them to be potential sources of innovative political micropractices with a system-wide effect. Consequently, Rosenau has to rely on the notion of the state-centric world being challenged by the transnational world to account for what he sees as systemic transformations in world politics, thus becoming a prisoner of the logic of state sovereignty as this institution is considered a crucial explanatory factor.

One of the substantial differences distinguishing this article from the self-referential celebratory commentaries so typical for the landmine case is the refusal to treat conceptual categories as meaningful kinds. An interesting parallel is discernable in the thinking of Foucault and Cox: they work with the state and middle powers respectively as with meaningless empty containers, or

forms. Since they are meaningless, any explanation that uncritically depends on them is, inevitably, meaningless too. This is because the form *per se* does not tell us anything about the politics of the content, i.e. about the possible different ways of organising the exercise of political sovereignty with regard to the nation state, or about temporal differences in meaning as opposed to consistency in political function with respect to middlepowerhood. Foucault (1991) himself understands progressive political practices as ones that seek to transform the relationship between historically specific practices and their formation rules, rather than some kind of ultimate quest for ideal necessities or universal human subjectivities, which can be introduced into society. Conceptualising both the nation-state and middle powers as empty categories has thus an important corollary; it shows a promising way of analysing changes in world politics without the necessity of relying on normative and idealism-imbued accounts on the one hand, and on radical calls for dismantling current structures of world politics on the other.

So one can, to an extent, rely on traditional concepts, yet it is worth looking at them from new perspectives, thereby presenting heuristically innovative insights into what has widely been believed to have immutable meanings. As the previous analysis of governmental rationalities shows, despite the most central formal categories being the same, the dynamics of the governmentality of organised modernity and that of advanced liberalism were completely different. In regard to the former, it was exclusively the government who produced, funded and organised (military-based) knowledge about landmines. The access of nongovernmental actors to the security discourse was closed in spite of the fact that they did produce their alternative individual-centred knowledge about landmines. As to the latter, one can say that the government redefined ‘a discursive field in which exercising power is “rationalized”’ (Lemke, 2001, 190) and forged a new functional-symbiotic partnership, with nongovernmental actors supplying knowledge about landmines and the Canadian government funding this enterprise and using this knowledge in interactions with other states, both to consolidate the pro-ban coalition of like-minded countries and to discipline noncompliers through the exercise of peer pressure.

The attributes of advanced-liberal rationality examined above in the case of Canada’s exercise of political sovereignty can be compared to what Geoffrey Wiseman (2004, 47) calls *middle power plurilateralism*, i.e. the notion that official entities (the Canadian government) can be joined by nongovernmental actors (MAC as the part of the ICBL) without necessitating reciprocal recognition as sovereign entities. This confirms the argument that the explanatory factor in the subject matter of this article – i.e. changes in interactions between some governments and nongovernmental actors – is not the institute of state sovereignty, but the shift to the governmentality of advanced liberalism, specifically the use of methods through which the individual became an active political subject of *government*. Not only did middle powers act in the landmine

case through nongovernmental actors, but they also gave these non-state actors a free hand in their agenda setting and issue framing as well as in strategy selection and networking. Moreover, as the landmine case demonstrated, the knowledge about landmines was produced entirely by non-state actors, and the governments of self-constructed middle powers, most notably Canada and Norway, were subsequently provided with that knowledge.

Finally, there is the question of what the Canadian government has acquired by its advanced-liberal procedure. It is suggested that a government that builds a functional-symbiotic relationship with nongovernmental actors gains a comparative advantage over other states, insofar as it has at its disposal a rare and valuable type of human-oriented knowledge about security which, in turn, serves as an important basis for the worldwide reputation and symbolic status of a given country. Governments that have formed and discursively legitimated their collective identity around the category of middle power frequently build both informal and formal coalitions of like-minded countries. For instance, as a result of successful practices of an informal like-minded group led by middle powers Canada and Norway in the landmine case, these two leading countries signed the bilateral Lysøen Declaration of 1998, and a year later expanded into The Human Security Network (HSN). As I argued elsewhere (Hynek and Waišová 2006), the aim of such platforms is not only to bring about a system-wide normative change (e.g. a prohibitive regime, be it of antipersonnel landmines, small arms and light weapons or child soldiers), but also socialising other participating actors into accepting norms, methods and procedures linked to this governmentality of advanced liberalism. It is self-constructed middle powers who often assume leadership and steer the direction of a like-minded group. The HSN is a flexible platform which can be, due to member governments' close cooperation with nongovernmental actors, regarded as the product of a plurilateralist organisation informed by advanced-liberal governmentality. Moreover, the subsequent institutionalisation of Canada and Norway's advanced-liberal experiences to the plurilateral HSN demonstrates more systematisation in what was previously ad-hoc attempts to conduct the governmentality of advanced liberalism in world politics. Thus we might be able to expect more of these developments to occur in the future.

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The Gratuitous Suicide by the Sons of Pride: On Honour and Wrath in Terrorist Attacks

Denis Madore¹

*“Where there is coal, or oil, or water-power, there
new weapons can be forged against the heart of the Faustian Civilization”*
Oswald Spengler, *Man and Technics*

*“In that day, Yahweh with his hard and great and strong sword will punish
leviathan, the fleeing serpent, and leviathan the twisted serpent; and he
will kill the dragon that is in the sea.”*

Isaiah 27:01

In the Western philosophic and literary tradition to be without home or country is a fate that both demands our loathing and pity. As Aristotle characterized it, a man born without a city is either a “beast or a god”. Such beings Aristotle maintains, since they cannot properly be called human, have a natural tendency towards war and violence. Aristotle sites Homer in describing such a being as clanless, lawless, and hearthless. “The man who is such by nature at once plunges into a passion for war; he is in the position of a solitary piece in a game of draughts.”² Oswald Spengler addresses this issue of such wanderers by appealing to the image of Nietzsche’s beasts of prey. “*The animal of prey is the highest form of mobile life.* It implies a maximum of freedom for self against others, of responsibility to self, of singleness to self, an extreme of necessity where the self can hold its own only by *fighting and winning and destroying*. It imparts a high dignity to Man, as a type, that he is a beast of

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² Barker, Ernest, trans. Aristotle, *Politics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998. Pg. 10, 1253b17.3.

prey.”³ The beast of prey that Spengler describes is also much akin to Alexandre Kojève’s conception of the japanized man, a being whom is capable of the highest spiritual undertakings – “the gratuitous suicide”.

Both mythopoetic and philosophic accounts in the Western tradition attempt to give us an understanding of such men – they are naturally wed to the ways of war, but also hold no particular allegiance to community though they may invoke it in their march towards power. A great deal of effort in the classical Western cannon is spent rendering and making available a system of education and organization that permits the necessary tethering of such men, so as to not have them unleash their wrath inwards against their fellow citizens or plunge their respective communities into war with others. Such early mythopoetic and philosophic accounts of the warrior’s nature also have modern equivalents which, it should, be noted, are not far removed from the classical examinations and judgements of Plato, Aristotle and St Augustine. Thomas Hobbes titled his *magnum opus* the Leviathan, from the book of Job, because Leviathan “... seeth every high thing below him; and is King of all the sons of pride”.⁴ This paper aims to survey several of the ancient and modern ontological accounts on the man of war as he relates to the regime. The hope is that such an analysis can bear fruit in showing a manner of understanding the global resurgence of dangerous individuals that can contest states directly by means of terrorism. I wish to stress however that for the most part I will be drawing upon such examples from the Western tradition of political philosophy, and leave it to more competent Islamic scholars to address such issues within Islamic traditions.⁵

Before we can attest that an act of violent suicide is a tactic of the powerless, or that religion offers a solace making it “reasonable”, we must first take note of Achilles choice in Homer’s Iliad: “Better a short life full of glory, than a long life.” Behind liberal democratic thought lies a Christian heritage that often escapes the analysis of most secular interpreters. Augustine’s theological and political philosophy is the first sustained argument on what became the Catholic Church’s position on the injunction against suicide. The early Christian movements struggled with the relation between private and public as they related to pioussness and civic duty – how were these often conflicting and unstable forces to be mediated in a polity that was heterogeneous in content? The Donatists and Circumcellions challenges to the Catholic Church paved the way to what has become the communitarian heart of the Christian world view,

³ Spengler, Oswald, *Man and Technics: A Contribution to the Philosophy of Life*, University Press of the Pacific, Honolulu, 2002. Pg. 22.

⁴ Hobbes, Thomas, *Leviathan*, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1994. Pg. 210.

⁵ As in the spirit of Joseph Campbell, “My hope is that a comparative elucidation may contribute to the perhaps not-quite disparate causes of those forces that are working in the present world for unification, not in the name of some ecclesiastical or political empire, but in the sense of human mutual understanding.” Campbell, Joseph, *The Hero with a Thousand Faces: Third Edition*, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Pg. VIII.

but Augustine's doctrinal answer to Donatist and Circumcellion⁶ challenges against Catholic authority spelled out how the magistrate⁷ was to treat a being capable of a "gratuitous suicide".⁸ Within this Catholic world view is born the injunction against pride that will haunt the thought of liberal democracy. It is this inability of liberal democracy to understand the ontological roots of the prideful, honour-seeking individual that is at the heart of our global predicament.⁹ It is important to step back our analysis of such prideful men, to pre-Christian times since therein we find a very different and favourable understanding of the internal and external psychological forces that propel such men to action and sacrifice. And after two millennia of Christian secularism, our wits have become dull to what is perhaps most evident in world politics today – the return of the Gods, a return to myth as motive and means to establishing power.

A Mother's Council: Pride and Honour in the Timocrate

The ancient Greeks has two senses for the word pride – the positive type of pride was love of honour in the negative sense it was hubris. The positive notion of pride, if we transliterate, means philo-timai – by philo we recognize the friendship towards something, just as philo-sophia is friendship to wisdom, or better still the love of wisdom. Timai is a harder word to denote in its specific meaning, since it can mean a number of things – honour, avenging, that which is valued, precious or esteemed – the word is generally related to value and judgments of value. But this does not mean we can translate the meaning of philo-timai as a type of money-loving, rather it is linked with the love of judgement, the identification with judgement, of choosing between good and bad, or

⁶ Catholic Encyclopaedia Dictionary, Cassel. London, 1931, "Agonistici (Agon = 'struggle')." One of the names given by the Donatists to those of their followers who went through cities and villages to disseminate the doctrine of Donatus. They first appeared about 317 (Tillemont, *Mém.*, VI, 96), and claimed that they were champions of Christ, fighting with the sword of Israel. Their war-cry was *Laudes Deo* (Praises to God). They committed many barbarous acts and deeds of violence. Whether they called themselves "fighters" (Agonistic) because they fought the battles of the Lord, or because they were forced to fight those who sought to protect their property against their invasions, is not clear. The Catholics styled the Agonistici, "Circumcellions," i.e. circum cellas euntes, because they roved about among the peasants, living on those they sought to indoctrinate." The Circumcellion attempted to reach martyrdom by forcing the hands of those they attack, or by taking their own lives.

⁷ I use the word magistrate to directly link this with the later thought of John Locke in the *Letter on Toleration* to emphasize the notion of religious and secular divide.

⁸ Dyson, R.W. ed. Augustine, *The City of God Against the Pagans*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pg. 27, 32–33.

⁹ Of course I am not referring to those that have contemplated the problem of pride, such as Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes "vainglory", or Jean-Jacques Rousseau's "amour-propre", rather I am referring to more narrow views that have been expressed popularly with regard to liberal democracy.

friend and enemy; it also is linked with the esteem associated with honours and privilege, reward and punishment. Yet pride is a complex psychological force which has a counterpart, its negative double; hubris as an overweening pride.

In book eight of Plato's *Republic* the account given by Socrates tells us that a Timocrate in youth will be with freemen "...tame and to rulers most obedient. He is a lover of ruling and of honor, not basing his claim to rule on speaking or anything of the sort, but on warlike deeds and everything connected with war; he is a lover of gymnastics and the hunt."¹⁰ Socrates goes on to describe how such a type would in youth deride the pursuit of wealth, however as he grew older the more he would associate with it and come to love it. Socrates' account demonstrates a type of individual who at their core loves both victory and honour (philoneikia, philotimai). Such a youth scoffs at those that talk too much, and prefers the man of action – it is both his ideal and ultimate aim. For those that talk too much veil their inadequacies in war by way of words, and ultimately they are sycophants and hypocrites that provide no emulative model either in educating one towards victory or the acquisition of honour. Such a youth has very high standards of respect, and those whom do not meet his criteria are not deserving of his respect. Socrates attributes this type of psychological complex to the education such a youth receives in the home, and for the main it is a consequence of motherly interventions to remedy the inadequacies of an introverted father. Socrates in the *Republic* stresses the importance of properly matching husband and wife, and when he describes Timocrate's malformed education; one gathers the importance he stresses with regard to the equality necessary in the coupling of husband and wife.¹¹

The attitude adopted by the youthful Timocrate is not the free expression of an innate nature, rather it is the consequence of motherly education. The status an ancient Greek woman would hold in Greek society was largely determined by the standing and status of her husband.¹² If her husband was not well looked upon in public this would necessarily bleed into the private sphere of the household, and as primary guardian over the youth's education. Socrates explains how the child would come to learn through his mother and the slaves of the estate how they all lose honour as a result of the inactions in public of the father. Both mother and slaves would come to resent their current conditions, having no power or ability to change their fate they would continually remind the youth, that unlike his father, he should seek to gain the esteem of others. His father is constantly presented to him as inadequate, lacking in manliness – *andreia*. This sends the youth into a search for surrogate educators as well as a life of austerity, he cannot become fully public having been educated

¹⁰ Bloom, Alan, trans. Plato, *The Republic of Plato: 2nd Edition*, Basic Books, Chicago, 1991. Pg. 226, 549a.

¹¹ Walcot, Peter, "Plato's Mother and Other Terrible Women", *Greece & Rome*, 2nd Ser., Vol. 34, No. 1 (Apr., 1987), pp. 12–31.

¹² Pomeroy, Sarah B. *Goddesses, Whores, Wives and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity*, Schocken Books, New York, 1995, pg. 25–29, 79–84.

primarily by non-freemen. This also means that his tethering to the public and, by consequence, the community is tentative. This loose association to the city is a consequence of the regime change that has cast his father into private life – for to undo such wrongs he must seek the help of those factions which would help him undertake the avenging of his kin. But this makes the family and private life more important than public responsibility and duty. The youthful Timocrate is marinated in an education that he must become manlier than his father.

Adeimantus and Socrates discuss the relation of the degeneration of regimes and how they affect the sons of a polity in flux;

Then they will be stingy with money because they honor it and don't acquire it openly; but, pushed on by desire, they will love to spend other people's money; and they will harvest pleasures stealthily, running away from the law like boys from a father. This is because they weren't educated by persuasion but by force – the result of neglect of the true Muse accompanied by arguments and philosophy while giving more distinguished honor to gymnastics than music.

You certainly speak of a regime, he said, which is a mixture of bad and good.

Yes, it is mixed, I said, but due to the dominance of spiritedness one thing is most distinctive in it: love of victories and of honors.¹³

The sketch outlining this type of upbringing should concern us with regard to the rise of dangerous warlike individuals, and this is not simply of philosophical interest. As with Plato our inquiry is to investigate what types of individuals emerge and under what conditions, but unlike modern psychology we are not interested in this psychological make-up as an exception, as we trust as with Plato that it is important because it is a perennial lesson about politics.¹⁴ The Greeks, being an honour culture themselves, have much to teach with regard to the revival of timocratic men in world politics.

The essential element in the account rendered by Socrates is the regime change that occurs in the polity, which is by and large what makes the Timocrate pursue his march towards war. But it is also why he does not have a genuine attachment to the community itself, after all, if his father became powerless it

¹³ Bloom, Alan, trans. Plato, *The Republic of Plato: 2nd Edition*, Basic Books, Chicago, 1991. Pg. 225-226, 548b-c.

¹⁴ I am in agreement with H.E. Malden in *The Sequence of Forms of Government in Plato's 'Republic' Compared with the Actual History of Greek Cities*, *Transactions of the Royal History Society*, New Ser., Vol. 5. (1891), pp. 53–74, when he writes “Even, Plato, however, could hardly be serious in suggesting that the ethical decadence of individual character from generation to generation proceeds always by a fixed law, that the son of the perfect man is always or even generally ambitious, that the son of the ambitious man is always money-loving and so on.”

was a direct consequence of the regime's change, that though he seeks to take it over and renew it to avenge the injustice done by it, our young Timocrate in the end cares for it less than his task of becoming an important man of courage and honour. Because the father of the young Timocrate was unable to re-establish his station in the renewed regime, like Friedrich Nietzsche writes in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Zarathustra seems to warn the young Timocrate, an "Aggrieved conceit, repressed envy – perhaps the conceit and envy of your fathers – erupt from you as a flame and as the frenzy of revenge. What was silent in the father speaks in the son; and often I found the son the unveiled secret of the father."¹⁵

Socrates' account raises some difficulties when we consider that no polity exists in a vacuum, and certainly the degeneration of polities that Plato describes in the Republic are not immune from contingencies and invasions. It is not coincidental that the degeneration of the polities of Plato's Republic seems to match the same development undergone by Athens in her rivalry with Sparta, but the outcomes in Athens were as much determined by internal forces as well as external pressures. It should be noted that the establishment of the Thirty Tyrants by Sparta would have led to the conditions necessary for the arising of Timocrates. Those active in politics under new Spartan management would have been relegated to the private sphere.

The Timocrate finds his birth place between these borderlines, since his upbringing was always between the private and public realm. His father, having been pressured out from public life into private existence, is a man defeated – effectively his status is that of women, at worst he is a slave. His mother, meanwhile, along with the household slaves, goad him to take station in the public realm. In the Platonic tripartite soul it is not at all curious that the Thumotic part of the soul resides in the midsection of the torso, separating the head and bowels. It is this element of the thumotic, the in-between, that is the engine of the soul. It should not surprise us that modernity, and more often modern liberal democracy, has been described as populated by "men without chests".¹⁶

Socrates in the Republic gives us a philosophic account. Homer meanwhile, in the Iliad, gives us the mythopoetic account of this man of war in the personage of Achilles. Both are suggestive that it is due to unequal pairing in marriage that causes the unbalanced character we see in the young Timocrate's war-loving. Homer's account of Achilles is that he is a man divided, being a demi-god, son of Peleus, a mortal king and Thetis an immortal goddess.

¹⁵ Kaufmann, Walter, trans. Nietzsche, Friedrich, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for None and All*, Penguin books, New York, 1978, pg. 100. Plato also makes this a key feature of the youthful Timocrate, that he pursues what his father could not gain, namely wealth and standing.

¹⁶ See: Lewis, C.S. *The Abolition of Man*, Macmillan Publishing Co., New York, 1975 and also Fukuyama, Francis, *The End of History and the Last Man*, Harper-Collins Publishers, New York, 1992, specifically chapter 24 entitled "Men Without Chests".

Unlike the Timocrate of the Republic, Achilles is not fathered by a defeated father, rather Peleus is a man denied access to the realm of the gods, being a mere mortal, which means that he is incapable of holding any clout among the gods. For Thetis, this means a rather unhappy marriage to a man that cannot increase her standing. As Achilles recounts, his mother told him a prophetic choice regarding his future:

For my mother Thetis the goddess of the silver feet tells me I carry two sorts of destiny toward the day of my death. Either, if I stay here and fight beside the city of the Trojans, my return home is gone, but my glory shall be everlasting; but if I return home to the beloved land of my father, the excellence of my glory is gone, but there will be a long life left for me, and my glory is gone, and my end in death will not come to me quickly.¹⁷

As in Plato's account, the mother exhorts the young Timocrate to take station within the public realm and fulfil the duty that his father was either unwilling, or incapable, of accomplishing. Though Thetis knows full well that her son Achilles cannot become a god, she can do her part to goad her son into a standing most like the gods – immortality. Achilles' immortality however resides within his glory that will be "everlasting". Yet Thetis is sure to remind her son that his glory will not be everlasting if he returns home to his father, this in part has to do with relative glory. Achilles will be denied the glory as judged by his mother's divine standard. Thetis however seems to be divided with regard to her son. At times she seems overly protective of him, and in Apollodorus' she dresses him up as woman to protect him from death. This dualist protect/goad treatment is best represented in an account that Thetis attempted to burn off Achilles mortality until his father Peleus took him to the apprenticeship of Chiron. Heracles and Dionysus, unlike Achilles, are examples of demi-gods that join the Olympian patheon because their father was Zeus, and being Zeus begotten they can by their father's station rise to the level of godhood, while Achilles is born to Thetis, she cannot dispense this privilege, being a goddess among gods. In Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound*, Prometheus recounts a prophecy that Thetis will bear a child greater than his father, which quickly quelled Zeus' sexual interest given the catastrophic consequences.

A great deal of speculation can be had with regard to the ills of the patriarchal system in ancient Greece, most interesting is the equal pairing of husband and wife in Plato's warrior class – and it is most suggestive that philosophers of the time conceded in part that such a system engendered overweening violent behaviour in youths. I am not suggesting that equality in marriage

¹⁷ Adler, Mortimer J. Ed. *Great Books of the Western World: Homer*, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1992, pg. 105 Iliad, book 9: 410.

was presented out of notions of male/female equality, but rather there was an acknowledgment of the ills produced out of inequality in standing.¹⁸

Homer's account gives us a basis by which we can understand the actions of the Timocrate capable of a gratuitous suicide because of the relation between the profane and sacred realms, while the Platonic account gives shows how this is accomplished in our all too human considerations.

The Son of Pride's Ascetic Suicide: The Exogamy of Imagined Cities

Homeric and Platonic views on the thumos, that element most related with striving towards warlike ambition, could not differ more starkly. In Homer's account the thumos is not something that is "housed" so to speak, within the soul. Rather it is like a spirit that advises the self in its undertakings, but this voice is not considered to be an inner voice of "conscience". As E.R Dodds, in *The Greeks and the Irrational*, argues

This habit of (as we should say) "objectifying emotional drives," treating them as not-self, must have opened the door wide to the religious idea of psychic intervention, which is often said to operate, not directly on the man himself, but on his thumos or on its physical seat, his chest or midriff. We see the connection very clearly in Diomedes's remark that Achilles will fight "when the *thumos* in his chest tells him to *and* a god rouses him."¹⁹

In Homer there is an explicit link between the thumos to a type of religious experience that divorces the individual from what we would call a "conscience" that chooses. Though the heroes in the Iliad may argue and rebel against their counselling thumos, it is a god through *ate* or *menos* that ultimately determines events. As Dodds argues, the ancient shame-based culture of the Homeric

¹⁸ Pomeroy, Sarah B. *Goddesses, Whores, Wives and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity*, Schocken Books, New York, 1995, pg. 19. Pomeroy makes an interesting comment regarding the relation between the warrior and the promised kingdom, and the relation of a Timocratic pattern of progeny. "In the matrilocal pattern it was often a roving warrior who married a princess and settled down in her kingdom. The husband was attracted by the expectation of inheriting his bride's father's realm; hence the succession to the throne in his case was matrilineal. Sometimes fathers gave their daughters in marriage to notable warriors to obtain allies. Achilles boasted that he had his choice among the daughters of many Greek chieftains. Since the prize was the kingdom, the princess' father often held a contest for her hand, thereby assuring himself that he found the strongest or most clever son-in-law." Ortega y Gasset also makes similar observation in his *The Sportive Origins of the State* on the role of Exogamy in the formation of the warriors. Interesting parallels can probably be made with the fundamentalist martyrs promise of virgins in the hereafter if he dies in the service of Allah.

¹⁹ Dodds E.R. *The Greeks and the Irrational*, University of California Press, Berkley, 1964. pg. 16. It is interesting to note that much of Sayyid Qutb and other radical Islamist theorists express a similar sentiment with regard to the over-determination of events, almost in abdication of responsibility.

world over-determined events, and consequently sudden disasters or bursts of wild energy rousing the warrior to superhuman feats is ascribed to the gods which dispenses such events – for the Homeric consciousness events could not have been otherwise, and events that are beyond normal occurrence are attributable to the psychic intervention undertaken by a god. Before elaborating on the dangerous mixture such divine attributions to events comes to signify within shame-based cultures, I wish to treat the manner in which the Platonic account makes note of the Timocratic penchant for an asceticism that fits into the hero complex, or as Joseph Campbell titled it the monomyth, an allure that is all to tempting for a youthful Timocrate.

In Campbell's loose schema, the hero hears a call to adventure, and follows a harrowing road of trials brought on by supernatural forces, during which he achieves the goal; the hero then returns to the ordinary world dispensing boons to the community.²⁰ Often the hero is first trained by an elder or wiseman of varying descriptions, but often such a figure lives on the outskirts of the community. In Achilles' case he is the immortal centaur Chiron who lives in a cave on Mount Pellion, a creature that is both identifiably animal but equally divine. As we saw with Aristotle, a being who can reside outside of the community is either a beast or a god, and ironically Nietzsche later retorted he must be both, a philosopher. This in-between station that the educator takes, being part profane (natural/bestial) and sacred (supernatural/divine), is mirrored in the philosophic²¹ traditions as much as it is in the mythopoetic.

The symbolism is stark and rather suggestive. Chiron is also attributed with helping Peleus capture Thetis by order of the gods, a reward for his piousness. Chiron helps avert the potential cosmological regicide of Zeus that Prometheus longs to see so that he may be freed from his torments. The mythopoetic accounts of Achilles span far wider than the account provided by Homer's *Iliad*, but the *Iliad* is unique because of its scope, for it is a song sung by the Muses about the rage of Achilles – in fact it is quite something that the epic poem's opening word is *mēnin* (*rage* or *wrath*)! The complete Epic Cycle of the Trojan war is mostly fragmented accounts of the build-up and subsequent conclusion of the war, but the *Iliad* is the poem which testifies to the everlasting glory of Achilles – that glory is his wrath.

In the Republic Socrates mentions that the Timocrate will have a love for “gymnastics and the hunt,”²² yet both activities in the Greek are related to the

²⁰ Campbell, Joseph, *The Hero with a Thousand Faces: Third Edition*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

²¹ Often in the Platonic corpus Socrates is said to talk with young thumotic men outside of the city proper, under and olive grove, in the house of metic (non-citizen) etc...

²² Xenophon, *On Hunting*: “Moreover, the very attempt makes them better in many ways and wiser; and we will give the reason. Unless they abound in labours and inventions and precautions, they cannot capture game. [14] For the forces contending with them, fighting for their life and in their own home, are in great strength; so that the huntsman's labours are in vain, unless by greater perseverance and by much intelligence he can overcome them.”

practice necessary to the attainment of honours. Such exercising of the youthful Timocrate is a preparation for war, just as the hero acquires an instructor that guides him to the excellence he will require in warfare. In part this is what Machiavelli tries to explain to Lorenzo de' Medici about having a mentor that is half-beast and half-man. In mentioning Achilles' mentor Chiron, Machiavelli makes clear that politics, specifically the rule of others, is primarily about appearance. Machiavelli also mentions Achilles in the succession of imitation necessary for the ruler, citing the imitation that Alexander undertook of Achilles. Although Machiavelli invokes the study of history "for the light it sheds on the actions of eminent men,"²³ with waging war he begins his chain of men not in history but rather a mythical account. Though Alexander may have imitated Achilles, Achilles was trained by the mythical Chiron, and Chiron was trained by Homer. This type of training in military matters, which include hunting from the classical teachings, is capable of making hereditary rulers maintain their power, but also "enables men of private status to become rulers."²⁴ For this to happen however, such a man will have to follow what is asked of Lorenzo de' Medici, an education and mentoring by Machiavelli inserted into Chiron. The teaching is both of things profane and sacred. "Look how Italy beeches God to send someone to rescue her from the cruel and arrogant foreigners. Again, see how ready and willing she is to rally a standard, if only there is someone to lead the way."²⁵ Machiavelli, as with Homer, sees the need of believing in heroes.

But why is this teaching of specific importance to the young Timocrate, and why the appeal to the hero? The bestial teaching has to do with the practical aspects of war – it is for the most part a teaching about mere survival, but to exhort men to great deeds the bestial needs the compliment of the divine and eternal, so that a man can sacrifice himself to greater purposes. The invoking of myth and religion are the only means by which men can be swayed to sacrifice themselves, and choose the course chosen by Achilles. The ancient Greek cynics also practice this type of exhortation; they condemned men for their following of customs, and how they had become weakened as a consequence of such conventional moorings. They prescribed the emulation of animals and then the heroic demi-god Hercules. This mixture of profane and sacred was regarded as a short cut to virtue. They coined this process of toughening

13:13–14, and Peleus stirred a desire even in the gods to give him Thetis and to hymn their marriage in Cheiron's home. Bk 1:8–9, [16] Achilles, nursed in this schooling, bequeathed to posterity memorials so great and glorious that no man wearies of telling and hearing of him. Machiavelli also recommends that knowledge of hunting and horseback riding are essential for a knowledge of warfare and its associated virtues.

²³ Skinner, Quentin and Price, Russel, ed. *Machiavelli: The Prince*, Cambridge University Press, pg. 53.

²⁴ *Ibid*, pg. 52.

²⁵ *Ibid*, pg. 88.

askesis, in the Greek exercise, which was also linked with the word *aksein* to shape as in art. One must transform oneself into something other.

We can see the utility of such exhortations by reading carefully Franz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*, regarding the struggle for de-colonization. The appeal to myth, specifically local and historically rooted, is a powerful engine to action.

The atmosphere of myth and magic frightens me and so takes on an undoubted reality. By terrifying me, it integrates me in the traditions and the history of my district or of my tribe, and at the same time it reassures me, it gives me a status, as it were an identification paper. In underdeveloped countries the occult sphere is a sphere belonging to the community which is entirely under magical jurisdiction. By entangling myself in its inextricable network, where actions are repeated with crystalline inevitability, I find the everlasting world which belongs to me, and the perennality which is thereby affirmed of the world belonging to us.²⁶

José Ortega y Gasset, writing on the sportive origin of the state, concedes similar forces that unite under proto-political institutions;

For, surprisingly enough, these primitives associations of youths took on the character of secret societies with iron discipline, in which the members through severe training developed proficiency in war and hunting. That is to say, the primeval political association is the secret society; and while it serves the pleasures of feasting and drinking, it is at the same time the place where the first religious and athletic asceticism is practiced.²⁷

He goes on to relate that

We must not forget that the literal translation of the word “asceticism” is “training and exercise”. The monk took it over from the sport vocabulary of the Greek athletes. *Ascesis* was the regime of the life of an athlete, and it was crammed with exercises and privations. This we may well say that the club of the young is not only the first house and the first casino, but also the first barrack and the first monastery.²⁸

Both Fanon and Ortega attend to the intimate link between the bestial and divine as a unity within the practice of warlike individuals. This mixture of beast and god is a frightful power; it is this cloak and garb that the warrior ascetic wears. In *On The Genealogy of Morals* Nietzsche makes the argument that

²⁶ Fanon, Frantz, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Grove Press, New York, 1963. pg. 52.

²⁷ José Ortega y Gasset, *History as a System and Other Essays Towards a Philosophy of History*, Norton Library, New York, 1961. pg. 29.

²⁸ Ibid.

the bending of men voluntarily to the ascetic ideal was a manner of inspiring fear in others. Self-mortification and privation from the common individuals is a manner of inspiring fear and awe from the community – every self-seeking vanguard, to use an anachronistic term, undertakes this development since it acts as the very proof that is different, but also superior, and attempting to walk the path of heroes. By profanity we should understand the term for what Nietzsche claims it to really be, “a hardness out of deliberate pride” and not an altruism. As Nietzsche writes more succinctly in the *Gay Science*:

On the origin of religion – The distinctive invention of the founders of religion is, first: to posit a particular kind of life and everyday customs that have the effect of a *disciplina voluntatis* and at the same time abolish boredom – and then: to bestow on this life style an *interpretation* that makes it appear to be illuminated by the highest value so that this life style becomes something for which one fights and under certain circumstances sacrifices one’s own life.²⁹

In closing this aphorism Nietzsche continues, “To become a founder of a religion one must be psychologically infallible in one’s knowledge of certain types of souls who have not yet *recognized* that they belong together. It is he that brings them together. The founding of religion therefore always becomes a long festival of recognition.”³⁰ It must be noted here that recognition is another form of expressing the honour-seeking of our young Timocrates. For Nietzsche this process is not unrelated to a transvaluation of values. That is to say, a shift in the manner that both individuals and society come to place their highest esteems. This is a necessary process for the young Timocrate if he is to rule one day, he must first undermine what is already established by an appeal to another unit of esteem, preferably those values which were held by his father. However, the young Timocrate is not above manipulating what his father held dear, because in the end his father was not a real man and gave into the corrupting influence of the newly established regime.

The Shield of Achilles or Secular Empire

Why are such phenomena of importance to understanding global events, specifically fundamentalist Islamic terrorists? And can our, up to now, very Western analysis serve to help us understand this global conflict?

Judaism and Christianity from the perspective of Sayyid Qutb’s Islamism are corruptions of the primordial religion of Adam. What does this essentially theological tenet signify for Western civilization? Fundamentally it means that

²⁹ Kaufmann, Walter, trans. Nietzsche, Friedrich, *Gay Science*, Vintage Books, New York, 1974. pg. 296 section 353.

³⁰ Ibid.

the Judeo-Christian world order is something that will ultimately be overcome. Such beliefs by monotheistic religions that purport the sole and unique way towards salvation are nothing new, as the belief by many Christian millenarian sects can attest. But just as Christianity finds its root and germ in Abrahamic faith, it also must ultimately absorb or destroy it to fulfil its historical providence. Such providence is also present in Islam, the corruption in time is to be purified by the final prophet of God's teaching.³¹ Alexandre Kojève expressed a similar idea from a secular Hegelian perspective; in principle history has ended, and the fact that nation-states were still in the main the predominant political unit, expressing mere nationalism, and not humanity, we could expect an intermediary state of organization to assist the labour of the negative to achieve a universal world order – this in-between state, larger than a nation but smaller than universal humanity would be the multi-national empire. As Kojève phrased it, “the period of *national* political realities is over. This epoch of *empires*, which is to say of *transnational* political unities, but formed by *affiliated* states.”³² Of course, such an empire would need to fracture and collect upon shared customs and traditions. Writing to Charles de Gaul on what should be France's foreign policy after the Second World War, Kojève put forth that Europe would be caught in the pinchers of two transnational affiliated states (the Anglo-American empire and the Slavo-Soviet empire). Obviously the Cold War did not quite work out in the manner Kojève might have anticipated. Nonetheless, Kojève expressed a very real development that from our present quarter reminds one of the ‘discourse’ of globalization, and understandably so, since Francis Fukuyama owes a great debt to his intellectual mentor in thinking that history had ended with liberal democracy. If one reads carefully Kojève's memo to the French government, it becomes exceedingly clear in retrospect how Fukuyama was little more than a pitch for Anglo-America preponderance, but fundamentally in agreement with Kojève. Perhaps it is important to review how such conglomeration of interests, customs and traditions would not be an easy, to use George Tenet's term, “slam dunk”.

As Machiavelli had noted, it is far harder to make men follow a new prince, even in ideals alone, than what their prejudices and old grievances tell them. But given that the Westphalian order was partially the consequence of bridging

³¹ I am not arguing that Islam does not have a notion of tolerance, as this is certainly true with regard to other Abrahamic faiths. However, in principle if this were essentially the case, then there would be no need to follow Islam as a faith. Indeed without affirming the need to follow Islam, we are stating essentially what any other faith will do as long as it is monotheistic, to say nothing of its practices. What I am attempting to show is that religions, more specifically Islam in our case requires boundaries and distinctions, otherwise they merely melt into permissive cosmopolitanism. This is how a Timocrate sees his religion, founded on an us and them, friend/enemy basis, which uses universalism as mere means to action. See also Schwab, George, trans. Schmitt, Carl, *The Concept of the Political*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996.

³² Kojève, Alexandre, “Outline of a Doctrine of French Policy” pg. 7, Hoover Institute, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3436846.html>.

bias of the imagination, it was possible to Kojève and others to replicate such labours for Empires, at least theoretically.³³ As the European Union can well attest, this process of forging a loose union is fraught with difficulties, often technical in nature, but it seems it is always the issue of old national identities that most firmly impede the progress of unity – though it may be the most practical and rational of associations. Why?

As Kojève elaborates;

This “kinship” between nations, which is currently becoming an important political factor, is undeniable concrete fact which has nothing to do with generally vague and unclear “racial” ideas. This “kinship” of nations is, above all, a kinship in language, of civilization, of general “mentality”, or – as is sometimes also said – of “climate”. And this spiritual kinship is also manifested, among other things, through the identity of religion.

This is very curious given Kojève’s overt atheistic attitude which made him profess that he was a god-man, though not at all that curious if Kojève is following in the footsteps of Machiavelli. Essentially what Kojève harkens to is that mere racial (ie ethnic) differences can be subsumed beneath the common lineage of religion, but religion in its everyday practices forges within men a way of being that makes them characteristically alike in manners. Yet this is a very technological and rational manner of seeing religion. As Tom Wolfe wrote about in his essay, *Two Young Men Went West*, the old structures of Anglican hierarchy in the east gave the eastern seaboard industrial corporations their hierarchical structure imitating a mechanic great chain of being – but as protestant denominationalism worked its way westward further afield from its old dominations, it gave way to the lateral and associational basis of protestant conscience, and in doing so doing gave birth to the thinking needed for the microchip. We would do well to see how such Machinist realities were nothing more than the material reworking of the religious mind. For Hobbes could have dreamed of any number of mechanism, but he chose to build a mechanical God in the shape of a man. Oddly enough we can see that for Kojève history had ended, and that indeed Hegel had achieved what he set himself to do in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*; “To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title ‘love of knowing’ and be *actual* knowing – that is what I have set myself to do.”³⁴ In so doing the realm of the slave whom had won the battle for dominion of the planet, set themselves to their highest virtues – work. As Alan Bloom noted, “If Kojève

³³ From Kojève’s tone in the “Outline of the Doctrine of French Foreign Policy,” one gathers that a conscious imitation of Machiavelli is undertaken. That is to say, just as Machiavelli is exhorting Lorenzo de Medici to undertake actions to unite Italy, Kojève is exhorting France’s government officials to help create a Latin Empire.

³⁴ Miller A.V. trans. *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977. pg. 3.

is wrong, if his world does not correspond to the real one, we learn at least that either one must abandon reason – and this includes all science – or one must abandon historicism.”³⁵

It is important to keep in mind that the animating agent for Kojève is desire, and this desire is also pointed at the desire to have others desire us. This means that recognition is the central human relation which involves strife between individuals. After this battle, the slave chooses life over death and submits to the will of the master. The end of History then is the process by which the slave slowly emancipates himself and his self-worth until he is willing to forfeit his life for the sake of freedom. In effect, the slave becomes like the master, and in the ensuing order equality becomes the basis of their mutual recognition. Given all the world wars that have taken place since the French Revolution, the ultimate event in this process of mutual recognition, the principle achieved, all other conflicts would necessarily mimic this battle of recognition. For any group would seek to have the other recognize it. But Kojève was not blind to the fact that some could not be incorporated into this rational world order on the gathering horizon. What to do with them?

Well, these are *facts* that are brought in opposition to Hegel. And, obviously, he can make no answer. He can at best oppose the *fact* of the conscious Wise Man to the *facts* of unconscious “Wise Men”. And if this fact did not exist....? In any case, by definition, Hegel cannot refute him, “convert” him, only with *speech*. Now, by beginning to *speak* or to listen to a *discourse*, this “Wise Man” already accepts the Hegelian ideal. If he truly is what he is – an unconscious “Wise Man” – he will refuse all *discussion*. And then one could refute him only as one “refutes” a fact, a thing, or a beast: by physically destroying him.³⁶

Kojève has something rather specific in mind when he attends to this possibility, but I would like to compare this to a type of man that Kojève may have overlooked, or at any rate underestimated. Kojève keeps to a very Hegelian reading of asceticism, that is to say it is a retreat into subjectivity. Now Kojève concedes that this can be accomplished, as he states “Nietzsche seriously envisaged the possibility that the ideal that he called “Chinese” might become *universal*” (i.e. an unconscious Wise Man). But Kojève understands this possibility in Hegelian terms, and hence rationally. As such, its failing is both its unconsciousness, which is the same as saying mytho-poetic, for those under the mytho-poetic ideal cannot account for why they know what they know. Yet they are not willing to be converted by rational speech or discourse, and consequently and fundamentally are irrational. This type of asceticism, though

³⁵ Bloom, Alan, *Giants and Dwarves: Essays 1960–1990*, Touchstone, New York, 1990. pg. 272.

³⁶ Bloom, Alan, ed. Kojève, Alexandre, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, Cornell University Press, 1969. pg. 84.

it may invoke the universal, cannot articulate it, nor do such individuals seek to. In effect they are the most stubborn of mules, they “have realized “moral perfection”, since there have been men who took them as the model”³⁷. If we consider the necessary steps in order to achieve Kojève’s notion of empire, then we must understand what he means by affiliated states. Kojève is a thinker who chooses his terms rather carefully, and we will benefit in understanding the etymology of affiliated. Affiliate means “adopt, fix the paternity of”, and is a compound word – the prefix af- means to assimilate, added to filius, which is latin for son. We have sufficient elements in order to paint a rather stark picture of the young Timocrate in a Hegelian world of Empire.

As we noted before with regard to the rational account rendered by Socrates of the young Timocrate, he will due to his rearing be “... a lover of ruling and honour, not basing his claim to rule on speaking or anything of the sort, but on warlike deeds and everything connected with war; he is a lover of gymnastics and the hunt.”³⁸ Now, as Fukuyama has rightly pointed, out “the liberal democratic state did not constitute a synthesis of the morality of the master and the morality of the slave, as Hegel had said. For Nietzsche, it represented the unconditional victory of the slave.”³⁹ Now Socrates mentions that the young Timocrate with slaves “would be brutal, not mere despising slaves as the educated man does.”⁴⁰ Now the diplomatic chatter necessary to keep affiliated states together, all mutually respecting one another as equals, devoid and avoiding wars, means that a young Timocrate is hard pressed to find his model. This silent model does not profess or articulate its universal truth publicly, but teaches the sacred and profane arts of war. Where would such a young man seek his education? Further, what if such a man’s father’s standing was lessened because his values, his esteems, his honour was not recognized in the manner it use to be? Such a basis has its origin in colonialism – which is to say the rational secular order that took hold in Egypt, a place where, as with the young Timocrate, women held no weight in the father’s standard of honour.

The Battle for Planetary Rule: Seeking the Spear of Achilles

This is the most acceptable explanation of that galaxy of remarkable characters whose recollection Islamic history has preserved as it grew through the ages. It is also the explanation of those events and occurrences which one would almost regard as legends created by some fertile imagination, were

³⁷ Ibid. Kojève already discounts this. Note the past tense of “took”.

³⁸ Bloom, Alan, trans. Plato, *The Republic of Plato: 2nd Edition*, Basic Books, Chicago, 1991. 549a.

³⁹ Fukuyama, Francis, *The End of History and the Last Man*, HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 1992. pg. 301.

⁴⁰ Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, 549a.

it not that the records of their happening have been accurately kept and preserved by history. History can scarcely record all the examples of spiritual purity and psychological courage, or moving sacrifice and of death for an ideal, all the flashes of spiritual and intellectual greatness, and the actual deeds of heroism in the various fields of life.⁴¹

We can see in the words of Sayyid Qutb⁴² an appeal to similar forces invoked by Fanon in the *Wretched of the Earth*, that both appeals to traditional and local heritage that demand the renewal of myths, and by consequence a continuation of the lineage of heroes compelled to act. Let us trace the genealogy of Islamic terrorism as it relates to the change of regimes within the middle-east in order to see more clearly the young Timocrate.

The Egyptian Republic was declared on the 18th of June 1953, and by 1956 Gamal Abdel Nasser had implemented a fully independent, but more importantly secular, state. I do not wish to get into the specifics details of Egypt's historical development, rather I would like to draw comparisons to the mytho-poetic and philosophical accounts that were made previously. This will help us see how young Timocrates would have flourished under such conditions. By 1954, the alliance and support the Muslim Brotherhood had for the nationalist Free Officers Movement under Nasser quickly came to an end. It became evident that the newly established regime would not enforce strict Islamic law. The quick repression against the Muslim Brotherhood signalled what Qutb had already suspected in his book *Social Justice in Islam*. There he had seen foreign influence, only to come home from his studies in the US and realize it had taken root in Nasserism. During the Nasser crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood, Qutb was arrested and released several times, only to have his work increase in radicalism while he cemented a network of plotted assassinations – he was sentenced to death by partisans of the Nasser regime, and it was Anwar Sadat himself that brought a message of clemency if only Qutb would appeal the sentence. A scene almost reminiscent of Plato's *Crito*, Qutb refused and followed through with his declaration before the trial that would take his life: "The time has come for a Muslim to give his head in order to proclaim the birth of the Islamic movement."⁴³ Qutb's youth was a time of great change in Egypt. Increasingly he would openly criticize King Farouk's complicity in British colonialism; this was also mixed with astonishment on Qutb's part towards America's support for the founding of Israel, a battle that had humiliated the pride of Arabs across the Middle-East, more specifically their martial talents. President Truman's support for the transfer of a hundred thousand Jewish refugees into Palestine caused Qutb to proclaim, "I hate those

⁴¹ Sayyid Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam*, Octagon Books, New York, 1970. pg 140.

⁴² <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/07spring/eikmeier.htm>.

⁴³ Wright, Lawrence, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*, Vintage Books, New York, 2007, pg. 26.

Westerners and despise them! All of them, without any exception: the English, the French, the Dutch, and finally the Americans, who have been trusted by many.”⁴⁴ It was the loss of honours that helped Qutb find the wrath necessary to found a mytho-poetic movement. Idealist through and through, it would in the end prove to be the necessary motive to seek out an ascetic warriors ethos and practice; its Mount Pellion would be the Lion’s Den in Afghanistan and later al-Qaeda.

Eleven years after independence, Egypt, along with her allies, suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Israel. For three years Nasser fought the War of Attrition, until his death. Shortly upon taking over, Anwar Al Sadat instituted the Corrective Revolution as he slowly purged the regime of opponents to his rule, and over the long term implemented the realignment of Egypt domestic and foreign policies away from Soviet and towards American influences. This was a considerable step away from rule under Nasser, though Sadat temporarily supported the Muslim Brotherhood in order to help him purge the leftist elements from Egypt. Western secular colonialism in the middle-east was an instituting of the ideas of European Enlightenment, and in its advanced form was a “Godless” mechanism. By consequence its system of esteem, what it is to be considered of worth and value by society, faded the remnants of spiritual worth and value in favour of vulgar materialism. Like the young Timocrate in Plato’s *Republic*, the standing of the father was reduced to nothing, and by and large his share of prestige faded into worthlessness as the new secular nationalism gripped nation after nation in the Arabian world. It was this seminal conflict that was brought to the fore in the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afganistan; where before the young Timocrate’s of the middle-east were displaced and lived in the in-between of secular states, unable to re-assert a new paradigm of value, in Afganistan they found a way of establishing the “immortal glory” sought by Achilles. But as the secular nation-states purged their populations of factional fundamentalists, it gave them the status which Aristotle warned, those that are “clanless, lawless, and heartless,” and they plunged immediately into a passion for war.

The leader that would arise as the leading Qubt-inspired Timocrate was Ayman al-Zawahiri. Zawahiri was born to Dr. Mohammed Rabie al-Zawahiri, a clan which had under the newly secular governance of the British established a dynasty of medical professionals, nicely fitting into the new modernist standards established in Egypt. But the Zawahiri name was most identified with religion, specifically the Imam Mohammed al-Ahmadi al-Zawahiri, who as Wright notes, “enjoys a kind of papal status in the Muslim world.”⁴⁵ Al-Zawahiri’s mother, Umayma Azzam, however, was from a wealthier and more politically prominent clan. As Wright describes al-Zawahiri’s father, he was “Obese, bald and slightly cross-eyed,” and had a reputation of being eccentric

⁴⁴ Ibid. pg. 11.

⁴⁵ Ibid. pg. 40.

and absentminded, though he was beloved by his students and neighbourhood children. As Socrates mentioned about Timocrate's father, he does not busy himself with seeking honours, as Dr. Mohammed Rabie al-Zawahiri was wont to do when he retired into his laboratory and medical clinic.

It was al-Zawahiri's uncle from the more political Azzam clan that introduced him to works of Sayyid Qutb. While not the sportive type, al-Zawahiri was known for his defiant temperament towards those he regarded as lesser, more notably secularists, while deferential to religious arguments and radical Imam notables. For al-Zawahiri, the sacred realm became his milieu of esteem, and by consequence his prideful bouts of contest. More memorable were his exchanges in jail with rivals for leadership, such the blind Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, whom is suspected of having issued the fatwa against Sadat, and now in American custody.

Osama bin Laden certainly draws parallel to what Socrates describes as the "love of hunting and gymnastics" the young Timocrate would pursue, far more of a physical type than al-Zawahiri. In fact Osama bin Laden very much matches the descriptions often rendered by the ancients about the honour-loving youth. As a young man Bin Laden enjoyed games of contest, but more conspicuously he liked horseback riding and big game hunting. As Wright documents when Jamal Khalifa recounts his friendship with Bin Laden, as young man, he had a penchant for adventure: "We were riding horses in the desert, and we were really going very fast. I saw fine sand in front of us, and told Osama this is dangerous, better stay away. He said no, and he continued. His horse turned over and he fell down. He got up and laughed. Another time, we were riding in a jeep. Whenever he saw a hill, he would drive free fast and go over it, even though we didn't know what was on the other side. Really, he put us in danger many times."⁴⁶ Khalifa goes on to tell how he and Osama at the time were very much looking for a type of disciplining of the spirit: "Islam is different from any other religion; it's a way of life."⁴⁷ Both Jamal Khalifa and Osama Bin Laden were taught by the late Sayyid Qutb's younger brother, Mohammed Qutb, teaching them both the radical post-torture writings, *Milestones* and *In the Shade of the Quran*. Like the early Christian debates between St Augustine and the Donatists and Circumcillions, Osama Bin Laden would read the debates between Hasan Hudayi, who followed the Augustine-like conclusion in not questioning the faith of others in his book *Preachers Not Judges*. Though in early agreement with the more tolerant view, Osama would follow his Timocratic inclination towards the love of judgement and ultimately give into the notion of *Takfir*, the killing of apostates.⁴⁸

Like Juilen Sorel in the *Red and the Black*, Osama's prospects for honour were limited in Saudi Arabia, as Wright relates:

⁴⁶ Ibid. pg. 91.

⁴⁷ Ibid. pg. 91.

⁴⁸ Ibid. pg. 91–92.

His brothers were being educated at the finest universities in the world, but the example that meant the most to him was that of his illiterate father. He spoke of him constantly and held him up as a paragon. He longed to achieve comparable distinction – and yet he lived in a culture where individuality was discouraged, or at least reserved for royalty. Like other members of the Saudi upper class, the Bin Ladens prospered on royal favors, which they were loathed to put at risk. Moreover, they were outsiders – still Yemenis, the eyes of clannish Saudis. There was no political system, no civil society, no obvious route to greatness. Bin Laden was untrained for the clergy, which was the sole alternative to royal power in the Kingdom.⁴⁹

From its origins fundamentalist Islamic success was marginal if we compare it to the superpowers of the Cold War and secularism. Its growth and power however remains with its ability to capitalize on spectacular mythopoetic imagery much akin to that invoked in the Illiad. Whether this is a cynical or genuine belief is beside the point to a large extent, since it is capable of drawing out the most brazen and wrathful courage which lies within the Timocratic soul described by Socrates. Indeed, the Timocratic education is that of Chiron, half beast and half divine, as invoked by Machiavelli. This certainly creates a new paradigm that no longer sees the state as something necessary to achieving its goals, and gives the means as promised and “enables men of private status to become rulers”. In fact, one could argue that the experiences with national secularism has made the mujahedeen ascetic warrior all the more confident that his power relies purely in his ascetic ideal, unmediated by Imam or magistrate, using, as Spengler describes, the beast of prey’s rebellion against technology. For “him it is a *spiritual* need, not on account of its *victories* – ‘*navigare necesse est, vivere non est necesse*’ For the coloured races, on the contrary, it is but a weapon like a tree from the woods that one uses as house-timber, but discards as soon as it has served its purpose. This machine-technics will end the Faustian civilization and one will lie in fragments, *forgotten* – our railways and steamships as dead as the Roman roads and the Chinese wall, or giant cities and skyscrapers in ruins like old Memphis and Babylon.”⁵⁰

As George Tenet testified before the Congressional Joint Inquiry on 9/11 on October 17th, 2002, “While we often talk of two trends in terrorism – state-sponsored and independent – in Bin Ladin’s case with the Taliban we had something completely new: a *terrorist* sponsoring a *state*.”⁵¹ This weapon forged against the Faustian civilization, that is to say, the secular global order of remaking the world, is like the spear of Achilles wedged within the neck of

⁴⁹ Ibid. pg. 95.

⁵⁰ Spengler, Oswald, *Man and Technics: A Contribution to the Philosophy of Life*, University Press of the Pacific, Honolulu, 2002. Pg. 103.

⁵¹ <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html>.

Hector. And this Western world certainly feels the besiegement that Troy once did. For the mytho-poetic imagery does not require understanding of mechanisms as Kojève would find necessary, it simply needs to know how to use the weapon. 9/11 was not achieved by a Manhattan project like technology, but rather the use of a religious asceticism and idealism which pronounced itself as powerful as any implementation of technology. The far enemy, as it is often called by radical Islamic Timocrats, is not a battle for any one state nor empire as it may have started out. It seeks the wrath of Achilles to strike at the very heart of Troy with a gratuitous suicide for immortal glory. This strategy should remind us of Ahab's vengeful wrath against Moby Dick, the leviathan;

The White Whale swam before him as the monomaniac incarnation of all those malicious agencies which some deep men feel eating in them, till they are left living on with half a heart and half a lung. That intangible malignity which has been from the beginning; to whose dominion even the modern Christians ascribe one-half of the worlds; which the ancient Ophites of the east revered in their statue devil; Ahab did not fall down and worship it like them; but deliriously transferring its idea to the abhorred white whale, he pitted himself, all mutilated, against it. All that most maddens and torments; all that stirs up the lees of things; all truth with malice in it; all that cracks the sinews and cakes the brain; all the subtle demonisms of life and thought; all evil, to crazy Ahab, were visibly personified, and made practically assailable in Moby Dick. He piled upon the whale's white hump the sum of all the general rage and hate felt by his whole race from Adam down; and then, as if his chest had been a mortar, he burst his hot heart's shell upon it.⁵²

⁵² Melville, Herman, *Moby-Dick or The White Whale*, Collector's Library, London, 2004, pg. 262.

Israeli Security Doctrine between the Thirst for Exceptionalism and Demands for Normalcy¹

Shoghig Mikaelian²

Israeli security has been invoked time and again to explain Israeli behavior and justify Israeli actions vis-à-vis neighboring states and peoples. Yet there have been few insights into the manner in which Israeli security doctrine³ has been formulated, the various factors that have shaped and influenced it, and the events that have re-shaped it over the years.

Since 1991, Israel's regional standing and relations with Arab states and other actors have undergone major changes, owing in part to a number of events, chief among them the Gulf War (1990–1991), the September 11 2001 events in the US, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the capture of three Israeli soldiers in June–July 2006 and subsequent conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon. How have events in the region and beyond impacted Israeli strategic and security thinking? And how has Israeli security thinking in turn impacted the course of events in the region, as well as relations between the various state and non-state actors? It is difficult to assess let alone prove that there is a causal relationship between any of these events. Yet assessing ways in which they may potentially to provoke or encourage shifts in policies would increase our understanding of at least some aspects of the dynamics of Israeli security doctrine and appreciate its domestic, regional, and global determinants. In this respect, an examination of the historical record of Israeli security doctrine would enable one to assess the resilience of the doctrine in, as well as its adaptation and transformation in response to, both periods of full-scale war as well as of constant low-scale conflict. This paper examined both the historical and

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³ For the purpose of this paper, Israeli security doctrine is to be defined as an amalgamation of Israeli national and security interests and their incorporation into a long-term plan vis-à-vis Arab (and other regional) states and non-state actors.

contemporary nature of Israeli policies, with emphasis on key elements such as: existential threats, wars of choice, unilateralism, and the war on terror.

Demise of the Existential Threat

Historically, Israel's security doctrine was based on the assumption that Israel was engaged in a struggle for its survival. This view comprises not only an assessment of Arab attitudes towards Israel, but also a national (or ethno-religious) consciousness and reference to the broader historical predicament of Jews and their continuous collective struggle for survival.⁴

The 1948 war, despite bringing about a decisive victory against the Arab armies, nevertheless did not bring peace to Israel. On the contrary, it resulted in a series of coups and a subsequent alignment of Syria and Egypt along the Soviet axis (Yaniv 1993, 5). In terms of security, the 1948 war was not without its lessons for the Israelis. According to Israel Tal, the Vice Chief of the General Staff of the IDF in 1973, one of the primary lessons that were learned from the 1948 experience was the importance of “offensive as a basic strategy, reliance on assault power, and eventually the doctrine of preemptive attack and taking the fighting into enemy territory” (2000, 121–122).

In the first two and a half decades the Arab–Israeli conflict, the threat to the State of Israel emanated primarily from regular Arab armies, which were *quantitatively* superior to Israel and therefore may have indeed posed an existential threat. To offset the asymmetry, Israel's focus throughout this period was on the acquisition of *qualitative* superiority. Furthermore, individual acts of infiltration were met by disproportionate responses;⁵ the aim of which was to force upon the Arabs the conviction that violence and attrition would not bring about a change in the status quo, effectively erecting a “wall” of deterrence, aided by Arab regimes' fears of domestic instability which might ensue from reprisals. In short, these attacks contributed to Israel's “deterrent image” (Tal 2000, 125–126). Moreover, the assumption was that successive costly defeats would bring about political change in the Arab world (Lustick 1996, 16).

The 1956 Israeli (with France and Britain) initiated conflict serves as a clear example of Israel's attempt to polish its deterrent power (Tal 2000, 129). Yet if Israel's actions in 1956 had earned it a military victory, the ensuing political situation gave Egypt the upper hand. This was to be Israel's first – but not last – encounter with the limits of military power. In many respects, the 1967 campaign was a correction of the mistakes of 1956, in terms of the convergence of military objectives and plans on the one hand, and political calculations on the other. The war was also the first time that Israel would put into practice its newly-

⁴ Joseph Adler sums up this predicament as “survival at the edge of the existential abyss” (Adler 1994, 231).

⁵ One example is the Qibya massacre, which occurred on 14–15 October, 1953. For details see: Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: Norton, 2001), 90–93.

formulated security doctrine against multiple confrontation states (as opposed to the 1956 campaign solely against Egypt). The components of this campaign were: pre-emption; capture of territory; and a quick war (Tal 2000, 139).

Thus, post-1967 the concept of strategic depth became the dominant element in Israeli security thinking. This aspiration for maintenance of occupied territories was rooted in the quest to strengthen the military's maneuverability and the country's ability to survive a surprise attack and mobilize the army to deal a second blow.

The feelings of invincibility that followed the victory of 1967 brought about unwillingness on the part of Israel to accommodate the voices in the Arab world that had become convinced of its invincibility.⁶ Moreover, the successful achievement of strategic depth blinded Israel to the necessity of adjusting and reformulating not only its foreign policy but also its security doctrine, a failure that would exact a not insignificant price from Israel in 1973.

Subsequent to the 1973 war, Israel entered a new era. The four successive defeats of Arab armies in twenty-five years eroded Arab states' ability to pursue any serious strategies to destroy Israel or carry out large-scale conventional attacks against it. The decline of the conventional threat, especially in the wake of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979, limited Israel's ability to market its case in the international arena as being exceptional,⁷ a claim that would have justified the extraordinary measures and rejectionist policies it would continue to pursue in its dealings with Arab states and the Palestinians. Moreover, the neutralization of one of the biggest and potentially dangerous adversaries – Egypt – boosted Israel's security and strengthened its strategic and political position. The Camp David peace accords with Israel isolated Egypt from other Arab states and encouraged Israel to pursue the idea of separate agreements as a countermeasure to the Arab insistence on a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. The legacy of the 1973 war, however, was far from entirely positive. Israeli security policy had, prior to 1973, emphasized the idea of self-reliance. Post-1973, however, Israel's increased dependence on the United States, militarily and politically, was consecrated. Notwithstanding this de facto dependence relationship, Israeli leaders were wary of increasing the state's dependence on the United States; this wariness, along with a combination of other factors, reduced the appeal of "preventive" war (Yaniv 1993, 40).

From the perspective of Israeli security, the post-1973 period was one of decline if not complete the complete removal of the idea of an existential

⁶ This was a clear violation of the concept of the "Iron Wall." See Ian Lustick, "To Build and to Be Built By: Israel and the Hidden Logic of the Iron Wall," *Israel Studies* 1.1 (Spring 1996): 196–223.

⁷ For a thorough discussion of the claim that Israel's national security predicament is exceptional, see Gil Merom, "Israel's National Security and the Myth of Exceptionalism," *Political Science Quarterly* 114.3 (Autumn 1999): 409–434.

threat.⁸ Furthermore, chief among the lessons learnt from the war was the burdensome nature of such immense a strategic depth as Israel had acquired in 1967, which had thinned Israeli troop concentration and strained Israeli forces' operative maneuverability and flexibility. Notwithstanding these negative aspects of territorial conquest and maintenance of occupation, the idea that occupied territory could be used as a bargaining chip for normalization of ties and neutralization of threats by diplomatic means – namely the “land for peace” concept – retained its centrality in Israeli strategy. The 1973 war also brought about a change in the nature of Israel's interest in the occupied territories. Whereas these territories, perhaps with the exception of East Jerusalem, had previously been viewed from a strategic-security perspective, in the post-1973 era they acquired an additional – ideological and religious – angle. The concept of the State of Israel gave way to the idea of the Land of Israel. Prior to 1973, only few settlements were established in the territories occupied in 1967. The large-scale settlement drive began after 1973⁹, and gained further momentum with the rise of the Right and the election of Likud's Menachem Begin in 1977.¹⁰

Clausewitz Redux: Wars of Choice

The first signs of major transformations in Israeli security doctrine, after the 1973 war, were made in the early eighties, with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The rationale behind the invasion was neither prevention nor deterrence, but rather for the achievement of political aims. Dan Horowitz notes that ‘Operation Peace for the Galilee’ was a clear endorsement of the Clausewitzian doctrine of war as a continuation of diplomacy by other means (Yaniv 1993, 41). Thus, in the early 1980s, there was a great disparity over international consensus and Israeli mythmaking over the reasons Israel was waging war in Lebanon – this disparity rested on the notion of ‘wars of choice,’ rather than ‘wars of necessity.’ The idea of waging ‘wars of choice’ posed a challenge to the dominant discourse, and despite the fact that Israel continued to frame its official discourse in terms of security threats, a departure from the idea of collective security was affected in its security doctrine. The main security policy

⁸ The only exception was the Iraqi nuclear program, which greatly worried Israeli leaders and military strategists, culminating in the decision to strike the nuclear power plant, Osirak, in 1981. The destruction of the plant effectively put an end to the existential threat.

⁹ For data on Israeli settlements, including year of establishment, see the document compiled by the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights, B'Tselem, http://www.btselem.org/English/Settlements/Settlement_population.xls (last accessed: June 2007).

¹⁰ Begin's government framed the importance of settlement in terms of the security argument, at the same time emphasizing the concept of the “Land of Israel”: “Settlement of the Land of Israel is a right and an integral part of the nation's security.” As Arye Naor points out, “it was the new government, not the security establishment that decided on the security value of the settlements. Ideology was the basis for the new policy.” See Arye Naor, “The Security Argument in the Territorial Debate in Israel: Rhetoric and Policy,” *Israel Studies* 4.2 (Fall 1999): 161.

became the quest to guarantee personal safety and security for the citizens of the state (Naor 1999, 151).

The next challenge was how to deal with rogue elements and non-state actors that posed a more elusive security challenge but not an existential threat. Despite retaining only limited military capabilities, these elements proved to be far more difficult for Israeli security doctrine to cope with, and find a solution to, than entire Arab armies combined, in part thanks to the guerilla tactics they employed. Another factor was the political dimension, namely, the lack of progress on the peace front.¹¹ Thus, Israel found itself in a dilemma: on the one hand, it was unwilling to compromise; on the other hand, it was unwilling to accept the security challenges associated with such political blockage. Accordingly, the ground was set for the use of force to bring about change in neighboring states. The most fertile ground for such policy was Lebanon, which had already become a battleground and a sphere in which Syria manipulated to its interests the various parties to the civil war.

Israel's involvement in Lebanon aimed to eliminate, or at least impinge on Syrian local capabilities on the Golan, and to secure its vital political and strategic interests, encourage a friendly Lebanese regime that would sign a peace agreement with it (as manifested by the infamous May 17 agreement), which would bring about economic benefits and possibly a water sharing agreement. Israel's thirst for water has meant that this resource would be a major component of Israeli security and a vital strategic interest, one which might impact Israel's chances for survival in the long run.¹² The annexation of the Golan Heights,¹³ the continued occupation of water-rich Sheba'a Farms, and Israel's water policies in the West Bank attest to the importance of water in Israeli security and strategic doctrine, and by extension, its foreign policy and attitudes towards the peace process.

Commenting on the invasion of Lebanon, Menachem Begin insisted that it was a war of choice waged "in order to avoid a costlier, more terrible war in the future" (Yaniv 1993, 41). Yet slightly more than two decades later, Israel would find itself fighting a full-scale war against an enemy far more deadly than that it had set out to destroy. Clearly, the events stretching over the 18-year period of occupation of South Lebanon demonstrated the weakness of

¹¹ This factor was explicitly recognized during electoral campaigning, leading to the conclusion that a military analysis alone cannot solve Israel's security problems, but on the contrary is likely to perpetuate them. See Jonathan Marcus, "The Politics of Israel's Security," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 65.2 (Spring 1989): 245.

¹² For more on Israeli water strategy, see Harald D. Frederiksen, "Water: Israeli Strategy, Implications for Peace and the Viability of Palestine," *Middle East Policy* 10.4 (Winter 2003): 69–86; and Nadav Morag, "Water, Geopolitics and State Building: The Case of Israel," *Middle Eastern Studies* 37.3 (July 2001): 179–198.

¹³ For a detailed walkthrough of Israel's water strategy vis-à-vis the Golan Heights, see Frederic C. Hof, "The Water Dimension of Golan Heights Negotiations," *Middle East Policy* 5.2 (May 1997): 129–141.

Israeli strategic thinking and assumptions, if not the underestimation of its enemies' commitment to the struggle against it. Moreover, as the Lebanon war would demonstrate, the new, "post-existential" phase in Israel's strategic thinking required a cost-benefit analysis.

Advent of Unilateralism

The break-up of the Soviet Union ended bipolarity internationally and in the Middle Eastern context. The Iran–Iraq war wore down two of Israel's potential rivals for regional hegemony and obstructed the proliferation of non-conventional weaponry in the region. In the late 1980s, Israel was busy with the first *Intifada*, which it attempted to deal with through several policy tools including: the deployment of limited military force, economic, and administrative pressures (Inbar 1998, 69). The most crucial event from the perspective of Israeli security, however, was the 1991 Gulf War, which revealed Israeli vulnerabilities to sustained rocket attacks against its civilian population. Israel's self-restraint in the face of Iraqi Scud missiles is perhaps an indication of the difference that political leadership can make on the decision to go to war.¹⁴ Furthermore, as Charles D. Freilich notes, Israel's reaction to the 1991 crisis necessarily had to be based on the "complex web of regional and global considerations." An Israeli response could have had consequences on a global scale (Freilich 2006, 638).

A second important event in the post-Cold War period, was 1993 the signing of the Oslo Accords. The Oslo negotiations were facilitated by the intensity of the first *Intifada* and Israel's inability to find a decisive military solution to the uprising (Celso 2003, 69). The failure of the Oslo process boosted the rejectionist front in Israel, which argued that Oslo brought more terror, facilitated by Palestinian perceptions of Israeli weakness. According to Isaac Ben-Israel, "the 'soft' image of Israel created in the Palestinian mind was the outgrowth of the jettisoning of several basic principles in Israel's security doctrine" (Ben-Israel 2002) – chief among them deterrence.

Israeli strategic planning experienced a major turning point in the late 1990s, primarily as a result of the increasing number of casualties in the ranks of the IDF in occupied South Lebanon, and the subsequent drive by civil society to "check the military's powers on security policymaking."¹⁵ At the heart

¹⁴ In an article on the July 2006 war that appeared in *Ha'aretz*, Aluf Benn contrasts Shamir's ponderous and Sharon's artful conduct with the reactionary and adventurous conduct of the leadership that took Israel to war in July 2006. Shamir's rationale for avoiding involvement in Iraq in 1991 despite the Scud missile attacks was that Israel had nothing to look for in Iraq. The comparison is a telling one, especially in light of the debate on the erosion of Israel's deterrence. See Aluf Benn, "Sleep on it." *Ha'aretz*, May 3 2007, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/855153.html> (last accessed: June 2007).

¹⁵ Avraham Sela, "Civil Society, the Military, and National Security: The Case of Israel's Security Zone in South Lebanon," *Israel Studies* 12.1 (Spring 2007): 73. For a detailed study of

of the movement lay the rationale that soldiers deserved no less security than civilians.¹⁶ This being the case, the psychological factor was crucial, not only in determining the outcome of the confrontation, but also in its impact on Israeli deterrence. Notwithstanding this fact, and for the first time in its history, Israel adopted the decision to unilaterally withdraw from South Lebanon.

Many critics of the withdrawal had argued that it would result in the erosion of Israeli deterrence and bring about catastrophic consequences for Israeli security. While it is true that the psychological impact of the withdrawal was immense, the discussion of deterrence must take into account the clear distinction between deterrence against irregular forces and one against regular armies.¹⁷ Whereas the former was harmed, the latter was largely left untouched, though in reality enemy states continue undeterred in their view of non-state actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas as strategic assets. The withdrawal was based on a number of strategic considerations: first, the implementation of UN SCR Resolution 425 would set back Syria's attempts at linking UN SC Resolution 242 to Resolution 425; second, it would boost Israel's international diplomatic standing; third, it would legitimize in the eyes of the international community Israel's reaction to any future attacks emanating from Lebanon. Thus, in stark contrast to the harsh measures on Israel's northern front promised by the (Netanyahu) government in 1996,¹⁸ the (Barak) government of 1999 adopted a toned-down, prudent and strategic position.¹⁹ A number of analysts have pointed to the factional/political struggles and the breakdown of consensus in Israeli society, arguing that the failure to achieve strategic and national

the changing nature of civil-military relations in Israel, see Sela, 53–78; and Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer, "The Study of Civil-Military Relations in Israel: A New Perspective," *Israel Studies* 12.1 (Spring 2007): 1–27.

¹⁶ This argument would be advanced less than a decade later, albeit in a different context, namely to justify taking offensive military action in response to the capture of soldiers, as well as extensive use of air power as an alternative to "boots on the ground." Criticizing Israel's response to the capture of the three soldiers on the Gaza and Lebanon fronts, Gideon Levy aptly calls the rationale behind the response "Operation Peace for the IDF" (a pun on Operation Peace for Galilee). See Gideon Levy, "Operation Peace for the IDF," *Ha'aretz*, July 20, 2006, <http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=10613> (last accessed: May 2007).

¹⁷ For a discussion of Israeli deterrence post-2000 withdrawal, see Israeli strategic analyst, Shai Feldman's piece published by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (at Tel Aviv University), "Israel's Deterrent Power after its Withdrawal from Lebanon," *Strategic Assessment* 3.1 (June 2000), <http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v3n1p3.html> (last accessed: May 2007).

¹⁸ In the section on "peace, security, and foreign relations" in the Guidelines of the Government of Israel – June 1996, the government promises to "act to remove the threat to the northern border." For the full text of the guidelines, see the website of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Previous+governments/Guidelines%20of%20the%20Government%20of%20Israel%20-%20June%201996> (last accessed: May 2007).

¹⁹ The government's quest is framed in terms of "guaranteeing the welfare and security of residents of the north". See the Guidelines of the Government of Israel – July 1999, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Previous+governments/Guidelines%20of%20the%20Government%20of%20Israel%20-%20July%201999> (last accessed: May 2007).

policy planning could be attributed to these.²⁰ Sasson Sofer calls Israel's predicament a case of "diplomatic discontinuity" (Sofer 2001, 11). This schism has in recent years, especially after the withdrawal from Lebanon and the onset of the second *Intifada*, become all the more acute, and arguably grown beyond a manageable scope, leading to a number of strategic blunders.

The War on Terror

The second (al Aqsa) *Intifada* further enlarged the gulf in public opinion and lent credence to the predictions and warnings of the rejectionist front on the consequences of a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. These elements maintained that the perceived success of guerrilla tactics by Hezbollah would heavily influence the Palestinians.

In contrast to the longer-term planning and the projection of threats onto the future that characterized Israeli policy in the early years, the post-1973 era was one of improvisation and reliance on short-term policies based on trial and error. This was not without its reasons. The increasing strain placed on Israeli economy due to decades of large defense allocations and expenditures could be responsible for the shift from a longer-term strategy (which would require extensive and expensive investment in military technologies which may or may not work in future combat conditions) to a shorter-term adjustment to threats and situations as they came along.²¹ Hence, a combination of strategic myopia and economic strains brought about a decline in Israeli ability to find solutions to the newly devised methods of resistance.

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks also had an impact on Israel's regional and global positioning, as well as its strategies. First and foremost, 9/11 sharpened the emphasis on the differences between "Western values" (of freedom, democracy, etc.) and "non-Western despotism" – notwithstanding the fact that virtually all Arab dictatorships had enjoyed solid American backing. Second, it caused (or allowed) the U.S to adopt an active approach against "terrorism." Third, it raised the prospects as well as fear of the proliferation of WMD in the region, and their concentration in the hands of unfriendly regimes or non-state actors.²² The introduction of terrorism into world public opinion meant that Israel's international standing would improve significantly and its actions against the Palestinians could be portrayed as part and parcel of the war against terror. Indeed, only nine days after 9/11, former

²⁰ See the analysis of Charles D. Freilich (2006: 635–663) of the various components and processes of Israeli security decision-making.

²¹ In 2001–2002 Israeli defense expenditure as percent of its GDP was at its lowest since 1956. See the graphs on defense expenditure prepared by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications/security/pdf/97_grafs.pdf (last accessed: May 2007).

²² See the analysis of Major General Aharon Ze'evi (Farkash), "Israel's Strategic Environment," *Strategic Assessment* 5.2 (August 2002), <http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v5n2p7Zee.html> (last accessed: May 2007).

PM Benjamin Netanyahu at a hearing of the U.S House government reform committee on the subject of “preparing for the war on terrorism” insisted that “Israel’s policy of pre-emptively striking at those who seek to murder its people is ... better understood today, and requires no further elaboration.”²³ A day later during an interview with CNN Ariel Sharon emphasized that the US and Israel shared fundamental values, which made them targets of terrorists and natural allies in the war on terror.²⁴ Perhaps most tellingly, however, is that of Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres in an article dated October 10, 2001. Peres emphasized the movement of the world “from a position of national strategy to a position of global strategy.”²⁵ The movement that Peres was referring to would manifest itself in terms of Israel’s support for the invasion of Iraq, which not only removed Iraq from the list of potential strategic threats in the long run, but also resulted in severe sectarian tensions in the Arab and Muslim world. Paradoxically, Israel’s emphasis on the convergence of Israeli and American fate and course echoes the Syrian discourse of *wahdat al-masir wal-masar*.²⁶

In the aftermath of 9/11, Israel sought to portray its conflict in the Occupied Territories as part of the war on terror. Yet despite the rhetoric emanating from official Israeli sources, Israel’s policies and interests in the Occupied Territories continued to be driven by economic, territorial, and ideological interests rather than its fight against “terror.” A study conducted by the International Development Research Center (IDRC) revealed that “70% of the groundwater on which Israel is dependent, and more than 40% of its sustainable annual fresh water supply, originate in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, mainly in its aquifers.” Even more alarming is the fact that more than 90% of the recharge area of the Mountain aquifer *within* the Green Line, namely in Israel proper, is inside the West Bank. The study concludes that Israel views the maintenance of these water sources as a strategic goal.²⁷

Following the decision to unilaterally withdraw from the Gaza Strip, the question of deterrence was brought up once more. The enemies of withdrawal argued that a retreat would be tantamount to “rewarding terror”, and encourage Palestinians to widen the scope of their actions. These voices remained

²³ See the website of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the full text of the speech. <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches%20by%20Israeli%20leaders/2001/Statement%20by%20Former%20PM%20Benjamin%20Netanyahu%20at%20the%20H> (last accessed: May 2007).

²⁴ See website of Israeli MFA for the full transcript of the interview. <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2001/Interview%20with%20PM%20Sharon%20on%20CNN%20-%2021-Sep-2001> (last accessed: May 2007).s

²⁵ Shimon Peres, “Terror – a Global Threat.” <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2001/Terror+-+A+Global+Threat+-+by+Shimon+Peres+-+10-Oct.htm> (last accessed: May 2007).

²⁶ The Arabic phrase roughly translates to “the congruence of fate and course.”

²⁷ “Watershed: The Role of Fresh Water in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, IDRC (1994), <http://www.idrc.ca/openbooks/719-1/> (last accessed: May 2007).

powerless in the face of the unbending will of the government to go ahead with the withdrawal; nevertheless, the victory of Hamas in the January 2006 Palestinian elections confirmed Israel's worst fears.

A New Middle East

Notwithstanding Israel's preservation of more traditional interests in the Occupied Territories, one cannot deny that in the wake of 9/11 its perceptions of what the "new" Middle East should look like and what policies must be adopted to that end, have changed. Syria's primary interests lay in the Golan Heights, but also in countering the pressures exerted on it on the Lebanon file, chief among them the Syria Accountability Act of 2003 and UN SC Resolution 1559. Consequently, Syria (and Iran) tapped into the Iraqi quagmire to extract as many diplomatic benefits as possible. The situation in Iraq was the baptism of fire for the Iranian-Syrian axis and the first major test in a series of attempts by the Israeli-American axis to weaken it. This latter axis would come to include "moderate" and "friendly" Arab regimes, mainly Saudi Arabia, whose leadership of the Arab world was cemented in the latest Arab Summit in Riyadh.

The assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri on February 14, 2005 and the ensuing upheaval in Lebanon which culminated in Syrian withdrawal allowed for the commencement of the second stage of the regional struggle, at the center of which was Lebanon. It was assumed that the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon would weaken Hezbollah and effectively rob Syria of all its cards on the Golan Heights. From an Israeli strategic perspective, the assassination of Hariri was the best it could have hoped for.²⁸ Nevertheless, as it was soon to discover, this excessive optimism was based on a number of false assumptions, pertaining to the nature and dynamics of the relationship between Hezbollah and Syria, as well as the former's domestic position in the wake of the withdrawal of its patron from Lebanon.

On the Palestinian front, the strengthening of Palestinian Islamism was but one expression of the wider phenomenon of Islamism that had swept through the region in the 90s and especially after 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. Arab regimes, increasingly worried about the power of appeal of non-compliant Islamism, became more willing to sacrifice their support for the Palestinian cause in return for an improvement in relations with the U.S. The renewal of the Arab peace initiative at the 19th Arab summit (2007) in Riyadh could be understood as a function of this quest on the part of some Arab regimes, led by Saudi Arabia. Although often ignored in current analyses of both Israeli-

²⁸ The growing Israeli interest in Lebanon was crowned by the declaration, by the intelligence corps, that 2005 was the "Lebanon Year." See Yoaz Hendel, "Failed Tactical Intelligence in the Lebanon War," *Strategic Assessment* 9.3 (November 2006), <http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v9n3p9Hendel.html> (last accessed: May 2007).

Palestinian and Israeli-Lebanese fronts (and especially the former), Arab regimes are a fundamental – and increasingly valuable – element in the new equation. The increased value is in no small part due to Israeli and American calculations and strategy vis-à-vis Iran’s growing regional influence.

For its part, Israel’s new strategy in the West Bank following the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip was the creation of facts on the ground, be it the cementing of existing settlements or the annexation of land and the construction of the “separation fence”²⁹ as part of the unilateral border delineation. The May 4, 2006 guidelines of the 31st government headed by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert clearly refer to Israel’s quest for the unilateral determination of its borders. The guidelines also contain a clear indication of the growing convergence in and coordination of Israeli and American policies. In reference to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the government promises to “take action even in the absence of negotiations and agreement with [the Palestinians], on the basis of a broad national consensus in Israel and a *deep understanding with Israel’s friends in the world, primarily the United States of America and President George Bush.*”³⁰ Summer 2006 was the epitome of this cooperation and coordination.

Lebanon the Model

In a recently book on the July 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war, Michel Warschawski observes that “the war Israel has waged on the Palestinians and against Lebanon as well as Israel’s ambitions with regard to Iran and Syria are simultaneously a laboratory for the U.S. neoconservatives’ global war strategy and its most advanced front” (Achcar 2007, 75).

The intensification of an Iranian threat put into question the idea that the existential threat to Israeli security had indeed been overcome. This, coupled with US expectations of support for its “war on terror,” and Hezbollah’s warm relations with Iran and the direct military and financial support the latter bestows upon the former, meant that Israel’s views of Hezbollah were necessarily tied to its views of Iran (as well as Syria). While it is possible that the war was waged in isolation from Israel’s broader regional considerations, it could also be the case that the desire to prevent the regionalization of a future strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, which the latter might react to by putting into use

²⁹ The Israeli MFA nevertheless insists that the “fence” is explicitly for security purposes and “does not have political significance.” See the basic guidelines of the 30th government of Israel – February 2003. <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Current%20Government%20of%20Israel/Basic%20Guidelines%20of%20the%2030th%20Government%20of%20Israel> (last accessed: May 2007).

³⁰ Emphasis added. See the Israeli MFA for the full text of the guidelines. <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Current+Government+of+Israel/Basic%20Guidelines%20of%20the%2031st%20Government%20of%20Israel> (last accessed: May 2007).

the Hezbollah card against Israel, was central.³¹ The second interpretation is more in line with the revelations that Israel had planned for a war in Lebanon months before the capture of Israeli soldiers.³² In this sense, the July 2006 war was but one stage in a multi-stage conflict, which could see the resurfacing of pre-emption in Israeli security doctrine.

Another explanation of Israel's preparations for war is its determination to restore the deterrence that was lost both in the north and in the south following the two unilateral withdrawals. It could also be viewed in the context of a plan for a double-crackdown on two militant groups both enjoying ties to and support from Syria and Iran. In a special cabinet communiqué issued on July 12, a connection was made between the attack from the Gaza Strip and the attack from South Lebanon, describing both actions as “the product of those who perpetrate terrorism and those who give it shelter.”³³ The statement utilizes the anti-terror discourse and an implicit reference is made to Syria. In another cabinet communiqué dated July 16, the motives for the two operations are described in terms of the enemies' incorrect interpretation of Israel's “aspiration to live in peace.”³⁴ In his address to the Knesset the following day, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated explicitly the goals – numbering five – of “Operation Change of Direction.” Furthermore, he pointed out that Israel's enemies “misinterpreted [its] willingness to exercise restraint as a sign of weakness” – a clear reference to the need to restore its shattered deterrence. In addition, emphasis was placed on the fact that Israel had returned to the borders recognized by the international community.³⁵ This emphasis was arguably made not only to give Israel the cover of international legitimacy, but also to signal a change in Israel's attitude towards the idea of unilateral withdrawal.

In stating the goals of the operation in Lebanon and adopting an uncompromising stand both in rhetoric³⁶ and actions, the Israeli government and its strategists had fallen into the trap that Israel Tal warns against, namely, “taking aggres-

³¹ In an interview with Ha'aretz correspondent Gidi Weitz, Brigadier General Yossi Kuperwasser, head of the research division of the Military Intelligence, argued that the confrontation with Hezbollah was unavoidable, and that it was important to understand that “the timing is advantageous, because we are still ahead of the Iranian nuclear project.” See Gidi Weitz, “To Beirut if necessary.” *Ha'aretz*, April 28, 2007, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=749190> (last accessed: May 2007).

³² Conal Urquhart, “Israel planned for Lebanon war months in advance, PM says.” *The Guardian*, March 9, 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/syria/story/0,,2029732,00.html> (last accessed: May 2007).

³³ The full text of the communiqué is accessible from the website of the Israeli MFA. <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2006/Special+Cabinet+Communique++Hizbullah+attack+12-Jul-2006.htm> (last accessed: May 2007).

³⁴ See <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2006/Cabinet+Communique+16-Jul-2006.htm> (last accessed: May 2007).

³⁵ “Address to the Knesset by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert”, Israeli MFA, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2006/Address+to+the+Knesset+by+PM+Olmert+17-Jul-2006.htm> (last accessed: May 2007).

³⁶ In the Knesset address, Olmert warned that “we will not stop until we can tell the Israeli people that the threat hanging over it has been removed.” *Ibid.*

sive, uncompromising positions and then showing flexibility” (Tal 2000, 56), an observation echoed by the Winograd Commission.³⁷ Israel’s military impotence in South Lebanon had the effect of luring Israel into abandoning its traditional adherence to the concept of “quick wars”³⁸. Furthermore, whereas Israel’s traditional concept of deterrence was based on the threat of and its ability to occupy Arab lands, in the aftermath of the July war, its deterrence is based more on its destructive capabilities and less on its strategic and military achievements.

More significant however, was the effect of Hezbollah’s rockets on the progress of the war. The toll, both civilian and military, the unprecedented damage that the rockets had caused, and the psychological impact of the rocket barrage on Haifa and beyond, established a “balance of terror.”³⁹ It also neutralised Israel’s airforce – a traditional tool for deterrence and coercion – and forced Israel into a security dilemma: on the one hand, of being dragged into a potentially protracted ground-war, which Israel had severe reservations against doing (owing to its 18 year occupation and ensuing war of attrition) as well as its sensitivity to IDF casualties;⁴⁰ on the other hand, take no action, which itself is a sensitive issue, given the immense rocket arsenal that Hezbollah had amassed between 2000 and 2006, a period characterized by Israeli inaction.⁴¹ It is therefore likely that there would be a return to the doctrine of “boots on the ground” as a means to achieving victory as well as ensuring the security of the citizens in the north. This could result in the resurgence of the logic of buffer or “security” zones.⁴²

³⁷ “Winograd Commission submits Interim Report”, April 30, 2007, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2007/Winograd+Inquiry+Commission+submits+Interim+Report+30-Apr-2007.htm> (last accessed: May 2007).

³⁸ While it is too early to base one’s assessment on any preliminary reports about the conduct of the war, perhaps the statement by GOC Northern Command Major General Gadi Eisenkott to the effect that “the IDF had planned on a 4–6 day conflict” provides some insight into the military’s focused perspective in contrast to the strategic ignorance and personal considerations of the political echelon. See “Top IDF Officer: we knew war would not get abducted soldiers back.” *Ha’aretz*, April 28, 2007. Uri Bar-Joseph also accuses the political echelon of being “devoid of strategic thinking” and “succumb[ing] to narrow political interests.” Uri Bar-Joseph, “Their most humiliating hour.” *Ha’aretz*, May 3, 2007, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/853115.html> (last accessed: May 2007).

³⁹ Moshe Arens points out that “the government did not take into consideration Hezbollah’s expected response to the Israel Air Force’s bombardment of Lebanon.” Moshe Arens, “Time for a change at the top.” *Ha’aretz*, May 1, 2007, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/854171.html> (last accessed: May 2007).

⁴⁰ It is highly likely that the heavy casualties that Israel suffered in the last 3 days of the fighting will make future Israeli leaders and strategists rethink the threat and implementation of a large-scale ground operation for the sole purpose of achieving what the military had failed to achieve in 30 days of fighting. See Aluf Benn, “Final Lebanon push decided after PM met informal team.” *Ha’aretz*, May 25, 2007.

⁴¹ As Yoaz Hendel notes, an unprovoked attack on Lebanon to prevent the arming of Hezbollah “would have been denounced internationally, severely impairing the credit Israel earned following the withdrawal.” Hendel, op. cit.

⁴² In this context, an observation of Israeli attitudes towards UNIFIL II would provide some interesting insights.

A New Strategy?

Given the profound impact of the decision to go to war in July 2006, any discussion of Israeli security and strategic doctrine must take note of and assess this event. That Israel considered the capture of Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser a *casus belli* stands in stark contrast to its restrained reaction to the capture of three IDF soldiers and Elhanan Tannenbaum in 2000. Yet what explains this sharp divergence? Is it a mere difference in the modes of perception of different administrations, or is there a much broader strategic doctrine at work? An observation of Israel's actions post-9/11 lends credence to the argument that there has indeed been a major change in Israeli security doctrine, beginning with Operation Defensive Shield (2002), the Israeli lobby's advocacy for the invasion of Iraq, the Syria Accountability Act (2003), and UN SCR 1559 (2004), the siege of Hamas-led PA (2006), and finally reaching its apex in Lebanon in July 2006. Nonetheless, both in its confrontation against Hezbollah and its fight against the Palestinian resistance, Israel has been faced with the limits of military power. It has been unable to devise a solution to Hezbollah's Katyushas, as well as Hamas' Qassam barrages.⁴³

Israel is undoubtedly at a strategic crossroads. A return to the negotiations table with Syria may possibly contain both Hezbollah and Hamas, and weaken the Iranian-Syrian axis. However, pending the initiation of negotiations, it could very well be the case that Israel has adopted a policy akin to the Bush administration's theory of "constructive chaos." Certainly, the official Israeli position towards the Hamas-Fateh tensions lends credence to the theory of an Israeli role in the clashes. It is more difficult to assess the nature and extent (if there is any at all) of Israel's involvement in the Lebanese turmoil. The latter, however, could potentially pour in Israel's favor and contribute to its attempts to weaken, isolate, and eventually neutralize Hezbollah. Should this option prove inadequate, Israel might find it difficult to avoid being drawn into both the Gaza Strip and Lebanon. It remains to be seen whether Israeli security doctrine would witness a return to pre-emption, in the form of a strike against Iran's nuclear facilities or, as recent tensions have suggested, against Syrian military facilities.⁴⁴ It is impossible to predict the path Israel will be taking; nonetheless, what is evident is that recent events have alerted Israeli leaders and strategists to the necessity of overhauling the security doctrine.

⁴³ Military analyst Ze'ev Schiff, in an article on the situation in the southern Israeli town of Sderot, insists that Hamas has succeeded in setting up a system of mutual deterrence. He attributes this failure partly to the abandonment of the principle of transferring the fighting to enemy territory. Ze'ev Schiff, "An Israeli defeat in Sderot." *Ha'aretz*, June 8, 2007, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=868471> (last accessed: June 2007). Arguably, this failure is also partly the result of the high cost of intercepting these rockets. Reuven Pedatzur places the cost of developing an interception system at hundreds of millions of U.S dollars, and the cost of intercepting each rocket at \$100,000 (Pedatzur 2007).

⁴⁴ Jonathan Marcus, reporting for BBC News, analyzes the September 6, 2007 Israeli incursion into Syrian air-space as having "partially restored" Israel's deterrent capacity (Marcus 2007).

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Adoption of Socially Responsible Investment Practices in the Chinese Investment Sector – A Cost-Benefit Approach

Svenja Stropahl and Niklas Keller

Introduction

In 2003, ten of the world's largest private banks, in cooperation with the International Finance Corporation, voluntarily committed themselves to adopting social and environmental investment-standards. Since then, 54 institutions from 21 states, active in over a 100 countries have adopted these standards.¹ Although the implementation of Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) demands sweeping reforms, the established part of the private investment sector considers SRI to play a significant role. Recently though, this process appears to be threatened to be undermined by the appearance of new, powerful investors from countries that derived financial benefits from their outstanding economic development.

As the most significant example of this trend, the article focuses on Chinese investors emerging on the global investment scene. China's "Go-Out" Strategy, a nationally concerted effort to promote international expansion of the Chinese corporate sector, was launched in its 10th 5-year plan in 2001. By 2005, Chinese companies' overseas direct investment amounted to a staggering \$ 200 billion (USD) and Chinese banks are now the leading lenders on the African continent.² However, examination of the international agreements shows that Chinese investors are acting without the social and environmental restraints of SRI. In the following section, we have identified the various pressures which have an impact on the decision of whether an investor incorporates SRI into its corporate identity.

¹ "The Equator Principles" – Become an Adopting Institution. (<http://www.equator-principles.com/join.shtml>).

² Michelle Chan-Fishel (2007), *Time to Go Green: Environmental Responsibility in the Chinese Banking Sector*, Friends of the Earth US, (http://www.foe.org/pdf/Chinese_Bank_Report_5-9-07.pdf).

The Cost-Benefit Analysis

At the heart of any activity in the financial sector, the cost-benefit analysis remains as an overarching principle due to the rules of competition on a free market. Accepting this, it becomes clear that traditional financial actors have adopted sustainable investment principles not because they feel they have a social obligation *per se*, but largely because doing so affects the cost-benefit analysis in some way or another. This section will therefore attempt to shed some light on the reason for the differences in the pace of adoption of sustainable investment standards in Western and Chinese bank by identifying the difference in pressures on the cost-benefit analysis in Western and Chinese contexts in a number of areas. We will also comment on the degree Western and Chinese companies are exposed to such pressures, thus enabling us to make postulations regarding whether and how quickly the Chinese investment sector is likely to implement SRI in the future.

Long-term risk calculation

Negative “side-effects” of unsustainable investment, such as the fuelling of conflict in unstable regions, unsustainable modes of resources extraction, etc., can contribute to instability and subsequently in the inability of debtors to pay back loans, thus creating negative financial repercussions for the investing actors. As a result, old assumptions that sustainability would impose costly duties and regulations on business have begun to break down in the international discourse.³ While the corporate culture of Chinese investors is still geared towards short-term profit-seeking,⁴ a discernable trend towards the incorporation of long-term risk assessment strategies can be observed.

Availability of access to social funds

SRI assets, capital only invested in projects that adhere to certain social and environmental standards, are a rather recent phenomenon in the financial world. Yet they have mushroomed in size and made up \$ 2.29 trillion (USD) in 2005⁵ – a significant incentive by anyone’s standard. As with long-term risk

³ In a survey conducted by the International Finance Corporation in 2007, 86% of financial institutions reported that positive changes had resulted from their integration of social and environmental sustainability issues into their long-term risk assessment. Not a single one reported negative consequences. (International Finance Corporation (2007), *Banking on Sustainability – Financing Environmental and Social Opportunities in Emerging Markets*, The World Bank Group, January 2007, ([http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/p_BankingonSustainability/\\$FILE/FINAL_IFC_BankingOnSustainability_web.pdf](http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/p_BankingonSustainability/$FILE/FINAL_IFC_BankingOnSustainability_web.pdf)).

⁴ See Chen R. and Chen C.P. (2005), “Chinese professional managers and the issue of ethical behaviour”, *Ivey Business Journal Online*, London: May/June.

⁵ The Social Investment Forum (2006), *2005 Report on Socially Responsible Investment Trends in the United States*, (http://www.socialinvest.org/areas/research/trends/sri_trends_report_2005.pdf).

assessment, access to social funds as a result of implementing CSR will confer direct benefits to Chinese financial actors and is thus likely to quickly find its way into Chinese financial practice.

Internal norms

A poll conducted among young professionals in the UK by British Telecom in August 2007 found that more than a third of respondents viewed working for a socially and environmentally responsible employer as more important than the salary and 44% said they would discount an employer without good CSR credentials.⁶

In China, however, such internal pressures are of a much lesser degree. Due to a combination of media censorship⁷ and uncritical education, Chinese employees lack the necessary informational base to build up the same consciousness for SRI as it has developed in Western countries. Additionally weak channels of legal recourse, personal hardship, and a very large pool of excess labor⁸ restrict the employee's possibilities and desire to confront their employers with normative qualms.

Investor pressure

As a result of awareness campaigns by the media and civil society about cases and negative impact of unsustainable investment global investors have found their reputation tarnished to the extent that they had to register large-scale investor flight. As is the case with Chinese employees, all-encompassing censorship in the Chinese autocratic system precludes Chinese investors from gathering the necessary information on SRI. Furthermore, the Chinese private investment sector is very immature and the regulation on foreign acquisitions very restrictive – meaning that the Chinese investment landscape remains very firmly in the hands of a selected group of Chinese nationals and the government.

As the world's largest recipient of FDI, expected to surpass \$ 60 billion (USD) this year,⁹ China is not impervious to external investor pressure – recently, the “Save Darfur Coalition” managed to force two large US investment firms, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. and Fidelity Investment, to withdraw their investment in China's No.1 oil producer, PetroChina, due to its

⁶ Reported by www.startups.co.uk (http://www.startups.co.uk/Get_socially_responsible_to_attract_talent_firms_told.YbKI3jRoS63Ijg.html).

⁷ BBC Monitoring Media (2007), *China: Watchdog report disputes government media freedom “promise”*, 7 August 2007.

⁸ Although the official urban unemployment rate is 4.2%, unemployment across the countryside remains rampant. CIA World Factbook (<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>).

⁹ Denise Tsang, “Foreign investment in mainland leaps 11.9pc”, *South China Morning Post*, p. 3.

activities in war-torn Darfur.¹⁰ However, given the magnitude and complexity of international financial flows, much of socially irresponsible investment remains under the radar and subsequently leverage on Chinese financial actors remains weak.

Political Pressure

Although liberal systems of governance are much more sensitive to citizens' concerns, the Chinese government also derives its final legitimacy from the citizens. However, in the case of SRI it is unlikely that political actions are taken which may be contrary to the national interests. These are defined first and foremost as economic development and the secure supply of natural resources. Moreover while the threat of social unrest and upheaval could initiate political actions, SRI does not affect the Chinese citizens in a direct way. Unlike in liberal democracies, there is little incentive for the Chinese government to enact reforms on SRI due to the absence of a strong civil sector and the lack of environmental and social lobbying.

Legal Frameworks

Were there is sustained public and political pressure, an issue will be incorporated into national or international (or both) legal structures. Legal structures obviously affect a cost-benefit analysis as their disregard can result in hefty fines for the company and prosecution of individuals.

In today's China, national legislation on SRI remains weak and there is little oversight and transparency. Furthermore, the balance of power within the Communist Party apparatus remains shifted in favor of investors. Thus, on the 23rd of August 2007, China's two major state-owned oil companies, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the China Petroleum and Chemicals Corporation (Sinopec), who are directly supervised by the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), openly and resolutely rejected a program drawn up by the State Environmental Protection Agency and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission that would have forced them to buy "environmental protection insurance".¹¹

Conclusion

The issues raised in the above discussion are by no means covered in their full scope. Due to the limited space of this article the last section points out

¹⁰ Barry Schweid (2007), "Coalition presses investment firms to divest China company's Sudan oil interests", *The Associated Press*, 1st May 2007, (<http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/nav03.cfm?nav03=60111&nav02=57273&nav01=57272>).

¹¹ Reported by SynTao.Com, (http://www.syntao.com/E_Page_Show.asp?Page_ID=5032). Original article in Chinese (<http://news.eastday.com/c/20070823/u1a3060982.html>).

some trends which will affect the further development of SRI in the Chinese sphere of influence.

The various pressures referred to in this article do not remain constant, but are in a continuous state of flux. While 'long-term risk assessment' is more likely to be incorporated into Chinese banking practice as it has been shown to be a viable business model increasing financial competitiveness, other factors, such as 'consumer pressure', will certainly lag behind for the above-mentioned reasons.

Especially one trend should be taken into account which breaks down the black and white picture and blurs any comparisons between Western and Chinese investors. Rather than national investors acting in isolated ways due to their cultural development and political system, the ongoing dissemination of the Chinese market makes for a perfect example for the effects of global interconnectivity. Just in 2006 major Western financial institutions purchased minority stakes in Chinese banks.¹² This surprising shift of the Chinese economic policy is closely connected with the radical, state-driven shake-up of the Chinese banking sector. While experts are concerned about a clash of the different corporate cultures, it can be asked if the share of experiences and the initiation of structural reforms based on Western companies will have the effect of guiding Chinese investment practices more towards social investment standards. But not just internal changes initiated by foreign investors are likely to happen. Additionally acting in cooperation with several investors in bigger projects could confront Chinese investors with the procedures and benefits of SRI. But unfortunately the positive image of Western investors is not as convincing as it likes to portray itself in PR campaigns and the signing of SR-principles. Under the guise of Chinese investors, the attraction of enjoying some of the short-term benefits of unsustainable investment is also a likely reason for investing in Chinese banks. Yet, given the magnitude and complexity of international financial flows, much of socially irresponsible investment remains undiscovered.

¹² Colin Hawes, Thomas Chiu (2007, February), "Foreign Strategic Investors in the Chinese Banking Market: Cultural Shift or Business as Usual?", *Banking & Finance Law Review*. Bd. 22, Ausg. 2; pg. 203.

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Is Peace-Building Common Sense?

Richard Lappin

Peace, it is often claimed, is common sense. Whilst many of us feel a normative bond to this claim, the continuation of violence would suggest that the fostering of sustainable peace remains an elusive goal. Perhaps it is time to re-examine this most fundamental of claims if we are to accept the true complexities that are involved in peace building.

Common sense is one of those fantastically frustrating phrases that is used with significant frequency, yet is annoyingly difficult to comprehend. The *Collins English Dictionary* defines common sense as: ‘Plain ordinary good judgement; sound practical sense.’¹ In terms of semantic usage, I have no qualms with this definition. Indeed, most people often follow up their appeals to common sense by claiming ‘its obvious’ or ‘everybody would have done that’. However, this is where I begin to doubt exactly *what* knowledge is obvious or what is *common* to the majority. Interestingly, the bulk of research on common sense comes in the discipline of Artificial Intelligence which seeks to instil a range of basic information to help computers/robots function with a greater fluency and naturalness. The common sense they attribute includes basic facts such as ‘fire is hot’ and ‘people do not walk on their heads.’

Could the principles of peace building be added to this canon of common sense? Advocates would argue a resounding yes. They would state that you do not need any esoteric knowledge or a postgraduate degree in conflict resolution to understand that peace is a “good thing.” However, this claim is immediately rendered insensible by the continuation of violent conflict which clearly illustrates that some people profit from war, whilst others see it at the very least form of ‘common sense’ and the only way that they can maintain or change their world order.

Moreover, even if it was possible (I disagree) to claim the *aim* of peace building is common sense, the *means* used to achieve this aim are too complex and disputed to ever be considered common-sensical. This is highlighted perfectly in Gene Sharp’s seminal work, *The Politics of Non-Violent Action*, in which 198 methods of non-violent action are described. However, more tellingly, common sense would presumably dictate that such non-violent methods are peaceful and used solely for good causes, but in actual fact they can, and are, used for confrontational and negative aims. For example, one only has to look at the orders of Slobodan Milosevic to create ‘human shields’ on infrastructure during the 1999 NATO bombardment of Serbia. Similarly, it is accepted that

¹ “Common Sense”, *Collins Softback English Dictionary*, Third Edition, Harper Collins Publishers: Glasgow (1991), p.312.

aid can sometimes prolong a conflict (by keeping factions fed and healthy to continue fighting), whilst premature elections can lead to a return to violence (by polarising societies on the very issues that led to violence).

More fundamentally, common sense can be argued to be the very enemy of peacebuilding. Common sense is often appealed to in political debate, particularly in the absence of sound argument, to detrimental effect. Civil rights for ethnic minorities, women's suffrage and homosexuality have all been attacked as being contrary to common sense. Indeed, common sense can be seen as a conservative notion which implies that a 'fact' is present and indisputable. It is my belief that if common sense prevailed, we would live in a static world, cloaked in ignorance and which shunned creativity. This is the very antithesis of peace building which seeks creative, win-win solutions to seemingly intractable conflicts. If common sense dictated we should surrender all thoughts of finding a solution to issues such as Kashmir or the Balkans because, as some would have us believe, these 'people will never see eye-to-eye.' However, we must remember that Western Europe was once the same, but the formation of the EU has proved how peace building can triumph over stagnant common sense beliefs.

This illustrates the first of three fundamental flaws with common sense. Firstly, it fluctuates *temporally*. To use an obvious example from outside peacebuilding, the contention that the world is flat was once common sense, yet common sense now tells us that the world is 'in fact' round. As Henry Ward Beecher famously posited: 'The philosophy of one century is common sense to the next.'²

Secondly, common sense fluctuates *spatially*. What is common sense to an American may often differ greatly from, for instance, an Iraqi. Many Americans are often puzzled by the seemingly irrationality of many Iraqis and wonder why they blindly follow propaganda and are so easily manipulated. Of course, the opposite is true and many ask the same about Americans. However, the point is that an exogenous peacebuilding effort based on common sense will often be paternalistic, patronising and ultimately rejected. As already noted, common sense suggests an indisputable answer and in peacebuilding there are no such easy answers or 'quick fixes'.

Finally, I would also contend that increasing *individuality* make any pretence to common sense ridiculous, even within small communities. In what can be viewed as an increasingly postmodern world, the destruction of meta-narratives and breaking down of rigid demarcations (for instance in class, gender and the nation state) illustrates that there is no universal knowledge. People increasingly transgress traditional borders and 'pick and mix' the truths that

² Quote commonly attributed to Henry Ward Beecher (former US Congressman). Available at: "common sense." Quotations. Quotations Book, 2005. *Answers.com* 11 September 2007. <http://www.answers.com/topic/common-sense>

are most suitable to them. This is evident in the increasing emphasis on trans-disciplinarity within peace building which makes use of numerous disciplines to provide a creative (individual) solution for specific problems.

In conclusion, a person's 'common sense' may not necessarily be the 'common sense' of another person, and this is why the term has never gained any 'common sense' understanding. Moreover, experience often teaches us that our own common sense changes over time. Therefore, despite a seemingly obvious appeal, common sense has no place in peacebuilding.

American Political Power: Hegemony on its Heels?

Balka Kwasniewski

International relations epochs seldom have abrupt beginnings and conclusions. Rather, changes to the norms, values and boundaries of international relations often occur in a painstakingly slow and ambiguous process. As the saying goes, Rome was neither built nor destroyed in a day.

The post-Cold War period seems to be the exception that proves the rule. The reunification of Germany, the crumbling of the Iron Curtain, the demise of the Soviet Union (and with it the Cold War clash of ethics and historical interpretation) occurred with a speed unparalleled in international relations history.

Since the Cold War ended in haste it seems fitting that the key events which have come to define the post-Cold War international order have also transpired seemingly out of the blue – ushering in changes to international expectations and exchanges in broad sweeps. On the pedestal of such changes lay the materialisation of a unipolar world – with the US as the benchmark global power to which all others assess their relative position within the international hierarchy.

Before commencing on the theme of this short work, a brief exploration of terms will help advance an understanding of the general agents being depicted here. Since I am focusing on hegemony, it is best to provide a theoretical representation which will later be attached to the empirical case of the US.

In layman's terms, hegemony means that a single state dominates international society by maintaining sharp military, economic and political command over key resources, other states and institutions and a degree of control over the outcomes of international disputes and conflicts. This tri-variable definition

is borrowed from Jeffery Hart's 1979 paper entitled "Three Measurements of Political Power." While Hart focussed on power at the national level, his variables are valuable for understanding international power as well.

However, this conception is not universally accepted. Hegemony has become one of the most widely disputed terms in contemporary international relations literature.

Some academics choose to employ it as an abstraction, an elusive term which acts as a conduit for portraying – not explaining, events which are unexplainable through other theories. Others use hegemony in the negative, marrying power to ill-intent. Others still employ hegemony as a regional-political device, a neutral term for a state or international institution which is more powerful than others in a specific region.

I use the term hegemony subjectively as belonging to the post-Cold War period alone. I contend that there is no continuity of hegemonic states. Contrary to hegemonic stability theory which argues that international society is always dominated by single great powers, I hold hegemony to be a relative fixture. While other periods in international relations history may boast unipolar moments, never before has there been a global hegemon with a truly global reach and a reflective globally oriented foreign policy.

Therefore, the emergence of a single *truly* dominant state in contemporary international relations is the result of power, such as high technology, which has only become available recently, making the present day international system unique in history.

That said, the US presently embodies hegemony; in this case they maintain a symbiotic relationship. In other words, America – in the post-Cold War period – is defined by hegemony and hegemony defined by America. Arguments over the particulars surrounding the emergence of the American hegemony will be further developed momentarily.

The second term requiring definition is asymmetry. Asymmetry is neither as ambiguous nor as widely disputed as hegemony. Asymmetry implies a lack of parity between two or more adversaries locked in an enduring dispute or rivalry. Such a portrayal typically focus on clandestine organisations such as cults, nationalist rebels, guerrilla movements, anarchists, organised criminal gangs and terrorist cells – those sub-state groups which maintain a revisionist ideology towards a state, states or the international system but who lack sufficient military capabilities to force change through direct combat, particularly if their adversary is a state. The hallmarks of an asymmetric war are the unconventional tactics employed by sub-state groups to compensate for their lack of military aptitude and resources.

The conflict between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan government is illustrative of an asymmetrical relationship. In this case, the Tamil Tigers chose not to face the Sri Lankan military directly but attack Sri Lanka through

a blend of terrorist acts, ambushes, and hit and run tactics over a long period of time – a kind of protracted war of attrition – to psychologically erode Sri Lanka’s desire to maintain the status quo of incorporating the ethnic Tamils into Sri Lankan society.

I extend this definition to include any relationship where direct military pressure cannot be applied because of the high degree of disparity of power and influence between actors – states and non-states, allies and adversaries alike.

This discussion is meant to clear away some of the fog obstructing the view of international society in the wake of the Cold War. This brief comment is meant to explore. One important issue: the advent and development of American hegemony and its exposed vulnerabilities.

The Making of American Hegemony

The circumstances surrounding the dawn of America as the lone hegemon are shrouded in mystery. With little imagination as to the outcome of the nationalist and democratic agitation from Central and Eastern Europe, America awoke in 1990 to find the Iron Curtain in tatters, Germany reunited the USSR on the brink of disintegration and its own role in international relations changing minute-by-minute.

US officials had not been cautioned over the gravity of the unfolding revolutions. In fact, there is almost no indication that the US anticipated the rapid turn of events and alteration of the status quo. America had been caught by surprise, uncertain of how to react. From this confused beginning American hegemony was born, confirmed two years later in 1991 when the USSR imploded altogether.

The Cold War was defined as a duopoly – consisting of 2 superpowers. One of the superpowers vanished from the international scene leaving only one unscathed. I know that IR theorist usually make terrible mathematicians but if we can recall that in maths $2 - 1 = 1$, it seems natural that the post-Cold War is defined according to a unique type of unipolarity: Pax-Americana or American hegemony.

17 years later American hegemony still defines international society. This is largely due to how the US ordered its international priorities in the immediate post-Cold War years. Enforcing the principle of adherence to international law enframed in the UN Charter, institutionalisation and democratisation – became central elements of George Bush Sr.’s “New World Order.” Their intent was to cultivate internationally acceptable mechanisms for peace keeping, peace-making and the advancement of a universal human rights regime in which they would dominate. These features also formed the backbone of American foreign policy during both Clinton administrations.

Such normative consideration of American international affairs should not be misread or overstated. While reinforcing its international image through the actualisation of its foreign policy, which paralleled the democratic and capitalist revolutions sprouting up throughout Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America, the US grew accustomed to the wealth of power at its disposal. It became increasingly interested in determining the contours of international society. It simultaneously advanced its own IR agenda while strengthening international institutions which were also engaged in democracy proliferation.

International resistance to American foreign policy at the time was limited to traditional quarters such as Syria, Iran, Cuba, North Korea and sometimes China and Russia. The lack of concrete opposition to American foreign policy in the 1990's has often been explained through two key features of the international society at the time:

- 1) America was generally seen as having benign intents. It threatened neither its neighbours nor the international community at large
- 2) American national interests and the tactics employed for implementation intersected with large portions of international society – including, significantly the UN charter

A strong example of the two distinct strands of US policy pursuance in the immediate post-Cold War period is found in its military spending. One expectation of the age of arms reductions and limitations was a decline in American (among others) military spending. For many, the logic of arms race ended with the Soviet Union. The US took advantage of not having a global military competitor to embark on an ambitious programme of ABM systems while dramatically increasing its military spending to widen the gap between it and any long-term potential adversaries. In 1992 American military expenditure amounted to more than the next 7 highest spenders combined, by 2001 the next 8.

Despite its mounting military budget and the widening power gap, there was recognition that American hegemony was not unlimited. There were periods of strain and impediments from allied nations (including NATO itself), the UN, new and old adversaries such as China, Russia and Iraq. Such stresses did not hinder American hegemony and it is a matter of debate over whether they intended to.

It appears, in retrospect, that periods of strain were the result of states testing the contours of international society, contributing to it and reminding America of the new responsibilities which accompanied its preponderance of power. At no time in the 1990's was it evident that a major or even minor power sought to revise international society.

Despite such preponderance America was incapable of mitigating the many conflicts and crises throughout international society on its own. It opted in favour of forging a leadership rather than a commanding role for itself,

encouraging the formation of international coalitions to support and legitimate military deployments enframed as international interests.

Although there are multi-tiered academic and popular quarrels over US policies throughout the 1990's, the 10 actual deployments of American military forces that occurred between 1991-1999 (Iraq, 1991, 1993, 1996, 1998, its involvement in Somalia in 1993, in Bosnia and Haiti in 1994, Afghanistan and the Sudan in 1998 and Yugoslavia in 1999) have generally been accepted as international goods, not simply designed to prolong American hegemony but to increase international security – something considered an absolute gain – even though the US itself sat atop the pyramid.

As history has shown, the 1990's were honeymoon years of US hegemony; a period of international adjustment and anticipation over the future configuration of international order. The 2000 election of George Bush Jr. to President of America ushered in a new, more proactive phase of American hegemony. Bush's Neo-Con movement instigated global crosswinds among its allies, supporters and adversaries.

Even before the 11 September attacks and the unveiling of the Bush Doctrine of pre-emptive war there were hints of what was coming. The Bush team, from its inauguration spoke and practised unilateralism (ie: the rejection of the Kyoto protocol and abandoning the ABM Treaty) while making clear its intentions of aggressive democratic proliferation – particularly in the Middle East, and particularly in Iraq.

These foreign policy additives were considerably influenced by Bush's administration and support staff: those who had founded or joined the Project for the New American Century in 1998 and carried its ideology with them into the halls of American power.

The PNAC bases its ideology on deploying American military force to correct what it sees as the wrongs of international society. It seeks to undermine the sanctity of national sovereignty and rather turn international society into a hybrid of the US complete with a manifest destiny and universal acknowledgement of good and evil. Although it tried desperately, the PNAC never really left the ground. It could not proactively shape international relations because within a heartbeat of the neo-con and PNAC's assumption of power America was forced onto defensive footing.

On 11 September 2001 America's hegemonic honeymoon came to an abrupt end.

Weakness in Power

On 11 September 2001, agents of the shadowy al Qaeda (the Base) Islamic organisation launched pre-meditated terrorist attacks against US civilians. These attacks have since been recorded as the first shots of an asymmetric war against the US and the international society it dominates. Recounting

or theorising about the historic causes of the attacks themselves will only entangle us in blame attribution and conspiracy theories. It is more appropriate to delve into some theoretical causes and more explicit impacts the attacks have had on perceptions of the US and international society.

Al Qaeda is not an omnipresent or monolithic Islamic organisation. Their reach is limited as are their resources. While al Qaeda's rare successes have been spectacular the majority of their plots are said to have been thwarted by intelligence operations or failed due to operational errors.

Yet, the existence of al Qaeda and the success it had on 11 September has significantly changed the international relations landscape by exposing the myth of US impenetrability.

In a matter of hours al Qaeda had reached out to the symbolic centre of American hegemony and exacted a price for its continuity. The rag-tag outfit had done, with box-cutters, what the USSR complete with nuclear technology could and would not fathom.

What does this mean for 21st century international relations? In the short term it is likely that the US will maintain its hegemonic position. It has, over the past 5 years reformulated its foreign and defence policies to allow for both preemptive and preventive deployments of force. Such strategies are quick-fixes, meant to prolong the dominant international position the US currently holds. However, the damage of 11 September 2001 has not yet been fully appreciated. It seems probable that the exposure of US vulnerabilities will encourage others, states and non-state actors, to pursue their own interests without paying heed – with the same awareness – to the US. The result will be a return to multipolarity and competing international interests, similar to those which preceded World War 1. We can only hope that humanity has truly learned its lessons from the violence and carnage of the 20th century and despite the inevitable exit of a dominant hegemony from international relations, does not allow the system it help construct, slip into disrepair and ultimately chaos.

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